

The Polish Crisis 1980–1982 from the Western Perspective

Editor Piotr Długołęcki



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1980–1982
from the Western Perspective

Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych

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Reviewer and copy editor

Piotr Puchalski

Index of personal names

Marcin Furdyna, Marek Rodzik and Katarzyna Staniewska

Technical editors

Dorota Dołęgowska and Katarzyna Staniewska

Cover designers

Dorota Dołęgowska and Mateusz Józwiak

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The Polish Crisis 1980–1982 from the Western Perspective

Edited by Piotr Długolecki

with contributions from

Australia	Matthew Jordan
Austria	Maximilian Graf and Wolfgang Mueller
Canada	Brendan Kelly
France	Nicolas Chibaeff, Isabelle Richefort, Emmanuelle Jouineau and Céline Brugeat
Germany	Ilse Dorothee Pautsch
Greece	Georgios Polydorakis
Ireland	Michael Kennedy
Israel	Louise Fischer and Shlomo Mark
Italy	Francesco Lefebvre d'Ovidio and Rita Luisa De Palma
NATO Archives	Nicholas Nguyen, Francesca Magnoni and Ineke Deserno
Netherlands	Marc Dierikx
Poland	Piotr Długolecki
Turkey	Ayşe Selcan Şanlı and Sabriye Kısa
United Kingdom	Richard Smith
United States	Mircea Munteanu and Adam Howard

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Introduction

Foreword

The idea of publishing this collection of documents follows on the publication three years ago of a book devoted to the reactions of different countries to the fall of the Berlin Wall.¹ It was a work made possible by the collaboration of diplomatic document publishers from eleven countries, who selected, from their respective archives, documents showing their country's reactions to the events unfolding in Germany in 1989. Thanks to that joint effort, it was possible to gather in one volume archival material about the perception, in different countries, of one of the most important episodes of the 20th century. That work was published in English, thus making documents written in many different languages accessible to a wide range of scholars.

Besides its scholarly value, the aforementioned volume was conducive to greater collaboration between publishers of diplomatic documents from various countries. This collaboration began in 1989, when the International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents was held in London for the first time.² Since then, editors of source documents from around the world have met 15 times, with the most recent conference taking place in Berlin in 2019. The organisation of that meeting in the German capital on the 30th anniversary of the 1989 events coincided with the idea of a joint publication devoted to those occurrences, which were of key importance for diplomatic history.

It is also worthwhile to mention the 12th International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents, which took place in Geneva in 2013. During the conference, delegates from different countries decided to enhance their collaboration by creating a new international organisation: the International Committee of Editors of Diplomatic Documents.³ The subsequent publication of documents concerning the fall of the Berlin Wall was the product of that decision.

The organisation of the 16th International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents in Warsaw and the desire to continue the joint editing activities led to the publication of the present work. The hosting of the conference by Poland facilitated publishing a collection of documents devoted to the Polish Crisis in 1980–1982, one of the most important issues in international relations at the time.

¹ M. Dierikx, S. Zala (eds.), *When the Wall Came Down. The Perception of German Reunification in International Diplomatic Documents 1989-1990*, Bern 2019. The entire work is accessible online at www.dodis.ch/en/q12.

² For more details see *Papers presented at the FCO Seminar for Editors of diplomatic documents, November 1989*. Occasional Paper No. 3 (FCO, London: 1989) https://issuu.com/fcohistorians/docs/hpop_3.

³ For more information on the history of the collaboration between publishers of diplomatic documents and on the ICEDD, see <https://diplomatic-documents.org>.

The representatives of 15 institutions specialising in editing diplomatic documents took part in this project, which brings together a compilation of 112 documents illustrating events in Poland in the early 1980s.

As we publish this collection of documents on the 40th anniversary of the events concerned,⁴ we trust that it will prove to be a unique source bringing an international perspective to such issues as the creation of the Solidarity Trade Union, the threat of Soviet intervention and, in the end, the imposition of Martial Law in Poland.

⁴ The conference in Warsaw was initially planned for 2021 but it was postponed to 2022 due to the coronavirus pandemic.

Selection criteria

The present volume contains archival documents from Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States as well as material from NATO Archives. The events of the summer of 1980 and the wave of workers' protests and strikes in communist Poland were chosen as the starting point (the first document is dated 25 July 1981). Initially, we planned to close with the end of 1981, but as documents from the first quarter of 1982 summarising the events of the previous year were uncovered during archival research, this time frame was extended. As a result, the most recent document chosen for publication is dated 3 March 1982.

The editors have sought to avoid materials about bilateral relations as far as Polish documents are concerned. Given the size of the present publication, it was not possible to include a greater number of documents and examine the entire crisis through the prism of bilateral relations. Therefore, the present volume seeks to show the actions of the Polish authorities using documents of a general nature (such as circulars sent as instructions to all Polish diplomatic posts) or materials synthesising the entirety of the actions taken. In reference to the title of the work and the 'Western perspective,' the volume is an attempt to show the way in which the People's Republic of Poland viewed the reactions of Western countries, and to present a mirror image of them.

It is worthwhile to mention the distinct situation of Ireland and Israel. The former did not have its own diplomatic representative in Warsaw, and the Irish ambassador accredited to the Polish government resided permanently in Stockholm. The latter country did not have diplomatic relations with Poland, as Warsaw, acting under Soviet pressure, broke them off in 1967. This does not mean that Ireland or Israel were not interested in the events in Poland, but the lack of their own diplomatic posts in Warsaw means that documents from these countries have a different character.

The idea leading to this publication was the desire to show the Polish Crisis from the perspective of the countries which—in the then bi-polar world—were part of the Western Bloc. In addition, a selection of documents from the NATO Archives showing the policy of the Alliance made it possible to give a more complete illustration of Western countries' reaction to the events in Poland. This selection of documents makes this publication a complement to the earlier two-volume edition of archival material, which was released in Polish some 15 years ago and showed the crisis as seen by the countries which were then part of the Eastern Bloc.⁵

This present publication also supplements the 2007 book *From Solidarity to Martial Law*, which contains both American documents and documents from Eastern Bloc

⁵ Ł. Kamiński (ed.), *Przed i po 13 grudnia. Państwa bloku wschodniego wobec kryzysu w PRL 1980–1982. Tom I (sierpień 1980 – marzec 1981)*, IPN, Warszawa 2006, and *Tom II (kwiecień 1981 – grudzień 1982)*, IPN, Warszawa 2007.

countries (primarily Polish and Soviet), in English translation.⁶ In comparison, however, working with publishers of documents from many countries made it possible to broaden the available source base significantly, in both geographical and quantitative terms, and to show the 1980–1982 events from a wider perspective.

Naturally, the documents collected in this volume might be present in series of diplomatic documents published in countries participating in this project. Some of those countries have not published their archival material from the years 1980–1982 yet, but in others documents from this period have been declassified and published. Such documents have appeared, among other countries, in the United Kingdom (in a special volume entitled *The Polish Crisis and Relations with Eastern Europe, 1979-1982*),⁷ and in Germany, where documents concerning the events of 1980–1982 were published in seven volumes.⁸ In the case of the United States, the materials intended to form a part of the publication about Poland are representative of the type of documents that will be published in the upcoming volumes.⁹ In Poland, the 1980–1982 crisis was tackled in five volumes of the *Polish Diplomatic Documents* series, which consist of more than 2,500 documents.¹⁰ The topic also drew the interest of document publishers whose research does not focus on foreign policy and international relations, but rather on domestic or military matters. As a result, Party documents from meetings of the Political Bureau¹¹ as well as military¹² and governmental¹³ documents have also been published.

⁶ A. Paczkowski, M. Byrne (eds.), *From Solidarity to Martial Law. The Polish Crisis of 1980-1981. A Documentary History*, Central European University Press, Budapest-New York 2007.

⁷ I. Tombs, R. Smith (ed.), *Documents on British Policy Overseas* (hereinafter: DBPO). *The Polish Crisis and Relations with Eastern Europe, 1979-1982*, Routledge, London 2017.

⁸ *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (hereinafter: AAPD). Hrsg. im Auftrag des Auswärtigen Amtes vom Institut für Zeitgeschichte. *Jahrgang 1980*, Bd. 1, 1. Januar bis 30. Juni 1980, Bd. 2, 1. Juli bis 31. Dezember 1980, Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2011; *Jahrgang 1981*, Bd. 1, 1. Januar bis 30. April 1981, Bd. 2, 1. Mai bis 30. September 1981, Bd. 3, 1. Oktober bis 31. Dezember 1981, Oldenbourg Verlag Munich 2012; *Jahrgang 1982*, Bd. 1, 1. Januar bis 30. Juni 1982, Bd. 2, 1. Juli bis 31. Dezember 1982, Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2013.

⁹ For details, see <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/carter> and <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/reagan>.

¹⁰ P. Długolecki (ed.), *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1980 styczeń–czerwiec* (hereinafter: PDD), PISM, Warszawa 2018; *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1980 lipiec–grudzień*, PISM, Warszawa 2020; *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1981 styczeń–czerwiec*, PISM, Warszawa 2021; *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1981 lipiec–grudzień*, PISM, Warszawa 2022 (in print) and M. Ruchniewicz (ed.), *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1982*, PISM, Warszawa (in preparation).

¹¹ T. Kozłowski (Introduction), *PZPR a Solidarność 1980-1981. Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego*, IPN, Warszawa 2013.

¹² E. Nalepa (ed.), *586 dni stanu wojennego 1981–1983 w dokumentach Sztabu Generalnego WP*, Naukowe Wydawnictwo Piotrkowskie przy Filii Uniwersytetu Jana Kochanowskiego, Piotrków Trybunalski 2016.

¹³ M. Jabłonowski, W. Janowski, G. Soltysiak (eds.), *Stan wojenny w Polsce z perspektywy Urzędu Rady Ministrów*, Wydział Dziennikarstwa, Informacji i Bibliologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, Fundacja Archiwum Dokumentacji Historycznej PRL, Warszawa 2017 and B. Kopka, G. Majchrzak (eds.), *Stan wojenny w dokumentach władz PRL (1980–1983)*, IPN, Warszawa 2001.

These selection criteria have produced a collection of documents that demonstrate the common and divergent elements of Western countries' policies adopted in connection with the crisis in Poland. This made it possible to show the specific nature of each country's relations with Poland, as well as the measures the Polish communist authorities adopted to counter the steps taken by Western countries.

Editorial remarks

While preparing documents for publication in this volume, the editors sought to follow the editorial principles of the Polish Diplomatic Documents series. It should be borne in mind that even though all national series are dedicated to the same task, that is to publish diplomatic documents, the editing principles they follow and solutions they adopt vary somewhat.

The present publication is based solely on original documents which are stored in archives or scanned and made accessible on the websites of various state (or private) institutions. This means that no archival material was reproduced based on earlier editions without checking them first against the original in the archives. The vast majority of the documents in this volume were produced by the different countries' diplomatic services and are now stored in the respective national archives or the archives of foreign ministries. In the case of NATO documents, the originals are held in the Alliance's Archives and are also available in the form of scans on various websites. Under each document, the name of the archive, the group or collection it comes from as well as the call number are given, making it possible to locate the original version of a particular report, memo or cipher.

Each contributor participating in the preparation of this publication conducted a search and selected documents illustrating the policy of the country or organization in question with regard to Poland. The authors also prepared a scholarly apparatus of the materials they submitted. In addition, in order to facilitate the reading of the publication, the scientific editor of this volume supplemented the submitted archival documents with additional footnotes clarifying certain issues related to the internal situation in Poland or correcting inaccuracies in the spelling of Polish surnames or place names.

Some of the documents in this volume have appeared in print before. As can be seen, the Polish, British and German documents were published in the national series using the full scholarly apparatus. Information on any previous publication of documents from British, German and Polish archives has been given in summary form under each document, following its archival call number.

Some of other materials have also been made available on the Internet in the form of scans, but without the same scholarly apparatus being used. In this publication, the editors have chosen not to use repeated referencing to a previous online publication, on the assumption that information about the previous publication of a source will be of little use for an English-speaking reader of such an international collection of documents. For similar reasons, no reference is made to documents that are only mentioned, but not published, in this collection. For example, if an ambassador of a given country refers in a cipher published in this volume to his earlier cipher or to a previously received instruction that have not been published here, then the possible publication of the said cipher or instruction in a national series is not referenced.

All documents in this volume (including the scholarly apparatus) are published in English. In the case of documents from Australia, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, the United States and NATO, editorial changes, if any, were limited to corrections of obvious spelling mistakes. For example, the name 'Hensinki' in one of the documents was corrected to 'Helsinki' without a footnote. Editing documents that needed to be translated (documents from Austria, France, Greece, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Turkey) presented more challenges. Every effort was made to ensure that the translation reflected the original as closely as possible. British spelling was used throughout, including the Introduction, footnotes and indexes (except for specifically American functions).

NATO documents were also originally produced in English, with the exception of short fragments in French (such as the transcribed statements of certain Belgian and French representatives who spoke French during meetings). In such cases, the French passages were translated into English and the footnotes indicate which part of the document was translated.

The great majority of documents are published in full, but in some instances only fragments are published. In such cases, omissions are indicated by square brackets, with information about what the omitted part refers to being given in the footnote. Square brackets are also used to indicate parts of a document that have not yet been declassified, as in the case of certain US and NATO documents, some parts of which remain classified. In such cases, the impossibility of publishing certain non-declassified fragments is mentioned in the footnote (apart from the square brackets). In principle, all omissions in a given document are mentioned in a single footnote related to the first omitted or non-declassified fragment. Documents are published with their initial 'confidential' markings, but without the stamp that is usually affixed to such documents when they are declassified. However, it should be emphasized that whether the documents published in this volume came from the archives of individual countries or from NATO Archives, they have been declassified and are publicly disclosed.

A few editorial mentions added to the documents are also in square brackets.

The number of footnotes was kept to a minimum, with any arising issue being clarified the first time it appears. This way the contents of a footnote do not reappear alongside subsequent information related to a given issue. For example, the first reference to the CSCE is accompanied by a footnote explaining the Conference and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, but this is not repeated in subsequent references to the CSCE. Naturally, this approach entails a greater concentration of footnotes in the initial part of the volume.

Abbreviations which appear in the documents are not expanded upon in the footnotes—these are explained in a separate list of abbreviations. NATO documents, which—due to the specific nature of this organisation and its somewhat hermetic language—required a separate approach, are the only exception. The editors felt

that merely expanding the abbreviations concerning the structure, for example, would not be sufficient without also giving a broader explanation of the role or tasks of individual organisational units.

No biographical notes were given as a general rule, while information about the functions performed by various individuals in 1980–1982 was included in the Index of Persons. This made it possible not to repeat the same information in successive footnotes. For example, General Wojciech Jaruzelski appears in almost every document. To provide biographical information each time this takes place would require a great number of identical footnotes about him in the volume. As a result, an individual's official functions appear in the footnotes only to explain changes that take place in the position filled by that person. They also appear in case of significant errors in surnames, in which case the correct version is given in the footnotes. For example, the incorrectly spelled surnames Zabirski or Sapalo were noted in the footnotes (Żabiński and Sapela). In the case of slight errors due to the Anglicisation of Polish names and the omission of Polish diacritical marks, no footnote was given. For example, if surnames appeared in forms such as Jaruselski, Jaruzelsky, Rakowsky, Walesa or Gomulka, no corrections or footnotes were provided, the correct version being placed in the Index of Persons (with the Anglicised version in brackets).

The footnotes contain all the indispensable information about the events described, but the editors made no attempt to interpret those events, leaving the readers to make up their own mind. Cross references to individual documents within the volume have also been omitted. The footnotes which are present in the original documents were indicated using the letters x, xx, etc., and were placed between the regular footnotes, which are listed using Arabic numerals.

The documents are published in chronological order in keeping with their date of production.¹⁴ Each document was given a sequential number and a 'title' containing, besides the date of production, information on the issuer, the addressee and, as a rule, brief information on its content. The editors felt that the Readers would find it easier to follow the dynamics of the Polish crisis in such a chronological order than had they divided the documents according to their country of origin, thus creating many mini-chapters. Each document, however, is preceded by the name of the country (or organisation) which produced it. The title of each document also contains information indicating any possible attachments or a note if only a fragment of the document is being published.

¹⁴ Documents from NATO Archives (Nos. 53, 76, 87, 103, 108) are an exception. These are minutes of meetings held by representatives of the Alliance's member states. Although these documents were drawn up and sent out at a later date (usually a couple of weeks following the meetings) in this volume they are published in keeping with the date of each meeting. This approach avoids chronological disruptions in the narrative and makes it easier for the reader to follow the events described.

It is also worthwhile to mention that the documents in this volume reflect a wide variety of office styles and traditions of creating diplomatic correspondence proper to different countries. When preparing documents for publication, no attempt was made to standardise formal features (such as the arrangement of text on a page, the indication of the time of sending and reception of a given document or its date and place of production).

The issue of Dutch ciphers, which were originally written in a much abbreviated (coded) language, warrants some clarification. During their translation into English their content was rendered in a somewhat more expanded manner, thus making it more accessible to Readers. An unusual situation also arose in connection with one Greek document: while it is, strictly speaking, a letter (prepared in English) from the Polish Deputy-Minister of Foreign Trade, it is almost entirely made up of a quote from a Greek draft trade agreement that had been previously submitted to Poland. In this case, the editors decided to treat this document as one of Greek provenance.

The overwhelming majority of the documents are in the form of typescripts. Only one Israeli document was based on a manuscript, as indicated in the appropriate footnote.

The office descriptions of each document, such as the number of copies, various seals, 'certified true copy' stamps, and distribution lists were omitted. Information about whether a document was sent to recipients other than the addressee was also included in footnotes.

Piotr Długolecki

The Polish crisis in 1980–1982 from the Western perspective: An attempt at interpretation

According to observers and participants in international events at the time, the year 1980 and the beginning of the eighties were characterised by a sense of decline: the period of Détente was coming to a close, while a new era, referred to at times as the second Cold War or the post-Détente period, was beginning.¹ The most obvious sign of this new era was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late-December 1979, an event that worsened relations between the Eastern and Western blocs markedly and affected Poland's relations with Western countries. Among Western politicians and diplomats no one doubted that the nature of relations between East and West had been completely altered by the Soviet aggression. The Austrian foreign minister gave vivid expression to this view when he stated, in conversation with his Polish counterpart, that 'Afghanistan was undoubtedly one of the problems that caused the policy of Détente to bottom out.'²

Attempts were made (also on Poland's initiative) to improve the situation, which were unsuccessful. These included a meeting in Warsaw between the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the President of France. Another example illustrating the state of relations at the time was the stalemate at the Vienna discussions about reducing military forces and armaments in Central Europe. During the 20th round of the negotiations, which were held from 31 January to 3 April 1980, 'the mere fact of its normal holding' was seen as its only positive outcome.³

Poland's situation was additionally complicated by the consequences of the growing domestic economic crisis, which had a profound influence on the PRP's actions abroad. The resulting primacy of economic over political issues radically narrowed Poland's room of manoeuvre in foreign policy. Polish diplomats increasingly focused on attempts to obtain further loans and contracts, and this placed the Polish foreign service in the role of a supplicant desperately seeking financial aid and clearly limited its ability to attain political aims.

The chaotic attempts made to overcome the crisis by Edward Gierek, who had been in power for a decade and was inexorably losing support, were doomed to failure. In turn, the outbreak of strikes in Poland in the summer of 1980 heralded

¹ For an example, see H. Sjørusen, *The United States, Western Europe and the Polish Crisis. International Relations in the Second Cold War*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York 2003, and M. McCauley, *The Cold War 1949–2016*, Routledge, Oxon, New York, 2017.

² Memorandum on the conversation between the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Willibald Pahr, and the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Czyrek (excerpts), 10 November 1981, doc. no. 67 (in keeping with the numbering of documents in the present volume).

³ P. Długolecki (ed.), *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1980 styczeń–czerwiec*, PISM, Warsaw 2018, doc. no. 297.

changes on the domestic front that could not remain without consequence on the international situation. A trait specific to the non-democratic communist countries dependent on the USSR was that economic protests there often turned into political demonstrations and led the way to speculation about the communist party's loss of power and the creation of a new centre of power independent of Moscow. This, in turn, immediately raised questions about possible Soviet reactions, including the most drastic scenario in the form of a possible Soviet military intervention.

Such a perception of the Polish crisis can be seen from its very outset in the reports of diplomats from the various Western countries. They compared the events in Poland with earlier instances of internal crisis and workers' protests: in 1956 (in Poznań); in 1970 (on the Baltic Coast); and in 1976 (in Radom, Ursus and Płock). They reflected on Moscow's possible reactions in the context of the past military interventions by the USSR in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) aiming to entrench communist power and Moscow's influence in those countries and to ensure their continued alignment with the Eastern Bloc.

The formulation of such opinions was all the more evident as Poland was the largest and most populous country in the USSR's external empire in Europe, with the most important transport routes from the Soviet Union to the GDR. It is worth noting that NATO saw threats to the security of transports between the USSR as one of the most important factors that could induce the USSR to intervene in Poland. The minutes of the NATO Council meeting of 8 July 1981 state that the Russians would prefer to avoid intervention, but it could take place if, among other things, 'communications between the Soviet Union and the GDR were jeopardized, thus putting Soviet security interests at risk.'⁴

On the other hand, in the opinions of Western diplomats one can see an awareness of the differences that existed between Poland and other Eastern Bloc countries, such as the Polish Catholic Church, whose role was greatly strengthened in 1978 when the Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyła became Pope. Another distinctive feature of Poland was the existence of opposition groups, which were stronger than in other communist countries and which opposed the actions of the authorities openly. At the same time, Western diplomats warned not to overestimate the importance of these differences. The US Ambassador, William Schauffele, after describing specific opposition groups in the report he prepared at the end of his mission in Poland, informed: 'Nevertheless they remain what they were – a group of intellectuals.'⁵ Still, this did not contradict the more general view formulated by the Irish ambassador, who stated without hesitation shortly after the August strikes

⁴ Summary record of a Council Meeting (excerpts), 8 July 1981, doc. no. 53.

⁵ Telegram from the US Ambassador in Warsaw, William Schauffele, to the US Department of State (excerpts), 10 September 1980, doc. no. 16.

began that Poland has always been quite different in a number of fundamental respects from other socialist countries.⁶

All these factors meant that from the very outset the strikes in Poland generated considerable international interest, with foreign diplomats convinced that these events were of an extraordinary nature. In July 1980 the Dutch ambassador stated, not without reason, that ‘it is certain that independent action by workers’ delegations in discussions with the management of factories during strikes is unique in the Eastern Bloc.’⁷ It is also worth stressing that Western diplomats analysed the Polish crisis from two angles: in political and in economic and social terms. The economic dimension of the Polish crisis at times remains on the sidelines as events in Poland in 1980–1982 are considered, but the collapse of the Polish economy was so extensive that it had a profound impact on the decisions taken by the Polish authorities and on their domestic and foreign policies. Many Western observers were concerned that the state of the Polish economy made it impossible for the social demands of the strikers to be met. The lack of means to improve the situation, the discouragement of Polish society, which was described as ‘severely disappointed,’ as well as internal friction within the governing camp, were seen as factors ruling out any lasting political and social stability in Poland.⁸ The most vivid expression of the lack of faith in the possibility of overcoming the crisis was that of the Dutch ambassador, who stated in his report from his stay in Gdańsk and visit to the Lenin Shipyards: ‘Unfortunately, we had to conclude that as far as activities in the port were concerned, there was little difference between a strike and work. No significant shipping, no ships at anchor and hardly any at the wharves, no cranes busily working. The oil refinery, which had been built a few years ago, was a void, and at the wharves there were mainly repairs or overhauls of a few domestic and foreign vessels.’⁹ No more optimistic was the prognosis of the US ambassador, who thought that ‘the immediate outlook for the Polish economy – all things considered – is bleak.’¹⁰

A common trait of almost all Western reports about the Polish situation was a noticeable restraint and prudence shown in the formulation of unequivocal prognoses. It was universally thought that the situation in Poland was unpredictable, and that events could evolve in many different directions. All opinions were accompanied by numerous reservations, and the Irish ambassador went so far in

⁶ Political Report by the Irish Ambassador in Stockholm, Dermot Waldron, for the Secretary General of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Andrew O’Rourke, 17 August 1980, doc. no. 3.

⁷ 25 July 1980, Code message from the Dutch Embassy Councillor in Warsaw, Paul Lagendijk, to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 July 1980, doc. no. 1.

⁸ For an example, see the Telegram from the German Ambassador in Warsaw, Georg Negwer, to the German Federal Foreign Office, 7 August 1980, doc. no. 2.

⁹ Letter from the Dutch Ambassador in Warsaw, Joost van der Kun, to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chris van der Klaauw, 21 July 1981, doc. no. 54.

¹⁰ Telegram from the US Ambassador in Warsaw, William Schaufele, to the US Department of State (excerpts), 10 September 1980, doc. no. 16.

one of his reports as to suggest that events were changing so quickly that they could outpace the writing of his analysis.¹¹ On a side note, it has to be said that this prudence speaks highly of the professionalism of Western diplomats at the time, as events in Poland were indeed difficult to predict, and even overly cautious opinions considering many different scenarios should be seen as more valuable than unequivocal but faulty analyses.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the end of the strikes and the signing of the Gdańsk Accords opened a new chapter in modern Polish history and significantly influenced the shape of international relations. The existence of Solidarity was unprecedented in the Soviet Bloc. For the first time since the end of the Second World War and the imposition of communist rule in the countries of Eastern Europe, a legal organisation had come into being and was allowed to function independently, beyond the control of the communist authorities. This event was such a momentous change in Poland that, according to the British ambassador, ‘To return to the *status quo ante* will, short of Soviet intervention, be almost impossible.’¹² The creation of Solidarity also entailed an end to the monopoly of the party and state authorities in foreign policy. The new trade union engaged in activities on the international stage independently of the PUWP, by organising reciprocal visits of trade union delegations, by maintaining contacts with foreign political parties, by developing relations with journalists and by joining international organisations.

This shift was immediately noticed by Western countries, which from the very beginning were fully aware that ‘history was in the making’ and knew that the importance of the Polish events could not be overstated. It is also worthwhile to quote the French ambassador, who as early as 1 September 1980 thought that the victory of the strikers had shaken the communist regime in Poland (‘Victory of the Gdańsk Strikers: shaking of the Regime’). Ambassador Jacques Dupuy had no doubts about the unique nature of the events he was describing, and he concluded his account by stating: ‘In any case, things will never be the same again. The concessions made by the government are a win that was unthinkable only eight days ago. What does this mean in terms of power: a new Poland or a new confrontation?’¹³

The stance of the Italian Ambassador was somewhat more subdued. He reported about the opinions of the EEC ambassadors accredited to Poland and pointed to existing conditions: ‘The final result, if all goes well, according to the forecast presented a few days ago, may be progress toward freer and more autonomous

¹¹ Political Report by the Irish Ambassador in Stockholm, Dermot Waldron, for the Secretary General of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Andrew O’Rourke, 17 August 1980, doc. no. 3.

¹² Telegram from the British Ambassador in Warsaw, Kenneth Pridham, to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, 3 September 1980, doc. no. 12.

¹³ Telegram from the French Ambassador in Warsaw, Jacques Dupuy, to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 September 1980, doc. no. 8.

forms of Polish socialism, which, however, must still be understood within the limits of the ideological and international system to which Poland belongs.¹⁴

Another feature that was specific to the Polish crisis was its duration. Previous crises in Poland were initially characterised by a violent outbreak of social discontent which turned to mass protests or fighting in the streets. The authorities' usual reaction was a violent and at times bloody suppression of the protests followed by a reshuffle at the top of the ruling camp or attempts to normalise the situation. For a very long time, the crisis of 1980–82 was of a different character. While workers' protests did lead to concessions on the part of the government, the very nature of the communist system meant that the actions of the newly established Solidarity Independent Self-Governing Trade Union would lead to a confrontation. The protracted nature of the Polish crisis, with its alternating periods of tensions and calm, was arguably most aptly described by the Irish ambassador, whose report on the situation in Poland was entitled 'Crisis Upon Crisis in Poland,' and began with the words 'Yet another tense situation in the Polish saga...'¹⁵ A few months later, the same ambassador returned to the issue of the Polish crisis' protracted nature and related a joke going around at the time: 'The latest Polish story has been rather widely quoted in the western press about Pope John Paul II asking on his knees the Good Lord will he, John Paul, live to see the end of the Polish crisis and the Good Lord replies to him that the question is not whether John Paul will live to see the end but whether he, the Good Lord will live so long.'¹⁶ These words, rather unusual by the standards of official diplomatic correspondence, provide a credible image of the diplomats' attitude to the situation in Poland at the time, including a perceptible weariness having to do with the duration of the crisis and a certain lack of faith in its rapid end.

The most important feature of all diplomatic, intelligence and military reports on the situation in Poland, however, was the issue of a possible Soviet military intervention. As mentioned above, the events in Poland were compared to the situation in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan a few months earlier (December 1979). This imposed a specific perspective as a matter of course. From the very beginning no one doubted that 'The Soviet Union is likely to be highly concerned about the current situation in Poland and to put pressure on the Polish leadership to reform their economy.'¹⁷ The Soviet Union's concern grew as the workers' economic postulates

¹⁴ Telegram from the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw, Marco Favale, to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 September 1980, doc. no. 9.

¹⁵ Political Report by the Irish Ambassador in Stockholm, Dermot Waldron, for the Secretary General of Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Andrew O'Rourke, 8 April 1981, doc. no. 43.

¹⁶ Political Report by the Irish Ambassador in Stockholm, Dermot Waldron, for the Secretary General of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Andrew O'Rourke, 23 September 1981, doc. no. 59.

¹⁷ Telegram from the German Ambassador in Warsaw, Georg Negwer, to the German Federal Foreign Office, 7 August 1980, doc. no. 2.

rapidly turned to demands of a political nature. As ambassador Dermot Waldron noted, ‘the nightmare of the Soviet authorities is that one year these economic disturbances should link up with the political and human rights movements in the country and thus produce a real danger for the Polish régime, possibly provoking the dreaded question of the Soviet authorities’ interference.’¹⁸ During the initial stage of the crisis, it was generally thought that the Soviet government was reluctant to intervene in Poland militarily.¹⁹ At the same time, such an intervention was not ruled out if the situation in Poland were to evolve in a direction that Moscow found impossible to accept. Among the factors that could have inclined the USSR to intervene militarily was the fear that the ‘Polish contagion’ would spread to other Eastern Bloc countries.²⁰ The British ambassador, in his analysis of Soviet policy, noted that ‘the USSR must however be seriously concerned, both for the situation in Poland itself and for the risk of the contagion spreading to other East European countries including the USSR itself.’²¹ But even when considering the possibility that events similar to those in Poland might arise in other countries, it was pointed out that ‘the uniqueness of Poland is the primary argument against the spread of the “Polish infection” to the rest of the Warsaw Pact in the near term.’²²

The most important factors that might incline the USSR to intervene were summarised and categorised during the above-mentioned NATO Council meeting (at the level of permanent representatives) in July 1981. It was thought then that the ‘Russians would prefer to avoid a very costly intervention and that they had therefore tolerated developments which, only a year ago, would have been considered unacceptable.’ It was pointed out, however, that Moscow would most probably decide to intervene if one of five predictable circumstances were to arise, i.e.: ‘...if Poland declared its intention to leave the Warsaw Pact; if communications between the Soviet Union and the GDR were jeopardized, thus putting Soviet security interests at risks; if there was a major breakdown of law and order; if the Polish Communist Party became so “heretical” that it could no longer be regarded as belonging to the Communist movement; [and] if the ferment in Poland began

¹⁸ Political Report by the Irish Ambassador in Stockholm, Dermot Waldron, for the Secretary General of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Andrew O’Rourke, 17 August 1980, doc. no. 3.

¹⁹ See, among others, the Memorandum by the Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan Gotlieb, for the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, 29 August 1980, doc. no. 7, or the Cablegram from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs to all Australian diplomatic posts, 19 September 1980, doc. no. 17.

²⁰ Report by the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw, Marco Favale, for the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emilio Colombo, 4 September 1980, doc. no. 13.

²¹ Letter from the Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary, David Neilands, to the Private Secretary to the British Prime Minister, Michael Pattison, 22 August 1980, doc. no. 5.

²² Circular from the US Department of State on the situation in Poland, 8 September 1980, doc. no. 14.

to spread to other Eastern countries.²³ It seems that this assessment reflected the real situation quite well, as all the above-mentioned factors (including the already mentioned issue of communications with the GDR) were extremely important in terms of Soviet interests and any disturbance of the existing state of affairs would most certainly lead to discontent at the Kremlin. Similar assessments were formulated in other countries, also at the very outset of the crisis. A good example is the stance of the Australian government, which stated that ‘the prospect of Soviet intervention is slight and likely to remain so unless there is a serious challenge to the fundamental control of the Polish Party.’²⁴

The protracted nature of the Polish crisis also affected opinions about the possibility of Soviet intervention. The degree to which Western diplomats thought it probable evolved along with the changing situation in Poland. The opinions they drew up were influenced by all the stages of the crisis, such as the issue of the registration of Solidarity’s statute; the events in Bydgoszcz; the threat of a general strike; the congress of Solidarity delegates; and the proclamations to the Polish émigré community and the working people of Europe adopted at the congress. In addition, the issues having to do with relations between the authorities and Solidarity overlapped with internal party issues, such as the changes in the positions of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) and Prime Minister, accompanied by growing Soviet pressure exerted on the Polish authorities at all levels. All these factors meant that Soviet intervention seemed more probable at times of heightened crisis and less so at times of relative calm. It could be said that in December 1980 the invasion was thought possible, while before and after that time it was not seen as very probable.

Estimations of the probability of intervention in December 1980 stemmed from observations of Soviet activities and information obtained by US intelligence. As he sent his memorandum of 2 December 1980 on the situation in Poland to senior American policy makers, CIA Director Stansfield Turner stated: ‘I believe the Soviets are readying their forces for military intervention in Poland. We do not know, however, whether they have made a decision to intervene, or are still attempting to find a political solution.’ In the memorandum itself, he wrote that ‘there are indications that the Soviets are increasing preparations for an invasion of Poland. [...] On balance, this activity does not necessarily indicate that a Soviet invasion is imminent. We believe that these preparations suggest, however, that a Soviet intervention is increasingly likely.’²⁵

²³ Summary record of a Council Meeting (excerpts), 8 July 1981, doc. no. 53.

²⁴ Cablegram from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs to all Australian diplomatic posts, 19 September 1980, doc. no. 17.

²⁵ An Alert Memorandum prepared by the US Central Intelligence Agency for the US National Security Council (excerpts), 2 December 1980, doc. no. 29.

The issue of how the Polish army would react to a possible invasion by Soviet troops was an extremely important question in the various discussions about Soviet intervention. Such questions were raised, for example, by the Irish ambassador, who wrote in one of his reports that ‘perhaps the two biggest questions which may be asked about Poland today are: in what circumstances would the Soviet Union invade? And if they did, would the Poles resist?’²⁶ The same ambassador, only two months later, went on to stress that ‘if there were an invasion its speed would depend on resistance from the Polish army.’²⁷

An unequivocal answer to this question was not easy to come by, but there was no shortage of views similar to those of the Australian ambassador, who said that ‘on this assessment the initial phase of Soviet intervention would be a very messy business, would cost the Soviets some thousands in casualties and might last for quite some weeks. It would be a far cry from Czechoslovakia 1968.’²⁸

Among the reactions of Western countries to the threat of Soviet intervention, it is worth noting the somewhat peculiar reaction of the Israeli authorities, who also looked at the situation in Poland through the prism of the situation of the Jewish minority, while assuming, in case of a Soviet intervention, that ‘Israel will have to react, but should not be too forceful, since, despite the lack of relations with the USSR, it is still a superpower which supports the right of Israel to exist.’²⁹

Another common trait of Western assessments of the events in Poland was the total absence of any plans for military action in response to a possible invasion by Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces. Neither the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nor any of the Western countries considered any action on Polish territory or any military aid. This fact did not go unnoticed by Robert Furlonger, the Director-General of the Australian Office of National Assessments, who was somewhat critical of the statements on this subject made publicly by the NATO Secretary General. In a report prepared for Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, Furlonger pointed out that ‘a Soviet invasion of Poland would not provoke a Western military response (as has already unnecessarily and unfortunately been publicly stated by the NATO

²⁶ Political Report by the Irish Ambassador in Stockholm, Dermot Waldron, for the Secretary General of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Andrew O’Rourke, 14 October 1980, doc. no. 19.

²⁷ Code Telex from the Irish Ambassador in Moscow, Pádraig Murphy, to the First Secretary of the Political Section at the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Anne Anderson, 5 December 1980, doc. no. 32.

²⁸ Cablegram from the Australian Ambassador in Warsaw, John Burgess, to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs (excerpt), 17 December 1980, doc. no. 34.

²⁹ Letter from the Israeli Foreign Service trainee, Y. Mermelstein, to the Director of the Eastern Europe Department at the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Yosef Govrin, 22 December 1980, doc. no. 36.

Secretary-General) and would not lead to a war between the superpowers and their respective European allies.³⁰

The Polish crisis reached its culmination when Martial Law was imposed and when the Polish Army took full control of the country. As mentioned just prior to the proclamation of Martial Law, the likelihood of Soviet intervention was seen as minimal, as can be seen in a telegram from the Canadian ambassador on 15 October 1981, which stated that ‘despite numerous reasons Moscow has to be unhappy and apprehensive, direct Soviet action in the near future seems unlikely.’³¹ On 7 December 1981 in turn, a memorandum prepared by the CIA and entitled ‘Polish Preparations for the Imposition of Martial Law’ stated that ‘the ongoing confrontation with Solidarity has caused the Polish government to prepare extensive plans for the imposition of martial law. These plans are nearing completion and some steps have been taken to implement them.’³²

Western countries’ reactions to the introduction of Martial Law in Poland varied, and the existing discrepancies were due to the state of a given country’s relations with Poland. In general, however, they reacted by taking actions of a political, economic, cultural, scientific-technical and humanitarian nature. In practice, this usually meant the cancellation of ministerial visits, the postponement of the entry into force of agreements already signed, or limitations on economic cooperation. The most determined position was adopted by the United States, which also tried to mobilise Western European countries to take a more active stance. This divergence between the American and Western European positions was noted by the Canadian Department of External Affairs which, while viewing the European position as correct, stated that ‘a European/humanitarian approach should govern our behaviour, not a USA/confrontational posture, if these divergences should appear in the Alliance or in multilateral agencies.’³³ It should be emphasised, however, that after the bloody suppression of the strike at the Wujek coal mine, the position of some Western European countries stiffened somewhat. This was well summarised by the Dutch ambassador, who stated, while pointing to ‘initial bloody incidents,’ that ‘Western deliberation on the modalities of further assistance to Poland, whose

³⁰ Memo by the Director-General of the Australian Office of National Assessments, Robert Furlonger, for the Prime Minister of Australia, Malcolm Fraser, 28 November 1980, doc. no. 28.

³¹ Telegram from the Canadian Ambassador in Warsaw, John M. Fraser, to the Canadian Department of External Affairs, 15 October 1981, doc. no. 63.

³² Memorandum by the US Central Intelligence Agency (excerpts), 7 December 1981, doc. no. 69.

³³ Report by the Chairman of the Policy Planning Secretariat of the Canadian Department of External Affairs, Peter Hancock, for Canadian Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, James H. Taylor, 14 December 1981, doc. no. 78.

continuation is of such particular importance to the Polish government, will have to be carefully adapted to fit the new situation.³⁴

It would seem, nonetheless, that the Americans were increasingly aware of a possible historical opportunity and becoming convinced that ‘the Soviet communist system is collapsing of its own weight.’³⁵ They felt that the Polish situation could be used to gain some advantage in the political and economic confrontation with the USSR. On the whole, however, there was noticeable restraint on the part of the Western countries, best summed up during one of the NATO Council meetings, which concluded that ‘it had been consistent Alliance policy to insist that the Poles be left alone to solve their own problems. While intending to discourage Soviet intervention, the Alliance should equally apply the principle of non-intervention, which means that, from the public position at least, Allied Governments must not only insist that the Soviet Union refrain from lending direct support to elements in Poland, but also refrain from supporting other elements. From this he [the Canadian representative] drew the conclusion that Allies could continue to warn the USSR against intervening but that they cannot themselves openly take up for example Solidarity’s cause. They might however, be critical of the Polish Government’s abuse of human rights. That would correspond to long-standing Alliance policy.’³⁶

While describing the reactions of Western countries,³⁷ it is also worthwhile to note the reaction on the Polish side to the actions taken in the West in the context of the domestic crisis. As already mentioned, the events under way in Poland placed the country at the centre of world politics, and its foreign policy under these conditions inevitably became multi-faceted. In its relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries, the Polish authorities sought to act in a calming manner, assuring their allies that the situation was under control and downplaying anti-Soviet incidents. In contacts with Western countries, emphasis was placed on avoiding Western interference in Poland’s internal affairs and all Western comments about the repressions inflicted on the opposition were relativised. Efforts were also made to keep international organisations, such as the European Parliament and the UN, from discussing the situation in Poland and to prevent the raising of the Polish question at the CSCE. In relations with both Western and Eastern Bloc countries, as well as with the EEC and the IMF, financial support and food aid was sought.

The Polish authorities reacted to growing foreign interest in the internal situation of the PRP by imposing restrictions on bilateral contacts and reducing the number

³⁴ Code message from the Dutch Ambassador in Warsaw, Joost van der Kun, to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 December 1981, doc. no. 89.

³⁵ Minutes of a US National Security Council Meeting (excerpts) 21 December 1981, doc. no. 94.

³⁶ Summary Record of a restricted meeting of the North Atlantic Council (excerpts), 16 December 1981, doc. no. 87.

³⁷ On the subject of Western countries’ policy toward the Solidarity Trade Union in the 1980s, see P. Pleskot, *Kłopotliwa panna „S”*. *Postawy polityczne Zachodu wobec „Solidarności” na tle stosunków z PRL (1980–1989)*, IPN, Warszawa 2013.

of visits to Poland, by foreign journalists above all. During the relatively few times that Western delegations came to Poland, the Polish authorities sought to hinder their attempts to establish contacts with representatives of the Solidarity trade union. Attempts were also made to limit or control Solidarity's actions on the international stage, but these measures usually failed to produce the intended results.

Internal tensions also led to increased activity on the part of the Polish émigré community. On the one hand, Polish émigré organisations initiated protests about the political situation, the activities of the opposition, or the threat of Soviet intervention, while on the other Poles abroad often organised aid campaigns (collections of medical supplies and food). The authorities attempted to reduce contacts between Polish émigré organisations and representatives of the Solidarity Trade Union and to counteract the protests, usually without success. In accepting foreign aid, they sought to balance between the dramatic state of the economy and the enormous needs that this entailed on the one hand, and the negative PR due to Poland finding itself in the role of a country requiring humanitarian assistance on the other.³⁸

After the introduction of Martial Law, Polish diplomats sought to differentiate their approach to various countries and to make any actions taken with regard to them dependent on those countries' stance with regard to events in Poland. In official speeches and in diplomatic meetings, the Polish government defended its decision to introduce Martial Law and attempted to find ways out of the isolation in which Poland found itself after 13 December 1981.³⁹

The words used by the Canadian ambassador to sum up one of his reports seem an apt conclusion to this overview: 'Wherever power in Poland now lies, what kind of power is it: power to do what? We have seen a fairly negative use of power since 13 December. Can this be translated into power to shift Poland into forward gear? One must hope so.'⁴⁰ The hope expressed by the ambassador was realised in the end. However, 'shifting Poland into forward gear' had to wait until 1989, when communism collapsed and Poland regained its full sovereignty. Only then did it become possible for the Solidarity movement to take power and change Poland's domestic and foreign policy in a fundamental manner, thus opening a new chapter in (not only) Polish history.⁴¹

Piotr Długolecki

³⁸ About Poland's foreign policy in 1981, see P. Długolecki (ed.) *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1981 styczeń-czerwiec*, PISM, Warszawa 2021, pp. vii–ix.

³⁹ Informational note by Eugeniusz Noworyta, Director of the 4th Department of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concerning the position of Western countries on the internal situation in Poland, 26 December 1981, doc. no. 106.

⁴⁰ Telegram from the Canadian Ambassador in Warsaw, John M. Fraser, to the Canadian Department of External Affairs, 31 December 1981, doc. no. 109.

⁴¹ The introduction and the Polish documents were translated from Polish into English by Jean-Jacques Granas.

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NETHERLANDS

1

25 July 1980, Code message
from the Dutch Embassy Councillor in Warsaw, Paul Legendijk,
to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Warsaw, 25 July 1980

Subject: Labour unrest in Poland

Not before 19 July did the Polish government break the silence of the official media about the labour unrest that started three weeks ago in a number of cities (see my code 124) with an article in the party journal *Trybuna Ludu*¹ entitled ‘People want order—order depends on people.’² The calming text claims that the government very much wants to prevent a repetition of the 1970 and 1976 turbulences,³ which also arose from government measures to reduce food subsidies. The general impression is that the recent increases in the price of meat are only the immediate cause of the unrest and that deeper causes are to be found in dissatisfaction growing over the years with the poor results of the economic system, which confronts the population on a daily basis. Today, a committee headed by Deputy Prime Minister Jagielski was supposed to meet to address the grievances of the workers involved in the general strike that has affected Lublin and other places for several days. For the time being, there is little reason to assume that the government will shy away from implementing further reductions in subsidies that are increasingly weighing down on the country’s budget. However, they face an extremely difficult task which requires considerably more tact than has been shown so far and will take more time than the country can actually afford. It can therefore be expected that increases in the prices of sugar and meat, although perhaps delayed, will be followed by those of dairy products and petrol, to which it appears the population will be less sensitive than to meat prices. The existing trade unions that are represented in the Polish Parliament, and which

¹ *Trybuna Ludu* (Polish: People’s Tribune)—the official daily newspaper of the Polish United Workers’ Party (one of the largest newspapers in communist Poland).

² The events in question are the social and economic crisis and the wave of strikes which took place in Poland in the summer of 1980. Protests, prompted by price increases, first took place in Lublin aviation plants, among other places, and lasted from 8 to 11 July, when an agreement was signed. On 14 August a strike broke out at the Gdańsk Shipyards, which was soon joined by other enterprises. The protests ended on 30–31 August 1980 with the signing of agreements in Szczecin, Gdańsk, Jastrzębie and Dąbrowa Górnicza, which resulted in the creation of the Solidarity Trade Union.

³ This is a reference to the workers’ protests of December 1970 on the Baltic Coast (their bloody suppression by the army was followed by Władysław Gomułka’s replacement as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUP by Edward Gierek) and to the workers’ strikes and demonstrations of June 1976, triggered by price increases (the most violent protests took place in Radom, Ursus and Płock).

are responsible for implementing social legislation, do not appear to play any role. Where the foreign press speaks of unions, reference is to joint action by workers within a certain company. Whether this can eventually develop into trade unionism in the Western sense, as the foreign press suggests, is perhaps premature. However, it is certain that independent action by workers' delegations in discussions with the management of factories during strikes is unique in the Eastern Bloc. Before publication of the *Trybuna Ludu* article, the local government of Lublin already acknowledged the seriousness of the unrest by putting up messages in the main streets containing somewhat dramatic appeals not to be guided by emotion but by civil discipline and patriotic feelings. Recent weeks have proven that information for foreign correspondents provided by dissidents of the KOR⁴ group has thus far been factual and reasonably reliable. That this group of intellectuals has a hand in the unrest itself or is even in contact with the organisers does not seem plausible, contrary to the impression created. But the group does have its own observers everywhere, passing on messages rapidly. It is certainly not the case that the savings obtained by reducing subsidies will have to be spent on wage increases for the working population and—if productivity lags behind, as is to be expected—will exacerbate rising inflation.

Finally, it should be noted that, according to the latest reports, workers' unrest continues in various parts of the country and the situation is therefore still flammable.

Legendijk 126

Netherlands National Archive, 2.05.330, BZ, inv.nr. 9881

⁴ The Workers' Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników) was a non-legalised opposition group founded in 1976 to assist workers persecuted by the communist authorities following the suppression of the June 1976 protests. It operated overtly and in 1977 transformed itself into the 'KOR' Social Self-Defence Committee.

GERMANY

2

**7 August 1980, Telegram
from the German Ambassador in Warsaw, Georg Negwer,
to the German Federal Foreign Office**

Restricted

Sent: 7 August 1980, 17.30

Received: 7 August 1980, 19.04

Telegram No. 888

Citissime

Re: Meeting of First Secretary Gierk and the Federal Chancellor on 19/20 August 1980⁵ specifically: Poland's domestic political situation

Ref: DE No. 347 of 5 August 1980—214-321.36 POL

As per instruction

I. Since the end of the first week of July, there have been three increasingly intense waves of work stoppages in numerous companies in Poland, reflecting the dissatisfaction of large sections of the population with the economic and socio-political situation in the country—dissatisfaction that has been smouldering for a number of years. Falling or stagnating real incomes since 1978 have been accompanied by a deterioration in the supply of food and important consumer goods such as furniture, and also in the particularly sensitive area of medications. The expectations of the population, which had become accustomed to continuous growth in the first half of the Gierk administration thanks to a rapid and tangible progress in living standards, especially for workers in Poland's flagship industries (coal mining, shipbuilding, mechanical engineering), were severely disappointed.

At the Party congress in February 1980,⁶ vocal criticism, voiced in particular by a number of regional Party secretaries and Central Committee members, led to Jaroszewicz's downfall and Babiuch's succession.⁷ From the outset, Babiuch had announced a reform policy to improve the country's overall economic and socio-political situation, one that would hit people harder, including a reduction of the

⁵ The planned visit of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party to Hamburg did not take place.

⁶ The 8th Party Congress took place on 11–15 February 1980.

⁷ Piotr Jaroszewicz, who had been Prime Minister since 1970, was deprived of his position as a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PUWP during the 8th Party Congress and was forced to resign as Prime Minister. He was succeeded by Edward Babiuch.

multitude of subsidies and a reorganisation of the price structure, while keeping wage levels largely stable. At the most recent session of the Sejm, a detailed update of current targets was adopted and initial price corrections introduced, particularly in the meat sector, which has been a sensitive area for years due to an inadequate supply situation. In contrast to 1970 and 1976, the Government responded to the resulting, rapidly spreading protests with considerable flexibility and a willingness to compromise. However, over the next few months (and probably also in the event of future price adjustments or conflicts over the adaptation of standards), this is unlikely to prevent

- similar resistance and demands for compensation from the workforce,
- increasing aversion of broad sections of the population to the Government and Party organisation,
- questions following Jaroszewicz's departure about who is responsible for the ongoing economic crisis,
- as well as fresh clashes over policy or even power struggles within the leadership.

Gierek's position and role have thus become the focus of criticism. Even within the Central Committee and the top echelons of the leadership, voices criticising his lack of determination and overly soft leadership style are already making themselves felt. Many observers believe that there are signs of growing tensions between Gierek and Babiuch. The latter is said—and this appears conceivable – to have expected more resolute support for his policy of 'tightening our belts.' There are no more tangible indications of this so far, however. On the occasion of his talks with Mr Mischnick,⁸ Gierek was still quite relaxed, referring to 'groups that believe that they could possibly be rid of us by September or October of this year,' but surely neither he nor Babiuch will have reckoned with the resistance that has now come to light and which has so far manifested itself almost without exception in an objective, orderly and non-violent manner. The Polish people's soul, which has a tendency to overreact very quickly in times of crisis and stress, will continue to be capable of this in view of the hopelessness and lack of direction in the current situation, especially should the Government decide to abandon its present policy of responding flexibly, advocated above all by Gierek.

II. 1) The current wave of strikes was caused by price increases for certain types of meat and poultry, entering into force on 1 July, which were essentially transferred to the system of 'commercial' meat stores and became unaffordable for many people. New Prime Minister Babiuch left no doubt from the outset about his intention to reform the price system and thus take a decisive step towards reducing the subsidy burden. The very rapid fulfilment of the strikers' demands during the first work stoppages then triggered a chain reaction of further strikes.

⁸ Wolfgang Mischnick visited Poland from 6 to 11 July 1980.

2) The Polish leadership's response to date has shown a determination not to escalate the situation. The fact that wage increases demanded by the workers were granted quickly and without protracted negotiations, and according to some press reports even voluntarily and at a higher rate than demanded by the workers, does not necessarily suggest insecurity on the part of the leadership. This form of appeasement by granting compensation in pay packets may also have been informed by the consideration that, in the case of longer strikes, unavoidable production losses weigh more heavily than a further increase in the wage fund in view of the chronically tight supply of goods in the country.

3) Wage increases granted already comprise a substantial number of companies, reportedly already over 100, and are giving rise to additional inflationary purchasing power.

At the end of June 1980, average net income was 9.9 percent higher than in June 1979, according to official figures, while the cost of living had risen by 6.3 percent during the same period. The gap between purchasing power growth and price levels has thus widened again. It is doubtful whether the new price and subsidy policy will succeed in pushing through further price increases in various areas without additional shifts in the wage structure, thus further depleting excess purchasing power. The impact of current wage increases on overall morale and thus on productivity is likely to be negative at the end of the day. It can hardly be expected that the companies benefitting from wage increases will heighten their productivity, while on the other hand the selective wage rises will increase the reluctance to work among those not taken into consideration.

4) According to estimates so far, the prospect of a comprehensive domestic political crisis is latent, but there is no immediate risk of this occurring. Such a crisis could only be set in motion by much stronger tipping points than those that have existed to date. The leadership is visibly endeavouring not to place too great a burden on the dissatisfied population. The restraint shown by the security forces up until now also speaks for this. Nor are the workers likely to seek open conflict on their own initiative at this stage. The same currently goes for the dissident movement, whose role should not be overstated. It can also be assumed that the church will use its clout to prevent an open outbreak of conflict.

5) The current wave of strikes shows that the raft of speeches that Gierk has given since last autumn, with countless personal appearances and extremely frank pronouncements, with a view to convincing the population of the necessity of drastic austerity measures, has not resonated among large parts of the workforce. This has accelerated the erosion of his authority.

However, the current wave of criticism is directed less against individual leaders than against 'conditions' in general. The search for the responsible parties has yet to begin in earnest. For example, despite his tough approach, Prime Minister

Babiuch has not been subjected to the kind of public aversion his predecessor had to contend with.

6) The Soviet Union is likely to be highly concerned about the current situation in Poland and to put pressure on the Polish leadership to reform their economy. It has already tried to help overcome the Polish economic crisis through economic support measures and is likely to continue to do so, especially since this will strengthen Poland's engagement in its own economic interests. Nevertheless, even if the domestic political situation in Poland worsens or attempts at economic reform are introduced that do not fully conform to the system, measures taken by the Soviet Union against Poland seem unlikely. Incalculable risks of direct intervention in Poland as well as negative experiences with Afghanistan⁹ currently militate against this. Even in the event of Gierek's downfall,¹⁰ which does not seem imminent at the present but is not considered inconceivable if the crisis continues to worsen, the Soviet Union—unless a shift affecting the very foundations of the ideology and system is to be expected—is more likely to at first critically tolerate any new Polish constellation that may emerge than to install a favourable leadership group with large-scale repressive measures.

Negwer

**Political Archive of the German Federal Foreign Office, B 150, vol. 484
(AAPD 1980, Doc. No. 228)**

⁹ This is a reference to Soviet invasion on Afghanistan, which started on 24 December 1979.

¹⁰ Edward Gierek, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, was removed from office on 5 September 1980 and replaced by Stanislaw Kania.

IRELAND

3

17 August 1980, Political Report
by the Irish Ambassador in Stockholm, Dermot Waldron,
for the Secretary General
of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Andrew O'Rourke

STOCKHOLM,¹¹ 17 August 1980

(PR 7(1980) Warsaw)

‘Developments in Poland’

In relation to developments in Poland, and at this point of writing events seem to be moving rather fast and may rapidly overtake this report, one of the big questions, of course, is—whether the Poles will be allowed to settle their problems and to go their own way without direct Russian interference. It has always been clear that from a military and strategic point of view, as well as from a constitutional and macro-political point of view, there is no hope whatever of a major change in Poland's line-up with socialism, the socialist countries and the Warsaw Pact. Even within Poland itself one hears comments, and Poles speak quite freely their views on this subject, that they are not looking for a separation from the socialist bloc or a break away from the Warsaw Pact, but they would like to manage their own economic problems.

2. The Polish papers do not give an account of the strikes taking place in the country (and one of the new demands of the strikers is that they should), and until the last few days Polish television has not referred to the fact that they are taking place. It might be said that the Helsinki documents,¹² in so far as they relate to freedom of information, might as well never have happened. It is very difficult for observers either inside or outside the country to determine the number of strikes and strikers, the real significance of them, the geographical location. Nevertheless, for the last six weeks it is clear that there has been a wave of large significant strikes in important sectors of industry throughout the whole country supported by very large sections of the people. The figure at present mentioned for the current Gdansk strike alone is 50,000. The strikes are of the same nature as 1956,¹³ 1970 and 1976: they are directly related to shortages and prices in the food sector. It is clear also that significant salary increases have already been conceded. A question is whether

¹¹ The Ambassador of Ireland to Poland was also accredited to Sweden and based in Stockholm.

¹² The Helsinki Final Act, signed at the closing of the third phase of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975.

¹³ A reference to events in Poznań in June 1956, when a general strike and mass demonstrations turned into street fighting which was bloodily suppressed by the armed forces.

the strikes can now be said to have taken upon themselves a political character. One of the present requests from the strikers at the big Lenin dock at Gdansk is that there should be erected a memorial to those who lost their lives in the 1970 strike in Gdansk. Is this a political request? Strikers are also requesting that they should be allowed to vote freely for new trade union leaders and not just have to accept the régime's appointed leaders. Is this a political request? At this stage, most observers would say they are political demands. Certainly one is departing fast from the rules which apply in other East European countries and in the Soviet Union; but Poland has always been quite different in a number of fundamental respects from other socialist countries. The leader of the propaganda department in the Polish Politbureau, Mr Jerzy Lukaszewicz,¹⁴ in speaking to foreign newsmen the other day (as reported in the Swedish papers) was very anxious to stress that the strikers had only made economic requests and there was nothing political about their protest. This point relates back to the matter to which we have referred in earlier political reports about Poland, namely, that the nightmare of the Soviet authorities is that one year these economic disturbances should link up with the political and human rights movements in the country and thus produce a real danger for the Polish régime, possibly provoking the dreaded question of the Soviet authorities' interference. We have not seen anywhere in the press or heard suggestions that this has happened yet in Poland. The activities of KOR (the 1976 Committee founded to protect workers who had been involved in strikes and protests from victimisation) are nevertheless very important. According to the Swedish press, it is KOR which has sent out of Poland the information concerning the protest situation in Poland in recent weeks. Mr Lukaszewicz's anxiety to stress that there is nothing political about the strikes taking place is probably directed more to the east than the west. He does not refer to 'strikes' but to 'stoppages.' It is still not possible for a marxist society to accept that workers can rebel against their own régime. Mr Lukaszewicz said this to the foreign press:

'Let us talk about our difficulties. But speak about them peacefully, and in the knowledge that only higher production can help us.'

In his defence it must be said that he only acts as all governments do everywhere when he goes on to indicate in figures what the wave of strikes have already cost Poland.

3. Mr Babiuch, the new Polish Prime Minister spoke in the same terms on Polish television two days ago. He did so the same evening that Mr. Gierek, the First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, had returned from his holiday in the Soviet Union prematurely, where he had met Mr. Brezhnev on the Crimea. Presumably Mr. Gierek gave Mr. Babiuch his instructions. That the Prime Minister should himself make a special appearance on television and appeal for peace and quiet is in itself an

¹⁴ Jerzy Łukaszewicz.

indication of the wide-spread nature and deep roots of the present disturbances. That Mr. Babiuch should find it necessary to tell the Poles that their friends abroad—and no Pole would be in any doubt about which friends were being referred to—were worried about developments in Poland is not unusual. One just wonders how much effect such an appeal and such an observation would have on the average Pole in dealing with his economic problems. Of course it might frighten him. There was considerable self-criticism in Mr. Babiuch's statement (as reported in the Swedish papers). He said the economic situation was 'very serious.' 'Our debts have gone over limits which they should never have reached ... We are with you who discuss and criticize. But we do not solve anything by stopping work. One must separate the time for discussion from the time for work. We certainly do not wish to allow production to stand still.' On one of the big talking-points, the price and shortage of beef, the Polish Prime Minister had very little good news but he did promise that there would not be any further increase in the price of meat in the near future.

4. Will the wave of unrest in Poland develop further? The situation appears to be very tense and it would seem that anything can happen. It is not only outside observers who would like to know the answer, but also the régime in Poland, as well as, of course, Poland's 'friends' abroad. But none of them know the answer. Perhaps the uncertainty lies somewhere in the strange character of the Pole who over the centuries has accepted so much, but at times, such as at the beginning of the last war, in a desperate and puny effort to repel Hitler's tanks, he can show tremendous independence and courage. At the moment, Poland has an advantage in that their closest 'friend' does not wish to bring upon himself any further international criticism by any interference of any kind in Poland (apart from the question of what would happen in Poland itself).

5. There were two very good articles about Poland in the 'Irish Times' on 18th and 19th July.¹⁵ One quoted a Polish columnist¹⁶ as having told the author of the article, Judy Dempsey, that the problem really was 'the system itself.' I must say I have heard this same expression in Poland on a number of occasions from well-informed people. When pressed about solutions and their future, about the current crisis etc. they shrug their shoulders and say the fault is with 'the system. Unless the system changes there will be no improvement.' At the same time, as indicated in the first paragraph above, they do not really expect that any change which comes can be so radical as to effect 'the system itself.'

6. What of the Church at present? It does not seem to have figured prominently but of course it is still there, and of tremendous importance in this as in every aspect of Polish life and development. I am reminded of the Polish driver of the car hired on my last visit to Poland who had been speaking rather contemptuously

¹⁵ These were 'Polish system in crisis' (18 July) and 'Church in role of opposition' (19 July).

¹⁶ Polish economist Waldemar Kuczyński.

of Czechs and their lack of reaction to the Soviet tanks in 1968;¹⁷ asserting that the Polish reaction in such a situation would be quite different, he added 'in any case, the Pope has his arms around us.'

NAI, 2011/39/1744

¹⁷ A reference to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR and a number of Warsaw Pact countries in August 1968.

POLAND

4

**20 August 1980, Circular
by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emil Wojtaszek:
instructions about information measures
connected with events in the country**

Warsaw, 20 August 1980

Secret
IMMEDIATE

CIPHER No. 7414

Heads of all posts

1. You have received information through non-confidential channels concerning the tensions and the strike situation in the country. We particularly wish to draw your attention to Comrade Gierek's speech from the 18th of this month.¹⁸ In order to normalise the situation, very intensive measures are now being taken in keeping with the directives of the Political Bureau. The Secretariat of the Central Committee addressed a letter to all party members, indicating the causes and seriousness of the events and the duties of communists in this situation.

2. Strikes are continuing in the Tri-City,¹⁹ with the essential difference between them and earlier work stoppages elsewhere being that significant influence was gained there by troublemaking and hostile elements, mainly from KOR. They brought about the inclusion in the [workers'] social and economic postulates of demands of an anti-socialist nature which are contrary to our systemic premises (including changes to the electoral law, the legalization of so-called free trade unions, the actual legalization of the opposition and giving it access to the mass media). These elements have gained control of the so-called inter-enterprise strike committee. This committee undermines the discussions the government committee is holding with representatives of the crews of various striking enterprises about the fulfillment of their social and economic postulates. This makes the normalization of the situation difficult.

3. In Szczecin, slogans of solidarity with the strikers in the Tri-City were proclaimed, along with social postulates.

4. The main directions of our actions are:

¹⁸ The speech, in which Edward Gierek called for calm, was broadcast on radio and television and published in the press on 19 August.

¹⁹ Tri-City is the unofficial term used to describe the urban agglomeration made up of Gdynia, Sopot and Gdańsk, three neighboring cities lying on the Baltic Sea coast.

- To act solely using political means, without resorting to violence, through dialogue with representatives of the workers;
- Not to allow any provocations and, should they take place, to contain them and isolate troublemakers and political foes;
- To concretise and implement the social and economic solutions announced in the speeches of Comrade Gierek and Comrade Babiuch;²⁰
- To enable ideological and mobilising activity within the party and in society around issues of paramount importance for the party and the nation. One of the factors that are conducive to making society aware of the significance of these issues is the position of the Church, which is showing restraint and calling for prudence.

Cont'd

To all stations except Moscow, Prague, Berlin—Embassy, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Ulaanbaatar, Hanoi, Pyongyang, Vientiane

5. The aim of our actions abroad should be to prevent events that harm our political economic, trade, credit and other interests. The assessments we are receiving from you and through other channels allow us to state that the climate is favorable for our actions.

6. To work against the anti-Polish and anti-socialist actions of circles that are hostile to us, like leftist groups, the extreme Right, the 'yellow trade unions',²¹ etc.

7. Act calmly and prudently, but offensively, both in your contacts with representatives of the authorities, of political forces, and of propaganda. Make use of all milieus and people that are favorable to us. Inform us about moods and assessments (we receive press reports through the Polish Press Agency)

Wojtaszek

AMSZ, ZD 29/82, w. 13, t. 111 (PDD 1980/II, Doc. No. 90)

²⁰ Babiuch's speech, in which he spoke about the poor state of the economy and called for the resumption of work, was broadcast on radio and television on 15 August.

²¹ The expression 'yellow trade union' refers to unions that only created the appearance of fighting for workers' rights when, in fact, they were subordinated to and served the aims of the employer.

UNITED KINGDOM

5

**22 August 1980, Letter
from the Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary, David Neilands,
to the Private Secretary to the British Prime Minister, Michael Pattison**

22 August 1980

Confidential

Dear Mike,

You asked for an assessment of the current situation in Poland for the Prime Minister. You will by now have seen the report on the situation approved by the JIC yesterday. The following may however help in amplifying this assessment.

The labour unrest in Poland, which began in early July as a result of meat price increases, has escalated in the last 10 days with large-scale strikes in the Baltic ports. These have centred on the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk but have spread to a number of other ports in the area. A large number of enterprises appear to be involved and the strikers have established an inter-factory strike committee to negotiate with the authorities. There have also been rumours of trouble in other areas, including the important mining and industrial area of Silesia and the steel works in Krakow but these remain unconfirmed.

The significant feature of the present strikes is that whereas the strikers' demands in July were exclusively economic, the demands now being put forward include many in the political field which it is virtually impossible for the regime to concede. These include the replacement of the official trade union structure by free trade unions, abolition of censorship and the release of political prisoners. Nevertheless by contrast to the situation in 1970, the unrest has so far been largely confined to strikes and there have been virtually no demonstrations and no violence. The Church, always one of the most powerful sources of influence in Poland, has remained on the side lines.

The reaction of the authorities has been conciliatory. But they have made it clear that they are unable to concede the political demands now being made and are unwilling to negotiate with the inter-factory strike committee. Speeches on TV by Polish leaders, including one by the party leader Mr Gierek, on 18 August, have warned about the serious economic consequences of the strikes and the hardship they are causing to ordinary Polish people. The main tactic of the authorities is likely to be to attempt to isolate the strikers in the Baltic area and avoid the strikes spreading to other parts of the country and to wear down the resistance and solidarity of the workers and induce them to negotiate on a factory by factory basis. This is no doubt the main reason behind the arrests yesterday of 14 dissident leaders since the dissident movement had been acting as one of the main channels of information

on the strikes.²² The authorities have very little room for manoeuvre. They will no doubt be prepared to make further economic concessions to reach a settlement and may also be prepared to introduce some reforms in the trade union system. But they cannot give in on the major political demands without undermining their own authority and risking Soviet intervention. The authorities have said that they will not use force and we believe that they will indeed be very reluctant to do so, not least because Mr Gierek himself came to power as a direct result of the use of the force to put down similar unrest in 1970. Nevertheless, the longer the strikes continue, the more the pressures will mount on the authorities to re-assert their authority by taking tougher action. There are no apparent differences yet within the Polish leadership on how the strikes should be handled and Mr Gierek appears so far to have maintained the confidence of the Soviet Union.

The USSR must however be seriously concerned, both for the situation in Poland itself and for the risk of the contagion spreading to other East European countries including the USSR itself. Their decision to resume jamming the BBC and Voice of America Russian Services on 20 August for the first time since 1973 (a matter which we are instructing HM Ambassador in Moscow to raise) probably reflects the latter fear. We believe, however, that they would be very reluctant to intervene directly unless the situation gets out of control. Afghanistan and the advent of Madrid²³ will make them still more reluctant. Nevertheless the Polish leadership have made a number of allusions to the threat of Soviet intervention and no doubt hope that this will help in persuading the strikers to exercise moderation.

The situation, particularly if it drags on, can only exacerbate Poland's economic problems. Poland's hard currency debts already amount to \$20 billion and they had been hoping for a significant turn round in their hard currency balance of payments this year, not least to revive the flagging banking confidence in the West. They have recently succeeded in obtaining a further loan of \$325 million from a consortium of Western banks and some \$670 million from West German banks. The direct economic effects of the strikes coupled with the inflationary effects of the wage increases the authorities are having to concede and the prospects of another bad harvest can only make the economic outlook extremely gloomy. This will increase the likelihood of further labour unrest, as the authorities try to tackle the problems of the economy, even if they are successful in settling the present difficulties.

There has been virtually no official international comment from any quarter on the situation in Poland so far and Lord Carrington, who has approved the above assessment, considers that so long as the Polish authorities are trying to settle the matter peacefully and there is no outside intervention we should continue to keep

²² This refers to the arrest of opposition figures connected to the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR), including the detainment of Jacek Kuroń on 20 August 1980.

²³ This is a reference to the Second Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe that began in Madrid on 11 November 1980.

a low profile. As you may have seen, in answer to a question about what the West should do, following a lecture to the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm on 19 August, Lord Carrington took the line that in our view this was an internal affair of the Polish people and he hoped that the countries in the surrounding area would take the same view.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Robert Wade-Gery (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,
David Neilands

The National Archives, PREM 19/331

AUSTRIA²⁴

6

29 August 1980, Memo by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Vienna, 29 August 1980

ON THE POLISH CRISIS

1) The extent to which the Polish crisis is viewed as dangerous by the Kremlin results especially from the fact that Moscow apparently agrees with the negotiation tactics of the Polish leadership to allow the concession on the workers' right to strike and thus has had to accept a profound ideological incursion into its immediate area of dominance.

2) The concession on the right to strike touches the dogma of the leadership role of the CP,²⁵ which by definition represents the interests of the working class and derives from this its exclusive claim to power ('leading political force,' according to the Polish constitution). By granting the workers the right to strike, the CP's exclusive right to representation and thus the justification of its monopoly on power as the foundation of the communist regime is called into question.

3) With this, the strike movement could thus make an ideological incursion that is likely to have already exceeded the threshold of tolerance of the CP regime in ideological terms. The CP regime is now obviously striving to intercept this ideological incursion in terms of power politics by strictly refusing any further concessions on the question of admitting 'free,' i.e. trade unions independent of the CP. By maintaining the existing trade union structures (= reform without structural changes), the concessions ('secret' elections, right to strike) can be neutralised via power politics.

4) Further concessions on the part of the government towards the admission of 'free' trade unions, i.e. unions independent of the CP, appear to be excluded since otherwise the mechanism of neutralisation by power politics shown under 2)²⁶ would not be possible and the existence of the regime would be threatened (question of self-preservation).

5) Should the strike movement insist on its demand for the admission of 'free' unions, i.e. unions independent of the CP, an increasing confrontation can be expected, which will inevitably lead to the repressive suppression of the strike movement with the unpredictable consequences associated with it (up to a Soviet intervention).

²⁴ The editors of the Austrian documents thank the Austrian State Archives and its General Director Doz. Dr. Helmut Wahnout, for providing copies of the documents, and Dr. Gregory Weeks, for translating them from German into English.

²⁵ Communist Party; here referring to the Polish United Workers' Party.

²⁶ Correct: under 3).

6) Conclusions:

The current situation is as follows:

a) The regime's tolerance threshold had already been reached once the right to strike was granted, further substantial concessions on the part of the government on the question of the 'free,' i.e. trade unions independent of the CP, are by no means to be expected.

b) The following circumstances speak against the strike movement giving in on the trade union issue:

- It is the central concern of the strike movement,
- Deep crisis of confidence in the relationship between the workers and the government or the CP (previous attempts at democratization in 1956 and 1970 gradually fizzled out),
- Appeals for moderation by the Church, which is very influential in Poland, have thus far not been able to curb the expansion of the strike movement,
- The strike leader's charismatic personality had an impact on the mood of the workers and possibly created illusions about the alleged enforceability of the central issue in the trade union question,
- The solidarization within the strike movement as a result of propagandistic attacks on the part of the CP regime (in particular recent allegations of the activities of 'anti-socialist elements' within the framework of the strike committee).

c) Since the government cannot concede in substantial respects (see point a)), the only possibility for a non-violent settlement of the crisis is for the strike movement to give in (i.e. conceding the substance of the trade union question), which due to the factors mentioned under b) is made more difficult but still appears feasible, provided that

- a corresponding majority building of political will takes place among the strike leaders (in view of the imminent and foreseeable serious danger to the Polish nation),
- through the skilful conduct of negotiations on both sides, this concession leads to a tactical (i.e. apparently only addressing the concerns of the strike movement) pseudo-compromise.²⁷

Austrian State Archive ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 166.03.00/42-II.3/80

²⁷ The memo was written and signed by Counsellor Yuri Standenat at Section II.3 (Eastern Department) and read by several diplomats as well as the Foreign Minister, Willibald Pahr. A handwritten postscript in longhand by Standenat dated 2 September 1980 opined that such a 'pseudo-compromise' in the trade union question was actually achieved in the Gdańsk Agreement of 31 August 1980 and referred to an opinion piece by the journalist Paul Lendvai in the newspaper *Die Presse* of the same day, where he had spoken of a 'victory of reason of state.'

CANADA

7

29 August 1980, Memorandum**by the Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan Gotlieb,
for the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan**Confidential

Ottawa, 29 August 1980

Situation in Poland

The domestic crisis continues in Poland as tension and uncertainty mount. The negotiations between the Joint Strike Committee in Gdansk and the Government Commission have broken down over the intractable issue of free and independent trade unions. Moreover, it appears the Politburo is divided over this ideologically sensitive question. There is evidence in the official media to suggest that some elements of the leadership are prepared to accept independent trade unions as long as these confine their activities to the socio-economic realm. Another faction holds that free, independent trade unions are unacceptable, as they would ultimately intrude into the political sphere which, under the communist system, is the exclusive preserve of the party.

The position of the Church with respect to the present crisis has been ambiguous. On the one hand, statements by the Polish Primate, Cardinal Wyszyński and the Episcopate have called for 'order, peace and reasonable thinking' and have suggested that the strikers moderate their demands in order to arrive rapidly at a settlement and thus spare the Polish nation further hardship. On the other hand, the Church statements reiterate traditional support for an improvement in the peoples' civil and economic rights. Partly as a result of these somewhat contradictory postures, the Church has had little influence in the ongoing negotiations between the strikers and the government.

As the strike activity spreads to Wrocław and Łódź and the economic and political costs of the labour unrest mount, the leadership is under increasing pressure to find a solution. The crucial question appears to be whether the regime can reach an acceptable compromise with the strikers on the free trade union issue. All the other demands of the strikers appear manageable. Although ideologically difficult to accept, the regime would appear to have no alternative to agreeing to the establishment of free trade unions given the unity and insistence of the strikers on this point and the possibly disastrous consequences inherent in a recourse to force.

With regard to the security situation, there is no evidence of unusual activity by either the Polish internal security or regular army forces. Activity by the Soviet forces stationed in Poland (53,000) is considered normal, as is that by the Soviet

forces in the German Democratic Republic and those in the Soviet-Polish border area.

Preparations continue for the 'Comrades-in-Arms' exercise in the German Democratic Republic from September 8th to 12th. This exercise has been in preparation for many months and in no way is connected to the Polish events. In fact, there are indications that some naval-related activity is to be relocated to avoid any such impression. Poland has a large, well-trained and reasonably well-equipped regular army (326,000), plus 2.5 million reservists. Internal security forces (107,000) are well-organized, although the calibre of equipment and conscripts is lower. Morale and discipline in all forces is considered good, although conscripts are bound to reflect public discontent. In the view of the Department of National Defence, the Polish Armed Forces must be considered reliable and responsive to government direction.

The spectre of a Soviet intervention hangs over the Polish crisis and grows each day that it is prolonged without a satisfactory resolution in sight. The Polish media continues to make references to the possibility of a 'national catastrophe' if the crisis is not quickly settled. All the participants in the Polish situation are very aware of the fact that the Soviet Union possesses an ultimate veto over the nature and extent of changes in the Polish system and there are no illusions regarding the Soviet readiness to exercise the veto if the situation warrants.

An unsettling element has been recent Soviet media commentary to the effect that 'anti-socialist elements' were trying to 'push Poland off the socialist road.' The Soviet commentary also criticized the western media for aggravating the Polish crisis and certain reports in the West German press were cited as evidence of German 'revanchism.' Such accusations preceded and were subsequently used to justify the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and their reappearance now in the Soviet press may indicate that the USSR is initiating the political preparation that would be required in the event a decision to intervene was taken.

The USSR, however, is also stressing the positive efforts of the Polish Communist Party to deal with current problems, thus reflecting a Soviet desire to see the Polish party resolve matters on their own. Nevertheless, the Soviet authorities must be concerned lest a Polish solution involve, in Soviet eyes, unacceptable compromises which might have a contagious effect on the rest of the Soviet Bloc. Such a situation would oblige them to act.

This action might not initially take the form of an armed intervention, but rather of a political attempt to steer the Polish party back into a more orthodox path and to define for them and the Polish population the acceptable limits to change. This would parallel the events of October 1956 when the Kremlin extended an invitation to the Polish Politburo to come to Moscow for consultations. When the Poles declined this offer, Khrushchev and a high-level delegation arrived uninvited in Warsaw to discuss the crisis. The tradition of Polish party autonomy, its independent

handling of previous crises, and the nationalist and anti-Soviet sentiments of the populace all militate against heavy-handed political interference in Polish affairs.

Although the Soviet Union is compelled to keep its options open vis-à-vis political and military intervention, there are numerous reasons that argue against such intervention. Among these are the fact that Poland does not border directly on a western state, the absence of any challenge to Poland's alliance with the USSR, or to Communist party supremacy as such, the fact that reforms have originated outside the party (which, while responding to them has not yet been taken over by reformers as was the case in Czechoslovakia under Dubcek), the possibility of serious resistance by the Polish population, the almost certain end it would put to détente coming so quickly after the Afghanistan invasion, and the remote but not negligible chance that it could somehow escalate into a NATO/Warsaw Pact confrontation.

This suggests that while the Soviet Union will not permit communist power to be overthrown in any of its East European satellites, it will go to great lengths to avoid using force in Poland. A crucial factor is the extent of deviance from the Soviet model of a communist system the USSR is prepared to tolerate. The example of Hungary, Romania and pre-crisis Poland indicate the relatively large leeway the USSR has allowed its Eastern European allies, although the case of Czechoslovakia demonstrates that limits do exist. To date the only demands of the workers which seem to be really disquieting for the Russians are those for free trade unions and the abolition of censorship. If the former can be sufficiently qualified so as not to pose a political threat (e.g., purely economically-oriented unions along North American rather than West European lines) and the latter sufficiently circumscribed to prevent anti-socialist propaganda, the Soviet leadership should, in the circumstances, be able to live with such changes. The calls for economic reform have not exceeded those already implemented in Hungary and even the demand for media access for the Church has its precedents in East German and Hungarian practice.

The possibility that the Polish regime itself will use force to end the crisis cannot be excluded. This option, however, appears unlikely, given the public assurances by the government that it will not resort to force, the non-violent character of the strikes, the bitter legacy of the 1970 riots when force was used, the possibility of an intense public backlash, and some lingering doubts as to the willingness of the army or the police to fire on workers.

In response to appeals from all the Polish parties involved, western governments have taken the line that the Polish crisis is an internal affair that the Poles themselves should resolve. Moreover, there has been no significant comment on the substance of the present turmoil, which reflects a western desire not to provide the Soviet Union with a pretext for intervention, nor to impart false hopes to the Polish workers that an alternative to the communist regime is feasible.

Although reaching an agreement between the government and the strikers would resolve the immediate political crisis, the economic crisis will remain in an aggravated state. It is almost certain that Poland would have to approach the west for economic assistance, principally but not exclusively for the rescheduling of its debt. There would be strong political reasons for the west to ensure the financial stability of the new liberalized Polish regime and hence to look favourably on the Polish requests. Canada, as a major lender and a significant trading partner, would undoubtedly be involved in any such assistance programme. The question of high-level visits to Poland (e.g., by the Prime Minister, yourself and the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce) already in the offing would take on a new imperative and significance in the light of our bilateral relations with a post-crisis Poland.²⁸ It is too early as yet to pronounce on the outcome of the crisis and the exact nature of subsequent Polish requests, but your scheduled meeting with the new Polish Foreign Minister on September 26th could provide an opportunity to explore these possibilities.²⁹

A.E.G.³⁰

**Library and Archives Canada, Department of External Affairs fonds,
Vol. 16025, File 20-POLND-1-4, Pt. 7**

²⁸ The visits did not take place.

²⁹ Marginal note: 'Thanks—I agree with your suggestions.' [MacGuigan]

³⁰ Allan E. Gotlieb.

FRANCE**8**

**1 September 1980, Telegram
from the French Ambassador in Warsaw, Jacques Dupuy,
to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

1 September 1980

Victory of the Gdańsk strikers: shaking of the regime.

After 18 days of harsh but non-violent confrontation with the authorities, the Baltic strikers have won in every respect. Although a degree of uncertainty remains, the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee (MKS) affirms that almost all of its 21 demands have been satisfied, and in particular those that are most unacceptable to the regime: the right to strike, creation of free independent trade unions, reform of censorship, church access to television, release of political prisoners.

The clause of respect for the principles of socialism and the party's leading role does not save the party's face. The system has faltered, despite all the weight of an apparatus that remains outwardly intact.

1) The authorities could not have been surprised by the strikes in the Baltic shipyards (trouble spots in 1970), albeit with a late start, after six weeks of sporadic walkouts all over the place. There was some initial confusion about the nature and motivation of the movement and contact with the MKS was refused, even if that meant disavowing the first plenipotentiary, rejecting and then accepting to negotiate on the 21 points. From then on, Warsaw took a tougher stance, with Mr Gierek denouncing the politicisation of the strike by 'anarchist and anti-socialist' leaders (first speech of 18 August). The key members of the KOR movement, the workers' social self-defence committee, which emerged following the events of 1976, have been arrested. The Lenin shipyard did not seem in the least impressed.

The sacking of the prime minister, the widespread purge of the party, the outpouring of self-criticism, the promise and especially the offer of reform of the official trade union on the basis of free elections (second speech of the 24th), did nothing to erode the solidarity of the strikers, nor did the rather weak call by the cardinal primate for a return to work.

For the MKS, free trade unions only made sense outside of a party-dependent central office.

The party leadership, undermined from within and subject to contradictory pressures, did not want to concede but had no other means of imposing its will without force. However, Mr Gierek had ruled that option out because it was not clear how, without using tanks as in Gdansk in 1970, he could storm an overcrowded Lenin shipyard, adorned with portraits of the Pope, hoisted with Polish flags,

resounding with hymns and portraying a spectacle of calm resolution to the world, unlike the crowds in Gdansk and Poznan, which had attacked the militia and burned down the party's premises. In the shipyard, Lenin stood next to the cross and the white eagle.

2) However, the analogy with this sequence of events is profound in many ways. The origin: a sudden increase in prices, labour standards. The context: the demand for free trade unions independent of the party, which had already been demanded in 1970, and since 1976, and, above all, the refusal to rely on the promises of the authorities, which have fooled the workers at every turn. As Lech Walesa, president of the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee, improvised leader of the strikers and a worker himself, said, only the existence of independent trade unions gives workers a means of pressure and legal control.

The MKS undoubtedly had progressive and Catholic intellectuals among its advisors, but it took great care to distance itself from any specific opposition group, and there was no 'down with the USSR' chant, like in Poznan, nor was any criticism of socialism allowed in the assembly hall. However, the demands for freedom of speech, access to the media, the release of political prisoners, and self-management are in line with Jacek Kuron's ideas on the primacy of democratic reform, as well as those of active liberal intelligentsia, whose signatures were increasingly appearing on manifestos.

Nothing, better than the determination of the Gdansk workers, could prove that the Polish people aspire to something other than semi-freedom, that they are infuriated by a faceless bureaucracy and by the poor living conditions of some in contrast with the privileges of others. Must we accept new sacrifices to pay the price of a leadership that the party itself recognises as a failure?

3) The PUWP can only be deeply humiliated by this submission so strongly forced on it by the working class, in whose name it governs. There may be an ulterior motive to limit the extent of the concessions made under the new laws on trade unions and freedom of speech. However, it will first be necessary to be seen to play the game, while justifying itself to its dominant neighbour which is presented with a fait accompli: a difficult task.

On the human front, it would be wise to postpone a new settlement of scores after the recent purge of the fourth plenum,³¹ and this is why Mr Gierek, who is accused of losing contact with the masses, he who had found a way to communicate with the workers in the midst of the riot ten years ago, is able to remain in position as First Secretary. However, he has been conspicuously absent from television screens for the last week.

³¹ The 4th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party took place on 24 August 1980.

4) The social crisis will continue from an economic perspective since it will be necessary to honour the wage increases, to supply the butcher's shops with emergency meat imports, and to suffer the consequences of the losses in export earnings.

On the political scene, repercussions will be more unpredictable but no less certain. The party feared that independent trade unionism would become a counter-power. It was probably right. Moreover, the August crisis produced political ferment in Polish society, including within the party: all the manifestos give the same message: faster democratisation and liberalisation of the system, without contesting that the 'Polish reason of state'—i.e. relations with the Soviet Union—imposes certain limits, but at the same time maintaining, if possible, the recent dynamics of late summer.

In any case, things will never be the same again. The concessions made by the government are a win that was unthinkable only eight days ago. What does this mean in terms of power: a new Poland or a new confrontation?³²

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve, Diplomatic Archives Center,
FRMAE_1929INVA/4584, Europe, 1976–1980, Poland**

³² The telegram was also distributed to French diplomatic posts in Berlin, Brussels, Budapest, London, New York, Rome, Tirana, Washington, Belgrade, Bonn, Bucharest, Helsinki, Moscow, Prague, Sofia and Vienna.

ITALY

9

**1 September 1980, Telegram
from the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw, Marco Favale,
to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Warsaw, 1 September 1980

Confidential
Absolute Priority

No. 00823-00824

Subject: Polish crisis—Agreement between the workers' movement
and the Government

The conclusion of the agreements signed at the end of the week—after a series of ups and downs that seemed, on one side and on the other, to be a prelude to a test of strength between the workers' movement and the Government—lends itself to some preliminary assessment, immediately examined comparatively with those of the colleagues representing the EEC.

A feeling of satisfaction for the perspectives that have been thus opened is visible in everyone; but at the same time a feeling of relief, especially in the German Ambassador, who in the last days appeared to be extremely worried that the 'situation could escape from someone's hand' and for the 'incalculable consequences that could also arise not only for Poland but also for Ostpolitik generally.'

The agreements, of which I am transmitting the full text by courier, introduce a series of factors, including:

a) liberalisation (in the field of censorship, where there will be instances of administrative appeal); freedom of the press, radio and television, which should allow 'a diversity of ideas, opinions and judgments'; the 'guarantee of a respect for opinions in public and professional life'; freedom to debate within 'any environment and any categories on the program of reforms'; possibility, to an extent to be regulated, of access to media by all religious confessions, that is, in practice, in Poland, by the Catholic Church, which has always been one of its fundamental claims; suppression of repression for opinion crimes (and thus the release of all the political prisoners or dissidents recently arrested);

b) 'workers' participation,' through a new legislation that shall guarantee 'considerably increased autonomy for companies and an effective participation by self-managed workers' cells in the decisions concerning the management of companies' and a return of 'rural self-managed bodies' for farmers' property;

c) trade unions' pluralism, through the admission (also to be regulated by legislation) of new free trade unions alongside the official ones, the independence

of which is guaranteed by the reference to the convention of the International Organization of Labour and which must have all the technical and information instruments regarding the living conditions of workers available;

d) progress towards the creation of a *de facto* workers' rule, through the transformation of the committees for the right to strike into new unions or into new self-management committees, and through the recognition—although within the qualifications and the mechanism provided for—of the right to strike (see my n. 812).

On the other hand, however, the government wanted to be cautious in inserting a whole series of counter-factors and counterweights, i.e., the limitations 'resulting from the Constitution of the People's Republic of Poland' and 'from its international alliance system.' The ambiguities [and] contradictions that emerge from the conflict between these explicit limits and the contents and potentials of the political-union innovations thus introduced will provide the framework for the dialectics and for the 'free international and European debate' that is now beginning.

2) However, within this framework, there is a wide agreement, shared by my EEC colleagues, that one should not entertain the delusion about the size of the effort—under the pressure partly from the more orthodox factions within the Party and partly from power conflicts both internal and international—which will have to be undertaken in order to reduce the breadth of this liberalisation process and to rearrange everything within the system and the spirit of the system. As of now, during the post-war era, there has been a reduction of political pluralism, in theory here still in full force, to a purely fictitious and nominal pluralism. The campaign, which is still continuing in the press, against 'anti-socialist' forces; the 'no' already expressed against the 'politicisation' of the new unions; the possibility, already mentioned, of 'coordinating' the latter with the official unions; the fact that in the East and in Poland, during the 'socialist phase,' a 'diversity of opinions and interests' is still ideologically provided for, but it should consist in 'non-conflictual and non-antagonistic contradictions,' which should always end up by converging in the construction of socialism; the trend, already evident in Jagielski's negotiating platform (see my n. 812), to reduce the freedom of the press to the usual freedom of self-criticism; the possibility that the unlimited freedom of choice among candidates in the union elections can become a variation of the same that already exists, to a certain extent, in the political elections among candidates, sometimes 'without a party,' but never 'against the Party' (or 'anti-socialist').

This is clear from—and I have reported on this previously—the offensive, which has already started, of the representatives of 'party pluralism,' of the 'peasants,' of the 'democrats' and of the 'progressive Catholics' to become active parts in the regime's liberalisation, and—presenting themselves as bearers of a 'diversity of opinions and interests,' which at most might be somewhat revitalised—to reabsorb

such liberalisation within its own schemes of ‘collaboration-competition,’ for the purpose of ‘constructing socialism.’

3) The final result, if all goes well, according to a forecast offered a few days ago, could be a progress towards freer and more autonomous forms of Polish socialism, but one which still should be understood within the limits of the ideological and international system to which Poland belongs.

This would be a result that might be realistically appreciated by the West as a maximum, taking into account the present international balances and the relationship of strength; and even in Moscow, all in all, as a minor evil, which, despite the dangers of contagion and a further reduced cohesion and resistance of the system, would avoid the explosion of the Polish ‘witches’ cauldron.’

4) There is, among EEC colleagues, a full convergence of opinions, that the attention that the West—and particularly Western Europe—will give to this debate and the support of moral solidarity and political and cultural thought that they can hope to give to it, will constitute an important element and contribution to its final results; in the same way that economic aid to Poland, appropriately qualified and presented, will be able to help Poland to defend and maintain its current economic-political balances.

There is a unanimous consensus that, in substance, this debate will be an essential phase—although no longer a diplomatic one, but rather one directly embedded and experienced at a national level—of the historical cycle which was opened by the Helsinki agreements, and that this dialectic will also be in a good measure provided for by the two alternative readings—the Western one and the Eastern one—which have long been offered of the Helsinki agreements and of the fundamental freedoms that they proclaim.³³

Favale

**Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation,
Historical Diplomatic Archives, (hereinafter ASMAE), DGAP, Uff. VI, 1980, b. 199,
fasc. *Agitazioni operaie in Polonia, settembre 1980, A/1 Pol.***

³³ The DGAP, Office VI sent the telegram for information to Italian Embassies and Representations, to the Consulate General in Berlin and to its Offices II, IV and VII.

POLAND

10

2 September 1980, Circular
by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Czyrek:
instructions for discussions on the internal situation of the PRP

Warsaw, 2 September 1980

IMMEDIATE

Secret

CIPHER No. 7778

HEADS OF POSTS—to be implemented –

Zone I, without Havana and Lima

Zone II, without Nicosia

Zone IV, only Tokyo

Attn: All Socialist Countries

1. After the signing of the agreements with the strikers, we are observing an escalation of hostile actions, with 'praise' and 'statements' of dubious value. Some Western politicians, Genscher for example, are taking advantage of routine conversations with the ambassador of the PRP to issue communiqués that contain derogatory formulations (thanking the West German government for its understanding position). 'Expressions of support' for the new trade unions and ploys like Reagan's meeting with the Wałęsa family are especially provocative. All this works against us, and actually even constitutes an attempt to interfere in our internal affairs.

2. We must strongly resist such policies and actions and not become involved in ventures of doubtful value and seemingly benevolent support. In particular:

a) Do not, without instructions from Headquarters, conduct any official talks with reference to the Polish leadership and do not express on its behalf any judgments on the position of the country of posting.

b) Do not allow them to use the fact that discussions are being held for propaganda gains.

c) During discussions, emphasise our political principles: Poland's socialist character, keeping any changes within our systemic framework, loyalty to our alliances, the fundamental importance of friendship and cooperation with the USSR, and continuity in the pursuit of our foreign policy coordinated within the Warsaw Pact.

d) Do not allow, and strongly condemn, any attempt to use our events and arrangements against the fraternal Socialist Countries and communist and workers' parties.

e) Counteract, and even strongly condemn, all manifestations of and attempts to interfere in our internal affairs, including the solidarity-assistance campaign for the new trade unions.

f) Do not give in to pressure or become drawn into making doubtful statements, giving interviews, taking part in television discussions, etc.

We continue to expect that you will act with caution and in keeping with the interests of our socialist Fatherland.

Regards,

Czyrek

AMSZ, ZD 29/82, w. 13, t. 111 (PDD 1980/II, Doc. No. 163)

NETHERLANDS

11

**3 September 1980, Code message
from the Dutch Embassy Councillor in Warsaw, Paul Legendijk,
to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Warsaw, 3 September 1980

Subject: Labour unrest in Poland

The following is my preliminary evaluation of events in Poland over the past 2 months. As is well known, unrest in the form of occasional strikes began in early July after unannounced sharp increases of meat prices of about 60 percent. Meat occupies a prominent place in Poland's consumption pattern and is an extremely sensitive subject due to persistent shortages. The Babiuch government, apparently believing that the Poles were sufficiently prepared for the need to reduce the unbearable subsidy burden, made a major psychological error in misjudging the popular mood. Incidentally, it is certain that an increase in meat prices was only the direct incentive for an explosion of years of pent-up frustration among the population about shortages of consumer goods and a failed economic policy.

The strikes were initially met by the authorities with promises of requested wage increases of 10 to 20 percent, but—unsurprisingly—spilled over to other companies across virtually the entire country. Apart from a more or less general strike in Lublin (southeast), strikes were limited to occasional companies. Demands were always of an economic nature.

In the second week of August, this picture suddenly changed when strikers in the Gdansk shipyards—the scene of serious riots in 1970—after first accepting a pay rise, came forward with political desires. Why this happened is an interesting question, which is not easy to answer.

Plausible explanation for this appears to be that, with a view to the 10-year commemoration of the riots of 1970 next December, protesting workers had already drawn up a program of demands (especially free unions) for action in December. However, when the activist Anna Walentynowicz was fired during the strike, this led to general outrage and the situation seemed ripe for a continuation of the strike and much more far-reaching demands. As is known, the conflict then escalated quickly to a general strike throughout the Baltic coastal region, to the establishment of broad-based strike committees, and to a serious political crisis with potentially important East-West implications.

Conduct of workers.

Striking workers have continually shown surprising organizational ability and self-discipline. Supported by the Polish people, both have contributed decisively to the ultimate success of the actions. The strike committees, set up out of nowhere,

negotiated skillfully and with restraint with experienced politicians and showed great political maturity. People were well aware of the fact that such consultations were unique in the history of the communist system. Reporters who visited the shipyard and thus made developments known worldwide, were impressed by the mood of euphoria that had taken hold of everyone. A very important role was played in this strike by its leader Lech Wałęsa, a workers' activist, who showed remarkable leadership and even charismatic qualities.

Concessions finally won include:

- the possibility of setting up independent self-governing trade unions;
- the recognition of the right to strike;
- promotions on the basis of performance and not on that of communist party membership;
- no reprisals against strikers;
- payment of wages during the strikes;
- a reduction of official censorship (this will be followed by a draft law);
- a weekly broadcast of a Roman Catholic Mass on the radio;
- the release of all arrested dissidents;
- the publication of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- measures to improve the food situation;
- publication of the agreement reached between the government and MKS by the mass media.

On the other hand, the strikers have had to recognise the primacy of the Communist Party. Many details will still need to be worked out. For example, a new law on trade unions will be drawn up, in which the powers of trade unions must be laid down. Furthermore, the relationship between the official and the new trade unions is not clear. There is thus considerable scope for disputes over the interpretation of the agreement. It is possible that other commitments, such as improving the food situation, may not be honoured even if the government would be willing to do so.

Position of Gierek.

His position has, in general opinion, been weakened. Within the party he is exposed to attacks from multiple sides. Among the population he has lost a much authority now that his 2 personal interventions to end the strikes have had no effect. He was forced to drop confidants such as Prime Minister Babiuch³⁴ and Deputy Prime Minister Pyka and had to accept the return of opponents like his rival Olszowski. He did so with reference to 'the appointment to responsible positions of comrades who have warned us when shortcomings were accumulating, but whose voices were not heard at the time.' The same criticism that emerges from this hangs over his future as a dark shadow. He now has a formidable opponent alongside him

³⁴ Prime Minister Edward Babiuch was removed from office on 24 August 1980.

as a member of the Politburo and of the Central Committee's secretariat in the person of Olszowski, who is known to be a strong supporter of economic reforms. The latter's liberal image does not mean that Olszowski is not a convinced Marxist, but he would, it is assumed, be acceptable to Moscow.

Gierek's departure is not immediately expected. However, it is likely that the meeting of the Central Committee will produce some changes or appointments in the short term. (The Politburo currently has 12 instead of 14 members and no official has yet been appointed to be responsible for trade union organisation). Whichever way this will turn out, it is certain that the Politburo, which after the 8th party congress last February was homogeneous in composition, will no longer be so.

Role of the Roman Catholic Church.

The Church has emerged strengthened from this crisis. She fought for access to the mass media for years. The weekly radio broadcast of a Catholic Mass is a unique concession on the part of the government. Differences can be observed between the actions of lower clergy during the crisis and that of the higher hierarchy. Local lower clergy stood unequivocally behind the striking workers, while Cardinal Wyszyński, in addressing believers in the pilgrimage town of Czestochowa, called for calm and responsibility. However, the cardinal's references to workers' legitimate desires were not included in the television broadcasts, which in themselves were without precedent. That the cardinal was guided by the welfare of the Polish nation, the strikers understood.

Dissidents.

During the first 6 weeks of the strikes, dissidents of the committee for social resilience KOR played a vital role in relaying strike messages to Western media. That they in fact instigated the strikes is doubtful. But for the first time, an alliance between dissident intellectuals and workers was forged. That dissidents were not arrested earlier is probably because the authorities believed that they would be able to control the strikes without creating an image of repression. When the workers' unrest turned into a political crisis, they were arrested. Several of the political demands, such as an end to censorship and church access to the media, are believed to be instigated by dissidents. In accordance with the promise, they were all released on 1 September.

International aspects.

These have been comprehensive and are well known.

A few caveats.

It is not impossible that the hardening of the Soviet position has increased the willingness of both the Polish government and the strikers to reach an agreement. The famous *Pravda* article from last Monday, which sharply attacked strike leaders as anti-socialist elements, appears to have been written before the agreement, but was published anyway as a warning that a limit has been reached. The possibility of

a Soviet intervention was certainly taken into account here in Poland, but only as an option if all other means would have failed and chaos had been total.

Provided that the agreement just reached with the striking Silesian miners, who demand similar concessions, will today lead to a return to work, it can be said in conclusion that the workers have emerged victorious from the battlefield. They have obtained concessions that were considered impossible until now. The regime and the party have suffered severe damage in authority and credibility. Translation of the agreement into practical measures can, however, easily lead to new problems. The workers who have discovered the power of bourgeois disobedience, will then, unlike after 1970, probably not hesitate to seize this same weapon. Poland's political and economic future is uncertain.

Lagendijk 147

Netherlands National Archive, 2.05.330, BZ, inv.nr. 9881

UNITED KINGDOM

12

**3 September 1980, Telegram
from the British Ambassador in Warsaw, Kenneth Pridham,
to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington**

Warsaw, 3 September 1980, 12.20 p.m.

Immediate, Confidential

MIPT: Polish crisis.

1. As important as the concessions themselves is the fact that they have been wrung from the Government in the glare of radio and TV publicity and have been enshrined in formal written agreements. This means that the issues have been publicly discussed, the regime's inadequacy confessed, genuine collective bargaining has been visible, and the agreements, unlike those of 1956 and 1970, are on record. To return to the *status quo ante* will, short of Soviet intervention, be almost impossible. The 1956 spring could be clawed back but the world (and the workers' sophistication) has moved on since then.

2. The government has successfully defended the leading role of the party, the collectivist ethic and the country's international alliances. Probably only the former was at all difficult. The signature ceremonies took place under a banner reading 'Workers of the world unite,' and right-wing dissidents seemed entirely out of the picture. But to yield at all in such circumstances was of course a shattering defeat for the regime. Just how the new trade unions will develop is uncertain but they can hardly fail to become a force in the country parallel to the Party/Government and the Church. Most ominous of all for the regime is the discovery by organised workers of the power of the strike weapon. When they find (see below) that things will have to get worse before they get better, they may use it again and in a less restrained manner. There is plenty of scope also for argument on implementation of the agreements.

3. Many of the strikers' demands covered comparatively minor matters concerning conditions of work, shifts, health arrangements, leave, pensions, etc. This suggests that had the government been sufficiently in touch with the feelings of the workers and dealt with such grievances a few months ago (i.e. if the party congress in February had fulfilled its proper function), things might not have come to boil as they did. There has certainly been a massive failure of communication. The regime's best hope now is to learn to accept the situation, to offer some genuine power-sharing and, most of all, to establish a proper dialogue with the people. Only in this way might the party revivify itself and stand any chance of capturing the new unions, which may be its ultimate aim. Meanwhile there are a lot of economic and

social grievances which the unions could occupy themselves with for some time without impinging further on politics.

4. A major difficulty however is that so many of the strikers' demands, e.g. for higher pay, lower prices, shorter hours and more meat, will in the short run exacerbate economic difficulties. And new union power will make it harder to reduce over-manning and increase the mobility of labour. Without an economic miracle or large new borrowing, the Government's promises of more food and more flats cannot be made good. Disappointments in these fields may lead to new strikes with less responsible leaders making impossible political demands and perhaps thinking Soviet intervention a paper tiger.

5. The logic of all this is that the West needs to help to keep Poland afloat rather as we kept Tito afloat in the 1950s for different reasons.

6. MIFT discusses more fully the economic implications.³⁵

**The National Archives, FCO 28/4161
(DBPO, The Polish Crisis, 1979–1982, Doc. No. 19)**

³⁵ The telegram was also distributed to British posts in Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Budapest, Bucharest, East Berlin, Belgrade, UKDEL NATO, Washington, Paris, Bonn, MODUK.

ITALY

13

**4 September 1980, Report
by the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw, Marco Favale,
for the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emilio Colombo**

Warsaw, 4 September 1980

No. 3124

Minister,

in my report No. 2058 of May 29, 1980 I advanced the argument that the Soviet Union, as aggressive as it is in terms of armament and conquering new security positions on its Asian and Afghan borders, was really reduced, both politically and ideologically, to a defensive position by its many chronic weaknesses and, in the first place, by the poor cohesion of its system; and I further noted that these two aspects were not contradictory, despite their appearance, but rather complementary. The Polish Summer provided the first, prompt verification of this assumption.

The economic crisis, which also promises to be a structural and long-lasting one in the East, forces a return to resorting to the categories of our economic logic, starting with the relationship between productivity and wages that has been so often mentioned in recent weeks by the Polish leadership. But above all, it exacerbates in an unbearable way the gap between what Marxism-Leninism has promised and what it has maintained, between the standard of living in the West and that in the East.

The economic crisis thus leads to the ideological crisis; and the latter, by widening the cleavage between the legal country and the real country, between imported Marxist-Leninist internationalism and the permanent and underlying historical and spiritual reality of the country, provokes the national crisis. The surface of the 'socialist brotherhood' is thus torn off.

But the Polish summer is not only the first, and macroscopic, verification of the crisis in the East. It is something worse for Moscow. It is a scandal, in the precise sense that Tertullian gave to the scandal which, in the long run, ended up by causing the pagan world to collapse, even though it was so self-assured of its own strength and its invincibility.

The scandal of the workers striking against themselves; scandal of the victory, over Lenin, of Sorel, Rosa Luxembourg and also Péguy, who saw in the struggling workers the bearers of the dignity and honor of social, but also of Catholic and national ideals, and who would have loved Walesa's character so much; the scandal of a communist country which denies its confidence in the government with which it should identify itself in compact unity and where the head of the Party, similarly to the president of the French Fifth Republic, does not feel to be directly involved

and dismisses the Prime Minister, loyal to him and in office for only a few months, as well as half of the government. But above all, the scandal of the principle of non-recourse to violence, expressing a true human, social and national brotherhood, against which the weapons of the new Goliath are blunted.

2) The agreements between the workers' movement and the government only mark the end of the first 'round.' If all goes well, there will be a liberalisation of the press, of the mass media, and more generally of the whole cultural-political life of the country, which will be able to attain the same level that had been reached during the first Gomulka era and perhaps even exceed it.

We could arrive at some form of workers' participation: a sort of return to 1956, when Gomulka sent delegations to study Yugoslavia. Participation is compatible with the Marxist-Leninist system; indeed, in its perfect form, the elimination of the state and self-government represents its final stage. But it is already now clear that in no case will it be possible to arrive at the intensity of the Yugoslav model, of which, in addition to everything else, the fundamental prerequisites of national independence are lacking.

The foundations have been laid for a workers' power which will have its own independent trade unions and which—even if it will not be a real tribunal of the people, with its right of veto capable of leading to the legitimation of the strike—will at least be able to act as another parallel power, alongside with the Church; and thus to initiate in Poland, in a country that history has always educated to make the most of all the gray areas and all the margins left by law or foreign control, a *de facto* pluralism.

It will be a long and difficult journey. This liberalisation, this participation, this new counter-power will have to deal with the virtuosity of Marxist-Leninist dialectics: highly skilled in bringing everything back to its own system and to the 'spirit of the system'; a master in reducing the political categories that do not suit it to an empty shell or in filling them with new and wholly different contents. And it will take place under the watchful and suspicious eyes of Moscow and the other eastern neighbors.

But also, under the eyes of the world's public opinion, whose 'mass media,' for the first time, have opened a big breach in the communist camp. The conversation—diffused by the loudspeakers in the occupied area and repeated by the international press, between Walesa, who believes that trade union freedom means one very specific thing, and Jagielski, who patiently tries to make him understand that, instead, it means many and different things—may have surprised the common sense and Western logic of the workers who were listening to him. But, certainly, those who live every day in political and diplomatic practice are not surprised by the clash between our reading and the Eastern reading of the Helsinki agreements, between our interpretation of fundamental freedoms and that which the East gives them.

3) But all this does not complete the overall picture. The 'Polish question' has been re-proposed. Poland has ceased to be an object of East-West relations, often valued only for the distance it could take from Moscow on this or that specific problem. Thanks to its workers and to a whole people in solidarity with them, Poland once again becomes a subject, and an active subject, of these relations.

Russia in Poland has always followed two policies. The first of Russification, of assimilation, of a struggle against Catholicism and of orthodoxy: in short, to make Poland a province of the Empire. The other policy, which was the policy of Alexander I, Emperor in Russia and King in Poland, of the personal and federative union between the two countries, with respect for the historical, cultural and religious personality of Poland, but reserving its foreign and military policy for Russia: federative ties, but close and indissoluble. These two policies, alternatively practiced until 1917, have both failed. Poland felt too Western and European (the Pole is a 'civis Romanus,' as the Primate used to say) and wanted full independence and freedom.

Russia paid dearly for this failure and all her repressions in Poland. In many ways, due to the large part that her intellectuals and her cadres took in it, the October Revolution was also Poland's nemesis and revenge against Tsarism. This suggests what sinister echoes an 'intervention' in Poland or the Polish 'contagion' can evoke in the Kremlin, among the current successors of the Tsars.

In this postwar period, after some initial slippage—the proconsular regime and the appointment of Rokosowski—the Soviet Union after 1956 opted definitively for the second policy, where Moscow's ideology and trust (which had greatly supported Gierek during the crisis) replaced Slavic brotherhood and personal loyalty to the Tsar. But even in the new form the ties with Russia had to be so 'indissoluble' that an attempt was made to anchor the concept in the new Polish constitution; it was waived only in the face of the revolt of public opinion.³⁶

But Russian-Polish relations also had an international influence. It is worth reading, among diplomatic memoirs on the First World War, the account of the steps that the French ambassador took from time to time with regard to the Tsar to advocate the cause of Polish independence (instructions of the kind Sonnino was careful not to send them to the HM's ambassador in Petersburg; it will take Sforza reconnecting with the traditions of the Risorgimento to resume the politics of nationalities, also towards Poland and its new borders).

³⁶ The Constitution of the People's Republic of Poland was amended by Act of Parliament on 10 February 1976. This led to protests since, among other things, the act contained a new article that gave constitutional rank to relations with the USSR, and which stipulated that 'The People's Republic of Poland in its policy: [...] strengthens friendship and cooperation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other socialist countries.' Moreover, it also stated that 'The leading political force of society in the building of socialism is the Polish United Workers' Party'; Journal of Laws 1976, No. 5, item 29.

‘Poland’s independence, that’s fine; but in an untouchable union with Russia, and as long as it doesn’t create illusions or excite hot heads in Lithuania, White Russia and Ukraine. However, that’s not enough. To rebuild an independent Poland, it must be reconstituted within its historical borders. Poland will therefore have to get back all its lands now in the hands of the German Empire and perhaps even go further, to obey fundamental security requirements on which the general staff does not compromise. This will probably lead to the shattering of German unity; the cause, after all, of so many troubles for Europe.’

[This was] a program that was meticulously carried out in 1945; but that shows how Gierek was not completely wrong when, in his television appeal to the country, he made an effort to explain the interdependence between the German problem and the Polish problem—which justifies all the alarm of the GDR.

4) This essential national component of the Polish problem introduces another permanent element of risk and complications. In Poland, as in the liberal-national Europe of the last century before Marxist internationalism, fundamental freedoms and the liberty of the nation are inseparable; and also, as in Guelph Italy of 1848, they are still closely linked to the religious and Catholic factor. And the election of a Polish Pope, even if it did not have the catalytic and reunifying effect that the election of Pius IX had in our country, made his influence be felt. The portraits of the Pope on the gates, the mass in the factory and the recurring singing of the national anthem evoked images of our ‘48.

Will the Polish people be satisfied with the new spaces of liberalisation, without any progress on the national question? To what extent will the process that has now begun acquire strength to develop in this direction? And will this connection be accepted by the Soviet Union, which on the contrary has always, until now, as in the case of Rumania, accepted autonomy in the foreign policy of the countries belonging to its system but on the condition that it was compensated by the alignment in internal and ideological politics, or, as in the case of Poland, vice versa?

Nor should many other factors of uncertainty and risk be neglected. No economic crisis is conducive to structural reforms; least of all in Poland, where the only principle of Marxism-Leninism that the Poles seem to have learned is that in economics, miracles can be made, and where now the rulers are scrambling to explain that this is not true, and that ‘no one can make miracles’ and that ‘no economic management can distribute more than it produces.’ Libertarian and romantic ferments remain in the country, which even the Church can struggle to control. Moreover, Poland was the country of ‘confederations’: if the government did not stick to social pacts, the original and constitutional ones or the additional ones, each party would use its freedom of action, the government on one side and free men on the other. The ‘commune’ of Gdansk was, in its own way, a ‘confederation,’ a peaceful confederation. It could rise again and extend itself. The government and

the party know this, and they will have to be careful, in applying the agreements, not to pull too hard.

5) It is still very early to evaluate all the consequences of the Polish summer, even within the communist world and its environs. But already now, a series of questions and issues may be examined, as far as the next stages are concerned.

How will Moscow react to East-West relations? It is thinkable that it will evaluate the Polish crisis as a success for NATO and for European strategy and will draw conclusions that are unlikely to proceed in the direction of a greater flexibility, notwithstanding the necessity in which it finds itself to carry on détente in Europe. The speeches that I hear—namely that the missile negotiations and the European Conference on Disarmament have a fundamental and common objective of defending the status quo of military equilibrium ‘already achieved’ in Europe (that is, that if NATO really wants to apply its decision taken in December, at least in part, it will have to renounce corresponding parts of the FBS)—are not encouraging. And it is perhaps no coincidence that Moscow has relaunched the idea of missile negotiations and CDE at the very moment of the greatest tension for Poland: both are an antidote to the ‘destabilising forces’ active in Europe (and when they operate within the Soviet system, and as now in Poland, they are called ‘anti-socialist forces’).

The political dialectic that is opening in Poland is essentially a phase in the application of the Helsinki agreements and their two different interpretations: Western and Eastern. This increases the importance of the Madrid Conference but also its difficulties. It is an issue of reconciling the respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, which was the principle that guided the West and the European Community during the crisis, with attention duly paid to respect for human rights.

Can we say that in the first case, we are in a political-diplomatic dimension, while in the second, in a moral-political dimension? The distinction is a subtle one, and it will be contested (and it is already repeatedly affirmed that in Madrid we must be careful not to compromise the spirit of Helsinki, and not only the balance between the three baskets, but also the balance between all the principles of the first basket, among which non-interference and the inviolability of borders are notoriously the translation into modern terms of the ‘*cuius regio, eius religio*,’ the ideological-political status quo for Moscow).

To this end, it will be useful to have an ever-greater direct connection between Madrid and public and parliamentary opinion, national and European, such as you, Hon. Minister, began through the establishment of the Italian Committee for the CSCE.

The EEC countries will be able to help this movement for a renewal and a liberalisation of Polish life in many ways: through economic aid that safeguards the delicate economic-financial balance of Poland and therefore its now structural

ties with the West and above all with the EEC, by strengthening the coordination of their bilateral initiatives and by studying the well thought-out means to avoid providing Moscow with easy pretexts or to embarrass the Polish government itself; through the moral solidarity of its political and trade union forces with the popular forces that here promote the movement; by reconnecting the channels, interrupted or dried up by the split of the last decade, between life and cultural-political ideas in Poland and in the rest of Europe. And the spiritual unity of Europe, which has been so vividly remembered by us, will be able to find greater influence on national and even European legislation on human and cultural relations. Starting with a review of the visa regime, which is still so restrictive today, and which arouses many inconveniences—and even discontent—in the Polish population.

This action will serve to counter the impressions that propaganda may have left on the Polish popular conscience; propaganda that has insisted so much in recent days on the 'realism' and 'prudence' which the West and Europe would have shown during the crisis: that it must always be Poland, at the price of her freedoms, that pays for peace in Europe.

Problems can also arise within Atlantic relations. The crisis has confirmed the validity of an approach which, through human rights, aims to promote the liberal-social and national movement of Eastern Europe with a view to peaceful and long-term evolution; but it also confirmed some of its limits. Ten, one hundred, one thousand cases of human rights remain a moral fact; for them to become a political fact, a popular action is required. And unlike Budapest and Prague, the detonator was not provided by its being welded with a reformist faction at the top of the party and state, but rather by self-combustion. However, the connections that have been created with opposition intellectuals have favoured the choice of a method of struggle that has caught the East absolutely by surprise.

It can be easy to take factories militarily; less easy to make them work. The general strike, the great 'myth' of pre-1914 socialist Europe, failed as an instrument of revolutionary struggle above all because, classist as it was, it split the nation in two; today in Poland it would not only not divide, but it would rather enhance national unity. And we have already come very close to this.

Situations of tension and danger between the East and West, as a function of Eastern Europe, can therefore, despite any caution, still arise and could present themselves in a timely manner. After all, politics is one thing, our awareness that for this reason we cannot face a war, and deterrence, a minimum of deterrence, is another and different thing. Moreover, the latter does not necessarily have to be military; it can take many other forms in today's world, including the mobilisation of public opinion. In this capacity, the Third World countries may play an ever-greater role. What happens in Poland, and what has already happened in Yugoslavia and Romania, confirms that Marxist-Leninist internationalism, by turning the ironies

of history against Moscow, is producing, everywhere where it was planted, a new patriotism to which, even outside Europe, it is not easy to refuse one's sympathy.

5) [sic] There is a final point that concerns Italian politics more closely in the European context. For some time in the EEC, we have promoted the principle that the enlargement of a community is not just a mechanical fact, an algebraic sum of positive or negative signs; but that, in a necessarily organic vision, it is a controlled and supported rebalancing process that must be followed.

This thesis, which is not only an instrument of defence of national interests but promotes the transformation of the Community from a simple aggregate into a system, is valid, I would say, not only for its economic structures, but also for the political ones.

The enlargement of the Community, first towards the North and now in the Mediterranean, may, through the objective strength of things, tend to weaken the position of Italy in Eastern Europe to the advantage, above all, of France and Germany, a position which, to its credit, it has pioneered in the 1960s on the path of détente, which Ostpolitik and the CSCE later had to follow. And this is true, regardless of contingent or purely tactical facts, such as the exploitation that is taking place now, in Warsaw as in Moscow, of the Franco-German binomial as an element of division, between Europeans, and between Europe and the United States.

Your recent initiative for Poland,³⁷ Hon. Minister, in its careful dosage and presentation, is highly useful also for this reason. By strengthening the Italian position, it favors at the same time the rebalancing and effectiveness of the strategy and of coordinated European action towards Poland.³⁸

Please accept my regards, Mr. Minister.

Favale

ASMAE, DGAP VI, 1980, b. 199,
fasc. *Agitazioni operaie in Polonia, settembre 1980, A/1 Pol.*

³⁷ Presumably, this is a reference to Emilio Colombo's speech on Poland at the Rimini Meeting for friendship among peoples on 23 August 1980.

³⁸ The DGAP, Office VI sent the report for information to Italian Embassies and Representations, to the Consulate General in Berlin and to its Offices III and IV.

UNITED STATES

14

**8 September 1980, Circular
by the US Department of State on the situation in Poland**

Washington, September 8, 1980, 2334Z

Confidential; Immediate

238732. Subject: Poland and Eastern Europe: Analysis and Policy Implications.

1. (C-Entire text)

2. Although events in Poland have not yet run their course this would seem to be the right time to analyze how events in Poland will affect the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe and what the implications are for US policy. An interagency group will be discussing this issue on September 10 and it would be very useful to have addressees thoughts by that time, with more detailed comments to follow.

3. Analysis. Events have not yet run their course in Poland and the question of whether the workers are ultimately successful in winning a major political liberalization of Polish society will bear significantly on how other Eastern Europeans see Polish events. But the Polish workers have already won some signal victories—not only in gaining agreement to an independent trade union structure, acknowledgement of their right to strike, but also in other sensitive political issues such as censorship and access by the Church to the media. Even if the new Polish leadership succeeds in calling back some of these concessions over time—and they are bound to try—the events in Poland are bound to have a lasting impact. While EE posts are better equipped than the Department to estimate what this impact will be in each individual country, we provide our analysis as a basis for discussion

4. Uniqueness of Poland. The uniqueness of Poland is the primary argument against the spread of the ‘Polish infection’ to the rest of the Warsaw Pact in the near term. The weakness of the Polish economy, the politicization of the workers, the strength of the Catholic Church as an alternative set of values, the force of Polish nationalism and historic anti-Russianism and the bankruptcy of the Polish Party and Government in recent years are only a few of the factors which set Poland apart from the rest of the Warsaw Pact. While the specter of a politicized working class facing a weakened Communist Party in Poland must haunt Eastern Europe, it does not seem likely that either the workers or governments in other Pact countries foresee a replay of Polish events. Therefore for the short term our estimate is that there will be no dramatic spillover effect.

5. Longer-term implications of Poland. In the longer term, we believe that events in Poland will have a significant impact on both the peoples and governments of the region. The same economic forces which are in play in Poland—stagnation in

growth, imported inflation, rising energy prices and declining availability, etc.—are fueling consumer discontent elsewhere in the Pact. Western political and economic influence is growing and the Soviet model is viewed as increasingly unattractive. Whether or not the workers elsewhere in Eastern Europe or the USSR eventually try to seize the initiative as happened in Poland, we would predict the following trends in the time ahead:

A. From parties and governments:

- New emphasis on internal vigilance to insulate the peoples of the area from Western influence and prevent any coalition of dissidents and workers from forming.

- New attention to the possibility of structural reform—perhaps along Hungarian lines³⁹—as a way of dealing with worsening economic problems.

- New concern about the consumer sector and agriculture as a way of heading off worker discontent.

- Probably increased internal debate between the ‘metal-eaters’ and ideological hard-liners on the one hand and those who favor placating the workers and maintaining ties with the West on the other.

- Increased Soviet pressure for ‘drawing in the wagons’ both economically and politically to guard against Western inroads.

- Countervailing EE pressures to maintain their economic and political ties to the West, given EE disenchantment with the state of EE/Soviet economic relations, and especially if the predicted Soviet energy shortages materialize.

- Marginally increased Soviet economic support for Eastern Europe to reduce their incentives for turning to the West and permit some easing of workers’ conditions.

- More Soviet tolerance for economic experimentation in Eastern Europe—coupled with insistence on ideological orthodoxy.

- A parallel Soviet ideological offensive against the U.S.—and to a lesser degree against Western Europe and Eurocommunist influences. This could come to the surface at Madrid in the form of a more pugnacious Soviet stance on Basket III⁴⁰ issues.

- A heightened Soviet paranoia, possibly resulting in more defensive and hostile reactions to outside vents.

B. From workers and dissidents:

- Increased dissident efforts to politicize the workers.

- New readiness by workers and technocrats to criticize the economic—as opposed to political—policies of the parties and governments.

³⁹ This is a reference to the tolerance of economic liberalism under János Kádár during the period after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

⁴⁰ This is a reference to Basket III of the August 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (the ‘Helsinki Accords’), which covered human rights.

– Increased interest in expanding areas of cultural and economic diversity as a means of asserting national individualism and seeking more elbow room at a time when the USSR is diverted by economic and foreign policy problems.

6. Policy implications. The above list of general considerations does not pretend to take account of the wide diversity among the Warsaw Pact countries. Post reactions will supply this essential dimension. But if this analysis is generally correct, it will be on balance more difficult to pursue our policy of encouraging domestic liberalization and foreign policy independence in Eastern Europe in the time ahead. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we concluded that the proper course was to try harder to pursue these goals. Generally speaking, the EE response has been positive—at least in private. Our tentative conclusion—which will be discussed at policy levels in the week ahead—is that the events in Poland dictate a continuation of our efforts to develop closer relations with Eastern Europe on a differentiated basis. We may have to be more subtle in tailoring these policies to the level of tolerance of EE governments, but continued activism seems indicated. Such a policy would be tailored to each individual country's domestic and foreign policy stance and willingness to reciprocate U.S. interests and concerns.

A. With all EE countries we would propose:

– Increased emphasis on USICA information and exchange programs as well as private sector programs designed to influence EE decision-makers and the general public.

– Continued readiness to expand trade and financial ties provided that there is readiness to improve political relations and respect for human rights.

– Emphasis on our readiness to deal with each EE country on the basis of its own individual policies rather than letting our relations with the USSR be the governing factor.

– Continued access by EE countries to non-strategic controlled technology—and U.S. grain⁴¹—provided these are not diverted to the USSR.

– Encouraging our allies to follow a similar activist policy.

B. With Romania, Poland, and Hungary:

– Taking the initiative in maintaining the political dialogue by proposing high-level visits, seeking to deal with them bilaterally rather than in forums where the Soviets can control the discussion.

– Encouraging trade and financial ties more actively than elsewhere.

– Seeking to use international institutions to influence internal developments—e.g., IMF, ILO, CSCE.

⁴¹ This is a reference to the cancellation of US grain exports to the Soviet Union following Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan.

C. With the GDR, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia:

- Holding out the prospect of closer economic and political ties—including MFN—in return for internal liberalization and/or foreign policy independence.
- Seeking a modest expansion of cultural and information exchange—including conclusion of bilateral agreements where feasible.
- Maintaining the political dialogue but below the Cabinet level.
- Seeking a negotiated settlement to the Czechoslovak claims/gold problem rather than acceding to congressional efforts to sell the gold and return the principal to Czechoslovakia.

7. Action requested:

A. Comment on the analytical section of this telegram.

B. Policy recommendations for each individual EE country.

C. For USNATO: You may wish to draw upon the analysis in paras 3, 4, and 5, emphasizing that this is a preliminary assessment which will be refined on the basis of inputs from our posts in Moscow and Eastern Europe.

8. For Belgrade: While we fully realize Yugoslavia's unique status as an independent and nonaligned country with a decentralized economic system, we would appreciate your views on how the Polish situation may affect Yugoslavia.⁴²

Muskie

US Department of State Freedom of Information Act Virtual Reading Room

⁴² The telegram (drafted by Robert Barry and approved by Rozanne Ridgway) was sent to the Mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the US Embassies in Hungary, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. It was also copied for information to the US Embassies in Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Spain.

ITALY

15

**9 September 1980, Telegram
from the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw, Marco Favale,
to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Warsaw, 9 September 1980

Restricted
Absolute Priority

No. 00854

Subject: Polish position—comment by Dobrosielski

Dobrosielski, the Deputy Minister responsible for security and disarmament issues—who was formerly head of the Polish delegation in Belgrade, who will also be its head in Madrid, and who in the last days has taken the place of Czyrek as first Vice-Minister⁴³—had communicated to me—via a phone call from the European head office—that he would like to see me. I met him this morning. ‘Even if it cannot be said that the crisis has been resolved, the worst is now behind us’—started Dobrosielski. ‘If this has happened, it must be due firstly to the will of the government to apply that principle of non-recurrence to force that inspires its action, in conformity with the Helsinki agreements, on the international level, also on the internal level.’ What happened in Poland was, despite the efforts of antisocialist forces, ‘the expression of a genuine worker movement.’

But Dobrosielski added that the responsible attitude maintained by the Western and European countries has also concurred: which, after all, has corresponded to the similar attitude held by Poland’s allies. ‘In no time, despite so many press reports, the possibility of a Soviet intervention was possible.’ Poland’s foreign policy does not change; respecting its alliances, it will continue its relations with western and European countries, in a commitment to détente and cooperation. ‘In this sense, it is now looking towards Madrid with increased interest, as to an important stage.’

On my part, I said that I welcomed his words, which seemed to me to converge to a wide extent with your thoughts and statements, Hon. Minister: which were inspired—I added—within a European framework not only by the respect of Poland’s sovereignty, the non-interference in its internal affairs and the desire to maintain and even further develop the economic-financial relationship with Poland, also as a function of the new needs that now could be directed to us, but also by the belief in the thus increased importance of the Madrid conference; the principles

⁴³ This is a reference to the change caused by the appointment of Józef Czyrek to the post of Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

of the latter have, in fact, been confirmed to be a contribution and a fundamental model for the development and consolidation of a wider democratic space throughout Europe (and also, for their force of attraction outside Europe); and in view of Madrid, Italy, with its legislation that guarantees the practical and coherent application of its principles, believed it had all its papers perfectly in good order.

Dobrosielski told me that, through the Ambassador of Poland in Rome, he was already well apprised to the present Italian attitude and wanted to reiterate his appreciation for it. He added that, even for Madrid, he would have been pleased to keep in further contact with us and that he expected to see me every time I considered it to be appropriate.

I have known well Dobrosielski for his cold intelligence, which is reflected in his clear contributions to *Foreign Affairs* regarding the refined and subtle strategy of the CSCE as well as the disarmament of Poland (and of the East), of which he is an overseer. But when I told him that the proof of solidarity and national unity which Poland has offered in these days will remain, as shared by my colleagues, a great page in the history of Poland, he was touched.

It is too early to conclude that there is a 'new tone' in Polish diplomacy; but at least, in this interview, there was.⁴⁴

Favale

**ASMAE, DGAP VI, 1980, b. 199,
fasc. *Agitazioni operaie in Polonia, settembre 1980, A/1 Pol.***

⁴⁴ The DGAP, Office VI of the sent the telegram for information to Italian Embassies and Representations, to the Consulate General in Berlin and to its Offices II, IV and VII.

UNITED STATES

16

**10 September 1980, Telegram
from the US Ambassador in Warsaw, William Schaufele,
to the US Department of State (excerpts)**

Warsaw, September 10, 1980, 1407Z

[...]⁴⁵

8990. Subject: Poland: 1980 and After.

1. [...] entire text

2. After the events of the last two months it is exceedingly risky for a departing Ambassador to Poland to prepare, with his usual air of infallibility, an analysis which might hold up for any length of time. But, in keeping with customary usage, I will try.

3. Where is Poland? Where is it going? The simple answers to these questions are respectively: in a mess. To perdition. But that is nothing new in Polish history which teaches us never to write off this country's ability to survive.

4. A Communist Party official many of whose views I respect, once said that Poland's major post-war mistake was to try to build communism on the Soviet model which fits neither Poland's tradition, history, culture nor national character. Perhaps from the perspective of the future we will see 1956, 1970, 1976 and 1980 as unscheduled stages in correcting that mistake.

5. The August events may presage significant change in Poland but perhaps not to the degree that some assume. This is still a communist country, which the strikes have also been forced to acknowledge. The vast—proportionally—party and government bureaucracy remains in place and will continue to have control over the implementation of any changes resulting from the strike agreements and other reforms. Those individuals making up the bureaucracy tend to resist change under normal circumstances and have many tools to resist, modify, subvert or simply not carry out new departures unless they are closely and continually monitored. In the past even the Party has complained of this bureaucratic inertia.

6. Up to now thirty-five years of communist rule, organization, reward and punishment have demonstrated that advancement depends on the Party. Even if the agreement to eliminate that criterion for high management positions is faithfully observed, the population is still conditioned to believe that to get ahead one has to join the Party at some point. And if it were no longer necessary, many will still think it won't hurt them.

⁴⁵ Excerpts marked with [...] are not declassified or illegible.

7. There are sincere members of the Party who believe that the Polish system can sustain and benefit from the kinds of changes which have been the subject of the strike demands. But others disagree and undoubtedly think that their power and influence can only be eroded if their views and actions are more exposed to public view and accountability.

8. Those who wish to try to make the agreements work will find their work cut out for them—even without internal opposition. I am no expert on communist ideology or theory of governing, but the idea of independent trade unions does not fit into the Party lexicon. Paradoxically many Party leaders here will admit that in the absence of ‘shock-absorbers’—labor action, even bread and butter issues, automatically creates a political confrontation with the Party and government. Since Poland seems doomed to at least sporadic labor unrest it needs the ‘shock-absorbers’ but does not know yet how to construct them.

9. Currently the favorite speculation in the diplomatic corps and the foreign media is whether the regime will live up to its commitments, real and implied, to the strikers. My guess is that it will try to circumvent or dilute the political promises, procrastinate in fulfilling many of them or hedge them in with so many regulatory requirements that their real objectives will be seriously jeopardized. And no one should underestimate the core strength of the Party, its commitment to its ideology, its pervasive presences or its sheer stamina and stubbornness in resisting change.

10. Nevertheless concessions once made, even if only partially fulfilled, are difficult to withdraw in Poland. In the first place it is my view that the opening of the media had already started before the strikes started. There seemed to be general agreement that, if the regime wanted to enlist the people in the struggle to solve Poland’s economic problems, it had to ‘level’ with them. If that analysis was correct than it is even more justified now. What the Poles have read in their papers, seen on their television screens or heard on their radios is very heady stuff—the primate, a strike leader, the actual negotiations themselves. But even that degree of openness will be difficult to maintain as Party and government officials feel the pressure which public scrutiny will inevitably place on them.

11. The events of the last two months do little to help Poland solve its immediate economic and financial problems—indeed they made them worse. The reduction of some subsidies through price increases is more than offset by increased wages and other benefit with no assurance of increased production; I promised increased supplies of meat and other items will further unbalance Poland’s foreign (\$) exports.

12. Admittedly there is a lot of slack in the production apparatus in both industry and agriculture. Admittedly—now—there is a surplus of manpower. Admittedly there is poor productivity and distribution. And admittedly—to some extent—Poland doesn’t know how to market what it does produce for export. One would think from a communist point of view that a planned economy could foresee

and remedy these weaknesses and not wait for them to become so serious as to contribute to social upheaval.

13. But if there is anything that has or should have become evident to all observers it is that the system simply doesn't work. Whether the climate for change which now exists will lead to a wider acceptance and successful implementation of a more liberal, decentralized and flexible economic system remains to be seen. Like political, social and other reforms it will be resisted by the partisans of ideological purity. Unfortunately the effects of successful economic change will be long in coming and successful resistance could prevent its running the full course. Conceivably the need to preserve social peace and to recruit public support for economic sacrifice can force the regime to retain and even extend the liberalization developments of the last ten years.

14. The area which could achieve the quickest change is probably agriculture. The return on investment and labor from the state and cooperative farms hardly justifies the past efforts of the government. The marginal increase in productivity, compared to the also inefficient and fragmented private farms, does not warrant a continuation of massive investment. If, however, the government can assure the necessary distribution of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, machines and spare parts to private agriculture, productivity there could be increased relatively quickly.

15. The immediate outlook for the Polish economy—all things considered—is bleak. Even successful policies will not bear fruit for several years. The promises of increased assistance from Poland's 'socialist brothers' will obviously help but the West will now have to rethink its own economic and financial ties to Poland as well. But certainly in my farewell talks I am hearing something unthinkable earlier—rescheduling.

16. The leadership: My first draft of this section predicted that Gierek would be leaving but I was too prudent to predict when. On balance I had thought that the old leadership might be forced to stay the course long enough to see through the new labor and other likely legislation, he reported study of 'what went wrong' and the launching of a new economic course of some kind. In this way there was assurance that the whole spectrum of the leadership both old and new, would be associated with change. I was wrong.

17. The Gierek era is over. But that does not mean a new one has begun. I suspect we are in a transitional period of uncertain length. No one can yet distinguish all the threads to a future development which resolves the basic Polish contradictions. The continued economic dependence on the USUV [sic!] and other COMECON countries as opposed to the opening to the West which results in a \$28 billion debt and future reliance on Western technology. The inability to supply both the internal market and the export market (even the inability to supply either), the need for a more disciplined economy [...] of the most liberal society in Eastern Europe.

The inability to create a rational price structure because of the adverse [...] political reaction. #

Note by OCT: (#) omission para 11 and garbles in para 17. Correction to follow.

18. The change of September 6 was I believe dictated for two major reasons whatever the ultimate outcome will be. First it tended to reassure the Soviet Union which much too late realized the significance of the strike agreements and required that someone else promise that orthodoxy would return. Secondly it was an effort to reassure what must be a very edgy party and government bureaucracy which sees in the events of the last two months, in the effects of documents like the DIP reports and in its own observation of economic crisis a serious threat to itself.

19. We have made our initial assessment of new First Secretary as far as possible. But no one knows how much power Olszowski really possesses or can acquire. He may simply be riding on a wave of change which could gradually dissipate as time passes and as his opponents regroup to dilute or block whatever economic reforms he has in mind. And if he has the power to make changes he must know full well that implementation largely depends on a party and government apparatus which cannot be expected to accept change easily. Not just his ideas but also his political skills will be put to the test. And it is hard to know just how firmly his allies including Kania, will support him or how long they will stay on the bandwagon. Old inflexibilities are easier to live with and less disquieting. But he is a young, ambitious and vigorous figure who looks as if he will never have a better opportunity despite the obstacles.

20. The Church

Although the primate may have stumbled in his Czestochowa sermon, it did not seriously harm the position of the Church here. It is too deeply implanted in Polish society, has too long represented an alternative source of authority and is too strengthened by the charisma of a Polish Pope to be seriously affected by this development. Undoubtedly it views with some chagrin that a victory in the battle for access to the media was a tail on the strikers' kite. But it will certainly exploit that access once realized.

21. Whatever its mistakes in tactics the Church will continue to be concerned about the chances of internal unrest becoming a reason for internal repression, including the use of force, or ultimately for Soviet intervention. Like the USG it is caught between the threat of the latter and its desire for internal liberalization. There has and will be grumbling among intellectuals—Catholic and non-Catholic alike—and militant workers about the less-than-wholehearted support from the Church in such matters. But for the Polish population the Church will play the same role it has played so successfully and so carefully in the past. For the individual Pole remains a devoted Catholic and it would take a lot to affect his religious loyalty and dedication. He will still see the Church, especially in adversity, as the one institution he can cling to with hope and sustenance.

22. Actually, although I do not envision any great change in the way the Church operates to hold and reinforce its position vis-à-vis the State and Party or to speed the process of liberalization, it will feel emboldened by the recent events and probably speak out more strongly than it has. Furthermore, it will be counted on to monitor government performance and to identify and to highlight any back-sliding. In that way it can at least partially correct the impression inferred from the primate's sermon. The primate's meeting with strike leader Walesa September 7 will also help in this regard.

23. The opposition

If one excludes the Church the opposition is confined to diverse groups of intellectuals, organized as KSS–KOR (usually referred to only as KOR), ROPCO,⁴⁶ KPN⁴⁷ and the KIK.⁴⁸ KOR is essentially a socialist group supported a more human, more democratic form of socialism, closest perhaps to a form of social democracy. ROPCO includes a more diverse spectrum of ideology running from socialism to Christian democracy—and some say, even monarchism. The KPN, formed by a defector from ROPCO, professes to be a political party but has no legal standing as such. KIK is not so centralized as the others but all the Catholic intellectual clubs are loosely and informally bound together.

24. The courage and the skills of many members of the opposition are noteworthy. Their ability to publish, more or less regularly, sophisticated, unofficial periodicals, to inform at last part of the Polish population, to channel information to the West, to organize some manifestations and demonstrations if not in direct confrontation to at least without the approbation of the regime and to get public attention in the West is impressive.

25. Nevertheless they remain what they were—a group of intellectuals. Efforts to enlist workers have failed, although in times of difficulty—as in 1976 and 1980—they can and do provide counseling assistance to the workers. However, there is no sign that large numbers of the latter are interested in joining any social-political movements for the long haul.

⁴⁶ Ruch Obrony Praw Czlowieka i Obywatela, ROPCiO (Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights) was an independent socio-political group founded in Warsaw in 1977. Its aim was to topple the communist system in Poland and to achieve full sovereignty for the country (after overcoming the subordination of Poland to the USSR).

⁴⁷ Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej (Confederation for an Independent Poland) was a radical, pro-independence party which operated in conspiratorial conditions and opposed the Polish communist authorities. It was founded by activists who had left the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO). In document incorrectly 'MPN.'

⁴⁸ The Catholic Intelligentsia Club (KIK) was a social organisation of lay Catholics founded in 1956. During the 1980 strikes, KIK activists served as advisors to the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee in the Gdańsk Shipyards, and then to the national and local structures of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Unions.

26. ROPCO activity has not been pronounced for some time although, as far as we know, ROPCO publications continue to appear. The KPN has successfully organized demonstrations linked to important dates in Polish history, i.e. November 11,⁴⁹ tried to get on the ballot in April and has its own publication, but there is little obvious indication of any further activity.

27. KOR and KIK emerge as the most active groups but again in different ways. KOR, through its publications, the active participation of many of its leaders in the flying universities, its widespread contacts in the West constantly snipes at the system without, however, challenging its international affiliation or its basic commitment to communism. And certainly its post 1976 help to the imprisoned workers and its counseling role in 1980 were very important.

28. KIK, however, may be even more active, not in opposition as such—although it opposes much in Poland—but through its education efforts on diverse subject—not just political or theological—within the community through its members' ties with the Church. Some KIK representatives, in carrying out these responsibilities, may see and talk to more workers and their families in a month than a KOR representative does in a year. And it may be most significant—whatever help KOR provides the strikers—that it was mostly KIK members who were invited to counsel the interfactory strike committee when it got down to hard bargaining with the government.

29. With the possible exception of Molczuski's⁵⁰ KPN the opposition has not demonstrated traditional romanticism but has been utterly realistic in measuring how far it can go. Again with the exception of the KPN it has not emphasized an implicit or explicit challenge to the Soviet Union. In a nutshell one should not expect these groups to lead the way to a new Poland but they are vitally necessary and useful groups which act as gadflies to the state and monitor its actions so that Poles and the world outside knows what is going on here.

30. The workers

I do not claim to know the workers or their leaders. Many of us have contacts with individuals but in the absence of any organization—outside of the unrepresentative official trade unions—no one can really make a thorough and valid judgment of what force and potential they represent. In the past six weeks some have begun to talk of a third center of power (the Party and the Church being first and second) but it is much too early to come to such a conclusion.

31. However, the history of the Polish People's Republic demonstrates that the Polish workers are the least docile in Eastern Europe. How spontaneous are the strikes in individual factories is difficult to judge. Interestingly no matter how much pre-strike organization goes on neither the official trade unions nor the Party

⁴⁹ Polish Independence Day (11 November 1918).

⁵⁰ Leszek Moczuski, the leader of the *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej* ('Confederation for an Independent Poland').

organization seems to know about it in advance. And the strikers are obviously not intimidated by the possible consequences of their actions although the events of 1970 and 1976 seem to have taught them the value of non-violence which puts the 'monkey on the back' of the authorities.

32. One still unexplained aspect of the Gdansk strike is why it took six weeks after the first strikes in Lublin area for the shipyard workers, who have a reputation for militancy and courage, to go into action. In the absence of any contrary information, I can only assume that the strike was as thoroughly organized as possible during that period. Certainly the discipline and the organization displayed during the strike seems to support this thesis. The hiatus caused many observers—including me—to believe that the strikes were tailing off and would be largely limited to economic issues.

33. About the best I can do is to assume that, given the appropriate circumstances, any Polish regime will have to build into its thinking the possibility of strikes. Any effort forcefully to suppress them would probably be bloody even if any assumption is correct that the Army and a good part of the militia would refuse to fire on fellow Poles. If the regime chooses to exert intimidating controls under such circumstances the progressive liberalization of the last decade will have been reversed and the cost in reduced production and a sullen, uncooperative population would be high.

34. The amorphous term 'workers' is a real dimension in the Polish scheme of things but we are not in a position to measure its basic strength or everything which triggers worker action. I leave it to the sociologist to try but I content myself with the observation that any Polish regime which overlooks this important factor is probably headed for trouble sooner or later.

35. The Soviet dimension:

No one here forgets for long 'the friend to the East.' It is a reality understood by nearly all. But Polish concerns about Soviet reactions may be matched by the Soviet quandary of how to handle Poland.

36. Certainly Poland is important to the USSR—politically and strategically—and the latter could not tolerate a real threat to its dominance here. Over the years it has learned to accept such Polish heresies as the position of the Church and private agriculture and the fact that the Polish brand of communism has retained an elasticity alien to the Soviet concept. And certainly the Soviets are deterred by the almost certain conclusion that direct Soviet military intervention would be resisted. The prospect of holding Poland in line through a military occupation must be daunting even to Kremlin hardliners.

37. However much the Poles chafe under Soviet influence they, including most of the opposition, face the world as it is. They realize that the ultimate result of a direct challenge to the Soviets would be repression rather than the further liberalization they seek. Party leaders have, in the past, justified certain policies and attitudes on their anticipation of the Soviet reaction. In my view this often became a convenient

excuse, but there are real limits. The problem is that often no one really seems to know, at any given time, the limit of Soviet tolerance.

38. Conclusion: Poland has gone through yet another turbulent crisis which, in some way, could have more far-reaching consequences than those of 1956, 1970 and 1976. But this one is not finished. True there are strike agreements which provide for economic political and social change. True the leadership has, as [...], changed.

39. But the absorption of change, if realized has several more stages. Now that the top Party leadership has been changed we must assume that the membership of the Central Committee which elected it is also likely to be modified. And there already seems to be a decision to hold an extraordinary Party Congress which will not only, in effect, ratify acts already taken by the Central Committee but also make decisions on new policies and directions. In addition the Sejm will also have to adopt new legislation, including a new trade union law which would have to be discussed in the Party, the Central Council of Trade Unions and elsewhere.

40. And these processes provide opportunities for either real progress or regression, to implement fully or to nullify the 'guts' of the strike agreements. The new leadership would certainly like to blunt the significance, if not the reality, of some of the concessions and it will undoubtedly succeed to some degree. However it will also be aware that this would cause an adverse reaction in the West from which it still needs understanding and even more financial help.

41. For instance, one approach may be to set up a series of mechanisms through which labor grievances must pass before resort to the right to strike would be legal. I also sense an effort to split the 'dissidents,' particularly KSS-KOR, from any legitimate association with the workers. The latter are not being described as anti-socialist, but the former are being tagged as anti-socialist in the media.

42. Assuming that the Party will hold a special Congress⁵¹ before the year is out, the intervening time will be devoted to developing a policy to handle an autonomous labor movement within the bounds of 'socialism,' attempting to convince the public that democratic reform will indeed occur and laying the groundwork for economic reform and the revision of the 1991 and five-year plan.

43. We will also be subjected to conflicting signals as the Party leadership proclaims its fidelity to agreements already reached but at the same time makes statements which seem to indicate a contrary direction. We will have to measure these inconsistencies carefully to determine what is real and what is not and what is, in effect, a trial balloon which can be shot down by its own launchers if necessary.

44. The negotiated agreements to end the strikes magnifies rather than reduces the economic problems. The regime may have to grant political concessions in order to motivate the population to support its economic policies. But it will find

⁵¹ The 9th Extraordinary Congress of the Polish United Worker's Party took place only on 14-20 July 1981.

it extremely difficult to fulfill its twin goals of increasing both exports and supplies to the domestic market. Experience has already demonstrated that the inability of workers to procure their wants—even if they have the means—is an important source of internal instability which the regime will have to cope with.

45. Essentially then my cloudy crystal ball sees the following as being likely developments, among others, over the next few months.

A. Party efforts to water down if not completely nullify the results of the strike negotiations.

B. A determined effort to effect renewal of Party elan, authority and influence which are in disarray.

C. The development of a program of economic reform which will still, however, be a source of controversy and resistance.

D. Some disillusionment among the population as they discover that the regime and even factors outside the regime's control preclude the quick change they hope for.

E. Regime efforts to discredit KOR and other opposition groups but probably not including excessive harassment for the time being.

F. Appeals and strong efforts to receive increased help from both West and East which will help Poland tide itself over the ever-present financial crisis.

G. Some progress by the Church on some of the issues which it has raised with the State.

46. In order to achieve our primary aims of continued Polish stability and increased internal liberalization we will have to maintain a basically sympathetic attitude but preserve a prudent posture toward what we, as the U.S., can do. We should also consult with other Western countries to keep ourselves informed even if there is no coordination. We should assume that the 'two steps forward' in September may result in at least 'one step backward' in December. That may be an acceptable compromise but if it points to renewed worker unrest or a systematic effort by the regime to roll back all progress we will have to engage in a serious and complex reconsideration of our policy. What we could accept in June, before the strikes may not be acceptable in January given the events of the last two months.⁵²

Schaufele

Department of State Freedom of Information Act Virtual Reading Room

⁵² The telegram was copied for information to the US Embassies in Yugoslavia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Romania, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Bulgaria, and the U.S. Missions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Berlin.

AUSTRALIA

17

**19 September 1980, Cablegram
from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
to all Australian diplomatic posts**

Canberra, 19 September 1980

C o n f i d e n t i a l**CABLEGRAM O.CH916418
POLAND: IMPLICATIONS OF SETTLEMENT**

Following is text of an assessment done in the Department of the implications of the recent Polish settlement as developments stood at 11 September.⁵³ Posts may draw on this in discussion with host Government, and comments on the assessment would be welcome.

P o l a n d : I m p l i c a t i o n s o f S e t t l e m e n t

The Polish workers have succeeded in extracting from a weakened regime a range of fundamental concessions which have far-reaching implications for the people of Poland and which constitute a serious act of dissent from Soviet orthodoxy in Eastern Europe.

The most significant concession is the granting of free trade unions, although there is considerable uncertainty about the Government's real commitment to implement this reform. If the new unions gain the right to negotiate wage agreements, with the right to strike to support their demands, this would lead to fundamental changes in Poland's socialist economic planning. The regime appears reconciled to allowing the new unions some latitude, but it has sought to dilute their power by restricting their scope to individual enterprises wishing to take advantage of the proposed new umbrella legislation and preventing the formation of regional or national bodies which might directly challenge the authority of the official trade unions. Workers outside the Baltic Coast and Silesian coalfields are probably less politicised than the port and mine strikers and may not be as tenacious in forming the organisations now theoretically available to them. The regime will probably also try to reform the official trade unions in a way which might attract some support from proponents of the new bodies. The Government's most important goals, however, are to limit the damage done to its authority by not letting the unions act as a guarantor of political liberalisation, by excluding the unions from involvement in the politically

⁵³ The fourth (the last) of the August accords (the Gdańsk Agreement) was signed at the Katowice Steelworks in Dąbrowa Górnicza on 11 September 1981.

sensitive issue of setting national economic priorities, by preventing the formation of a national federation of free trade unions, and probably denying them funding from the West. It will also attempt to isolate the dissidents from the workers and to prevent demands of the new unions from assuming a political form.

The agreements between the Government and strikers have ended Poland's immediate labour crisis, although the limited scope for the regime to implement all the economic concessions it has granted and the differing possible interpretations of the meaning of proposed reforms in trade union organisation are likely to cause further conflict between workers and the authorities. The formation of independent trade unions also is unlikely to lead to the increases in real income which the workers evidently expect and disappointment over unrealised improvements in the standard of living could cause new labour unrest. The regime will have to dedicate more resources to consumption as a result of the economic promises it has made but this will necessitate a revival of the country's strategy of economic reform based on wage and price stability. Further Western and Soviet loans will be necessary to support the Government's new policy but these will only postpone the more austere measures which must ultimately be taken.

The Party has been weakened and divided by the crisis and the lengthy process of implementation of the agreement will generate further conflicts within the leadership. Gierek's departure was expected and poor health provided only the immediate reason for his removal. Prima facie, his successor as Party First Secretary, Stanislaw Kania, has hard-line credentials and his appointment appears to have been welcomed by Moscow. His image of firmness and orthodoxy satisfied Soviet requirements although endorsement from that quarter is unlikely to enhance his credibility among the Polish population. It is notable, however, that Kania's period in charge of internal security was marked by its relatively relaxed nature and an improvement in Church-state relations in which Kania was also involved. His 'acceptance speech' to the PZPR Central Committee gave some comfort to the Soviets by indicating the need to re-establish the Regime's credibility and control but it also sought to modify public apprehension by agreeing to fulfil Gierek's commitment to the workers. Kania's task is unenviable and, as an apparatchik experienced in internal security and Church matters, he may play a caretaker role than become a national leader. If the workers find that Kania is unwilling or unable to effect the changes they are expecting there could be renewed port and mine strikes. It is uncertain whether Kania would be disposed to use force but, given his security background, he will probably be less hesitant than Gierek.

The role of the Church in the crisis has been ambivalent, but is clearly regarded by the Government as valuable. It did not play a key role in resolving the crisis, but the regime undoubtedly appreciated its calming influences, although it probably does not feel under pressure to grant the Church many of its longstanding demands. Many Poles initially saw the Church's statements as siding too closely with the

Government's position, although Cardinal Wyszyński's meeting with strike leader Walensa has a clear signal of the Church's sympathy with the workers aspirations.

Moscow's belated acknowledgment of the settlement, its refusal to permit details of the agreements to reach domestic Soviet audiences and its attacks on 'anti-Socialist elements' indicate deep concern with the agreements, their implication for Polish politics, and their potential impact on the Soviet domestic scene and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union would have been consulted about the terms of the settlement but we do not know whether Moscow agreed to the final package of concessions in recognition of the need to defuse the immediate crisis. It appears to have grudgingly accepted the agreements and to have offered a measure of endorsement to the Regime's tactics in resolving the crisis. The Soviets have questioned the validity of the new independent trade unions but Brezhnev's message to Gierek expressing wishes for his early recovery was presumably intended to give some weight to the political settlement he had just achieved and not give the impression to the Polish people that Kania would be re-negotiating it. They do not appear to be considering forcing the Polish leadership to revoke the settlement but are trying to ensure that the new trade unions are so restricted as to become powerless.

It would be extremely difficult for the USSR to reconcile itself to the loss by the Polish Party of its leading role in respect of trade unions but this does not mean that it will not have to do so. It is clear that the Soviet Government is angry and humiliated at the apparent success of Western political and social principles and is clearly impatient to see a return to Socialist normality. It will be looking for a demonstration of exemplary firmness by the Polish leadership in containing and perhaps eroding workers' gains and undercutting any dissidence which could constitute a residual threat in the future.

The Soviet Union will be looking for evidence that the Polish Party is firmly in control. The principle of the leading role of the Party was accepted by both negotiating sides and this stipulation may prove to have import[ant] consequences in the implementation of the Trade Union reforms. This provision was probably necessary to sell the agreement to the Party leadership and perhaps Moscow and if there is to be an attempt by hard-line elements to restrict the reforming scope of the agreement it will certainly be their chief lever and weapon.

Moscow is also confronted with new consideration about the parlous condition of Poland's economy. The extent of new Soviet aid is not yet clear, but Soviet interests are likely to include helping Poland to avoid defaulting on its large foreign debt and helping to restore the domestic economy so as to prevent further worker unrest. In that sense the Soviet Union could find itself in the curious position of helping to finance the otherwise unpalatable political gains of the workers (but that may be preferred to an even larger inflow of Western aid).

The prospect of Soviet intervention is slight and likely to remain so unless there is a serious challenge to the fundamental control of the Polish Party. Even if a consolidation of worker gains were to lead to a new sharing of power between the Party and Unions, there would still exist formidable constraints against Soviet military intervention. The probability of such intervention would arise only in circumstances where the Soviet Union perceived a grave and lasting threat to the Party's position of central authority. It would then act not only to restore order in Poland but to prevent the possible spread of negative and inflections [sic] symptoms elsewhere in Eastern Europe or even in the Soviet Union. Soviet media allegations that foreign involvement in Poland is directed at diverting the country from its socialist path obviously relate to Soviet concern with its own security arrangements and with viability and cohesion within COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. They would also provide a useful pretext if intervention were considered necessary; Soviet allegations of foreign involvement in Afghanistan might provide a salutary comparison.

If trade union reform in Poland succeeds, however, in a way which challenges Party authority, it will not necessarily be the model for similar changes elsewhere in Eastern Europe because of the role of the Church, the extent of private landholdings and other factors which make Poland a special case. But it will nonetheless constitute a serious and fundamental act of dissent from Soviet orthodoxy which may carry implications for Soviet authority within Eastern Europe in the longer term.

NAA, A1838, 48/1/3 PART 11

AUSTRALIA

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**7 October 1980, Cablegram
from the Australian Ambassador in Warsaw, John Burgess,
to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs**

Warsaw, 7 October 1980

C o n f i d e n t i a l

CABLEGRAM O.WS5229

Poland: Kania's address to the CC plenum⁵⁴

It is a measure of the severity of the Polish crisis that Kania's address (summary by separate telegram)⁵⁵ contains the extraordinary admission by a CC First Secretary that the Communist Government has lost the confidence of the Polish working class.

2. The main thrust of Kania's argument is that while the Party line established in 1970 was essentially correct, very serious errors of implementation have been made over the last decade. These are analysed in some frankness and detail. Whilst thus effectively disposing of ten of Poland's thirty-five years of Communist rule (much of the rest has been similarly disposed of by predecessor regimes) Kania is able to argue, as in his position he must argue, albeit unconvincingly, that the system and the Party itself can provide a better future.

3. The impression given by Kania's long address is of a Government which has received a severe scare, has its back to the wall, and is now belatedly offering a whole clutch of thoroughgoing reforms which has been aired off-stage for some years but never picked up. It needs to be recognised that these reforms now cover a much wider area than trade union reorganisation. The Party in effect seems willing to consider, indeed grant, just about any reform consistent with economic rationality provided that there is acknowledgement by those concerned of Poland's socialist orientation. Some of the reforms mentioned by Kania, e.g. the Party to keep 'a greater distance from concrete economic and State decisions,' suggest that the form may be more important than the substance of this acknowledgement.

4. A large question at present is what reception these offers of reform will be given by the population at large, and by Solidarity in particular which might be expected to give a lead. Scepticism would appear to run very deep. Promises have been made before, in 1956 and 1970 in particular, and despite the Party/Government's profession of its goodwill, it has after all been brought to make these

⁵⁴ The 6th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party took place on 5–6 September 1980 and (second part) on 4–6 October 1980.

⁵⁵ Not published.

gestures involuntarily after severe pressure. Witch-hunts within the Party are not likely to help. Kania is not yet well known in the country. The warning strike of 3 October was an indicator of the depth of worker scepticism. In effect its message was an affront to the Party/Government, and received by it as such. The message was: we do not accept your word.

5. My first impression is that what we have in Poland is essentially a severe conflict between Nation and State. It is by no means clear at this stage whether this conflict can be reconciled short of a major upheaval which would raise the prospect of intervention from the East. For the present, however, I have the impression from Party/Government statements that Kania has obtained, or insisted upon, a good deal of latitude from Moscow on the means by which he will set about seeking a national reconciliation.

Burgess

NAA, A1838, 48/1/3 PART 11

IRELAND

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14 October 1980, Political Report
by the Irish Ambassador in Stockholm, Dermot Waldron,
for the Secretary General
of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Andrew O'Rourke

STOCKHOLM, 14 October 1980

PR 12 (1980) Warsaw

‘Big Questions in Poland’

Perhaps the two biggest questions which may be asked about Poland today are: in what circumstances would the Soviet Union invade? And if they did, would the Poles resist? Many people may have the feeling that there is somewhere somebody who knows the answer to these questions, but in fact there is probably nobody in either Poland or the Soviet Union who could give any kind of precise answer. Furthermore, it does not follow that because one may be close to the facts of the situation, or well aware of the circumstances, such as a Polish general or somebody who might be working in the Polish Foreign Ministry, that he would necessarily have the answers.

2. With regard to the first question, it can only be said that at the present time in Warsaw Poles do not give the impression of being worried about the possibility of a Soviet invasion. Diplomats tell me that every few days there is a scare of some kind: Soviet ships have steamed into Gdansk, Soviet manoeuvres are taking place on the eastern frontiers, Soviet troops have been reinforced in Poland etc. etc. Diplomats in Warsaw don't know whether to report these stories; they may feel foolish if they do, and nothing happens; but of course they may feel even more foolish if they don't, and something does happen. The important fact to note and to which attention may be drawn at the present time is that the protesters in Poland and indeed this does not mean just the strikers but 90% of the Polish nation because the great majority of consumers in Poland are protesters whether it is about the meat supplies, or the shortage of apartments etc; but all these people are not giving any excuse or pretext to the Soviet Union to intervene; this was the remarkable thing about all the protests, strikes and hold-ups so far. Nobody was injured. No Soviet soldier or citizen was attacked or harassed. There are no anti Soviet slogans on the walls. There are no political demands for withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. On the contrary, the strikers in Gdansk have, as you know, accepted, at least for the record, the socialist system in Poland, and in effect the constitutional and political status quo. They know from their past experience, from 1956, 1970 etc. that lack of discipline will get them nowhere. The discipline which they have

already shown this year has in fact got than very far. So, if Mr. Brezhnev and his generals wished to intervene in Poland at the time of writing, it is difficult to see what justification they could give for it. It is true that the Soviet press has spoken (but in relatively mild terms) of anti-socialist western elements in the strikes. They have been contradicted by Polish Government officials, including Mr. Stanislaus⁵⁶ Kania, First Secretary of the United Worker's Party himself, who has repeatedly said that the strikes are entirely Polish.

3. If the Soviets intervene, would the Poles resist? A Pole will of course give a proud and immediate answer to this question. Not just because he is a Pole but also because he is romantic by nature. We have already mentioned the scorn which Poles at least express of the way in which the Czechs accepted without a word Russian intervention in their country in 1968. But what of the Polish army? Perhaps some Polish generals may know, or think they know, the answer to this question, but I did not meet any well-informed people in Warsaw who could give an honest reply. They do not know. Perhaps those who think they know, would be reluctant even to say so at the present time. A great deal would depend on the way in which the crisis presented itself: as mentioned in the previous paragraph, at the present time there would be little justification or pretext for Soviet intervention. One could therefore reasonably argue that the likelihood of resistance of the Poles, and therefore of the Polish army fighting, would be all the greater. Whatever that may be, the Polish army is large and powerful.

4. If the Soviets did intervene, involving presumably a great deal of blood and terror, what then? Poland is not Afghanistan and there are 35 million well-educated people in the country. Apart altogether from the reaction of other socialist countries, and in Western Europe and NATO, could Mr. Brezhnev and the Soviet authorities really envisage imposing in Europe in 1980 a régime of terror over 35 million people for an indefinite period to come? Could the Soviet Union afford it? Terrible things may happen in some countries; indeed in our own country terrible things happen which we find it hard to understand.⁵⁷ Perhaps therefore it is possible that this could happen again to Poland. But, for what it is worth, the Poles do not themselves believe it at present.

NAI, 2011/39/1741

⁵⁶ Stanislaw.

⁵⁷ A reference to the ongoing 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland.

CANADA

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**15 October 1980, Telegram
from the Canadian Ambassador in Warsaw, John M. Fraser,
to the Canadian Department of External Affairs**

Warsaw, 15 October 1980

Confidential

Polish Crisis: First Impressions

Although life goes on normally and without any sense of immediate crisis, there is an underlying uneasiness and apprehension. Everyone agrees that Poland's troubles are far from over; no one pretends with any confidence to know how they can be resolved or how the situation will develop.

2. What is striking is the massive lack of confidence in the government and in the party on the part of the population and even of the government and the party themselves. The new leadership team have given a convincing description of the mess that Poland is in and of the errors of the previous leadership that put it there. They have not however given the impression of taking charge over events or of having any clear idea of what to do about the situation.

3. Their plight is, admittedly, unenviable, resembling that of a tightrope walker who must cross chasm with one foot on each of two rather loose ropes: the need to satisfy the aspirations of workers and the need to demonstrate to Moscow that the party has things adequately under control and that Poland's orientation is not in question. While the new trade union leaders and others uneasily riding forces of change have been very careful not to challenge the socialist system or the 'leading role of the party,' it is apparent that many of them really view both with indifference and/or contempt. Oft-repeated declarations accepting these principles qualify as ritual incantations to ward off evil (Muscovite) eye.

4. Despite bland assurances from Polish officials that Poles can and must settle their own problems themselves (echoed by, inter alia, the DDR⁵⁸ and Vietnamese ambassadors here), fears of Soviet intervention are widespread among the general public. Rumour has even chosen November 5 as D-Day (in memory of Guy Fawkes perhaps?).

5. The government has (albeit rather clumsily) underlined this hazard in constant references to Poland's membership in the socialist bloc and close relations with the USSR as a decisive guarantee of its national sovereignty and independence. Workers have been prepared to believe this up to a point and have refrained from the kind of direct provocation of Moscow that marked 1968 'Prague Spring.' They have not, however, been deterred from persisting in their political demands by such warnings,

⁵⁸ It refers to the German Democratic Republic (Germany: Deutsche Demokratische Republik).

and some of the union and dissident leaders clearly believe that they can push the regime even further without triggering a Soviet response.

6. It is widely believed that union leader Lech Walesa had agreed to call off October 3 token strike but was overruled by his committee (some of whom have bitter personal experience of regime duplicity and retaliation with regard to concessions won by workers in 1970 and 1976). This confirms the impression that not only the government and the party but also the new union leadership is not entirely in control and lacks coherent idea of where to go next. Unions, of course, are faced with organizational and policy challenges quite outside the experience of anyone in the Soviet bloc.

7. All this adds up to some danger of things getting out of hand, although restraint shown by both sides to date has been remarkable. While there is some public apprehension about possible Soviet intervention, one suspects that there is also a feeling in some quarters, particularly among youth, that times have changed since 1968 and the USSR 'wouldn't dare' move against Poland in 1980. The Polish leadership is almost certainly under no such illusion.

8. Lurking behind the politics of the situation, of course, is horrendous state of the Polish economy. As a result of concessions made to workers involving change in the shift system, coal and copper production may well decline and it is hard to see how losses in industrial production generally due to strikes can be made up. Quite apart from question of paying for it, there is not enough available meat in all of Europe to make up Polish shortfall this year. Meat rationing is almost certain to be imposed as soon as the government can work out how it should be done (public has been asked to send in suggestions). The Polish press is full of circumstantial detail on grimness of the economic situation.

9. At the same time, the campaign to root out wrongdoers in the party and the government (i.e. those who have abused their positions for personal gain) is probably designed to restore credibility as well as to root out Gierek supporters. The party must hope to persuade the population both of the need for tough economic measures (which would blow the roof off if imposed now) and of its moral authority to impose them. The leadership may even go as far as to eliminate some of the most visible privileges enjoyed by party officials to create the impression that sacrifices are being shared.

10. Even if they succeed in winning the cooperation of the free trade unions for an economic recovery programme (which would be one way of co-opting them) recovery will be a long, slow and painful process. If the Soviets are rational, they would want to think at least twice before taking on too direct a responsibility for tackling Poland's problems.

Fraser

UNITED KINGDOM

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**16 October 1980, Despatch
from the British Ambassador in Warsaw, Kenneth Pridham,
to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington**

16 October 1980

Confidential

The Polish Crisis: Should We Help? (October 1980)

My Lord,

1. The idealism, independence and indomitable spirit of the Polish people need no emphasising for a British reader. Memories of Polish action during the Second World War are common coin in Britain even to-day. But not even the closest observers of the current Polish scene forecast the convulsions which have shaken the Polish People's Republic during the past few months. The governing party and the Government have had troubles before—in 1956, 1970, 1976—but they have never before had to deal with such a powerful force as has emerged from the Gdańsk shipyards—of workers, intellectuals and Catholics—which, in the form of a free trades union, has, for the time being at least, wrested from the Polish United Workers' Party, its self-awarded leading role in Peoples' Poland. The Party has had to face a revolution of part of the proletariat against its own dictatorship of the proletariat. And, as this is not possible—nor even conceivable under Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the new Party leaders have had to try to explain that the workers' protest was not against Socialism but against 'errors of socialism' perpetrated by the previous leadership, with which most of them subsequently collaborated, and which is currently being purged from the Party. Small wonder that any residual confidence either Party or non-Party members might have retained in the Party has been shattered, and that Party workers to-day unanimously acknowledge their first task is to rebuild the Party's confidence in itself and the people's confidence in the Party.

2. But, even as Party leaders and activists set about this formidable undertaking, their problems continue to grow. The initiative still lies plainly with the free trade unions, the ultimate objectives of whose leaders are not at all clear. Wałęsa, their spokesman, has insisted they are not spearheading a political revolution but are merely striving for a better deal for the workers. Yet, whether they wish it or not, their successful strike pressures against the régime in August have added a new dimension to the existing pluralism of communist Poland and have set the country upon a path from which there is no turning back.

3. The dust raised by these deep-seated tremors in the body politic and in Polish society will not settle for some time. The key sector of this non-violent revolution is at the moment in the registration of the free trade unions by the Warsaw Voivodship Court.⁵⁹ The battle is being waged with words between the free trade union lawyers and officials of the registration court, as Government and Party on the one hand and the independent workers' movement on the other strive to extract maximum advantage from the somewhat ambiguous phraseology of the Gdańsk, Szczecin and Jastrzębie agreements they signed barely 6 weeks ago. The present battle centres on the statutes submitted by the principal free trade union 'Solidarność,' with its application for registration. The Registration Court has objected *inter alia* that the statutes do not explicitly recognise the leading role of the Party, as agreed in the accords; and that they claim to be applicable throughout the country whereas the union is regionally based in Gdańsk.

4. Such debates will continue and will multiply during the coming months, as the authorities and workers adjust to the more liberal atmosphere created by the strikers' success, and in particular, as the new laws on censorship and free trades unions, promised under the agreements, are debated and introduced. Meanwhile, with the Party in disarray, there is no guiding hand at the helm and the Polish ship of state is drifting. It is with this current situation in mind that I venture to offer some thoughts on the attitude Her Majesty's Government might take, on the eve of your forthcoming visit to Poland—the first undertaken by any Western Minister since the present Polish crisis began.⁶⁰

5. Our current policy towards Poland, in its simplest terms, is part of our overall strategy to encourage the diversity we see developing amongst the states of Eastern Europe. The present Polish crisis presents us with a golden opportunity for furthering this policy. Poland is already far gone along the path of greater diversity within the Soviet monolith. To her existing anomalies, for a communist country, of a thriving religious community and a preponderantly private agricultural sector, she has in the past few months added a militant and highly organised independent trade union movement already reputedly as large, at over 3 million, as the Party itself. Indeed, so diverse and pluralistic has she become that Western observers, though very few Poles as yet, are already counting the days to Soviet armed intervention to stop the rot. I do not yet share their pessimism; but I am sure it will be justified if the Polish authorities lose control of the situation because they are unable, for lack

⁵⁹ This refers to the dispute over the registration of the Solidarity Trade Union on the basis of the motion submitted by on 24 September to the Provincial Court in Warsaw. The authorities sought to modify the trade union's statute by the addition of a clause that spoke of the leading role of the communist party. In the end, the Independent Self-Governing Trade Unions were registered on the basis of the ruling issued by the Supreme Court on 10 November 1980, which repealed the amendments introduced by the Provincial Court.

⁶⁰ The visit to Poland by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Peter Carrington, took place on 29–31 October 1980.

of hard currency, to provide basic essentials for their people and thus to avoid fresh explosions of discontent.

6. The vicious circle for the Government posed by the Gdańsk agreements is that, if they carry out their side of the bargain, they are moving the country further down the path to economic disaster but, if they go back on their pledges, they risk further industrial strife which could lead to ideological and political disaster. A dramatic rise in productivity (which on present form seems most unlikely) might help to soften the obvious incompatibility between the economic imperatives of the current situation and the Government's pledges; but it cannot be achieved overnight. Meanwhile Poland's economic situation is moving from the disastrous to the indescribable.

7. The Party and Government need time to work out a more liberal *modus vivendi* with this powerful new force in Polish society. They need time to work out new economic plans and reforms. There is no question of renouncing socialism, or the Soviet alliance; geopolitical and historical realities rule that out. But within the Soviet orbit, and within the Warsaw Pact, there may be room to-day for something that could not exist in Czechoslovakia barely 12 years ago: a movement towards establishing 'socialism with a more human face': and in Poland, based on workers' power, it might just come off without provoking Soviet intervention with all that that implies for European and world stability.

8. We know the sort of aid the Poles are likely to ask us for: more and softer export credits and our agreement either to re-finance capital repayments to Britain in 1981 and 1982 or to stretch the period of their repayment into the late 1980s. The commercial case for agreeing to a larger and better credit package has already been made strongly and consistently by this Post to the Department of Trade and Export Credits Guarantee Department over the past few months and I shall not repeat the arguments here. To them is added the political case in the foregoing paragraphs. Moreover, if we fail now to set an example to our Western partners by providing generous financial help to Poland, we shall have lost much of our status for complaint and protest when the Soviet Union steps in with its 'fraternal' help, whether purely financial or of a more sinister kind. There is, of course, no guarantee that this flowering of liberalism in Poland will not be nipped in the bud by the Soviets, as were those of the Hungarians and Czechs, even if the Soviet Government can point to no general breakdown of Party or Government control in the country. Additional Western financial help over the coming difficult years would, however, be a major factor in minimising the risk.

9. On the political side I recommend that we should firmly eschew any temptation there may be to offer encouragement to those few elements in Polish society whose objective is the revolutionary overthrow of the communist system. That would be to encourage useless violence and bloodshed. Our current declared policy of non-interference in Polish internal affairs (by ourselves and others) is clearly right.

10. To sum up I recommend Western financial aid as the best hope of encouraging a more liberal Polish régime and society, of avoiding Soviet intervention and of maintaining stability in the world. I hope, Sir, that during your visit, you will be prepared to offer the right kind of help and encouragement to your Polish hosts and that, after your visit, you will be willing to influence your Western colleagues in the same direction.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Moscow, East Berlin, Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest, Prague, Sofia, Helsinki, Bonn, Paris, Washington and the United Kingdom Delegation to NATO. I am also sending copies to the Secretary of State for Trade, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Governor of the Bank of England.

I am, etc,
K. R. C. Pridham

**The National Archives, FCO 28/4165
(DBPO, The Polish Crisis, 1979–1982, Doc. No. 29)**

POLAND

22

**31 October 1980, Note
by the Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marian Dobrosielski,
on the impact of the internal situation on the PRP's foreign policy**

Warsaw, 31 October 1980

SECRET

URGENT NOTE

The consequences of the events in Poland
for our country's role in European politics
in the opinion of West European governments and political circles

The events of the last few months in Poland continue to draw the attention of West European governments and political circles. Their assessments of what took place in our country are interwoven with reflections on the consequences of these events for Poland's role in European politics.

1. In the position of government circles arising from, among other things, arrangements within NATO and the EEC, one can clearly discern concern that the process of renewal could get out of control and, given the known internal and external factors, lead to the country's destabilization. These fears lay at the basis of the caution shown in making declarations and expressing judgments.

For public use, it should be emphasised that these are the internal affairs of Poland and the Poles, which can and should be resolved by the party and by society. Among some opposition parties one can observe the use of the Polish situation for internal and ideological ends in order to discredit and delegitimise socialism as a system serving the nation. Such activity has been conducted mostly by the CDU/CSU and by a number of socialist and social-democratic parties. The attitude of the conservative government in Great Britain is similar.

2. While avoiding declarations and actions that could be interpreted as interfering in our country's internal affairs, the possible implications of the crisis in Poland for *détente* and European cooperation are often raised.

Generally, the thesis is voiced that further aggravation of the difficulties in Poland may exclude our country as an active player in European politics and, in the long term, deprive Poland of the means to play its traditional role as an initiator and co-organiser of peaceful coexistence on our continent. Moreover, it is emphasised that a lack of political activity and presence on Poland's part would upset the balance of power in Europe. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in particular expressed this clearly when he stated that 'Poland's existence and role is of fundamental importance for balance and peace in Europe.'

The fact is also raised that weakening Polish activeness in foreign policy will deprive France of a privileged partner for promoting certain concepts of cooperation in the bilateral sphere that have a pan-European dimension. Stagnation in cooperation with Poland would objectively weaken certain tendencies in Western Europe for giving Europe certain accents of independence in the setting between the two superpowers and would undermine the credibility of the policy of overcoming divisions on the European continent.

In the position of the West German government one can notice, on the one hand:

– Calculations that the evolution of events in Poland, especially the democratisation process, will not remain without influence on the socialist countries, especially on the GDR. It is thought that this could make reunification policy more real in keeping with the concept of ‘change through rapprochement.’

While on the other:

– Fears that the events leading to destabilisation represent a potential threat for the continuation of the policy of *détente* and, in consequence, could have a negative impact on the state and prospects of relations between the FRG and the GDR, and generally between East and West.

An altered situation in the area of the Eastern policy of France and the FRG and, in consequence, that of *détente*, and the possibility that their existing concept of relations with Eastern Europe might collapse creates a convenient opportunity for the opposition in those countries to mount a general attack on their governments and reveal the unreasonableness of their existing policy.

Declarations by most West European countries about their readiness to meet our economic needs can be justified by requirements of an internal nature and long-term national interests, whose fulfillment is only possible if the *détente* process is continued.

The West German government’s intentions in this regard are fully reflected in Schmidt’s statement that such assistance will be possible ‘solely on the condition that the policy of *détente* is continued in keeping with Germany’s long-term interests.’

Offers of assistance are accompanied by statements warning against ‘interference in Poland’s internal affairs by its neighbors.’ It is suggested that such a step would be fatal for *détente* and, at the same time, it is stressed that the processes under way in Poland are only possible thanks to the policy of *détente* and the deepening of the CSCE process. The thesis of the SPD, which reflects the position of the most western governments, that *détente* favors the creation of a situation in which the cohesion of the socialist camp will be much lesser than during the Cold War period, is accompanied by the conviction of the FRG’s Christian-Democratic opposition and the British Conservatives that the erosion of the socialist system through its internal evolution is possible—something of which Poland can serve as an example—hence

the efforts made by various political groups to establish contacts with the new trade unions in Poland.

3. Displaying their appreciation for Poland as an important link in Europe's security and cooperation system, West European states are showing a broad interest in day-to-day cooperation with Poland. Beside offers of assistance, we have noted declarations expressing the readiness to take up consultations, to embark on overdue visits and extend existing cooperation into new areas. At the same time, a strong emphasis is being placed on the understanding for our alliance relations, as part of which Poland should play a greater role in pursuit of the *détente* policy, of consolidation of the CSCE system, and of disarmament talks.

Maintaining or possibly expanding the structures of bilateral relations would, in the opinion of most West European governments, ensure the continuation of the process of building an infrastructure for pan-European cooperation.

Conclusions:

1. The resolutions of the 6th Plenum, confirming the consistent implementation of the renewal processes and the continuation of the present foreign policy, provide the basis for the intensification of our activeness in both the economic and political spheres, as well as for consistently winning in order to secure our economic interests in West European countries.

2. The planned working visit of Giscard d'Estaing in Poland would play a particularly important role in the intensification of decisive efforts to show the unchanging and lasting nature of Poland's commitment to the processes of *détente* and pan-European cooperation.⁶¹

3. In relations with other West European countries, we will use the Foreign Ministry's existing mechanisms of political consultations, meetings of Foreign Ministers, of parliamentary groups, etc. without involving the party and state leadership in higher level visits.

M. Dobrosielski

AMSZ, Dep. IV 46/84, w. 3 (PDD 1980/II, Doc. No. 363)

⁶¹ The visit did not take place.

GERMANY**23**

**31 October 1980, Telegram
from the German Ambassador in Moscow, Andreas Meyer-Landrut,
to the German Federal Foreign Office**

114-5825/80 Confidential

Sent: 31 October 1980, 10.40

Received: 31 October 1980, 10.05

Telegram No. 4836

Citissime

Re: Soviet options in Poland

Ref: DB No. 4045 of 12 September 1980—Pol 341.00 confidential

I. Even after the flying visit to Moscow by Kania and Pińkowski on 30 October, the Soviet position regarding events in Poland is not clear. The one-sided Soviet press release on the negotiations with the Soviet leadership is neutral in tone, focuses heavily on economic issues, and offers little in the way of insight into the true Soviet assessment.

A certain exacerbation of the situation has occurred insofar as the apparently extremely short-notice scheduling of the visit by Kania and Pińkowski (the evening before, Polish interlocutors denied that the visit was imminent) on a day when a Politburo meeting normally takes place in Moscow, and shortly before the talks with the new trade union movement in Warsaw, indicates that the Soviet leadership now wants to intervene more actively and directly in domestic Polish disputes. This is reminiscent of the Czechoslovak crisis in the spring of 1968, when Dubček was summoned to Moscow.

II. 1) Whether or not the USSR will intervene in Poland is still an open question. If we take the interventions of 1956⁶² and 1968 as models for Soviet decision-making, it is likely to do so only when the Party and Government of Poland

– are either no longer able to deploy their own instruments of power to safeguard the Party's political monopoly or

– the Party is ready to relinquish its monopoly and 'monolithic' unity in favour of de facto political pluralism.

2) At the moment, the signs are that the USSR is, for now, trying to exert pressure on the Polish leadership via Poland's neighbouring countries, especially the GDR and the ČSSR. Apart from the indirect statement by Kirilenko in Pilsen, the Soviet

⁶² This is a reference to the Soviet military intervention in Hungary.

Union is currently refraining from commenting on the situation in Poland. There is also hardly any coverage relating to Poland. Presumably, they are awaiting the outcome of the latest battle of wills between the Party and the trade unions as well as the visit by Kania and Pińkowski.

3) It is to be expected that an intervention in Poland will not come as a surprise but that it will come to pass over a period of time. Since the Soviets will try at first to have the Poles bring about a forcible resolution to the crisis in Poland themselves and to only invade as a last resort, they are likely to start by increasing the pressure on the Polish leadership. At the same time, the theory of Western interference would be taken up again and propagated as intensively as possible to create the right climate for intervention. Surprise action on the part of the Soviets would perhaps be easier in military terms, but even more difficult to justify than an intervention in an atmosphere of East-West crisis conjured up for this purpose.

4) We must assume that a Soviet decision in favour of intervention would ultimately be motivated by bloc politics, without regard for the international environment, and that the scope of the West for exerting influence is therefore limited. The lack of Western influence stems from the fact that Soviet intervention would not be a response to an external threat (which would make an East-West dialogue theoretically possible), but a reaction to internal events in a Warsaw Pact country that affect the specific Soviet security concept rooted in history and ideology. We have only marginal influence over this security concept in the short term. In the long term, we have already done our part to guarantee the external security of the Warsaw Pact countries through our Ostpolitik and the CSCE process, especially since we also accept the alliance structures in Europe as legitimate. We cannot and do not want to give the Soviets a guaranteed status quo in ideological terms, nor can we grant them the right to defend this status quo time and again by threats or the use of force. We cannot accept the idea that internal changes in a Warsaw Pact country should affect the Soviet security concept.

We are running up against a boundary here at which dialogue with the USSR on internal processes in its sphere of influence becomes impossible, a boundary also regarding crisis management within the framework of détente in Europe. As long as the USSR perceives its role as a world power and its continued existence as a Communist multi-ethnic state as being contingent on its success in repeatedly enforcing the identity of alliance membership and – a very narrowly defined – political system in Eastern Europe, even the best goodwill on our part will not help, as the problem bound up with this will have to be solved by the Soviet leadership alone.

5) Should there be a Soviet intervention in Poland, it will, in all likelihood, be justified as a response to Western ‘interference.’ The shape of this apologia has already been sketched out. In view of the undeniable restraint, indeed willingness to cooperate, of Western governments (economic support for Poland), the political core

of the Soviet interference theory lies in the attempt to label expressions of opinion and actual conduct of autonomous social institutions (the press) and organisations (trade unions, parties) in the West as 'interference,' and thus to blur the essential conceptual difference between state and non-state conduct propagandistically to such an extent that, in a contingency, state Soviet intervention can be legitimised as a response to non-state conduct in the West.

In the West, this Soviet tendency, were it to manifest itself again, should be countered immediately and decisively. (See reference telegram). It will probably only be possible to judge what additional scope the West has for influencing the course of events once the outcome of Kania's visit is apparent.

Meyer-Landrut

**Political Archive of the German Federal Foreign Office, B 150, vol. 489
(AAPD 1980, Doc. No. 312)**

UNITED STATES

24

**8 November 1980, Telegram
from the US Department of State
to the US Embassies in Bonn, London and Paris:
a letter from the Secretary of State
to the Foreign Ministers of Germany, United Kingdom and France
(excerpts)**

Washington, 8 November 1980

[...]⁶³

Subject: Letter From the Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

1. [...] Entire text.

2. Embassy should deliver as soon as possible Nov. 10 the following letter on the Polish situation from the Secretary to the Ministers Genscher, Carrington and Francois-Poncet.

3. Quote:

Dear

[...]

Events in Poland are nearing another tense moment with Monday's Supreme Court hearing on the statutes of the Solidarity Union. In the past few days, the government and the union have increased their pressures on each other, with the union reiterating its November 12 deadline for a strike if a compromise is not reached on Monday and the government warning against 'counter-revolutionaries' in the union and the abuse of the right to strike. Monday's court hearing will probably be but one of a series of confrontations that will take place over what promises to be a tense fall and winter in Poland. We believe that the Polish leadership seeks to continue the process of compromise and conciliation, but their manoeuvring room is limited by the deteriorating economic situation in the country as well as by Soviet attitudes. We see no signs at present that the Soviets are on the verge of military intervention. Yet any one of these confrontations between the union and the Polish Government could deteriorate rapidly to violence, increasing the possibility of Soviet intervention.

Our primary aim in the current situation should be to deter Soviet intervention or the use of force by the Polish Government against the unions which could well escalate and result in Soviet intervention. Some of us have already warned the Soviets of the incalculable consequences for East-West relations of intervention.

⁶³ Excerpts marked with [...] are not declassified.

And I believe it essential that we make this unmistakably clear if tensions continue to build in the time ahead.

We are also considering what we can do to meet Poland's requests for economic assistance. I hope you are also giving urgent consideration to this issue, given your own political, security and economic interests in Poland which are even greater than our own.

We are already engaged in consultations on further steps we might take to deter such intervention and what contingency actions we might take if it takes place. The Quadripartite⁶⁴ Political Directors will be meeting again on Thursday in Paris. Particularly since that meeting could be taking place at a time of increasing tension within Poland. I hope that they can concentrate their discussion on practical measures that might be taken to deter the use of force and Soviet intervention in that country and as well consider how we would react if intervention takes place.

Since you are closer to the scene in Poland than I am, I would greatly value your interpretation of the current situation and your estimate of how it is likely to develop. I know you share my view that the success or failure of the Polish experiment will have an enormous impact on the situation in Europe. I hope we can stay in close touch as events develop.

Edmund S. Muskie

Unquote.⁶⁵

Muskie

Department of State Freedom of Information Act Virtual Reading Room

⁶⁴ This is a reference is to the Quadripartite group of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

⁶⁵ The telegram (drafted by Robert Barry and approved by Warren Christopher) was also sent for information to the US Embassies in Warsaw and Moscow and to the White House.

ITALY

25

**9 November 1980, Summary report of the conversation between
the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emilio Colombo,
and the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Czyrek**

Warsaw, 9 November 1980

Subject: conversation between the Honorable Minister and Minister Czyrek.⁶⁶

The Hon. Minister had, during his flight stop in Warsaw, a long conversation with Minister Czyrek; present, in addition to myself, was Ambassador Gardini.⁶⁷

Czyrek began by thanking for the Italian sympathy and understanding for Poland, which was recently apparent within the European community.

The Hon. Minister took note of his words with satisfaction and highlighted that recently, as a matter of fact, the Nine, on an Italian initiative, had talked about economic aid to Poland. The outcome had confirmed both the non-interference approach (so much so that the subject had not appeared in any press release) as well as the favorable, common general principle, which will find its concrete application in bilateral negotiations between the individual EEC countries and Poland and in the continuation of the consultations between the Nine on the subject.

As regards Italy, in particular, he would examine with the greatest attention what Governor Ciampi, who had been here in Warsaw on a visit in recent days, reported to him, as well as the more concrete and technical approach that Minister Długosz brought during his next trip to Rome; it being understood that the Polish requests should have to be fitted harmoniously into the context of both our financial resources and our balance of payments.

The Hon. Minister—given that he does not intend in any way to interfere in Polish internal matters but only to interpret the close connection existing between the détente process and the process of stabilisation and internal renewal in Poland, a connection that has always been reaffirmed on the Polish side—expressed the widespread concern that, in the dispute currently underway between the Government and the trade unions, there will be no mortifying initiatives for the latter or even forceful actions that could not fail to have very negative effects on the climate of East-West relations, on détente and on its prospects for a relaunch.

⁶⁶ Attached was the following Confidential Note from the Head of the Secretary General's Office: 'To Amb. Gardino. To Amb. Bucci. Sent by Amb. Favale to the Head of Cabinet, 14.XI.1980.'

⁶⁷ Minister Józef Czyrek met with minister Emilio Colombo in Warsaw on 9 November 1980 (during his return trip from Moscow).

In this sense, he hoped that positive impulses could emerge from the new, imminent ruling of the Appeals Court for the purpose of consolidating this renewal process.

Czyrek said that he wanted to respond with equal sincerity and frankness. The recent Polish-Soviet meeting in Moscow underlined the renewed confidence in Moscow that the Polish Government and the Party will be able to solve their internal problems on their own, on the assumption that the foundations of socialism, the leadership role of the Party and the current alliance system will be respected. But he wondered what those forces—which, in the union, press on Walesa, or rather have placed him in a minority position and are aiming for new strikes—are really proposing. If they intend to bring the government to its knees and destroy the Party and the foundations of socialism in Poland, they are deceiving themselves. They would only succeed in destroying Poland. They acted against reason of state and Polish national interests. And the head of the Polish government, Pinkowski, clearly told this to the union leaders.

For this reason, there is concern in Poland about the unrest of forces which, in the West, intend, instead of helping normalisation, to act in a destabilising way, lending their support to all those forces that, within Poland, do not understand the preconditions and limits of the democratisation process and the process of setting social dialogue on new foundations, but they would like to undermine the very foundations of socialism. In this perspective one should read the steps taken in Warsaw with some Western Ambassadors about radio propaganda broadcasts (Radio Free Europe) as well as the criteria applied to some recent cases (e.g., refusal of visa entry to the CDU trade unionist Blüm).

The Hon. Minister pointed out that limited or episodic facts should not be generalised. The European and Atlantic attitude remains firmly anchored in the principle of non-interference, it being understood that it is valid for all parties, not only externally but also internally in Poland.

Czyrek asked the Hon. Minister for his opinion on what might be the orientations of the new American administration, especially in terms of relaunching détente.

The Hon. Minister, without wishing to anticipate future developments, said that he was convinced that détente will remain an essential dimension, also for the United States. Of course, this concept had to be framed not only within the necessary globality of détente, but also in the assumptions that are a condition to its consolidation and progress, which is to say, in the issues currently open in East-West relations.

With regard to the Madrid Conference and the continuing difficulties encountered there in establishing a procedural framework, Czyrek drew, even from his most recent talks with Gromyko and other allies of the Warsaw Pact, the belief in Moscow's goodwill in the search for détente. The socialist countries, however, want

to avoid a clash in Madrid and would like, if not guarantees, at least the creation of favorable conditions for achieving the basic objectives.

These are the prior requisites, while procedural issues are secondary and instrumental.

In view of the essential Polish interest in relaunching détente and the role that for this purpose belongs to Madrid and its results, he hoped that the Hon. Minister, during his visit in Moscow,⁶⁸ could perform good work. He wanted to add that he knew the Western and Italian concerns and that the new importance given to military détente could jeopardise the other priorities, and in particular those of the first basket; but at the same time [he wished] to reaffirm the Polish intention to strive to maintain the balance between the three baskets.

The Hon. Minister briefly recalled the criteria by which the Italian position in Madrid is inspired: the importance that, exactly in order to enable the Conference to achieve its objectives, it attaches to the elaboration of a very precise and articulated mandate for the EDC.

Minister Czyrek, in taking leave from the Hon. Minister and in repeating his wishes for the former's good trip and good work in Moscow, reaffirmed the interest he attributes to relations between the two countries and expressed the hope—which the Hon. Minister shared—to see him visit Warsaw again.

Favale

ASMAE, DGAP VI, 1980, b. 198, fasc. Agitazioni operaie in Polonia, novembre 1980, A/1 Pol.

⁶⁸ The visit to Moscow will take place from 9 to 12 November.

POLAND

26

**10 November 1980, Circular
by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Czyrek,
on the decision of the Supreme Court
to register the statute of the Solidarity Trade Union**

Warsaw, 10 November 1980

S e c r e t
Immediate

CIPHER No. 9692

Heads of all posts

RE: our 9690:

1) The decision of the Supreme Court on the 10th of this month formed the basis for an agreement between the authorities and the Solidarity Trade Union on its registration. Its elements include:

- a) To revoke the appealed Voivodship Court rulings of 24 October;
- b) To register the Solidarity Trade Union in the wording that takes the applicant's amendments into account;
- c) To supplement, at the motion submitted to the Supreme Court by the Solidarity Trade Union, the statute with an annex forming its integral part and containing, among other points, the full text of point 2 of the Gdańsk Accords about the Solidarity Trade Union's ideological make-up (the system, the leading role of the Party, alliances);
- d) To reinstate in the statute the provisions about the right to strike, with modifications to their wording and limitations of their applicability until the passing of the Trade Union Act.

- 2) In discussions—depending on the needs on the spot—stress the following:
- The decision of the Supreme Court closed the dispute about the registration of the Solidarity Trade Union and made it possible to avoid the threat of an unusually serious social confrontation;
 - We attained the goal that guided our actions from the outset, namely a clear self-definition of the Solidarity Trade Union with respect to the socialist system and the role of the Party;
 - The agreement has been adopted due to our strong will to resolve problems by political means, through agreement. The parties' reason and political sense of responsibility prevailed;

– The mere fact of registration does not remove all sources of tensions which occur in social life.

3) For special use in discussions with Socialist Countries and friends:

a) The problem was resolved thanks to the attitude adopted by the Party, especially the principled position expressed in his speech by Comrade Kania in Nowa Huta and the growing realism of a great portion of society, including many Solidarity Trade Union activists. Also essential was the high degree of mobilisation among the party ranks to oppose tendencies toward troublemaking. The Party was able to move on to decisive action on many planes (in addition to Comrade Kania's speech, regional conferences of Party activists, special POP⁶⁹ meetings, and an integrated mass media campaign). This mobilisation of the Party, combined with a perceivable increase of the sense of realism in society, created the bases for achieving this much needed solution. This settlement is thus a victory of the reasonable approach imposed by the Party.

b) An ideological platform for the functioning of the Solidarity Trade Union has been defined and rests upon recognition of the socialist system, the leading role of the Party and our alliances. This creates a chance that the Solidarity Trade Union might act as part of a predefined framework.

c) Of course, this does not remove the acute problem of the continued struggle over the shape and political face of the new trade unions.⁷⁰

Czyrek

AMSZ, ZD 29/82, w. 13, t. 111 (PDD 1980/II, Doc. No. 382)

⁶⁹ Basic Party Organisations (POP, Podstawowe Organizacje Partyjne) were the smallest organisational units (cells) of the Polish United Workers' Party. They functioned in places of work, in higher learning institutions and in various other types of institutions. They also functioned at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in individual diplomatic and consular stations abroad.

⁷⁰ There are a few handwritten corrections made by Minister Czyrek in the original document, which were included without markings.

UNITED STATES

27

**25 November 1980, An Alert Memorandum
prepared by the US Central Intelligence Agency
for the US National Security Council
(excerpts)**

Washington, 25 November 1980

Top Secret

Subject: Poland

The Polish leadership is facing its gravest challenge since the strikes on the Baltic Coast in August. I am concerned the Kania regime may resort to force. The present situation moves us closer to coercive measures by the regime or a possible Soviet military invasion. [...]⁷¹

Frank C. Carlucci

ALERT MEMORANDUM^x

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council

SUBJECT: Poland

The Polish leadership is facing the gravest challenge to its authority since the strikes on the Baltic Coast ended in August. The Warsaw leaders of the Solidarity Trade Unions have issued a list of six political demands and threatened a large-scale strike in Warsaw factories if the regime fails to begin talks on these demands by Thursday noon. It will be difficult for the regime to acquiesce to the union demands, especially in view of the Tass warning on Monday against a railway strike, and of the political quality of the present demands. Thus the present situation moves us closer to coercive measures by the regime or a possible Soviet military invasion. [...]

The Polish leadership is facing the gravest challenge to its authority since the strikes on the Baltic Coast ended in August. According to Reuters' reports, the Warsaw leaders of the Solidarity Trade Unions have issued a list of six political demands, and threatened a large-scale strike in Warsaw factories if the regime fails to begin talks on these demands by Thursday noon. The Warsaw union demands include:

⁷¹ Excerpts marked with [...] are not declassified.

^x The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior policy makers are aware of impending potential developments that may have serious implications for US interests. It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. Because of time criticality this memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence community. [Excerpt of the footnote not declassified].

- the release of the printer⁷² arrested and charged with betraying State secrets by copying a document which deals with official policy on dissidents;
- the naming of the authors of the document on dissidents;
- the release of jailed dissidents;
- an official investigation of the people responsible for suppressing demonstrating workers during labor protests in 1970 and 1976;
- the establishment of a joint Government-Solidarity Parliamentary Commission to investigate the powers of the police;
- the limiting of the State budget for the prosecutor's office.

This new confrontation comes at an already tense time with reported strikes on November 25th by railway workers in Gdansk and Warsaw, workers in several factories in the Capital and in Lodz, and by coal miners in Silesia. [...]

It will be difficult for the regime to acquiesce to the union demands, especially in view of the Tass warning on Monday against a railway strike, and of the political quality of the present demands. If its past responses to such crises provide an indication, the regime will try to buy time, possibly by undertaking negotiations in the hope of splitting the National Solidarity leadership, bringing pressure by moderate union leaders and the Church to bear, and seeking a compromise solution. [...]

In the event strikes in Warsaw ensue, similar work actions are likely to spread throughout Poland. In these circumstances the Kania regime would have a high incentive to use limited force in an effort to reestablish its political authority, to stave off a Soviet intervention, and in the hopes of preempting wide-spread violence. Such a limited use of force would probably include the arrest of militant union leaders and dissidents and the declaration of a state of national emergency. The resort to force could, however, provoke the very disorder the regime seeks to avoid. [...]

While the Soviets will allow the Polish regime some time to contain the situation, these developments will serve to convince the Soviets that, unless the unions can be made to go back to work peacefully, coercive measures either on the part of the Polish leadership or the Soviets themselves will eventually have to be employed. Thus the present situation moves us closer to a possible Soviet military invasion. [...]

[...] increased preparedness level of forces that would probably be part of an intervention force and the establishment of a communications structure to support that force would indicate that the Soviets could move rapidly to ready an invasion. While Soviet flight activity into Poland [...] may be related to recent troop rotation, it could also be a part of Soviet contingency plans for intervention. [...]

Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room

⁷² Reference to the arrest of Jan Narożniak and Piotr Sapela.

AUSTRALIA

28

**28 November 1980, Memo
by the Director-General
of the Australian Office of National Assessments, Robert Furlonger,
for the Prime Minister of Australia, Malcolm Fraser**

Canberra, 28 November 1980

Confidential

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

POLAND. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET INTERVENTION

You have asked for an urgent assessment of the international consequences of any Soviet military intervention in Poland.

2. These would be very serious indeed, both for the general international environment and for the Soviet Union itself. A Soviet invasion of Poland would not provoke a Western military response (as has already unnecessarily and unfortunately been publicly stated by the NATO Secretary-General) and would not lead to a war between the superpowers and their respective European allies. Particularly since there is a strong possibility of significant violence between Soviet troops and the Polish population, the stability of Europe would be subjected to its greatest test for 20 years. There would be a major emotional impact in the West. The pressure of public opinion, sustained by Trade Unions, the Catholic Church and influential Polish minorities not only in the United States but also in Western Europe, would induce the strongest possible Western response short of military action.

3. Coming at a time when East/West relations are already at their lowest ebb for a decade, such an event would set the scene for a prolonged period of international frigidity and tension. Whether or not the Polish crisis triggers off disturbances in neighbouring Communist countries, as the East German and Czechoslovak leaders obviously fear, it is likely that a Soviet invasion of Poland would be accompanied by a general security crackdown in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The international environment created by an invasion of Poland could assist the emergence of a harder-line Soviet leadership in succession to Brezhnev.

Political Costs to the USSR

4. a. Conservative opinion in the incoming United States Administration would be strengthened in its view of the USSR. There is the likelihood of a sharp increase in Western defence spending, a prolonged standstill on arms control, as has been signalled to the Soviet leadership by Senator Percy, and a heightened arms race.

Cutbacks would need to be made in other areas of the flagging Soviet economy in order to deal with these developments.

b. A fatal blow would be delivered to Soviet hopes of maintaining détente with Western Europe and encouraging Transatlantic divisions. An invasion of Poland would assist political forces in the FRG which are hostile to the Ostpolitik of Chancellor Schmidt. The French Government's independent policy towards East/West relations would be severely damaged. NATO unity would be stimulated and European neutralist trends undercut.

c. As occurred after Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan a year ago, there is the prospect of a further drawing together of China and the United States.

d. The CPSU's influence in the international Communist movement would be further jeopardised. Relations with the important Eurocommunist Parties in Italy and Spain would be further damaged, perhaps irreparably. The dominant and quite recently restored pro-Soviet tendencies in the French Communist Party would suffer a severe setback.

e. Soviet international prestige would be significantly tarnished and Western and, in particular, Chinese propaganda given a field day at this renewed evidence of the failure of Soviet-style Communism to take root in Eastern Europe.

f. Anti-Communist dissidence would be given some stimulus in the USSR and other Communist countries. We believe, however, the Soviet social discipline and control, as well as traditional Russian nationalist antipathy to Poles would nullify any internal political difficulties in mounting military intervention.

The Economic Consequences

5. These would be threefold: the cost of the invasion itself, the subsidies required to support the Polish economy, and the longer-term implications for the Soviet and East European economies.

6. Sustained military action in Poland could raise Soviet defence spending by about 2 percent. This would increase the proportion of the Soviet GNP devoted to defence by about a quarter of one percent—a bearable cost. However, the diversion of this expenditure to operational tasks would complicate the process of resource allocation and the many equipment decisions required for the coming five-year defence plan. In addition, the Polish economy, at present in very serious difficulties, could be expected virtually to collapse in the wake of a Soviet invasion. Apart from damage caused by hostilities, we envisage that the country would be paralysed by a general strike. The loss, even temporarily, of vital Polish products such as coal, chemicals and industrial goods would be a serious blow to the economies of the USSR and its allies, particularly the GDR. The USSR would be forced to rely exclusively on COMECON resources to salvage the wrecked Polish economy, including its massive foreign currency debt, where up to now Western banks have played a major role. \$US 9 billion are currently required for servicing this debt,

a sum which in short term could only be met by sales of Soviet gold, reducing total reserves by perhaps as much as 6–7 percent.

7. From the Soviet viewpoint the most serious consequences would probably result from Western embargoes, coinciding with increased pressure on Soviet defence expenditure. Sales of grain and technology, and the provision of trade credits, will be curtailed. The strained Soviet economy would be driven back on its own considerable but poorly managed resources. After an initial period, however, during which embargoes would be more widely accepted and effectively sustained than was the case following Afghanistan, pressures for the restoration of profitable trade with the USSR will build up again in the West.

Refugees: An Australian Interest

8. A Soviet military invasion and occupation of Poland is likely to lead to a significant movement of refugees, although the lack of a land frontier with the West will make their departure more difficult than was the case in Czechoslovakia or Hungary. Australia, with more than 100,000 Polish settlers, is a natural ultimate destination. If our immigration arrangements are prepared for this contingency, as they were not in 1956 or 1968, Australia should be able to attract more of the highly qualified people who could be expected to be available than was the case in either 1956 or 1968, when our arrangements suffered by comparison with those of the United States, Canada and Britain.

NAA, A1838, 48/1/3 PART 11

UNITED STATES

29

**2 December 1980, An Alert Memorandum
prepared by the US Central Intelligence Agency
for the US National Security Council
(excerpts)**

Washington, 2 December 1980

Top Secret;

[...]⁷³

Subject: Possible Soviet Military Intervention in Poland

I believe the Soviets are readying their forces for military intervention in Poland. We do not know, however, whether they have made a decision to intervene, or are still attempting to find a political solution. [...]

Stansfield Turner

Attachment: [...]

ALERT MEMORANDUM^x

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Military Intervention in Poland

There are indications that the Soviets are increasing preparations for an invasion of Poland. Recent military activities in and around Poland are highly unusual or unprecedented for this time of year. [...] This could be designed to intimidate the Polish leadership and population, but in view of other military activity in the Western USSR it could also serve as a cover for an intervention. The unusual closing of large areas of the GDR along the East German-Polish border between 30 November and 9 December is probably related. A summary of relevant military developments is attached in an annex. [...]

A substantial buildup of forces could now be underway in the Western Military Districts of the USSR. [...]

[...] There might be very little warning time prior to an invasion. [...]

⁷³ Excerpts marked with [...] are not declassified.

^x The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior policy makers are aware of impending potential developments that may have serious implications for US interests. It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at the working level with CIA, DIA, NSA, State/INR, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and the Strategic Warning Staff.

On balance, this activity does not necessarily indicate that a Soviet invasion is imminent. We believe that these preparations suggest, however, that a Soviet intervention is increasingly likely. [...]⁷⁴

Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room

⁷⁴ Next 2 pages in document exempt.

ITALY**30**

**2 December 1980, Telegram
from the Deputy Director General for Political Affairs
of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vieri Traxler,
to the Embassies in Moscow, Warsaw, Washington
and to the Permanent Delegation of Italy to NATO in Bruxelles**

Rome, 2 December 1980

Secret
Urgent

No. 7309/C.

Subject: Poland—Conversation between the Secretary General and the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires

For your appropriate confidential information, it is hereby announced that, following instructions from the Hon. Minister, the Secretary General has summoned this Soviet Embassy to explain the essential lines of the Italian attitude regarding the situation in Poland.

On the part of the Secretary General, first of all, reference was made to the traditional and important relations between Italy and the USSR, confirmed at the highest level by the recent visit to Moscow by the Hon. Minister and by our desire to give these relations a concrete content, in the conviction that both countries are called to play a decisive role in favor of détente.

In this line of thought, the Secretary General added that he considered it necessary to express the profound apprehension with what Italy had noted about the recurrent indications on the possibility of a repressive action in Poland by the Soviet authorities. The Secretary General restated the Italian belief that initiatives of this kind would not only have negative, immediate and far-reaching repercussions on Italian-Soviet relations, but would perhaps damage détente irreparably, which had already been so much compromised by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The Secretary General concluded that as Italians, we were therefore encouraged to appeal to the Soviet authorities for a reconsideration, in terms not dissimilar to those we found to have been used by other Western countries.

The Soviet Chargé d’Affaires, specifying that he spoke without instructions, replied by uttering the well-known official theses that had already appeared in the Soviet media and emphasising particularly that the stability of the Polish internal situation is currently being undermined by the unrest fomented by ‘Western circles.’

However, he assured that he would not fail to report with urgency and accuracy the arguments advanced by Italy to Moscow, also highlighting the context in which they had to be placed.

Favale

ASMAE, DGAP VI, 1980, b. 199, fasc. *Crisi polacca 1980*

GERMANY

31

**3 December 1980, Telegram
from the Director-General for Political Affairs
at the German Federal Foreign Office, Klaus Blech,
to the German Permanent Representative to NATO in Brussels,
Hans-Georg Wieck**

Secret

Sent: 3 December 1980

Telegram No. 245

Citissime at night

For the Ambassador

Re: NATO consultations on Poland
specifically: political response

Ref: Telegram Nos. 1770, 1771, 1772 and 1773 of 2 December 1980

At the Council meeting on 4 December, you are requested to base your discussion of possible political steps on the following considerations:

1) We continue to judge the political situation in Poland to be extremely volatile even after the conclusion of the Central Committee meeting in Warsaw.⁷⁵ The preparations for military action that have been observed, however, do not permit any firm conclusion that the Soviet leadership has already decided in favour of military intervention. The overall situational analysis suggests rather that Moscow continues to hope for political stabilisation and would decide to intervene militarily only if it were obvious that political control was slipping entirely from the Polish leadership.

We also believe that it is conceivable that the Soviets might initially expand their forces stationed in Poland—possibly in accordance with existing agreements or arrangements—without these forces then already intervening militarily and occupying key political and military positions, for example. An increased military presence on the part of the Soviet Union would potentially have a deterrent and intimidating effect but would also entail a considerable risk of escalating incidents.

Last but not least, it does not appear impossible that, before or at the same time as a reinforcement of the stationed Soviet armed forces, the Polish militia would take action against opposition forces in the country and that the Polish army (in order to avoid Soviet intervention) would also assume tasks related to the political order.

⁷⁵ The 7th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party took place on 1–2 December 1980.

Such actions would certainly have to be judged differently from the point of view of the consequences for East-West relations than a Soviet occupation of Poland in which the armed forces intervene in Polish political structures.

2) The Federal Government has repeatedly warned the Soviet leadership in recent times, including at the highest level, of the consequences of intervention in Poland. It will reiterate these warnings on appropriate occasions. In this connection, reference should also be made to the declaration of the European Council of 2 December.

Public and confidential warnings of the Allies should be issued in such a way as to achieve the maximum possible effect and not merely to give rise to a verbal confrontation. It might be expedient to point out in confidential contacts that the West is not interested in destabilising the situation in Poland but desires a peaceful development and stabilisation of Poland's political, social and economic conditions, without any outside intervention.

3) If, however, military intervention by Soviet forces should occur, we assume that, apart from bilateral protest measures, this will be addressed in the United Nations (Security Council and General Assembly) without delay. It will also be necessary to make rapid and, above all, tangible use of the Alliance and EPC consultation mechanisms, also taking special meetings of foreign ministers into consideration. Moreover, military intervention will lead to a very critical development at the CSCE conference in Madrid, should it meet at that time.

We expect that the Allies will coordinate their positions within NATO and that a clear and united response will be achieved.

The question of interrupting ongoing negotiations in Vienna, Madrid and Geneva requires careful consideration.

4) In the economic field, drastic measures to restrict economic cooperation would become inevitable in the event of Soviet intervention. The precise details of this require careful consideration from political, legal and economic standpoints.

5) For your own information: our internal reasoning is that, notwithstanding the need for effective substantive responses, the existing treaty structures on which present East-West cooperation is based should not be called into question as such. Whether and to what extent the implementation of individual agreements should or could be restricted or suspended still requires in-depth consideration.

You are requested to avoid making any commitments whatsoever in discussions about this aspect; discussions that we are not in a position to seek. We do not think it appropriate to commit at this stage to such specific responses to a most grave emergency—one that is, however, predictable in its political details—in a way that might force us to contend with a specific automatism.

Blech

IRELAND

32

**5 December 1980, Code Telex
from the Irish Ambassador in Moscow, Pádraig Murphy,
to the First Secretary of the Political Section
at the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Anne Anderson**

Moscow, 5 December 1980

(No. 279)

‘Poland’

Military Attachés here are—perhaps predictably—more pessimistic than the diplomats in assessing the likelihood of Soviet military intervention in Poland. One of them (a leading west European country) sees the chances as ‘fifty-one to forty-nine’ on the grounds that on top of the war of nerves which the Soviets have been conducting on the frontiers (Military exercises, banning Westerners from the border areas) they have since yesterday now begun to call up reservists in much larger numbers than hitherto (it began in [a] small way in September). This is information [which] has been gleaned on the spot here through personal observation by western military attachés of certain assembly points accessible to visual observation. If there were an invasion its speed would depend on resistance from the Polish army. The aim would be to remove Kania, instal a new and more absolute party leader, and put all the dissident leaders behind bars.

That being said even the military pessimists (which the US is not) see the period of Brezhnev’s visit to India next week as one during which the Soviets would refrain from any action (if what happened when the Chinese started up against Vietnam during visit of Indian FM)

While my diplomatic colleagues here rate the chances of Soviet intervention as dangerously high they feel that the Soviets have not yet taken a decision which would of course be an act of desperate last resort. My own view is that while the signs in the press are mixed and even more ominous than previously in some ways, there are also signs the Soviets consider the situation in Poland to have eased and that Kania should be given further time to see if the Party’s authority can be re-established.

Nobody here is so naive as to believe that the Soviets are likely to tip their hand in advance by actually proclaiming their intention in extra tough press comment. Nevertheless the general tenor of the press here gives a rough idea of evolving Soviet thinking. The recent mixed signs have been:—the well known article in

Pravda on 30th November summary Czech *Rudé Právo*⁷⁶ article on 10th anniversary of party resolution on ‘lessons of the crisis development in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and society after the 13th Congress’ of the Czechoslovak Party. The article said that ‘international help’ (i.e. from Soviet Union) thwarted plans for a ‘counter-revolution’ in 1968, that ‘counter-revolutionary forces’ had not ceased their activities and were ready to act at a ‘suitable moment’ in the socialist countries. Then followed a direct reference to the ‘recent events in Poland’ in which it was stated that external as well as internal ‘hostile’ forces are concentrating their activity for the realisation of a cunning plan—that of bringing into operation and strengthening a certain ‘anti-socialist aggressive trade unionism.’ But even this veiled warning to the Polish comrades to take ‘Solidarity’ trade unions more firmly in hand was softened by the acknowledgment that the ‘Polish Communists’ had in fact made clear (CP. The contrast with Dubcek in 1968) that there was a ‘dividing line’ which could not be crossed’ and that there were ‘no grounds whatsoever’ for imperialism to hope to regain lost positions or change the situation in the world. (Note: in other words, there was no imminent danger of a foreign-inspired take-over, which would have been the natural catch-word if *Pravda* had wanted to build up further the dossier justifying intervention.)

NAI, 2011/39/1741

⁷⁶ *Rudé Právo* (Czech: Red Justice)—the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

POLAND

33

7 December 1980, Circular
by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Czyrek:
instruction regarding reports of the USSR's threat
to intervene in Poland and the internal situation

Warsaw, 7 December 1980

Secret
URGENT

CIPHER No. 10510

Heads of all posts

1. A campaign centred on the alleged threat of a 'Soviet intervention in Poland' has tended to dominate Polish affairs recently. At the same time, there was a certain toning down of information about the further destabilisation of the country's internal situation. The hypothesis of the so-called Soviet intervention was used by political circles and the mass media in the West against the USSR and our alliances for anti-socialist purposes in general, and for stoking a sense of impermanence and anti-Soviet sentiments in Poland in particular. In such a situation, the subject of 'economic aid' for Poland was necessarily relegated into the background.

2. The situation in the country continues to be difficult and complex but is accompanied by the rise of positive elements within the Party, in the mood of the public and, to some degree, even within the Solidarity Trade Union.

The 7th Plenum was assessed both within the party and in society at large as an important step forward in comparison with the 6th Plenum. There was a deeper examination of the sources and causes of the crisis, there was a broader reckoning with the past, there was a wider development of program elements in intra-party, ideological, political and socio-economic activity—in all the most important issues facing our party and country.

A clear line was drawn for the continuation of the renewal process, but under the guidance of the party, in keeping with socialist principles and using the instruments of socialist democracy. A decisive battle was declared against everything that hampers this process (anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary forces, anarchy, as well as conservative resistance or lack of understanding on the part of some activists). A resolution was passed to convene the 9th Extraordinary Party Congress. The thesis has been firmly put forward that dual power cannot occur.

The Central Committee's call led to a deeper understanding by society of the gravity of the situation. At the same time, anti-socialist and troublemaking elements understood that the escalation of extra-statutory, and thus political, acts by various

Solidarity Trade Union groups would meet with decisive counteraction on the part of the party and the state, and that they could no longer count on the automatic support of the working class and society.

The majority of the Episcopate, along with Wyszyński, continues to play a favorable role in reinforcing this trend.

People are tired of the tensions and difficult circumstances of everyday life. They want to regain a sense of general and social security.

The process of differentiation within Solidarity is reaching deeper. In elections to the trade union leadership, extremist and troublesome elements are mostly eliminated by the workers. People representing reason and goodwill are usually elected. The leadership of the Solidarity Trade Union is displaying an outward course for moderation and something like a toning down, at least temporarily, of the campaign of claims and the political struggle (demands of a political nature, leaflets, etc.).

While seeing and emphasising these positive symptoms, it is important to realise that the situation in the party and the state is still far from a full and permanent normalisation. The party and the government will work with determination to consolidate these positive trends.

3. The period of escalation of the political activeness of the Solidarity Trade Union and anti-socialist elements (occupation of public institution buildings, attacks on the security services and the justice administration system against the backdrop of the Narożniak case⁷⁷) was accompanied by growing concern on the part of our socialist friends and allies about the leading role of the party, the effectiveness of the authorities and of the defence of socialism. This concern was sharpened by various irresponsible antics in the mass media.

In this situation, the meeting of the leaders of Warsaw Pact member states held in Moscow and its results are particularly important.⁷⁸ In reference to the communiqué from the Moscow meeting and the substance of the communiqué from the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party of the 6th of this month (the texts of both documents were announced by the Polish Press Agency) do stress:

a) The constructive position adopted by fraternal parties and states of the Warsaw Pact about the continuation of the policy of *détente*, of dialogue and cooperation;

⁷⁷ On 21 November 1980, opposition activists Jan Narożniak and Piotr Sapela were temporarily arrested and charged with disclosing state secrets (the secret instruction of General Prosecutor Lucjan Czubiniński concerning methods used to harass and repress opposition activists). Following numerous protests and threats of a general strike, the authorities decided to release the two men.

⁷⁸ This was a meeting of leaders of Warsaw Pact member states, which took place on 5 December 1980 and was devoted to the situation in Poland.

b) The conviction expressed by all participants of the meeting that communists, the working class and the Polish working people are able to overcome the difficulties that have emerged in Poland and will ensure the country's further development on the path of socialism;

c) The readiness of Warsaw Pact states to extend their fraternal solidarity and support to us;

d) That Poland was, is and will remain a socialist country and a lasting link in the socialist community.

The confidence of the leaders of the fraternal parties and states in the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party and its First Secretary is extremely important.

Communiqués about the Moscow meeting and about the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Polish United Workers' Party should effectively counteract speculation about the so-called Soviet intervention in Poland and weaken the destabilising pressure on public opinion. Act with determination in this direction as well.⁷⁹

Czyrek

AMSZ, ZD 29/82, w. 13, t. 112 (PDD 1980/II, Doc. No. 467)

⁷⁹ There are a few handwritten corrections made by Minister Czyrek in the original document, which were included without markings.

AUSTRALIA

34

17 December 1980, Cablegram
from the Australian Ambassador in Warsaw, John Burgess,
to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
(excerpt)

Warsaw, 17 December 1980

Confidential

CABLEGRAM O.WS5799

Poland: assessment

Recent developments suggest that Soviet intervention in Poland is not imminent in present circumstances. This telegram questions some assumptions in Western assessments suggesting otherwise. It points up the costs to the Soviets of intervention, questions whether the limits of Soviet tolerance have been reached and whether the Polish leadership would cooperate in any Soviet decision to intervene.

2. We continue to stand by the assessment made in O.WS5724⁸⁰ of 9 December that Soviet intervention in Poland did not seem imminent and that the Soviet Union was likely to wait upon the course of events in the hope that intervention could be avoided. Developments over the intervening period seem to be bearing out that assessment. This telegram questions some of the key assumptions informing other assessments we have seen over this period which have pointed to imminent Soviet intervention in Poland.

Costs of Soviet Intervention

3. One of the assumptions noted has been that Soviet or Warsaw Pact intervention offers the Soviet Union the prospect of 'solving' the Polish problem, that intervention would result in the return of Poland to something like the *status quo ante* July 1980. Our assessment of the consequences of intervention for the Soviet Union is that such action would be more likely to compound the Soviet Union's present problems with Poland than to alleviate them. The disastrous effects of intervention upon East/West relations have been well-aired and Soviet leaders can be under no illusions on this score. That this would be an important consideration in their thinking is not in doubt, but it may not be their main consideration. The Soviet Union must be giving the most careful consideration to the situation that would obtain in Poland itself in the event of intervention and to the possibility

⁸⁰ Not published.

that events set in train by such action could wash over beyond Poland's borders and cause a wider conflagration.

4. As for the course of events in Poland itself the Soviet Union can be under no illusion that armed intervention would be a straightforward task. There has been speculation, it seems no better based than that, that the Soviet Union might seek to implement a creeping intervention in the partial guise of joint armed manoeuvres. This would require cooperation on the part of the Polish Government and armed forces and in our view, argued more fully below, this would not necessarily be forthcoming at the present time. Assuming that it were and that this approach were adopted there would come a time when it [be]came clear that intervention rather than joint manoeuvres were taking place. There seems every chance that in that event resistance within the country would precipitate a full-scale intervention on the lines of Czechoslovakia 1968. It is doubtful whether the Soviet Union would gain the advantage of surprise by the creeping approach. It might well be argued that they would lose it.

5. The degree of active Polish resistance is hard to assess but it is certain that there would be some and probable that it would be significant. It is hard to see formed Polish units taking Soviet invaders on frontally though the Poles have shown suicidal tendencies in their recent history. If, however, as seems quite likely, the Soviets sought to confine Polish forces to their barracks there could be quite notable clashes. It seems unlikely that the Polish army command would order national resistance though there might be some tacit encouragement. We would expect quite large-scale desertions of Polish soldiers, and to a lesser extent of Polish officers to resist Warsaw Pact forces. It is also difficult to quantify the degree of active armed resistance from the civilian population. Solidarity has an estimated seven million members and it is not too difficult to imagine one in seven of these engaging in active opposition to a Soviet invasion. On this assessment the initial phase of Soviet intervention would be a very messy business, would cost the Soviets some thousands in casualties and might last for quite some weeks. It would be a far cry from Czechoslovakia 1968.

6. It is a little easier to assess the shape of the next, or occupying phase, of Soviet intervention in Poland. The Soviets would continue to take casualties in this phase also though in isolated small-scale incidents. Sabotage of plant would be widespread and would lead to the need to post Soviet troops in factories. For the rest there would be non-cooperation on the part of the population. The Poles have been occupied over a long part of their history and would revert to practices they know well. The prospect has been described vividly in a response which the Polish journalist and

Party member, Bkaikowski,⁸¹ gave on 14 November to a *Figaro* interviewer who asked him about Soviet intervention:

‘The Soviets are interested in the stabilisation of the power structure in Poland. They know that here it is not possible to govern if the power structure is not accepted by the population. If there were an alternative—and I don’t think there is—of installing an occupying power here, everyone knows what that would mean in Poland. During the last war we did not have a resistance movement, we had a clandestine Poland. An entire clandestine State. We are not a country where present problems can be solved by using force and coercion. The Soviets are well aware of this. Their analytical powers should not be underestimated. They know Poland very well. So in my opinion the risk of Soviet intervention should not be taken seriously ... besides, given the present state of our economy and our external debt, intervening here would amount to taking on this burden. And the Soviet Union with its own economic problems has enough to do.’

The Poles who have not shown notable willingness to work under successive socialist governments, would be even less inclined to work under Soviet occupation. The first Warsaw Pact Division that rolls into Poland will cost the Soviet Union in excess of US 20 billion and that would only be the beginning of an expensive support program.

7. A further consequence of Soviet intervention would be that NATO Warsaw Pact military balance in Europe would undergo a marked change in favour of NATO. The fifteen Polish divisions and at least twenty Soviet divisions which would be required to garrison Poland would have to be footnoted as otherwise engaged in the event of wider East/West conflict.

8. The Soviet Union will also be very conscious of the possibility that intervention in Poland could wash over Poland’s borders. It knows full well that the economic and political frustrations which have produced the Polish crisis exist not far below the surface throughout the whole of the East Bloc and would be conscious that a conflagration of the kind described above in Poland might well lead to further outbursts in other parts of its empire, say by miners across the border in Czechoslovakia or in the Ukraine. These could be inspired more by opportunity than by sympathy for the Poles, though there would be some of that. The activities of Polish emigrant groups in support of Polish nationalists could be a problem, particularly if the first conflict phase of Soviet intervention were an extended one. These activities would be organised within Western countries whose Governments should be under great pressure to tolerate/facilitate them. The Soviet Union would be quick to accuse the West of fermenting armed subversion in Poland. Were

⁸¹ This is probably a reference to Stefan Bratkowski, a journalist and president of the Polish Journalists Association.

refugees from Poland to take to the Baltic Sea this would present possibilities of conflicts between Western naval vessels seeking to assist, and Warsaw Pact vessels seeking to impede them. Western sanctions quickly lead to Warsaw Pact pressure on Berlin. It is not too difficult to devise scenarios in which conflict of these kinds, in the extreme heat of a portentous event, could lead to an escalation of conflict beyond Poland's borders.

9. As comes through above I believe that Soviet assessments of the pros and cons of intervention in Poland would focus much more on Soviet weaknesses than many Western assessments of Soviet motives calculate.

Limits of Soviet Tolerance

10. Another assumption informing current Western assessments is that the Soviet Union has come to the definite view that independent trade unions are unacceptable in terms of Soviet orthodoxy and that Kania was told at the Warsaw Pact Summit that he must dismantle them. There appears to be very little evidence for either part of this assumption widespread though they have become.

11. There is no room for doubt that the Soviet Government does not like the emergence of independent trade unions in Poland. There is, however, considerable room for doubting whether it has closed off the option of tolerating them under certain conditions which would include order in Poland and absence of an overt challenge to the role of the Party in the country. The Soviet Union has never liked the role of the Church or of private agriculture in Poland but has come to tolerate them. The question can be asked why, if the Soviet Union finds the concept of independent trade unions in Poland completely unacceptable in terms of Soviet orthodoxy, did it permit the signing by the Polish Government of the Gdansk Agreement on 31 August which accepted the concept and the subsequent Court decisions which gave that concept legal force in Poland? One answer might be that it did not foresee the full implications of these decisions and 'solidarity's' capacity to challenge the Party, so effectively demonstrated during late November. This, however, is to move the argument for the assumption that this is a matter of firm ideological principle. The course of events suggests that Soviet concern over the Polish situation mounted in direct response to the events of November which saw widespread industrial disorder in the country with the Polish apparently impotent to resist it. To the extent that the situation then obtaining has undergone marked change—no strikes of note for three weeks and the Party, rather than 'solidarity' now showing activity—Soviet concern appears to be subsiding. In short I believe that any Soviet intervention will depend on future rather than past developments. It is not now an imminent prospect.

12. The second part of the assumption is that Kania returned from his most recent visit to Moscow with orders to dismantle or eliminate 'solidarity.' This seems a very tall order. A mass organisation of seven million Poles with their blood up is not

so easy to eliminate. The attempt would be very likely to precipitate and to require Soviet intervention. Moreover, it must now be noted that Kania, if he has received such orders, has been rather tardy in carrying them out. Indeed, he continues to talk about 'partnership' with solidarity. Even on the question of picking up 'counter-revolutionaries' and 'anti-socialists' on the fringe of 'solidarity' while Kania has been talking tougher since the 7th Plenum (i.e. before the Moscow Summit), he has not in fact acted to lock anyone new away. We find it very difficult to believe that Kania, who we believe is firmly committed to avoiding the use of force in solving Poland's problems, who came to office on the promise of implementing the Gdansk Agreement, and who has presided over the process of giving 'solidarity' legal status in Poland, would accept a Soviet order to go home and wrap up 'solidarity' thus precipitating Soviet intervention. It seems to me highly probable that he would resign first.

Attitude of Present Polish Leadership

13. I have noted also an assumption that a majority of the present Polish leadership could be relied upon to cooperate in any Soviet decision to intervene in Poland. This is a highly speculative area and much would depend on the circumstances at the time. In the present circumstances I cannot see any of the ten-man Politburo inviting the Soviets in, though I have some doubts about Olszowski. I understand the Minister of Defence, Jaruzelski, a member of the Politburo, refused to put his forces at Gomulka's disposal in 1970 which suggests a certain independence. Further the Soviets apparently made it clear at the same time that they would not accept Moczar, another current Politburo member, as Gomulka's successor. Even in extreme circumstances I would expect any Polish leader to hesitate before putting his name to an invitation to the Soviet Union to intervene, for fear that he might be signing his own death warrant as a National traitor.⁸²

[...]⁸³

Burgess

NAA, A1838, 48/1/3 PART 12

⁸² The cablegram was also sent for information to Australian diplomatic posts in Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Geneva, London, Moscow, Paris and Washington.

⁸³ Information about TASS report omitted.

NETHERLANDS

35

**17 December 1980, Code message
from the Dutch Ambassador in Warsaw, Joost van der Kun,
to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Warsaw, 17 Dec. 1980

Subject: Poland's domestic situation

Ceremonies in Gdansk and Gdynia proceeded quietly and with dignity. Authorities, church dignitaries and Solidarnosc jointly attended the commemoration of dockworkers who fell in 1970, which prima vista appears to function as catharsis rather than providing fuel for new confrontation. The new Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olechowski (ex-ambassador in Paris), assured me yesterday that Soviet military intervention in Poland is out of the question. This view seems to correspond to reports regarding US oil magnate Armand Hammer (Occidental Petroleum Corporation) who had conversations with Brezhnev and Kania (on the 15th of this month), from which the observation transpired that Kania and Brezhnev were on the same wavelength and that the former had received assurances in Moscow that no Soviet invasion was to be expected.

Consultations with NATO chiefs of mission here in town yesterday led to the following almost unanimous evaluation:

a. The Polish party PZPR, Solidarnosc and the church all benefit from and therefore insist on a breathing space in order to lower the domestic confrontation threshold, give the shocked economy a chance and (this of course unspoken) not to provoke the Soviet Union.

b. However, this does not justify the expectation that a longer period of rest will come. Moscow will continue to exert pressure and as the Polish and Soviet party congresses draw near, this will probably increase, which will not discomfort the Polish party leadership who may have been given a breathing space until the end of February to prove that the PZPR is homogeneous and in control of developments in the sense desired by Moscow.

c. Interim tensions and incidents may arise lightly from either PZPR hardline attempts to slow down the process of liberalisation under the Gdansk agreements, or from militants within Solidarnosc to accelerate this.

d. It is expected that the Soviet Union will look for ways to reverse Polish developments without outright invasion, using intimidation and possibly creeping occupation (combined manoeuvres, etc.). The costs of high readiness of Soviet divisions around Poland remains as a hidden threat.

e. In the background, there remains a danger that PZPR hardliners, in harmony with Moscow but against Kania's intentions, will provoke domestic incidents and construct 'Western interference' with the specific intent to justify tougher action by Warsaw Pact allies against Poland.

van der Kun 198

Netherlands National Archive, 2.05.330, BZ, inv.nr. 11867

ISRAEL

36

**22 December 1980, Letter
from an Israeli Foreign Service trainee, Y. Mermelstein,
to the Director of the Eastern Europe Department
at the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Yosef Govrin**

Jerusalem, 22 December 1980

Re: summary of a meeting

On 19/ 12/1980, a 'Round Table' meeting was attended by Israel's former ambassadors to Warsaw: Dov Sattat, Katriel Katz, Avigdor Dagan and Moshe Avidan. The discussion was led by the director of the Eastern Europe Department, Yosef Govrin.

The undersigned took notes. See below for a summary of the subjects raised.

1. The situation in Poland

Gierek's regime had two main characteristics: a. it was more open towards the West and was willing, to some extent, to carry out a rapprochement with Israel; b. in internal affairs—relatively greater liberalism and more freedom than in the past.

In recent years, the changes for the better towards Israel found expression mainly in Jewish motifs rather than Israeli ones, since this plane was more convenient and less dangerous. This was expressed both in declarations by Polish leaders and in actions, such as the visit by Polish literary figures and academics to Israel and vice versa; allowing the staff of Yad Vashem [the Holocaust Remembrance Authority] and other institutions access to material from World War II; holding an international conference on the Hebrew language in Warsaw and especially the forthcoming visit in January 1981 by the minister of religion (see below).

In the internal field, liberalisation was reflected in the rise and entrenchment of three centres of power outside the Party: the Church, the intelligentsia (70 'samizdat' publications with a wide circulation) and recently—the workers.

In 1978, a research report sponsored by the authorities diagnosed that the situation in Poland demanded attention, but the problem was not merely economic, but also social and political. The criticism of the regime and political structure did not lead to outrage on their part.

Recently, as a result of these events, sweeping changes have been made in the Polish leadership, mainly at the top. The Politburo and the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party are made up of new faces, who only took up their posts recently. The exception and most significant anomaly is Mieczysław Moczar, a Politburo member and the president of the Party internal control committee.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ This is probably a reference to the Supreme Audit Office. Moczar was the head of this governmental agency at that time.

His return after previous dismissals from every position of influence is (almost) unprecedented. His rise was accompanied by commentaries predicting a return to nationalism, a hard line and antisemitism. Regarding antisemitism, Moczar has made an effort to try to clear himself, both in private and in public statements.

2. Soviet involvement

The possibility of a Soviet invasion of Poland was discussed at the meeting. Several points were made suggesting that it was not likely that the USSR would invade, even if the situation becomes more serious than it is now. On the other hand, this possibility cannot be entirely ruled out, since the situation in Poland may have implications for other states in the Soviet bloc, especially in view of the fact that the struggle in Poland is now not only for economic gains but also for political ones.

In case of an invasion, Israel will have to react, but should not be too forceful, since, despite the lack of relations with the USSR, it is still a superpower which supports the right of Israel to exist. In addition, Israel has issues to deal with connected with the USSR, which may be harmed as a result of an excessive condemnation beyond indicating the real aggressor (which preaches morality to the world).

3. The Polish delegation to Israel

In mid-January 1981, a delegation headed by the Polish minister of religions, Jerzy Kuberski, is supposed to come to Israel. Kuberski is coming in the capacity of his post, as chairman of the international Janusz Korczak association.⁸⁵ The minister has said that he is willing to meet anyone that his hosts think appropriate.

In view of this, the following lines of action were suggested:

a. We will not initiate a discussion on the question of renewal of diplomatic relations with Poland.

b. If the subject comes up or other arrangements are suggested, such as an Interest Officer who could be stationed at the Polish bank in Tel Aviv, the reply should be given that the proposal will be favourably considered, but we should not jump at it.

c. We should try to raise the subject of trade or cultural exchanges while emphasising that these do not contradict the political stands held by each side.

d. If the subject of trade does come up, a meeting of experts from both sides should be arranged for substantive discussions.

e. It is desirable to raise the subject of the stoppage of pension payments to Israeli citizens by the Poles.

The comment was made that the most important point in all contacts with the Poles is to retain our self-respect and to remember that in the past, there were many cases where they did not carry out their promises or agreements with Israel.

Israel State Archives, MFA 8915/3

⁸⁵ The head of the Office of Religious Affairs, Jerzy Kuberski, visited Israel on 13–19 January, 1981.

ISRAEL

37

**25 December 1980, Letter
from the Director of the Eastern Europe Department
at the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Yosef Govrin,
to the Special Adviser to the Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Sasson**

Jerusalem, 25 December 1980

Re: Request by the Federal Republic of Germany for the Prime Minister to support Lech Wałęsa's candidacy for the Noble Peace Prize⁸⁶

Reference: the letter of 22 December from Hava Bitan to the director of the Prime Minister's Bureau

Although we were not asked to give an opinion, I would like to recommend giving an equivocal answer to this request, like that given by Willi Brandt.

We should not arouse the ire of the East European bloc (including Romania) by supporting this nomination. Except for Yugoslavia, all the eastern countries see Wałęsa as an element planning to subvert, in stages, the structure of the current Communist regime in Poland and to expand his influence in Eastern Europe in general. Israel's support of Wałęsa, with all the sympathy we may have for his cause, may be interpreted by the East European bloc as support for its enemies.

Some say that the free Trade Union organisation founded in Poland and headed by Wałęsa is not without anti-Jewish sentiment. This, too, should be taken into consideration, in my view, even if we do not have substantial information about it.

Israel State Archives, MFA 8915/16

⁸⁶ The request was made by Rudolf Patsch, head of the Democratic Club in Berlin, and not by the West German government as implied here. Lech Wałęsa was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983.

AUSTRALIA

38

23 January 1981, Cablegram
 from the Australian Ambassador in Warsaw, John Burgess,
 to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs

Warsaw, 23 January 1981

C o n f i d e n t i a l

CABLEGRAM O.WS605

Poland: political situation: assessment

The Polish crisis is now in its seventh month and the rebellion of the Polish Nation against the Polish State is being pushed with renewed vigour. Despite quite notable efforts on the part of the Party/Government to break with its past, accumulated bitterness towards it and distrust of its motives makes a National compact look very distant. The prospect is for continuing overt tension between 'Solidarity' and the State, though not necessarily at the current high level.

C u r r e n t I s s u e s

2. The two main issues on the surface at the moment are those of a five-day working week and a 'rural solidarity' union.⁸⁷ These issues are likely to fade in the shorter term but will be replaced by others from a long list of outstanding grievances.

3. A compromise on the five-day working week still seems within reach. The Government has not closed off the option of a five-day week under certain conditions and the compromise is likely to involve agreed voluntary work outside the five working days, much along the lines of the agreement reached with the miners. The issue is as much symbolic as substantial. A lack of sensitivity in the way the Government handled it and an effective breakdown in communications between it and 'Solidarity' over the issue has produced a charged atmosphere complicating a rational solution.

4. The 'rural Solidarity' issue may also soon fade into the background. A good deal of the effective support for the farmers is coming from industrial 'Solidarity' rather than from rural areas. The farmers themselves appear to be in a rather primitive stage of organisation (we understand there are at least three rival 'rural Solidarity' organisations). The farmers' movement has not had 'Solidarity's' ten-year long maturation period, lacks a viable leader, and because its members are mostly old people it lacks the generational drive which is an important factor in 'Solidarity's'

⁸⁷ Rural Solidarity (the Independent Self-governing Trade Union of Individual Farmers—Solidarity) was registered on 12 May 1981 following numerous strikes and protests.

rebellion. Come spring the farmers will go back to their land and have little time for agitation. The issue in its present form is over the machinery through which the private farmers can exercise independence and self-government, objectives which the Government now supports. The Government has made it clear, however, that it will oppose creation of a new Farmers' Union and favours enhancing the power of the traditional forms of farmers' circles and co-operatives.

Solidarity

5. Walesa's current authority within 'Solidarity's' national consultative committee is a key question bearing on Poland's future. Recent signs point to him losing some of his former authority though he still has unrivalled national prestige. The challenging course 'Solidarity' has adopted over the five-day week issue suggests to us that Walesa has been forced by his movement into the present confrontation. We now know that in late-November Walesa felt very strongly that Warsaw 'Solidarity' action around Narozniak's arrest was ill-advised and he then carried the day against his radicals. To this point he has not been able to exercise similar restraining authority over the five-day week issue.

6. The Church has come out clearly for restraint (not without some internal misgivings) and it seems that part of its thinking in arranging Walesa's recent meetings with the Pope was to enhance his prestige and authority within 'Solidarity.'

7. It seems clear that the mood at grassroots level in 'Solidarity' (in effect the nation) is such that there will be continuing overt pressure on the Party/Government. Distrust of the authorities appears to have deepened rather than eased and there is a conviction, owing much to the disappointments of 1956 and 1970, that only through pressure can the authorities be brought to institute change.

The Party

8. While the Party's reputation in the nation is low and its authority weak, it has in recent weeks started at least to give the appearance of pulling itself together and of reasserting the leading role which is one of the inescapable requirements of Poland's political environment. The Marxist-Leninist ideology is dead not only in Poland at large but, with few exceptions, in the Party itself. From the time of the 7th CC Plenum the Party has sought to dig itself in and resist further concessions to 'Solidarity' pressure, though it has not abandoned its line that solutions should be sought by 'political means' and not by force. This stiffening of the Party's position probably stems from a need for Party self-respect as well as from awareness that the Soviet Union required a stand to be made. It has been expressed largely by an increase in rhetoric against dissident groups and about 'anti-socialist' (sometimes 'counter-revolutionary') forces in Poland and within 'Solidarity' itself. In actual practice it has been expressed most notably in a police action to clear an occupied

building in the town of Ustrzyki Dolny⁸⁸ on the Soviet border and by unwillingness to this point to cave in to 'Solidarity's' demands over 'free' Saturdays.

9. The IXth Party Congress is providing a focus for Party activity and it is becoming clearer from material issued from Party sources that it is shaping up as an occasion when quite notable reforms will be introduced, not only in the economy, but affecting the internal organisation of the Party itself. The broad lines of the economic reform are decentralisation and self-management involving partnership between management and trade unions at the enterprise level. The broad lines of Party reforms likely to be introduced at the Congress are democratisation of the Party and include provisions for more genuine elections within the Party, limits on duration of office-holding etc.

10. The pressure for a radical reforming Congress is coming essentially from the grassroots level of the Party (basic Party organisations) and we are impressed that at this level there is a significant overlap between membership of the Party and 'Solidarity.' 'Solidarity's' reforming views are thus being forcefully represented within the Party itself. Rakowski, the prominent Party member who edits the respected 'Polityka',⁸⁹ has produced one of his seminal articles in that journal commenting on present trends in the Party. It contains the passage:

'From what we hear and read, we can guess the intentions of the Party basis unmistakably. The base appears to be saying to the top: after so many crises, this time we are not going to let you come back to practices, which, in effect, had to lead to deviations. We will not allow another situation where we will once again have to stand at the bar of public opinion. We, the rank and file, want to exert an authentic impact on the policies of Party levels.'

11. While the reforming trend appears to be gaining strength in the Party, it is clear that there are still conservatives in the middle and upper reaches of the Party providing counter pressure against too radical reforms. Their real strength would appear to lie in the support they can count on from mainstream Soviet thinking.

12. Kania's own position remains something of an enigma though we continue to believe that he has a genuine commitment to change. His authority in the Party still seems tentative, however, and far from being in a position to dictate he will have to bend in response to the competing pressures upon him. We do not exclude the possibility that Kania may be removed from or vacate the First Secretary position at the Congress. There does seem to be some real danger that the Congress may adopt a line falling between two stools, failing to satisfy domestic demands for change yet introducing change which is too much for the Soviet Union.

⁸⁸ This is a reference to the wave of strikes that took place in southeastern Poland (including Rzeszów and Ustrzyki Dolne), which ended with the signing of an agreement with the authorities on February 19 and 20, 1981.

⁸⁹ This is reference to the weekly magazine *Polityka*, in which Rakowski was Editor-in-Chief in the years 1958–1982.

13. The timing of the IXth Congress, officially set for the turn of March/April, seems by all accounts more likely to slip than not. Generally the reformers appear to want it earlier and the conservatives later. But the interest of all in a well-prepared and managed Congress will probably make for slippage.

The Soviet Factor

14. There still seems very little to go on in seeking to assess the limits of Soviet tolerance, still the most important unknown in the Polish equation. It is our impression here, based on trends within both 'Solidarity' and the Party and on casual contacts, that the Poles are not worrying too much about what the Soviets might do. The instincts of this passionate and not always rational people may not of course be the best guide to the probability of Soviet intervention. Various forms of Soviet pressure on Poland, short of overt armed intervention, could exercise a sobering influence on the situation here and it seems likely that we shall soon see a Soviet move, possibly some form of combined military exercise. The effects of such moves seem likely to be only temporary. As argued elsewhere overt armed intervention, which the Soviets must still be debating, does not offer them a final solution here either, as it would be likely to produce an even worse situation for the Soviets in Poland. Nevertheless the Soviets may come to feel they must exercise this option for want of a better [one]. With or without that step the Polish situation may now have moved beyond Soviet control.⁹⁰

Burgess

NAA, A1838, 48/1/3 PART 12

⁹⁰ The cablegram was also sent for information to Australian diplomatic posts in Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Geneva, London, Moscow, Paris, Washington and Brussels.

AUSTRIA

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19 February 1981, Circular by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Vienna, 19 February 1981

On the Polish crisis
(as of 20 February 1981)

1) Since its effective legalisation on 10 November 1980, the independent trade union federation SOLIDARITY, has achieved, by using strike or the threat of strike, whereby in various places public buildings have also been occupied several times, the following:

- Wage improvements, e.g. new wage rates for railway workers on 26 November of the previous year (enforced by a railroad strike),
- the release of the printer Narozniak and the judicial clerk Sapalo⁹¹ from pretrial detention on 27 November (enforced by massive strike threats),
- a compromise regulation on the question of the five-day week and working hours on Saturdays on 31 January 1981 (enforced by repeated nationwide strikes),
- the dismissal of local party and government officials in Bielsko-Biala for mismanagement and corruption on 6 February 1981 (enforced by a local strike).

2) These successes of SOLIDARITY seem remarkable as, to accomplish its agenda, the trade union movement not only had to overcome the Polish government's stalling tactics but also had to withstand, at times, very strong political pressure from the other member states of the Warsaw Pact.

The SU and especially its allies bordering Poland, the GDR and CSSR, have endeavoured in the last few months to promote the firmness of the Polish leadership in its dispute with the free trade union movement through

a) the closing of borders, troop concentrations, reports of 'joint military exercises' and the like,

b) through political pressure, e.g. assurances of 'brotherly solidarity' (= emphasis on socialist internationalism) at the Eastern Bloc summit on 5 December of the previous year, demand for a 'quick overcoming of the crisis' on the occasion of Foreign Minister CZYREK's visit to Moscow on 26 December,⁹² tightening propaganda in the media (from the end of November last year, parallels to the events in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia have been drawn with regard to the activities of 'anti-socialist forces'; from around the second half of January 1981, also in Soviet media, SOLIDARITY has increasingly been accused of 'counterrevolutionary' tendencies,

⁹¹ Piotr Sapela.

⁹² The visit took place on 25–26 December 1980.

the leadership of the union subjected to increasingly sharp criticism ‘... Blackmail ... Threat ... Anarchy ...’).

3) In an effort to re-establish its authority, the communist regime implemented a number of measures, the effectiveness of which must first be proven by future developments:

a) repeated changes at the top of the government and in top-level bodies of the PUWP (most recently, the nomination of Defence Minister JARUZELSKI as Prime Minister, whereby he will become the 4th head of government in Poland in less than 12 months!),

b) repeated announcement of programmatic declarations of intent for a ‘socialist renewal’ (most recently JARUZELSKI’s ‘ten-point program’ for the restructuring of the economy on 12 February of this year, etc.),

c) administrative or judicial measures (e.g. Government decree of 4 February of this year on continued payment of wages in the event of strikes to curb nationwide work stoppages, initiation of a criminal investigation against the KOR for ‘subversive activities’ in order to reduce the influence of intellectual dissidents as advisers to SOLIDARITY, rejection of the application for registration of ‘Rural SOLIDARITY’ as a farmers’ union to counteract the political emancipation of the Polish peasantry, etc.),

d) increased use of state propaganda against the democratic forces (‘anti-socialist forces’ in SOLIDARITY want to introduce ‘political pluralism with counter-revolutionary intentions’ and the like).

4) The PUWP is still committed to the ‘complete implementation’ of the agreements made with the free trade union movement in the Baltic Sea Protocols,⁹³ but its real objective—as can be inferred from the stalling tactics against the implementation of the agreements—is more likely the restoration of trade union unity and thus also of the PUWP’s monopoly on power, which has been shaken for months.

5) For its part, the democratic labour movement has developed a momentum of its own in the months of social upheaval in Poland (combined with a certain tendency towards radicalisation of the base; WALESZA has already been outvoted several times!), which cautiously leads to the expectation that SOLIDARITY will continue to pursue the struggle for enforcing the political and economic-social concessions confirmed in the Baltic Sea Protocols in a determined manner in the future.

In particular, this concerns:

a) enforcement of the right to strike and restriction of censorship that still require legal implementation,

⁹³ This is a reference to the Gdańsk Agreement of 31 August 1980.

b) inclusion of the peasant movement in the democratisation process (the recent rejection of the application to register 'Rural SOLIDARITY' as a peasant union will make the deliberations on the trade union law to be passed even more difficult!),

c) inclusion of the student movement in the democratisation process (independent student association approved on 18 February of this year; a comprehensive catalog of student demands, including the demand for the abolition of compulsory lectures on Marxism-Leninism),

d) criticism of the government's information policy, SOLIDARITY's access to the mass media (question of 'self-censorship' when publishing the promised weekly newspaper and organising weekly radio and television broadcasts),

e) protection of KOR members from official prosecution (judicial investigation initiated on 9 February of this year),

f) implementation of economic and social concessions (including improvements in the food supply, introduction of rationing, wage increases, increased housing allocations, etc.), the implementation of which will largely depend on the improvement in the economic situation, for which there are currently no signs.

6) It is not entirely certain whether in view of such an extensive open problem the renunciation of strikes proposed by the government and accepted in principle by Lech Walesa can be maintained for three months. However, it is very unlikely that permanent solutions can be found during this period. The system's inner logic demands that the power and opinion monopoly of the leading social force, the PUWP, be maintained. As long as the free labour movement also continues to make essential political demands, as has been the case up to now, stable solutions are not possible.

7) Long-term instability in Poland is causing political uncertainty in the other communist states in Eastern Europe, the long-term consequences of which are difficult to assess. In the economic realm, the Comecon area will undoubtedly be severely disrupted, as Poland will not be able to fully meet its obligations in the system for the foreseeable future.

8) The situation in Poland is unsatisfactory for the Soviet Union and its allies as long as the PUWP does not fully control domestic political developments and its monopoly on power is restored. Liberalisation, to a certain extent, should be considered acceptable, but democratisation, which undermines the leading role of the PUWP, is not.

9) The use of the Soviet Union's own instruments of power to safeguard the communist system in Poland in the sense of 'socialist internationalism' is not likely to happen, provided that:

a) there are no serious doubts about the loyalty of the Polish CP⁹⁴ leadership,

⁹⁴ This is a reference to the Polish United Workers' Party (Communist Party in Poland).

b) the system is actually affected, but the possibility of restoring the communist monopoly on power through their own means, possibly also using state instruments of power, appears to exist by maintaining a minimum level of state authority,

c) Poland's loyalty to the alliance is not called into question.

If these conditions are no longer met, a decision to intervene should be expected regardless of all the expectable serious negative side effects for the Soviet Union.⁹⁵

Austrian State Archive ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 166.03.00/64-II.3/81

⁹⁵ The circular was written and signed by Counsellor Yuri Standenat and approved by the head of Section II.3 (Eastern Department) of the Foreign Ministry, Paul Ullmann. The memo and attached chronology of recent events in Poland were sent to all Austrian diplomatic missions abroad, all sections of the Foreign Ministry and all departments of Sections I and II of the Foreign Ministry.

POLAND

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**[Before 26 February 1981], Note
by the Polish Embassy in London on the attitude of Western states
towards Poland's internal situation**

The crisis situation in Poland and the strategy of the West

In the NATO strategy re-evaluation process that is presently under way and aimed at securing the interests and expanding the sphere of influence of the West as a whole in the world, one of the regions of interest for NATO's political and military circles is Eastern Europe. These circles are especially interested in Poland given the internal changes taking place in our country. Western analyses of the crisis in Poland make use of the categories of the West's security as well as economic and political interests.

In strategic and military terms, Poland is seen as an important element of European security, and it is recalled that Poland's situation was defined in the agreements between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union that form a part of the post-war peace order in Europe.

In the opinion of some Western politicians, the socialist political system was allegedly imposed on Poland through force and, as the former Labour Party foreign policy spokesman P. Shore stated, 'the Polish nation left to itself will make further changes in the nature of the communist state.'

In the opinion of these circles, the Soviet Union is guided more by military interests than ideological ones in its relations with Poland. Thus, as the aforementioned P. Shore stated during a parliamentary debate in November of last year, sooner or later, the West should initiate 'serious discussions' with the Russians about the future of Eastern Europe.

The purpose of these talks would be to reach an agreement under which the West would recognise the Soviet Union's strategic interests and security requirements in the region of Eastern Europe in exchange for [the Soviet Union's] abandonment the 'Brezhnev doctrine.'⁹⁶

This concept ignores that national security and the defence of socialism in each socialist country are strictly connected and that they are also a matter for the entire community of socialist countries.

Thus, in the opinion of more realistically thinking politicians, such ideas are dangerous and threaten to destabilise the European situation as sanctioned by the Helsinki accords, among others. What stands out in particular is that a direct

⁹⁶ The Brezhnev Doctrine, also called the limited sovereignty doctrine, was first formulated in 1968. It stipulated that the USSR has the right to armed intervention in communist Bloc countries where the foundations of the socialist system are in danger.

consequence of abandoning the accepted accords concerning the Central European region would be the revival of demands for German unification, something that neither the East nor the West would be interested in.^x

As an internal document of the House of Commons from December of last year states, ‘the West can do little in the question of altering the relations between the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe without causing a crisis of incalculable consequences.’

Hence, according to this document, the West’s reaction to the events in Poland must be very vague. So far, these reactions have expressed themselves in the form of:

- Conveying expressions of sympathy to the independent trade unions;
- Issuing warnings for the Soviet Union not to intervene in Poland;
- Influencing Poland through an appropriate loans policy.

According to the opinion expressed in another analytical document concerning the situation in Poland,^{xx} Poland is of such fundamental importance for the security interests of the Soviet Union that should they be threatened, issuing warnings to the Soviet Union would be of marginal effect on its decisions.^{xxx}

While indulging in all sorts of speculation about a hypothetical Soviet intervention in Poland, the paper concludes that ‘obviously the security of no country would be strengthened if the USSR felt compelled to march into Poland. The immediate danger to Western countries would be outweighed by the possible indirect benefits arising from the USSR being engaged in a rather uncomfortable operation.’

The declaration adopted by the Anglo-Polish Parliamentary Group on 13 February of this year and addressed to the Prime Minister of the PRP states, among other things, that ‘any military intervention in Poland would not only constitute an act of unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the Polish nation, but it would create a situation leading to the destabilisation of Europe, to the undermining of the European Security Conference in Madrid, and to a dangerous increase of tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.’

Taking the Soviet Union’s ‘sensitivity’ about its security into account, most Western politicians, including British ones, are inclined to respect the Soviet Union’s

^x See the statement by M. Bonham-Carter, chairman of the British committee for the organisation of the Polish-British Round Table, in *The Times* of 16 February 1981.

^{xx} Richard Portes, *The Polish Crisis; Western Economic Policy Options*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 1981.

^{xxx} Amongst the motives that could prompt the Soviet Union to intervene, the ones most frequently mentioned include Poland’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact or the transformation of the Solidarity Trade Union into a political party that would compete with the Polish United Workers’ Party. According to Western circles, in the final analysis the Soviet Union would decide whether to intervene following an assessment of whether the processes unfolding in Poland can be localised and prevented from spreading to other socialist countries.

strategic interests and the defensive alliances it has concluded with its neighbors, including Poland.

Among other things, the parliamentary group's statement quoted above states that 'it doesn't intend to interfere in the arrangements made by the sovereign Polish government to provide for its defence and other vital interests.'

British political circles widely share the opinion expressed in November of last year by NATO Secretary General J. Luns, to the effect that the West cannot intervene militarily in Poland in case of a 'Soviet military intervention.' This does not mean that the West has abandoned plans to influence developments in Poland through other, non-military means.

Since the session of NATO Defence and Foreign Ministers held in Brussels in November of last year, the terms 'internal intervention' or 'indirect Soviet intervention' have often been in use. What is understood by this is a stabilisation of the situation using internal forces, which, by putting an end to the activities of the anti-socialist forces, would be described as a return to repressive methods.

On the political plane, the principal postulate raised by the West is the [free] development of internal autonomy in Poland through the implementation of appropriately targeted economic and political reforms. This entails the evolution of Poland's political system in a direction that would give it the traits inherent to political pluralism, especially by granting the independent trade unions an important role in the country's economic and social life, and also, if less openly, its political life, thus supplementing the agreements in force with the Church. This rests on the premise that such forces would play the role of an informal opposition. At the same time, the West is interested to 'hem in' these changes by providing them with an appropriate legal form and enshrining them in the constitution, thus sanctioning the transformation of the political system in Poland.

By betting on the evolution of Poland's political system through appropriately targeted economic and political reforms, the West hopes to gain within the socialist community a bridgehead that would have a destabilising effect on the remaining socialist countries.

According to the author of the above-mentioned report about the crisis in Poland and the policy of the West, given its limited possibilities to influence the evolution of the situation in Poland through military and political means, the West should use the economic assets in its possession.

For this reason, Prof. R. Portes' opinion, which reflects the thinking of influential political and economic circles, is that at the current stage of the Polish crisis, economic policy measures will play the main role. This means both taking and not taking steps using government funds as well as private capital.

According to Prof. R. Portes, the condition under which the West would consent to refinance or defer the repayment of Poland's debt should involve an understanding between the Party, the Solidarity Trade Union and the Church on a serious economic

and political stabilisation program that would ensure the repayment of the debt toward the West.

The one-sidedness of such an approach stands out: While stressing debt repayment, it ignores internal socio-economic priorities that are to be attained by means of a program of economic and political stabilisation through, among other, the implementation of economic reforms. Such a decision should support the internal liberalisation process and, generally, the evolution of Poland's political and economic system in a direction favourable for the West.

In Professor R. Portes' words, 'it would be difficult to agree to a deferral of payments for the sole purpose of preserving the banks, the Soviet Union and the Polish leadership, without providing incentives to strengthen internal autonomy and the reformist current.'

Such a stance has nothing to do with supporting the program of reforms and democratisation of internal relations in Poland that requires the cooperation of the party with other social forces, including the Solidarity Trade Union and the Church.

Quite the opposite, in banking circles the economic demands of the Solidarity Trade Union are viewed as unrealistic and actually undermining the chances that Poland's economy might recover, thus restoring the country's ability to meet its foreign obligations.

In the position adopted by the West there is an undoubted conflict between interests of a political and economic nature.

Placing a premium on liberalisation, the West reserves the right to withdraw from cooperation in the matter of a deferral of payments of Poland's debt, and to burden the Soviet economy with it instead, if the reform process were to be hindered by 'internal intervention' or if the reforms introduced do not produce the economic results expected to guarantee the repayment of the debt.

As Prof. R. Portes writes, at the same time the West cannot ignore [its] purely economic interests, which come down to the need to protect existing investments; to prevent Poland's insolvency and the threat that this would entail for the banking system and for East-West trade; and to maintain current exports to Poland.

In any case, the decision to discuss Poland's debt refinancing is seen as a political rather than a financial decision and it is expected of governments.

Conclusions

1. In western political circles, including British ones, the importance of Poland as a factor of stabilisation and political equilibrium in Europe is recognised, but in geopolitical terms.

2. Interest in 'a strong and prosperous Poland' (an expression of Lord Carrington) does not extend to acceptance for our country's present political system. Hope is being voiced that the present evolution of Poland's situation, by weakening

ideological ties with the socialist community, may open up the issue of choosing a political system in Poland.

3. The concept of developing internal autonomy in Poland, as pushed by the West, assumes such an evolution of the political system in our country in the direction of a pluralistic model in which the party would formally retain its leading role, but would share political power with trade unions and the Church, officially recognised as apolitical, and playing the role of an informal opposition.

4. In the West's strategic deliberations, the concept of Poland's 'internal autonomy' is given preference over 'external autonomy,' understood as breaking out of the socialist countries' joint foreign policy.

5. The West would be willing to recognise the Soviet Union's strategic interests and security requirements in Eastern Europe in exchange for the loosening of its ideological and political ties with Poland and other socialist countries.

The above concepts negate the logical consequences of Poland's membership in the socialist community and undermine the principles of socialist solidarity on which relations between socialist countries rest.

6. At the current stage of the crisis in Poland, economic policy measures are assigned the main role in influencing the evolution of the situation in our country. This means both taking and refraining from taking steps using government funds as well as private capital to achieve intended political goals.

7. As the main instrument serving to influence the development of the internal situation, the loans policy should favour the liberalisation and, generally, the evolution of the Polish socio-political system in a direction that is favourable for the West.

At the same time, as it is subordinated to the criterion of restoring the ability of the Polish economy to repay debts to Western creditors, it may threaten the socio-economic priorities assumed in the economic reform.

Prepared by M. Gorajewski

AMSZ, Dep. IV 45/84, w. 7 (PDD 1981/I, Doc. No. 181)

TURKEY

41

**12 March 1981, Cipher
from the Turkish Ambassador in Warsaw, Turgut Tülümen,
to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

CONFIDENTIAL

CIPHER
TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. After the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,⁹⁷ in the negotiations between the Soviet and Polish leaders, some doubts arose that a new attitude had been agreed upon, apart from the known usual statements. In fact, the signs that Solidarnosc has toughened its stance again in the last few days may be an initial effort to stop the growing planned pressure of the government.

2. The most important development was the declaration published by the Szczecin Regional Representative of Solidarnosc, which the party newspapers tried to refute with counter-ideas.

In the declaration, Kania was picked upon because of the speech he made at the Soviet Party congress and after it was questioned how he got the right to speak on behalf of the Polish nation in Moscow. It was stated that he could only speak on behalf of the party he represented. The fact that Kania regarded Solidarnosc as a respectable respondent inside, and made a deal with it, and accused the same partner of being anti-revolutionary, was severely reproached in Moscow.

If the news (cipher No. 772) that the party has completely infiltrated Solidarnosc in Szczecin, expressed by the western ambassadors at the NATO Summit, is regarded as correct, it is possible to connect this declaration to a game of killing two birds with one stone by the opposition group of Kania within the party leadership. However, the fact that restlessness has started across the country in Solidarnosc indicates that the Declaration is part of their overall action plan.

3. On the other hand, in Lodz, the second largest city of Poland and especially the centre of the textile industry, the dispute initiated by the Solidarnosc Regional Organization on 4 March with the demand of the re-employment of 5 dismissed workers continued with a one-hour warning strike on 10 March, and Solidarnosc decided to go on strike in and around Lodz on 12 March. In the same context, Solidarnosc went on a warning strike on March 10 in Radom.

⁹⁷ The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union lasted from 23 February to 3 March 1981.

Afraid of the sudden reaction of Solidarnosc in the first stage of the test of force, the Government reached an agreement in Lodz on 11 March (today). Negotiations continue concerning the Radom region.

4. In addition, it was noteworthy that a meeting was held outside the garden of the University of Warsaw, as opposed to the public protest meeting held by the new independent student organisations, with the participation of Solidarnosc representatives, in that garden on 8 March.

5. Another development is the joint Soviet-Polish military manoeuvres which began on 2 March, according to Western sources thanks to the information received from the Albanian Counsellor on March 6. It is said that 25 thousand soldiers participated in these manoeuvres, which took place around the Polish Mining and Steel Industrial Zone and in the region close to the Czechoslovak border. At a time when it was confidently confirmed that these manoeuvres were still going on, today (11.3.1981) it was announced that a military exercise with the participation of Polish-GDR-Soviet and Czech troops would begin in Poland in the second half of March.⁹⁸

6. As it was tried to be stated in our previous correspondence, despite the internal developments in Poland, the successful continuation of the innovation movement was mainly possible thanks to the maintaining of the dialogue between the independent workers' movement, which is popular with the people, and the political leadership. The issuing of statements by Polish leaders in a way that calms their allies does not change this fact (negative). It is understood that the leadership, which seems to dominate the party today, has involuntarily adopted the foreign policy of the Socialist Bloc.

7. However, it becomes apparent that there are two distinct trends which are becoming more and more evident both in the party and in Solidarnosc.

Despite the fact that moderates are dominant on both sides at the moment, in the face of increasing accusations against Solidarnosc, especially by the party and government circles, the reaction against these accusations and attitudes in the Independent Labour Movement will mean the end of the dialogue which has been carried out so far. If this possibility occurs, the new game which is about to start could feature any scenario.

Respectfully,

TULUMEN

Turkish Diplomatic Archives, 368/97910

⁹⁸ The Soyuz-81 Warsaw Pact manoeuvres took place on Polish territory from 17 March to 7 April 1981.

POLAND

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21 March 1981, Circular
by the Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Polish United Workers' Party for International Affairs, Emil Wojtaszek,
concerning the Bydgoszcz events

Warsaw, 21 March 1981

Top secret

Immediate

CIPHER No. 2047

Heads of all posts

In connection with Western sources' disinformation about the situation in the country, I am providing analyses and assessments arising from the current work of the party and government leadership.⁹⁹

The incident of 19 March in Bydgoszcz was due to the actions of the so-called Solidarity of Individual Farmers [SRI], which had been under way in the city since 8 March and which were supported by the local Inter-Enterprise Founding Committee [MKZ] of the Solidarity Trade Union. The ZSL¹⁰⁰ building was under occupation since 16 March. On 19 March, a rally was prepared in front of the Voivodship government headquarters. Approximately 50 people, led by the management of MKZ (5 people had been invited) entered the meeting hall of the Voivodship National Council [WRN] and demanded that the WRN discuss, despite its lack of competence, issues concerning the activity of SRI. After the session ended at 1:30 pm, the group remained in the hall, getting ready to occupy it. Following attempts to negotiate and appeals to leave the hall, at 7 pm the Voivodship authorities brought in unarmed security forces who removed the resisters, including the MKZ leadership, from the building in about 40 minutes, without resorting to truncheons or gas. An aggressive crowd of about 1,300 people gathered in front of the building. MKZ chairman Rulewski and two other persons sustained

⁹⁹ This is a reference to the three Solidarity Trade Union activists who were beaten by the Citizens' Militia as they attended a session of the Provincial National Council in Bydgoszcz devoted to the issue of registration of the Solidarity of Individual Farmers. When the session was interrupted by its chairman, the trade unionists refused to leave the room, and delegations of trade unions from nearby enterprises began to gather in front of the building. The Citizen Militia's actions, during which the trade unionists were removed from the building, led to numerous protests across the country.

¹⁰⁰ United People's Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe) was a Polish agrarian political party accepted the hegemonic role of the Polish United Workers' Party. It was founded in 1949.

superficial injuries outside the building's hall in unclear circumstances. R. refused to be examined by a doctor at the seat of the Voivodship government, and at the hospital he was separated from officials by S. activists. One should keep in mind R.'s aggressive nature and determination, fuelled by a traffic accident he has recently caused and in which a person was killed. In the past, he was sentenced for desertion (after his flight, he was captured in the GDR-FRG border area, the sentence was served, then expunged).

The Bydgoszcz incident has the clear marks of a provocative violation of the law by a group of S. activists, and this led to a legitimate and balanced response on the part of the authorities, with inevitable consequences in the form of tensions and emotions, however. The incident was used for propaganda by S. for two purposes:

- 1) To maintain pressure about the SRI and to attack the upcoming congress of the Farmers' Cooperatives Association;
- 2) To escalate attempts to discredit the Citizens' Militia and the Security Services and to set them against the government.

The reaction of society to the rapid and massive propaganda of S. is worrisome: a significant rise in tension occurred, as did far-reaching strike readiness and local work stoppages, as early as 20 March. Such a reaction needs to be calmly defused by means of a continued willingness on the part of the authorities to maintain a dialogue with S. Talks between Rakowski and Wałęsa and, especially, the Bafia committee's trip to Bydgoszcz are planned.

The chain of events in recent days reveals once again the confrontational intentions of many circles within S. and calls for increased vigilance, as well as swift countermeasures in the propaganda and legal spheres.

In your interpretations of the Bydgoszcz events, stress the lawful nature of the authorities' actions, the unavoidable tensions that attempts to break the law entail, the inflammatory nature of S.'s actions in many parts of the country, the complexity of S.'s internal situation, the uniformity of the authorities' response, and the determination of the party and the government to proceed with the socialist renewal and dialogue in conditions of order and lawfulness. Given the very rapidly changing situation and social climate, we will increase the scope and tempo of information about areas of conflict, but stations should be ready to react quickly based on the above-mentioned set of assessments when faced with clearly biased and anticipatory Western sources and S. propaganda.

Wojtaszek

AMSZ, ZD 23/84, w. 17, t. 148 (PDD 1981/I, Doc. No. 252)

IRELAND

43

8 April 1981, Political Report
by the Irish Ambassador in Stockholm, Dermot Waldron,
for the Secretary General
of Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Andrew O'Rourke

STOCKHOLM, 8 April 1981

PR 10 1981 Warsaw

‘Crisis Upon Crisis in Poland’

Yet another tense situation in Polish saga seems—at the moment of writing—to have passed in the last few days with Brezhnev’s less-threatening-than-expected speech in Prague at the Czech communist party congress.¹⁰¹ We have previously taken the view that there were three main areas in which a break-down in the Polish situation could occur; either in the economic conditions, and in particular the food supplies situation, which have been the occasion of out-bursts of anger and rebellion in the past—and this situation remains of course very serious; or secondly, in the strength and authority of Solidarity and the new unions, which might be tempted by their very strength to overstretch themselves; or thirdly, in the Polish United People’s Party itself falling asunder, and Moscow’s feeling that Poland’s socialism had lost control. This last crisis seems to have been caused largely by Moscow’s assessment that in fact their Polish Communist colleagues’ party had almost fallen asunder, and its authority, discipline and ability to govern had been lost. In particular, there had been criticism of the Polish Party for the first time by *Pravda* and *Isvestia*. Previously, Solidarity was accused, KOR was attacked as counter revolutionary and anti-socialist, other dissident organisations etc. were blamed, but never the party itself. If Mr. Brezhnev himself had endorsed this lack of confidence in the Polish party, then the outlook was very gloomy indeed.

2. The immediate cause of the recent crisis must have been the assessment of the Polish Central Committee plenum on 29 March.¹⁰² In case there may still have been any doubts, it emerged clearly from that meeting that the so-called ‘hard-liners’ in the Politburo and Central Committee are in a small minority. The leaders of this Polish Gang of Four are members of the Politburo, Stefan Olszowski, Andrzej Zabinski,¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ The 16th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia took place on 6–10 April 1981.

¹⁰² The 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the PUWP took place on 28–30 March 1981.

¹⁰³ Andrzej Żabiński.

Tadeuz Brabski¹⁰⁴ and the Central Committee member Dżisław Kurowski.¹⁰⁵ It is significant that it would appear from Swedish reports that eventually even these hard-liners at the Central Committee Meeting agreed to give their support to the present leadership of the party with party Secretary Stanisław Kania and Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski. But the hard-liners remain in the Politburo. These men have for the moment turned their back on seeking a solution to the Polish crisis based on the use of force. However, it was exactly this which has worried Moscow, an unwillingness to use the jack-boot, which is an integral part of any totalitarian régime. Stefan Olszowski's speech yesterday in Prague, as reported in the Swedish papers, seems to have been loyal to his colleagues in Poland, and patriotic even though he is of course known to favour a much harder line than Kania or Jaruzelski.

3. However, the second cause of disquiet in Moscow, apart from the refusal to use force, arising out of the Polish Central Committee plenum on 29 March, has been that after many hesitations and postponements, the Polish United Workers' Party has finally settled for a date, the 20th of July, before which the new party congress must be held. The party hierarchy must be very doubtful as to what awaits them when the party assembles. This has been the reason why they have for months postponed fixing a date for the Congress. However, the actual fixing of a new date for the party congress is not without peril. The leaders in the Soviet Union now know that if they are to act, they will have to do so before the 20th of July. The significance of these party congresses has been clear since the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Can the Soviet communist party afford to allow a party congress to go ahead endorsing the present leadership and programme of the party, confirming the liberal line, excluding the use of force, and excluding outside 'friendly' intervention from the Soviet Union. Nothing as they say concentrates a man's mind so much as knowing he is to be hanged the next day. One need feel little sympathy for the leaders of the Soviet Union but at least it would seem that they now must concentrate their minds on that latest date of the 20th of July to decide whether or not they are going to intervene in Poland,

4. Because at the moment it looks as though there can be little doubt as to what may happen in the Congress in July in Warsaw, if the meeting is allowed to go ahead. The changes which have taken place in Poland, as you are aware, have affected the Communist party as much as any other part of Polish society. It was expected that the party would pull itself together after the concessions to the workers at Gdansk etc. in the summer and that slowly but surely Solidarity and the new unions would be infiltrated and rendered ineffective. The opposite has happened. Solidarity has infiltrated the Communist party. Estimates are very difficult to make but it is

¹⁰⁴ Tadeusz Grabski.

¹⁰⁵ Zdzisław Kurowski.

thought that up to one half of the Polish United Workers' Party may now also be members of Solidarity. It seems certain that the new people at the Party Congress will result in a 70% or 80% turnover in the 130 odd seats which make up the Central Committee. These people will be men who accept what has happened in Poland since last summer. A very important fact in these elections is that the Central Committee has endorsed at its famous meeting on 29 March, the 'odd' Western system of the secret ballot for the next party elections. 'Democratic centralism' which we have mentioned before in previous reports as being in danger, appears to be in course of being abandoned. The new men elected to the Party Congress will place emphasis on the need for any communist party to have a dialogue with the people, to be on the same level as the people even as far as housing allocations etc. are concerned, certainly to be honest and uncorrupt, men who are dedicated to the so-called 'socialist renewal.' But these men will no longer be marxist-leninist dogmatists. They will be prepared to work and negotiate with the free trade unions. They will accept that there is little real censorship any more in the media. They will respect the rights and standing of the church. They will in a sense be democrats. Indeed without wishing to become too euphoric about what developments may be, there is now the possibility of a politically new state-structure emerging and a form of communist democracy succeeding the July meeting—provided it takes place. Certainly the totalitarian and authoritarian stamp of the old dogmas and of the existing régimes in the Soviet Union and the rest of eastern Europe will have been put behind them by the Poles.

5. What will be the effect on the other socialist states of a reformed and 'democratic' Polish United Workers' Party after the Party Congress in July? One would be well-advised to wait for all these things to happen in July, but it is hard to believe that in due course there not be some rather important effects; despite censorship and discipline and other methods to isolate the developments in Poland. One wonders, for example, whether there may not be even people in the Soviet Union who may feel that some move in the direction of a real democratic communism on the Polish model should be possible in that country also. What of the young people and students in the other socialist countries, who will certainly come to know of the freedoms of the students in Poland, of their not having to study marxist-leninism, not to mention the Russian language.

6. Perhaps, however, one should again come back to what we have stressed all along as being our view of the single greatest disincentive to Soviet intervention in Poland—the vast economic implications; the Soviets might perhaps accept the collapse of détente and CSCE for some years, their loss of standing in the world, cut-offs in the transfer of technology, materials and resources from the west. But could they face a blood-bath involving 35 million people, as well as sabotage of the country's harbours, communications, mines, industries etc. Swedish military experts say one million Russian men would be needed to take over and occupy the country.

Many talk of Poland in the same way as Afghanistan. But there are enormous differences in significance and size of the country in Europe, its very large, and literate population, its geographic area. Its army is 250,000 men. Could the Soviet Union impose a terror regime in 1981 on such a country, certainly uncooperative and perhaps rebellious? And Poland's economic problems: could the Soviet Union take on board the problems of such a broken and bankrupt country? Poland has \$26 billion of debts; a poor and undeveloped agriculture; ineffective industry; vast Infrastructural inadequacies in roads and railways; all of which will take at least maybe a decade to put right, even with the assistance, money, materials etc. from the west. Is the Soviet Union really prepared to take over all this? Let us continue to be optimistic, and hope the answer is in the negative. And it is worth remembering, as we have pointed out before, that nobody in Poland has talked of withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, or neutrality, and the head of the Polish Government is a Communist General.

NAI, 2017/40/14

POLAND

44

**16 April 1981, Informational note
by the Director of the 4th Department
of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ryszard Korczewski,
on the reaction of Western countries to events in Poland**

Warsaw, 16 April 1981

Confidential

INFORMATIONAL NOTE

Re: the attitude of West European countries to the recent events in Poland
– beginning with the incident in Bydgoszcz

I. Tensions raised by the events in Bydgoszcz and the strikes that were proclaimed in its wake, as well as the ‘Soyuz-81’ manoeuvres, which coincided with them in time, caused a sudden increase of anxiety in relation to the previous period, especially in West European capitals where, until comrade W. Jaruzelski became Prime Minister, moderate optimism about developments to come prevailed. During this period, the situation in Poland became the leading international topic. At the same time, this created an opportunity for the West to launch a propaganda campaign focused on supposed ‘outside intervention.’ From the opinions presented against this background by official representatives of [Western] governments emerges a universal conviction in the West that ongoing destabilisation and increased tensions in our country would lead to irreversible consequences for the entire *détente* process. At the same time, the link between events in Poland and the situation and interests of West European countries is stressed. This is the spirit in which statements were made by the President of France Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and the Chancellor of the FRG H. Schmidt, among other figures.

The events in Bydgoszcz and the proclamation of the strikes on the one hand, and the results of the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party and the course of the discussions between the delegation of the National Coordination Commission and governmental representatives on the other, also made Western Europe aware—to a greater extent than had been the case earlier—that:

– The front of the forces of reason and moderation that emerged as events unfolded creates a chance for a gradual, although undoubtedly difficult, stabilisation of the situation in our country;

– This stabilisation will not be possible, however, if economic difficulties, especially the market-related ones, and in the area of supplies for industry, continue to worsen.

A fuller awareness of the connections between Western Europe's interests and Poland's economic situation found their expression in the declared readiness of practically all West European governments to respond quickly to Poland's needs by, among other things, refinancing or deferring repayments and selling food products. Such a position was even supported by opposition parties, as was the case with the CDU/CSU, for example.

During this period, two important political events took place, directly and positively affecting the realisation of our economic requests: H. D. Genscher's talks in Warsaw¹⁰⁶ and the decisions of the West European Summit in Maastricht,¹⁰⁷ preceded by Genscher's report from his visit to Poland. Soon after this, Deputy-Prime Minister Jagielski held fruitful talks in Paris and Washington.¹⁰⁸

At the same time, we are observing an intensification of the propaganda campaign in West European countries aimed at stoking anti-Soviet sentiment. Characteristically, it is not—as used to be the case—expressly ideological in nature but is concentrated primarily on the possibility of 'outside intervention.' It most certainly has to do with the need—stressed during the US-West European consultations—for a propaganda campaign to precede the implementation of the program to deploy US intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Considering West European anxiety about the current stage of affairs in East-West relations, one may presume that the purpose of the alarmist American statements is, among other things, to 'discipline' the Western alliance. At the same time, it seems that while the tendency to internationalise the problems having to do with the situation in our country has relented somewhat after L. Brezhnev's speech at the 16th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, it will presumably continue in one form or another.

We are also seeing a certain evolution in the attitude of the West with regard to the matter of debt refinancing and new loans for Poland. This evolution concerns not so much the substance of the matter as much as those of its elements that are to guarantee such a commitment on the part of the West.

Initially, all declarations about the need to help Poland solve its economic problems were accompanied by the reservation that the condition for this was the initiation of a process of gradual stabilisation of the situation in our country. The consequences that an alleged 'outside intervention' would have in this respect were also stressed.

Subsequently, following consultations between leading West European politicians and representatives of the new US administration, the statement was made that this

¹⁰⁶ The visit took place on 19–20 March 1981.

¹⁰⁷ This is a reference to the summit of the European Council, which took place in Maastricht on 23–24 March 1981.

¹⁰⁸ Deputy-Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Jagielski's visit to France and the United States took place between 30 March and 4 April 1981.

assistance would only be possible 'on condition that there would be no use of force there (i.e. in Poland), either from outside or from within.' Almost all leading West European politicians spoke along these lines. It was stressed that resolving Poland's problems through the use of force would result in a definite collapse of the CSCE process, the Vienna negotiations,¹⁰⁹ and the SALT process,¹¹⁰ leading to a new arms race and—as the French foreign minister said—'it would be wrong to think that, if such a scenario were to materialise, economic interests would prevent (France) from drawing the consequences from the violation of the Helsinki Accords along the entire line.' Presumably, such thinking was also present in the letters addressed to L. Brezhnev by German Chancellor H. Schmidt and British Prime Minister M. Thatcher.¹¹¹

In recent days, however, the idea has emerged that there is a need to 'defend the achievements of renewal in Poland up till now' and, against this background, an emphasis on the interest in seeing Solidarity consolidate its role in Poland's socio-political system.

The evolution presented indicates the West's interest in maintaining the current direction of change taking place in Poland, also because in [the West's] opinion this would be of great importance with regard to the other countries of the socialist community.

II. West European countries have responded positively to our aide-mémoire of 25 March requesting a deferral of payments due on 31 March, recognising that the absence of these payments can be treated as a technical problem. West European governments are supporting our efforts to defer payments to private banks.

The position of these governments on providing us with transactional loans can also be viewed positively.

The EEC countries and other West European countries agreed to sell us significant quantities of agricultural commodities under the second tranche on price and loan terms similar to those of the first tranche.

Government circles widely stress that this positive response was essentially due to political decisions.

¹⁰⁹ This is a reference to the Vienna Disarmament Negotiations between Warsaw Pact countries and NATO on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe that had been ongoing since 1973. Three successive rounds of negotiations were held in 1981: the 23rd, from 29 January to 9 April, the 24th, from 14 May to 23 July, and the 25th, from 24 September to 10 December.

¹¹⁰ The US-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) ended on 18 June 1979 with the signing of the Vienna Agreement, which was not ratified by the US Congress in the end. The talks were a continuation of earlier negotiations on the limitation of missile defence systems (SALT), which led to the signing of an accord in Moscow on 26 May 1972.

¹¹¹ The letters were sent in response to Brezhnev's earlier letter (from 6 March 1981) to Western leaders about disarmament. The German Chancellor's reply was forwarded by Minister Genscher during his visit to Moscow on 2–4 April 1981. The British Prime Minister replied by letter on 3 April 1981.

Conclusions:

1. At the current stage of East-West relations, West European countries (mainly France and Germany) are trying to pursue their political aims by oscillating between continuing the policy of *détente* and maintaining the hard 'new American policy' line. This is reflected, among other things, in their interest in stabilizing the situation in Poland and their readiness to develop contacts, which is stressed in this context, as well as in their susceptibility to US pressure.

Undoubtedly, given its own interests (the 'reunification policy'), Germany took the lead among West European states that are interested in maintaining the policy of *détente* and in the stabilisation of the situation in Poland, coming ahead of France in this respect. We should strive to include in these positive trends the other West European states with which we have thus far maintained an extensive political dialogue and lively economic relations.

2. At the same time, very close coordination of actions between Western Europe and the United States has become evident against the background of the entire crisis in Poland. This coordination has military and economic aspects, but it is especially visible at the political level. The actions taken by the US are aimed at taking the greatest advantage possible of the entire range of issues having to do with the situation in Poland in order to discipline Western Europe in the pursuit of NATO concepts. Thus, the current propaganda campaign aiming at the creation of an impression of 'threat' from the Soviet Union is used, among other things, to justify NATO's deployment of new mid-range weapons in Western Europe.

3. After the Polish strikes proclaimed in relation to the Bydgoszcz events were called off, a certain decrease in anxiety could be sensed, also in Western Europe. However, there was an increased tendency to interfere in Poland's internal affairs (this can be seen in the declarations of Western politicians) and to internationalise the problems associated with the Polish situation (and this could be seen in the letters sent to L. Brezhnev by Schmidt and Thatcher).

Imbuing the events in Poland with the traits of an international problem and the political and propaganda activities that accompany this are seeking, among other things, to postpone the need to respond to the latest proposals of the USSR and thus, in a sense, to 'slow down' Soviet initiative on the international stage.

Against this background, the recent US-West European consultations have revealed certain differences in the positions of the US and Western Europe expressed, among other things, in the fact that West European countries are presently more interested in East-West dialogue than the United States.

R. Korczewski

AUSTRALIA

45

4 May 1981, Cablegram
 from the Australian Ambassador in Warsaw, John Burgess,
 to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs (excerpt)

Warsaw, 4 May 1981

Secret

CABLEGRAM O.WS6788
 POLAND: TEN MONTHS ON

[...]¹¹²'Solidarity'

2. Ten months after the beginning of the strikes in 1980 'Solidarity' remains the most powerful political force in Poland and the best guarantee of continuing reform here. 'Solidarity's' power rests on massive support from the population, support which does not appear to be diminishing as the economic situation worsens. Walesa had had some success in steering his movement away from a confrontationist attitude towards the authorities, a development that has depended on the authorities' willingness to treat with 'Solidarity' on a realistic basis. A wide range of matters are now being negotiated between the two sides without the need for 'Solidarity' to have recourse to strike threats. Thus some progress is being made in the direction of an internal consensus on the shape of necessary reforms. While some more extreme elements in 'Solidarity' are dissatisfied with Walesa's moderate approach, Walesa seems able to rely on very great support from among the rank and file of the movement. There are no indications of an imminent split.

The Party

3. The Polish Party has continued in disarray though a consensus is now emerging within it. By its own admission thoroughly discredited by the massive mismanagement and corruption it has presided over in recent years, it nevertheless maintains that its right to rule remains unimpaired. Most Poles accept this as a fact of life, acknowledging that the Party's leading role is a condition of continuing Polish independence. For this reason they must tolerate the Party, though they invest their hopes in 'Solidarity.'

4. The leaders of the Polish Party have always faced the dilemma of reconciling the wishes of their own people and the wishes of its giant neighbour. With the

¹¹² The abstract and detailed information about the internal situation in Poland were omitted.

emergence of 'Solidarity' that task has become even more difficult, and the Party's disarray is largely over how best to respond to it. After ten months the preponderant view in the Party is that it must reform itself radically by establishing internal democracy in the Party and rank and file control over the actions of its leaders. In effect the majority response now proposed to the dilemma is to move towards 'Solidarity' rather than towards Soviet orthodoxy. The revolution is now claiming the Polish Party.

[...]

The Economy

7. While there are still major question marks over Poland's future political stability, progress made in this area is more impressive than in the area of the economy. Only with minimum political stability can headway be made towards concerted economic reconstruction. So far, the Government has managed only to air publicly the full extent of Poland's economic problems and the best cure generally at the directions reform will have to take. More analysis and discussion is promised before the hard decision making begins in earnest. On paper the situation is disastrous, pointing towards a steep decline in national income and major internal restructuring. The community is clearly suffering much greater hardship now in obtaining supplies than it was at the beginning of the strikes last year and a stockpiling mentality has developed which is compounding supply problems. This hardship will presumably increase though at this stage we do not see signs that the country is sliding into a situation where economic hardship will itself produce pressures (food riots) that could disrupt the political situation further. One has the impression that even if supplies are not where they are meant to be, they are still around. Appearances can be deceptive, but the country still goes about its business with some air of normality.

The Allies

8. It is now ten months since the first strikes in Poland and few would have believed then that the Soviet Union would be prepared to tolerate its neighbour making concessions to popular pressures which have included legalisation of independent trade unions for industrial workers and private farmers, a Parliament with an independent voice, a major relaxation of censorship, and stand by while the Communist Party, discredited and practically powerless in the face of popular pressures, reached for internal democracy and control over the actions of its leaders. There is no doubt that the allies abhor what is going on in Poland, but it seems they have been unable to come up with a means of stopping it which would not create more problems than it solved. The outward signs suggest that the Soviet Union has flirted seriously with armed interventions on two occasions, in November/December and March/April. On each occasion preparations appear to have been made in the expectation that the Polish authorities would themselves

have to take a forceful stand against 'Solidarity.' On each occasion the Polish authorities were able to avoid this. Without Kania's determination not to use force against 'Solidarity' it seems more than likely that Poland would have seen Warsaw Pact intervention by this [time]. That continuing commitment on Kania's part will be important also in the future but may yet not be enough. Among the options the Soviets have are first, to sit back in the expectation that the Polish revolution will prove ephemeral. They will recall that Gomułka¹¹³ faced them down in 1956, in a situation comparable in some ways, but then loyally brought Poland back to the fold. Or they may think that the Polish revolution carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction and they need only wait to collect the pieces. A second more activist option would be to seem to destroy the fragile internal consensus now forming in Poland by arranging incidents which would bring 'Solidarity' and the authorities into conflict along the lines of the March incident in Bydgoszcz which very nearly was the end of the road for Poland. One assumes the Soviets could arrange such incidents purely through their own resources in Poland. On the whole I am inclined to think that the waiting option is more likely to appeal to the present inert Soviet leadership. In this case there may still be hope for the Polish revolution.¹¹⁴

Burgess

NAA, A1838, 48/1/3 PART 14

¹¹³ Stanisław Gomułka.

¹¹⁴ The cablegram was also sent for information to Australian diplomatic posts in Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Brussels, London, Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, Vienna and Washington.

ISRAEL

46

**6 May 1981, Letter
by the Director of the Eastern Europe Department
at the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Yosef Govrin**

Jerusalem, 6 May 1981

Re: Conversation with W. Sokorski, Chairman of the executive of ZBoWiD¹¹⁵
(an anti-Nazi fighters' organisation)

1. Sokorski, formerly the Polish minister of culture, arrived in Israel as the head of an official delegation to take part in the Holocaust memorial rallies,¹¹⁶ as guests of the organisation of fighters and partisans in Israel (with our help and encouragement).

While in Israel, the delegation toured different sites and stayed one day in Jerusalem. When the Israeli organisers asked Sokorski if he would like to meet any government officials, he hinted that although he does not have any official post in Poland, he would be happy if I could receive him for a talk.

I received him in my office, escorted by Stefan Grajek, on 30 April. These were the main talking points:

Poland—Israel: Jerzy Kuberski, the Polish minister for religious affairs (who visited Israel in January and participated in the Janusz Korczak international convention) asked him to send me his warm regards. Sokorski added that Kuberski returned with enthusiastic impressions from Israel and delivered a most favourable report to the Polish Communist Party.

Poland will soon resume trade relations and widen the cultural ties established between the two countries. In this way, a favourable atmosphere will be established, which will help in a concrete way to renew official relations. The Polish reliance on Libyan oil has been reduced. There is no great love for the Arabs in Poland in general, or for Yasser Arafat. The reason this matter is not dealt with more seriously is the Party's preoccupation with internal affairs.

My question: does he think that, considering Poland's sensitive relations with the Soviet Union, Poland can make such a move that might be seen as undesirable by the USSR?

His (unequivocal) answer: the USSR has for a long time expressed its opinion that Poland should strive to restore its relations with Israel and that it would have done so itself if it could.

¹¹⁵ Poland's Society of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy was an official state-controlled veterans' association in communist Poland.

¹¹⁶ Holocaust Memorial Day is commemorated in Israel by law every year in the week after the Passover holiday (usually falls in April or May).

My question: what stops the USSR from doing so?

His answer: its obligation towards the Arab states and its involvement with them.

Thus, the USSR would view restoring relations between Poland and Israel favourably, acknowledging that severing them was a mistake.¹¹⁷

The Polish dilemma and the USSR

[Sokorski] was present during the talks between the Polish leadership and the Soviet delegation, led by Suslov,¹¹⁸ not long ago, and according to him:

– The USSR is not satisfied with the Polish leadership, which does not display sufficient toughness with ‘Solidarity’—the free Trade Union organisation—but the Soviets still trust the leadership [in general]

– The USSR does not intend to invade Poland, as long as there is no real danger of the collapse of the authority of the Polish Communist party. Moreover, Poland is surrounded by other Eastern bloc countries, so the USSR does not see any strategic possibility of Western intervention in Poland.

According to Sokorski, the USSR will let Poland solve its own internal problems. It expects Poland’s leadership to prepare the coming (Special) Ninth Congress of the Polish Communist party well, in order to come out of it strengthened.

Poland—internal affairs

– Intense arguments are taking place with greater freedom in Polish official and Party media, in the Sejm (Parliament) and during public gatherings.

– Students are burning history books, claiming that they are riddled with lies.

– He, as a historian, a former minister of culture, a member of the Party’s Central Committee, and someone who acted in close collaboration with the Russians, is now being asked very embarrassing questions, and he has to answer them as best he can, with a greater degree of candour, which he could not allow himself in the past.

– In the circle of the free Trade Unions in Poland, a new, talented, technocratic-intellectual class is rising, casting a shadow on those who are currently directing the development of the Polish economy and industry.

– The elections being held lately in central cities and in provinces have helped new people unknown to the Party leadership gain key positions. One must assume that this generation will put an important, perhaps decisive, stamp on the deliberations and decisions of the coming Polish Communist Congress (14–18 July of this year).

– The Polish leadership has already crossed the red line, while the Polish people claims that it is not enough and is determined to receive more liberal democratic

¹¹⁷ Full diplomatic relations between Israel and Poland were only reestablished in 1990. In 1986, a Polish interests section was opened in Tel Aviv and an Israeli interests section in Warsaw.

¹¹⁸ The delegation of the Central Committee of the CPSU headed by Mikhail Suslov traveled to Poland on 23 April 1981.

rights and by that means to revitalise the Polish economy and to renew the trust between the people and its representatives.

– He estimates the number of members of ‘Solidarity’ at around 13 million, of whom 20 percent are registered members of the Polish Communist Party. This is an impressive number, and the Polish leadership must take it into account when deciding on policy and dealing with the organisation.

2. Antisemitic manifestations

I remarked that the antisemitic demonstration [in Warsaw] on 8 March caused deep anxiety in Israel and abroad, for fear that Poland is returning to the antisemitic hysteria that gripped it in 1968.¹¹⁹

He responded that it should be seen as an exceptional expression of Soviet agitation and that the Polish leadership not only repressed the demonstration, but also distanced itself from it immediately, publicly and forcibly. Although you cannot ignore antisemitic feelings, they are a relic of the past, and the Party will do all that is in its power to repress these feelings.

Appreciation:

Sokorski surprised me with his open and candid words about the Polish crisis. Especially surprising was his remark on the USSR’s approach in encouraging Poland’s rapprochement with Israel. We indeed have not noticed any Soviet criticism of the process of Poland’s rapprochement with us, which began 3–4 years ago. Since Sokorski is close to the circle of the centre of the Polish Communist Party, one must assume that what he is saying is well founded. Time will tell how much of this premise is true.¹²⁰

Israel State Archives, File 8915/17

¹¹⁹ This is a reference to the activities of the Grunwald Patriotic Association, a political organisation whose members held nationalist views, founded on 14 February 1981 (formally registered on 25 April 1981). On 8 March 1981 members of this association, which operated with the PRP government’s consent, organised a rally in front of the headquarters of the former Ministry of Public Security in Warsaw, during which they accused people of Jewish descent of crimes during the Stalinist period. The rally was a counterdemonstration against the University of Warsaw’s special anniversary commemoration of the events of March 1968, an event in which many scholars of Jewish descent who had been forced to emigrate in 1968–69 participated.

¹²⁰ The note was sent to the Acting Director of the European Branch [not identified], the Director of the Foreign Minister’s Bureau Yossef Ben-Aharon, the manager of the Director-General’s Bureau Yitzhak Ben-Ari and to the Security Department and the Centre for Political Research at the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

GREECE

47

**8 May 1981, Letter
from the Undersecretary of State
of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade and Shipping, Ryszard Strzelecki,
to the Secretary General of the Greek Ministry of Trade, Georgios Vartholomaios
(quotes the Greek letter granting Poland credit facilities)**

Athens, May 8th, 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. President,

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated May 8, 1981, reading as follows:

‘Following the discussions held in Athens from 6 to 8 May 1981 between our two Delegations, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Hellenic Republic is ready to grant to the Government of the Polish People’s Republic credit facilities for the financing of purchases of the following Greek products being mainly Government stocks, of a total value not exceeding 20.000.000 free U.S.A. dollars.

1.	Durum wheat	\$	7.000.000
2.	Tobacco	\$	4.000.000
3.	Olive oil	\$	4.000.000
4.	Sultanas Raisins	\$	2.400.000
5.	Beans	\$	1.500.000
6.	Macaroni products	\$	600.000
7.	Canned fruits	\$	500.000
	Total	\$	20.000.000

The value of each of the above items may be increased or decreased by 10% within the limit of the above stated total amount of \$ 20.000.000

The above mentioned credit facilities are granted under the following terms:

- (a) The credit will cover 100% of the value of each delivery and will be repaid in (3) three equal annual installments, on 31st December 1983, 31st December 1984 and 31st December 1985.

The value of the contracts will be expressed in free U.S.A. dollars on FOB basis.

- (b) The above installments shall be covered by promissory Notes issued by the Purchaser and shall be guaranteed by the BANK HANDLOWY w WARSZAWIE S.A.

- (c) The interest rate is fixed to 8% per annum. The payment of interest calculated from the date of each delivery will be effected semiannually, starting on the 1st of July 1982.
- (d) For the implementation of the above understanding the BANK HANDLOWY w WARSZAWIE S.A. and the BANK OF GREECE or other Greek banks will conclude appropriate credit arrangements subject to the approval of the competent Greek Authorities.
- (e) The relevant contracts will be signed within a period of six (6) months from the date of the signature of the present letters, except for durum wheat, which will be signed until the end of June 1981.

I have the honour to request you to confirm the above understanding which will constitute an Agreement between our two Governments.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.⁷

I have, the honour to confirm the above understanding, which constitute an Agreement between our two Governments.

Please accept, Mr. President the assurance of my highest consideration.

RYSZARD STRZELECKI
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE
AND SHIPPING OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

**Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Service of Diplomatic and Historical Archives,
Archives of the Embassy in London 1981/3.4**

POLAND

48

**21 May 1981, Protocol
of the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee
of the Polish United Workers' Party about Polish-Soviet relations
(excerpts)**

Secret

Protocol No. 94

from the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee
of the Polish United Workers' Party of 21 May 1981

[...] ¹²¹

Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski

Informed [all present] of the visit of Ambassador B. Aristov, accompanied by representatives of the Soviet Army Group. During this visit the ambassador made a verbal declaration. Its content indicates that the government of the USSR is drawing the attention of the leadership of the People's Republic of Poland to instances of provocative behaviour on the part of Polish citizens directed at Soviet soldiers and to displays of anti-Soviet sentiment taking place throughout the country. These cases are not subject to official evaluation; they are not cut short by official organs (at this point I reacted by stating that such occurrences met with condemnation during the plenary sessions of the Central Committee, in the Sejm). The Ambassador replied that they see this, but believe that there is a lack of evaluation of specific cases of anti-Soviet propaganda in the form of leaflets, caricatures, etc. This leads to understandable incredulousness on the part of the Soviet people; it harms friendship and cooperation; and has a negative impact on the Warsaw Pact. He underlined that Victory Day on 9 May didn't turn out very well, which indicates an insufficient political, propaganda and party work on behalf of friendship (I replied that we find ourselves in an unusual situation, that it was difficult to mobilise the public to participate in the celebrations, but the mass media put strong emphasis on the anniversary of victory).

He gave examples of hooligan pranks—such as when six [Soviet] soldiers in Legnica were attacked on 19 March, or when a drunken Solidarity member attacked a Soviet patrol on 13 May. When summoned, the Citizens' Militia didn't show up, and a few days later the Solidarity Bulletin wrote that it was the patrol that had attacked the Solidarity member, a claim that the local authorities failed to deny. A member of the Mazowsze Solidarity leadership wrote a letter to the Mayor of Warsaw that the activities of the [Soviet] communications unit stationed in Rembertów disturbed the

¹²¹ The fragment concerning internal affairs was omitted.

local population and should be curtailed. They see this statement as an attempt to interfere in the internal life of the Soviet unit. The Solidarity of Legnica Voivodship called on the authorities to turn over the buildings occupied by Soviet army units in Szprotawa, Żagań and Legnica to the inhabitants. Party and state authorities did not protest. He mentioned other examples of anti-Soviet propaganda in the form of posters, leaflets, caricature exhibitions, inscriptions, etc. He stressed that Solidarity has ceased to be a trade union; that it is acting as a political force and has a negative influence on mutual relations. They believe that this wave of anti-Soviet feeling must be resisted.

This statement must be taken with all seriousness. I replied that we are aware of this situation, which is one of the manifestations of the struggle under way. I declared that the Political Bureau would deal specifically with this matter, that material is being prepared about how to counteract anti-Soviet propaganda, and that the Presidium of the Government had also expressed this in its communiqué.

He thinks that this problem should be brought to the attention of the first secretaries of the Central Committee, especially those where Soviet troops are stationed. Comrade Rakowski will raise these issues in talks with the National Coordination Commission.

Comrade Stanisław Kania

The rise of anti-Soviet occurrences are part and parcel of the situation in the party and the country. This is a dangerous phenomenon. Specific facts should be explained and dealt with by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Generally, the point is to launch an intelligent counterattack in defence of Polish-Soviet relations. Activists should be provided with guidelines concerning our economic, scientific and technical relations and the problem of prices, as these questions are easy prey for demagogues.

AAN, KC PZPR, V/165 (PDD 1981/I, Doc. No. 419)

ISRAEL

49

**28 May 1981, Letter
from the Counsellor at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Harry Knei-Tal,
to the Director of the Eastern Europe Department
at the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Yosef Govrin**

Washington, 28 May 1981

Re: Conversation with a Polish diplomat

1. I happened to meet by chance, at a social event, a Polish diplomat (M. Lipowski, who is a minister-counsellor). This diplomat served in Israel during the 1960s until his country was obliged to sever relations with Israel following the Six Day War.

2. The above-mentioned expressed his concern over the tough American policy targeted to test the Soviets. In his view, this [policy] may explode and threaten world peace. He was especially displeased with Haig's declaration, several days ago, that the most difficult problem in the international arena is Afghanistan. Lipowski claimed that this is complete nonsense and ignores the very dangerous centres of tension in the Middle East and Central Europe.

3. Lipowski admitted that the situation in Poland harbours many dangers, but he believes that Poland will find a way to handle the current difficulties, in the same way that the Poles learned how to cope with the three partitions of Poland and with Nazi occupation.

He pointed to the fact that Poland has experienced great changes because of the events of the last 10 months, but it is now time to start the hard work of healing the economic fractures. In his opinion, the leader of Solidarity, Wałęsa, is a simple man, who lacks the qualifications of a manager. Wałęsa does have a certain charisma, but charisma is not sufficient for managing the difficult problems Poland is facing. Lipowski was indignant about the state of anarchy that has taken over Poland and about the fact that there is no longer any respect for authority and to those associated with it. Everyone does what they please and anarchy reigns.

4. He added that it not enough to say that one does not want one leader or another. It is important also to point out something constructive (a policy to get Poland out of its dire state, who is capable of carrying it out). The frequent changes in the leadership in the last months show that it is not personalities who are the key to recovery of the situation, but the return to stability.

5. He praised the role of the Church in the last crisis and described it as a stabilising and moderating force. He is worried by the passing of Cardinal Wyszyński.¹²² In his opinion, the Church must appoint a responsible and moderate figure to head it.

¹²² Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński died 28 May 1981.

6. In closing, he reminisced about his service in Israel and added that it is one place he would be happy to return to serve in again. He added with a smile that to his regret, small countries cannot decide by themselves on different subjects and are under pressure by great powers. In order to illustrate his point, Lipowski pointed out that Israel cannot act in the Middle East without American backing, and Poland, too, needs to co-ordinate with the USSR.

7. Note: the general tone of Lipowski's words was characterised by an attempt to be seen as a man of the world, willing to agree that the Communist party was wrong in some matters. Yet, his disapproval of Wałęsa and the Solidarity movement was noticeable, and between the lines one can sense his longing for the good old days of order.

Copies:

Foreign Ministry, Centre for Political Research

Mr. Y. Levi, Security Officer, Washington

Israel State Archives, File MFA, 8915/20

POLAND

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**3 June 1981, Informational note
by Stanisław Pichla, Director of the Consular Department
of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
on the Solidarity Independent Self-Governing Trade Union's
contacts with representatives of Polish émigré circles**

Warsaw, 3 June 1981

Secret

INFORMATIONAL NOTE

about the Solidarity Independent Self-Governing Trade Union's
contacts with representatives of Polish émigré circles¹²³

1. The changes that unfolded in Poland after August 1980 strengthened the emotional ties between the Polish émigré community and the home country. Generally, the reactions and actions of the Polish émigré community showed understanding for the renewal process within the framework of the socialist system.

The emergence of the independent trade union movement was greeted with universal sympathy, with progressive sections of the Polish émigré community seeing its strongest member—the Solidarity Independent Self-Governing Trade Union—as one of the elements of the positive transformation of the country's internal social and economic life. The Polish émigré milieus that are close to us were alarmed by the political actions undertaken by the Solidarity Trade Union, especially by the strike pressure methods it used, leading to the emergence of tensions and confrontations that harmed the national economy.

The ties between the Solidarity Trade Union and domestic opposition organisations made political émigré circles—which had long been propagating those organisations' ideas abroad—take up with redoubled energy and new hope the slogans forming part of the program of the independent unions. In political émigré circles it is thought that the Solidarity Trade Union, which operates legally in Poland, constitutes a proper platform for collaboration with KOR, KPN, and ROPCiO, and embodies the hope that the program of these organisations might be realised. Those political émigré circles see in these opportunities a validation of the essence of their activities. There have even been attempted suggestions that some of the slogans raised by the Solidarity Trade Union are the result of those émigré circles' persistent efforts.

¹²³ The original document has numerous traces of editing (abridging) made by hand. These changes are not shown here.

2. An array of recent actions taken by the Solidarity Trade Union indicate that it is interested in establishing direct relations with the Polish émigré community.

During the first months of 1981, contacts between Solidarity Trade Union representatives and Polish émigré communities became a fact. We do not have a full picture of the scope of these contacts at this time, as not all of them are official by nature and institutions and our stations are not always able to obtain adequate and reliable information on this subject.

The examples gathered so far indicate that the Polish-American community is of particular interest for the Solidarity Trade Union. Recent visits by Z. Gryszkiewicz and W. Sila-Nowicki in the United States confirm that the Solidarity Trade Union has taken practical steps in this direction. They both took part in meetings organised by émigré organisations, they granted interviews to émigré and American mass media outlets, they spoke publicly, and they gave lectures. Z. Gryszkiewicz appeared, among other events, at a rally organised (after the Bydgoszcz incident) by the Polish-American Congress, Polish veterans, and the Pokolenie-Pomost publishing house.

While taking part in the 3 May celebrations,¹²⁴ W. Sila-Nowicki appeared as a former prisoner of the People's Republic of Poland and a defender of workers and the KPN, emphasising in his speech the importance of the Solidarity Trade Union as a universal movement 'born not out of economic difficulties, but out of a desire for sovereignty.'

L. Wałęsa's call in the New York paper *Nowy Dziennik* to the leadership of the Polish-American community (and thus to the Polish-American Congress) and the trade unions for opinions on how to resolve Poland's problems in agriculture and housing is well known. Wałęsa also announced (the interview in the *New York Post* was reprinted in the Polish émigré press) that during his planned visit to the United States¹²⁵ he would meet with 'Americans of Polish origin from whom the Solidarity Trade Union receives moral and financial support.'

An equally lively interest in contacts with the Polish émigré community was shown by Solidarity Trade Union representatives in other countries. A two-person delegation of miners in Canada took part in meetings held by the local Polish community and gave a radio interview for a local Polish community channel. Mazovia Region representatives, J. Onyszkiewicz and K. Śliwiński, as well as the Solidarity Trade Union delegation in France offer other examples of the trade union's activeness in the area under discussion.

Against the background of the general interest in the changes taking place in Poland, some of the opposition activists now in France took various steps aimed at establishing new organisational entities. Depending on the recruitment of members from the Polish émigré community, at the same time they tried to draw the most

¹²⁴ This day marks the proclamation of the Constitution of 3 May in 1791.

¹²⁵ The visit did not take place.

competent and representative group from French political and social activists, the intellectual elite, etc. to the new entities.

Last fall, a new organisation called 'Solidarité France-Pologne' was registered. Its main objective is assistance and collaboration with the Solidarity Trade Union. In the longer term, 'Solidarité' is to set up a number of regional and sectoral branches charged with establishing collaborative ties with chosen national field organisations. The contact of 'Solidarité France-Pologne' with the Solidarity Trade Union became a fact, as this organisation actively participated in organising the stay of J. Onyszkiewicz and K. Sliwinski in France.

Another organisation, called 'Solidarité pour Solidarité,' has been established in France. Its goals and statutory tasks are the same as those of the organisation mentioned above.

In Australia, at the turn of the year a new Polish organisation called 'Solidarity—Association of Free Poles in Australia' appeared. Its main purpose is to bring material aid and moral support to the Solidarity Trade Union, and anyone can be a member, except for 'supporters of totalitarian systems.' 'Solidarity—Association of Free Poles in Australia' was founded mainly by Weyman (an 'anti-regime,' basically anti-Polish, activist from Sidney) and Boniecki (a former employee of the Polish foreign service who has worked with Weyman for many years).

The growth of this organisation worried Polish émigré clerical circles, especially given its thinly veiled intention of strengthening KOR's influence on the Solidarity Trade Union from abroad. Priests initiated a public polemic from the pulpit with Weyman, warning the Polish community against 'becoming involved in ambiguous political actions.'

A member of the board of 'Solidarity—Association of Free Poles in Australia,' M. Bąkowski, who is presently in Poland, conducted interviews with the Solidarity Trade Union's leading activists, such as L. Wałęsa, A. Gwiazda, and W. Gruszecki. These interviews were then published in Sydney's weekly *Wiadomości Polskie*. A statement by A. Gwiazda, in particular, seems to meet the expectations of the newly established movement. The article is accompanied by a photo of L. Wałęsa with the author.

The same weekly magazine tried to pass the Solidarity Trade Union badge that Wałęsa had given as a personal present to K. Weyman and a pennant of this organisation as a present to 'Solidarity—Association of Free Poles in Australia.'

3. The development of contacts between the Solidarity Trade Union and Polish émigré communities and organisations has been fostered by the assistance they provided to Polish society in various forms.

Émigré communities sought to establish a partnership with the Solidarity Trade Union, seeing this organisation as the only guarantor (besides the Church) that the aid supplied would be properly received in Poland and then distributed among the institutions and people who needed it most. On its part, the Solidarity Trade

Union became very active, seeking to establish contacts with the most important organisations of the Polish émigré community. Its activity took the form of sending a special envoy to the US, whose task was to take up with the leadership of the Polish-American Congress the matter of assisting Poland in solving the disastrous problems with providing Polish society with supplies of food and medication.

Even if only fragmentary, the above illustration shows that the mutual interest of the Solidarity Trade Union and the Polish émigré community is obvious.

Organisations such as the Polish American Congress, the Canadian Polish Congress, the Federal Council of Polish Associations in Australia or leading anti-communist émigré circles in Great Britain and France treat the Solidarity Trade Union as an ally in their struggle against 'the regime,' often not dissimulating that the slogans voiced by the union about acting within the socialist system and respecting existing alliances are only a tactical ploy given the absence of conditions favouring the voicing of anti-socialist slogans overtly.

The adoption of such a concept creates a convenient and long-sought plane for political émigré circles to collaborate with Polish society, while eliminating the mediation of the state and its institutions.

At the same time, Solidarity Trade Union representatives embarked on activities that can be seen as attempts to 'mediate' between state institutions and those Polish émigré organisations, which had strongly rejected such contacts until now. This was especially evident during the United States sojourn of W. Sila-Nowicki who declared, during his talks at the General Consulate of the Polish People's Republic in Chicago, the readiness to facilitate contacts with the leadership of the Polish American Congress.

4. The information we have received from our stations indicate that our representations react differently to the visits of delegations of the Solidarity Trade Union and members of its authorities, and to aid actions (also organised by non-Polish organisations) undertaken in their jurisdictions. They feel a lack of exhaustive information and sufficiently detailed political guidelines with regard to their role in relation to the new partner that emerged in the contacts with the Polish émigré community.

We should expect a steady growth of interest in the Solidarity Trade Union on the part of the Polish émigré community and various political groups in the countries where it resides. Undoubtedly, the Solidarity Trade Union will also strive to develop its foreign contacts as their internal position strengthens and their needs (material and financial) grow.

The contacts being established now are rather aimed at establishing ongoing cooperation with Polish émigré organisations that lie beyond the influence of our stations, and which are at times openly anti-communist. As we have seen, this is undoubtedly the realisation of aims set by the opposition.

5. In the light of the above, it seems necessary to make a political decision enabling the Polonia Association for Contacts with the Polish Émigré Community¹²⁶ to take practical steps in this area, and even to consider having the Solidarity Trade Union form a part of the Association's organisational structure.

The aim of the above should be to work out such forms of mutual contacts that would ensure coordination of the above-mentioned steps towards the Polish émigré community. The Solidarity Trade Union's contacts with the Polish émigré community may also produce some positive aspects in the form of increased access to those Polish communities, the neutralisation of the actions of hostile agent centres, etc.

It can't be ruled out, however, that the Solidarity Trade Union's intention will be to collaborate with the Polish émigré community outside the institutions officially established for this purpose.

Given the advanced and continually growing contacts between the Solidarity Trade Union and the Polish émigré community, it would be advisable and urgent to provide stations with guidelines reflecting our stance toward the issues presented above.

St. Pichla

AMSZ, DSiP 27/82, w. 1 (PDD 1981/I, Doc. No. 455)

¹²⁶ This is a reference to Towarzystwo Łączności z Polonią Zagraniczną „Polonia”—state- and party-controlled organisation responsible for contacts with the Polish community and emigrants in Western countries (mostly used for propaganda purposes).

NATO

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**30 June 1981, Memorandum
by SACEUR to the Chairman of the Military Committee
on ACE responses to an intervention in Poland**

NATO SECRET

30 June 1981

Chairman of the Military Committee¹²⁷
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Autoroute Brussels/Zaventem
1110 Brussels

SUBJECT: ACE¹²⁸ Responses to an Intervention in Poland (NC¹²⁹)

1. (NS¹³⁰) In light of the developing Polish situation, I believe we should improve our ability to react quickly to the increasing possibility of a Soviet/WP¹³¹ intervention. Therefore, I am forwarding to you my proposed intentions in that regard for consideration by the MC¹³² and the DPC¹³³ with the aim of facilitating a swift response by the Alliance in the event of an intervention.

2. (NC) By previous Ministerial action, SACEUR¹³⁴ was predelegated authority to implement certain actions either prior to or after an intervention. I would

¹²⁷ The Military Committee is NATO's highest military authority, composed of the Chiefs of Defence of each member country. It is charged by the North Atlantic Council with the peacetime task of recommending those measures considered necessary for the common defence of the NATO Area. The Chairman of the Military Committee presides over the Chiefs of Defence and directs the day-to-day business of the Committee. Admiral Robert H. Falls (Canada) served as the Chairman of the Military Committee from 1980–1983.

¹²⁸ Acronym for Allied Command Europe, the NATO Command was responsible from 1951–2003 for the planning and execution of all NATO military operations covering the land area extending from the North Cape to North Africa and from the Atlantic to the eastern border of Turkey.

¹²⁹ Acronym for the security classification NATO CONFIDENTIAL, applied to information whose unauthorised disclosure would be damaging to NATO interests. Individual NATO security classifications are applied to the subject line and each paragraph in this document.

¹³⁰ Acronym for the security classification NATO SECRET, applied to information whose unauthorised disclosure would cause serious damage to NATO.

¹³¹ Acronym for the Warsaw Pact.

¹³² Acronym for the Military Committee.

¹³³ Acronym for the Defence Planning Committee, the coordinating and decision-making body for all defence matters concerning the integrated military structure. Established in 1963, it is composed of representatives of the member nations participating in the NATO integrated defence structure (France withdrew from the NATO integrated military structure in 1966).

¹³⁴ Acronym for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Major NATO Commander responsible for the defence of Allied countries situated within the strategic area of Allied Command Europe. In time of war, SACEUR would control all land, sea and air operations

plan on implementing all or part of those actions, as suitable, at a time deemed appropriate.

3. (NS) In addition, I will instruct MSCs¹³⁵ to be prepared on short notice to raise the peacetime alert posture of ACE Air Defence Forces at my direction. If time permits, I will advise the MC and political authorities before raising the level of alert.

4. (NS) Furthermore, in order to shorten the response time required for approval of certain other actions, I would ask that nations consider now the following additional measures for which I might seek implementing authority in the event of an intervention. This list provides some responses to a situation short of the development of a direct threat to NATO from which appropriate actions might be selected according to the scope and scale of the intervention.

a. Subject to the approval of the nations concerned, deploy selected force contributions for the ACE Mobile Force¹³⁶ (Air) to contingency area N2 as follows:

- (1) Squadron (10XCF-5 Light Attack/RECCE Aircraft) CA.
- (2) Squadron (8XF15 All Weather Fighter Aircraft) US.

b. Subject to the approval of nations concerned, increase naval surveillance in the Baltic to level 2 or level 3¹³⁷ as considered appropriate and, in the case of the latter, including implementation of SACEUR OPLAN¹³⁸ 107dS Glass Flipper.

c. Direct CINCENT¹³⁹ to review the deployment of ground reconnaissance battalions/regiments within the Central Region, with a view initially to reduce their 'notice to deploy' to 24 hours.

in this area, and has the right to direct access to the Chiefs of Defence of any of the NATO powers and to Defence Ministers and Heads of State and Government.

¹³⁵ Acronym for Major Subordinate Commanders. SACEUR had three major subordinate commanders in Northern, Central and Southern Europe.

¹³⁶ The Mobile Force for Allied Command Europe was a multinational force of well-equipped land and air units assigned to SACEUR and immediately available for dispatch to any threatened area, particularly on the flanks of Europe.

¹³⁷ Reference to Maritime Security (MARSEC) Levels as defined by the US Coast Guard. Level 2 refers to the application of appropriate additional protective security measures for a period of time as a result of a heightened risk of a security incident. Level 3 refers to further security measures being maintained for a limited period of time, when a security incident is probable, imminent, or has occurred.

¹³⁸ The US military acronym for Operation Plan, a complete and detailed plan for conducting joint military operations

¹³⁹ Acronym for Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe, the NATO Commander directly subordinate to SACEUR headquartered in Brunssum, Netherlands, who was responsible for the land and air units in the Central European region. From 1979–1983, the position of CINCENT was held by General Ferdinand von Senger und Etterlin of the German Army.

d. In concert with CINCHAN¹⁴⁰ review the employment of STANAVFORCHAN¹⁴¹ to support ACE Naval Operations in the Baltic Approaches.

e. In conjunction with SACLANT¹⁴² consider the redeployment of STANAVFORLANT¹⁴³ from the Western Atlantic to European waters.

5. (NS) In listing these measures, I have assumed that our political authorities will wish to take no action which would engender false hopes for the Poles or provide unwarranted pretexts for the Soviets. I believe these measures are consistent with that assumption and provide options for a prudent, precautionary, defensive response to a Soviet/Warsaw Pact intervention in Poland.

BERNARD W. ROGERS

General, U.S. Army

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

NATO Archives, 2030-SHCGS-S-8-81

¹⁴⁰ Acronym for Commander-in-Chief Channel and Southern North Sea, the Major NATO Commander responsible for the Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN) established from 1952–1994 to defend the Allied sea areas around the English Channel. Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse (UK) served as CINCHAN from April 1981–October 1982.

¹⁴¹ Acronym for Standing Naval Force Channel, the mine countermeasure squadron activated on 11 May 1973 and tasked with the protection of the English Channel and the Southern North Sea under the direct command of CINCHAN.

¹⁴² Acronym for Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, the Major NATO Commander responsible for Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), the area extending from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of north America to those of Europe and Africa. SACLANT's wartime responsibilities were to ensure security in the whole Atlantic area by guarding the sea lanes and denying their use to an adversary, to conduct conventional and nuclear operations against enemy naval bases and airfields, and to support operations carried out by SACEUR. Admiral Harry D. Train (US) served as SACLANT from October 1978–September 1982.

¹⁴³ Acronym for Standing Naval Force Atlantic, the international squadron composed of ships from NATO countries which normally operate their naval forces in the Atlantic. The first naval force to be formed on a permanent basis in peacetime, STANAVFORLANT is a subordinate command directly responsible to SACLANT.

NATO

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**30 June 1981, Chairman Military Committee Memorandum
for the Secretary General
on military appreciation on the current situation in Poland**

NATO SECRET

North Atlantic Military Committee
CMCM-11-81

30 June 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
SUBJECT: Military Appreciation on the Current Situation in Poland

1. Attached herewith please find a Military Appreciation on the situation in Poland.
2. This paper has been prepared in accordance with the wishes expressed by the Council last month and is designed to serve as a background document for the discussion scheduled to take place on 8 July.
3. I have attached sufficient copies to allow for distribution to Ambassadors and to your staff.

R.H. Falls
Admiral, CF
Chairman, Military Committee

ENCLOSURE TO CMCM-11-81

A MILITARY APPRECIATION
ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN POLAND

This paper seeks to assess Soviet military capabilities in and around Poland, especially with regard to reacting to a Soviet political decision to intervene militarily in that country. In particular it attempts to determine how quickly the Soviet military forces could react to such a decision, and in what strength they could intervene.

The main factors involved in a consideration of Soviet military preparedness for operations in Poland are:

- combat readiness;
- combat efficiency;
- logistic support posture;

- troop morale; and
- employment of other Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces.

In order to discuss the various possibilities, we should note first the disposition of Soviet and NSWP forces currently in and around Poland. The Soviets have 2 Divisions stationed in Poland as part of the Northern Group of Forces; 19 Divisions plus 2 Brigades in the GDR; 5 Divisions in the Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia); and 4 in the Southern Group of Forces (Hungary). All are Category A.¹⁴⁴ There is 1 Category A Division in each of the 3 Western Military Districts of the USSR, including the Carpathian Military District which has a reduced Category A Division. In the Baltic Military District there are 3 Category B¹⁴⁵ Divisions and 6 Category C¹⁴⁶ Divisions. The Belorussian Military District has 1 Category B Division and 9 Category C Divisions, while the Carpathian Military District has 3 Category B Divisions and 8 Category C Divisions. Thus, there are 30 Category A Soviet Divisions in the Groups of Forces comprising the forward area and in the Western Military Districts there are 3 more Category A Divisions, 7 Category B Divisions and 23 Category C Divisions. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces are as follows:

Poland, 10 Category A, 3 Category B and 2 Category C;

GDR has 6 Divisions, all Category A;

Czechoslovakia 7 Category A Divisions, 3 Category C;

Hungary has 3 Divisions in Category A, 2 in Category B and 1 Category C Division.

There are a number of questions which must be addressed in order to analyse Soviet military capabilities, or, at least, the analyst must be prepared to make some assumptions at the outset since the speed and size of a Soviet reaction to a Polish contingency would depend upon what Soviet contingency forces would be required to accomplish, and which forces would be employed. To examine several examples, if the Soviets planned to augment the two Northern Group of Forces Divisions already in place in Poland in order to enhance Soviet Security only, it is estimated that this could be accomplished within 24–48 hours with 3–5 divisions.

If the Soviets desired to introduce a mid-size contingency force of from 15–20 divisions to support a Polish national effort, for example, to impose martial

¹⁴⁴ Soviet divisions were divided into three readiness categories during peacetime: Categories A, B, and C. Category A units were certified combat-ready, manned at 75 to 110% (assault) strength in both men and equipment.

¹⁴⁵ Category B units were manned at 30 to 70% strength, the average being slightly more than 50%. Equipment was close to full strength, but less so than Category A divisions because more equipment was in storage. These divisions were deployable within 30 days of mobilisation.

¹⁴⁶ Category C units were manned at 5 to 30% strength and usually have only 30 to 50% of their equipment available, mostly in storage. Divisions in this category were not normally considered deployable until 90 and 180 days after mobilisation.

law, approximately 10 days to 2 weeks would be required to prepare the forces. A full invasion force, comprised of 30 or more divisions, designed to impose a military solution on Poland would require 2–3 weeks of preparation time.

In all these cases NATO's warning time would be less than the preparation time stated. With regard to readiness, the Soviet combat forces which would most likely be employed in Poland, are in what is considered to be a normal state of readiness. That is to say they are engaged in training activities considered normal for this time of year. The only Soviet troops who can be considered to have been on continual 'alert' status since last year are a limited number of Signal Troops. The signal formations have been operating and continue to operate a contingency command and control communications network. There are no recent reports of military formations in the Groups of Forces or the Western Military Districts currently at other than seasonal normal levels of readiness.

While increased readiness has been detected from time to time in various Soviet formations, such increased readiness has not been concurrent throughout the area surrounding Poland and it has not, in the aggregate, involved all of the forces simultaneously that would be expected to be committed to a military intervention. Since last September, the Soviets have exercised selected elements and command headquarters of an intervention force, and, as a consequence, their overall preparedness to conduct a military intervention has been increased. However, the state of overall readiness has remained normal, and, upon analysis, it is doubtful whether their potential 'combat efficiency' is any different than it would be in normal times.

Although the Soviets have done little in the way of exercising the total logistic support structure which would be required for a full scale military intervention, there are sufficient logistic resources already available in the Groups of Forces, as well as in the Western Military Districts to support all options, including a full scale intervention. The latter option or a mid-contingency option, would require some mobilization activity of AVTOKOLLONA, or army and Front level logistics units. To date, no such mobilization activity has been detected.

The readiness and efficiency of Soviet forces is a function of, and is directly dependent upon, not only the category of the individual formations, but also upon the amount of time which has passed since the most recent troop rotation. The Autumn 1980 and Spring 1981 troop rotations have been assessed as normal two-way movements with no anomalies reported in the conduct of the rotation in any of the areas around Poland. As mentioned, all Soviet units in the Groups of Forces are Category A and by now should largely have overcome many of the adverse effects of a semi-annual rotation of approximately 23 percent of the force. The 7 Category B Soviet Motorized Rifle and Tank Divisions in the Western Military Districts would require 10 days to 2 weeks to achieve an appropriate level of readiness for intervention. The 24 Category C units, some of which would be

needed for a full-scale invasion would require 2–3 weeks. Since there are no NATO objective standards by which we can measure efficiency, one must assume that peak efficiency is normally reached towards the end of the current training cycle. A Soviet intervention prior to that time would be likely to suffer some proportional loss in efficiency.

Turning to the question of morale in Soviet Forces, it must be kept in mind that troop morale in Category A units is not now, or expected to be in the future, a limiting factor. There have been some reports concerning leave and movement restrictions for Soviet (as well as national) personnel in Poland as well as GDR and Czechoslovakia. In general, these restrictions seem to fall more heavily on signal troops maintaining contingency communications and, of course, this could ultimately have an adverse effect on morale. It is also likely that Soviet forces stationed in Poland have felt the effects of the crisis more severely than other Soviet forces, because of movement restrictions and the more openly hostile attitude of the Polish people. However, in general, their morale is assessed to be normal. A largescale mobilization of reservists required to bring Category B and C units up to strength could introduce some local loss of efficiency and lower morale, but these elements would be unlikely to degrade seriously the overall effectiveness of any intervention.

Since 1 January 1981, only two new Soviet formations have been identified in or near Poland. One is a new Soviet Assault helicopter regiment, now permanently installed in BRZEG, Poland and the other a Soviet Air Assault unit at OROMOV LAZNE in Czechoslovakia. Because of an ongoing restructuring of Soviet combat forces, it cannot be determined precisely, at this time, if these two formations are related to the internal situation in Poland or are part of the ongoing restructuring of the Soviet military establishment.

It is likely that some Soviet Airborne forces would be employed in any military intervention in Poland. In a full-scale intervention, for example, it is likely, as a minimum, that an Airborne Division, plus the airborne formations organic to other forces, would be employed in the classic role of airborne forces: to secure airfields, key communications and terrain features. In the mid-contingency, airborne elements would also add mobility and shock power to the conventional ground elements. In the security role, airborne elements could have the same mission as above plus a forward contingency mission in the event later reinforcements would be required. It is expected that airborne forces would be deployed by air transport.

In the event that Naval Infantry were to be employed, along Poland's Baltic coast, it is likely they would be moved by sea. While some Soviet (and NSWP) forces could also be deployed by air transport, it is more likely that the majority would move by rail and road transportation in order to provide a rapid 'saturation' effect and to avoid problems incident to moving large numbers of inexperienced ground troops and equipment and concentrating them, for a time, on or near airfields.

With respect to the question of employment of other Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces which might be designated or 'earmarked' for a contingency in Poland, we have not received any information that specific Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact units have been so identified, although it is expected that some Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces would be employed to give any intervention the appearance of Warsaw Pact solidarity. Most National Intelligence analysts doubt that any major intervention role is envisaged for Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces.

It should be clear that the Soviets have a number of options for military intervention in Poland, as well as adequate resources to support any option they may select. The Soviet military leaders have rehearsed their staffs, communications and selected elements which they believe would be required to initiate any of the possible scenarios. It is not possible to determine which of the options would be the most likely one to be employed; indeed, it is probable that at this juncture the Soviet military leaders themselves have not decided. In all probability; such a decision will be dictated largely by events at the time of decision. In accordance with long-standing doctrine and practice, Soviet leadership has reserved for itself the maximum flexibility in the number of options available, confident that a suitable choice can be made when necessary.

CONCLUSION

The last nine months have borne witness to an unusual series of events in Poland. Major political changes, unprecedented in Eastern Europe in recent years have been accomplished with a minimum of violence, yet the underlying factors which brought about the changes remain themselves essentially unchanged. The Polish authorities who have been pursuing various policies of expedience, (while the Soviets have, to a degree, temporized), seem unable to address fundamental popular grievances. This suggests to many observers that the Poles may be running out of time while the Soviets may be running out of patience.

The Soviets have put the time elapsed since last Autumn to some good use. The necessary military plans and initial preparations for military intervention have been accomplished. In the accomplishment and rehearsal for possible military intervention, Soviet activities must be considered as not only directed toward increasing preparedness for possible military intervention, but also as a form of 'posturing' designed to put pressure on the Poles, hopefully sufficient to discourage them from continuing a course of action making intervention necessary.

The military situation in Poland proceeded from October 1980 through January 1981 from a condition that has, in recent years, been considered, to be normal, up to a high level of activity and readiness and then, back again to seasonal norms. We have observed normal and routine activity continuing through the Soviet Troop Rotation period of April-May 1981. During the end of June and through July and August, 1981 it is likewise normal to expect an increase in the level and intensity

of out-of-garrison training, field training exercises and movement of troops in and around Poland. Since some of this activity will occur contemporaneously with the forthcoming Polish Party Congress, and other related political activity, it is natural that such military activity may again increase speculation concerning possible intervention. Since it is difficult to distinguish between normal seasonal training at the higher levels and what could be the initial stages of intervention, and also, as the proficiency of potential intervention forces increases with the effects of time and training, the military situation will have to be watched with great care, and analysed together with political and other indicators, in order to arrive at a timely and accurate forecast of events.

As set forth in the foregoing intelligence assessment, in order for the Soviets to initiate a military intervention into Poland, the necessary preparation time could range anywhere from 24 hours to 3 weeks, depending upon:

- the specific mission of the intervention force;
- the size and composition of the selected forces;
- the precise time at which an intervention would be initiated; and
- the posture of the selected forces, at the time of an intervention.

Thus, should a decision to intervene be implemented soon, say in early July, with Soviet forces as they now stand, the longer preparation period might apply. As Soviet forces progress further into their training cycle, or, should a more intensive training mode be adopted, the time required in preparation of the forces would decrease proportionally. Should a decision to intervene be implemented while large numbers of the forces are in field-training or manoeuvre posture, the preparation time could be reduced dramatically, as much of the preparation would have been accomplished through activities associated with the manoeuvres. In any case, NATO's warning time would always be less than any preparation time which might be postulated.

MILITARY COMMITTEE JUDGEMENT

It is the judgement of the Military Committee, as experience has demonstrated, that Soviet military intervention is characterized by speed, secrecy and great force, immediately following a political decision that Soviet interests require such action. This, in turn, poses a dilemma for the Soviets as in order to prepare and dispatch any sizeable force, and despite imposition of rigorous security measures, some preparation actions would be expected to provide an advance warning of such an intervention and would provide, as it has in the past, time for NATO political reaction to take place.

NATO Archives, CMCM-11-81

NATO

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8 July 1981, Summary Record of a Council Meeting (excerpts)

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL¹⁴⁷

NATO SECRET
Copy/exemplaire number: 281¹⁴⁸

SUMMARY RECORD
C-R(81)28¹⁴⁹

Summary record of a meeting of the Council¹⁵⁰
held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on Wednesday 8th July 1981 at 10.15am

PRESENT¹⁵¹

Chairmen: Mr. Joseph M.A.H Luns
Mr. E. Da Rin

BELGIUM

Mr. M. Van Ussel

GREECE

Mr. N. Athanassiou

NORWAY

Mr. K. Vibe

¹⁴⁷ Original text was preped in English and French on 11 August 1981.

¹⁴⁸ NATO SECRET documents are numbered and registered for controlled distribution.

¹⁴⁹ The document is part of a chronological series of documents issued by the North Atlantic Council, known by the NATO Reference 'C' and consisting of the summary record of discussions that took place at the Council. After 1952, this series was arranged per document type, year and sequential number, in this case the 28th Summary Record (R) issued by the North Atlantic Council (C) in 1981. The series was issued in each of the two official languages of the organisation, English and French.

¹⁵⁰ The North Atlantic Council, or Council, is the main political decision-making body of the organisation; it is a permanent consultation forum for member nations. The Council meets at different levels: Permanent Representatives, Foreign Ministers or Heads of States. The present document records a meeting of the Council at the Permanent Representatives level, and as such it is called Council in permanent session. Permanent sessions of the Council take place every Wednesday, and, in addition, whenever circumstances require.

¹⁵¹ Chairman of the meeting was the Secretary General, Mr. Joseph Luns. Luns, previously Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, served as NATO Secretary General from 1 October 1971 until June 1984. Italian ambassador Eric Da Rin served as Deputy Secretary General from 1981 to 1985, and he acted as Deputy Chairman of the Council. Attendees to the meeting include permanent representatives of ambassadorial ranks for each member nation, as listed. Members of the International Staff, the permanent staff supporting the Council, also attend the Council, such as the Executive Secretary, who is also Secretary of the Council. The North Atlantic Council can also be attended by a member of the Military Committee, which is the highest military authority of the organisation in charge of giving recommendations concerning defence matters. Its Chair is elected by the chiefs of staff. Canadian Admiral Robert Falls chaired the Military Committee from 1980 to 1983.

CANADA	ICELAND	PORTUGAL
Mr. J.G.H. Halstead	Mr. H. Sv. Björnsson	Mr. O.N. Valerio
DENMARK	ITALY	TURKEY
Mr. A. Svart	Mr. V. Tornetta	Mr. O. Olcay
FRANCE	LUXEMBOURG	UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. C. Arnaud	Mr. P. Wurth	Sir Clive Rose
GERMANY	NETHERLANDS	UNITED STATES
Mr. A. Böcker	Mr. C.D. Barkman	Mr. W. Tapley Bennett

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Assistant Secretary General	Mr. H.C. Lankes
Political Affairs:	
Executive Secretary:	Mr. T. Ozçeri

MILITARY COMMITTEE

Chairman:	Admiral R.H. Falls
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- I. Statements on political subjects (Restricted Session)
- II. Poland (Paragraphs 1–59)
- III. Soviet and East European agriculture (Paragraphs 60–73)
- IV. Air command and control system team (Paragraphs 74–78)

¹⁵² Includes the numbered items discussed during the meeting. Most of Council meetings start with the so-called 'Statements on Political Subjects.' This conversation between the permanent representatives on topical matters is not recorded to allow free discussions between member nations. The following items touch upon specific matters for discussion. For the present publication, only item 2, which is related to Poland, has been transcribed, that is, paragraphs 1 to 59.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED¹⁵³[...]¹⁵⁴

I. Statements on political subjects (Restricted Session)

NATO SECRET

II. POLAND

1. The CHAIRMAN recalled that on 30th June 1981, the Military Committee had circulated document CMCM-11-81, entitled 'Military Appreciation on the Current Situation in Poland,' which it had prepared at the Council's request. This document paid particular attention to the possibility of an intervention by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces and also analysed the question of warning time. It seemed possible to take some comfort from the Military Committee judgement that 'despite imposition of rigorous (Warsaw Pact) security measures, some preparation actions would be expected to provide an advance warning of such an intervention and would provide, as in the past, time for NATO political reaction to take place.' Of course, NATO action in this case would not occur until after the event. Before opening the discussion, he invited the Chairman of the Military Committee to inform the Council of the latest developments in the Polish situation.

2. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE said that the situation remained the same, even although political tension had heightened in Poland. The military situation was unchanged, the current exercises probably being designed more to apply psychological pressure on the Polish people than to prepare for an intervention, which seemed unlikely in the near future. Nevertheless, the existing force structure would enable the Soviet Union to respond to any crisis with a limited force. The fact that a large number of units had undergone the normal training cycle and had been deployed to the field for exercises had undoubtedly increased the scale of intervention which could be mounted in a given time.

3. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he had a question on warning time. The final sentence of the penultimate paragraph in the conclusion to the Military Committee paper stated that: 'In any case, NATO's warning time would always be less than any preparation time which might be postulated.' While accepting this assessment, he would like to have some idea of how this warning time related to preparation time. The Military Committee paper suggested three possible degrees of intervention, the preparation time being different in each case depending on the scale of the forces committed. His Authorities believed that any intervention would necessarily be on a large scale so that, on the basis of the assumptions in the Military Committee paper, there would be two or three weeks' preparation time. In

¹⁵³ Different security classifications apply to the various agenda items.

¹⁵⁴ The parts number I, III and IV were omitted.

the event that the intervention entailed the mobilization of Category C forces and, to a lesser extent, Category B forces, his Authorities took the view that the need to improve the preparedness of these forces would not necessarily increase the warning time.

4. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE replied that this aspect of the problem had been discussed at length, not only in the Military Committee but also in the Intelligence community. In the event of a large-scale intervention, the warning time would depend on the forces used. It seemed inconceivable that the Soviet Union would employ all the Category A forces stationed in East Germany and some of those in Czechoslovakia. Two to three weeks would be needed to mobilize the Category C forces in the Western military districts. Sixty to 70% of the Category B forces could be used without a very lengthy period of mobilization. This illustrated the difficulty of forecasting the warning time that would be available. The Military Committee believed that any intervention would necessarily be on a large scale but that the Soviet Union would try to keep the indicators secret. However, it was felt unlikely that such preparations could be kept hidden from Western methods of detection, even if infrastructure and logistics facilities were already in place.

5. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that according to his Government's information, there was a problem as regards the reliability of the Polish forces; since August 1980, half of these were made up of young recruits who sympathized with solidarity. Also, the Polish forces were almost 100% dependent on the Soviet Union for their equipment. He asked whether supplies of equipment had been reduced in recent months.

6. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE concurred with this analysis. However, it was difficult to forecast the degree of reliability of the Polish forces; a great deal would depend on the political situation at the time of any intervention and on the scale of the latter. As regards equipment, it seemed clear that if the Soviet Union had any doubts about the Polish forces' reliability, it would immediately suspend supplies. However, as none of these questions had yet been discussed by the Military Committee, he would like an opportunity to consult his experts before giving a more detailed reply.

7. The CHAIRMAN proposed that after this review of the military situation, the Council should go on to a general exchange of views on the other aspects of the situation in Poland.

8. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that the Polish leadership had reason to be satisfied with the outcome of the elections to the Party Congress. According to a report from the British Embassy in Moscow, the endorsement of all the Politburo members and hardliners seemed to have reassured the Russians by demonstrating that the Polish Communist Party was still in control. In this context, Mr. Gromyko's visit to Warsaw was seen as a step in the normalization

of inter-Party relations.¹⁵⁵ The Communiqué issued following this visit was a clear indication of Soviet acquiescence in the Congress and showed that Moscow's real interests were considered more important than ideology and that it was prepared to tolerate a degree of variation under the Socialist umbrella.

9. However, it seemed difficult to assess the extent to which the Polish authorities would be able to rectify the very dangerous economic situation. In his conversation with Lord Carrington, Gromyko had shown modest optimism about this. After pointing out that it was not his practice to discuss Polish affairs with representatives of non-Warsaw Pact countries, he had expressed the view that—particularly since the harvest prospects seemed fairly good—Poland might be able to overcome its difficulties, even although the size of its foreign debt had been under-assessed. There seemed to be no doubt that the Russians would prefer to avoid a very costly intervention and that they had therefore tolerated developments which, only a year ago, would have been considered unacceptable. None the less, there were five specific sets of circumstances in which they might decide to incur such a cost:

- if Poland declared its intention to leave the Warsaw Pact;
- if communications between the Soviet Union and the GDR were jeopardized, thus putting Soviet security interests at risks;
- if there was a major breakdown of law and order;
- if the Polish Communist Party became so 'heretical' that it could no longer be regarded as belonging to the Communist movement;
- if the ferment in Poland began to spread to other Eastern countries.

10. It was true that the Polish authorities would have some difficulty in keeping within acceptable limits while at the same time satisfying Solidarity's demands; this could be done only if there were no outbreak of violence jeopardising the present balance, which would entail a great deal of goodwill on both sides. However, the Poles had managed to preserve this balance for the past ten months, so that a Soviet intervention was not inevitable. There was even a possibility that the Poles would be able to come up with an original and truly national solution in the form of a genuinely liberalised Communist party. This idea was far from popular with the Russians, but they might become reconciled to it so long as Poland remained loyal to the Warsaw Pact and to Communist ideology. None the less, Moscow would have to reckon with the fact that a prolonged continuation of reforms would represent a serious ideological setback and could lead to demands for liberalization in the other Warsaw Pact countries.

11. In these circumstances, the Western objectives seemed clear: the Polish crisis must be resolved in a way which avoided Soviet intervention and enabled reforms to be continued. The way to make a Soviet intervention less likely was to draw attention to the Western reactions such a move would entail while at the same time

¹⁵⁵ The visit took place on 3–5 July 1981.

responding positively to the Poles' requests for economic and financial assistance. In other words, the aim should be to continue a policy which hitherto had made a significant contribution to the Soviet assessment of the costs of intervention. There could be no doubt that this policy would be more effective if the Russians felt there was a prospect of improving East-West relations, particularly in the areas they regarded as most important, such as arms control negotiations, exchanges of high-level visits and the encouragement of trade—i.e. what Moscow saw as the elements of détente. However, it had to be borne in mind that this would mean abandoning the policy followed by the West since the invasion of Afghanistan. Clearly, there was no easy way out of this dilemma; hence the importance his Authorities attached to striving for some form of negotiation on Afghanistan.

12. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE expressed general agreement with the United Kingdom Representative's comments on the significance of Mr. Gromyko's visit to Warsaw, which seemed to have been a milestone in relations between the two countries. The Communiqué issued after this visit was very noticeably different in tone from the CPSU's letter to the Polish Communist Party.¹⁵⁶ It contained the statement that 'Poland was, is and will continue to be a firm link of the socialist community' and indicated that Gromyko had been given information on the preparation of the Party Congress as if it went without saying that the latter would be held as scheduled. The Communiqué gave the impression that the Soviet Union wished to break the deadlock in which it had found itself as a result of the CPSU's letter and to put its relations with Poland back on the foreign policy level, where there had never been any discord between the two countries. The current difficulties were presented as being the result, not of domestic troubles, but of an outside threat on the part of elements whose aim was to exploit events to discredit the socialist system. The document contained a reaffirmation of the Soviet views on peace and disarmament and of the Eastern positions on foreign policy, where Poland had always strongly backed the Soviet Union. However, the energy shown by Poland in Gierek's time had flagged and Gromyko had urged it to play its full role as a special partner of the Soviet Union with a view to the problems that would soon have to be confronted, and especially the LRTNF negotiations.¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Warsaw's endorsement of the Soviet attacks on the West seemed very surprising at the present juncture, when it stood in greatest need of Western credits.

13. The same sort of comments were to be found in the speeches made by Mr. Czyrek during his recent official visits to Yugoslavia.¹⁵⁸ After pointing out that Poland was going through a very difficult period, with complex economic and social

¹⁵⁶ This is a reference to the letter of 5 June 1981, in which the Central Committee of the CPSU criticised the events in Poland and the actions taken by the Central Committee of the PUPW.

¹⁵⁷ Acronym referring to the long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) talks between the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on nuclear forces reduction (1982–1983).

¹⁵⁸ The visit took place 26 June – 1 July 1981.

problems, he had alleged that certain Western forces were trying to avail themselves of events in Poland to achieve their own aims, namely to discredit socialism, stir up trouble, destabilize the situation in the country and escalate the arms race. He had concluded that all efforts to destroy the foundations of the socialist order in Poland and to impair the ties of friendship between that country and its socialist neighbours were bound to fail.

14. If this were the price Poland had to pay in order to put Moscow's mind at ease, the West would probably have to accept it. Following the comments by the United Kingdom Representative, he expressed the view that before issuing any warnings, the Western countries should be mindful of the recent relaxation in tension and appreciate that a series of Western admonitions to the Soviet Union would be out of tune with the present turn of events, when there were signs of a relative lull, and lend credence to the allegation that the West was trying to aggravate the confrontation. It was noteworthy that no reference had been made to Poland in the Communiqué at the last EEC Foreign Ministers' meeting and that following his visit to Mr. Gromyko, Lord Carrington had stated that Poland had not been discussed.¹⁵⁹ This cautious attitude seemed appropriate, even although it also entailed certain dangers, especially that of opening up prospects of increased co-operation with the Soviet Union just when the West was asserting that it had no wish to forget the events in Afghanistan. An attitude of great caution therefore seemed advisable during the next few weeks.

15. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities still believed that the Soviet leaders had not yet taken any decision on an intervention in Poland and that this was borne out by Gromyko's visit to Warsaw. The leadership appeared to be somewhat reassured and resigned to having the Polish Party Congress take place, even although this event was still regarded with concern since, despite the fact that all the Politburo members, including the hardliners, had been elected, the outcome was still far from predictable. There was no doubt that Gromyko had given some private warnings, even although publicly he had appeared to stress the spectre of the West's intervention and its influence on the Polish deviationists. For the benefit of the public, however, the Communiqué on his visit underlined the Warsaw Pact's unity of views and solidarity. Also, what was known of Lord Carrington's visit to Moscow showed that the Soviet Union regarded respect for Communist orthodoxy as being less important than anything that could jeopardize its geopolitical interests.

16. His own view was that the outcome of the Polish crisis would be determined by the economic situation; if economic recovery was not achieved, there might well be political chaos. Up to now, however, the Soviet Union had not tried to apply

¹⁵⁹ The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Peter Carrington, met with the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, in Moscow on 6 July 1981.

economic leverage on the Polish leaders and had even granted them aid to the tune of \$2.5 billion in hard currency, as well as a moratorium on credits. Its attitude might, perhaps change after the Party Congress if the outcome was considered unsatisfactory. The question of whether the West should continue to aid Poland warranted consideration and a study of the implications of such a policy. As the French Representative had stated, the Western countries must continue to observe caution and refrain from issuing too many warnings to the Soviet Union, but they should also take care not to make too many concessions.

17. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that to start with, he wished to make a few comments of a general and somewhat retrospective character. His Authorities felt that in its continuous review of the situation in Poland, the Council should give closer consideration to a general analytical problem, namely the fact that since the beginning of the crisis, it had had great difficulties in obtaining reliable information about Soviet intentions and objectives vis-a-vis Poland. While there had been abundant and relatively exact information about the military aspects of the situation, it had, as far as the Soviet decision-making process was concerned, had to rely on analyses largely based on historical precedent and expert speculation. As a result, too much emphasis might, perhaps, have been put on military aspects; this was a factor of uncertainty that should be borne in mind. He wished to add that his Authorities had very much welcomed the sober and concise analyses of Soviet military capabilities and possible warning time which the Council had received from the Chairman of the Military Committee.

18. Politically, developments in Poland had demonstrated that, even in Eastern Europe, there were important factors which circumscribed the freedom of action of the Soviet Union in the field of foreign policy. There could be no doubt that for more than a year the Soviet Union had strongly wanted to bring the process of liberalisation in Poland to a halt. The fact that it had so far refrained from taking action in the traditional way through military intervention showed that it would be worthwhile to have a close look at the factors that might have been decisive in Moscow's decision-making process. There seemed to be general agreement that factors such as the likelihood of Polish armed resistance, the risk of internal disintegration of the socialist community, anticipated Western reactions and international complications resulting therefrom must have weighed heavily against military intervention.

19. During a recent visit to Yugoslavia by the Norwegian Prime Minister, the Yugoslav leaders had recognised, with reference both to Poland and to Afghanistan, that today any country would have to think twice before undertaking any military intervention that was not supported by the masses. As far as the Soviet level of tolerance was concerned, the Yugoslavs had considered that loyalty to the Warsaw Pact and the upholding of the Party's leading role were decisive factors in the Soviet evaluation but that the Polish leaders themselves had a realistic conception of the

limitations on their own freedom of action. Also, it might be assumed that the Soviet Union was aware that the Western countries had had time to co-ordinate their reactions to a possible intervention.

20. As far as the latest developments in Poland were concerned, he agreed that two main conclusions could be drawn from Mr. Gromyko's visit to Moscow:

– the Soviet Union had now acquiesced with the extraordinary Party Congress taking place as planned;

– it felt that, at least for the time being, it would have to live with the present Polish leadership.

21 As to the Party Congress, the political pressure on the part of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries had been very strong. In their talks with the Norwegian Prime Minister, the Yugoslav leaders had characterised the Soviet Communist Party's letter to the Polish Central Committee as a gross intervention in Polish internal affairs and compared it with the letter Yugoslavia had received from Stalin in 1948. However, the fact that Kania had stood up to the pressure and maintained the reform line had strengthened his internal position to an extent which the Soviet leaders had been unable to ignore. Also, he had succeeded in moulding the Congress in a way that would not provoke the Soviet Union. This was clear from the Communiqué issued following Gromyko's visit to Warsaw. However, this document also contained some warnings. Among other things, Poland was reminded that the inviolability of its borders was dependent on the defence of the achievements of socialism. Several points made in the Communiqué could be seen only as a warning to the Polish leadership to see to it that the Party Congress was kept within the socialist foreign and security policy framework. It should also be noted that the East German press continued to criticise developments in Poland, which it depicted as 'extraordinarily serious.'

22 As of the present time, his Authorities' assessment was that the threat of Soviet military intervention had receded somewhat, at least in the short term. They did not expect any dramatic results from the Congress. As for whether Kania would be able to secure results acceptable to the Soviet Union, account had to be taken of the social unrest and threats of strikes and, above all, of the extremely critical economic situation which might exacerbate the situation. A noteworthy feature was that both in the Communiqué on Gromyko's visit and in the Eastern media generally, there seemed to be an increasing tendency to ascribe the responsibility for the present difficulties in Poland to Western subversion. This again demonstrated that the low profile adopted by the West throughout the crisis had been both in its own interests and in those of the Polish people and should be maintained.

23 The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that the Italian Embassy in Warsaw assessed developments in and around Poland as follows:

24 The Soviets appeared to be increasingly looking for guarantees against the intervention of 'imperialist forces' as an alternative to any kind of direct intervention;

the latter could not be excluded outright, but seemed unlikely in the near future and would probably take place only as a last resort. The guarantees sought for were of various kinds:

– Ideological guarantees:

25. The proposed new Party Statute was neither revolutionary nor excessively conservative or reactionary, but acknowledged Polish ‘specificity’ (freedom, publicity and transparency of discussions, free elections) in the context of ‘democratic centralism,’ the co-existence of national values and proletarian internationalism, co-operation with the social groups and the Church, but under the Party’s hegemony. The ‘*Tribuna Ludu*’¹⁶⁰ reported that the ‘Polish reality’ was a compromise of Marxists and believers aimed at creating a political and moral unity by democratic methods capable of harmonising contrasting views and interests. This entailed a democratically-elected Party.

26. At the same time, the Polish leaders were doing their best to reassure Moscow. Jaruzelski spoke of a ‘return to Leninist rules.’ Rakowski invited Solidarity to confine itself strictly to issues relevant to trade unions. Kania recommended that the Congress should strengthen structures to enable the Politburo to exercise control. The restriction of invitations to the Congress to the delegations of the Warsaw Pact countries and Yugoslavia could be explained by the fact that this was an extraordinary meeting. However, it also bore witness to a cooler attitude towards Eurocommunism, in spite of the latter’s undoubted influence on the right wing of the Party, the effects of which could be seen in the principles underlying the new Statute.

27. Moscow also seemed to be worried at the high percentage of newcomers (roughly 80%) among the 2,000 delegates to the Congress, which could eliminate the present members of the Party’s two top bodies—the Politburo and the Secretariat—and open the way to the ‘Social Democratic’ and ‘Christian Democrat’ tendencies denounced by Grabski.

28. However, even although a large number of delegates were members of Solidarity (although recent estimates, perhaps designed to reassure Moscow, put the figure at only 25%) or of the intelligentsia (largely represented), it seemed that realism would prevail and that the Congress would approve a statute which could be given the green light in Moscow. This feeling was widespread in both Party and Government circles and in Solidarity and justified a certain optimism.

– Military guarantees:

29. The unusual publicity given to the exercises held in Silesia, which had been qualified as relatively modest by western military attachés, as well as the rumours about new Warsaw Pact exercises in mid-July, were perhaps measures of intimidation and also signs of greater military integration of Poland in Warsaw Pact forces.

¹⁶⁰ This is a reference to *Trybuna Ludu*.

– Economic guarantees:

30. Jaruzelski's statements after the COMECON meeting in Sofia¹⁶¹ suggested that there might be a new orientation of the Polish economy towards COMECON and that, for their part, Poland's partners in COMECON might make better use of the Polish productive capacity

– Political guarantees:

31. The visit to Belgrade by Czyrek, as well as Gromyko's visit to Warsaw, seemed to suggest that Moscow was trying to secure more active participation by Poland in its diplomatic counter-offensive for 'peace and détente.' The Polish government's interest in a renewed East-West dialogue in order to consolidate the new trends in its policy was a major asset for the Soviet leaders.

32. The Polish government, subject as it was to Soviet pressures, was aware of the need to avoid any violent moves that could result in an explosion and was trying to gain time. The main austerity measures had been postponed until after the Congress. Kania seemed to be aiming at a political compromise with Olszowski. His hope was that the creation of the function of Party Chairman in conjunction with that of Secretary General would lead to a régime that was more centralized than the present one but was still far removed from the hard line of Grabski or Zabriski.¹⁶²

33. But neither Solidarity nor the Church could push the policy of moderation too hard without running the danger of a violent reaction on the part of radical elements. Solidarity was against the immediate adoption of the package of economic reforms which Rakowski regarded as the only way to avoid anarchy and wildcat strikes. Nor did it agree to the principle that policy was not the trade unions' concern and it had strongly criticized Gromyko's visit.

34. This 'stabilization within the instability' of the Polish situation required a sense of moderation and realism on the part of both the Polish people and Moscow. However, the strategy that seemed to be in course of preparation in Moscow tended to reinforce Eastern integration in all sectors, including the diplomatic sector.

35. In this connection, two factors warranted special attention: the economic measures taken by the Soviet Union to assist Poland and the role the latter could play in the resumption of the East-West dialogue.

36. With respect to the first of these factors, the Eastern press campaign on the paralysis of Poland's production and the non-fulfilment of its commitments towards its socialist partners appeared too well-organized to be accidental. Moreover, during the COMECON meeting in Sofia, the 'fraternal countries' had indicated that they were not prepared to burden themselves with Poland's economic problems. This tendency had been confirmed in a conversation between the Italian and Bulgarian Ambassadors in Warsaw. The Bulgarian Ambassador had expressed the view that

¹⁶¹ The 35th Session of the COMECON took place on 2–4 July 1981.

¹⁶² This is probably a reference to Andrzej Żabiński, a member of the Political Bureau of the Polish United Workers' Party.

it was unthinkable for the Eastern countries to continue providing Poland with food supplies if it did not resume regular coal deliveries. Various allusions to the burden represented by economic assistance to a country whose standard of living was incompatible with its resources had been made by Soviet officials in Warsaw. However, a cutback in economic aid could lead to a new wave of anti-Soviet feeling in Poland and to uncontrollable reactions. None the less, this means of leverage could be used by Moscow should the situation worsen and cause it to look for some form of intervention. It would also test the Western countries by exposing them to requests for aid that were not on a par with Poland's financial capabilities.

37. The second element to be taken into account was the connection seen by the Poles between the resumption of the East-West dialogue and the strengthening of their new policy of reform. This was not a new tendency; it was a constant element in Polish diplomacy and was particularly evident in time of tension. There was a degree of ambivalence in this attitude. The Polish leaders supported the general Eastern strategy while at the same time defending their national interests and trying to re-establish an East-West dialogue and co-operation that could help to deter Moscow from solving the 'Polish question' by force.

38. This attitude was illustrated by the remarks made to the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw by the Polish Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dobrosieski,¹⁶³ who had stated that it was wrong to believe that the prolongation of the Madrid Conference was helping Poland; on the contrary, it could damage his country by giving the Soviet Union cause to fear a rupture of the present East-West balance. Mr. Dobrosieski had expressed the view that various formulae currently put forward at Madrid offered some prospects of compromise and that if—contrary to his own expectations—the events feared in some quarters did, in fact, occur in Poland, the Western countries could always cancel their commitments.

39. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE concurred with the comments made on the military situation in Poland, which remained calm without any sign of unusual activity. On the political side, he agreed that the predominant event was the impending extraordinary Party Congress. Although 80% of the delegates were newcomers, he felt that the hardliners would stand firmly by their positions and that Kania would see to it that some of them were kept in the Politburo so as to foster Party unity and reduce opposition. At the Central Committee meeting on 30th June Kania had had no difficulty in having the Congress Agenda and rules of procedure adopted. His expectation was that the Congress would ratify the policy of renewal, keep Kania and Jaruzelski in office and eliminate the conservative elements who had supported Gierek.

40. Gromyko's visit to Warsaw had been no surprise in view of the discouraging results, in Soviet eyes, of the Central Committee Plenum held on 10th June, when

¹⁶³ Marian Dobrosielski.

it had become evident that the hardliners had too narrow a base to thwart Kania. Grabski's plan had failed not only because the military hierarchy had lined up behind Kania's leadership but also because the attacks on him had strengthened his position and given him the aura of a national figure. Also, it was owing to Kania's support that a number of delegates had been elected; consequently, the hardliners' base in the discussions would necessarily be limited. This was a situation that must henceforth be taken into account by Moscow.

41. The black point for the Polish leaders was still the economic situation, which continued to worsen, and the Congress would open against a background of economic disarray and social instability. The shortage of essential consumer goods continued to grow. Industrial production between January and May had fallen to its lowest level yet—i. e. about 13% below the figure for the corresponding period in 1980—and national income was expected to go down by about 15% in the present year. The shortage of hard currencies made it difficult to import raw materials and essential manufactured products. The picture was bright only for agriculture, with the prospect of a good harvest, although rationing was still necessary. On 30th June, the Polish Government had requested the United States to supply 400,000 tons of grain, valued at \$80 million, to be delivered as soon as possible. This request was under consideration in Washington. The financial situation was particularly serious. Despite the debt relief it had already obtained, Poland still faced debt service obligations totalling approximately \$2 billion in the second half of 1981. It undoubtedly needed additional assistance from COMECON, and also from the Western countries. There would be a stronger argument for such Western aid if the Party Congress produced moderate decisions.

42. The United States was convinced that the low profile maintained by the members of the Alliance since the outset of the crisis had been an important factor in deterring Soviet intervention and that this attitude should continue to be maintained so that the policy of reform in Poland could prevail.

43. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he agreed with previous speakers' comments regarding the Soviet Union's hesitations about the policy it should follow in Poland. His feeling was that while the Soviet leaders had taken no final decisions, they would like to avoid paying the high cost of an intervention and were prepared to let matters take their course in the hope that the forthcoming extraordinary Party Congress would have a stabilizing effect on the situation. However, the many threatened strikes showed that political and social stability was still extremely fragile and could at any moment break down. Also, the Communiqué issued following Mr. Gromyko's visit contained some fairly harsh language regarding western 'imperialist and hegemonistic circles seeking to destroy the foundations of détente.' This seemed to indicate that the Soviet Union might use these alleged threats of Western interference to justify an intervention in Poland and confirmed

that Moscow would put an end to its concessions when it felt that a threat existed to East European security.

44. He proposed to circulate an analysis from the Canadian Embassy in Moscow regarding the elections to the extraordinary Party Congress. In all probability, the Congress would be moderate and follow Kania's centralist line; nor was it likely to call in question the Party's leading role. The information received on the preparations for the Congress suggested that it would be concerned with procedural and organizational issues rather than philosophical ones. However, it could not be ruled out that socialist renewal might be given a more orthodox interpretation by delegates. Deputy Prime Minister Rakowski had recently stated that each of the Party militants must realize that this event would be attentively watched by the world and that the Party had to pass this test of political maturity. Basically, he felt that the Congress would probably not initiate any dramatic policy or personnel changes; the emphasis would rather be on rebuilding the Party and on strengthening its political effectiveness.

45. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE reported on talks between the Belgian Ambassador in Warsaw and Mr. Czyrek and Mr. Karski, Minister of Foreign Trade. Mr. Czyrek had seemed optimistic about the probable outcome of the Congress. He had expressed the hope that the elections would go off well, but did not anticipate that the number of candidates re-elected would total more than 10%; in his view, this did not mean that the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat would reflect the new majority. The Congress, he felt, was likely to confirm the process of socialist renewal and of internal Party democratization, but without endorsing any ideological deviations. However, he felt that it would not be able to approve a programme for economic recovery. It would be illusory to believe that the Congress could resolve Poland's difficulties. None the less, the Polish people might be prepared to accept sacrifices and the renegotiation of certain compromise solutions in the social sector.

46. Both Czyrek and Karski had taken the view that Gromyko's visit appeared to demonstrate Moscow's confidence in the Polish Communist Party and its leaders. They had recognized that Gromyko had, of course, indicated certain Soviet preferences as regards how the Congress should proceed.

47. With respect to Solidarity, both of them had expressed the fear that the Party might try to wear out the trade unions and to go back on certain concessions and compromises. In their view, the trade unions were not, perhaps, prepared for a protracted struggle. On the possibility of a Soviet military intervention, they had stated that even the representatives of Solidarity no longer believed in this, nor was, the position comparable with the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. At that time, Brezhnev had only recently come to power and the Soviet leadership had felt that there would be no Czech resistance.

48. The LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE mentioned a conversation which he had recently had with a high-level Polish official. This personality had said that changes which had taken place in Poland would not be reversible by the Soviet Union and had added that the Polish leadership was constrained by three elements: Party, ideology and alliances. Nevertheless, it would be possible to go a long way even within these constraints. It had been pointed out that 80% of delegates to the Party Congress were new and that there would be no extremists present, whether from the left or from the right.

49. His interlocutor had then referred to the economy, saying that although the situation was a bad one, it was not due to present circumstances but rather, to the previous leadership. He himself found this interpretation somewhat worrying.

50. It was clear, for example, that two to three years would be required to restore agricultural production to its previous level and four years would be needed to return to the previous level of industrial output. The implications for the medium-term were quite serious, the Luxembourg Representative said, and he could not see what steps the Polish Government could take to bring about a rapid change in the situation. There was a possibility therefore, that new strikes could break out.

51. The Polish official had commented, finally, that the democratization process had been shown very clearly in preparatory work for the Congress, which would certainly not be a rubber stamp body.

52. A further point was that the Luxembourg Ambassador to Moscow, who was also accredited to Warsaw, had recently left his post and had seen a number of high-level officials in Poland. He had discerned little fear of a Soviet intervention but a certain degree of concern as to the presence of activists among the reformers and the clergy. These people were regarded as a potential cause of difficulty.

53. In conclusion, the Luxembourg Representative remarked on the surprising evolution of the situation in Poland. It seemed to him that the Poles had made a very adroit use of salami tactics in their dealings with the Soviets.

54. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he had listened with particular interest to the views of his United Kingdom colleague. He entirely concurred with the analysis leading to five basic points which could be regarded as the 'bottom line' for the Soviet Union. The second of these five points related to lines of communication and basic Soviet security and it was of interest that the Chairman of the Military Committee had already considered these problems in his own paper. It seemed clear that if the Soviets were to move at all, they would do so with great force and energy in order to finish the operation as quickly as possible. Should this occur, some basic Soviet problems would be solved but the West would be placed in a position not presently covered by contingency planning.

55. As for the political situation, it was interesting to note the contrast between the Soviet letter to Poland on the one hand and on the other, the terms of the Communiqué issued after Mr. Gromyko's visit. This contrast suggested that

the Soviets had no idea what to do about Poland. Indeed, speculating about the intentions of the Soviet leaders was somewhat fruitless because they probably did not have any. They seemed even not to know what level of Polish liberalisation would be acceptable to them. It seemed probable that the Kremlin would allow the forthcoming Party Congress to go ahead and would follow developments closely. Although the Soviets would be cautious with respect to their vital interests, they might not be able to accept the long-term consequences of developments in Poland and this should be kept in mind, alongside the relative optimism which had been expressed by a number of speakers.

56. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his own Authorities had completed assessments which were similar to those described earlier by his colleagues. In particular, he regarded the economic situation as an alarming one and said that the figures presented by the United States coincided with those available to him. It was a matter of particular concern that Western bankers were now hesitant in granting new credit to Poland. The total foreign debt of Poland was \$24 billion to the West and \$2.3 billion to the Soviet Union: this was a very high level of indebtedness indeed and the only way Poland could repay this debt, with interest, was by improving productivity in raw material export industries. To do this, however, would be very difficult. The economic situation had an impact on the political situation and on a possible reshuffle of the leadership. It seems to him probable that Mr. Jaruzelski would be re-elected but might well be replaced as Prime Minister after the Congress by a specialist in economic affairs.

57. Lastly, with respect to the risk of a Soviet intervention, he would support the views of his colleagues, and particularly, those of the United Kingdom Representative. At the same time, he thought that his Danish colleague had been entirely correct to point to the possible danger in the long term.

58. The CHAIRMAN, concluding the discussion, thanked the various speakers for their interventions. One point had emerged clearly from the discussion: this was that there were some reassuring indications of a relaxation in tension while at the same time, some dangers remained. It seemed evident that the Western position, which had served well as an effective deterrent, should be maintained and that the Allies should refrain from any actions or words which could affect the present delicate balance.

59. The COUNCIL took note of the remarks made during discussion. [...]

NATO Archives, C-R(81)28

NETHERLANDS

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**21 July 1981, Letter
from the Dutch Ambassador in Warsaw, Joost van der Kun,
to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chris van der Klaauw**

Warsaw, 21 July 1981

No. 2089/573

Subject: visit to Gdańsk, 7–10 July 1981

The social life in Gdańsk is dominated by the port and the shipyard. The atmosphere in these industries is controlled by Solidarność, the independent trade union of now 10 million members that has its birthplace here.

Not only the leaders of Solidarność, but also directors of the shipyard, the municipality and the province are happy to tell the foreign visitor from the West that ideals and objectives of Solidarność have become commonplace in all sections of society.

I experienced that representatives of the Church are also actively involved in governance and business in Gdańsk, when it turned out that appointments to visit various bodies—which could not be arranged by Foreign Affairs Protocol in Warsaw, arguing that due to the approaching party congress the officials concerned could not be reached—were arranged effortlessly by the pastor of the port area Henryk Jankowski. I came into contact with him by chance thanks to the widow of the former Polish employee of the Dutch Consulate in the area, Mrs. Wiatrak. Pastor Jankowski has been involved in the ups and downs of the workers' actions at the Lenin shipyard and the creation of Solidarność since August 1980, and was part of the delegation that visited the Pope with Wałęsa at the beginning of this year.

Port and Lenin Shipyard

We took a boat trip on the motorboat of the port service (organised by Jankowski) on the day that for the first time in several months the labour peace in Poland was disturbed by the one-hour warning strike of dock workers in the large Polish Baltic sea ports. Unfortunately, we had to conclude that in terms of activities in the port, the difference between striking and working was small. No shipping of any significance, no ships on anchorage and hardly any along the quays, no industriously working cranes. The petroleum port annex refinery built a few years ago offered a desolate image, the wharfs being mainly engaged in repair or renovation of a few domestic and foreign vessels.

However, the Director-General of the Lenin Shipyard, Klemens Gniech, told us that this year production will be 20% higher than in 1980 and that the order book is filled until 1984. Among the 16,000 site workers, unemployment is said

to be unknown. Work is done in one shift of 8 hours, except in the mechanical engineering department where work is done on a continuous basis. In the canteen of the yard, the employees can get a good meal for only 12 zlotych.

Two years ago, the last, large order for the Netherlands was delivered, namely a container vessel for the KNSM. The KNSM is currently participating in a Western European consortium for the placement of new orders.

In the company of the chief engineer of the yard, I laid a wreath of flowers at the impressive monument that was unveiled last December to commemorate the fallen workers of 1970, before having my conversation with the Director-General.

Also through Jankowski's mediation and in the company of my wife, I visited the Governor of the province (voivod) Jerzy Kolodziejski and the city president (mayor) Mlynarczyk. Especially with the latter, the situation in the port was discussed in some detail, about which the mayor turned out to be a realist-pessimist. He attributed the complete inactivity in the petroleum port to a Soviet ban on buying oil on the free market. However, the probable cause is the lack of hard currency for oil purchases on the free market to supplement the insufficient supplies from the Soviet Union. The mayor believed that, under the most favourable political and economic conditions, it will take 5 to 10 years to bring the country back to the level of prosperity of a few years ago (in accordance with the forecast of the new chairman of the Planning Committee, Madej).

Conversation with Wałęsa.

Again thanks to Jankowski—and partly because the Embassy had previously announced my visit to Solidarność in Gdańsk—I was able to visit the leader of Solidarność, Lech Wałęsa, on 9 July. The atmosphere in the union headquarters, located in a relatively spacious building in one of the main streets of the city, was similar to that which I had previously found on visits to Solidarność in Wrocław and in Kraków: a somewhat chaotic activity of young men cheerfully trotting back and forth throughout the building.

The great leader himself, dwelling in a small, messy and smoked room, made a somewhat tired and preoccupied impression on me, which was not surprising given his physically and psychologically exhausting task of keeping the mass movement in line nationwide and smoothing out ubiquitous wrinkles through his personal presence. Moreover, our visit was just after the short strike in the port and on the day that the Polish airline LOT organised a four-hour nationwide warning strike for the first time.

Wałęsa turned out not to be devoid of a sense of humour, sometimes mixed with some sarcasm. He seems to be fulfilling the role of charismatic leader rather than that of pragmatic director of this fast-growing trade union movement that hopes to transform itself into a more orderly and hierarchically structured organisation after elections at the end of August. Several times the answers given to my questions were

corrected, or at least supplemented, by two of his close associates who attended the conversation.

When I asked whether an organisation representing such a large component of the Polish workers should not eventually bear national, social, economic and therefore political co-responsibility, Wałęsa said that Solidarność did not wish to transform itself into a political organisation at all. At Solidarność in Kraków I had heard on this point that political responsibility cannot be avoided in the future and that this might take shape because the trade union will be represented as a corporation in a new-style national parliament. Wałęsa, on the other hand, said that there are no concrete thoughts on this yet.

When asked about the progress Solidarność is making in the consultations with the government regarding greater access to the publicity media, Wałęsa said that the negotiations on this were too slow and had not yet yielded results. If the government remained reluctant to give Solidarność the requested airtime, Wałęsa said with a certain bravado, Solidarność could very well build and operate a radio station itself. When I said that I had heard in Kraków that thousands of Solidarność newspapers and magazines are already seeing the light of day uncensored nationwide, he sighed that he was not very happy with their extensive and uncoordinated distribution. After August, things will have to be put in order.

When I asked whether the time chosen for the new warning strikes was related to the approaching Communist Party Congress, the trade union leader responded somewhat evasively. According to him, new protest actions would have a completely different, rather more constructive character: work will no longer be stopped but, on the contrary, doubled over a certain period of time, after which the product will be freely delivered to prospective buyers, such as tractors from the Ursus factory for the benefit of the free farmers. Later that day, he openly and critically expressed himself about these strike demonstrations that had apparently taken place without his consent. Since then, Wałęsa has once again expressly requested that the existing labour peace not be disturbed by wild actions.

Finally, Wałęsa said that he was prepared to hand over the national leadership of Solidarność if this proved to be the wish of the majority during the forthcoming Solidarność elections. (He has since been re-elected president of the Gdańsk region.)

J.L. van der Kun

Netherlands National Archive, 2.05.330, BZ, inv.nr. 11870

NETHERLANDS

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28 July 1981, Code message
from the Dutch Ambassador in Warsaw, Joost van der Kun,
to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Warsaw, 28 July 1981

Subject: domestic situation in Poland after the 9th party congress.

EEC colleagues here in town agree that the position of party secretary Kania within the party itself has been strengthened now that he has been democratically confirmed in his position by the 9th Party Congress.

That Moscow seems to be resigned for the time being to the course of events and results of the party congress may also contribute to consolidating the authority of the first party secretary.

Whether the prestige of Kania has also increased nationally, and especially vis-à-vis Solidarność, and whether the party itself has been able to restore its reputation that has been shaken by years of mismanagement, to any extent is doubtful. Although the party now wishes to adorn itself with the cloak of democracy, arguing that the central party organs, recreated by free elections, have the mandate to continue to play a leading role in the state, its purported legitimacy rests only on the narrow basis of an extremely small segment of the population. In fact, the people feel represented by the free unions of workers and peasants that are many times larger.

In essence, the Congress has made the position of the party and the government more difficult and has cast the enormous issues to which they have to find a solution in a brighter light: for weeks the people have been told that the Congress would provide the formulas and programs that were supposed to indicate a way out of the socio-economic quagmire; after the Congress everything would get better, almost as if by magic.

In reality, the texts of some of the adopted resolutions and of documents drawn up do not contain more than a list of old mistakes, incantation formulas and vague promises. The first concrete measures to restore coal production, for example, and to support and stimulate private agriculture, have yet to be taken. In the meantime, efforts are being made to ease tensions on the consumer market by means of occasional unpopular measures such as price increases in the food sector and a reduction in rations. Sobering, if not disillusionment, is now dawning. The first protest actions, tending towards hunger marches,¹⁶⁴ are indeed based on—perhaps

¹⁶⁴ This is a reference to the wave of protests connected to the deteriorating food supply and, among others things, the so-called hunger marches organised in many cities, including Warsaw. The protests were sparked by the government's decision on 23 July 1981 to increase food prices and reduce meat rations.

artificially whipped up by—local initiatives (as Walesa also stated these days before the national coordination committee of Solidarność, rejecting the idea of national protest actions for the time being). However, such demonstrations can easily infect the whole country if no prospect of improvement can be offered. Consultations between the government and Solidarność have led to a provisional compromise that a 20% reduction in meat rations (to an average of 3 kg per person per month) will only last until the end of August. However, Solidarność puts its finger on the wound by demanding that price increases and a limitation of the absurd subsidy system, which are in themselves plausible, must be accompanied by structural reforms and increases of the lowest wages.

Solidarność declares its willingness to participate in organised consultations and will set up regional study groups to find solutions. If this intention does indeed materialise, the trade union will take on policy-making responsibilities, a development which may not be unwelcome to the communist government. However, this also means that Solidarność can continue to press with all the weight for the social and political reforms it wants, for the abolition of censorship, for the introduction of autonomy in and of companies and other measures that the government is still standing firm against.

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Netherlands National Archive, 2.05.387, BZ, Warsaw Embassy, inv.nr. 604

AUSTRIA

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30 July 1981, Circular by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Vienna, 30 July 1981

On the Polish Crisis;
the situation after the 9th Extraordinary Party Congress of the PUWP

1) The Party Congress confirmed the forces within the party that have already chosen to make concessions to the Solidarity Union as the best way out of specific conflict situations. However, this does not mean that the current leadership of the PUWP is pursuing a real reform course. It has always defended the old system by using stalling tactics. Thus far, concessions for the implementation of parts of the Baltic Sea Protocols could only be wrested from it under strike pressure; however, agreements with the Solidarity Union have not yet been laid down in corresponding legal regulations, neither a trade union law, a media law nor a law on self-administration in state-owned companies has been passed.

This tactic was also used after the Party Congress on the question of the appointment of the general manager of the airline LOT.¹⁶⁵ The general manager appointed by the government and rejected by the workforce remained in his position, but under strike pressure, the union candidate was appointed to the newly created post of general manager.

Through such measures, many ambivalent situations have arisen where final clarification can only be brought about by a development process that may take a long time.

2) On various occasions, above all in the media, the appointment of delegates to the Party Congress and the various ballots at the Party Congress gave the impression of an open democratic process. Indeed, a more cautious assessment seems appropriate. There are some indications that Kania and his supporters directed the proceedings in their favour. As far as the possible impact on the future of the party is concerned, it seems significant that only the draft of the new status [statute] of the party is available for the time being, so the situation remains fluid and capable of development.

3) The reservations of the Soviet Communist Party against the development and attitude of the Polish fraternal party have by no means been eliminated. Even if it is acknowledged that the resolutions of the Party Congress and the draft statutes

¹⁶⁵ This is a reference to the conflict related to Bronislaw Klimaszewski, who was elected as director of the LOT Polish Airlines by the workers' self-government. In the face of the government's rejection of his election and the danger of strike, a compromise was reached whereby Klimaszewski assumed the function of deputy director.

are largely in conformity with the ideological principles of Marxism-Leninism, a clearly cool distance from Kania is noticeable. Furthermore, allegations are being maintained that verbal ideologically impeccable positions are only inadequately implemented into reality.

4) The supply situation for the Polish population has deteriorated further. EC food aid has also become less effective than expected, apparently mainly due to systemic flaws in the Polish economy.

The phenomenon of the so-called 'hunger marches' is a clear indication that there is a concrete risk of mass movements that are difficult to control, with all the associated consequences such as anarchy, the need to use state power, etc.

5) The problem of foreign debt is only being dealt with in the short term. Talks about medium-term regulations are ongoing but are being hampered by the lack of a Polish economic rehabilitation concept that is convincing to the donors.

6) Given these assumptions, the previous situation with repeated trials of strength between the Solidarity Union and the party is likely to continue. This situation, which only precariously and de facto within certain limits allows political pluralism to take effect in Poland, must deeply worry the communist leadership of the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European states. It has made visible clear tendencies towards increased internal repression in these states.

7) The Soviet Union has thus far in the Polish crisis used its military power as a psychological factor only and apparently does not consider the direct use of its own means of power as long as the possibility of a satisfactory solution from within still appears possible. One can only assume that the wish not to compromise the policy of the Soviet Union towards Western Europe and especially the FRG and perhaps to achieve a separation of these states from the United States on the issue of military armaments was not without significance for this decision.

Once this goal has been achieved and adequately secured, the problem of settling the Polish situation could possibly be fundamentally reassessed by the Soviet Union. Similar prerequisites would exist if the Soviet Union were to regard its efforts for Western Europe as having finally failed.¹⁶⁶

Austrian State Archive ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 166.03.00/228-II.3/8

¹⁶⁶ The circular was written and signed by Counsellor Wolfgang Hörtlehner and approved by the head of Section II.3 (Eastern Department) of the Foreign Ministry, Paul Ullmann. The memo was sent to all Austrian diplomatic missions abroad, all sections of the Foreign Ministry and all departments of Sections I and II of the Foreign Ministry.

AUSTRALIA

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**6 August 1981, Memorandum
by the Australian Ambassador in Tokyo, James Plimsoll,
to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
(excerpts)**

Tokyo, 6 August 1981

Secret

MEMORANDUM MTK6424

Talk with the Ambassador of Poland to Japan (Zdzislaw Rurarz)

I talked today with the Ambassador of Poland (Zdzislaw Rurarz) He said he had been economic adviser to Gierk 1971–72 but he had resigned because he believed the so-called ‘economic miracle’ would be a disaster, as it had proved to be.

2. Rurarz said that he thought that the likelihood of USSR intervention in Poland had receded for the time being. I said that I feared that what could lead to USSR intervention would be a deterioration in law and order in Poland to a point where the USSR believed it could no longer be assured of passage of its forces and transport across Poland into East Germany. Rurarz said that he too was worried about the possible deterioration of the internal situation. The Polish people were fed up with conditions and no longer believed any statements or promises by the authorities. They had been given repeated assurances in the past that conditions would improve, but 37 years after the war they still had queues. They did not recognise the hard fact that there were limitations on rapid change and on rapid movement in conditions. What could rally them would be an appeal to Polish nationalism, but that could hardly be done because it would involve calling for genuine Polish independence from the USSR and for a break with communism.

3. Rurarz continued that one had to be realistic and take account of geo-political realities. Poland had not been represented at the Yalta or Potsdam Conferences and, though Poland was nominally a victor nation in the Second World War, in fact it had been a loser. The Poles had had to accept realistically that this was something they had had to live with; but many Poles thought that today was the time to start rectifying it.

4. But there were severe practical obstacles to rapid change, even if the USSR did not intervene. For example, Poland was dependent on the USSR for oil and for natural gas and, if the USSR were to cut it off, Poland would suffer severely in all its economic life, including the petro-chemical industry. Even if the West were to offer to give petrol free, Poland could not take it up, because it lacked the port facilities and refineries. Similarly, Poland was dependent on the USSR for iron ore for its steel

industry, and even if Sweden were to offer an equivalent amount of iron ore free, Poland would not have the port facilities to take advantage of it. The port facilities and other infrastructure established in the past were such that it had closed off the option of Poland being relieved in many economic fields by the West. Again, it would not be easy to revert to capitalism. Only a few older men remembered from before the Second World War how to manage and operate private enterprises, and in any case they could only perform in a context where many other people and enterprises were behaving in a compatible manner.

5. Rurarz spoke of the romantic and impractical attitudes of many of his countrymen who would not recognise those obstacles. Even responsible leaders of Solidarity, including Walesa, had some unrealistic ideas—for example, putting factories under the control of committees of workers. Rurarz said it was necessary to have someone in charge and accept responsibility. Moreover, factories had been built by the nation as a whole, and running them and drawing advantage from them could not fairly be allocated only to the employees of a factory. Also, some Poles were concentrating on breaking the present system without concerning themselves with what should be put in its place. Rurarz continued that we should also have in mind an aspect of the Polish character which he would illustrate by referring to the 1930s. As Hitler was rising to power, only Poland and, in Britain, Churchill, had recognised that he was bent on world conquest and had to be stopped. In 1939 Poland had resisted Germany even though it had known it could not hold out for long, but believing that by military resistance Poland would force other countries like Britain and France to stand up to Hitler and eventually crush him and so save Poland. Poland had in fact held out against Hitler for longer than expected, and would have lasted still longer if it had not been invaded from the East by the Soviet Union. Rurarz said that today there were Poles who were moved by a similar spirit, and believed in pushing things to a point where other countries had to concern themselves.

6. Rurarz said he considered the USSR had hesitated to intervene for several reasons, among them the following. First, in Poland unlike Czechoslovakia the movement had come from below not from the top, and the people would be united and active against USSR intervention. Secondly, the costs of intervention and subsequent occupation and sustenance of Poland would be enormous. It would be a strain on the USSR economy, which was not in good shape. Thirdly, the USSR still had Afghanistan on its hands. Fourthly, even inside the Soviet Union there was some sympathy—in Byelorussia, Ukraine and to a lesser extent Georgia—for the Poles. Fifthly, the international repercussions would be great and damaging; the whole Christian world—not only the Catholics—would be against them.

7. Rurarz said that if the USSR intervened in Poland, there was no doubt that the Polish army would resist. But it would be quickly crushed. The USSR would then be faced with the burden, not only of the Polish economy, but of occupying

the country. He said that during the Second World War he had been in a region of Poland with a population of twelve million and yet it had taken one million Germans to hold it down, despite executions and fierce police control. Later he had been in an area half that size and with half that population where there had been 150 German Divisions, and yet the Germans had not been able to suppress the resistance forces. That was at a time when the Poles were less wholehearted than today, because they had the dilemma that if they got rid of the Germans they were opening the way for the Russians. Rurarz said he thought that today it would take three million Russians to hold the Poles down. The Russians also had to face the fact that their army though largely officered by Russians—had a large number of Asians from the Asian constituent republics, often not speaking Russian and not emotionally bound to the Russians.

[...] ¹⁶⁷

16. Rurarz said that he did not see the way out for Poland. Poland was like some other places—Palestine, Korea, and Vietnam—where there is no solution in sight. Even Northern Ireland, which was a much smaller question, had defied the efforts of those who were sincerely trying to find a solution. What was needed was a Marshall Plan for Poland. But it was not attainable. The Soviet Union would never agree to it. The West would not agree because it would fear that the Soviet Union might intervene in Poland and the aid would be lost.

[...]

18. Rurarz had only two photographs in his drawing room; one of Walesa and one of Pope John Paul II. Both seemed to have been taken during their respective visits to Japan. ¹⁶⁸

Plimsoll

NAA, A1838, 48/1/3 PART 15

¹⁶⁷ Excerpts from the conversation about the situation in the USSR were omitted.

¹⁶⁸ After the imposition of the Martial Law in Poland, Rurarz left the Embassy and asked for political asylum in the United States.

CANADA

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**19 August 1981, Telegram
from the Canadian Ambassador in Warsaw, John M. Fraser,
to the Canadian Department of External Affairs**

Warsaw, 19 August 1981

Confidential

Polish Crisis: Nothing Solved After One Year

For more than one year we have been asking ourselves how long things in Poland can keep going on like this without: (a) total breakdown, (b) major confrontation between the authorities and the populace, (c) Soviet military intervention, or (d) all of the above. It is still a good question.

2. What is certain is that after one year of tense and uneasy sparring and tests of strength, wholesale government and party leadership changes and revolutionary changes in power basis within the party itself, nothing has been solved. Nor does it seem that the authorities have any clearer idea of how to set about solving Poland's problems than they did last August, although a certain national consensus has emerged on how not to solve them: the authorities will do everything possible to avoid the use of force; Solidarnosc will work (so far effectively) to prevent the breakdown of public order and will draw back, often at the last minute and over objections from its most activist wing, from ultimate confrontation in such forms as a general strike or an explicit challenge to Poland's orientation or the 'leading role' of the PUWP.

3. Major unsettled question, and focus of periodic flirtation with confrontation that has been going on throughout past twelve months, is the power relationship between the party/government and workers/Solidarnosc. Put another way, how much of the pluralism which now exists de facto can be admitted or institutionalized and how much more power sharing can be tolerated? From Moscow's point of view, of course, the answer is that they have already gone too far. Even without none-too-gentle Soviet urgings, Polish leaders themselves (who are, after all, communists) must be profoundly uneasy with the idea that they can now govern only by leave of Solidarnosc. Such concessions as they have made to power-sharing have been out of practical necessity rather than ideological conviction.

4. That there is need for government cooperation with Solidarnosc can hardly be denied: Poland will not function without it. There is also a need for the party to play the leading role it asserts and for the authorities to produce an overall plan for immediate action that can be sold to Solidarnosc and to the nation as a way out of crisis and then implemented, promptly and effectively. Kania's words at the end of

the Ninth Party Congress seem more and more prophetic: he warned that if they did not move from discussion to action 'we will be accused by history of having talked Poland to death.'

5. It may be difficult for Solidarnosc to act as a coherent partner until its own congress is held early next month.¹⁶⁹ It may also not be politic for individual Solidarnosc leaders to be too accommodating settling or avoiding disputes with the government between now and then. If level heads on both sides prevail, however, it is possible to imagine a situation in which the party retains its leading role and the government exercises authority in form and enough in substance to retain necessary threads of communist respectability, while Solidarnosc is associated with recovery measures to give them credibility and a chance of success in ways that do not too obviously dilute government/party power. If such a situation cannot be created before Poland goes into what may be the winter of everyone's discontent, it is hard to see how a major confrontation can be avoided indefinitely.

Fraser

**Library and Archives Canada, Department of External Affairs fonds, Vol. 16026,
File 20-POLND-1-4, Pt. 12**

¹⁶⁹ The First National Congress of Delegates to the Solidarity Independent Self-Governing Trade Union took place in two rounds, on 5–10 September and on 26 September–7 October 1981.

IRELAND

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23 September 1981, Political Report
by the Irish Ambassador in Stockholm, Dermot Waldron,
for the Secretary General
of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Andrew O'Rourke

STOCKHOLM, 23 September 1981

(PR 19(1981) Warsaw)

‘Latest events in Poland’

The latest Polish story has been rather widely quoted in the western press about Pope John Paul II asking on his knees the Good Lord will he, John Paul, live to see the end of the Polish crisis and the Good Lord replies to him that the question is not whether John Paul will live to see the end but whether he, the Good Lord will live so long. In Warsaw on a number of occasions colleagues have said that they were always at a loss whether to report different rumours which came their way about Soviet troops, movements of ships in the Baltic, etc. I think that at this stage they probably feel, in retrospect, that they shouldn't have sent those reports. On the other hand if the Soviets had intervened, perhaps their headquarters would have taken an even poorer view of their silence. Apart from rumours of this kind, there have been so many swings in the Polish situation so many different directions which it has taken in unexpected ways, above all so many gloomy prognoses, particularly in the western press, which have been wrong, that it is certainly hazardous at this stage to think upon what may now happen or how the situation may develop. Who could have seen even fifteen months ago the establishment of free trade unions, the absence of censorship, the genuinely free elections within the Polish United Workers' Party to the Central Committee, the access to the media of the Church, etc., would be regarded as normal achievements of the policy of socialist renewal; or that such events have occasioned a Prime Minister, Mieczyslaw Rakowsky, to say at the party congress in July that any reversal of such reforms would lead to blood. He went further than this. He said at the congress: ‘These ideas will not lead us to anarchy and conflict. Poland which now seems as the sick man could then become one of the great hopes for socialism’

2. Since the July congress, the Polish United Workers' Party has a facade of both orthodoxy, as well as an appearance of power and authority in the country which is probably acceptable and re-assuring to the Kremlin. Nevertheless, they must be aware that the power and authority is very limited, and certainly cannot be compared in any way with the situation of the other communist parties in the socialist countries. Government in Poland is in effect shared to a great extent with

both the Church and the free trade unions. But Soviet communists are presumably prepared to accept Mr. Stanislaw Kania and his Politburo as being the best they can get and of course it includes a number of the old party faithfuls. The tone of the most recent letter from the Soviet Central Committee and Government to the Polish Central Committee and Government indicates however that there is no affection lost between the two groups of communists in Moscow and Warsaw. The situation with regard to that letter is, like the earlier letter of the 4th of June, a little strange. The wording of it is unequivocal but it is not an ultimatum, and in fact endorses the view that the Soviet Union still looks to the Polish Party and Government to deal with the Polish situation itself. It seems more directed against anti-Soviet and nationalist outbursts in Poland than against the 'anti-socialist' aspects of those outbursts. But the letter had been received sure ten days before it was published and the question may therefore arise, as with the earlier letter, whether it may not have been acceptable, or perhaps solicited, by the Polish authorities in order to help them to deal with the internal situation. I have discussed this with the Swedish authorities here and they had originally told me on the occasion of their Foreign Minister's visit in June last of the doubts which they had then heard about the authenticity, or rather the spontaneity, of the Moscow letter. They have also some doubts on this occasion without having anything firm on which to base those doubts. The earlier letter, it must be remembered, was in fact successful. Prior to its receipt it looked as if the old guard of the Polish United Workers' Party would be written off in the elections to the party congress. After the receipt of the letter, and as a result of very hard work, in particular by Stanislaw Kania, the elections to the party congress did not turn out to be as radical as expected. As you know, Kania was himself elected with a large majority and the Politburo includes at least four of the former Politburo and people whom the Soviet Union feels that, to some extent it can trust. These includes both Stefan Olszowski and Albin Siwak.

3. The question arises what steps can the Polish administration now take to enforce the demands of this letter. It may be noted that up to the present they have not taken any steps. They could for example declare a state of emergency; they could outlaw Solidarity; or they could, if they did not wish to go so far, insist upon the cancellation of the second part of the Solidarity congress starting this weekend; they could even disavow their present policy of cooperation with the trade unions (and indeed Mr. Rakowsky in a speech two or three days ago as reported in Stockholm seemed to be going in that direction); they could also of course seize and arrest people who are well known within Poland as being anti-Soviet, including in particular members of the dissident organisations. The question arises, however, whether any of these steps could in fact be enforced. For example, an emergency would presumably mean curfews and alike. Who would enforce the curfew? It seems unlikely that the military would do so and they are the only ones capable of it. The present Prime Minister said as Minister of Defence that he would never ask the

army to fire on Polish civilians. Admittedly a lot of water has run under the bridge since he made that statement. It nevertheless seems to be the general view that the Polish army either would not be asked or would not in fact in such a situation fire upon Polish citizens. The militia, a disliked and embittered organisation, would probably be unable on its own to enforce an emergency.

4. Perhaps one of the big disappointments of the past six months has been the inability of General Wojciech Jaruzelski as Prime Minister to take command of the situation in his country. I was in Poland at the time of his nomination and, as you will recall, there were then great hopes and expectations. He was being given the opportunity to put the political and economic situation in order. He was acceptable to the Soviet Union, he was very popular in Poland, and he had the trust of both the Polish party and especially of the army. Nevertheless, General Jaruzelski has not given the lead as might have been hoped. It is now rather cruelly being said that in fact it was only his uniform which elected him. Perhaps judgements are premature and he may yet show his steel. It is certainly true that he was a reluctant leader from the beginning.

5. At this stage, it is difficult to grapple with what the Soviet authorities, who must now be very divided among themselves about Poland, propose to do next and how they see the future in Soviet-Polish relations. Arising out of the current visit to Warsaw of the Soviet delegation and the threats to Soviet economic supplies to Poland the following interesting questions occur. Does this mean that the Soviets are giving up the possibility of military intervention? While there can be no doubt, but that the disruption to Poland would be disastrous if the Soviets carried out their threats, how could such a disrupted country ensure the infrastructure and communications network which is essential to the Warsaw Pact forces, for example the electricity supplies, the trains etc. etc.? Third question; why should such economic disruption result in the Polish people toeing the party line?

6. A theory which has been developed here in Stockholm is to the effect that the Soviets might now try to isolate Poland. It is pointed out that of course Poland does not touch upon any NATO country so that at least from a strictly military point of view it would be possible to carry through an isolation. It is also suggested that the catastrophic economic situation in Poland is now being blamed in the other socialist countries on the developments which have taken place there, rather than being the result of earlier mistakes when a more orthodox communist régime was in power. Be that as it may, the view that Poland can be isolated is not very convincing. For example, the students of the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, etc. are not likely to be unaware that their counterparts in Poland are no longer obliged to learn Russian and to study Karl Marx and it seems unlikely that the students in the other socialist countries are very much more enthusiastic about it than were their Polish counterparts.

7. The Polish people have never been intimidated within the last year by all the military and verbal threats which have been thrown at them. It has been particularly noticeable that the much criticised resolutions adopted and attitudes taken by the Solidarity congress in Gdansk were carried through while the extensive and nakedly threatening manoeuvres were being carried out right beside them on the Baltic coast. In truth, western Governments seem to have been much more impressed, and even to some extent intimidated, by these manoeuvres than were the trade unionists at the Solidarity congress. At this stage, having heard so much huffing and puffing on the Soviet side, and having suffered so much in the material way of life, it is unlikely that the Polish people will now change their attitudes. The outlook therefore must remain uncertain, with the Poles unbowed and the Soviet administration left still chewing its finger-nails.

NAI, 2011/39/1744

GERMANY

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**24 September 1981, Telegram
from the German Director-General for Political Affairs, Franz Pfeffer
(in New York at the time),
to the German Federal Foreign Office**

114-5491/81 Confidential

Sent: 24 September 1981, 13.13

Received: 24 September 1981, 19.38

Telegram No. 2011

Re: Talks between Federal Minister Genscher and Polish Foreign Minister Czyrek

FM Genscher inquires how Kania and Jaruzelski are doing. FM Czyrek indicates that he has been travelling for nine days (visit to Cuba—Meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union—Mexico).¹⁷⁰

FM Genscher asks about Olszowski's appeal for national unity.

Czyrek replies that Olszowski is responsible for questions about the national front in the Politburo and that the appeal represents the views of the Politburo as a whole.

He believes he owed FM Genscher an explanation for depicting the situation in Poland overly optimistically at the meeting in Bad Reichenhall.¹⁷¹

The degree of radicalisation at the Solidarity Congress could not have been predicted. Boundaries had been breached that called the principles underpinning Polish foreign policy into question. Messages had been conveyed to other socialist states, which were depicted as 'exporting counter-revolution' and resulted in protests in the Soviet Union and other states. In terms of domestic policy, the position of Solidarity had raised questions affecting the entire Polish nation. Parliament was being challenged if the trade union Solidarity announced that it would organise a referendum if its paper was not accepted. The party and government in Poland remained ready to cooperate with all forces in society, provided that Solidarity created the conditions for that.

Talks had also been held with the Church. Now it was a matter of waiting to see what decisions were taken in the second part of the Solidarity Congress. The

¹⁷⁰ In September and October 1921, minister Czyrek travelled to Latin America, where he visited Cuba (13–16 September), Mexico (16–19 September) and Brazil (30 September–2 October). In September, Czyrek was also in New York to attend a session of the General Assembly of the UN.

¹⁷¹ This is a reference to the talks held between FM Genscher and Polish FM Czyrek on 18 August 1981.

decisions in the first part had been surprising as they had related to questions which had not been on the agenda.

When asked by FM Genscher, Czyrek says that Wałęsa had tried to play a moderating role but had recently been riding on a demagogic wave, perhaps for tactical reasons.

When asked, he further confirms that the lack of Wyszyński's authority was keenly felt. His successor¹⁷² had yet to earn comparable authority.

Taking stock of the situation, Czyrek says he remained optimistic.

The Soviet declaration had been released on purpose to ensure the Polish public was able to see the impact of the development.

Looking at the international situation, Czyrek points out that the Soviet Foreign Minister had given a strong speech (to the GA) in which the readiness to engage in dialogue had also been clear. What worried him was that American policy was still lacking clear formulations.

FM Genscher explains that although all aspects of US policy are not formulated, the basic tenets are, however, clear. With its approval for the CDE and for negotiations on medium-range missiles, the US government had declared its readiness to negotiate on two key questions. It would be wrong for the Soviet side to believe it could thwart the implementation of the Double-Track Decision in Europe by stoking domestic-policy sentiments. Influence could only be exerted at the negotiating table. We hoped for fast and concrete results. We would hold our ground.

FM Genscher underscores once more that we were following what happened in Poland very closely. It was important to us that what was agreed in Helsinki was taken seriously.

He emphasises that his talks with other foreign ministers in New York had shown how important personal trust was at the current time and that was precisely what Foreign Minister Czyrek enjoyed everywhere. It was thus very wise of the Politburo not to have made any changes in the office of the Foreign Minister.

When asked by Foreign Minister Czyrek, FM Genscher explains he was all in all optimistic regarding East-West relations, provided that Moscow did not make any mistakes. Asked by Czyrek whether it was not Washington that was making mistakes, FM Genscher responds saying no-one was flawless. The fundamental direction in Washington was, however, right.

Turning to bilateral issues, Foreign Minister Czyrek addressed the matter of the refused visa for the representative of the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB) to attend the Solidarity Congress. He wanted to preempt FM Genscher's likely *démarche*. The visa was refused because the speech held by this representative

¹⁷² In September 1981 Józef Glemp was named the Archbishop of Gniezno and Warsaw and became the Primate of Poland.

would have had the potential to fire up emotions. It was an intervention in domestic Polish affairs.

FM Genscher replies it was not a matter of visas being refused in general but only this particular case. The speech given did not, he believed, reflect the line taken by the DGB.

Czyrek points out in the context of bilateral relations that he was unfortunately compelled to point out the urgency of the economic problems. Unfortunately, there were delays on all that had been hoped for.

FM Genscher underscores once more the importance of Poland joining the IMF and inquires whether steps had been taken in this direction.

FM Czyrek replies that steps had been taken but to date no decisions. He had problems with the economic departments. Also on other issues, they acted without political far-sightedness by asking for food supplies or loans from different quarters simultaneously, for example, from the EC and the Americans, which then ultimately added together to produce shockingly inflated totals.

Pfeffer

**Political Archive of the German Federal Foreign Office, B 150, vol. 513
(AAPD 1981, Doc. No. 274)**

UNITED KINGDOM

61

**13 October 1981, Letter
from the Assistant Under-Secretary of State
at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ewen Fergusson,
to the British Ambassador in Moscow, Curtis Keeble**

13 October 1981

Confidential

Dear Curtis,

Poland

1. Many thanks for your letter of 24 September. I was in Stockholm and Helsinki the week before last and just missed last Wednesday's bag—fortunately, because Kenneth James has now had time to comment (his letter of 8 October).

2. I agree that we ought from time to time stand back from the constantly shifting pattern in Poland to see if we can detect any general trends. Incidentally, we have much appreciated your full and prompt reporting of Soviet reactions to developments in Poland.

3. Writing with the benefit of 3 more weeks hindsight than you, but at a time when the Soviet attitude to Solidarity appears to have taken another dive (Moscow telno 625) we are still continuing to watch the political indicators as closely as the military. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of developments in Poland since August 1980 has been the number of crises, in which it seemed reasonable to suppose that Soviet patience had finally been tried beyond endurance, but which were nevertheless defused by one means or another.

4. Our view is that the Russians remain highly reluctant to intervene in Poland. It is very likely that they did not want the second phase of Solidarity's Congress to take place. The intensity of the present propaganda campaign is no doubt a measure of their anger and frustration, both at what is going on as well as the failure of the Polish Party to take resolute action. That said, however, we still have no evidence that the Russians have urged the Polish leadership to use force against Solidarity which, as they must realise, would probably lead to a situation where Soviet intervention could not be avoided. The Soviet message, sharp as it was, in a sense evaded the issue by calling for decisive action only against anti-Soviet manifestations. Although, therefore, I agree that the Soviet assessment of the Party's chances of re-establishing control must be fairly pessimistic, we do not have grounds yet to say that the Russians have decided that their previous policy is hopeless.

5. I think all of us agree on the 'internal' restraints on Soviet action: a bloody fight; devastated economy; no likelihood of general acceptance of an imposed leader;

down-grading of Poland's contribution to the Warsaw Pact etc. But neither of the two critical points, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact or real threat to strategic East/West lines of communication, have yet been triggered. The Solidarity programme (Warsaw telno 701) has a carefully constructed passage about 'International Alliances.' Externally, however, the arguments in favour of not intervening have been strengthened (as you recognise in Moscow telno 620). The dialogue with the Americans has resumed, and not just on TNE. Agreement has been reached with the Americans on grain and finally the gas pipeline negotiations appear near conclusion with a probable signature during Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in November.¹⁷³

6. Against that background we believe that the outcome to Solidarity's Congress is important, not least Walesa's election, however qualified by the elections to Solidarity's National Commission. And today's news of the Government's offer to Solidarity of a Joint Commission is, with luck, a sign of greater skill, on the part of the Party and Government, in dealing with Solidarity. If now Solidarity can show some disposition to work with the Government on economic issues we would have thought that the Russians would be content to wait and see how matters develop. They may hope that there are developments within Solidarity itself, in the attitude of the Polish people to Solidarity and also possible regroupings within the Party which could improve the outlook from their point of view.

7. In this respect, I very much share the views expressed by Kenneth James in the second paragraph of his letter. Recognising the profound reluctance which the Soviet authorities must feel for taking a final decision over intervention at the present time, I think that they may well be looking to a time when growing 'economic misery and despair may make a 'strong' solution more possible.' My view is, however, that true though that may be, the longer the delay the more difficult it will be for them. Whether at the last resort the Russians could live any length of time with an outwardly conformist but inwardly revisionist Poland (paragraph 3 of Kenneth James' letter) will in my view depend to a large extent on the reactions of the other Eastern Europeans. At present the risk of contagion seems small. But with time and above all a little economic success the Polish heresy might exert a powerful attraction for its neighbours.

8. That said we have no doubt that immediate Soviet pressure will be maintained on such important issues as censorship, worker/management etc. There could still be recourse to the escalatory political measures you refer to in paragraph 4 of your letter, and indeed, we would expect the Soviet Union to exhaust its various political options before deciding that the condition of Poland was only susceptible to radical surgery. But finally I would hedge my bets in the sense that misjudgement, miscalculation or deliberate provocation could result in a very rapid confrontation between Solidarity and the Government in which neither side had the time or the

¹⁷³ Brezhnev's visit to Bonn took place on 22–25 November 1981.

control to look for compromises. If another 'Bydgoszcz' took place we might indeed find the whole process telescoped and the problems of military intervention confronting us at very short notice. We are all very much on the look-out—in short, even if the criteria for intervention have not been fulfilled, none of us discounts the possibility that they may be. And we all know how quickly things could move.

Yours ever,
Ewen Fergusson

**The National Archives, FCO 28/4484
(DBPO, The Polish Crisis, 1979–1982, Doc. No. 89)**

AUSTRIA

62

15 October 1981, Circular by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Vienna, 15 October 1981

On the Polish Crisis; Situation after the 1st National Congress of Solidarity

I. Solidarity

I.1 The 1st National Congress of Solidarity (5–10 September; 26 September –7 October) has led to an organisational consolidation and the adoption of a program that undoubtedly goes beyond that of a trade union in the traditional sense.

I.2 The approximately 850 delegates appointed a nationwide commission (comparable to a CC), to which the 30 chairmen of the regional trade union organisations and 69 secretly elected members belong. Following the Congress, this body elected the presidium, presided over by Lech Walesa as president. He was directly elected by the Congress delegates with a 55% majority. The presidium, with which Walesa was very pleased because of its composition, is expected to play an important role in the work of Solidarity. Many Congress delegates showed a certain distrust of the leadership, above all by not electing intellectual advisors, who had often exercised moderating influence in the past, to the commission. Their future weight will also depend on the presidium, particularly Walesa.

I.3 The program of the trade union, which describes itself as the largest mass movement in Polish history and as a driving force for national renewal, provides for far-reaching changes in the economic and political spheres. Solidarity draws its values from Christian ethics as well as national, democratic and working-class traditions. The goal is a 'self-governing Poland.' A new economic and social order is to be created on the basis of a plan[ned economy], self-administration, and the market. In addition to points for improving working and living conditions, the program contains the following political demands:

- a) Free nomination of candidates by social organisations and civic groups in the next local and regional elections without priority for a specific list.
- b) Support for citizens' initiatives with political, economic and social programs.
- c) Reform of criminal law.
- d) Reform of electoral law in order to give the parliament, which is to receive a second socio-economic chamber, representative character.
- e) Creation of a constitutional court, which should also monitor Poland's compliance with international conventions.
- f) Independence of the judiciary, and societal control over prosecutors and police.

g) Punishment of those responsible for the repressions of 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976 and for economic ruin.

h) Fight against temporarily accepted censorship, abolition of the state monopoly on mass media (establishment of own broadcasting stations).

The maintenance of Poland's alliances, however, is expressly advocated, taking into account the balance of power in Europe. Poland's value as a partner, however, depends on the degree to which it is possible for it to determine its obligations alone.

I.4 The course of the congress and the preparation of the program has paid very little attention to the ruling system. However, in contrast to the radical program, there is leadership on the other side that may be more pragmatic, even if it must be taken into account that Walesa's line was only reluctantly supported by the Congress. The existence and influence of Solidarity—to a much lesser extent Rural Solidarity—undoubtedly represents a pluralistic element in the Polish system in which the church continues to occupy its traditional place.

II. The Party

Externally, the PUWP sees itself facing pressure from Moscow to reverse the course of developments and, internally, the increasing threat to its supremacy. Thus far, the forces within the party that are prepared to make concessions have prevailed, and they are obviously of the opinion that they are unable to lead the country out of the crisis without, respectively against Solidarity. However, there are likely to be repeated disputes within the party leadership about the course to be followed.

III. The Attitude of the Soviet Union

III.1 The Soviet mass media have increasingly attacked Solidarity and its program, in which the word socialism is practically not mentioned, more sharply than previously, whereby this frequently occurred only in correspondent reports from Warsaw. The declaration of the CC of the CPSU presented by Ambassador Aristov to the Polish leadership in Warsaw between the two parts of the congress, in which manifestations of anti-Sovietism that contradict Poland's alliance obligations are particularly attacked and in which immediate radical steps are demanded, is of greater importance. Then there is also the Petrov article in *Pravda* from the 13[th of this month],¹⁷⁴ which must be regarded as authorised by the party leadership. It contains, among other things, the following allegations against Solidarity: discrediting socialism, falsifying history, blocking the government's anti-crisis program, hindering international trade obligations through strikes, attempting to restore capitalism; Solidarity aiming at controlling the government's economic activities, the Sejm, the mass media and the education system, the destruction of the electoral system and, through reforms, endangering state security and public order. Poland's withdrawal from the WP was demanded at the Congress. The counter-

¹⁷⁴ A. Petrov, 'Solidarnost' rvetsya k vlasti,' *Pravda* 286, 13 October 1981, p. 4.

revolutionary adventurers in the leadership of the Congress wanted to restore the bourgeois order. The counter-revolutionary forces would be supported by forces of international reaction and reactionary representatives of the clergy. The preservation of the revolutionary achievements is not only an internal question for Poland (but proletarian internationalism is not mentioned in the article).

III.2 There is no doubt that the Polish developments do not correspond to the Marxist-Leninist principles represented by the Soviet Union and are therefore being fought by the Soviet Union with the means it considers suitable. These have so far included political pressure on the Polish leadership, including in two previously published messages from the CC of the CPSU, pressure via the mass media as well as military manoeuvres. Also, the Soviet Union has again reminded Poland of its economic dependence.

III.3 The following continues to speak against Soviet military intervention:

a) The risk of armed resistance by parts of the Polish population and army, the strength of the troops required, and the associated economic burden in addition to Afghanistan;

b) The Soviet wish not to compromise efforts to separate Western Europe and especially the FRG from the USA in the arms sector;

c) The danger that this could give the West a new impetus for armament efforts;

d) The economic burdens that the Soviet Union would probably have to assume in order to revitalise the Polish economy and to supply the Polish population;

e) The interference in trade with the West; however, since economic sanctions would affect the interests of Western states to varying degrees, this could lead to a weakening of Western cohesion in the long term.

III.4 Military intervention by the Soviet Union, however, appears likely in the event of

a) the impending loss of the leading role of the PUWP or the elimination of the 'socialist system' in Poland

b) Polish preparations for withdrawing from the WP

c) the spread of the Polish development to other 'socialist' countries, for which there are no indications so far, apart from less significant individual cases.

Since a long-term continuation of the Polish development in its current direction, despite the peculiarities of Poland, is likely to increase the risk of a gradual spread to other 'socialist' countries and thus to endangerment of the Soviet sphere of influence, Soviet intervention cannot be fundamentally ruled out even without the above-mentioned cases. In this light, the appeal of Solidarity to the Eastern European peoples appears to be an unwise challenge. By way of the representation of events in Poland in the Soviet mass media, which primarily may have pursued other ends, it has been attempted to prepare the Soviet public for such an eventuality.

IV. The attitude of the other WP states

While the CSSR and the GDR had long criticised developments in Poland, and Bulgaria soon followed the Soviet line, Hungary joined in the criticism before the 9th Party Congress of the PUWP and Romania followed in September.

V. Reforms

Of the major reform laws, the new censorship law entered into force on October 1. Among other things, it obliges the censorship authorities to state the exact details of the criticised positions, including the reasons, and exempts internal solidarity bulletins from prior censorship. In September, the self-administration law for companies was passed, which gives Solidarity a veto right in the appointment of directors (with exceptions) and provides for profit-sharing for the workers as well as participation in company decisions through a secretly elected staff council. The tactical significance of the law remains to be seen.

VI. Economic Situation

The Polish economic situation remains extremely critical. Production in the first 8 months of the year declined in all branches compared to the previous year, as did exports (-16.9%, coal exports by 14.3 million tons), and imports (-9%). Only the grain harvest is likely to have produced around 2 million tons more, and the prospects are better for potatoes and sugar beets as well. The purchase of cattle for slaughter has fallen by around a third. Poland still needs food aid from abroad. Debt rescheduling has so far only been achieved for the western loans due this year. The crisis is likely to reach a climax in winter, particularly because of the drop in coal production, which is expected to amount to 165 million tons (-35 million tons) in 1981.

VII. Further Development

To the extent that Solidarity seeks to achieve its program, there will not only be fodder for conflict between the union and the party but possibly also within the party. Assuming non-violent attempts to find a solution, the possibility of critical escalation with compromises as the respective result still seems conceivable. Little information is available on how far the party could rely on the security forces, including the army, or how far they sympathise with Solidarity. The Soviet Union could continue to wait, but it is likely to put increasing pressure on the Polish leadership to turn things around.¹⁷⁵

Austrian State Archive ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 166.03.00/312-II.3/81

¹⁷⁵ The circular was written and signed by Counsellor Klas Daublebsky and approved by the head of Section II.3 (Eastern Department) of the Foreign Ministry, Paul Ullmann. The memo was sent to all Austrian diplomatic missions abroad, all sections of the Foreign Ministry and all departments of Sections I and II of the Foreign Ministry.

CANADA

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**15 October 1981, Telegram
from the Canadian Ambassador in Warsaw, John M. Fraser,
to the Canadian Department of External Affairs**

Warsaw, 15 October 1981

Confidential

Poland and the Future of Soviet Empire

Summary: Despite numerous reasons Moscow has to be unhappy and apprehensive, direct Soviet action in near future seems unlikely. Economic pressure remains the easier option (if not necessarily assured of success) than military intervention. Poland's strategic reliability is probably of greater concern than ideological respectability, although there comes a point at which the two merge. Looking further ahead, Poland's internal evolution could ultimately lead to a transformation of the Soviet empire—no happy thought for Moscow. The suppression of Poland, by whatever means, would also have destabilizing effects beyond Poland's borders.

Report: The question of just how much Moscow can tolerate remains alive in Warsaw although neither Poles nor most diplomatic observers see direct Soviet action as likely in the near future. Why not? So many icons have fallen and so many more seem precarious that virtually all Soviet experts and most Warsaw observers would have confidently predicted one year ago that the Red Army would already be here in the circumstances that now exist.

3. It may be yet, although thoughtful Poles are worried that the obvious drawbacks to Soviet military intervention blind their more reckless compatriots to the dangers of Soviet pressure in other forms, particularly economic. Even that could turn out to be counter-productive. The plain truth of the matter is surely that Moscow does not know what to do about Polish disease (if they did know, they would have done it long ago). It is a unique situation in the Soviet empire: spontaneous mass (9.5 million) movement of workers is challenging the sacred right of the communist party to absolute rule, in conditions of economic catastrophe; the party leadership is not leading forces of change, but is unable to contain them; shooting (or jailing) a few intellectuals or union leaders would not solve the problem, nor would sending in the tanks.

4. What Moscow must devoutly wish is that Polish government/party will take the necessary steps to restore some semblance of orthodoxy. They may not realize how completely, even after extraordinary democratization of ninth PUWP Congress, the party is still distrusted. There is little belief in the good faith of the authorities,

and even less in their competence. As the economic situation deteriorates, week by week, there is a growing sense of hopelessness and continuing resentment of a system (and its managers) that has brought Poland to ruin.

5. That Moscow, at least, has some idea of the unprecedented nature of the Polish crisis is suggested by what CPSU CC Secretary for International Relations Zamyatin said to FGR Vice Foreign Minister in visit to Bonn early this month (as recounted by FGR ambassador at this week's meeting of NATO ambassadors). First of all, Zamyatin noted the relative moderation and caution of Soviet reactions to Polish events as compared to that of some other neighbours. He then went on to say that it was up to the Polish leadership to carry out the changes in state structures demanded by the population. Only essential was Poland's continuing fealty to its alliances.

6. There have always been two elements in the Soviet concern about Poland: ideological acceptability and strategic reliability. In considering its colonies, moreover, the USSR has often seemed unable to distinguish between the two, compelled by their own ideology to believe that heresy leads to (if it does not actually constitute) unreliability. Beyond a certain point, of course, this is probably true. Polish ideological purity is, by now, beyond saving. Strategic reliability remains intact in formal sense (and how much faith did Moscow even really have in it?) Poland is not declaring itself neutral, as Imre Nagy did in 1956, or dismantling its defence establishment, as Dubcek's Czechoslovakia was beginning to do in 1968. The Polish army cannot be counted upon for task of internal suppression, but is probably as reliable as it ever was for WPO-NATO confrontation. One certain consequence of either Soviet military intervention or economic strangulation would be to eliminate even that reliability.

7. There is also the problem of 'infection.' This must be the fear that has haunted Moscow from the outset, and the ill-advised call by Solidarnosc Congress phase one to their fellow workers in Eastern Europe must have seemed like the first salvo in the ideological equivalent of biological warfare. Even if the present unenviable lot of Poles inhibits spirit of emulation in fraternal countries, Moscow and other bloc countries must be aware that potential exists. Polish success story (hard as that may be to imagine now) would have a magnetic attraction if there were to develop a flourishing pluralistic democratic Poland still professing ideology of 'socialism,' faithful to WPO and still stressing close ties with USSR and virtual identity of views on international questions. This would constitute a fundamental change in the nature of Soviet empire. It is certainly not a change that Moscow wants, but if, at each milestone down this road, the disadvantages and costs of intervention seem to outweigh the potential benefits, it may be a change that Moscow will get in spite of itself.

8. There are, of course, many threats to this dream scenario. One of them is the simple fact that of all the European fraternal allies probably only the Bulgars

actually like and admire the Russians. The others have historic fears and animosities to compound the more recent resentments (except, perhaps, for Czechs who had no particular reason to dislike the Russians until they were taken over by them). Both in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968 anti-Soviet feelings quickly found expression. It is nothing short of astonishing that they have been so effectively contained (up to now) in Poland these last months. Despite accusations of 'anti-Soviet hysteria' there have really been very few manifestations of the intense anti-Russian feelings that are almost universal here. Such incidents as have taken place are, in some cases at least, suspect as possibly contrived provocations.

9. If Soviet leadership can content itself with being respected but not loved and with having allies bound to it by rational if unenthusiastic calculations of their own self-interest rather than by shared ideology, there may just be some hope for a peaceful evolution of the Polish crisis leading, sooner or later, to a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet relationship with neighbours. It seems almost too much to hope for. As many Soviet experts have pointed out, passivity in the face of such a disquieting prospect runs counter to the powerful instincts of Soviet leaders as demonstrated by their past actions at home and abroad. Yet to govern is to choose, and none of the choices are attractive. If toleration of the 'Polish disease' has disquieting implications for other parts of the Soviet empire, so too does action to restore apparatus of repression in Poland. Contamination surely works both ways, and one may wonder how much the stability of the Soviet empire would be enhanced by the return to neo-Stalinism. Poland itself will continue to be a destabilizing factor whichever way things go.

Fraser

**Library and Archives Canada, Department of External funds, Vol. 16026,
File 20-POLND-1-4, Pt. 13**

IRELAND

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**19 October 1981, Coded Telex
from the Irish Ambassador in Stockholm, Dermot Waldron,
to the Political Director at the Irish Department
of Foreign Affairs, Pádraic MacKernan**

STOCKHOLM, 19 October 1981

(C37)

‘Departure of Kania’

Kania’s departure¹⁷⁶ is not so surprising in view of the obvious displeasure of Moscow over some time and the growing disenchantment with him in the PCWS.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, a sad reflexion is that it is barely three months since his personal victory in democratic elections at the Party Congress.

Jaruselski’s nomination would appear to mean no substantial change in Polish policy, but this is difficult to reconcile with the tougher line being demanded by the Central Committee in regard to both strikes and the renegotiation of agreements with trade unions. Moscow is of course also clamouring for tough measures. One cannot exclude possibility that Jaruselski’s experiences in government in last twelve months have hardened his outlook and he may be prepared to move where Kania clearly was not. His army position must have been crucial factor in his nomination.

NAI, 2011/39/1744

¹⁷⁶ Stanislaw Kania, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, was replaced by Wojciech Jaruzelski on 18 October 1981.

¹⁷⁷ The acronym ‘PCWS’ is most likely an error and should read ‘PUWP,’ the Polish United Workers’ Party.

NETHERLANDS

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**19 October 1981, Code message
from the Dutch Ambassador in Warsaw, Joost van der Kun,
to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Warsaw, 19 Oct. 1981

Subject: Kania's exit

The resignation of party leader Kania, announced on the 18th of this month during the Central Committee's Plenum, came as something of a surprise to Western diplomatic observers.

At the end of the first day of the Plenum, Kania was unexpectedly heavily criticised by the meeting, which had been excluded from important decisions in recent weeks, and blamed for his weak performance towards the Solidarność congress (criticism from the Warsaw party committee a few days earlier had been a harbinger of the prevailing mood).

In the first place, it seems to me that replacing Kania with Defence Minister Jaruzelski is mainly of a cosmetic nature. Since the June letter from Moscow, it was clear that Kania no longer had full confidence from the Soviet Union. Execution of the communist ritual of scapegoating will intend to reassure Moscow again.

Jaruzelski's reputation was not much better at the time, but as a brother-in-arms he can more easily identify with views held within the Soviet armed forces.

Domestically, and especially vis-à-vis Solidarność, Jaruzelski's figure does not have to raise any major reservations. Like Kania he is a man of the middle, and he has declared that he will not use the army against Polish workers.

At the same time, however, the unique bundling (for the time being at least) of highest party and government positions in his person may hold a warning that the government has now really made the last available conciliatory gesture. Anyone who does not want to listen to the man who is not first and foremost a party boss but (since his appointment as prime minister and especially after the Bydgoszcz incident) the moderate saviour of the fatherland figure, is guilty of irresponsible and dangerous actions.

Already, the new party leader appealed to Solidarność to refrain from any strike action for the time being; a ceasefire call similar to that of February last year when he took office. This in the light of the widespread increase in strike actions.

I suspect, therefore, that the Kania-Jaruzelski alternation is intended to be a threefold tactical move: a temporary appeasement of Soviet fear and resentment; a signal to Solidarność that line of reasonable consultation will continue provided that the union moderates its demands; a transfer of blame to the trade union for further deterioration both politically and economically.

If Jaruzelski doesn't make it, what then? Perhaps a less pliable figure like Olszowski is waiting behind the scenes, offering no prospect of an improvement in the situation.

In the coming days, the EEC Heads of Mission will compile a joint evaluation effort.

van der Kun 168

Netherlands National Archive, 2.05.387, BZ, Warsaw Embassy, inv.nr. 605.

POLAND

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**3 November 1981, Informational note
by Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Wiejacz,
on the international aspects of the 1st National Congress
of Delegates of the Solidarity Independent Self-Governing Trade Union**

Warsaw, 3 November 1981

Confidential

INFORMATIONAL NOTE

International issues in the resolutions
of the 1st Congress of the Solidarity Trade Union.

The course of the 1st Congress of the Solidarity Trade Union indicated that the trade union defines itself as a socio-political movement seeking to contest the existing shape of the socialist system in Poland in many points and emphasises its complete independence of its operations from the state authorities. This is also the case in the sphere of relations with abroad.

The activities of 'S' since its founding until today, including the course of the Congress and the resolutions passed at it, bear witness to the great importance given in 'S' to contacts with abroad, both bilateral and multilateral, as well as to information and propaganda activeness and contacts with foreign embassies and representatives of the foreign press in the country. Formally, however, 'S' activists still say that the movement has no foreign policy yet.

The basic document adopted by the Congress and defining the position of 'S' with regard to foreign activity is the 'Resolution on foreign contacts.' This document confirms that, in its activities, the trade union will base itself on the Constitution of the People's Republic of Poland, which in combination with the statement expressed in the program resolution that 'we wish to carry out our work without infringing on international alliances,' should be seen as a confirmation of previous 'S' declarative commitments in this area.

The document also stresses, as if sanctioning previous practice in this area, that the activities of 'S' in the foreign sphere 'shall be conducted independently of state authorities, party authorities, religious organisations and any other organisations.' A practical example of such a stance was the adoption by the Congress of a 'resolution on the refusal to grant visas' to some foreign delegations invited to the second round of the Congress, which sees the visa decisions, dictated by the interest of the state, as 'a manifestation of unacceptable interference by the organs of the government of the People's Republic of Poland in the activities of the Solidarity Independent Self-Governing Trade Union guaranteed by the statute.'

The resolution on foreign contacts stipulates that 'S' will develop international cooperation in the fields of organisational work, trade union education, collective bargaining, labour protection, and tourist and cultural exchange.

Another example of the evolution toward independence of 'S' in the sphere of propaganda and information activity and cultural cooperation with abroad was the adoption by the Congress of the 'resolution on the participation of 'S' in the Frankfurt/M. Book Fair.'

The fact that during the Congress 'S' adopted such a broad 'offensive abroad' program, which is to be carried out by all cells of the union, often reaching beyond purely trade-union matters, and also the fact that 'S' intends to pursue it with complete independence from the state authorities, creates a new qualitative phenomenon for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the institution that coordinates all foreign relations of the People's Republic of Poland, as well as for a number of other ministries. This requires the development of methods of action that will prevent, in keeping with the existing legal order, any negative effects that the activities of 'S' might have on the interests of the state.

The Congress' 'program resolution' concentrates on the presentation of peculiar estimates about the sources of the crisis and ways of overcoming it by embarking on wide-ranging changes in the functioning of the country's social and economic system. However, the consequences of some of them go beyond the sphere of internal affairs and affect our position within the COMECON and our commitments as allies within the Warsaw Pact. This is the case with the proposal that the government re-examine the conditions under which Poland could return to the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and, especially, with the limitation of military spending to a minimum during the crisis. Both these matters must be seen in the context of the trade union's politically negative evolution.

On the other hand, the proposal to regulate legally the issues of economic emigration contained in the resolution has been for a long time a subject of interest and concrete steps on the part of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Possible contacts between 'S' and foreign trade unions, to which it was bound by the resolution, may be helpful in settling this complex international legal and socially sensitive issue on an international plane, provided that it isn't turned by 'S' into an object of anti-governmental ploys.

Neither does Solidarity's proposal to amend passport regulations stand in contradiction with the steps already taken by the relevant ministries.

The entirety of the postulates related to the ratification of the ILO conventions by Poland is close to the Polish government's stance as presented to this organisation. During more detailed consideration of the ratification of individual conventions, the competent ministries should pronounce themselves, taking into account the position of trade unions.

The view of 'S' in Socialist countries was seriously affected by the provocative 'message to the working people of Eastern Europe.' The message was harshly condemned in those countries and defined by them and by our Foreign Ministry in a published statement as an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

The Socialist countries responded to the message with worker demonstrations in a number of work establishments in Socialist countries and by passing resolutions. Worthy of note is the letter of the General Secretary of the Hungarian Trade Unions, the Chairman of the *ŠFZZ*, S. Gáspár, in which he firmly rejects and criticises the political intentions of the message's authors. At the same time, despite the differences and tensions that exist in mutual relations, a proposal to hold talks with 'S' was put forward for the first time. It should be seen as an important sign announcing the possibility of dialogue between 'S' and trade unions in Socialist Countries if 'S' can meet certain conditions. Such intent in the letter was noted by the Western mass media and probably by 'S.'

The adoption by the Congress of a statute amendment according to which 'the union's activity in foreign organisational entities of enterprises that have their seat in Poland shall not be limited' could lead to various types of conflict situations in case of the emergence of 'S' cells abroad. This would have a negative impact on the state of Poland's political and economic relations with certain countries, and also on internal relations between workforces.

However, it should be kept in mind that sectoral trade unions are very active among some of the Polish workers employed abroad. For this reason, a uniform guideline should be adopted with regard to the forms in which all Polish trade unions function abroad. A possible solution could be the establishment of works councils, independent of specific trade unions or managed by a team selected by all trade union headquarters.

The 'Message to the Polish Émigré Community' confirms that 'S' is interested in maintaining extensive contacts with Polish émigré milieus and in mobilising the Polish émigré community to provide assistance, something that was reflected, among other ways, in the organisation of the Bank of Medication, as well as in putting forward proposals aimed at engaging Polish émigré community capital in business activity in Poland. Besides the positive aspects, the activity of 'S' in this area was also marked by some negative aspects, such as ignoring the efforts made within the framework of the 'Polonia' Society or establishing contacts with reactionary Polish émigré centres known for their hostile attitude towards socialist Poland.

The part of the message that speaks of those Poles who 'to this day cannot find support in any Polish émigré organisation, who are denied the right to their own language, culture, history and citizenship' addresses the issue of Polish émigré activity in the USSR. Interest in this issue was signalled in publications, in letters and in questions during meetings with PUPW lecturers.

The 'resolution on the right for compensation' under labour and civil law for Poles who were abroad during and after WWII in connection with wartime operations may be applicable to the following claim categories: compensation claims, including former concentration camp inmates and forced labourers, and certain pension claims against the FRG, compensation claims against the GDR, claims for wrongful deprivation of liberty, for work in places of confinement, and for property left behind in the USSR.

The part of the 'Message to the Polish Émigré Community' that may concern the situation of the Poles in the USSR, as well as the one that raises the question of compensation claims with regard to the USSR and the GDR, touch upon subjects that have not been publicly discussed in Poland before and which are perhaps being raised with the intention of inflaming relations between the People's Republic of Poland and the interested Socialist Countries.

Conclusions:

1. It is advisable to continually stress the need for trade unions to observe the PRP's foreign policy principles in their activities abroad and to react firmly when these principles are violated. Practice indicates that this brings certain results.

2. The explicitly negative stance that has already been communicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 'S' management in the matter of setting up information offices abroad as well as conducting other forms of information and propaganda activities while bypassing state institutions set up for this purpose should be firmly maintained, as such activity violates legal regulations in force. It is worth noting that 'S' distanced itself from Przetakiewicz's office in New York following our intervention.

3. An analysis of the legal and factual situation, and our position on foreign compensation—the subject of the 'S' Congress resolution—need to be prepared. Our position must be better supported substantively, politically and legally.

4. In case of expansion of the National Unity Front platform, propose that 'S' be incorporated into the organisational structure of the 'Polonia' Society.

5. Accelerate the comprehensive study of the economic emigration question relevant government institutions.

6. Subject foreign contacts of 'S' in Western countries to even more careful monitoring; influence the direction and content of these contacts; prevent those who have harmed Polish interests while abroad from leaving. The same concerns financial subsidies and material gifts received by 'S' from abroad.

J. Wiejacz

AMSZ, Dep. III 49/84, w. 1 (PDD 1981/II, Doc. No. 312)

AUSTRIA

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**10 November 1981, Memorandum
on the conversation between
the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Willibald Pahr,
and the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Czyrek
(excerpts)**

Record of the conversation between the Federal Minister
and the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of Poland, Jozef CZYREK,
on 10 November 1981

[...] ¹⁷⁸

The Federal Minister opens the meeting with warm words of welcome and a reference to the excellent relations between Austria and Poland. Among the bilateral issues, the [Foreign Minister] first addresses economic relations, the development of which one has been very satisfied with in the past and shows understanding for Poland's current economic difficulties. He urges the Polish side to meet their coal delivery obligations insofar as possible. Otherwise, the Austrian energy concept, which is based on important Polish deliveries, will run into difficulties. Despite Austria's already preferential treatment, he asks, especially with regard to long-term energy planning, to come closer to the delivery quantities agreed to at the time. That is the most important question for him.

He also wants to point out a few other questions. The increasing number of Polish citizens in Austria, who behave very well overall, has also brought some criminal elements to Austria who have already committed criminal offenses in Poland. Austria, therefore, has an interest in intensifying criminal police cooperation and, if necessary, concluding an agreement such as that already in place with Hungary.

[...]

He also presents a list of Austrian journalists working for the Austrian media and asks that no obstacles be placed in the way of their work in Poland. Sometimes, there have been problems, perhaps due to communication difficulties. There is an interest in not affecting the very friendly coverage on Poland by the Austrian media.

With regard to the question of loans and debt rescheduling and the Polish wish for further grain deliveries, the [Foreign Minister] refers to Czyrek's upcoming talks with the Federal Chancellor and Federal Minister Staribacher. Austria is very satisfied with the rescheduling agreements and is hoping for their smooth implementation. It is aware that Poland needs further financial aid, Austria shows understanding and willingness to help at least a little according to its possibilities.

¹⁷⁸ Detailed information (list of participants) was omitted.

In conclusion, the Federal Minister once again praises the good bilateral relations and expresses the hope that they will continue to develop favourably in the future.

Foreign Minister CZYREK shares the conviction that there is a need for a further 'rapid' development of mutual relations. He invites the Federal Minister to visit Poland and mentions the invitation by President Benya to the Sjem to send a delegation to Austria; this parliamentary visit could be included in the 1982 visit schedule. He refers to the importance of the political 'consultations' at the level of deputy foreign ministers or general secretaries and also to the work of the responsible directors of the two foreign ministries.

He declares the [Polish] readiness to conclude the agreement on criminal police work proposed by Austria and asks for the text of the one concluded with Hungary to be forwarded, which can be used as a basis.

Austria has become one of Poland's most important economic partners; the economies of the two countries are complementary. Although Poland is currently unable to fully meet its coal delivery obligations, there is an interest in constant development of economic cooperation. The slowdown in Polish investment activity will continue to take a long time. Cooperation in third markets: involving of Polish companies in Austrian [contracts abroad] would help Poland a lot and improve its balance of payments. As with VÖEST-Alpine¹⁷⁹ and Polimex-Cekop,¹⁸⁰ other companies should also examine and agree on joint projects.

Efforts will be made to exceed 60% of the delivery obligations for coal deliveries to Austria. Poland only delivers 30–50% of the agreed amount to other countries. There is a will to treat Austria preferentially as a partner. He has read [Federal Minister] Staribacher's declaration regarding the (expensive) solution to Austria's energy problems for this year. Czyrek jokingly mentions that despite help from Poland, other states do not want to share with him the profits they have made because of reduced Polish deliveries. The Polish crisis has more of a socio-political than an economic background; it is a question of the adequate use of manpower, of working hours and equipment. If there is an agreement on economic issues in Poland, coal production can possibly be accelerated quickly. He cannot say more today than Poland really wants to give Austria preferential treatment within the scope of the possibilities and meet more than the 60% quota.

Exports, but even more so Poland's imports, have declined, and it is not possible to maintain this volume without appropriate financing via loans. The income generated goes into other necessary expenses, the interest payments. In the past, developments could not be foreseen. After a Polish consensus, an agreement on an economic policy would be able to create conditions for stable planning.

¹⁷⁹ Vereinigte Österreichische Eisen- und Stahlwerke (United Austrian Iron and Steelworks).

¹⁸⁰ Polska Firma Importowo-Eksportowa—Centrala Eksportu Kompletnych Obiektów Przemysłowych (Polish Enterprise for the Import and Export of Machinery—Central Bureau for the Export of Complete Industrial Facilities).

On the question of the employment of Polish nationals in Austria, Czyrek stated that he is not asking Austria to change its regulations on asylum seekers. But perhaps this employment could be put on an agreed basis bilaterally. Austria has a shortage, Poland a surplus of certain skilled workers (example: restoration of architectural monuments). Poland has an agreement with the FRG and will conclude one with France. The agreement with Germany concerns the employment of 10,000 Poles; it would be nice if a similar agreement for 5,000 could be achieved with Austria. One knows the worries about full employment, perhaps a proper regulation is still possible for some. The practice of granting asylum is a remnant of the Cold War, which does not apply to young people who are looking for happiness and prosperity and suddenly 'refine' themselves into political refugees. The regulation of residence permits is, of course, an Austrian matter.

[...]

The Federal Minister points out that the responsible ministry is not very interested in concluding a recruitment agreement, but he will take the question to the Minister of Social Affairs again. Most Poles in Austria only stay here temporarily in order to travel on to other countries; they can return to Poland at any time. They do not represent a burden on bilateral relations. More than 90% will not be treated as refugees according to the Convention.¹⁸¹

He asked the guest to inform the Federal Chancellor and Federal Minister Staribacher about the upcoming changes in the Polish economic system and their possible effects.

[...]

The Federal Minister confirms the excellent development of cultural relations. In 1983, there will certainly be a series of events, but it is important to him that these not be used against third parties (Turkey).¹⁸² History is important, but emotions should be avoided. He will speak to the responsible authorities about the idea of a Sobieski¹⁸³ monument. Sobieski is one of the most famous Poles in Austria (Czyrek jokingly: And Walesa?).

Ambassador Zanetti will in any case still attend the upcoming New Year's reception in Warsaw.

Moving on to the multilateral issues, the [Foreign Minister] explains that both sides are probably moved the most by East-West relations. The relationship between the two military blocs is of decisive importance for Europe, for its security, and thus also for neutral Austria. In the 70s, [the blocs] successfully committed to the policy

¹⁸¹ The Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951.

¹⁸² In 1983, the 300th anniversary of the victory of the allied forces of the Roman Empire, German states and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth over Ottoman forces besieging Vienna was celebrated with cultural events in Austria.

¹⁸³ The monument of King Jan III Sobieski was a subject of official talks between the presidents of Poland and Austria but remained unrealised.

of détente. According to the Austrian view, there had been a policy of détente before that, one could say, since the conclusion of the State Treaty, where for the first time the possibility of finding solutions through constructive negotiations had been demonstrated. There have been ups and downs since then. The current, not surprising, low points to a détente weariness on some sides. The word 'détente' aroused too much hope for a golden age without conflicts and problems. As the speeches in Helsinki in 1975 showed, this is entirely unjustified. The continuation of the ideological quarrel, albeit in different forms, was openly announced, it is important to keep in mind what Chancellor Kreisky has said since 1975: détente is not the absence of conflict, it is a *modus vivendi* of coexistence and cooperation. Where possible a consensus should be sought. Of course, this *modus vivendi* is currently burdened by a number of problems. Afghanistan was undoubtedly one of the problems that caused the policy of détente to bottom out. Further, the pursuit of a new wave of armaments has undoubtedly made détente's usefulness less credible. The question of military détente and CBM is therefore of particular importance in Madrid.¹⁸⁴ No agreement has yet been reached on this question. Certain questions in the area of human rights are also open. He is convinced that in case of an agreement on CBM, also agreement on the other open questions, human rights, is possible. Because of Brezhnev's offer to expand the parameters of CBM, concessions would also need to be made in the West. The reference in the N+N proposal to the adjacent sea and air space without a more detailed definition should suffice in the mandate for the Conference on disarmament and CBM.¹⁸⁵ Both Gromyko and Haig have expressed interest in the N+N proposal, and the Federal Minister still believes that this proposal is appropriate. One should not anticipate the negotiations; the room for negotiation could be limited by interpretative declarations. He is hoping for the Madrid meeting to come to an end this year since a continuation next year would diminish the Helsinki process.

In the field of disarmament, the Federal Minister expressed concern about the development in the field of medium-range missiles and welcomed the American-Soviet negotiations announced for the end of the month. The Austrian stance is brief: neither SS-20¹⁸⁶ nor Pershing missiles. A balance is necessary, but at the lowest possible level. The current tendency to conduct disarmament negotiations for different armaments systems and regions separately is unsatisfactory. Both regional and global armaments would have to be included, nuclear weapons as well as traditional; tactical missiles as well as medium and long-range missiles. Even military

¹⁸⁴ At the second follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Madrid from 11 November 1980 to 9 September 1983 it was agreed to convene a Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

¹⁸⁵ The mandate for the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Stockholm (1984–1986).

¹⁸⁶ NATO reporting name of Soviet nuclear ballistic missile RT-21M Pioneer.

representatives have not yet been able to give him any meaningful explanation for the distinction between whether Moscow, metaphorically speaking, will be destroyed from Washington or from Bonn. At Czyrek's objection that the difference would be 10 to 15 minutes, the Federal Minister explained that this does not count today because the missiles are no longer vulnerable because of missiles with multiple warheads. There is a disturbed relationship in this area. Efforts in the bilateral area could play a role here. Poland could speak with countries on the one side; Austria with the others. Brezhnev's visit to Bonn will be certainly of decisive importance.

Foreign Minister CZYREK sees the cause of the crisis of détente in the attempt to change the existing balance of power between East and West. For reasons of principle, the Soviet Union could not accept the principle of inequality of strength and security. As long as one side strives for military superiority, the policy of détente and confidence will suffer. This is the case to such an extent that for a long time one has been in a period where all options are possible. It would therefore be of great importance that the two superpowers meet again on the basis of the Nixon–Brezhnev Declaration¹⁸⁷ of 1972, where the principle of equality of strength and security was established. As long as that is not the case, the international situation will remain vulnerable to crises. One must develop a policy that at very least does not disturb the alliance systems, the superpowers, if one is not trying to help. Poland is doing everything it can to ensure that no one thinks of regarding the Polish question as a hotspot or exploiting it. For the situation in and around Europe, the decision on medium-range missiles and neutron weapons and the question of a regional nuclear war are important. To a certain extent, also Madrid is one of them, despite the limitations of its function. We agree that the question of détente is the most important among the results of the Madrid meeting. Czyrek is of the opinion that one should be satisfied with generally formulated principles, which could then be concretised in further discussions. The direction of the proposal by the N+N is commendable; it would be very desirable [if] they could help to get out of this impasse. The further course now depends on the Americans.

One should think about how the idea of peace and détente can be secured. A Helsinki follow-up meeting could take place in one or two years.¹⁸⁸ One idea is

¹⁸⁷ The US-Soviet Joint Declaration of 29 May 1972 confirmed both parties' determination to 'proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence.' Both sides declared that 'The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are prepared to make appropriate contributions to the positive trends on the European continent toward a genuine détente and the development of relations of peaceful cooperation among states in Europe on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, noninterference in internal affairs, sovereign equality, independence and renunciation of the use or threat of force.' *The New York Times*, 30 May 1972, p. 18.

¹⁸⁸ The final document of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1 August 1975, provided for the regular convening of follow-up conferences for evaluating the progress in implementing the decisions of the Conference.

that of military détente, which could give impulses. Perhaps there are opportunities in the political arena to express even more emphatically the European states' desire for peace. The spontaneous movements against the dangers made a great impression in the East and probably also in the West. That might give an impetus for how to support the European desire for peace.¹⁸⁹

Austrian State Archive ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 166.18.14/23-II.3/81

¹⁸⁹ The memcon was written and signed by Counsellor Klas Daublebsky and approved by the head of Section II.3 (Eastern Department) of the Foreign Ministry, Paul Ullmann. It was sent to the Austrian Embassy in Warsaw, Sections II to VI of the Foreign Ministry and Departments 2 and 3 of Section I of the Foreign Ministry.

AUSTRALIA

68

**1 December 1981, Cablegram
from the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tony Street
(in Brussels at the time),
to the Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser
(excerpts)**

Brussels, 1 December 1981

Secret

CABLEGRAM O.BS6915
Minister's visit to Poland¹⁹⁰

For the Prime Minister from the Minister.

I was given a very warm and hospitable reception by the Poles during my visit. My discussions amounted to a very intensive seminar on Poland's dramatic and complex political and economic situation. A warmth towards Australia was evident in all the meetings I had in Warsaw. I found Czyrek, in particular, exceptionally well-disposed and open. He made the point several times that the Poles regarded Australia as a 'partner of priority' and referred with appreciation to the understanding which the Australian Government had shown towards Poland in its difficult circumstances as reflected both in the Government guaranteed credit facility and the contribution to the 'Let Poland Live' appeal.

2. For my part I left Poland with a clear impression of a country confronted with a highly volatile and potentially dangerous situation. The social, political and economic crisis continues with no sign of an early solution evident. Emotions in Poland remain aroused.

3. While there is not quite a stand-off between the three major Parties with talks still going on there remains a considerable gap between the authorities and Solidarity and much distrust on both sides.

[...]¹⁹¹

9. The Poles outlined their economic problems in a frank and open manner. It is planned that economic reforms will be introduced from January 1982. These reforms will be difficult to implement both because of the situation generally and the lack of experienced and competent people with the necessary self-confidence to carry them through. The 1982 Economic Plan must therefore be suspect. Economic revival clearly depends to a great extent on progress towards political stabilisation.

¹⁹⁰ The visit took place on 25–27 November 1981.

¹⁹¹ The information about the domestic situation in Poland was omitted.

10. As far as the Poles were concerned the focus of the visit was their request for additional economic support from Australia and I was given an aide-memoire (cable separately to Canberra) asking for a great deal. They expressed appreciation for our existing Government guaranteed credit facility but made it clear that they attached very great importance to further support. I, of course, made no commitment beyond saying that the Government would consider the request carefully. I also made it clear that, in considering any further request, the Government would attach importance to Poland's ability to meet repayments that would fall due early next year under the present facility.

11. Both Solidarity and Government underlined the need for external assistance, especially credits. Jaruzelski sees Western economic assistance in this form and retention of Western trade, technology and other ties as critical if Poland is not to be forced totally into the Eastern mould.

12. I believe Poland is desperately seeking Western support to enable it to reduce the prospect of unwelcome, unwanted and complete absorption into the Soviet system.

13. Obviously very significant political and economic decisions must be made in the West and in present circumstances political considerations will be paramount.

14. In summary, while the spectre of imminent Soviet military intervention has receded the situation in Poland remains volatile and dangerous. It is difficult to judge just who is governing Poland at the moment—an unlikely mixture of Communists, Clerics and Solidarity all have an important say. There are, however, elements of self-restraint apparent which may give some basis and hope that an internal solution can be found.

15. There are few precedents for the economic deterioration—and possible collapse of an industrial country rich in natural resources as is now happening in Poland. A good deal of further Western help is needed quickly to prevent complete collapse and the main question for us to emerge from my visit is whether it is in our interest to put in anything more.

Street

NAA, A1838, 48/1/3 PART 16

UNITED STATES

69

**7 December 1981, Memorandum by the US Central Intelligence Agency
(excerpts)**

Washington, December 7, 1981

Top Secret; [...] ¹⁹²

Subject: Polish Preparations for Martial Law

1. The attached memorandum provides SOVA's assessment of the most current intelligence concerning Polish preparations for martial law. The continued confrontation with Solidarity has caused the Polish government to prepare extensive plans for the imposition of martial law. These plans are now complete, and certain actions have been taken related to their implementation. Nonetheless, this memorandum concludes that the regime views martial law as risky and continues to pursue political solutions.

2. This is a [...] report. For convenience of reference by NFIB agencies, the codeword [...] has been assigned to the product of certain extremely sensitive agent sources of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The word [...] is classified [...] and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. This memorandum must be handled in accordance with established security procedures. It may not be reproduced for any purpose. Queries regarding the substance of this memorandum may be addressed to the Director of Soviet Analysis. Requests for extra copies or for utilization of any part of this report in any other form should be addressed to the Deputy Director for Operations.

[...]

Attachment: [...]

Subject: Polish Preparation for Martial Law^x

1. The Polish government has completed its plans for imposing martial law and some recent activity is consistent with the final preparations that would precede the implementation of such plans. The possibility that the plans would fail, however, still appears to be driving regime moderates to find political solutions to contentious issues. If a decision to implement martial law were taken, we believe that the Soviets would likely begin parallel preparations ranging from increasing security to preparing

¹⁹² Excerpts marked with [...] are not declassified.

^x NOTE: This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center, by [...] be directed to Chief [...].

their own forces to intervene. We have not, however, observed the Soviets taking any specific actions in preparation for a major commitment of force. [...]

The Martial Law Program

2. As described by sensitive intelligence sources the Polish plan for martial law has been prepared for use in several scenarios. The full martial law program, which has been approved by Jaruzelski, would involve a large-scale repression of all antigovernment elements. Polish planners see this program as a swift, surprise operation intended to simultaneously eliminate the opposition leadership, and use the threat of force and legal sanctions to subdue general unrest. Reserves would be mobilized and individuals conscripted for unlimited durations, while workers would find their industries 'militarized' and themselves under essentially military roles and sanctions. Basic freedoms of internal movement, communications, and otherwise lawful assembly and association would be severely curtailed or eliminated. Selected individuals would be rounded up for internment during the night immediately preceding the public disclosure of the martial law decree in a named 'Operation Spring' [...]

3. In the period from several days to 24 hours preceding the declaration of martial law, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) would test unit readiness for special operations, confiscate firearms, prepare to confiscate radio transmitter-receiver sets, and perform a mobilization expansion of MIA units. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) would bring certain units to full strength, move selected units to training areas in the Warsaw Military District, deploy emergency radio and radio-relay systems, and generally prepare to perform physical security functions. [...]

4. Immediately preceding the declaration of martial law, but after the political decision to impose it, the MIA would relay orders on the execution of the special operation units (H-16), and then execute it (H-6). At the same time the MND would begin assuming physical security functions (H-6) and sealing off critical areas in Warsaw and other urban centers (H-1). [...]

5. With the actual declaration of martial law, the MIA would assume control of communications, selected installations, borders, etc. as the MND continued its general function of physical security while preparing to reinforce MIA units if required. In general, those functions of a confrontational nature appear to be the purview of the MIA, with the military playing a supporting role. The other Ministries would be involved in issuing legal directions concerning their areas of responsibility and implementing plans such as the mobilization of certain industries. [...]

6. Some of the earliest sensitive reporting on martial law indicated that the planners were of two minds with regard to the timing, scope, and nature of the program. On the one hand, arguments were heard that the program should be implemented in

stages, or only in specific sectors, to reduce the risk of confrontation. On the other hand, a position was taken, supported by the results of a decisionmaker's exercise in the spring of 1981, that the program's full effectiveness could only be obtained through swift, sudden implementation. [...]

7. While the military still profess a clear preference for the sudden, full program, conspicuous measures such as the retention of trained soldiers generally conform to the outline for 'creeping' martial law. The recent introduction of military teams into the countryside is neither noted nor implied in existing martial law plans. Nonetheless, by taking this 'extraordinary' step, the government is signalling its intent to retain both its authority and legitimacy. The military remains a respected institution within Poland. We have previously estimated that the military could be used with potentially positive results if introduced prior to any outbreak of violence—particularly if their contribution included not just police functions, but positive activities, such as the managing of foodstuffs. This may be what is being attempted at this time, as the government steps up its presence on Solidarity, while at the same time retaining an ability to suddenly apply the full program. [...]

The Evidence—Military

8. Recent reporting indicates an increased emphasis on activity akin to final preparations. Sensitive reports indicate that the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, General Siwicki, reported to the National Defense Committee on 14 September that military tasks had been assigned, personnel had been selectively retrained, and that unspecified 'essential measures' had *already been carried out*. A General Staff report, obtained by sensitive sources, declares that martial law could be implement 'immediately.' [...]

9. Sensitive reports indicated the need to augment standing forces prior to the declaration of martial law, but emphasized that this could be accomplished covertly and in stages. The Polish Armed Forces recently announced that they were retaining for two months approximately 53,000 soldiers who had completed their normal military obligation. The retention of trained personnel has long been a basic feature of the martial law program. Such retentions, plus the recent appearance of tents at Polish military and Ministry of Internal Affairs installations suggest a limited manpower augmentation. [...] The planned fall conscription of 60,000 men apparently was begun on schedule in late October. A major mobilization of the populace, however, need not take place *until* the application of martial law under the full program. Indeed, mobilization appears to be as much an objective of efforts to control the populace as it is a part of the *means* of control. [...]

10. Another element of military preparations mentioned by Siwicki is the deployment of a 'field communications system designed to meet the needs of the state wartime control system' The MND reported in mid-September that

‘intensive preparations’ for martial law included the preparation of the means of communications for directing martial law operations

[...]

11. Proper political preparation of the military is seen by the MOD as an important element of a successful martial law plan. [...]

The Evidence—Government

12. Sensitive source reporting implies that party/government planning has kept pace with the military. The government has completed all the public decrees and notices have already been printed. A former [...] career party official, who recently left Poland, reports that although plans for martial law have been in preparation for at least a year, directives from Warsaw since August have called for renewed emphasis to ensure that they could be quickly carried out. Province plans include an evacuation of key government and party officials and facilities to secure areas where they could be protected by the Army and State Security forces. Meetings were reportedly held in Warsaw under the cover of economic discussions during which the actual topic was martial law plans. [...]

13. State security organs are also being prepared for martial law. The same official reported that the [...] Provincial Commandant of the Citizens’ Militia received orders in July to prepare detention quarters for 300 people. Key leaders of Solidarity and the opposition groups were to be arrested the moment martial law was decreed. As of late-September, that list [...] numbered 150 individuals. Each was assigned a security ‘baby sitter’ who was to know that target’s every movement so that an arrest order could be carried out immediately. This information is consistent with the sensitive reports of ‘Operation Spring.’ [...]

The Political Factor

14. The failure of the regime to use its repressive apparatus up to now has not been due to a lack of planning or preparations, but to the realization that no matter how good the plans were, they run serious risk of failing to restore order and leading to some kind of civil war. The factor of surprise would give the regime only a temporary advantage. It seems unlikely that, once made, the early steps in implementation of martial law could be kept secret. As a result, efforts to round up Solidarity activists might only be partially successful. The remainder, with much of the work force, would spontaneously stage sit-in strikes. Attempts to evict them would likely lead to bloodshed and strengthening of the workers’ will to resist. [...]

15. The regime also cannot count on the reliability of many of its own forces. Sensitive reporting indicates that the Polish MOD is aware that a significant number of conscripts are already members of Solidarity, with many of the remainder in complete sympathy. The [...] Province official reports that the commanders of two Polish divisions (both of which feature in martial law plans) do not feel that

their soldiers can be expected to obey orders to use force against civilians. The most these commanders hope for is that their soldiers will obey orders to remain in their barracks or to move to remote bivouac locations to avoid contact with the population and probably occupation forces from the Warsaw Pact. Both reported a sense that their troops might use their weapons against any outside intervention forces. The same official reports that the commandant of the Province Citizen's Militia even has doubts about his most trusted unit—the Motorized Reserve, or 'ZOMO'—a highly trained security unit used in crisis situations. Complementing these general indications are the letters sent recently to Solidarity by conscripts of the Jelinia Gora¹⁹³ and Lublin Provinces. They expressed dissatisfaction with the extension of their service and declared support for Solidarity. They felt that actions against Solidarity were the real reason behind their retention and they rejected such a role.

[...]

16. The Polish party/military leadership is deeply divided on the use of force. Numerous reports from extremely sensitive sources have indicated that senior officials in the Ministries of Defense and Interior have been the strongest proponents of martial law. Those who have argued against martial law will come under increased pressure to give in if economic conditions worsen significantly in the coming months and lead to extensive strike activity. Even then, however, they would probably argue that martial law must be carefully tailored to specific conditions.

[...]

17. Jaruzelski himself is reported by sensitive sources to be in favor of martial law, and he certainly is seeking to limit concessions to Solidarity. Nonetheless, his public behavior still indicates that he prefers a course of political accommodation, and apparently does not consider current conditions propitious for the introduction of martial law.

[...]

The Soviets Role

18. The extent of the Soviets' role in recent events remains unclear. Sensitive reporting indicated that the Soviet leadership was in frequent and direct contact with Jaruzelski prior to the 17 October Party Plenum without the knowledge of Kania. They may, therefore, have had extensive prior knowledge of the Plenum's activities, and could have influenced Jaruzelski. The sudden return of Soviet Marshal Kulikov for one day to Moscow [...] from East Germany where he was observing an exercise, may indicate that the Soviets were anticipating significant Polish events.

[...]

¹⁹³ Correctly: Jelenia Góra (city in southwestern Poland).

19. The Soviets have advised the Polish government in its preparations for martial law. In fact, all public decrees on the program have been printed in the Soviet Union. In addition, in July, Soviet General Staff officers visited Warsaw and worked with Polish General Staff officers for a period of time. There is no doubt, therefore, that they are aware of the details of the plan. Although we have no direct evidence that the Soviets would be privy to a Polish decision to impose martial law, we believe that would be the case.

[...]

20. Prior Soviet knowledge of a Polish decision to impose martial law would likely result in some Soviet military preparations, if only to increase security of forces already in Poland. Current reports of Soviet military activities indicate such preparations are not under way. A single uncorroborated HUMINT report, however, indicated that logistic activity which may have been related to Poland was to have begun on 1 November. At that time, the report indicates, the Soviets would place a hold on large portions of their road, rail, air, and sea transportation systems in the areas bordering Poland for a four-week period. There are no positive indications that this has occurred. Earlier in October, a reliable, trained source reported that during the latter part of September, the Soviets had instructed the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Transportation to reserve numbers of rail cars for use by the military. Soviet officials stressed that the action was being taken as a contingency based on possible difficulties with Solidarity and that there was no cause for alarm. Should the reports on the Soviet transport preparations prove accurate, however, they would be a significant indication that the Soviets are anticipating some massive logistic operation, and have an idea of its general time-frame.

[...] ¹⁹⁴

Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room

¹⁹⁴ The memorandum was prepared for the US Director of Central Intelligence and the US Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and distributed to the Director of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State; the Director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director of the US National Security Agency; the Director of the US National Foreign Assessment Center; the Director of Soviet Analysis, US Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of European Analysis, US Central Intelligence Agency.

NETHERLANDS

70

**13 December 1981, Code message
from the Dutch Ambassador in Warsaw, Joost van der Kun,
to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Warsaw, 13 Dec. 1981

Subject: Crisis in Poland

The Chiefs of Foreign Missions were individually summoned to the Department in the afternoon of the 13th (in my case, by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wiejacz), receiving the following short oral explanation of the emergency situation that has occurred:

- measures taken so far by the government to ensure peace and order have not proved sufficient;
- imminent dangers, including civil war, necessitate the application of article thirty-three of the constitution, which provides for the possibility to declare the state of war if the country's defence and security so require;
- this declaration is required now, as this represents the last chance to resolve the crisis with Poland's own resources (this was underlined);
- the government firmly intends not to return to the situation that existed before August of last year: it will continue with measures aimed at renewal and at reaching national agreement, including on an economic reform programme;
- the government relies on the understanding of other countries for declaring the state of emergency, which will be of temporary duration, and aspires on the continuation of good relations.

Following my comment that there was certainly a great deal of interest abroad in action taken against Solidarność and in treatment of its members, Wiejacz said that, as far as he is aware, the Solidarność headquarters in Warsaw has been taken and sealed off, and that a number of Solidarność leaders are still being held, not including Wałęsa.¹⁹⁵

According to Wiejacz, forty party members from the Gierek period have been interned, amongst them Gierek and Jaroszewicz.

With the foregoing I note that in TV and radio explanations of this apparently well-prepared intervention, and in the presentation thereof, the responsibilities of the government and of the armed forces are underlined: Jaruzelski spoke only as head of the government and as General; TV commentators appear in uniform. Party elements are thus carefully kept in the background.

van der Kun 198

Netherlands National Archive, 2.05.387, BZ, Warsaw Embassy, inv.nr. 606

¹⁹⁵ Lech Wałęsa was arrested by the Polish authorities on 13 December 1981 and held (as internee) until 14 November 1982.

GERMANY

71

**13 December 1981, Telegram
from the German Ambassador in Warsaw, Georg Negwer,
to the German Federal Foreign Office**

Sent: 13 December 1981, 13.50

Received: 13 December 1981, 14.37

Telegram No. 1856

Citissime at night

Re: State of emergency in Poland

1) Foreign Minister Czyrek called myself to his office this morning after several other Western ambassadors to inform me of the following:

He urged me on behalf of the Polish leadership to advise the Federal Government, in particular the Federal Chancellor and Federal Minister Genscher, but also the chairpersons of the democratic parties, that no other way of preventing the country sliding into chaos had been seen. After the decisions of the Solidarity leadership in Radom,¹⁹⁶ which have now been confirmed by the national commission in Gdańsk, the danger of civil war had increased significantly. A complete collapse of Poland's economy had also to be feared. The appointment of the Military Council of National Salvation¹⁹⁷ and the declaring of a state of emergency did not mean that the road to political conflict resolution followed thus far was to be left. The aim to form a front for national understanding remained with a view to jointly continuing the policy of renewal, democratisation and reforms in all fields. There would be no return to old methods and past mistakes of the time prior to August 1980.

The aim currently was to secure the Polish state in the interest of the nation and by averting civil war also to take account of the international European interest in avoiding major conflict concerning Poland.

Commenting on the political platform, he said the Military Council of National Salvation did not replace the state's constitutional organs but had merely been granted special powers to secure inner peace. The decision to take the current steps

¹⁹⁶ This refers to a 3 December 1981 meeting of members of the presidium of the National Committee of the Solidarity Independent Self-Governing Trade Union devoted to the situation in Poland. The security services managed to obtain a recording from this meeting, which was made public (in a suitably altered form) on the instructions of the authorities and used in a press campaign against Solidarity in the days that followed.

¹⁹⁷ It was declared on 13 December 1981 that the *Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego* (Military Council of National Salvation) had been constituted. It called on the Council of State of the People's Republic of Poland to introduce Martial Law. The WRON was a temporary and extra-constitutional organ of power de facto overriding the other branches of state power.

was taken in line with the constitution by the Polish Council of State (state of war as the Polish constitution does not provide for a state of emergency). It was only the Military Council itself that is not expressly referred to in the constitution. This meant that the status of the government and the political parties and the Catholic Church remained unaffected. All social organisations without exception, however, needed to suspend their activities temporarily. Temporary internments, rather than detainments, were foreseen for persons who bore partial responsibility for the current escalation of the situation or for the emergence of the crisis prior to August 1980. This affected extreme forces of the trade union Solidarity, as well as persons who had previously been office-holders in the leadership of the state or the party.

Thus far all steps had been conducted without even minor incidents. It was the hope and wish that this would remain the case.

2) The Polish leadership hoped to be able to convince their Western partners that the steps taken were unavoidable. The Polish leadership emphasised that the policy towards them would remain unchanged. This was especially true for the Federal Republic of Germany which had accompanied Poland for a good part of its post-war journey and Poland wanted this to continue.

3) I shared my deep concern about current events with Minister Czyrek and pointed, in particular, to the alarm on the part of Western governments and in Western public opinion which would be caused by the detainment measures he referred to as 'internment.' It would make the situation very difficult if the impression were to emerge that this was a measure directed primarily at the trade union Solidarity. Czyrek vehemently denied this and pointed out that an amnesty decree had been issued simultaneously with this measure exempting any political actions performed before that time from punishment. Based on this decree, those affected could be released immediately after signing a declaration and further examination.

In many cases this had already happened, but of course the measure was still underway. He added that it wasn't just extremist representatives who were affected by the internment but so far also some 50 people who belonged to the previous leadership.

In response to my direct question as to whether hundreds or perhaps thousands of people were affected by such examination, Czyrek did not want to or could not specify. He requested furthermore that embassies as well as journalists restrict travel in the country in the near future. Private travellers (he seemed to refer to tourists) should rather return home but they will not be forced to do so. Polish citizens would in future need a special stamp in their passport to be able to leave the country. Otherwise, passenger and freight transport would continue unhindered.

However, transit visas for Poland would only be valid for 24 hours.

In response to my question, Czyrek confirmed that Wałęsa was not affected by internment. He had been invited to Warsaw and was conducting talks there with Minister Ciosek. Minister Czyrek responded clearly in the affirmative to my

question as to whether social organisations which had suspended their activities included Grunwald.¹⁹⁸

Evaluation to follow.

4) Minister Czyrek, whose suite of offices was bustling, seemed overworked and stressed but, in the course of the conversation, relaxed a little and seemed to become his usual confident self again. When Jaruzelski came up in conversation while bidding farewell, Czyrek took an almost melodramatic turn and praised him as a man with a strong sense of responsibility who would do anything to avoid bloodshed. Czyrek pulled out all the stops to garner understanding for the measures taken.

5) After the escalation of political clashes in recent weeks, played out particularly between Solidarity and the propaganda of the controlled mass media, the situation was heading towards confrontation. Only the cleverly chosen time for proclaiming a state of emergency was surprising. Up until recently, certain hopes had been vested in the mediation activities of the Primate, Archbishop Glemp, who himself also feared an escalation but not until next week.

Due to the state of emergency being declared in the early hours of Sunday following rapid and careful preparation by the military, immediate reaction was impossible. The Solidarity leadership had gathered in Gdańsk and the workers (with the exception of those on shift) were not at their places of work. As the telephone network had been switched off, communication was difficult.

It remains to be seen how the population will react to the drastic restrictions on freedom now that agencies are reporting on the details. Sunday as the day of rest continues with a sombre feel to it in the shadow of military presence and is being used to repeat broadcasts of Jaruzelski's serious and patriotic speech, presumably in the hope of creating a psychological impact. It was unclear to what extent the Politburo of the Polish United Workers' Party was involved in preparing the events. It seems Jaruzelski has been making decisions alone for a time. The programmatic declarations which are very much weighed down by the restrictive measures are attempting to invoke the political continuity since August 1980. All this without a doubt bears Jaruzelski's signature who wants to signal that the time for dogmatism has certainly not yet come. It is the 9th Party Congress and not simply a Central Committee decision that provides the loose ideological framework for what is primarily a patriotic measure. The question is whether the long dwindling authority of the General can make the embittered and largely lethargic nation sit up and take notice once more at this difficult time.

6) No-one can predict whether and in what state of mind the workers will arrive at their places of work tomorrow, whether they will engage in actions on their own

¹⁹⁸ This is a reference to the Patriotic Union 'Grunwald,' a political association of Poles with nationalist views.

initiative if Solidarity as an organisation really is unable to act. Only the Church could now exert a moderating influence on the unpredictability of this situation. Yet the Church cannot actually take a stance until it knows what the internment measures are really about and what Jaruzelski's intentions actually are.

The increased pressure from Moscow and the prospect of the Warsaw Pact summit meeting¹⁹⁹ have certainly played a central role in the decisions now taken by Jaruzelski. Yet I believe it was essentially his own autonomous decision. It was not just the extreme positions of Solidarity which were posing a threat to him; the Central Committee, too, became increasingly opposed to his policy of waiting and engaging in dialogue. Had Grabski been First Secretary, civil war would presumably have been unavoidable. Jaruzelski pre-empted this. But now the values and prestige of the Polish army are directly involved. Is this literally the last chance?

Negwer

**Political Archive of the German Federal Foreign Office, B 150, vol. 520
(AAPD 1981, Doc. No. 365)**

¹⁹⁹ On 18 December 1981, on the occasion of the 75th birthday of Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, leading representatives of the Warsaw Pact states travelled to Moscow for an informal meeting.

NATO

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**13 December 1981, Assessment Report
by the Joint Intelligence Cell in London for the NATO Situation Centre
on the declaration of Martial Law in Poland
on the night of 12/13 December 1981**

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO SITUATION CENTRE²⁰⁰

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Number: 031 /032

Date: 13 DECEMBER 1981

NADA²⁰¹ / ASSESSMENT / DEC 002 / JIC²⁰² / 1317302THE FOLLOWING IS AN ASSESSMENT BY JIC: POLAND.

1. The Declaration of Martial Law in Poland on the night of 12/13 December and the arrest both of Solidarity leaders and of Gierek and other members of the discredited former regime was clearly based on plans carefully prepared in advance. Relations between Solidarity and the Polish authorities had deteriorated sharply over the past week and negotiations between them had broken down. We do not yet know what has happened to the leading members of Solidarity, who were in Gdansk. Solidarity had prepared plans for countering measures such as those now taken; Jaruzelski must hope that it would be prevented from implementing these, and that the general population will accept his claim that he wishes the Polish 'renewal' to continue and to avoid Soviet intervention. The Soviet Union has reported briefly Jaruzelski's announcement but so far there has been no other comment.

2. Martial law was declared in Poland from midnight on 12/13 December. A Military Council for National Salvation, consisting of military leaders was set up under Jaruzelski. Military commissars have been appointed to oversee central

²⁰⁰ The NATO Situation Centre (SITCEN) alerts and provides situational awareness to the North Atlantic Council and to the Military Committee during times of peace, tension and crisis. This support is achieved through the receipt, exchange and dissemination of information from all available internal and external resources.

²⁰¹ NADA seems to be a Situation Centre-specific term that may no longer be in current use. The NATO Archives consulted with the NATO Situation Centre staff but were unable to determine the historical meaning of the acronym.

²⁰² Acronym for Joint Intelligence Cell, a focal point for military intelligence gathered by different intelligence agencies.

and local government. other steps taken include sealing of the borders, severing of telex and diplomatic links, imposition of a curfew, suspension of civil liberties, a ban on strikes and gatherings other than religious celebrations, a takeover of the broadcasting system and suspension of regional broadcasts. Threats to official persons and premises are to be countered through the use of army units.

3. Jaruzelski's speech announcing the measures stressed that they were intended to be of short duration and would be rescinded when calm and order were restored. The measures were intended to preserve the fundamentals of the 'renewal' and reforms, including economic reform would be continued, Jaruzelski left the door open for future cooperation with various forces in Poland including the 'healthy forces' in Solidarity. Authorities must hope that these assurances, together with the popularly demanded detention of Gierek and other former Party leaders and the promise of an end to corruption and inefficiency, will help to form public support for the measures.

4. Jaruzelski also announced that Solidarity extremists and activists of anti-state organisations were being detained. We do not yet know how successful this operation has been. Solidarity's National Commission was meeting at the Gdansk shipyard on 12 and 13 December and it is not known whether police were able to detain them individually or isolate them in the shipyard. Solidarity leaders may have had sufficient warning to allow them to disperse. Whether Solidarity can continue to operate in any form in the light of arrests and interrupted communications will obviously be crucial to what happens next in Poland. Solidarity has long had detailed contingency plans for just such a step, involving a general strike, industrial sabotage, the occupation of factories, the appointment of alternative leaders etc. But we do not know whether these plans are still valid. They must in any case be known to the authorities, who will no doubt take steps to counter them. The first reaction by Solidarity has been the distribution this morning of leaflets calling for a general strike.

5. The minimum public reaction is likely to be one of sporadic strikes and demonstrations. Widespread strikes are quite likely, and a nationwide strike cannot be ruled out. that would face the authorities with the choice of negotiating with strike leaders, sitting out the strike (difficult in the present critical economic situation), or using force to end the strike. The last option could entail a considerable risk of violence and bloodshed. If the police or army open fire, the risk of the situation deteriorating to the point at which soviet intervention would be likely will increase.

6. Polish police and army have cordoned off streets around the Solidarity headquarters in Warsaw. The building has been surrounded and occupied by the police. It is not clear what has happened in the rest of the country.

7. So far there has been no sign of any Soviet military movements.

8. The political situation in Poland has been deteriorating steadily since the Solidarity Congress in September and October, at which the union's political

ambitions were for the first time enshrined in policy documents. But there has been a particularly sharp deterioration in the last two weeks. It has become clear that Solidarity is not prepared to take part in the front of national accord on the regime's terms. Actions by the authorities such as the ending of the student firemen's strike²⁰³ have clearly convinced the union that they are not serious about discussing conciliation. It was becoming clear that the Sejm would not pass the special powers legislation desired by the Party. Archbishop Glemp's appeal to the Sejm not to do so was a direct challenge to Party authority. The Party's position in the factories has been crumbling: moves by Solidarity to expel Party committees from the factories have been falling in momentum. Finally, the Solidarity National Commission meeting in Gdansk on 12 December adopted resolutions calling on the Sejm not to pass the trade union law (which the authorities had amended to make it tougher) and supporting efforts to set up independent unions for the police; called for nationwide protest demonstrations on 17 December; reiterated its conditions for joining a front of national accord; and discussed a proposal to hold a referendum on the future form of a Polish government.

9. Jaruzelski must have been under increasingly severe pressure to act to stem the clear disintegration of authority in Poland, both from hard-liners in the Party and from Moscow. He may also have felt he had to act in order to pre-empt a call by hard-liners for Soviet assistance. His speech suggested that this was Poland's last chance of getting out of the crisis by itself.

10. The Solidarity proposals of 12 December will have provided the government with justification for their move, but the police action and the other measures taken to introduce martial law were clearly well planned and prepared. A barrage of propaganda against Solidarity over the past week must have been intended to prepare the population for tough measures. Jaruzelski will have to persuade the general population that he is acting in good faith and in order to forestall Soviet intervention if he is to have any hope of avoiding bloodshed over the next few days. The attitude of the Church will be crucial in this situation and Jaruzelski is likely to seek at least acquiescence and a plea for calm from the Church leadership.

NATO Archives, AS(81)95

²⁰³ The occupation strike at the Higher School of Fire Fighting in Warsaw began during the night of 24/25 November 1981. On 2 December 1981 the protest was quashed by special units dropped on the school's roof by helicopter.

ITALY

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**13 December 1981, Telegram
from the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw, Marco Favale,
to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Warsaw, 13 December 1981

Secret
Absolute Priority

No. 4037/1-4

[Subject:] Proclamation of 'state of war' in Poland. Convening by Czyrek

My 4036.

Czyrek—through his Head of Cabinet who, since the phones were not working, came personally to the Embassy to warn me—summoned me this Sunday morning at 10:30. Before me, the Ambassador of Austria, as dean of the diplomatic corps, as well as the Ambassador of France had been summoned. After me, Czyrek received the Ambassador of the Federal Republic (the Ambassador of Great Britain is ill, having suffered a heart attack a few days ago). Czyrek, very tense, informed me that, given the increasing prevalence of extremist and anarchist forces in the Solidarnosc movement, confirmed by the last meeting in Gdansk, the government found itself in the necessity to proclaim a 'state of war' ('stan wojenny'), as the Polish constitution does not provide for the distinction between 'state of siege' and 'state of war.'

A group of Solidarnosc extremists was 'interned,' not arrested. They can be released as soon as they sign a declaration of loyalty and abstention from activities contrary to security and the socialist constitution. Walesa was not interned but 'summoned' to Warsaw for 'a series of interviews.' At the same time, the entire leading group of the old Polish regime (Gierek, Jaroszewicz, etc.) was likewise 'interned.'

All trade union activities (both Solidarnosc and the so-called trade unions, that is, the surviving pro-government unions) are suspended.

A 'military council' has been set up, chaired by Jaruzelski, but it does not replace in any way the organs of the state, which continue to function regularly. This council ('not provided for by the constitution,' admitted Czyrek) will preside over the implementation of military measures. So far everything has gone smoothly.

The Primate of Poland was informed of the extraordinary measures taken during the night, before Jaruzelski appeared to announce them on television screens.

Temporary restrictions on the freedom of movement of foreign diplomats and journalists in Poland have been introduced.

Heads of missions will have to inform the Foreign Ministry in advance of their movements outside Warsaw.

The duration of validity of transit visas has also been reduced.

Czyrek ended his exposition by appealing to the understanding of the 'government' and 'Italian political forces' for measures that the government was forced to take to avoid the collapse of all structures of the Polish state and save the country from civil war. The fears that he had expressed to me on several occasions, repeated in Rome during his recent visit²⁰⁴ and expressed in the Vatican 'to Poles' ('but unfortunately, in the latter case, without much success'), had been proved real. During Cheysson's visit, he had asked him to speak to Walesa of these fears, but even that had not helped.²⁰⁵ Walesa had uncovered his game and had admitted that 'all his restraint, so far, was just a tactic.'

'The Polish socialist renewal will go on.' Moreover, he counted on Italy, together with Europe and the other Western countries, to continue its aid to Poland.

I said that, without anticipating the position of my government, I would speak to him with the friendliness but also frankness that has so far characterised our relations, as I had done in our mid-September interview. When it comes to détente, dialogue, human rights and perhaps peace itself, there are no longer any borders, neither in Europe nor in the world. This is the Helsinki spirit, and this is the spirit that, I thought, animated Poland as well (and here Czyrek nodded).

We had always relied on the assurances provided by the Polish side and reaffirmed in all international fora—including the Madrid conference, but also national ones—of adherence and fidelity to the 'political method' for resolving conflicts.

Now a priority problem arose—and I believed that the government, political forces and public opinion would have posed it in Italy as well—namely that of the compatibility between what is happening in Poland and these assurances.

By 'extremism,' we mean the use of violence. However, in no way, neither in recent weeks nor in recent months, Solidarnosc and the millions of its members recurred to it. Nor did it seem to me that expressing opinions could be classified and prosecuted within this category; opinions which in any case, even in their most specific forms, referred only to 'independence' and 'political freedoms': opinions, therefore, fully legitimate and constitutional.

And did the suspension of 'Solidarnosc' mean that the Gdansk agreements of last August were no longer in force for the Polish government?

With the same frankness, I was wondering—and I was not the only one here in Warsaw among my colleagues to ask this question—whether another external component had played its role in the adoption of these measures. Italy, within the European framework and in close coordination with the United States and its allies,

²⁰⁴ Czyrek's visit to Italy and the Holy See took place on 12–13 October 1981.

²⁰⁵ The French foreign minister paid a visit to Poland on 8–9 October 1981.

had always adhered to the principle of non-intervention and non-interference in Polish internal affairs. However, this involved the exclusion of any form of direct or indirect pressure and was valid for all countries 'without exception.'

In the end, I asked him what would have happened if the country went on a general strike, to the bitter end (the manifesto of the state of siege, posted in all the corners of Warsaw, includes a ban on strike as well as a ban on public meetings).

Czyrek replied that, as far as the first point ('political method') was concerned, there could be situations in which reason of state was the supreme law, and Italy had experienced this in recent years. I observed that, if we had introduced some legislative amendments duly approved by Parliament, we had always refused to resort to exceptional measures, such as a state of siege or the like. Moreover, this was not only for reasons of principle and moral, but also for political reasons: because it would have been the most counterproductive method for the purposes of normalising the situation, public order and the pacification of spirits.

Regarding the second point (validity of the Gdansk agreements) Czyrek told me that the Polish government still considers them in force, that Solidarnosc has not been dissolved, but only its activity—like any trade union activity—suspended, and that the national front project is still fully valid and will be actively promoted.

As for the third point (the external component), Czyrek looked me straight in the eyes. For a moment I had the feeling that he wanted to repeat the last September speech, when, after the Russian ultimatum with the invitation to take 'energetic and immediate measures,' he had let me understand how tragic was the situation of the Polish government, caught between two fires, and that in any case, whether he did something or did nothing (as he managed not to do for three months), he risked becoming 'hateful to God and His enemies.'

But Czyrek only invited me, with an equally eloquent reference, to 'read again the text of Jaruzelski's speech' (a few days ago, authoritative independent personalities had expressed themselves privately in the sense: 'better Poles than Russians,' Jaruzelski better than Grabski or Olszowski himself). On the fourth point, (no strike), Czyrek replied as follows: 'We cannot rule out anything. By now, the dice have been cast: we have crossed the Rubicon. We are ready for any eventuality' but 'an amnesty will be issued,' 'we will pass the towel on all the crimes of a political nature committed so far' so that all those who want to can contribute to the reconstruction of the country and national pacification.

Before leaving, I expressed to Czyrek the hope that it will be possible to restore, as soon as possible, those conditions of dialogue and negotiation, in a climate of renewal and freedom, which—despite so many difficulties and also some excesses of language or maximalist requests, advanced on both sides, and not just on one side—had introduced the Gdansk agreements in Poland: and this in the interest not only of Poland, but also of Europe, of dialogue and of East-West cooperation.

2) It is too early to anticipate judgments or conclusions. But for many days now I have been reporting a whole series of symptoms which indicated that Moscow—having now lost all faith in the party's resilience and realising that the revolutionary dynamic, fueled by popular aspirations for independence and political freedoms, was threatening to overwhelm the limits it had placed to the 'Polish renewal'—intended to speed up the timing of its 'recovery strategy' and present the bills drawn on Jaruzelski for their collection. And again, last night (see my 4036), that it was now legitimate to ask if and how long Jaruzelski could have stood up to its pressures.

The fears of the hard-liners of the party (encouraged and pushed by Moscow), that the 'bluff' of communism in Poland and of its 'hegemony' would have been unmasked in Poland, but also in the face of Europeans and of world public opinion, through free political elections or the 'referendum' invoked in recent days in Gdansk, were after all well justified.

But this technique of coup d'état, of the 'red December 2,' of 'the black hand descending into the night,' of military occupation of the country, of information given to the Primate a few minutes before the hour X, in an attempt to involve his responsibility, the beheading of the popular movement with the arrest of its major exponents (I am told that Geremek, one of the most moderate, whom the government had considered months ago for the post of deputy minister of a coalition government, was also 'interned'²⁰⁶) came unexpectedly and suddenly and it is legitimate to wonder how much the scenario had been agreed upon in the Warsaw Pact meetings of the first ten days of December and the relaunch of the East-West dialogue and also of the inter-German dialogue had worked like a smokescreen.

Jaruzelski's assurances, repeated to me by Czyrek, that the policy of the patriotic front (or the 'national compromise') will go on and that we will not return to the old regime (as the useless arrest of its surviving exponents, completely deprived of any power, is intended to show to the country) are certainly valid, provided, however, that they are understood in a precise sense, which is also, and above all, that of Moscow: that is, to make the new regime in Poland (which may not always be headed by Jaruzelski) a variant of Kadar's Hungary, with some, purely economic elements, taken from the Yugoslav self-management.

We will see now what the country's reaction will be. But whatever the immediate popular reactions may be, it is difficult to see how, in these conditions, the Polish nation will be able to endure the 'years of sacrifices and considerable lowering of the standard of living' that this Minister of Foreign Trade announced to me a few days ago as 'inevitable' (and I told him it was good to close windows and doors so that no one would hear him).

²⁰⁶ Bronislaw Geremek was interned to December 1982 (in 1983 he was temporarily arrested again).

In other words, I do not believe that an attitude of passivity or acceptance of the fait accompli, on our part, if there were any such intentions, can even serve as to guarantee the 'peacefulness' and 'order' in Eastern Europe, or in Poland, and to place Western Europe safe from any complication.

In any case, in a more global vision, European and Western attention could appropriately pause on the whole chain of interdependencies that are linked to Poland and which, as is well known, are not limited to East-West or inter-German relations but can reach as far as to the Caribbean Sea and Central America and on each of which the position of Europe can have its own autonomous individuality and characteristics.

By way of simple chronicle, since the respective positions will be clarified at the community meeting tomorrow in London, I would add that I had asked my French and German colleagues what their language had been with Czyrek.

Dupuy told me that, according to the first indications received, it was a 'matter between Poles.' Negwer—always concerned about the impact on inter-German relations and while deploring this unfortunate coincidence of the Polish crisis with the Schmidt–Honecker meeting—[told me] that he would have limited himself to asking for technical clarifications on the scope of the provision and on the powers of the military council, and that in any case many voices had been raised in the Federal Republic in recent times to say that Solidarnosc was exaggerating. I seemed to notice some hope in him that perhaps, from all this, a 'military Poland' could emerge, in its own way 'different' from Moscow as before and more than before. But, even if it cannot be excluded a priori like so many other, this seems to me a hypothesis that today is not founded and is 'wishful thinking' to some extent.²⁰⁷

Favale

ASMAE, DGAP VI, 1981, b. 240, fasc. *Polonia. Stato di assedio, dicembre 1981*, A/1 Pol.

²⁰⁷ The DGAP, Office VI sent the telegram for information to Italian Embassies and Representations, to the Consulate General in Berlin and to its Offices II, IV and VII.

FRANCE

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**14 December 1981, Telegram
from the French Ambassador in Warsaw, Jacques Dupuy,
to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Warsaw, 14 December 1981

After the military coup

1) 36 hours after the military coup, the population of Warsaw and, to our knowledge, the entire country, is in a state of shock, Solidarity is in disarray, its premises occupied, and a large number of activists have been imprisoned. The figure of 1,000 (one thousand) given by the authorities is likely to be very conservative. Military control in Warsaw is not particularly aggressive, but it is sufficiently intimidating to discourage any attempt at demonstration. A few gatherings outside the Mazowsze²⁰⁸ offices were dispersed without violence.

2) The primate of Poland delivered a homily that was eagerly awaited by the country's faithful. It was a condemnation of the coup and more specifically of the interruption of dialogue, the limitation of civil liberties and an intervention in favour of those arrested, but ultimately, it was a call for reason, in other words for submission in the name of 'the supreme good which is human life.' This text was repeated every hour on the radio.

3) Thus, the military's blitzkrieg now seems to have succeeded on almost all counts. It remains to be seen how resumption of work at the great worker' strongholds of the Ursus tractor factory on the outskirts of Warsaw and the Lenin shipyards, hotbeds of worker resistance, will go this morning.²⁰⁹

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve Diplomatic Archives Center,
FRMAE_1930INVA/5420, Europe, 1981–1985, Poland**

²⁰⁸ This is a reference to *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, a magazine issued by Solidarity.

²⁰⁹ The telegram was also distributed to French diplomatic posts in Berlin, Brussels, Budapest, London, New York, Prague, Sofia, Vienna, Belgrade, Bonn, Bucharest, Helsinki, Moscow, Peking, Rome, Vatican, Tirana, and Washington.

CANADA

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**14 December 1981, Memorandum
by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan,
for the Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau**

Ottawa, 14 December 1981

Confidential

The Situation in Poland

A state of martial law was declared in Poland as of midnight local time on December 12/13. A Military Council for National Salvation has been set up under Party First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski to oversee the operations of government and to enforce emergency measures. The latter include: the suspension of trade union activity, a ban on strikes and public gatherings other than religious ceremonies, the suspension of civil liberties, a 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew, military control of the media, the severing of telephone and telex links, and the closure of Poland's borders (although foreigners on approved business appear to be able to enter and leave the country). Dissidents, top union leaders and former party leaders have been arrested, and at least some Solidarity headquarters have apparently been occupied by police.

We do not yet have a clear picture of the country's reaction to the crackdown. Minor demonstrations and incidents have been reported, but the general situation in Warsaw appeared to be calm on December 13 and in the morning of December 14. Solidarity Chairman Lech Walesa has apparently not been detained, and is reported by Western media to be in consultation with the authorities. The arrest of many top Solidarity leaders may inhibit the union's reactions immediately, but as middle-level leaders come to the fore and as crisis contingency measures are implemented, we expect protest actions to be undertaken by the trade union movement, i.e. a flaunting of the martial law restrictions up to and including a general strike.

Relations between Solidarity and the Polish regime had deteriorated over the past two weeks and the emergency measures were preceded by a virulent propaganda war between the two sides, with the regime clearly on the offensive. The final impetus for Jaruzelski's actions was provided by the union's National Commission resolutions of December 12, appealing to the Sejm not to pass tough new trade union laws, calling for nation-wide demonstrations on December 17, and proposing a national referendum on the future form of a Polish government. Contingency plans for the emergency measures, however, must have been prepared well in advance. Governmental operations and political decision-making are now under the control of the military, which is being used as an instrument to prevent the further deterioration of the party's leading role. The party's authority had been effectively

emasculated in recent weeks, and Jaruzelski's moves have presumably been taken with a view to the eventual restoration of the party's role.

Jaruzelski has claimed that the emergency measures have been taken to allow Poland to continue its process of renewal under conditions of calm and an atmosphere of cooperation. Official spokesmen and Polish diplomats abroad have been at pains to explain that the present measures are considered extraordinary and temporary, that there will be no return to the discredited policies of Poland's former leaders, and that the crisis will be resolved by the Poles themselves through political means rather than by force.

Apart from the apparent use of water cannon by police to disperse crowds outside Solidarity's headquarters in Warsaw on December 13, we have no reports of serious violence or civil disorder. As the situation develops, however, and the population in general and union members in particular react to the events, the crisis may well deepen. Jaruzelski must hope that the Polish people will accept his rationale for the regime's actions. But if the new measures result in widespread chaos that Jaruzelski is unable to contain, the Polish authorities may have to request, or acquiesce to, a military intervention by the Soviet Union. We believe, however, that this would be a political decision of last resort that neither Moscow nor Warsaw wants to take.

With the imposition of martial law, Polish troops have been deployed in force in all major centres under well prepared contingency plans. In the event they are called on to quell public disorder, they could be expected, at the present time, to support the authorities; in the event of a more widespread breakdown of law and order, however, their continued loyalty to the regime is uncertain. There is no evidence that Soviet combat forces in Poland have deployed from garrisons. Similarly, there is no evidence that Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces around Poland are involved in any activity which would suggest that an intervention is imminent.

Canada is watching the evolving situation in Poland carefully and we are receiving reports from our embassy in Warsaw as well as from NATO capitals. The Secretary of State for External Affairs issued a press release in Dublin on December 13 in which he appealed to all concerned, both inside and outside Poland, to exercise restraint. He also expressed his confidence that all Canadians share the hope that the Polish people will be allowed to solve their problems peacefully. The general consensus among NATO foreign ministers is that the Alliance should take a relatively low public profile, and consequently today's meeting of the North Atlantic Council on Poland is being held at the level of Permanent Representatives.

Particular Canadian interests in Poland which will need to be examined in light of the new situation include our economic relations and refugee policy. The principal element of Canada's economic relations with Poland is a long-term grain agreement, expiring in December 1982, which provides for the sale of 1.0 to 1.5 million tonnes of grain annually and credit on favourable terms. Canada is thus a major food supplier to Poland, providing about 20% of its food import needs,

while Poland is Canada's fifth largest customer. As long as the situation in Poland is considered a purely internal affair, it would seem to be inappropriate for Canada to take economic measures that might be interpreted as constituting interference. Furthermore, although most Polish-Canadians do not support the present Polish government, it is likely that they will continue to press for food aid to Poland for humanitarian reasons.

With the imposition of martial law and the resulting closure of the Polish borders, Canadians of Polish origin will be concerned that relatives will no longer be permitted to visit or to emigrate and there will probably be pressures on the Government of Canada to take action on their behalf. If the Government of Poland remains sincere in its assertions that limitations on travel will be relaxed as soon as domestic order has been restored, the problem may be of short duration. If limitations on movement are maintained over a longer term, the Government of Canada will be obliged to express its dissatisfaction to the Polish Government and to make individual case-by-case representations on behalf of intending immigrants with relatives in Canada.

It is also probable that pressure will be placed on the Canadian government to increase the number of Polish exiles we will admit from first asylum countries such as Austria, Sweden and Germany. The 1982 refugee plan tabled by Mr. Axworthy in November increased the proposed intake of Eastern European self-exiles to 6,000 from the original 1981 level of 4,000. The majority of this flow will be comprised of Poles admitted from Austria. For the moment, the CEIC [Canada Employment and Immigration Commission] considers that it would be premature to discuss an increase in Polish exile intake from first asylum countries until the situation in Poland is clarified. If we are unable to maintain a reasonable immigrant movement from Poland itself, it may be necessary at that juncture to review and enlarge our programme in peripheral asylum countries.

In sum, we are awaiting the evolution of the present uncertain situation in Poland before recommending any fundamental changes in our relations with that country.

M.R.M. [Mark R. MacGuigan]

**Library and Archives Canada, Department of External Affairs fonds, Vol. 16026,
File 20-POLND-1-4, Pt. 14**

NATO

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**14 December 1981, Summary Record
of a Restricted Meeting of the Council
(excerpts)**

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

PR(81)78²¹⁰

To: Secretary General

Cc: Deputy Secretary General

ASG, Political Affairs²¹¹From: Acting Executive Secretary²¹²

Summary Record of a Restricted Meeting of the Council
held on Monday, 14th December 1981 at 4pm²¹³
DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND

Signed by A. Synadinos.

Attendance: Restricted. [...] ²¹⁴

Agenda: No.

Meeting place: Room 1²¹⁵

1. The CHAIRMAN, before turning to the subject under discussion, stated that it was with the greatest regret that he informed the Council of the death of Mr. Michael Jordan, Deputy Executive Secretary, after a long and painful illness.

²¹⁰ The document series Private Records (PR) are summary records of private meetings of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Permanent Representatives. These meetings, which are also referred to as restricted sessions of the Council, were recorded as informal notes taken by the Executive Secretary for principal use by the Private Office of the Secretary General. Documents in the PR series were not translated; all conversations were recorded in the language delivered. The series is arranged chronologically per year and successive numbers.

²¹¹ The Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs from 1978–1981 was Hans Christian Lankes.

²¹² The memo was signed by Augustinos Synadinos, who was the acting Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary is Secretary of the North Atlantic Council, and also Secretary of the Defence Planning Committee. As such, he has the responsibility of preparing the work of the two Councils and recording the proceeding and the decision taken.

²¹³ The text of the summary report was distributed on 22 December 1981.

²¹⁴ Excerpts marked with [...] are not declassified.

²¹⁵ Historically, all meetings of the North Atlantic Council are held in Room 1 conference chamber, with member nations sitting around a table.

Mr. Jordan had been an able, sympathetic and discreet member of the International Staff whose great devotion to the Alliance had not gone unrecognised.

2. This special meeting of the Council had been called in the wake of the recent developments in Poland and after due consultation with Permanent Representatives and the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Haig, who himself had been in touch with Foreign Ministers Genscher, Cheysson and Carrington, amongst others. He wished first of all to extend a warm welcome to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Mr. Eagleburger, as well as to other senior officials of the countries of the Alliance. In the light of the latest news of many strikes in Poland, and of factories being occupied, he wondered whether the Chairman of the Military Committee had any additional information.

3. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE stated that his report would be a negative one. Intelligence sources had revealed no sign of any military activities by either Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces in Poland. Equally, he had nothing significant to report with regard to the Polish armed forces. Implementation of martial law measures continued, but no cases of unreliability amongst the Polish armed forces had been reported. Moreover, no official reports of strike activity or widespread disobedience had been received. In conclusion, he stated that the introduction of martial law had led to a dangerous and confused situation from a military point of view and one which could erupt at any time.

4. The CHAIRMAN referred Permanent Representatives to the most recent Reuters report on the situation in Poland.

5. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE noted that no changes in the movements of Soviet forces or their state of readiness had been identified. He wondered whether the Chairman of the Military Committee could comment on the present state of readiness of Soviet troops in the western military districts, as well as in the GDR and, particularly, on how this affected their ability to intervene at short notice.

6. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE stated that it had not been his intention to imply anything other than that there had been no apparent change in the Soviet level of readiness. The Soviet forces had finished the normal troop rotation prior to the winter training cycle. He had already given a report to the Council on the post-rotation activities and the good state of operational effectiveness of Soviet forces. There had been no change in their communications, command and control (C3) capabilities since that report. Whether the Soviets would intervene in Poland remained a question of intention since they certainly possessed the capability to do so.

7. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE wondered whether any further measure of alertness would normally be expected if the situation arose where the Poles called for assistance from the Soviets.

8. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE replied that, in such an event, he would expect to see some notice either through communications or by watching troop movements. Up to 30 divisions would be needed for a major intervention. Any reaction from the Poles would normally be visible. He would estimate some 72 hours notice if the Poles did call for assistance from the Soviet Union. Of course, the Soviet divisions presently in Poland would be able to react much quicker than those stationed outside.

9. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE stated that Secretary of State Haig had originally been scheduled to leave Brussels the previous morning for South Asia, Pakistan and India but, in view of the recent developments in Poland, had decided to remain in Brussels. Press statements by Secretary Haig and the United States Delegation issued earlier in the day had been circulated to Permanent Representatives. Secretary Haig had since left for Washington at noon in view of the uncertainties over Poland but had asked that his regards be extended to the Council. During his stay in Brussels Secretary Haig had talked with a number of Foreign Ministers of the countries represented in the Council. The United States Representative added that he had also circulated a Polish situation report, drawn up on the basis of Press and intelligence reports by his delegation, which contained the most pertinent facts about the latest developments.

10. On the morning of 13th December, the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw was summoned to a meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Weijacz,²¹⁶ who had underscored that there would be no return to the situation which existed before August 1980 and that the reform process would continue.

11. Also on 13th December, Under Secretary Stoessel called in Soviet Deputy Chief of Mission Bessmertnykh in Washington. He emphasised that the United States was deeply concerned about developments in Poland and had urged that all parties exercise the maximum degree of restraint, prudence and caution in their approach to the Polish situation. Bessmertnykh had replied that the Polish events were a domestic matter and not the subject for any diplomatic activities between the United States and the USSR. However, TASS had in the interim issued an official Soviet statement approving the actions of the Polish regime. It was worth noting that this statement had been made within an hour of the declaration of martial law.

12. No reports had yet been received of clashes between demonstrators and police/army units. No violence seemed to have occurred, save for the use of water cannons by Polish militia against demonstrators at Solidarity Headquarters in Warsaw. Despite indications that the 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew would be 'inflexibly' enforced, the Embassy had observed some pedestrians and a surprisingly large number of private cars on the streets during the night. During the period of the

²¹⁶ Józef Wiejacz.

curfew, government forces did reoccupy the Headquarters of the Warsaw Solidarity Chapter. The streets of Warsaw were reported calm this morning.

13. However, the situation in Krakow appeared to be less quiet than that in Warsaw. The steel workers had begun an occupation strike at the Nowa Huta Works involving some 10,000 people. The Students Association at the Krakow University had demanded that martial law be lifted and called for an 'absentee strike' of classes.

14. Western Press reports indicated that the authorities were attempting to persuade Lech Walesa to appear on Polish television, presumably to discourage workers from carrying out a general strike. Although he was in consultation with the government, the exact position of Lech Walesa was not clear.

15. While the action of the Polish government could be seen as a pre-emptive move on their part, it was the judgement of the United States Embassy in Warsaw that this must have been done with the full knowledge of the Soviet Union, in view of the rapidity of their official statement. If the measures proved successful, the transition to martial law could be accepted without bloodshed. However, while there might be some element of success in the short term, the basic pressures would still persist over the long term. The West could but hope that the process of gradual reform would continue. It was most important that the Polish government would continue to implement its policies and, in this respect, the United States would be guided by the reassurances of the Polish authorities that they would pursue the process of reform. In recognition of these reassurances the United States was prepared to consider ways of assisting the Polish authorities, for instance through re-scheduling the Polish debt. The United States Government would adopt a low profile on Poland, while at the same time leaving the Polish authorities in no doubt that they viewed the recent developments as extremely serious. In this context, he believed that other national expressions on the Polish situation should be co-ordinated within the framework of consultation of the Alliance on a continuing basis.

16. In conclusion, he stated that, should bloodshed occur within the next 48 hours, the whole matter would be thrown once more into question. Depending on the level of violence experienced, the United States would not hesitate to seek a meeting of Foreign Ministers. While the United States did not wish to discourage the forces of freedom active in Poland, on the other hand they did not wish to incite them to take any action which could lead to bloodshed.

17. Mr. EAGLEBURGER stated that before Secretary Haig left Brussels, he had talked with him on the following three subjects: the Madrid meeting, the INF negotiations in Geneva and the impact, if any, of the events in Poland. He wished to share Secretary Haig's views with the Council.

18. The United States had a number of concerns about the Neutral and Non-Aligned proposal introduced by Austria in Madrid and more specifically on the ambiguity surrounding the formulation for a Conference for Disarmament in

Europe and, secondly, on the Human Rights issue. While this proposal did not meet all the desiderata of the United States, nevertheless in view of the situation in Poland, it was considered not appropriate or wise at the present time to conclude the Madrid meeting with a substantive agreement this week. The United States would not make this statement public. They believed that delegations should return to Madrid after a short Christmas recess as planned. However, it should be made clear in Madrid that any Soviet intervention in Poland would undermine the entire basis of the CSCE talks.

19. If there was not a significant level of violence and the Soviet Union did not intervene in Poland, the United States would proceed with the INF negotiations in Geneva due to recess on 17th December. Ambassador Nitze would stress in private that the conduct of the Soviet Union during the Polish crisis would affect the future of these negotiations. Ambassador Nitze would be addressing the Council on his return to the United States later this week. He added that the United States would, as it had done so in the past, make it clear in public that Soviet conduct vis-a-vis Poland would impact on these negotiations.

20. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that the latest information he had received squared with what had been said by the United States Representative and by the Chairman of the Military Committee. The situation was still quite uncertain; the decisive element would be the reaction of workers at the factories. So far, there had been scattered evidence of an occupation of a few enterprises near Warsaw, but not enough to allow any serious judgement on the public reaction to the introduction of the martial law.

21. The Soviet reaction had been restrained so far. Moscow had insisted on the fact that this was an internal Polish problem and that the situation was followed with the greatest interest.

22. As for the military situation, although certain alert measures had been taken within the Polish forces and an increased state of alert had been reported for the Soviet forces, on the whole there had been so far no abnormal activities in the districts around Poland. The Danish Authorities had decided to increase the surveillance activities over the Baltic.

23. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his government was following the developments in Poland with the greatest attention and concern. At this juncture, he saw no alternative than to observe restraint in public reactions and to maintain the line of non-interference in Polish affairs, which had been followed over the last months.

24. The Ambassador of the Federal Republic in Warsaw had had an interview with Mr. Czyrek, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had stressed that his government would do as much as possible in order to keep the crisis under control without outside interference and that it was its firm intention not to return to the methods in force before August 1980 and to proceed with social reforms,

even if they had to be temporarily suspended. He asked that Western governments show understanding for the Polish leaders, whose decisions had been inspired by the necessity to stop the country sliding into chaos and to prevent civil war. Nevertheless, the constitutional organs had not been abolished and the trade unions had only been temporarily suspended. Negotiations with Walesa continued. In the circumstances, Poland sincerely wished to maintain its co-operation with the West.

25. The German Representative went on to say that his government wondered whether this attitude would hold against events. Walesa would not probably feel free to negotiate and much would depend on how long the state of emergency would have to remain in force. As for the Soviet Union's attitude, it had probably been influenced by the critical evolution of the situation. On 11th December, TASS had accused Solidarity of counter-revolutionary action. It was more than likely that the measures taken by the Polish government had been co-ordinated with Moscow.

26. In conclusion, he stressed the need for continuing the consultations within the Alliance, but without over-dramatising the situation. Since the present meeting of the Council had been made public, he suggested that the NATO spokesman should make a statement along the following lines:

(1) The Allies are following the situation with careful attention and great concern.

(2) They are and shall remain in closest consultations among themselves.

(3) They believe that Poland's problems should be resolved by compromise and consensus among the various national groupings in Poland.

(4) The Allies shall observe a policy of strict non-intervention and they expect all signatories of the Helsinki Final Act to do the same.'

27. The CHAIRMAN stated that there had been close consultation between himself, Permanent Representatives and Secretary Haig. However, he had received several telephone calls from the Press looking for a statement. While he fully agreed with the German Representative not to over-dramatise the situation, he nevertheless felt that everyone expected NATO to do something. This was the rationale behind calling this special meeting of the Council. As it was unavoidable to have a certain amount of publicity, he drew the attention of the Council to the draft Press statement which had been circulated and on which he would base his oral comments to the Press. He believed that the points referred to in the German draft were adequately reflected therein.

28. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that his Government was not alone in being seriously concerned and, to some extent, also surprised over the most recent events in Poland. While it was true in the light of developments over the last weeks and days there was every reason to expect a new show down between the Polish authorities and Solidarity, particularly against the background of a new threat of a general strike on 17th December, it was equally true that Moscow's public criticism of events in Poland had again strongly increased over the last week, accusing inter alia, Solidarity of putting on the agenda the question of over-throwing

both the executive and legislative arms of Poland's government. Reference had also been made to 'demagogical demands being made for Poland's withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty and the COMECON' as well as to irridentist claims for a revision of the Polish/Soviet border. In spite of this, the far reaching and draconian character of the measures taken by the Polish authorities had not been expected.

29. cIn a statement issued the previous day, the Norwegian Government had expressed its deep regret over the declaration of martial law in Poland and the fact that the country was now under the control of a military council. It had also noted with concern that a number of arrests had been made. Further, his Government had stressed that the Polish people should be left to solve its problems without any outside interference, in accordance with the wish of the Polish people for continued democratization.

30. While he agreed that the rationale and motives behind General Jaruzelski's decision were a matter for speculation, it was tempting to believe that this action had been taken in anticipation of a new show-down with Solidarity this week. Moreover, in the light of the new strong language from Moscow, General Jaruzelski might have felt that the patience of the Soviet leaders was now starting to wear thin and that Poland was in fact, to use his own words, at the 'edge of the abyss.' According to the Norwegian Embassy in Moscow, the Central Committee had reportedly sent a new message to the Polish leadership, although this was as yet unconfirmed.

31. Another factor in the situation was that the constant confrontation with Solidarity had weakened the Polish Communist Party to the point where it was starting to lose relevance as a social force in Polish society. Its membership had been reduced by some 400,000 since July 1980. Jaruzelski and his colleagues in the Politburo might have felt this was the last chance to restore the authority of the Party particularly since the Polish authorities' efforts to create a national front had not gained any broad support, neither from the Church nor from Solidarity.

32. It was the Norwegian view that the Polish authorities had probably already prepared detailed contingency plans for a state of emergency. However, the efficiency and swiftness of the whole operation did not necessarily indicate that a decision to introduce the state of emergency had been taken some time before. The decision might well have been taken fairly recently, perhaps in the light of new strong indications of Soviet disapproval and concern.

33. The evolution of the crisis would probably first and foremost depend on the severity of the implementation and the duration of the state of emergency, as well as on the reaction of the Polish people to the measures. In spite of some reports of strikes and occupation of factories, the Poles seemed to pay more attention to the appeal from Archbishop Glemp not to resort to violence against what he called 'an infringement of civil and human rights' than to the appeal for a general strike from a group of Solidarity leaders.

34. A second decisive factor would be the reaction of the Soviet Union to any further developments. For the time being, the Soviet Union did not seem to have any increased incentive to intervene militarily. The clamp-down on Solidarity by the Polish authorities was probably exactly what the Soviet Union would have wanted. Furthermore, Jaruzelski had once more stressed that Poland was and would remain a firm link of the Warsaw Pact and an unfailing member of the Socialist community. On the other hand, should Jaruzelski lose control of the situation, as a result of resistance on the part of the Polish people, these assumptions might soon lose any validity.

35. General Jaruzelski had stressed that there was no question of going back to the situation prevailing before the establishment of Solidarity. The reform process would continue. In this context, the arrests of Gierek and Jaroszewicz might well serve to underline this point. On the other hand, it was difficult to see how the Polish authorities could go back to the situation before the last crisis started to develop. Indeed, Jaruzelski had made no reference in his speech to the future role of Solidarity.

36. However, the fact that Lech Walesa had not himself been arrested and was apparently continuing talks with the Polish authorities seemed to be the only glimmer of hope that the dialogue for a broad political solution might be resumed. The possibility however, could not be excluded that Lech Walesa might, as a result of his reaction to the latest events, have undermined his credibility and support among the rank and file of Solidarity to some extent.

37. Having made these points, he stressed that Norway also agreed that it would be wise to continue to adopt a relatively low profile with regard to Poland until it was clear how the situation would develop. Equally, Norway believed that the most recent events in Poland should not influence the negotiations in Madrid or other on-going negotiations on arms control and disarmament. However, should bloodshed occur, and in particular a Soviet military intervention take place, the situation then facing the Alliance would be entirely different.

38. The CHAIRMAN wished to stress that the reason Lech Walesa had not been arrested was presumably to prove that he was still in constant touch with the government. From a Soviet point of view the reaction in the West must be viewed as unpleasant. For instance, the Netherlands Socialist Party had held a demonstration in The Hague, and the Italian and Netherlands Communist Parties had condemned the Polish government. While the French Communist Party had been somewhat subdued, demonstrations had nevertheless been organized. Should the situation deteriorate further there could be a reaction from the working populations in the countries of the Alliance.

39. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE²¹⁷ said that the French Ambassador in Warsaw had also met with Mr Czyrek, who had said more or less the same thing to him as he had to the Ambassador of the Federal Republic. One interesting element in his explanation of the decisions taken was the announcement of an amnesty for all political crimes committed before 13 December, provided that the beneficiaries made a written commitment to change their attitude. He had also confirmed that Walesa was in Warsaw and was having talks with the Minister in charge of relations with Trade Unions. He had given the assurance that General Jaruzelski's aim was not to return to the previous situation, but to create the conditions necessary for continued social progress, in accordance with the conclusions of the 9th Congress.

40. According to information from the French Embassy in Warsaw, the number of arrests exceeded the 1,000 announced. The military surveillance, although not particularly aggressive, was intimidating enough to discourage demonstrations. For the most part, it had not been possible to obtain any proof of widespread strikes, apart from in Krakow. However, the call for a general strike could provoke larger-scale reactions in the coming days.

41. In his opinion, the attitude of the Polish Church was an important factor in the situation. He recalled that the Primate of Poland's sermon had strongly condemned the takeover but had also appealed to reason, in order to preserve the supreme good that is human life. His words echoed those of John Paul II, who had prayed that blood would not be spilled in Poland. He noted that the Church's attitude was similar to the moderation shown by Western governments. Moderation did not mean that reactions had to be timid. This was not the case in France, and he recalled that demonstrations had taken place in Paris with the participation of all the Trade Unions, except for the CGT and the Communist Party, whose equivocal stance could become problematic.

42. As for the approach that the Council should adopt, he took a very similar stance to that of the German Representative. He accepted the four points proposed by the latter as a basis for the statement that the Secretary General could have to make to the Press. He thought that the possibility of a statement by the Council itself should be reserved for a more serious situation.

43. Regarding the Madrid Conference, he had noted Mr Eagleburger's suggestion with interest, but asked for a period of positive reflection on the Neutral and Non-Aligned proposal that had arisen in discussions during the Ministerial Meeting.²¹⁸ In his opinion, there was no chance of Madrid reaching a definitive or satisfactory conclusion before Christmas. He did not think that it was in the West's interests to

²¹⁷ Paragraphs 39 to 43 have been translated from French for the present publication.

²¹⁸ The North Atlantic Council meets twice a year at both Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers level. The document refers here to the North Atlantic Council meeting at Ministerial level of 10 and 11 December. On this occasion, the Protocol of Accession of Spain to NATO was signed.

interrupt the review of this proposal at a time when the Soviets could perhaps be interested in reaching a conclusion and coming across as more conciliatory.

44. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that the Canadian Chargé d’Affaires in Warsaw had received from the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister the same explanations as given to other Allied diplomats. The latter had underlined that this was the last chance for Poland and had asked for understanding on the part of Western governments. He had pointed out that after the meeting of Solidarity at Radom, which had revealed the political ambitions of its leaders, General Jaruzelski had no other choice.

45. As for the Soviet Union, he felt that its tolerance might have been brought to an end on three points:

- the possibility of a break down of law and order on 17th December;
- the failure to secure Parliament’s approval for the condemnation of strikes;
- the call for a democratic government in Poland, as well as the reference to military relations with the Soviet Union and to the possibility for Poland to leave the Warsaw Pact which could be found in various statements by Solidarity’s leaders.

In his view, Jaruzelski’s warning that this might be the last chance for the Poles to resolve their problems by their own means should be taken seriously. The fact that Walesa had not been arrested suggested that Jaruzelski might hope to resume the dialogue with more moderate Unions. The role of the Church was also of great importance.

46. As for the Alliance’s position he felt that while following the situation with concern and calm, its members should exercise restraint in their reactions. It was his government’s hope that the Poles would be able to solve their problems peacefully. However, it was too early to take position on an action which it might not be possible to follow. His authorities were in favour of maintaining a low profile and had sent instructions to Madrid for a ‘business as usual’ attitude, in consultation with other Allied delegations. They had not yet convened a ‘Task Force’ in Ottawa on Poland. They were in favour of close consultation in the Council, if only to co-ordinate the assessments of public statements.

47. As for the Press guidance to the Secretary General, he could approve the four points proposed by the German Representative.

48. Finally, he suggested that the Senior Political Committee²¹⁹ might have a look at the ‘grey scenario’ put forward in a United States document in February.

49. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE stated that he could agree with many of the comments made by his colleagues in their interventions.

²¹⁹ The Political Committee supports the North Atlantic Council as an advisory body on political matters. It is chaired by the Assistant Secretary General of the Political Affairs and composed of Deputy Permanent Representatives and political counsellors of delegations who meet several times a week. The Committee prepares studies and analysis on political matters and supports the implementation of Council decisions.

The problems facing the Alliance were further aggravated in this respect because of the lack of information from Poland. Western Governments could only rely on Press reports and these concerned principally events in Warsaw and little of what was going on in the rest of the country. According to a Reuters report Lech Walesa was staying in a 'government guest house' whatever that might mean.

50. As far as the situation in Warsaw was concerned, he stated that, according to some reports from the United Kingdom Embassy in Warsaw that morning, their impression was that the city was rather quiet. The Chargé d'Affaires had stated that, although the ruling military council had assumed sweeping powers, they were not implementing them fully. For instance, no car checks were being carried out and, while the riot police were watching the crowds, they were not implementing the rules with respect to unauthorised gatherings. He confirmed that there had been no major incident the previous night and the police had adopted a lower profile today. Buses and trams were working as usual. The conclusion reached was that while the measures themselves were very serious, they had been applied with a relatively light hand. Everything would depend on the reaction of the Polish people and this was something which could not be predicted with any certainty. It was therefore difficult to speculate on how events would proceed. He agreed with his German colleague that the Alliance should keep a close watch on the situation, but added that to sit back and not do anything which might be taken as provocative or unnecessarily interfering might prejudice what was or was not happening in Warsaw. He therefore stressed the need for the Council to meet on a fairly frequent basis to keep the situation under constant review.

51. He went on to state that the United Kingdom Chargé d'Affaires had been summoned the previous day by the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister who had given him a similar message on the Polish government's position. It had been explained that under the Polish constitution there was no provision for a state of emergency but only for a state of war and a state of 'war-likeness.' He felt that a clear distinction over these two terms should be made, to avoid any confusion, particularly since the Press had already referred to a state of war in Poland.

52. Western Governments could only speculate on the reasons why such action had been taken at the present time. He assumed that this had been done primarily because of the growing frustration over the behaviour and activities of Solidarity. It was impossible to say if the initial impulse had come from Moscow or Warsaw. It was the considered opinion of the United Kingdom Government that it was more likely that this had come as a pre-emptive move by the Poles themselves to stem the tide of reform. This conclusion was reinforced by the assurances of the Polish Ministers about the continuation of renewal and the gains of Solidarity over the last 17 months. These reassurances had an important effect on the West's attitude.

53. He fully agreed with the German and the French statements on the general aims of Allied action in this respect. The Allies should do everything possible

to keep the crisis contained and encourage Poland to solve its own problems without outside interference.

54. As far as any statement to the Press was concerned, he endorsed the four points outlined by the German Representative in his proposal. He found the second paragraph of the Chairman's draft text somewhat provocative.

55. During his intervention, the United States Representative had stated that, although the situation in Poland was relatively under control, should violence break out, the United States would not hesitate to call a meeting at Foreign Minister level. He felt sure that if the Polish government decided to take repressive action, the suggestion to hold a Foreign Ministers' meeting would be forthcoming. However, he felt the Alliance should be very careful in deciding at what point such a meeting should be convened. This was an internal problem for Poland and, as such, was a grey area scenario for the Alliance as to when the actions by the Poles themselves to preserve law and order would lead to a situation so intolerable that the West would have to show its dislike. The problem here was that, to call such a meeting too early, could be seen by the Soviets as a provocative move on the part of the West and could risk giving them a pretext to intervene in Poland. To call a meeting at Foreign Minister level was a major political step: to convene such a meeting before Soviet intervention would reduce its effect if the Soviets did later intervene.

56. Finally, referring to the grey area scenario paper prepared by the United States, which had been discussed earlier in the year, he expressed some doubts as to the definition of grey area. While he agreed that this paper could be usefully discussed within the SPC, he would prefer a first round of discussion to be held in the Council, so as to be completely sure on what points the SPC should consider.

57. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE wished to reassure his United Kingdom colleague that a decision to hold a Foreign Ministers' meeting would depend entirely on the nature and level of violence and circumstances in Poland. He recalled that, during his original intervention, he had called for a low profile approach by the West. Nevertheless, the United States viewed the situation in Poland as an extremely serious crisis.

58. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE²²⁰ said that on Sunday afternoon Mr Colombo had had an interview with John Paul II, who had refrained from passing judgement. He noted that Monsignor Glemp's appeal for reason had been broadcast on Polish state radio every hour, which was a sign of how important the authorities considered him.

59. His government's position was based on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. However, Mr Colombo had summoned the Polish Ambassador in Rome to inform him of his concerns about an event that would surely have consequences for relations between European countries.

²²⁰ Paragraphs 58 to 65 have been translated from French for the present publication.

He recalled that public opinion in Italy had reacted very strongly and that the Communist Party had roundly condemned the takeover.

60. As for the Alliance's response, he thought that the scenario proposed by the United States should be reviewed. He quoted the following passage in particular: 'as long as the situation promised hope of continuation of political reforms and a start towards economic recovery or, in the case of a temporary or partial pull back from the reforms, some hope of reversibility, we should be careful to avoid action which would limit our influence on the Polish government.' He shared the general sentiment emerging from the discussion, which was 'wait and see.' In the meantime, consultations should continue at Council level.

61. The REPRESENTATIVE of LUXEMBOURG noted that the contrast between the optimism displayed at the Ministerial Meeting and the current reality showed how risky it was to make predictions about Poland and what a difficult task the intelligence services had. He acknowledged that Solidarity had doubtless gone a little too far and that, for example, the idea of a referendum on the legitimacy of the authorities in place would be unacceptable in Western democratic regimes. For this reason, he thought it best to be prudent for the moment, while waiting to have a better understanding of the elements of this internal crisis in Poland. Any statement that would endanger the possibility of a recovery was to be avoided. This notwithstanding, his government wanted discreet pressure to be applied to the Polish leaders, while avoiding any risk of an accusation of intervention from the Soviets. Regarding Western public opinion, it was, in his opinion, an opportunity to underscore that communist regimes were incapable of democratising.

62. As for the negotiations in progress, they had to continue. He suggested that a prudent statement on human rights be made in Madrid.

63. There remained the issue of aid to Poland. He thought that aid organised by private institutions should continue, but he had doubts about whether it was appropriate to maintain aid from Western governments. If the situation was not normalised, it would be up to the Soviet Union to come to Poland's aid.

64. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled his country's links with Poland; Belgium had welcomed many Polish refugees and many Belgians had Polish origins. This explained the concern of his government and of public opinion. Mr Nothomb had summoned the Polish Ambassador in Brussels to share his concerns. His government thought that everything should be done to help the Poles resolve the crisis themselves. A cautious attitude from governments should not prevent spontaneous demonstrations of public opinion in Allied countries being echoed in the Secretary General's statement to the Press. That said, he agreed with the text proposed.

65. He had also noted with great interest the Polish government's amnesty for political crimes committed over the last 18 months. The Church's role seemed of utmost importance to him. As for aid to Poland, his government had thought it

best, owing to the uncertainty of the situation, to put a halt to the transport of parcels collected by the Pax Catholica organisation.

66. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE stated that he welcomed this special meeting of the Council and the fact that it had been convened today rather than the previous day. His Government fully shared the view expressed by previous speakers that the Alliance should adopt a low profile with regard to Poland.

67. The Danish Ambassador in Warsaw had been told that the new measures in no way signalled a change of government attitude and had been given reassurances that the Polish authorities did not intend to revert to the old pattern. Indeed it was difficult to see how they could do so in view of all the changes that had taken place. He felt it was rather significant that General Jaruzelski had announced the detention of extremist and former party leaders, including Gierek. This move could possibly be taken as a signal of the Polish government's intentions.

68. On the question of a statement to the Press, he stated that the four German points could serve as useful guidance for the Press spokesman. However, he felt that this meeting should not in any way be referred to as 'special.'

69. He agreed with the Norwegian Representative about the difficulty over the role cast for Solidarity in future. This was a grey area and one which would take a long time to clarify.

70. He fully supported the view expressed by the United States that the impulse for the Polish government's action had been co-ordinated with the Soviet Union, even though there was no firm indication of this fact. He also shared the view that Jaruzelski had seen this-move as the only means of keeping control of the situation firmly in Polish hands. He did not believe that these two statements were contradictory, but rather complementary.

71. Finally, he felt that more deliberation was required on the way to proceed in Madrid, since all nations agreed that the Polish situation should not be over-dramatised. He felt that the best course of action would be to continue as scheduled in Madrid and, in this connection, he agreed with his French colleague that it was difficult to see any agreement being reached quickly in Madrid.

72. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE stated that his Foreign Minister had, yesterday, voiced the great concern of his Government over the events in Poland and especially the arrest of union leaders and the blocking of activities of Solidarity. Any chance for dialogue had thus diminished. If human rights were violated, the Alliance could only conclude that this was against the spirit of the Final Act of Helsinki.

73. As to a Press statement, he agreed that the Council should follow the guidance proposed by Germany in their proposal.

74. Finally, he wished to inform the Council and, in particular, his Belgian colleague, that 133 trucks from the Netherlands were moving towards Poland carrying food parcels. The Netherlands Government had received the assurances

of the Polish authorities that these would be allowed to enter the country and to reach their destinations which were mostly church organizations.

75. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE in reply to his Italian colleague's statement, underlined the need for all nations to exercise restraint in Press guidance.

76. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he had noted with satisfaction all the statements made concerning the role the Council and the Alliance should play at this juncture. He fully agreed that this should be kept low key and was a matter for internal review. The concern of the public and of governments was deep rooted and would require constant attention by the Alliance.

77. He had the following additional remarks to make to his previous statement. The German Foreign Minister had asked the Polish Chargé d'Affaires to call on him. During these discussions, he had underlined the West's view that all governments should encourage the Polish government not to part from its present course of reform and that the West would continue to pursue this line so long as there was no deterioration in the situation, no bloodshed and no Soviet intervention. He added that Germany supported continued multilateral approaches, for instance in Madrid. Germany looked to a rapid but business-like conclusion of the Madrid Conference on the basis of the Neutral and Non-Aligned proposal. He had noted with interest the information provided by the United States on what Ambassador Nitze intended to say to the Soviet delegation in Geneva.

78. The CHAIRMAN, in closing the meeting, welcomed the fact that the publics, governments and working populations of the countries of the Alliance had reacted so strongly to the introduction of martial law in Poland. He had found this a frank and friendly exchange of views and had noted Permanent Representatives' wishes to adopt a low profile in conversations with the Press.

NATO Archives, PR (81)78

FRANCE

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**14 December 1981, Telegram
from the French Ambassador in Washington,
François Lefebvre de Laboulaye,
describing the attitude adopted by the American authorities
after the establishment of Martial Law**

Washington, 14 December 1981

Shock and anxious expectation on the one hand, uncertainty and hope on the other—such is the general tone of the initial reaction in the United States to the introduction of martial law in Poland.

1) For the past two days, the administration has been observing extreme caution.

It is closely following developments and making that known (a reinforced team is working around the clock at the State Department under the direction of Mr Scanlan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the USSR and Eastern Europe). It expresses its ‘concern’ and warns Moscow against any intervention (statements by Mr Reagan in Washington, and Mr Haig in Brussels). However, in doing so, it also suggests that—pending further information—it does not consider the coup by general Jaruzelski to be sponsored by the Soviets and appears, in substance, to give the leader of the Polish government the benefit of the doubt. At the same time, members of the government and congress have been successfully advised to exercise discretion and moderation.

2) With a few exceptions, the same restraint can be seen in the reaction of public opinion and the press.

Although associations representing Polish Americans (ten million people) immediately called for demonstrations, statements by their leaders remain on the whole cautious. And while all commentators emphasise the extreme seriousness of the situation, the vast majority seem willing to give General Jaruzelski credit for his willingness to avoid the worst, or even ultimately respect the gain (‘the last chance,’ according to *The Washington Post*). The only notable exception to date is *The New York Times*, which sees the imposition of martial law as an indirect intervention by Moscow, leaving the Polish people to choose between ‘bloody resistance and a demoralising peace.’

3) A similar opinion was expressed yesterday by Mr Kissinger on ABC television.

Stating that the Polish government’s action represented a disguised intervention by Moscow and, if unsuccessful, would leave the way open for a Soviet invasion, the former Secretary of State called for a vigorous Western response, both in terms of

INF negotiations (which should be postponed ‘until the situation is clarified’) and trade policy towards the USSR.²²¹

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve Diplomatic Archives Centre,
FRMAE_1930INVA/5425, Europe, 1981–1985, Poland**

²²¹ The telegram was also distributed to French diplomatic posts in Brussels, Bonn, Moscow, London and Warsaw.

CANADA

78

**14 December 1981, Report
by the Chairman of the Policy Planning Secretariat
of the Canadian Department of External Affairs, Peter Hancock,
for the Canadian Deputy Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs, James H. Taylor**

Ottawa, 14 December 1981

Confidential

Polish Situation

The Canadian response to events in Poland should be grounded in a policy framework which recognizes:

- that the situation in Poland is fluid and that there is a continuum of possible developments short of the full-scale Soviet intervention to which Alliance planning has been geared.

- that Canadian policy must be sufficiently flexible to respond to events as they unfold.

- that there are distinctly Canadian interests in Poland which must be fully identified if Canada is to respond properly to events.

- that, although immediate action may be necessary to protect certain Canadian interests, care should be exercised not to foreclose our range of options over the medium term.

I—EVENTS

Management of Canada's response will require an ongoing assessment of these probabilities:

- Military government and martial law represent more than just Poles attempting to resolve Polish problems; they will be seen by the Soviet Union and other WPO states as a test of Polish will/capability, with an ascending scale of measures to follow if the Poles fail.

- Moscow is well aware that military intervention from the USSR will trigger massive political and economic retaliation by the West and entail losses elsewhere; therefore, they will aim to contain and control events in Poland by all means short of military intervention.

- This could include Soviet or other WPO advisors in key Polish ministries and media in increasing numbers; WPO exercises, virtual quarantine of Poland including a blockade of the Baltic coast; a large-scale COMECON effort to support the Polish economy for several months; forms of 'political receivership' or a WPO directorate to run Poland in place of the Poles.

II INTERESTS

Canada has a framework of interests in the Polish question, which should determine how our policy evolves:

- Bilateral interests, which need a detailed inventory, include: our citizens, wheat sales and credits, emigrants and visitors to Canada, commercial contracts and credits, human rights, views of the Polish émigré community in Canada, security and functioning of our embassy.

- Alliance interests include consultations and crisis management in NATO, with avoidance of having to choose between USA and European attitudes where they may differ. Development of a coherent and credible Alliance solidarity in face of events short of Soviet military intervention, as they progress.

- Multilateral interests include possible impact of further deterioration short of Soviet conquest on CSCE, in UN system (including rights and refugees), at the IMF, and within wheat trade-food aid community.

III TENTATIVE PROPOSITIONS

- That we give visible emphasis to our national and bilateral interests which make us a significant actor in the Polish issue.

- That a European/humanitarian approach should govern our behaviour, not a USA/confrontational posture, if these divergences should appear in the Alliance or in multilateral agencies.

- That, if events require disincentives to the WPO, we be prepared to take punitive steps against the USSR, GDR, and Czechoslovakia before we take them against Poland itself.

- That the SSEA and this Department continue to assert their leading role in formulating Canadian recommendations to Ministers, in consulting with the various domestic constituencies, and in advising other government departments.

- That we be prepared to change our policy and its instruments in line with events, and that we reallocate resources as required.

IV POLICY ISSUES

- Food—Canada is a major supplier of food to Poland. Grain sales and food aid are thus policy instruments. Continuation of food shipments under present circumstances is a policy decision. Whether and under what circumstances those shipments should be stopped is perhaps our most important bilateral policy question. POL²²² believes that food should be a weapon of last resort, but be used in the short-term as justifying a distinctively Canadian stake in the total Polish situation and supporting our other bilateral interests.

- Human Rights—There is already pressure from the Canadian Polish community for the Government to pay more attention to the human rights dimension of the present Polish crisis. Representations on emigrants and visitors may in the light

²²² This is a reference to the Policy Planning Secretariat.

of events have to give way to expressions of concern over those Poles arrested. Nevertheless, we should do our utmost not to jeopardize our locus standi for Canadian-sponsored departures from Poland.

– Relations with the Polish Government—Until Saturday, Canada's attitude had been that of cautious and deliberate cooperation with the Polish Government as it tried to cope with the sudden social and political evolution of Poland. The government has now changed. Careful consideration must be given to whether, and when, our attitude to that government should change to a more overtly critical one, with the probable detriment to our interests which that will entail.

P.J.A. Hancock, Chairman of the Policy Planning Secretariat

**Library and Archives Canada, Department of External Affairs fonds, Vol. 16026,
File 20-POLND-1-4, Pt. 14**

IRELAND

79

**15 December 1981, Coded Telex
from the Irish Ambassador in Stockholm, Dermot Waldron,
to the Secretary General
of Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Seán Donlon²²³**

STOCKHOLM, 15 December 1981

(C48) (Immediate)

'Poland'

Although the picture is not clear from Stockholm the situation in Poland seems calm, and the efficiency of the emergency operation becomes even more obvious. The general strike call has apparently not been successful but this may not be the end of the story as Solidarity picks up its broken and destroyed lines of communication again. The decisive factor may well be the situation in the mines. Jaruzelski in proclaiming the emergency emphasised that it was necessary because of the catastrophic economic situation. If the mines should now be sabotaged or if there should be a prolonged occupation or strike, then the whole point of the operation may be frustrated. The significance of the coal mines to Poland's economy is undisputed. If a comprehensive strike or occupation occurs, will Jaruzelski use force through the army against the workers.

2. The role of Lech Walesa may also now be crucial. It is tempting to compare his position to that of the kidnapped Czech leaders who in 1968 were brought against their will to Moscow to sign the protocol legitimizing the Soviet take over of Czechoslovakia. In any case the longer-term outlook for Solidarity itself must now be very poor.

3. Judging from international comments so far, the Polish authorities have moved rather successfully. World leaders seem to be nearly too cautious and careful at a time when a very hopeful democratic process has been brutally ended in Poland. International comment seems more anxious to stress this as a local and internal political problem unconnected with détente in Europe and certainly not effecting Moscow's grand peace offensive. It is an interesting question also whether the Schmidt–Honecker meeting showing further detente developments as possible was not also timed rather carefully also in order to blunt German criticism.²²⁴

²²³ Seán Donlon succeeded Andrew O'Rourke as Secretary General of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs on 27 October 1981.

²²⁴ German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt made an official visit to the GDR from 11 to 13 December 1981.

4. At least the Swedish government is speaking out on Poland. The following are comments made in the Swedish Riksdag yesterday by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Ola Ullsten: 'the events in Poland illustrate the communist system's true character. Communism cannot in the long run tolerate opposition or independent political movements.' He said that as far as Sweden is concerned every solution in Poland must be based upon the principle of the country's independence and the right to choose its own way out of the crisis without external interference. 'Negotiations and the willingness to accept compromises still appear to us as the only possible path. The people's desire for freedom can never in the long run be suppressed. Freedom must be also a freedom for those who think differently.'

NAI, 2011/39/1745

ISRAEL

80

**15 December 1981, Letter from
the Israeli Ambassador in Copenhagen, Yosef Hadas,
to the Director of the 2nd Europe Department, Amos Ganor,
and to the Director of the Eastern Europe Department, Yosef Govrin**

Copenhagen, 15 December 1981

Confidential

Re: The situation in Poland

The following account is based on a talk (on the 15th of the month) with the Political Director-General, Ambassador Dyvig:

A. At the time of our talk (14:30 local time), they did not know what was happening in Poland. An hour earlier they were in radio contact with their embassy in Warsaw, which told them that they knew even less than the outside world, since they were in a state of isolation.

B. The US embassy had tried to send three cars out of Warsaw. One was to Gdansk, but the Polish army would not allow them to leave the city and sent them back.

C. By the end of the week, or at most within a week, it will become clear how things are developing. General Jaruzelski is acting wisely, from his point of view, as a Pole, since at the same time as he ordered the arrest of the heads of the Solidarity organisation, he did the same with the leaders of the orthodox Communists. Thus, he presents himself to the Polish public as a representative of the middle way.

D. The (house) arrest of Lech Wałęsa because of his refusal to co-operate with the military council has not helped to restore calm, but rather the opposite.

E. The army is ensuring that martial law is maintained, but it is not clear how the soldiers will act. The statement by the archbishop²²⁵ that no Pole should shed the blood of another Pole should be noted.

F. If the situation deteriorates and the few strikes which broke out spread, or there are riots and bloodshed, massive intervention by the army, and possibly also by the Soviet army is feared.

G. The restrained reactions in the West, including Denmark, stemmed from the desire to avoid aggravating the situation and giving Jaruzelski and the USSR an excuse for military intervention or more severe repression. He does not know how long they can keep up this restraint, as pressure from the trade unions to express solidarity with the workers and the people of Poland is growing. Several left-wing

²²⁵ This is a reference to the homily given by Primate Józef Glemp in Warsaw on 13 December 1981, in which he called for peace and avoiding a fratricidal conflict.

newspapers in Denmark published today (the 15th) some of the first critical articles about the muted tone of the reaction of the government to the events in Poland. Possibly this pressure, at a time when the outgoing prime minister is trying to form a new government based on the support of the left, will cause the government to adopt a stronger line. All this on the assumption that there will be no significant change in the situation, since if it deteriorates, clearly Denmark and the countries of the European Community will have to take a much more openly forceful stand, which will include concrete steps, with all the possible consequences.

H. He replied to my question that even if he believes, or rather hopes, that there will be no Soviet intervention, he does not want to make a prediction, amongst other things because of Polish nationalist feeling.²²⁶

Israel State Archives, File MFA 8915/6

²²⁶ Copies of the letter were sent to Special Ambassador Yohanan Meroz, the Director-General's Bureau, the Centre for Political Planning, the International Department 1, the International Department 2 and to the Department for Strategic Aspects at the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

GREECE

81

**15 December 1981, Telegram
from the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou,
to the Director General of Political Affairs
at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aristotelis Frydas**

Athens, 15.12.1981

URGENT CONTACT

Prot. Nr. Α1ΔΦ. 2280/1172/ΑΣ 4852

Ref: Your telegrams AS 0432/14.12.1981 and AS 0433/14.12.1981

A government statement regarding the Polish crisis has not been issued and it is not considered appropriate to issue one.

For your information, during yesterday's informative visit of the Polish Ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the competent Political Director said that the problems of Poland must be resolved by the Polish themselves with no external interventions or pressure. Nevertheless, we are worried, as we would be for any other country where democratic procedures and trade union freedoms are suspended or abolished. For these reasons, we follow the developments with interest.

The above provides the framework for your stance regarding the draft common statement of the 'Ten'.²²⁷ We do not agree with proposals for national reconciliation (French), compromise or consensus (English) because they could be considered as an indirect interference in Poland's internal affairs.²²⁸

Papandreou

**Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Service of Diplomatic and Historical Archives,
Archives of the Embassy in London 1982/2.5**

²²⁷ This is a reference to ten countries belonging to the European Economic Community.

²²⁸ The telegram was sent by the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, to the 1st Director General of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aristotelis Frydas, who was in London for European Communities meetings under the British Presidency, to inform him of the Greek stance on the issue of Poland and the position of Greece on this subject in the meetings of the ten member-states of the European Communities.

NETHERLANDS

82

**15 December 1981, Code message
from the Dutch Ambassador in Warsaw, Joost van der Kun,
to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (excerpt)**

Warsaw, 15 Dec. 1981

Subject: Polish crisis evaluation by the consultation between EEC Heads of Mission of the 14th of this month.

General preliminary conclusions:

a. The proclamation of Martial Law (or: of War) was a purely Polish initiative; there was no foreign influence or interference, although intentions may have been shared with Marshal Kulikov last week, but most of the Warsaw Pact countries have received the measures with consent.

b. Although primarily intended to make all further Solidarnosc actions impossible (starting with the intended 17 Dec. protest demonstration), the intervention is also intended to cut short the hardline tendencies in the communist party.

c. The assurance by Jaruzelski that the Line of Renewal will continue on the basis of Gdansk agreements does not guarantee that the Solidarnosc desiderata will be taken into account: political freedoms that have been fought over have been curtailed for the time being; an economic reform plan is being introduced in accordance with government insights. (Separate copies of Jaruzelski's speech and restrictive measures follow).

d. Both in principle and because of the accompanying phenomena (freedom restrictions, the compromising of the dialogue, the violent termination of the liberalisation process), this intervention is reprehensible. Nevertheless, the looming alternative was equally fateful: slipping further into chaos. Riots, civil war.

e. In their assessment of the new situation, Western governments will have to be guided (in part) by the considerations mentioned under d. In addition, and more specifically, assessment will have to be made based on the treatment of detained trade union leaders, actions taken against (perhaps entrenched) workers in factories, as well as against possible wildcat strikes or other actions.

[...] ²²⁹

van der Kun 199

Netherlands National Archive, 2.05.330, BZ, inv.nr. 11872

²²⁹ One page omitted.

ITALY

83

**15 December 1981, Telegram
from the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw, Marco Favale,
to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Warsaw, 15 December 1981

Confidential
Absolute Priority

No. 4054

[Subject:] Situation in Poland. Repressive action

Order continues to reign in Warsaw, at least as of now. But the unrest that was taking over the students led the government to take the radical measure of the military occupation of the university, the evacuation of all 'student houses' and the arrest of a large group of professors. The rumor had spread that among them there was also the president of the Academy of Sciences Gieysztor who, together with another 'internee,' Geremek, had participated in the Lateran conference on the spiritual unity of Europe. On his return from Rome, he had informed me by telephone of his meeting with our Prime Minister and of his preparations to pay him and to Minister Colombo the honors of the rebuilt Royal Castle, symbol of this unity, on the occasion of their visit to Warsaw.

I asked a Polish employee of mine to go immediately this afternoon with my car, the only way to get past the barriers, to his home to get news. Gieysztor, who said that he was moved by our concern, has not been harassed, but confirmed that thirty-seven young professors (assistants or aggregate lecturers) were being detained, without it for the moment being known whether they could be released immediately or whether they will follow the fate of the other 'internees,' on whose number and names there is no certainty, but which may be some thousand people.

A leaflet released by the clandestine M.K.Z. of the Mazowice²³⁰ region—whose chief Bujak, as reported, escaped capture but apparently remained in Warsaw—indicates the figure at 49,000, but in all probability these are very exaggerated figures.

The government spokesman said that 'the number of internees is not yet known,' and that «the interned people will be released as soon as possible, but 'on a case-by-case basis'».

Walesa is not, according to the same source, 'interned.' He is in Warsaw and is treated with all the respect due to the leader of Solidarnosc. In reality, he is a 'guest'

²³⁰ Correctly: Mazowsze.

under surveillance in a small house on the outskirts of Warsaw, as attempts to persuade him to cooperate have so far failed.

Bratkowski, the former president of the Association of [Polish] Journalists, expelled from the party for his liberal attitudes, apparently managed at the last moment to escape capture in the clinic where he was hospitalised.

It also seems that two divisions are, for precautionary reasons, heading towards Warsaw and this military attaché, who went on a patrol, saw positions being dug on the outskirts of the city.

There is no way to check the news spread by a leaflet of the 'intelligence service' of the underground Solidarnosc leadership on the strikes in Poznan and Wroclaw. On the other hand, reliable news is available about the closure of public services in Krakow on Sunday; on the preparation of strikes at the University and at the Academy of Sciences; on the threat of strikes in the shipyards of Gdansk, strikes that those authorities would be ready to repress with a landing from the sea; finally, on the fact that a whole series of large factories in the country are surrounded by police cordons.

I learned the latest news from the wife of prof. Geremek, who spoke with Maresca. Seven policemen were waiting for him at home, stationed there to search and ransack it; they left the house only after learning that, on the way back from Gdansk, Geremek had been blocked by the police and 'interned' along with his son, a young university student. In reality, he was taken to the Warsaw prisons.

Favale

ASMAE, DGAP VI, 1981, b. 240, fasc. *Polonia. Stato di assedio, dicembre 1981, A/1 Pol.*

NETHERLANDS

84

**15 December 1981, Code message
from the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Max van der Stoel,
to the Dutch Ambassador in Warsaw, Joost van der Kun**

The Hague, 15 Dec. 1981

Subject: Démarche by the Polish Ambassador

Today (the 14th) I received the Polish Ambassador²³¹ at his request. He explained to me, mainly along the lines of what has since in various stages been announced by officials in Warsaw, the decision to declare the state of emergency.

In particular, he underlined the desire of the military council to continue the reforms and constructive dialogue.

For my part, I have expressed my concerns, citing as one of the very important reasons for serious apprehension the arrests of trade union leaders and the robberies of trade union offices.

I said that if the dialogue is indeed to continue, assurances must be given that those who have been arrested will be released soon, and I added that we await further developments.

The Ambassador stated that no one will be detained for even a day longer than necessary.

I have made it clear that continuation of the dialogue between the Church, Solidarity and the party can hardly take place if one of the parties involved is interned, and I expressed hope that the coming days will bring confirmation that real dialogue will continue between free people, and that as such there will be reason for some optimism. The Ambassador further expressed his delight that the convoy with Christmas packages indeed left on Sunday and assured that this would be allowed to cross into Poland without any difficulties.

For my part, I mentioned that unforeseen obstacles would certainly have enormous repercussions.

van der Stoel 156

Netherlands National Archive, 2.05.387, BZ, Warsaw Embassy, inv.nr. 606

²³¹ Alojzy Bartoszek.

UNITED STATES

85

**16 December 1981, Memorandum
by the US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig,
for President Ronald Reagan
(with enclosure)**

Washington, December 16, 1981

Secret/Sensitive

SUBJECT: United States Policy toward Poland

The prospects for East-West relations and our foreign policy under your Administration will depend very much on the skill and discipline we bring to our Polish policy at this critical juncture.

The Polish Government, the Soviets (privately), and some elements of the American left are now saying that the martial law regime was established in Poland by Polish nationalists in order to avoid a Soviet intervention. Whatever truth there is to this—and there may be some—it is largely irrelevant.

The martial law regime will not resolve Poland's massive problems. Whether Jaruzelski succeeds or fails in restoring 'order' and chastening the workers' movement, the Polish economy will remain a shambles—worse off than before the military assumed power—requiring large doses of foreign assistance merely to function. Economic deterioration and distress are therefore likely whatever happens, and are classic triggers for violence and disorder. The spread of disorder, should it occur, would almost inevitably prompt Soviet intervention. Thus, the prospect of Soviet intervention is as real under martial law as it was before.

There is both danger and opportunity for us in this situation. The danger of Soviet intervention is the same as it was or worse, because the economic situation will be worse. The opportunity, though modest, is new. Whereas before the regime could argue that Solidarity was responsible for Poland's economic troubles, it will now carry the exclusive responsibility for the mess. This may endow the prospect of assistance from us with some leverage.

Deterring Soviet intervention and restoring the reform process should be the twin objectives of American policy. They are functionally interrelated. If economic breakdown and Soviet intervention are to be avoided (they may be unavoidable), there must be restoration of reform and a process of true negotiation and compromise among Poles. Over the long term, Poland's problems can only be managed and resolved through such a process. In the short term, it is also the key to deterring violence and Soviet intervention.

Like most juntas, the martial law regime has proclaimed its commitment to continue the reforms. But its ultimate intentions are unclear. Internment of most

of Solidarity's top leadership and of many other political activists is not a promising sign. It also leaves the regime with no responsible negotiating partners. Walesa's own status is not clear, but it is evident that he is not a free agent. Furthermore, the communications blackout has left workers and their leaders with no good way of organizing for either resistance or negotiation with the authorities, and thus heightened the chances of spontaneous outbreaks. By dampening resistance in this fashion, the regime has by the same token made it impossible to move out of the crisis by negotiation with leaders who could deliver on agreements made.

In this situation, we must walk a narrow line between two dangerous and unnecessary policy approaches. On the one hand, if we are too passive and Jaruzelski succeeds in restoring 'order' and destroying Solidarity, we will have acquiesced in repression with little more than a whimper. The Soviets would certainly draw conclusions from such a U.S. posture. On the other hand, U.S. statements that can be portrayed after the fact as provocations or incitements could saddle us with the onus for breakdown, violence, and possible Soviet intervention, should they occur.

The wise approach, for now at least, is to insist publicly and privately that the only realistic solution to Poland's problems lies in restoration of a genuine process of negotiation and reconciliation among Poles.

—Publicly, our stance must be keyed to events, rather than ideology. We must make clear our opposition to the abridgment of civil and political liberties in Poland, and our commitment to human rights. But we should stress, at the same time, that this approach is reinforced in current circumstances by the eminently practical fact that, without restoration of real politics, Poles cannot solve the problems facing them.

—Privately, we should bring our leverage on the Polish Government to bear at every opportunity. That leverage—particularly in the economic area—is considerable, although not sufficient if Jaruzelski and the Soviets have decided to end the Polish 'experiment' no matter what the cost. We should urge the regime to moderation and dialogue, on grounds that this is the only practical approach to solving Poland's problems and avoiding massive damage to international peace. On the same basis, we should be willing to withhold or proffer help, depending on how events proceed within Poland.

This approach will require extraordinary discipline within the U.S. Government. I believe you must take the lead in enunciating our public posture and in enforcing the necessary discipline on all U.S. spokesmen. If you agree, your public statement tomorrow will be the keynote of a firm, consistent policy. I have attached a recommended text.²³²

²³² President Reagan drew on some of the language in the attached statement—though did not read it verbatim—at a press conference on 17 December 1981. See 'The President's News Conference,' December 17, 1981, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan*, 1981, pp. 1161–1170.

Attachment

Presidential Statement on Poland

We are receiving a steady flow of reports indicating that the imposition of Martial Law in Poland has led to the arrest and confinement, in prisons as well as detention camps, of thousands of Polish trade union leaders and intellectuals. Factories are being seized by security forces and workers beaten. These are extremely disturbing developments, for they point to a sharp reversal of the process of democratic reconstruction that has been under way in Poland for the past year and one half. It is difficult to see how Poland can emerge from its economic and political crisis when coercion takes the place of negotiations and compromise. All these acts are in gross violation of the principles enunciated in the Helsinki final accords to which Poland is a signatory.

We continue to monitor the situation closely, well aware that little occurs in Polish ruling circles without the full knowledge of the Soviet Union.

It is important that the position of the United States Government be clear to all. We view the current situation in Poland in grave terms, particularly the increasing use of force against an unarmed population and violations of the basic civil rights of the Polish people. Accommodation, which is essential to a resolution of Poland's difficulties, obviously cannot be reached in an atmosphere of intimidation and disruption of the means of communication. Violence invites violence and threatens to plunge Poland into chaos.

We urge all parties in Poland to reestablish conditions that will make constructive negotiations and compromise possible. We, for our part, are prepared to do our share to assist a Poland which has restored such conditions to overcome its economic difficulties. And finally, we believe that the Polish people must be permitted to resolve their own problems, free of coercion and outside intervention.

Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room

POLAND

86

16 December 1981, Note
by Eugeniusz Noworyta, Director of the 4th Department
of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
proposed steps to be taken with regard to West European countries
in connection with the introduction of Martial Law

Warsaw, 16 December 1981

Comrade Minister J. Czyrek

In connection with the new situation in the country, the 4th Department is presenting proposals for certain measures with regard to West European countries.

I. Observations until now indicate that the position of government circles in Western Europe continues to be one of restraint and expectation and, in some cases—such as France and the Vatican—is evolving in a negative direction under the influence of the emotional reaction of public opinion and for ideological reasons.

The future position of West European governments will depend on the maintenance of the internal nature of events, the scope and sharpness of the confrontation and the increase or decrease of repressive measures (the treatment of interned persons and their speedy release, the situation of Wałęsa and others).

In the approach shown by political parties, one can see a tendency to play off events to ideological advantage. The socialists excel at this. There were also sharp, negative reactions from many communist parties. Western trade union headquarters also reacted in a similar spirit. The first attempts to boycott the loading of Polish ships (Portugal, the Netherlands) took place.

It would seem that some of the more pragmatic government circles (like in the FRG) are interested in political and economic stabilisation in Poland, among other reasons because of possible implications of unfavourable developments for East-West relations and the possibility of securing their economic interests.

II. Based on the above and depending on further developments, we propose to consider some steps to reduce the negative repercussions of events on interstate relations with Western Europe and to counter possible attempts to isolate us in international contacts:

1. In order to confirm our diplomatic activeness, we suggest issuing a statement from the government or the Minister of Foreign Affairs elaborating on the relevant statements from Gen. Jaruzelski's foreign policy speech. Such a statement could:

a) Provide information about the steps taken by the authorities to order the economy and introduce reforms and about the intention of continuing on the path of renewal;

b) Reiterate the will to maintain our activeness and constructive role in foreign policy;

c) Give assurances that we wish to resolve our problems in a manner that doesn't encumber dialogue prospects and East-West relations;

d) Stress the pursuit of political stabilisation, which would benefit not only us but the whole of Europe.

The above statement could be handed to the heads of diplomatic missions in Warsaw by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his deputies accompanied with a comment which, depending on the case, could include positive or negative estimates of the given state's conduct in the political and economic spheres.

2. The organisation of press conferences in selected stations (Bonn, Paris) with the participation of influential columnists (such as W. Górnicki).

3. Using customary New Year greetings sent by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and, as appropriate, to give them a more substantive nature, to send personal letters including thanks for support and economic assistance, with an indication of [our] readiness to develop further contacts.

4. Our ongoing interest in maintaining visits and important political contacts with regard to chosen West European countries, including to:

a) Reiterate our readiness to welcome Minister of Foreign Affairs Colombo (his very measured statement is worthy of note);

b) Communicate to the French that we continue to look forward to develop contacts with them, including high-level visits—in the context of their importance for European dialogue and for East-West relations. Depending on the situation, to consider inviting Chirac;

c) Take up discussion with Denmark (whose measured reaction stands out): with the readiness to host the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs and to consider a visit by the Prime Minister;

d) Renew, in relation to the FRG, our readiness to host Wischniewski and Voigt;

e) Intensify our dialogue with Belgium, which assumes the chairmanship of the EEC in January 1982.

Even should our partners do not take up our proposals, our initiative could have a moderating effect on the position adopted of individual countries.

5. Take up the initiative with some countries to hold, as soon as possible, working consultations at the level of deputy-minister of foreign affairs or department-head, for example with regard to Sweden and Norway.

6. It would seem advisable not to postpone meetings (of mixed committees, for example), cultural negotiations, etc., that were previously scheduled at our initiative, in order to maintain indispensable contacts.

E. Noworyta

AMSZ, Dep. IV 45/84, w. 11 (PDD 1981/II, Doc. No. 443)

NATO

87

**16 December 1981, Summary Record
of a restricted meeting of the North Atlantic Council (excerpts)**

NATO SECRET

PR(81)80

To: Secretary General

Cc: Deputy Secretary General

ASG, Political Affairs

From: Acting Deputy Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a Restricted Meeting of the Council
held on Wednesday, 16th December 1981 at 4pm²³³
THE SITUATION IN POLAND

Signed by A. Synadinos

Attendance: Restricted [...] ²³⁴

Agenda: No

Meeting place: Room 1

THE SITUATION IN POLAND

1. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at a previous meeting it had been suggested that the Council might review the document issued on 4th February by the United States Delegation on the possible policy responses to use of force by the Polish Government against the Polish people. He felt that this document represented a realistic appraisal of the present situation and contained a number of measures, some of which had already been taken, but which might usefully be discussed in the Senior Political Committee under Council guidance.

2. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he wanted to make it clear that he was not proposing that the Council should undertake another contingency planning exercise. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the subject and the delicacy of the situation in Poland, he also wished to stress the need for full confidentiality of the Council's discussions to avoid public speculation. He was also fully alive to the need to avoid any actions or statements which could become part of the problem,

²³³ The text of the summary report was distributed on 7 January 1982.

²³⁴ Excerpts marked with [...] are not declassified.

either by making matters worse in Poland or furnishing a pretext or incentive for the Soviets to intervene.

3. His Authorities had welcomed the US initiative of tabling some ideas on what was conventionally known as the 'grey area' scenario. The present situation, he felt, corresponded in many respects to the 'grey area' scenario. There had already been a widespread abuse of human rights in Poland in the form of several thousand arrests of individuals who were clearly not guilty of any criminal act. In addition for the first time, there had been rumours of the application of physical force to break-up strikes with the possibility of bloodshed.

4. In the circumstances, he believed there would be some merit in examining collectively those considerations which various Allies believed ought to be borne in mind in responding to developments in Poland. This might take the form of a review of the rationale for measures already taken and an outline of what these were, ie. a pooling of information on what had already been done, and discussion of factors which Allies considered should be borne in mind in dealing with future developments.

5. Factors which, at present and in the absence of bloodshed, his Authorities had thought to be germane to Allied response had been the following:

(a) It had been consistent Alliance policy to insist that the Poles be left alone to solve their own problems. While intending to discourage Soviet intervention, the Alliance should equally apply the principle of non-intervention, which means that, from the public position at least, Allied Governments must not only insist that the Soviet Union refrain from lending direct support to elements in Poland, but also refrain from supporting other elements. From this he drew the conclusion that Allies could continue to warn the USSR against intervening but that they cannot themselves openly take up for example Solidarity's cause. They might however, be critical of the Polish Government's abuse of human rights. That would correspond to long-standing Alliance policy.

(b) But non-intervention did not mean indifference, and Allied action could take the form of maintaining an intensive dialogue with Polish Authorities to encourage them to relax their controls on Solidarity and to release those arrested.

(c) They should also be especially careful in how they used the economic leverage, to guard against the possibility that the threatened or actual withdrawal of economic assistance could induce instability which would make the use of force or Soviet military intervention more likely.

6. In keeping with the above, his Government had publicly reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention, had privately expressed its concerns to the Polish Government, and had decided that for the time being it would continue to fulfill its existing commitments in the area of economic assistance.

7. In practice, this meant that it would not interrupt Canadian grain shipments made possible by some \$300 million in food credit extended to Poland in 1981, and

it would not withdraw the \$500 million in food credits which the Government had recently announced would be available to enable Poland to import further quantities of Canadian grain next year. In addition, the Government had not withdrawn the special supplementary fishing allocation granted Poland earlier to allow it to augment its catch in Canadian waters.

8. With regard to refugees, his Government had reaffirmed that there would be no change in the special Canadian provisions designed to ease the Polish refugee situation, namely the relaxation of normal Canadian immigration criteria and permission for Polish self-exiles without Canadian relatives to remain in Canada for up to a year pending the outcome of events in Poland. So far almost 4,500 Poles had been allowed entry to Canada under these provisions.

9. In this respect, he would welcome information from other Allied Governments on the nature of their own responses in these fields to date, in particular clarification from the US colleague of the reported suspension of the US Government's good shipments to Poland and whether all existing contracts would be fulfilled. He would also be interested to learn more about Allies' intentions in respect of the treatment of Polish refugees.

10. He went on to say that looking at how to react to a further deterioration of the situation in Poland involving the shedding of blood, the American 'grey area' paper had identified the following factors which might be borne in mind in preparing the Western response:

- (a) the nature and extent of the force employed by the authorities
- (b) whether the use of force had been accompanied by other measures which had heightened the prospects for continuation of the reforms
- (c) the political make-up of the Polish leadership, and
- (d) the degree of Soviet involvement, whether overt or covert.

11. His Authorities continued to be attracted, by the utility of such a set of considerations, though the first two seemed by far the most important. They also had some suggestions for elaborating on these.

12. In considering the nature and extent of the force employed by the Authorities they believed extenuating circumstances should also be taken account of including:

- (a) the degree of provocation by Solidarity supporters
- (b) whether the use of force had been confined to specific instances or was indiscriminate, and
- (c) whether an effort had been made to respect legal procedures.

13. The importance of the existence of accompanying measures which heightened the prospects for continuation of the reforms could not be overestimated.

14. The third consideration, that of the political make-up of the Polish leadership, would be rather less important under present circumstances.

15. And the fourth consideration, that of the degree of Soviet involvement, while intellectually interesting would, he feared, in practice be extremely difficult to identify or prove sufficiently to be reliable.

16. In addition to the four considerations in the American paper, he believed that a fifth—the circumstances in which the present action had been taken should be taken into account. He pointed out that the American paper had been circulated in February, the Polish Government had still been sufficiently in control of events that a resort to force to impose its will could still have been considered discretionary in character. That was not the case at present. Whatever one might believe about the involvement of the Soviet Union or Polish hardliners in Jaruzelski's decision, it appeared incontrovertible that he had acted out of apprehension that events were about to get totally out of control, and that he had to do something (indeed almost anything) to stave off disaster. Abdication in favour of Solidarity under these circumstances would not be a realistic alternative, given Poland's geopolitical location and the certainty of a Soviet intervention in such an eventuality.

17. He did not conclude from this that Allied Governments should cheer Jaruzelski's harsh measures for what they were—and they should avoid any actions which could push Poland closer to chaos and Soviet intervention. At the same time, they should obviously seek to hold Jaruzelski to his professed willingness to return to a policy of dialogue and agreement, and not to turn back the clock to the pre-August 1980 regime.

18. In light of the foregoing, his Government believed there was a place for some or all of the kinds of responses outlined in the US paper, which he would list under the four categories of:

(a) public statements (these had already been made, but there would be occasions for more)

(b) diplomatic *démarches* (the same situation applied here)

(c) management of economic aid, and

(d) possible action in multilateral forums.

19. He would welcome the views of other delegations, and suggested that these matters might usefully be examined further if necessary in the Senior Political Committee.

20. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his Delegation would circulate a compilation of actions taken so far by his Government, in the hope that it would facilitate cooperation among Allied Governments. As regards the paper referred to by the Chairman, he felt that it was too early to take decisions on measures to be taken in view of the uncertainty of the present situation and that it was essential to maintain flexibility of approach. He did not see the need for the Council to prepare a new NATO Contingency Paper.

21. His Government had sought clarification from the Polish Government on the extent and duration of the present action. It had expressed its concern that

the Martial Law entailed violations to the human rights to which it attached great importance. It had warned the Polish Government that the use of force would affect bilateral relations and that the United States' economic support had to be suspended for the time being. However, private aid would continue. It had also expressed to the Soviet Union its grave concern and its hope that the principle of non-intervention would be strictly applied.

22. As regards the Madrid Conference, he expressed the wish that Allied Governments coordinate their action until the scheduled recess. His Government was of the opinion that an agreement would be inappropriate in the present circumstances, that the last NNA²³⁵ proposal was only a basis for negotiation and that Allied delegations should be prepared to return to Madrid in January or February. Then the NNA proposal could, with certain improvements, offer a possible solution.

23. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that the latest intelligence did not indicate that preparation of a deployment of Soviet forces was taking place, although the state of alert of those inside Poland continued to increase. Polish forces had an intense activity, especially in troubled areas.

24. Turning to the US document, he pointed out that any Alliance reaction should be closely tailored to the situation in Poland. As long as it was not clear, the western side should keep restraint and do nothing which might precipitate a Soviet intervention.

25. As regards economic assistance, he felt that a high degree of flexibility should be kept and that any pressure in this delicate area might easily become counter-productive and appear as an interference in internal affairs. Should the situation deteriorate to almost civil war it was not likely that such an action could have an effect on Polish leadership. In summary, he recommended that the situation should be followed closely and carefully.

26. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that having re-read the US paper of 4th February, he wished once more to pay tribute to what had been a very foresighted initiative covering rather closely, and with much nuance, precisely the present situation in Poland. When discussing the spectrum of possible Western reactions to Polish suppressive measures his Authorities thought that the following considerations should, in particular, be borne in mind.

27. The first and overriding Allied objective should be to avoid a Soviet military intervention in Poland. Such an intervention should be avoided in the interest of the Poles themselves as well as in the interest of a peaceful development in Europe and in East/West relations generally.

28. From General Jaruzelski's point of view, the imposition of the State of Emergency might have appeared as the only alternative to political and economic chaos and/or to a direct Soviet intervention. Only in light of further developments

²³⁵ Acronym for Neutral and Non-Aligned Nations.

should it be possible to judge whether these aims had been broader and less respectable, for instance, as some had suggested, to crush Solidarity as a political force in Poland. For the moment he should be given the benefit of the doubt.

29. The Alliance's assessment, he felt should also keep in mind that Poland was a Communist country and a member of the Warsaw Pact, with the limitations which these hard facts imposed on the prospects for an evolution in a democratic direction. Consequently, when deciding on Western reactions, it would be fallacious to base them on any wishful thinking or hope that Poland might in the short-term have any prospects for developing towards a pluralistic democracy of the Western type. What might be hoped for and stimulated was a gradual and peaceful evolution towards a more liberal and democratic society. In the present situation Allied objective should be to try to see it that the prospects for such an evolution were not crushed.

30. What had been called an 'internal solution' might, as indicated in the US paper, take different forms, and Allied reactions would have to be adjusted accordingly. Here he agreed very much with the flexible approach in the US paper. On the other hand he was of the opinion that until a little more about the way in which the State of Emergency was being applied be known, and what plans if any, the Polish Authorities might have for resuming the dialogue with Solidarity and reform forces, it would be very difficult to say whether the present situation was as described in 2nd aliena on page 2 of the US paper. ('It was possible to imagine a situation in which the measured application of force accompanied by a renewed expression of commitment to the post-August reforms could contribute to the stability in which those reforms and the economic life of the nation might best prosper').

31. He agreed that, so far, Allied countries had implemented most of the preliminary measures enumerated in the US paper. If and to what extent and with what timing economic measures should be applied would have to be considered very carefully. Here he agreed very much with what the Canadian and Danish Representatives had just said.

32. For the moment his Government was inclined to let the humanitarian aid continue in accordance with the practice which had been followed so far. In fact it had decided to allocate a further 13 million Nok. to humanitarian aid to Poland, in addition to 4 million Nok. allocated earlier. There were also six Norwegian private organizations which were giving humanitarian aid to Poland, with financial support from the Government. The truck transport of food stuffs and medical articles continued as normal. There were no difficulties at the receiving end. In spite of the fact that the Polish Authorities did not any longer permit Solidarity or Farmers' Solidarity to act as recipients of the aid, there seemed to be full coordination between those organizations and the Catholic Church organizations which were handling the reception and the distribution of the aid.

33. As to refugees his Government had made it clear that Norway would receive the refugees which might ask for asylum.

34. For the rest, his Authorities were inclined to advise that for the time being Allied reactions should be limited to deploring the State of Emergency, the arrests and use of force, to warning against foreign intervention, and to continuing to stress that the Polish people should be left to solve their problems themselves and to decide themselves on their own future.

35. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that Mr. Genscher had received the Polish Charge d'Affaires in Bonn and had expressed the hope that it would be possible for Poland, in accordance with statements made by Jaruzelski and Czyrek, to solve its internal problems without outside intervention and use of force. He had added that the Federal Government, which was following developments with great concern and sympathy, was expecting that the reforms would be pursued. This statement reflected his Government's opinion that at this juncture the best way to exert influence on the Polish Government was to take its words at their face value. He noted that other Allied Governments had more or less taken the same line, especially in practical matters, such as the continuation of the humanitarian aid. It was not possible, he felt, to ignore the deep concern in the Public Opinion on humanitarian and political aspects of the situation in Poland.

36. As regards the Madrid Conference, he agreed that it was very unlikely that the work could be completed before Christmas and that it would be a mistake to tie decisions to be taken there with developments in Poland.

37. As for the United States paper, he pointed out that most of the considerations contained therein had already been taken into account. It would not be worth it, he felt, to review a scenario which was only one of the numerous possibilities. The Council should continue to follow the situation and be informed of national approaches.

38. In Poland, it was clear that the Martial Law was more and more visible and felt by an increasing number of people and organizations. He could not see how Jaruzelski would be able to reach his objectives and to resume a reforms policy. The Church remained critical and Walesa refused to cooperate. His success would depend on when and how he would be able to convince a large part of the population that he only aimed at saving the country and not at suppressing liberties and reforms.

39. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that the latest reports he had received from Poland were that the situation was stable and that the militarisation of government machinery at all levels was increasing all over the country. Active resistance seemed to have ceased and passive resistance had started.

40. As for the United States paper, he supported what had been said by the German Representative. He had doubts about the need of re-discussing it, especially since any special study entailed greater risks of leaks. The Council should continue

to follow the situation and to consult; and any report which might have to be produced, should be part of its normal watching brief.

41. His Government's attitude towards the Polish Government was very much along the lines of the Federal Government's policy. Jaruzelski should be encouraged to pursue reforms and to solve internal problems without bloodshed.

42. As for economic assistance, his Government was not under the obligation of taking decisions in the weeks to come. However, the food aid already in the pipe-line would be forwarded and Christmas gifts would go ahead, as planned.

43. The LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE²³⁶ said that the Polish Ambassador in Brussels had asked to be received by Ambassador Wurth. He had acknowledged that only time would tell if General Jaruzelski had made the right decision. He had reported that the situation had normalised to some extent. As for the Soviets' attitude, he had said that his authorities were not expecting an intervention. He emphasised how much his government feared the withdrawal of Western aid and a more restrictive attitude to the granting of credits. Warsaw expected a positive attitude from NATO and the Ten, and also some understanding of the realities, in particular the fact that the Solidarity Trade Union had gone too far. It still seemed possible that an agreement could be reached with Walesa, who was moderate and realistic, compared to the extremist elements whose expulsion would mean that progress would continue and gains would not be jeopardized.

44. The LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE added that his position was identical to that of the German and United Kingdom Representatives as regards the United States paper.

45. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE recalled the latest positions taken by the Prime Minister, Pierre Mauroy, and the President of the Republic. Following the Council of Ministers, the latter had said:

'Having noted that Poland's recently gained freedom to unionise and freedom of expression have been undermined, a state of emergency has been established, and many people have been arrested, or are in one way or another prevented from carrying out their legally recognised activities and responsibilities, the French government must express its disapproval of the situation.'

46. Intelligence from the French Embassy in Warsaw, which had just been communicated to him, confirmed that sit-in strikes were continuing, in particular in Gdansk and Gdynia, that the army was intervening with tanks and helicopters, and that in future only those with nothing to lose were likely to resist the growing pressure.

47. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE noted that events in Poland were unfolding in accordance with a use-of-force scenario that had been foretold with perspicacity in the United States document of 4 February. He could only back the

²³⁶ Paragraphs 43 to 55 have been translated from French for the present publication.

suggestions it contained, it being understood that the Allied governments would be able to retain the necessary flexibility, particularly in their judgement concerning the return to the Polish renewal process as a whole. At this stage, he could only note that force was being used in Poland, but he did not have sufficient information to judge to what extent it was being used, its consequences and its aims.

48. While waiting to be in a better position to assess the meaning of and the outlook for the use of force in the country, the position of his Authorities could be summed up as follows:

– It went without saying that Italy remained firmly attached to the principle of non-interference in Poland's internal affairs. However, an event of decisive importance in the life of one European country could not leave the others indifferent. His country had always been deeply aware of this interdependence, and it was precisely because of this awareness that it had contributed to the economic and financial effort to help the Polish Government tackle the most urgent requirements linked to the national renewal process.

– In the same spirit, Italy could not remain indifferent to the evolution of a crisis that was violating the fundamental liberties of the Polish people. His Government had a deep respect for Poland's sovereignty, and demanded that it be respected by all, but this did not stop it from noting that the political method for the solution of national differences, a method which the Polish Authorities had confirmed they intended to adhere to on many occasions, had not been followed. Consequently, and while still respecting Polish sovereignty, it intended to retain the utmost flexibility in its future collaboration with and aid to the Polish Authorities in light of how events were unfolding in the country.

– Of course, it was not the food aid intended for the Polish people that was in question, but rather the aspects of collaboration with Poland (in particular financial and economic aid) that the Government in Warsaw directly benefited from.

49. It seemed to him that continued collaboration and, in general, the substance of relations with the Polish regime, would have to include regular, concrete checks of its intention to safeguard the gains of the national renewal. This intention, beyond the measures, which for its part Italy could only condemn, constituted the only positive aspect of the regime's attitude as things currently stood. This was an element that could not be ignored; nor the fact that, until now at least, the force employed in Poland was a Polish force. But it was also impossible to ignore the emotion felt by the people of Italy as a whole and the worry and disapproval about what had happened and was happening in Poland, expressed by every political force in Italy without exception.

50. He would be prepared to participate in an update to the United States document, either within the Council or within the Senior Political Committee.

Indeed, his authorities had reached the conclusion that the Fifteen²³⁷ would have to take a position. They agreed, of course, that the exchanges of views on the present situation should be kept strictly confidential.

51. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE stressed the increasing transmission difficulties for countries that, like Belgium, did not have direct lines of communication with their embassies in Warsaw. If it should be confirmed that the Polish authorities were systematically using radio interference to prevent communications, the West would have to speak out against this violation of the Vienna Convention. In addition, owing to the presence on Polish territory of many Belgian nationals, his government would be interested in an exchange of information on the fate of foreign nationals in Poland.

52. As regards food aid, he would like to have more information on the responses of the countries neighbouring Poland. East Germany, for example, seemed to have stopped some convoys coming from Western countries.

53. In general, although his government agreed to maintaining a low-key stance, it did not want this to be interpreted as a sign of indifference, which would run counter to popular opinion in the Allied countries.

54. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE recalled that his government had made a statement on Sunday, 13 December that was in keeping with those of the other Allied governments. On Monday 14, the Council of Ministers had been entirely devoted to Poland and the Poland-Portugal Joint Commission had been adjourned indefinitely. He agreed with everything that had been said about the United States document.

55. The CHAIRMAN noted, in conclusion to this exchange of views, that the Allied governments agreed not to consider any measures, at least not in the current circumstances, and to continue consulting each other and monitoring how events developed. If necessary, the Council could task the SPC²³⁸ with reviewing the various scenarios already prepared concerning the Polish crisis.

NATO Archives, PR(81)80

²³⁷ This is a reference to fifteen countries belonging to NATO.

²³⁸ Acronym for NATO's Senior Political Committee.

FRANCE

88

**17 December 1981, Circular
by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to French diplomatic posts**

Paris 17 December 1981

Urgent
Unencrypted

The statement by the President of the French Republic

I hereby communicate to you the statement made by the President of the French Republic on the situation in Poland at the meeting of the Council of Ministers of Wednesday 16 December 1981.

‘Start quotation’:

The president of the Republic declares:

‘Whether the result of external pressure or internal oppression, the loss of public, collective and individual freedoms is without exception reprehensible and must, therefore, be categorically and vigorously condemned.

Having noted that the trade union rights and freedom of expression recently acquired in Poland have been called into question, that an exceptional regime has been established, that many people have been arrested or are, in one way or another, prevented from pursuing their activities and responsibilities, despite being recognised by law, the French government must express its disapproval of such a state of affairs.

It is France’s position that the Polish people must find an additional reason to believe in their ability to overcome the dangers facing the country.

The President of the French Republic, having expressed his full agreement with the meaning and impact of the Prime Minister’s statement made last Sunday, considered that the Prime Minister should, in his address to the National Assembly, inform the country,

– On the one hand, of the reality of the means available to France to provide moral and material support for the legitimate aspirations of the Polish people, in particular with a view to releasing workers that are currently imprisoned, and

– On the other hand, of data allowing the international situation to be assessed as accurately and to the fullest extent possible’ end quotation, notify consuls, signed.

JP. Guyot

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve Diplomatic Archives Center,
FRMAE_1930INVA/5421, Europe, 1981–1985, Poland**

NETHERLANDS

89

**18 December 1981, Code message
from the Dutch Ambassador in Warsaw, Joost van der Kun,
to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Warsaw, 18 Dec. 1981

Subject: Polish crisis; first evaluation

Not only the thorough but also the grim character of the military seizure of power in Poland manifests itself in initial bloody incidents²³⁹ and in credible reports of the needlessly harsh treatment of numerous prisoners, including trade union leaders who can hardly be counted as extremists.

Today's situation most certainly offers no basis for confidence in the officially declared intentions not to return to the situation that existed before August 1980, respect reforms and continue the dialogue. Apart from the physical impotence of the opposition (*Solidarność*), the newly created chasm of hatred and distrust will make finding a new basis for unison an extremely difficult and slow process, provided that the real rulers in Poland—in whatever configuration they manifest themselves—are willing to do so.

Like some of my Western colleagues, I believe the assurances given by Polish ministers that the military intervention took place to prevent 'worse' (or 'internationalisation'), i.e. direct Soviet intervention. It is plausible that Moscow, most certainly roused and anxious because of unfeasible *Solidarność* demands and plans that were formulated last week in Radom and Gdansk, which unfortunately went too far under the circumstances, instructed its Polish brothers to intervene, 'or else.'

Whether the Soviet screenplay will be followed to the bitter end will depend on the 'success' of the operation now undertaken—all the more reason to have this run in 'model' fashion. And then it makes little difference whether the occupation takes place directly or by proxy—except perhaps for Moscow itself, which can wash its hands of accusations of direct interference.

The message relayed to you by Bartoszek on the 17th (the day after first admitted victims fell) about improving the situation and the prospect of stabilisation sounds cynical. Currently known facts and circumstances are at odds with this, unless, of course, one uses frames of reference from years ago reverting back to the Stalinist period.

²³⁹ This is a reference to the events of 16 December, when the authorities conducted a bloody repression of the strike at the Wujek coal mine using firearms and tanks, with 9 miners being killed and 23 wounded.

Western deliberation on the modalities of further assistance to Poland, whose continuation is of such particular importance to the Polish government, will have to be carefully adapted to fit the new situation. The observation I sent you on Polish bishops may perhaps be a guiding principle.

van der Kun 224

Netherlands National Archive, 2.05.387, BZ, Warsaw Embassy, inv.nr. 606

FRANCE**90****18 December 1981, Note****by the Europe Directorate at the French Ministry of Foreign Relations**

Paris, 18 December 1981

Meeting of the Polish Ambassador with the Secretary General Francis Gutmann

Secretary General:

The Prime Minister yesterday set out the government's policy. The news reaching us has increased our concern; we are aware of the difficulties facing your government and we have noted General JARUZELSKI's commitment not to jeopardise the renewal process.

However, we are struck by the contrast between the information received from Poland, and the intentions expressed by the Head of the Polish Government, and universally recognised ideals and rights.

We know that the ILO is considering sending a mission to Poland. We consider this a good initiative; the ILO is an objective, internationally recognised trade union organisation; it could help international public opinion to have a clearer view of reality and perhaps dispel any contradictions.

Developments since Sunday have led us to express our concern with increasing insistence. The French government wanted to refrain from taking a firm stance at the outset, or at least one that might cast doubt on your government's democratic intentions. This position is increasingly difficult to maintain, not only with regard to our opinion but also in conscience. Anything that the Polish authorities can show to confirm the existence of real dialogue will be crucial, as since Sunday morning all the information has been pointing in the same direction, towards the suppression of freedoms. We have not seen a sign, a gesture, that democratic values are safeguarded. We anxiously await evidence of free and genuine dialogue with trade union and religious leaders and all the elements that constitute the originality and richness of Polish society and that form the basis of our friendship.

Mr Kulaga:

Mr Secretary General, I do not know if your information has been obtained from a direct source; from the information I have received, the situation is evolving towards a broader understanding. The government's intention is that the measures taken should enable the renewal process to resume as soon as possible. We started from a situation 'on the brink of disaster,' so problems were inevitable; however, I confirm that political methods—discussion, persuasion—were always used. I would like to share a piece of information just broadcast by Warsaw Radio: three important regional leaders of Solidarnosc, including one from Poznan and one

from Radom, have declared their support for the measures taken. The problems that exist do not affect the line defined by General JARUZELSKI.

I understand your wish for a real demonstration of willingness to dialogue. I must tell you that in these extraordinary times, it is difficult to resume the dialogue as planned prior to recent events after a period of only five days. However, the Polish authorities remain determined to use all political means to avoid confrontation.

As for the ILO, my personal opinion is that any form of internationalisation will narrow General JARUZELSKI's path of action; I say this in all frankness: in order to solve our problems along defined lines, any interference, however minor, should be avoided. We currently envisage the possibility of resuming dialogue at an early date; contrary to media speculation which, based on limited data, is drawing exaggerated conclusions that create a specific climate. You will have noted that in our bilateral cooperation we have tried to take all the necessary measures.

I will inform my government of your concerns and I take the liberty of reminding you of the need, as pointed out by a senior French government official, for composure.

Secretary General:

Concern does not mean interference; France cannot confuse non-interference with indifference to the respect of fundamental freedoms. If there is one thing that the new government considers a fundamental principle of its policy, it is this. This is the cause of our concern; we have no information to diminish it; we have no desire for an internationalisation process. As you yourself say, the media is communicating in one direction, and bona fide officials, such as members of the ILO, could provide as broad a range of information as possible. It is for this reason that we express our interest in this initiative.

We intend to keep our composure, but our relations will surely be influenced by whether or not we believe that the democratisation process is not dead.

Mr Kulaga:

I had the opportunity not long ago of making a suggestion: a visit at a level set by you could satisfy your concerns.

Secretary General:

This suggestion may be difficult to carry forward. The testimony of a single person can be called into question—it would be interesting if it were addressed to several people from different countries who could freely talk to whomever they choose.

We will have the opportunity to meet again.

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve Diplomatic Archives Centre,
FRMAE_1939INVA/347, General Secretariat, 1955–1984**

TURKEY

91

**18 December 1981, Circular
by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
to the Turkish diplomatic posts instructing them
on responding to the questions on the Polish crisis**

REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
EMBASSY OF BELGRADE
URGENT

CIPHER (Incoming)

URGENT

FM: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

TO: 1- EMBASSIES 2- PERMANENT REPRESENTATIONS 3- TEL AVIV
MISSION

No.: DAGM-I-3068 (threethousandsixtyeight)

It is deemed appropriate to respond to the questions that may be raised by the press and foreign representatives in relation to the developments in Poland, within the following principles.

Turkey follows the developments in Poland closely and carefully. Turkey believes that Poland must solve her own problems, without any foreign intervention. Turkey is of the opinion that any foreign intervention in Poland may lead to serious, dangerous and undesirable consequences for the world peace, particularly for the stability in Europe. All countries having signed Helsinki Final Act must respect their commitments resulting therefrom.

It is true and natural that consultations at various levels and on diverse international matters are being conducted among NATO allies. Along with our allies, Turkey also follows the developments in Poland with utmost interest and concern.

Respectfully

Turkish Diplomatic Archives, 4222/19151915

FRANCE

92

21 December 1981, Note
by the French Director General of Political Affairs, Jacques Andréani,
for Minister Claude Cheysson

Paris, 21 December 1981

‘Poland: long-term view’

I.—Recognition of the status quo and quid pro quo expectations

If the Soviet Union achieves its objective in Poland—i.e. normalisation without overt action on its part and therefore, it believes, without significant Western reaction—it will have succeeded with its policy which has consistently been to benefit from the advantages of normal relations with the West while rejecting the disadvantages.

Since 1946, the USSR has controlled the Eastern Bloc countries. During the Cold War, Western countries criticised and denounced the situation, but it was clear that they would do nothing to change it. Since the 1960s they have endorsed and recognised it in various ways. But the ‘détente,’ in each of its different versions, claimed to have a certain quid pro quo for this arrangement:

– de Gaulle’s version of détente (1966–1968).—de Gaulle proposed a climate of ‘détente, understanding and cooperation’ to the USSR and the people’s democracies.

In return, he did not raise the issue of freedoms, but hoped for a national differentiation of the Eastern European countries, which could, each according to its own identity, gradually return to Europe and slowly gain a degree of freedom from Moscow, similar to how Western European countries are freeing themselves from US tutelage. He went to Moscow, and he also went to Warsaw and told the Poles: ‘Be yourselves, see a little farther, a little wider.’

Normalisation in Czechoslovakia in 1968 sounded the death knell for these hopes.

– Germany’s version of détente-Ostpolitik (since 1969)—this was the recognition by West Germany of the partition of Germany. By accepting this division, Brandt believed, they give themselves the means to overcome it. The quid pro quo was not precisely defined. It ranged from improved human contact to the development of tangible links between the two Germanies, to a vague hope of reunification.

Without making any important concessions, Moscow kept this hope alive and thus introduced a degree of polarisation into German behaviour, thwarting any possibilities of a unified Western policy towards the Soviet camp.

– US version of détente (culminating with Nixon around 1972–1973, but still existing latently).—for the US governments, the quid pro quo was twofold:

cooperation between the two superpowers to manage crisis situations around the world, and dialogue to control the strategic arms race.

According to the US, the quid pro quo should be broader and include a more radical modification of Soviet behaviour, hence the zigzagging US policy and ultimately the growing misunderstanding between the two superpowers, especially as even the modest hopes of the US leaders of the realist school were not realised (Soviet over-armament, activity in Africa, Afghanistan).

– Helsinki version of détente (signature of the Final Act, 1975)—in Helsinki, recognition of the status quo obtained by the USSR was more explicit (inviolability of borders), but the quid pro quo was theoretically greater and gave rise to hopes that would be even more cruelly dashed.

It took three forms:

a) Recognition that respect for human rights in every country is part of the context of international relations;

b) Respect of the ten principles of inter-state relations by each of the signatories with regard to each of the other parties, regardless of their mutual relations. In other words, the USSR was supposed to respect sovereignty and refrain from violating territorial integrity and intervening in the internal affairs, not just of capitalist states, but also of ‘brotherly nations.’ This was in theory a negation of the Brezhnev doctrine;

c) Commitments for the freer movement of people, ideas and information (‘basket III’).

II—The Soviet Union has proved incapable
of making any changes which would address the hopes thus raised.

The Western countries generally judged the behaviour of the Soviet Union in relation to these ‘promises of détente’ with great restraint, and France was the first among them to consider that the security interests of Russia should be taken into account. No one has ever considered demanding that the USSR withdraw its forces from the Eastern European countries where they are stationed, or to allow them to develop Western-style institutions. No one, with the exception of the Germans, but in a perfunctory manner, has even dared to raise the question of German reunification, which is perfectly legitimate under international law. No one has claimed to demand—as Jean Laloy²⁴⁰ suggests—the application of the Yalta

²⁴⁰ Jean Laloy—a French diplomat with a degree in Russian, was General de Gaulle’s interpreter during his meeting with Stalin in 1944. Director of Europe at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1956 to 1961, he was one of the negotiators of the Treaty of Rome and contributed to the Franco-German rapprochement. He directed, until 1974, the Diplomatic Archives. He was then appointed head of the General Directorate of the Quai d’Orsay, that of Cultural Relations, which he left in 1977 for the presidency of the Franco-German Interministerial Commission. In 1978, he was one of the co-founders of *Commentaire*, a ‘political and

agreement to Poland—the real one, not the legendary one—i.e. free elections in Poland. However, all of them more or less hoped that, at the price of a policy that gave respectability to artificially implanted communist regimes and the Soviet Union and its ‘allies’ important economic advantages, it would be possible to obtain a more humane treatment for these countries, a drawdown in methods of terror, and a system of management more in keeping with a cultural and political tradition that created these profoundly European countries.

In 1968, the Czechoslovak communists, knowing that it was impossible to extract their country from the Soviet sphere of influence, sought to establish a system in which an unattainable party pluralism would be replaced by the internal pluralism of the communist party.

In 1980–81, the spokesmen of the Polish workers, aware that recognition of the primacy of the communist party was a prerequisite for anything, tried to reconcile this recognition with the establishment of a system of control and dialogue between the party and the real popular forces.

Both experiences could have been reconciled, with a certain amount of imagination and compromise, with the preservation of the Soviet Union’s strategic interests.

These repeated examples show the unsuitability of the type of organisation established in the Soviet Union to deal with the problems of the central European countries, its inability to tolerate different management methods within its sphere of control, and ultimately reveals a fundamental intrinsic weakness of the Soviet system. At the same time, however, these recurring events cast considerable doubt on the significance of the policy of ‘détente’ analysed above and suggest that our thinking on the future of Europe over the next few years must include a review of the underlying foundations of this policy.

III—Language to be used

It is not a question of returning to a position of forcing a change in the situation in Eastern Europe. Rather, it is a question of making the Soviet Union understand that events which spontaneously arouse such strong emotions in the populations of Western Europe are likely to make it impossible to continue a relationship which permanently provides the Soviet Union—although it has become so commonplace we no longer notice it—with complete political satisfaction and even greater economic advantages.

These considerations lead us to propose an approach that would include:

A) An assessment of the Polish situation with regard to the principles governing East-West relations

intellectual journal? Jacques Andréani probably refers to the article that Jean Laloy published in its Summer 1981 issue under the heading ‘Europe since 1945: constraint or reconciliation?’

A true assessment can only be made by considering the Soviet system as a whole.

We must definitively put an end to the dispute regarding the degree of Soviet involvement in the repression. We must come to the simple truth that the internal crisis which provoked the repression would never have occurred if the country had not been subjected to daily, generalised intrinsic interference by the Soviet Union over thirty-six years.

However, Poland was the only country in the East where this interference had been limited, since the strength of the Polish people's resistance was felt for the first time in 1956—compliance with the Soviet model meant excluding the collectivisation of rural areas and anti-religious repression, and a certain *de facto* freedom of expression was tolerated. Did this freedom contribute to producing the labour movement, and will its repression result in the removal of concessions made since 1956?

We can now say that the source of the problem lies in the incompatibility of the Soviet model with the situation of other Eastern European countries and in the inability of the regimes to find suitable forms.

As regards regulatory matters, it should be said that the question is whether the Helsinki principles must be respected by all states regardless, or whether the Soviet Union maintains the right to disregard them, in the name of ideological solidarity, in its relations with the countries it has drawn around it to form a 'bloc.'

We need to revisit this notion of 'bloc' and make it clear that the relationship between the countries of the Atlantic alliance is based on respect for sovereignty. In Europe there is an alliance of free countries and a 'bloc.'

B) Serious questions for the future

Will the Soviet Union continue to remain incapable of making the minimum concessions necessary to break the one-way communication between East and West? Will it be able to free itself from this fundamentally asymmetrical conception which allows it to appropriate all rights—the most basic being the right to security—and refuse to recognise them for others? Will it accept that in some cases it has to back down—as the West has often done and as it should accept in Afghanistan (withdrawal of its troops) and in Poland (acceptance of a greater degree of autonomy without sacrificing its security interests)?

We must make it clear that if the answer remains negative for too long, a return to the Cold War will be inevitable.

C) Suggesting a risk of questioning certain acceptances

There is no better way to make the USSR understand that the limit has been reached than suggesting that the time for *détente*, based on the 'acceptance of realities,' may soon be over.

This objective would already be partly achieved if we were to assert that the root of the problem is the artificial and inadequate nature of the regime that is being imposed on Poland.

It would also be a great step forward if, on certain occasions, we were to remain silent on the German problem and come out in support of what is still, in theory, our premise, namely that we are in favour of German reunification through peaceful means. It is not a question of making this premise a central theme of our policy, but of alluding to it publicly on multiple occasions. This would help to ‘depolarise’ German opinion, and make the USSR think about the consequences of its current policy.

Similarly, Jean Laloy’s suggestion that free elections in Poland are the unfulfilled promise of the Yalta agreement is very welcome. However, I think that here too, we should limit ourselves to vague references to subtly raise awareness.

Finally, I propose that, with the same aim, a government official should take the opportunity to recall that France—like the other Western countries—has never recognised the annexation of the Baltic States by the USSR, in application of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact which enabled the Soviet Union and Germany to partition Poland between them.²⁴¹

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Archives Center of La Courneuve,
FRMAE_447INVA/147, General Directorate of Political Affairs, files Gabriel Robin
(1979–1981), Jacques Andréani (1981–1984), Pierre Morel (1985–1986)**

²⁴¹ The document was communicated to the following recipients: Francis Gutmann, Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Jacques Martin, Deputy Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Jacques Dupont, Deputy Director of Political Affairs; Jean-Claude Paye, Director of Economic and Financial Affairs, Bertrand Dufourcq, Director for Europe, Stanislas Gergorin, Head of the Analysis and Forecasting Centre, François Scheer, Director of the Minister’s Office, Denis Delbourg, Minister’s Office, Harris Puisais, French politician, Special Adviser to the Minister.

UNITED STATES**93****21 December 1981, Memorandum****by the Executive Secretary of the US Department of State, L. Paul Bremer,
for the US President's Acting Assistant
for National Security Affairs, James Nance**

Washington, December 21, 1981

Secret/Sensitive

SUBJECT: Discussion Paper for NSC Meeting

Attached is a paper for discussion at this morning's NSC meeting.

L. Paul Bremer, III

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the U.S. Department of State.

Revised December 20, 1981

SECRET

U.S./Allied Responses to Developments in Poland

In order to prevent further deterioration in Poland, establish the conditions for reconciliation which would preserve the gains and prospects of reform, and deter the Soviet Union from further interference, we are confronted with the necessity to begin now to make difficult choices vis-a-vis both Warsaw and Moscow. These actions would be taken unilaterally as well as within NATO and with other key nations.

Our objectives should be (1) to forestall further deterioration in Poland, and to keep the situation reversible and reconcilable; and (2) to put the Soviets on notice that we hold them accountable for Poland and that their complicity has costs. In pursuing these objectives, we should bear in mind the need (1) while taking actions against the USSR/Poland, to keep some measures in reserve as deterrence should the situation worsen or the Soviets intervene physically; and (2) to prevent a split in the West of the kind that took place after the invasion of Afghanistan. If our decisions even on purely national actions are to achieve their objectives, we must bring the Allies with us.

The following list summarizes actions which already have been taken and additional steps which we should now consider:

A. ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN (in NSC memorandum to the President of December 19)

We have:

- 1) suspended shipment of remaining 6,000 tons of surplus dairy products to Poland;
- 2) suspended renewal of export insurance for Poland;
- 3) activated international organizations (UN SYG, UNHRC, ILO) to weigh in on human rights questions;

We have also decided, for the present:

- 1) to go ahead with humanitarian food aid for Poland provided we can get guarantees from the Polish authorities that we can monitor distribution;
- 2) not to invoke the 'exceptional circumstances' clause of the 1981 Polish debt agreement at this time;
- 3) not to hold up the International Harvester license for exports to the Soviet Union;

B. OTHER ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS pending consultation with the Allies/further consideration on our part (some of these measures are referred to in NSC memorandum to the President of December 19)

Vis-a-Vis Poland

- 1) Suspend Polish request for IMF membership.
- 2) Establish the 'no exceptions' policy for Poland in COCOM.
- 3) Reconsider allowing Polish fishing fleet access to U.S. waters.
- 4) Presidential letter to Jaruzelski.
- 5) Advise banks that we are not invoking the 'exceptional circumstances' clause, and thus are not seeking a default situation.
- 6) Seek Papal visit to Warsaw.

Vis-a-Vis the Soviet Union/others

- 1) Letter to Brezhnev making clear that we hold the USSR accountable for its obvious role in Polish situation and that we are reviewing entire relationship accordingly.
- 2) Inform Soviets that January 26–28 Haig–Gromyko meeting is under review in light of Polish developments.
- 3) Briefly but publicly recall Ambassador Hartman for consultations.
- 4) Suspend negotiations on a new maritime agreement and impose strict port access regime when current agreement expires December 31.
- 5) Refuse to set a new date for talks on a long-term grain agreement.
- 6) Seek rapid ratification in NATO capitals of Spanish Alliance membership.
- 7) Suspend Aeroflot flights to the U.S.

8) Work with the Allies to seek a halt to the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union.

9) Reconsider the International Harvester license for sale of combine technology (the license has already been issued).

10) Reconsider issuance of an export license to Caterpillar for 200 pipelayers.

11) Add Polish situation to our arguments for a major tightening of COCOM controls on exports to the Soviet Union.

12) High-level trip to consult with Allies, Japanese, Chinese.

13) Call for UNSC/UNGA action.

14) Warn other Warsaw Pact countries.

C. ADDITIONAL ALLIANCE STEPS WE SHOULD BEGIN NOW TO CONSIDER

Some of the steps listed above are included in the 'menu' of sanctions approved in NATO for consideration in the event of massive Soviet intervention in Poland. The following list contains all remaining elements of the NATO-agreed package; they are directed fundamentally at the Soviet Union. It should be noted that, while our position has been that all of these measures should be adopted if circumstances dictate, the Allies have agreed only to their inclusion as elements of a 'menu' from which choices would be made. It clearly will be no easy matter, even in the event of Soviet invasion, to get Allied unanimity on the tougher measures.

Political Measures

1) Hold emergency NATO Foreign Ministers meeting.

2) Call for emergency UNSC meeting and, if appropriate, a meeting of the General Assembly.

3) Postpone resumption of Madrid CSCE meeting (and/or call for emergency CSCE meeting on Poland—this variant has not been discussed in NATO).

4) Make protest demarches where and as appropriate.

5) Conduct extensive campaign of public condemnation.

6) Recall of ambassadors for consultations.

7) Postpone resumption of INF negotiations, now set for January 12 (this is technically a U.S. unilateral action but requires Allied support).

8) Suspend MBFR negotiations.

9) Suspend all exchanges of high level visits with Warsaw Pact states participating in repression or intervention in Poland.

10) Impose additional restrictions on Soviet and other participating Warsaw Pact embassies and organizations, including limits on travel and staff (i.e., perhaps impose equal ceilings).

11) Suspend major cultural, academic, scientific and athletic exchanges and events and, if applicable and necessary, the execution of cultural agreements.

Economic Measures

- 1) Embargo on exports to the Soviet Union affecting all new contracts for exports.
- 2) Denial of new official credits, credit guarantees and credit insurance for exports to the Soviet Union.
- 3) Restrictions on Soviet commercial aviation to and from other Allied countries.
- 4) Restrictions on Soviet use of Allied ports and of Allied use of the Trans-Siberian land bridge.
- 5) Commitment to accelerate review of proposals to tighten long-term COCOM restrictions on technology transfer to the Soviet Union.
- 6) Reduction of Soviet non-diplomatic, commercial representation.
- 7) Suspension of participation in Siberian natural gas project.

Attachment

Memorandum From the U.S. National Security Council Staff
to U.S. President Reagan.

Washington, December 19, 1981

Secret

Poland

The discussion this morning will be broken down into three parts. You will be requested to make decisions on the following points:

I. Rescheduling Polish Debt

A. Should the U.S. invoke the 'exceptional circumstances' clause of the 1981 debt agreement? 'Exceptional circumstances' is having a country refuse to give an extension on credit owed them.

B. Assuming the U.S. commercial banks are not paid, should the U.S. government communicate to the banks its desire not to have default proceedings at this time.

1. Contact leading banks and express U.S. desire to negotiate.

2. Contact leading banks and indicate U.S. government not invoking 'exceptional circumstances.'

II. Food Aid to Poland

A. Last April we sold \$71 million worth of dried milk and butter to Poland. Approximately 10% has not been delivered. Should that be stopped?

B. CARE has a program to distribute tens of thousands of CARE packages to the elderly and infirm. Should we hold up shipments on this until we have guarantees that we can monitor its distribution?

III. Economic Measures

Against Poland

- A. Take actions to suspend Polish request for membership in IMF.
- B. Reconsider allowing Polish fishing fleet access to U.S. waters.
- C. Seek Allies' agreement as a 'no exception' policy for Poland in COCOM.
- D. Suspend renewal of export insurance for Poland by The Ex-Im Bank.

Against USSR

- A. Suspend negotiations indefinitely as a maritime agreement.
- B. Refuse to set a new date for talks or a long-term grain agreement.
- C. Encourage Western banks not to lend \$200 million Soviets now want to borrow.
- D. Add the Polish situation to our arguments for a major tightening of COCOM controls in exports to the Soviets.
- E. Work with our Allies to seek a halt to the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviets.
- F. Reconsider the International Harvester and Caterpillar export licenses.

Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room

UNITED STATES

94

21 December 1981, Minutes
of a US National Security Council Meeting
(excerpts)

Washington, December 21, 1981, 10:30 a.m.

Secret

SUBJECT: Poland

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

State

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Deputy Secretary William P. Clark

Treasury

Secretary Donald T. Regan

OSD

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

Commerce

Secretary Malcolm H. Baldrige

Agriculture

Secretary John R. Block

OMB

Mr. William Schneider, Jr.

CIA

Director William J. Casey

USUN

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

USTR

Mr. David Macdonald

JCS

Admiral Thomas B. Hayward

White House

Mr. Edwin Meese III

Admiral James W. Nance

Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC

Dr. Norman A. Bailey

Dr. Allen J. Lenz

Dr. Richard E. Pipes

Minutes

Nance.

Mr. President, we have one agenda item, today—Poland

At the last meeting (Saturday, December 19) you made several decisions that it may be useful to review.

You decided that we will not invoke the ‘exceptional circumstances’ clause of the 1981 debt agreement at this time.

That we will contact leading banks and advise them that the U.S. does not intend to invoke ‘exceptional circumstances’ at this time.

About ten percent of \$71 million worth of dried milk and butter we agreed to provide Poland has not yet been delivered. You decided that we will withhold shipment of this material until further notice.

You decided that we will continue shipment of food packages via CARE.

In other economic measures against Poland you decided that we will discuss with our Allies in an attempt to gain unanimity:

- Suspending the Polish request for IMF membership;
- Setting a ‘no exceptions’ policy in COCOM on exports to Poland;
- Reconsidering allowing Polish fishing fleets access to U.S. waters.

You also decided that we would unilaterally suspend the renewal of export insurance for Poland by the U.S. Ex-Im Bank.

Various actions against the USSR were also reviewed, but action was deferred for further discussion at today’s meeting.

Based on last Saturday’s meeting, you also dispatched letters to three other heads of state.

Al, would you like to begin the discussion of actions that we might take against the USSR

Haig.

Yes, but perhaps Bill (Casey) would like first to give us an update on events of the weekend.

Casey. [...] ²⁴²

Haig.

I want to go over the political logic of the situation. I share the CIA assessment. There was little change in the situation over the weekend. There is widespread resentment among the people against the Polish government, but no major, overt

²⁴² Excerpts marked with [...] are not declassified.

challenge to it. It has been reported that Walesa has been moved to a military prison headquarters, but this is soft information.

It is most significant that Cardinal/Archbishop Glemp has ‘walked the cat back.’ He has shifted from a position of strong condemnation of the military law that has been imposed to a plea for moderation and for no bloodshed. We have reports that the Polish military visited every parish this last week and told the parish priests that there would be no reading on Sunday of a condemnation letter. Most of the parishes appear to have followed that lead, though there are some exceptions. The main message has been one of moderation—no bloodshed. While there have been some strong reactions, they have been isolated.

There are two Papal delegations in Poland as of Saturday night. Ambassador Meehan will be meeting with Cardinal Glemp today. Larry Eagleburger will be meeting in Rome with Monsignor Silvestrini.

We have also received a detailed analysis from our Embassy in Moscow. The theme of this message is that the Soviets are ‘cooling it.’ They are not preparing for intervention and, significantly, they are not preparing the Soviet people for intervention. Our embassy feels that—and on this we may differ with them—the Soviets are now willing to accept a Polish nationalist government as distinct from party rule. Party authority is no longer discussed in Moscow.

American Embassy in Moscow believes the Soviets are afraid to intervene because they know they can’t hack it. The Soviets are preparing food for shipment to Poland and preparing for a massive bailout of the Polish economy.

In Poland, the crackdown continues. But are the Soviets cracking down on Poland?

The position of our Allies is stiffening. There is a popular outcry in Britain, in France, and even Schmidt has been dragged along, kicking and screaming, by a Bundestag resolution.

So far, we have no discord in the Atlantic Community. Of course, we have not asked for any difficult actions yet.

Yugoslavia has condemned the situation in Poland, while within the Warsaw Pact, Hungary and Romania have been the least enthusiastic in endorsing happenings and Bulgaria has been the most enthusiastic.

Things are calm in Warsaw, perhaps aided by the fact that there was a great deal of snow over the weekend. Together with a communications blackout.

[...]

It is important that, so far, we have correctly avoided intensifying the crisis (by inflammatory messages to the Poles). RFE is now being jammed intensively, to a greater extent than in many years. VOA is getting through somewhat better.

One question to be examined is ‘Is it time for a strong letter to Jaruzelski and/or Brezhnev?’

With regard to sanctions, we don't want to let the assessment of the situation get out of hand with the actions we take.

I am not one who espouses the 'devil theory' that all is lost, that the Soviets are in charge, that Solidarity is dead, that all this is the case with or without Soviet intervention. I don't think we should proceed on these assumptions.

There is a second school of thought: that not all is lost; that we should husband our leverage and use it as the assessment changes.

I am of the second school, that all is not lost. In making our assessments of what to do, we should move before all is lost. However, a first question to be answered is 'What constitutes all being lost?'

Some see this (what is happening in Poland) as a fundamental unravelling of the Soviet empire (with that as the goal to be pursued). Others see advantages to us in a partial rollback (from what that Poles have achieved), but retaining many of the gains achieved as basis for a subsequent evolution toward further gains—that we should preserve the environment in which such gains can be achieved.

The real question: is some degree of repression tolerable from our standpoint, or do we stand only for total victory and are we prepared to pay the price necessary to achieve total victory?

Another question: Are we going to sit still (while events proceed in Poland), or are we going to apply our own pressure on other fronts? For example, Cuba, Afghanistan?

However, it seems to me the worst thing we could do at this time would be to divert world attention from Poland by U.S. muscle flexing elsewhere. Though, perhaps we could do something in Afghanistan without diverting world attention.

But we don't want to piddle away our resources before we have concluded that all is lost. You have authorized some actions. These may be seen by some as 'beating up on poor little Poland.' You will get criticism from some quarters on this. However, you will have to take a lot of flack no matter what you do, and you will want to make your decision on this matter based on what is right, not on the views of constituencies.

There are now new uncertainties in the situation in the attitude of the Church. I think we will want to delay pressure on the Soviets until we further assess the situation. However, we should go ahead with a letter to Brezhnev, advising the Soviets of the price they will pay if they continue.

That is my viewpoint. However, there may be different analyses from others.

The President.

Let me say something in the form of a positive question. This is the first time in 60 years that we have had this kind of opportunity. There may not be another in our lifetime. Can we afford not to go all out? I'm talking about a total quarantine on the Soviet Union. No detente! We know—and the world knows—that they are behind

this. We have backed away so many times! After World War II we offered Poland the Marshall plan, they accepted, but the Soviets said no.

Let's look at the International Harvester license. Kirkland said in a conversation with him that our unions might refuse to load ships. How will we look if we say yes (let U.S. exports to the Soviet Union proceed) while our unions—our own 'Solidarity'—won't load the ships.

I recognize that this is a great problem for International Harvester and for Caterpillar. It may mean thousands of layoffs. But, can we allow a go-ahead (on these transactions)? Perhaps we can find a way to compensate the companies if we say no. Perhaps put the items in inventory and use them by some other means. But can we do less now than tell our Allies, 'This is big Casino!' There may never be another chance!

It is like the opening lines in our declaration of independence. 'When in the course of human events...' This is exactly what they (the Poles) are doing now.

One other thing in addition to the Marshall Plan. The Soviets have violated the Helsinki Accords since the day it was signed. They have made a mockery of it. We are not going to pretend it is not so.

The Vice President.²⁴³

I have thought a lot about this problem over the weekend. I agree with the President that we are at a real turning point. I believe the President should really identify, in a speech, with Walesa and the Polish Ambassador.²⁴⁴ I really feel that—particularly at this Christmas time—the country is waiting for a more forward position. This is not a political matter, but one of the world leadership. If we appear to do nothing, we are not taking that position of leadership. The Church has stepped back, but if we have Allies that might act and do nothing, we are sending the wrong signal.

Weinberger.

I agree. I suggest that you (the President) talk to the world. It can have the same strong impact that the 'Zero Option' speech²⁴⁵ had. This is not a time for (undue) prudence or caution. The world needs to be told that it has a leader.

I understand the worry about creating another Hungary situation (referring to 1956 uprising in Hungary), but while we don't want to give the wrong impression (as to Western support to Poland), we do want to give an impression of support.

Let's not be mistaken. What Poland has now in Jaruzelski is a Russian general in Polish uniform. The Soviets are getting what they want.

²⁴³ This is a reference to George H.W. Bush, US Vice President from 20 January 1981.

²⁴⁴ This is a reference to Romuald Spasowski, Polish Ambassador to the United States who defected to the United States on 19 December 1981.

²⁴⁵ This is a reference to 'Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons,' 18 November 1981, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan*, 1981, pp. 1062–1067.

Offering Poland a Marshall Plan may be a good idea. But now, we have to stop licenses. We can't have a high moral position while we are licensing (to the Soviet Union).

This is a chance to seize the initiative. It is the time to do it. The President should make a talk, Wednesday or Thursday—maybe on Christmas day.

Baldrige.

I agree with the Vice President and Secretary Weinberger. This is a chance to lead the West. The Allies might support us, or we might proceed alone. But my only concern is that our actions may be seen as a slap on the wrist. Cancelling the International Harvester and Caterpillar deals would be a slap on the wrist. We should consider suspension of all validated licenses. This category includes all high-technology material. If we suspend all these licenses, coupled with International Harvester and Caterpillar deals, it would be much stronger. But it will be effective only if our Allies go along with at least part of it. Hopefully, there would be a chance of their doing so.

Casey.

We lose credibility if we fail to follow through now on this situation. We are seeing an unravelling of the communist economic system. However, the prospects of our Allies going along with us are fairly slim. But leadership is getting our Allies to go along. The President should speak to the world. We should go with across-the-board sanctions.

Block.

The Soviet communist system is collapsing of its own weight. I believe there should be a Presidential message, but we must be careful. If we play our trump card—total economic sanctions—at this time, what else can we then do? We must wait for the time to play that card. Not do it prematurely.

We need to learn more about what is happening to Solidarity, et al., before we make our move.

We need Allied support. We should try for that before we move off quickly.

The President.

Let me tell you what I have in mind.

We are the leaders of the Western world. We haven't been for years, several years, except in name, but we accept that role now. I am talking about action that addresses the Allies and solicits—not begs—they to join in a complete quarantine of the Soviet Union.

Cancel all licenses. Tell the Allies that if they don't go along with us, we let them know, but not in a threatening fashion, that we may have to review our Alliances.

The Helsinki Accords have been violated constantly.

I am thinking back to 1938 when there was a great united effort opportunity. In a speech in Chicago, FDR²⁴⁶ asked the free world to join in a quarantine of Germany. On that request, his brains were kicked out all over.

But I am also reminded of Warner Brothers action on its movie ‘Confessions of a Nazi Spy.’ Interests that wanted to continue selling movies in Germany—even though the Holocaust had already started—and offered to buy the film, including a profit for the makers, to prevent it from being shown (to protect their position in German markets).

But Warner Brothers refused to do it. The film was run and had as much impact as anything (in altering world opinion).

If we show this kind of strength—and we have labor and the people with us; if we demand that Solidarity get its rights; if that happens, nothing will be done. But if not, then we invoke sanctions (against the Soviet Union) and those (of our Allies) who do not go along with us will be boycotted, too, and will be considered to be against us, then...

The wheat and Olympics²⁴⁷ actions after Afghanistan were ridiculous. It is time to speak to the world.

Block.

You are saying we expect the Soviets and the Polish government might back off and give Solidarity back its rights?

The President.

Yes. We would expect things to go back to the previous position and negotiations to start from there. There could also be appeals to compromise.

Regan.²⁴⁸

I see a problem on three levels.

The immediate problem: we want to send some message. But we do not want to incite street fighting. But a message of hope—at this season they would particularly appreciate it.

Second, Al has to have time to get our Allies on board without bullying them. Show them where we stand and where we are heading. This takes time.

Third, we go it alone, if necessary.

The President.

I agree, we should not surprise (our Allies). But there are some things we can do now, plus we tell them this is what we are prepared to do.

Haig.

May I make a comment, please?

²⁴⁶ This is a reference to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, US President from March 1933 to April 1945.

²⁴⁷ This is a reference to the US boycott of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games in protest of the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

²⁴⁸ This is a reference to Donald Regan, US Secretary of the Treasury from 22 January 1981.

This is the first time in my memory that we have a pretty solid consensus that the time has come to do something.

What I had in mind is that we send Eagleburger to Europe to talk tough. Also, your letter to the Allies is tough, and mine to the Foreign Ministers is even tougher.

But if we decide here today to step away from incremental pressure, the pipeline, the pipelayers and the rest—this is all a laugh.

You decide this situation requires you to use all your leverage. In Moscow they are still uncertain. If you now slap on a full court press, then they (the Soviets) can say to themselves they have nothing left to lose. On the other hand, we should know in a matter of hours or days whether there is going to be any pullback by the Polish government.

We had hoped Saturday night (December 19) to get a consensus on your line— isolate the Soviet Union wholly—hopefully with the Allies, but alone if necessary. Eagleburger will tell us.

However, we should not do this until we have, at least, warned the Soviets in an unequivocal way.

We have planned for a speech on Christmas eve or Christmas day. It would be nationally televised, but before the speech, ... we must decide that we are prepared to act.

The President.

That doesn't bother me at all. If we don't take action now, three or four years from now we'll have another situation and we wonder, why didn't we go for it when we had the whole country with us. I am tired of looking backward.

The Vice President.

I agree with Don and Al. We should take the time to consult, but giving a speech now is essential. What is missing is moral leadership. You should state how strongly you feel about Walesa—about Solidarity—about the Polish Ambassador and about the Polish people. You can speak in generalities without spelling out details. We don't want to delay.

We are at an emotional turning point. We can do the speech, but leave our options open. Identify with the turn in freedom.

Weinberger.

My worry is that we will wait too long because a single Ally can hold us back. If there is moderation in the Soviet position, the way to find out is not to hold back, but to make the speech, then if there are no results, spell out the specifics of what we will do. This would be similar to the 'zero option' speech.

Haig.

All that is being said is compatible. However, we are not dealing with giving a speech, but with setting policy. I would never give such a speech unless you are prepared to act. From my viewpoint, I don't think we are in a such a bad position now.

The President.

No—no litany of items is to be recited. But what we should say is an overall expression of what we will do in an absolute quarantine of all trade as President Roosevelt had proposed in 1938.

Haig.

To warn them again is an empty threat. When you speak (on this) it should be to inform them that you have decided to do something. It will take three days to find out our Allies' position.

The President.

That puts us up to Christmas eve.

Deaver.

There is a Wednesday time set for a broadcast.

Haig.

Mr. President, we don't know what the Church is doing, but we might be in trouble if you come down too hard.

The President.

We will make it known that this is what will be done if they do not release Walesa.

Kirkpatrick.

Mr. President, you must tell the truth. You must stand by the central core of this administration. The speech will be an important act. Your (earlier) statement was fine, but we, I am sure, have all read George Will's column, in which he describes the outrageous fact that we have taken no action. This is important.

Every day, beginning today, we should have some symbolic affirmation about the loss of freedom in Poland.

We don't have to warn anyone about anything.

You should receive the Polish Ambassador—in front of the TV cameras!

It is also time for a letter to Brezhnev. We must set this event in history. We need to do this vis-a-vis our Allies. We need to assure them that we plan to stand against oppression.

We might have to suspend the Helsinki Accords. There are also a number of other meaningful acts that we can take that are not dangerous.

One of our objectives is to prevent our own demoralization by inactivity. It made me ill this morning to read a Post article on Afghanistan where the Afghans are still fighting Soviet tanks with ancient rifles. Perhaps one of the things we can do is more effective aid to Afghanistan. We don't have to talk about it—just do it.

We should do something every day (on Poland) and culminate with a Christmas day speech.

Meese.

It is important, at this point, to get a list of actions to be taken and a list of actions not to be taken.

For example, are we going to cut off all trade? Part of trade? All communications, including flights and telephones? Are we going to cut diplomatic and political contacts? Are we going to recall our ambassador? What is our position in the UN?

We have to have all these things down in some detail so that we know what we are doing.

A letter to Brezhnev should be done today. Hartman should be brought home for consultations.

All departments should hold relevant actions in abeyance. We should slow licensing actions.

The President is seeing Polish leaders today; the Polish Ambassador tomorrow. We should begin work on the speech. And we should organize for the possibility of sanctions.

The President.

We have all these things we can do. We don't have to let them out. We can't close our embassy in Moscow. We would have to give back the seven Christians that are there. We should also keep arms limitations negotiations going for the time being, but be prepared to walk out.

Haig.

We don't want to close our embassy or break diplomatic contact. We don't want to get into a World War III scenario. We don't want to stop the INF talks, we don't want to create riots in Europe. In our talks, we should take a position that we are reviewing what to do. The Soviets may (as a result of other actions by us) walk out on the INF talks themselves.

The President.

Cutting off the talk would not punish the Soviets. The talk should, therefore, go ahead.

Haig.

We hope by Thursday to see if they have done enough to justify what we are planning. Of course, if the Soviets invade Poland, there can be no continuation of the INF talks.

The President.

I agree.

Haig.

I am still not at the point where I would recommend a speech. You probably will want to give one (after events unfold), but if Walesa starts talking with the government, we will have a different scenario.

_____.

We need to assess the total cost of our actions.

Baldrige.

There is approximately 3.8 billion of Soviet trade in 1981.

(There followed a brief, multi-party discussion of trade statistics.)

Nance.

My data shows that exports were \$3.853 billion; imports \$1.24 billion.

_____.
When is our next meeting?

Meese.

Tomorrow.

The Vice President.

I don't see why the speech needs to wait. What has been running is a moral identification with Walesa. No more time is needed to at least match that of Mitterand, a socialist leader. We have not clearly identified with the historic significance of this event. We need to exert moral leadership.

Haig.

There is a difference between what you are saying and what we are discussing. The President wants to take dramatic action. You want the President to be identified with events in Poland.

The Vice President.

We need a clear statement of what will happen (if repression continues in Poland).

Weinberger.

Delay avoids leadership. The time we needed this was yesterday.

Meese.

As a practical matter, the President's Wednesday speech cannot avoid addressing the Polish issue.

The President.

Yes, I cannot make a 'Santa Claus is Coming to Town' speech in this environment.

The letter to Brezhnev could contain carrots. It could address the fact that they haven't been able to provide their people the living standard they would like and that they would be in an even worse plight without trade (with the West).

We could say that we cannot continue trade (if events in Poland continue) and that we will press our Allies to follow us unless the Polish situation is alleviated. But again holding out our hand. Can he envision what it would be like if trade with the West were open? It would be a different, much better, world. He can have that one, giving up nothing, or the one that will result if we are forced to take trade-cutting actions.

Nance.

What about the National Christmas tree?

Haig.

Let us make no mistake. This (the Polish matter) is a matter of life and death for the Soviet Union. They would go to war over this. We must deal with this issue with this in mind and have no illusions. There are no 'cheap runs.' We cannot be concerned with various constituencies.

Deaver.

But haven't we ruled out military action? We did that the first day.

Haig.

But we may not have that option.

Weinberger.

Soviets may take military actions against Poland, but this is not world war.

Haig.

We are talking about the way in which we represent our case.

Meese.

We are 15 minutes behind schedule for a meeting with a women's group.

The President.

Remember, everyone stock up on Vodka!

The Reagan Files

CANADA

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**21 December 1981, Telegram
from the Canadian Ambassador in Warsaw, John M. Fraser,
to the Canadian Department of External Affairs**

Warsaw, 21 December 1981

Confidential

Poland Under Martial Law: Week Two

Number of people detained²⁴⁹ (still subject of wildly varying rumour and little hard info) and of organizations suspended or disbanded (apparently including such oddities as the Polish Academy of Fine Arts) probably exceeds what might reasonably have been expected. Otherwise, the martial law regime, while strict, has hardly been surprisingly so. The public reaction, while certainly hostile, has been more muted than it might have been.

2. Even the Katowice mine incident in which seven are admitted to have been killed had a certain ghastly inevitability. Having banned strikes, the authorities could hardly stand idly by when workers immobilized mines or factories. Most clearing operations seem to have been carried out without excessive violence, but luck ran out at Katowice. Rumours put the number of dead nation-wide at sixty—there is no way of knowing whether or not there is any truth in them, but there may well have been more fatalities than the seven acknowledged officially.

3. Warsaw is not a city in terror: comparisons with Budapest in 1956 are fatuous. There is, of course, much gloom and no little apprehension among Poles. As viewed by the train from Katowice 17 December, the countryside is in state of Arctic calm. One of our LES reports similar impressions driving from the DDR border to Warsaw.

4. If order has generally been restored, Poland's generals move on to an infinitely more difficult problem: how to get people back to productive work, little of which is being done now. There are some signs that the most repressive features of martial law may be eased in those parts of the country where the military government is satisfied that it has things under control. In other areas, notably Baltic coast and Silesia, the martial law regime is probably tightening. Some lessening of repression will surely be necessary if any kind of dialogue of cooperation with the workforce is to be possible. The release of a substantial number of detainees is probably key.

²⁴⁹ During the first week of Martial Law, about 5,000 people were interned. In all, over 10,000 people were interned during the entire Martial Law period.

I would suggest that it is also the most important single factor in determining our own reactions.

5. The first fierce days of military rule are not a good basis on which to decide whether or not the Polish government has forfeited indefinitely all claim to our sympathy. Given that the authorities must try to reach some kind of accommodation with the populace if the country is to function, it would seem sensible to wait and see how they go about it before flinging too many thunderbolts.

Fraser

**Library and Archives Canada, Department of External Affairs fonds, Vol. 16026,
File 20-POLND-1-4, Pt. 14**

ITALY

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**21–22 December 1981, Telegram
from the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw, Marco Favale,
to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Warsaw, 21–22 December 1981

Restricted
Absolute Priority

No. 4120/1-2

[Subject:] Italian position on the situation in Poland

Your 9417/c. of 19/12.

Given the urgency of the step, and not having found Czyrek, I asked to see his deputy Dobrosielski and pointed out to him—in the firm and precise terms referred to in your instructions, Hon. Minister, and of which Dobrosielski has taken written note—all the deep concern of the Italian government for the serious violations of the final act of Helsinki and our sincere hope for a return to the political method through a resumption of dialogue with the popular forces. And I asked him to report not only to Czyrek, to whom the Italian position was already well known, but also to General Jaruzelski.

Dobrosielski assured me that he would do so immediately.

With regard to the violation of the agreements, he did not entrench himself—as might be expected—behind the principle of non-interference interpreted according to the manner of the East. Instead, he expressed himself in terms that I try to refer verbatim below:

The full significance that Poland has always attributed to the Helsinki Final Act is well known, as well as the contribution it has given to its elaboration and conclusion.

Poland's adherence to the political method remains valid. But the Helsinki acts could not foresee—and did not foresee—a borderline situation such as the one that occurred in Poland, and which left no other choice: it was a question of avoiding civil war. The responsibility lies with the extremist leaders of Solidarnosc.

But it is General Jaruzelski's intention to 'return to the political method as soon as possible': the reforms will continue and an 'authentic national consensus' can be formed in which 'all social and political forces are represented.' 'Much will depend on the attitude of Western countries and on the continuation of economic and financial cooperation between them and Poland.' 'We don't want humiliating gift packages or charity.' 'We must be on guard against the wave of propaganda unleashed abroad on Poland and which can be dangerous.'

‘We could not allow the life of the country to become paralysed and the impression spread throughout the world that Poles do not know how to govern themselves.’

Almost in a whisper he then added—and it seemed to me a significant admission—«I don’t know if (in the absence of our decision) there would have been ‘an intervention’».

In short, a speech that seems to me to fall within the logic of the need to return to the political method, but in the perspective and within the limits referred most recently in my 4110. (A senior ministry official told a colleague of mine: “There’s no way to rule a country if soldiers are in the streets’ and announced a speech by Jaruzelski to the country for next Wednesday). Moreover, that speech, as regards economic aid, expresses, albeit in a much more mild and diplomatic form, the counter-conditioning posed by Czyrek last Friday and referred in my 4086.

I then pointed out to Dobrosielski that the government and all the Italian political and popular forces considered the restoration of civil and personal freedom as prerequisite and direct implication of this return to political dialogue.

Dobrosielski recorded. In this regard, I can only refer to my 4110. There, I expressed the belief that the Polish government’s intention or its interest in a political solution to the crisis goes towards the release of the internees, but ‘adequately discriminating’ and above all taking precautions against groups and small groups of ‘dangerous and irreducible’ elements that *Trybuna Ludu* banishes every day by name.

Of particular concern appears the fact that Geremek has been now added to the list, denounced ‘as one of the brains behind Radom’s infamous statements.’ I also felt that he would have been branded as a ‘Jew’ (and if true, this would not be surprising: anti-Semitism has always been a classic instrument of reaction in Poland since the Empire era).

Geremek’s moderating role, as Walesa’s adviser, was well known not only to me, but also, among others, to the German Ambassador and to the French Ambassador, who, among other things, had had him as his guest with Walesa during the meeting with Cheysson.

Given that, perhaps on the basis of family responsibility, he was arrested together with his son in the circumstances indicated in my 4054, (and I don’t even know if he is still in the Warsaw prisons or if he has been transferred to one of the internment camps in Northern Poland during this very bitter Polish winter), I begged Dobrosielski to tell General Jaruzelski that the denunciation of the *Trybuna Ludu* was unfounded and that the prompt release of Geremek (and his son) would be a gesture, as morally due as for all the others internees, certainly appreciated in Italy and Western Europe.

Dobrosielski seemed sensitive to my words and assured me that he would immediately pass them on to General Jaruzelski.²⁵⁰

Favale

ASMAE, DGAP VI, 1981, b. 240, fasc. *Polonia. Stato di assedio, dicembre 1981, A/1 Pol.*

²⁵⁰ The first part of telegram was sent on December 21 and the second one on December 22. It was also sent for Information by Office VI of the DGAP to Embassies and Representations, to the Consulate General in Berlin and to Offices II, IV, and VII of the DGAP.

FRANCE

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22 December 1981, Note**by the Deputy Director of the Europe Directorate, Georges-Marie Chenu,
for the Director for Europe, Bertrand Dufourcq**

Paris, 22 December 1981

'Foreign journalists in Poland'

On Friday 18 December at 9.30 p.m., I summoned Mr ZARFARZ²⁵¹ to protest the Polish government's obstruction of foreign journalists exercising their profession.

I explained to him that the conditions under which the journalists were working were unacceptable: restrictions on movement, closure of telex machines and, from Thursday 17 December, censorship of texts transmitted by the only telex machine with an international connection. Such obstacles are not only contrary to the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act, but they are also detrimental to the Polish government, as they raise serious concerns about the conditions under which the state of siege is being applied.

The Minister Counsellor of the Polish Embassy pleaded exceptional circumstances, the temporary nature of the measures taken and their forthcoming relaxation.

In the ensuing conversation about the number of people arrested, my interlocutor spontaneously asserted that as far as Geremek was concerned, 'things could go wrong for him because he was largely responsible for what had happened in Poland.' I warned my interlocutor that if anything happened to this privileged adviser of Lech Walesa, it would have massive repercussions in France.

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve Diplomatic Archives Centre,
FRMAE_1939INVA/347, General Secretariat, 1955–1984**

²⁵¹ Sylwester Szafarz, a counsellor at the Polish Embassy in Paris.

UNITED STATES

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22 December 1981, Minutes of a US National Security Council Meeting

Washington, December 22, 1981, 2:30–4 p.m.

Secret

SUBJECT: Poland

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

State

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Deputy Secretary William P. Clark

Under Secretary Walter J. Stoessel

Treasury

Secretary Donald T. Regan

Defense

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

Agriculture

Secretary John R. Block

Commerce

Secretary Malcolm H. Baldrige

OMB

Mr. William Schneider, Jr.

CIA

Mr. William J. Casey

USUN

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

USTR

Ambassador William E. Brock

JCS

Admiral Thomas B. Hayward

Lt. General Paul F. Gorman

White House

Mr. Edwin Meese III

Mr. James A. Baker III

Mr. Michael K. Deaver

Admiral James W. Nance

Admiral John H. Poindexter

NSC

Dr. Norman A. Bailey

Dr. Allen J. Lenz

Dr. Richard E. Pipes

Minutes

The President.

They tell me that cars in California are already displaying 'Solidarity' stickers.

The President then departed for 15 minutes.

Nance.

Mr. President, with your permission, I will run down quickly a list of decisions made at our previous meeting.

The President.

All right.

Nance.

Briefly reviewed the discussions in the meeting that day between President Reagan and Ambassador Spasowski of Poland. (The exchange is recorded in some detail in file #8107302.)

Casey.

I haven't much new to report today. The Soviet plan seems to be working. There are reports of pockets of resistance. The rest of the country is acquiescing. In the coal mines—in some factories. We have a report that many Soviet KGB officers are involved in the operation.

Nance.

Secretary Haig, will you explain events and the options facing us?

Haig.

Yesterday I said we would need to discuss why the church has softened its line. We now have a report from Ambassador Meehan on his conversations with Archbishop Glemp. The church is under pressure from the government. Government representatives told the church last week that the message scheduled to be read last Sunday was too tough. When bloodshed began, the Archbishop felt it necessary to go for moderation.

Walesa is alive and apparently vigorous. But he does not want to negotiate with a Soviet agent (Jaruzelski). Walesa is a card for playing in the future. He is a protege of Cardinal Wyszynski. They don't dare kill him at this time.

We have no indication from the authorities of a willingness to negotiate either with Solidarity or the church.

The Army's role is still fairly subdued. They are using special security forces.

We have a Swedish report that the Soviets and the Czechs intend to intervene on December 26, but no verification of it.

The strikes continue in the Silesian coal fields. Thirteen thousand coal miners are holed up in a coal mine. The government apparently intends to starve them out.

The Western bankers in Zurich this morning took a hard line. They refused the Polish request to loan \$350 million to the Poles for interest payments and they also refused to begin discussion of rescheduling of Poland's 1982 debt payments.

I had a call last night from Irv Brown of the AFL/CIO. He feels that resistance in Poland is strong and will be growing. He says 'Don't be influenced by the banks' (don't bail out the Poles). European bankers believe that they will be compensated either from the foreign hard currency accounts in Poland or by the USSR.

The Brandt statement of yesterday on behalf of Socialist International was a disaster. A rebuttal press statement is being formulated.

The Brezhnev interview with Marvin Kalb skirted Poland, but it was held on December 4, prior to recent events, so it is of little significance to this issue.

Larry Eagleburger called me twice this morning. He reports the Italians are vigorous, staunch and supportive of actions to be taken. Colombo is good!

But in Bonn, Genscher is opposed to initiatives now, since the Soviets have not intervened. He agreed to discuss economic sanctions, however, and to consider imposing them before they (the Soviets) intervene.

There is vigor lacking, however.

Hormats, in his discussions, sees a spectre of softness and opposition to action at this time. The reactions range from the Brits to the French (most vigorous), with the Germans softest.

These papers (referring to the handout provided for the meeting) that we have put together present steps that we can consider and provide pros and cons of each step and some assessment.

The first paper outlines actions that can be taken against Poland.

The second paper lists measures against the Soviets.

One of the themes throughout the assessment, Mr. President—and all those that we have discussed are included in the paper—is a strong emphasis on the Soviet steps on Allied unity. As of today, on economic sanctions—and on some political actions—Europe would break with us.

The President.

Well, Al, it seems to me on this we make up our own minds on what is right to do. We say to the Soviets tomorrow, right, we will proceed with actions, without spelling them out—actions that will isolate them politically and economically. We reduce political contact; we do all we can to persuade our Allies to come along, unless and until martial rule is ended in Poland and they return to an antebellum state. We have to deal with our own labor movement. They are shutting off shipments to Poland, though church shipments are still going.

Haig.

Yes they are still going. Last shipment was one week ago.

The President.

I don't know whether Red Cross aid is going or not.

The Vice President.

Cardinal Krol mentioned they were getting receipts for the food deliveries.

The President.

For that handled via their own distribution?

Haig.

Another thing I would like to call to your attention, Mr. President. It is vitally important that whatever we do, we do officially to Brezhnev and Jaruzelski so that they are on notice. They should be offered an alternative. We should include a deadline by which we expect a response. Now, if we want to get out a list of actions we are taking tomorrow night before we have a response to our threats, we risk losing the Europeans before we even get started.

You can lay out the human rights considerations tomorrow night. That keeps us flexible. Keeps our options open with no public threats.

You can highlight that you hold the Soviets responsible, but it is too soon for threats unless you want to break with our Allies.

The President.

The thing that bothers me—the constant question is—that we continue to deplore, but isn't there anything we can do in practice? Those 'chicken littles' in Europe, will they still be 'chicken littles' if we lead and ask them to follow our lead?

Haig.

The answer, Mr. President is 'yes and no.' They are not the most courageous people (European leaders), but they have more at stake than we do. They are closer to Poland than we are.

The President.

I know.

Haig.

We ought to be careful (with our demands) until we decide we want a break with them over this matter (if that is what it comes to).

The President.

If they (the Polish government) don't cancel martial law, can we yet do these things?

Haig.

We will be in for a long, torturous period with the continuation of martial law and negotiations (between Solidarity and the Polish Government) going on. It is difficult for us to kick over the traces now—to go all out—and then to be accused of triggering what will probably happen anyway (a Soviet intervention into Poland).

Weinberger.

Concerning our Allies and the stakes we have in this matter, we have over half a million people in Europe. It is comfortable for the Europeans to do nothing. If you take the lead and give a strong speech, they will be in an uncomfortable (moral) position and they may be dragged along with our actions.

We should be taking stronger action than just wringing our hands. That (wringing of hands) is what the Soviets want. They (the Polish government) can begin meaningless negotiations with Solidarity that will please Europe. We should have a list of nine things we can do. Each is, in itself, a pin prick, but they cause anguish and pain. They evidence our seriousness. They influence public and industrial labor movements. It is morally right to take a stand—a position of leadership.

It is easy to delay, to do nothing. If we delay, we will allow them to crush the movement in Poland. We won't push them (the Soviets) into intervening in Poland. (They will do it if it suits their needs.) As Ambassador Spasowski has said, they will march in for their own reasons, not because of what we do.

I hope your speech is along the lines of your statement yesterday.

Haig.

We agreed on a tough speech, but not on measures. We are not debating whether to do tough things—the timing is the issue.

Weinberger.

The longer we wait, the more the situation solidifies. Tomorrow night you should mention measures, not handwringing. These papers are an eloquent plea for doing nothing. We should be considerably bolder. There is a difference here between our recommendations.

The President.

Ambassador Spasowski, in his talk with me this morning, asked that I make a call for a lighted candle in every window on Christmas night.

Haig.

That's not the kind of act that Secretary Weinberger is saying we should take.

Meese.

It seems to me the candle is important, but we need something else. The things on the list, as far as Poland, are the very minimum that we can do. We should debate about what we want to put the heat on the Soviets.

Kirkpatrick.

In thinking about dealing with our Allies and if we take significant actions they will break with us as Al says. I would like to remind you that they do that frequently. Five of them went against us on a Mexican resolution on El Salvador, counter to our interests. The French Foreign Minister led the effort. All except Britain went along. Britain abstained. On the Abu Ein issue France abstained. They break with us frequently. They don't worry that much about breaking with us.

Haig.

I recommend we stop philosophizing and go down the list one by one.

First, Poland—what is the speech to cover?

Then the USSR—what actions now? what later?

Roman I is actions already approved. We are suspending consideration of the \$740 million Polish request for grain. You could state that in your message.

Weinberger.

We should emphasize there was no assurance that such assistance would go to the people.

The President.

We could say we'll go ahead in food if allowed to monitor that it goes to the people.

Haig.

The next item is the pipeline. I(c) is the letter to Jaruzelski, you already read it. I(d) is already done, but this should not be raised in the speech.

The President.

All of that is included in the item about food.

Haig.

You have sent a letter to Jaruzelski.

Weinberger.

What is its general theme?

(A detailed discussion of the letters to Jaruzelski and Brezhnev followed.)

Haig.

You can say in your message that you have sent a letter to Jaruzelski.

The President.

(Reads to himself the draft of the letter to Jaruzelski.) This seems to have the right tone.

Haig.

(Continuing down the list of actions against Poland). We have suspended ExIm credits.

Regan.

This is not significant enough to put in your speech.

Meese.

We should say we are suspending all financial aid.

Baker.

I suggest we go through the list. Decide what you want to do on each item.

Haig.

Mr. President, we decided yesterday we should not invoke the exceptional circumstances clause. The unions might disagree with us on this one.

The President.

Will it affect the people?

Haig.

This one will affect the banks. They took a strong position this morning in not backing off (on lending more money to the Poles to pay interest on their debt.)

The President.

(Continuing down the list.) We can withhold fishing rights, suspend consideration of IMF for Poland, and suspend their aviation rights in the U.S.

Regan.

I want to add a footnote on the item in the paper concerning the IMF. The paper is somewhat incorrect. The U.S. does not have an effective veto. We have only 20 percent of the total votes.

Weinberger.

But if we don't try, we are giving them hard currency.

The President.

Then we can oppose consideration by the IMF of Poland's application.

The acts on Poland. At that point (in the speech after listing actions against Poland) we say who is responsible—the USSR and Brezhnev. Now we go down and see what we have here (actions against the USSR).

I like the line 'seek to isolate the USSR economically.' That may take a lot away from them.

And I would think—that Marshall Plan thing—then to say, if this is done, we will cooperate. This should come near the end.

I oppose withdrawing from the INF negotiations. That would help them (the Soviets). We are trying in INF negotiations to get them to give up missiles.

I am looking down the list here. I think to consider Helsinki null and void would hit them hard.

Haig.

Europe will go bonkers if we do that.

The President.

Why pretend we have an agreement if they violate it constantly?

Haig.

You should warn the Soviets if you are going to do this. You will get their attention if you do so.

Casey.

We cannot terminate right away...

Block.

I think Al's actions are pretty well thought out. Our Allies may not come along with us, but they are closer to Poland. But I believe they may well come along if we consult with them.

Deaver.

I suggest we go from the top of the page down.

Haig.

That's what I want to do.

The UN Resolution. We have talked about it. It would get us a kick in the teeth.

Kirkpatrick.

We must bear in mind that on January 1, the Soviet Union assumes the Presidency of the Security Council. It is a very unfortunate change. It will be more difficult for

us to do anything. Also, Poland becomes a member of the Security Council on January 1.

Haig.

I recommend we hold up on this until we look at the rest of the list.

Kirkpatrick.

I recommend that if we are going to do it, we do so before December 31.

Weinberger.

Isn't there an advantage in doing it—in taking a strong moral position?

Kirkpatrick.

There is a good chance the resolution would not do very well, but there is something to be said for doing it anyway.

Haig.

I suggest we look at the other items first.

The most important thing, Mr. President, is what actions you take with China.

The President.

But we can't do it in a speech.

Haig.

No, but we are talking with the Chinese. We might encourage possible Chinese pressure on Vietnam or Laos, for example. It is important for the Soviets to know—if the Chinese are receptive—that we are working with the Chinese. It will drive the Soviets out of their gourds!

Weinberger.

The price of doing that is Taiwan. There should be nothing in the speech about this.

Haig.

Number three is the tough economic issues, including a total economic embargo.

Weinberger.

But we don't have to do it all. We can cut the exports of oil and gas equipment; cut their maritime access; there are two licenses, Caterpillar and International Harvester, that can be revoked; we can refuse to engage in long-term grain agreement discussions. We can do much, short of a total embargo.

The President.

I could go—in the sense of what we are telling the Soviets, not in the speech—with the idea that the total embargo is the price of intervention. They have already intervened. Let them guess what we are doing next.

Brock.

Before we leave item C, if we start down this road—even cautiously—we will not hurt the Soviets much unless our Allies can join us. My concern is how we posture on this.

The President.

I know, but if we really believe this is the last chance of a lifetime, that this is a revolution started against this 'damned force,' we should let our Allies know they, too, will pay a price if they don't go along; that we have long memories.

Haig.

I thought we agreed yesterday that we should take strong actions, sweeping ones, not incremental. I thought you approved that yesterday. Did I misread the consensus? My problem is the timing in a speech tomorrow will bring the spectre of the terror of WWII on Christmas Eve.

Weinberger.

But when is the right time to warn of WWII?

Haig.

You've gone incremental. I don't think we want to list (for example) the pipelayers in the speech.

The President.

I'm not talking of the speech, but what we will do. Some of those items I will raise in the speech.

For example, we will deliver food provided it reaches the people. We will suspend ExIm insurance. We will suspend IMF. We will suspend their fishing rights. Then we can move on to the Soviets as being really responsible, then say what we are willing to do.

What can we put in a speech to mention Helsinki? O.K., maybe not in a speech. Maybe we call our Allies to review the Helsinki agreement.

The Vice President.

The speech is important, but we should allow diplomacy to work, but I don't like sending a letter to Brezhnev and Jaruzelski and reading it in the paper. I think we should do three things: First, set the paper's moral tone. Second, tell Jaruzelski what steps we are taking. Third, communicate to Brezhnev we concur. This is not a weak position. It is a responsible position. We should give them a chance to work their way out if they want to. You should get your speech out soon. Set the tone, say what you have done, but stop short of details. If they don't respond, you can act.

The President.

We can tell the people we have outlined specifics and that unless and until...

The Vice President.

Or you can say you have made a series of representations. Not detailing them is the way to do it.

Haig.

I agree. Another thing to think about. This letter will likely get public and private rebuttals. We will be accused of intervening in the situation. You may then proceed rapidly.

The President.

It's like the Air Force Plan that was formulated for use in Vietnam. The Air Force had 63 aerial targets, which they wanted to eliminate one by one. But they wouldn't let them do it. It would probably have saved 50,000 lives if we had done it.

If he (Brezhnev) answers with that crud about (our) intervening in Poland's internal affairs—bang, bang, we'll take steps. First, their trade reps on the way home; then how many of those are needed before he gets the point?

Haig.

I believe that will be the outcome. Depending on whether we use an incremental or a full court press—there will be a kickback from Europe. The British and the French will be with us. We may be able to isolate the Germans.

The President.

What do you mean, full court press?

Haig.

In the letter, there should be no specifics.

The President.

Both in the speech and in the other, I like to term it—it could lead to the economic and political isolation of the USSR.

Haig.

From the U.S.!

Weinberger.

The letters should be mailed before the speech. We would be willing to submit a draft.

Nance.

We have two drafts of the speech, Mr. President. We can put these options on a list.

You can check off which you want to adopt.

Weinberger.

The question now is how and what we should put in the letter.

Haig.

Then we have political options. We can reduce political contacts.

Meese.

We could detail categorically.

Haig.

No, I wouldn't even do that. We could use the phrase, 'would have a profound effect.'

Baldrige.

That would be enough. That preserves our flexibility.

Weinberger.

We have to say more than 'profound effect.'

Haig.

You mean like 'you can't have the pipelayers?'

Weinberger.

We must be more specific.

Baldrige.

We are talking on the whole range of economic and political measures.

Weinberger.

At this point we need drafts. We need something more specific to focus on.

Nance.

Mr. President, we will provide you drafts and check lists of the various actions that can be taken.

The President.

What is the speech time?

Answer.

9:00 p.m.

Block.

Let's remember, we are trying to achieve a rollback for the Polish people. We don't want Soviet tanks coming in and blood to flow.

Deaver.

We need a summary on what we have decided.

Meese.

We will take all the sanctions on this sheet except the Papal visit.

The letter to Brezhnev will indicate that specific steps will be taken unless he responds to our concerns.

Let me summarize what has been decided:

– The speech tomorrow night will indicate that letters have been sent to Brezhnev and Jaruzelski.

– It will list specific steps to be taken against the Polish government.

– If there is no Soviet response, we will select actions from a list without deciding which actions now.

The President.

The letter must be definite enough without details. The speech must be definite enough to erase the press accusations that we are doing nothing but talking.

Meese.

What about the UN?

Haig.

I am not opposed to that option. But I believe it will backfire on us.

Meese.

Mr. President, this organization bleeds frequently on the human rights issue. Should we not go to them?

Haig.

If we do, you should put it in your speech (that you are doing so.)

Deaver.

Some time tomorrow we should have a redraft of the speech.²⁵²

Haig.

We are not making a determination on anti-Soviet measures.

Baker.

Again, concerning what we have decided, we are going to do paragraph (d)?

The President.

All of those things that if the Soviets do not reply, which of these do we start goosing them with?

The Vice President.

Concerning the UN, the Soviets will ask for some proof of our allegations of Soviet involvement. We will have to produce some sort of proof. What is our evidence? How much can we declassify to make our point?

Casey.

?????

The Vice President.

Jeane will need some of that stuff for her use next week.

Kirkpatrick.

If we want a meeting on December 26, we will have to request it this afternoon.

Haig.

I want to be able to tell our Allies first.

Kirkpatrick.

We do it all the time (at the UN). We always consult with them on a regular basis.

We could cite the situation in Poland (in our UN resolution) as a threat to peace without mentioning the USSR.

Haig.

We can't not mention the USSR.

Haig.

Since we are not going to win anyway, we might as well lose going at the Soviets.

Meese.

We should produce the information provided to Eagleburger, at a minimum.

The meeting ended at 4:00 p.m.

The Reagan Files

²⁵² This is a reference to the 'Address to the Nation about Christmas and the Situation in Poland,' 23 December 1981, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan*, 1981, pp. 1185–1188.

FRANCE

99

**22 December 1981, A brief note
by the Europe Department at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Paris, 22 December 1981

‘Reactions of the countries of the Warsaw Pact to the French steps on Poland’

With the exception of Budapest, our Ambassador was unable to meet with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of any government. Communications took place at the level of a Vice-Minister or Director^x.

1/ The most negative reaction came from Moscow, where Mr Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister, considered that the French authorities’ assessments represented ‘an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs’ of Poland. Refusing to answer the question put to him by Mr Froment-Meurice on the presence in Warsaw of Marshal Kulikov^{xx} on 13 December and to give Moscow’s analysis of the Polish situation and how things were likely to develop, Mr Kovalev said that the USSR ‘did not recognise the right of the French government to ask questions concerning Poland and its relations with Poland as an allied socialist state.’ However, Mr Kovalev reserved the right to come back to us on the Polish situation.

2/ The reaction of the other Warsaw Pact governments was less strong but similar in substance. While welcoming the measures taken by General Jaruzelski to rectify a situation threatened by the action of Solidarity, the interlocutors of our Ambassadors pointed out that declaring a state of siege in Poland was an internal matter.

In Sofia, the Director of the ‘Western Countries’ Department added that ‘Poland was and would remain an integral part of the community of socialist countries’ (the same attitude in Prague).

Many, like the Czechoslovaks, claim that General Jaruzelski was ‘forced’ to declare a state of siege.

3/ There were only two cracks in this solid wall, which probably appeared more significant than they were:

– In Berlin, the Europe Director clearly ruled out the possibility of external military intervention, making it clear that the GDR did not agree with the Czech analysis of the Polish situation;

– In Bucharest, the Europe Director, who had been instructed by his Minister, deplored the fact that the leading role had been transferred from the party to the army, but felt that there was no other option and that a Polish solution was preferable

^x A summary by country is attached.

^{xx} Czechoslovakia said this was ‘pure speculation.’

to external intervention. The Romanians do not feel in any way responsible for what the Soviets are doing, said our interlocutor, but he was careful not to make any remarks that might call the USSR's attitude into question./ . GENDRY. JPM²⁵³

REACTION BY COUNTRY

U.S.S.R. —————	Very harsh tone: Moscow does not recognise France's 'right to ask questions about Poland.' Mr. Gromyko had said so to Mr. Jobert. Rejection of France's 'attempted interference.' It is up to the Polish people to sort out their affairs. Presence of General Kulikov in Warsaw: answer already given to M. Jobert.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA —————	Feigned indignation at our 'interference.' Interest in keeping Poland socialist. Misleading information from the West. Jaruzelski 'forced' to declare a state of siege. American hypocrisy in suspending food aid. General Kulikov in Warsaw: 'pure speculation.'
BULGARIA —————	'Not the slightest external influence' on the Polish authorities. The Polish Party has 'conceded nothing.' Poland will remain an integral part of the socialist community.
GDR ———	Exceptional measures 'in accordance with constitutional provisions.' Poland 'an integral part of the post-war order.' 'There is no external military intervention.'
HUNGARY —————	Completely disagrees with our analysis. The situation on the ground is not as bad as we say it is. Kulikov in Warsaw: The Minister shrugs his shoulders. Hungarians want appeasement.
ROMANIA —————	'Great concern.' Does not approve of the state of siege. Deplores the fact that the leadership role has shifted from the PUWP to the army. But Jaruzelski could not do otherwise. This is better than external intervention. Temporary nature of the state of siege, Poland must be helped. Bucharest fears a return to confrontation between blocs.

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve Diplomatic Archives Center,
FRMAE_1930INVA/5419, Europe, 1981–1985, Poland**

²⁵³ This is a reference to Jean-Pierre Masset.

ISRAEL

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**23 December 1981, Unsigned handwritten notes
about the situation in Poland**

23 XII

The crisis in Poland²⁵⁴

Factors which should be taken into account:

Intervention by the army took place after Solidarity had crossed the red line:

- By threatening the supreme authority of the Party
- By declaring that [Poland] should leave the Soviet bloc

Conclusion

No reform can take place under the Soviet regime if these two principles are undermined.

The current situation is characterised by three important facts:

A. Although the leaders of Solidarity are in prison, the workers are continuing their strike. This fact shows that there is an internal dynamic of uprising, although it is not likely that it will be able to hold out for long.

B. The Polish army is standing by Jaruzelski, which shows that the authorities are winning.

C. The Soviets have not intervened up till now in the form of an organised invasion by Warsaw Pact forces and it may be assumed that the main reason for this is:

1. To give the Party in Poland another chance to solve its problems, while the army is under the discipline and the control of the USSR
2. To present the crisis as a local one, and thus to neutralize the possibility of Western involvement
3. Reluctance to take on the upkeep of 35 million Poles
4. Fear of the effect of an angry Western reaction on economic, trade and technology relations

Antisemitism in Poland

The number of Jews is estimated at 6–8 thousand (about 3 thousand in Warsaw).

There is no proof that the authorities are harassing the Jews because of their identity.

There is no doubt that some of them have suffered due to their identification with the extreme faction in Solidarity, which demanded a free and independent Poland (outside the Soviet bloc).

²⁵⁴ The notes were probably written by the Director of the Eastern Europe Department at the Israeli Foreign Minister Department, Yosef Govrin.

The difference between the antisemitic wave of 1968 and that of today is that then there was antisemitism planned from above, while now it is coming from below as a result of the license given to political activity by all kinds of Polish organisations, some of them antisemitic.

Although we don't have any substantial evidence, the tendency of Solidarity to exaggerate the antisemitic aspect so as to gain support from the West for its struggle against the current authorities should be taken into account.

Recommendations and suggestions for action

1. Not to condemn the current regime in Poland for its attitude towards Solidarity (since we have no accurate evidence on the situation of the Jews and since the Polish authorities, even the current ones, have displayed goodwill towards Israel in the field of bilateral relations).

2. An approach to the authorities in Eastern Europe, including Poland, to put a stop to antisemitic expressions in their sphere of influence.

Israel State Archives, File MFA 8915/4, manuscript

CANADA

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**23 December 1981, Telegram
from the Canadian Ambassador in Warsaw, John M. Fraser,
to the Canadian Department of External Affairs**

Warsaw, 23 December 1981

Confidential

Martial Law in Poland: How Should We React?

The question of how to react to the introduction of repressive measures by the Polish authorities (as opposed to Soviet intervention in Poland) has always been a 'grey area' in our contingency planning and rightly so. The nature, duration and provenance of repressive measures could not be foreseen; nor could the circumstances which gave rise to them. All of these factors are surely relevant to our considerations now that repressive measures have been introduced.

2. 'State of war' or martial law has little meaning in itself. The nature of repression depends instead on the measures introduced under this legal framework (and it should not be forgotten that what Polish authorities have done is legal under the Polish constitution, however little we may think of that document). Many of these measures—arbitrary detention of at least 4–5,000, restrictions on freedom of movement, suppression of private and public communication—are very repressive indeed, although there is, as yet, no reign of terror. In considering reactions in vacuo one year ago, they are the sort of thing that we might have thought should trigger our reaction.

3. Yet we were not thinking, in December 1980, of the evolution in the mass movement of Polish workers that set it (at least on leadership level) on an increasingly overt political collision course with Poland's communist structure and orientation. We had hoped for a more subtle development of free society within the perimeters of professed orthodoxy. To go outside those perimeters, we feared, was to invite Soviet intervention.

4. We did not expect, and should not now expect, that the regime's unpopularity and basic lack of legitimacy could lead to its abdication of power, given Polish geopolitical realities. Without going as far as to say that open civil war was just around the corner, one can nonetheless see that by December 13 the Polish authorities saw themselves faced with a brutal choice: action or abdication.

5. Do we really wish to take the position that it would have been better for the regime to have been superseded and the Russians to have come in? If, to prevent this, we concede that Solidarnosc extremists should have been reined in, is the state

of emergency out of court as means for doing so, even against the background of accelerating economic collapse?

6. It is surely the measures themselves we should judge, their severity, duration and appropriateness. By the same token, whatever pressures we may bring to bear against the government (not Polish people, as in cutting food deliveries) should be directed to specific and realistic goals of relaxation in the martial law regime rather than the immediate cancellation of martial law in toto or the restoration of full freedom of action to Solidarnosc as previously constituted. What we surely want to see are quick and reliable indications that the most repressive measures are really temporary and that this repression is not to become a permanent feature of Polish political life. The early release or bringing to trial of those interned, assurances about their treatment (perhaps by international Red Cross) and restoration of freedom of movement and communication would be the kinds of progress we should urge. The kinds of pressure we could bring are limited, of course, not least by our reluctance, or inability to meet, Polish requests even before December 13.

7. As far as pressure on the USSR and other WPO members is concerned, it seems odd to penalize (let us say) Hungary for what is going on in Poland. Even Moscow, while pressing for firm action of this kind over the past months, is probably not directly responsible for what was done, and may not entirely approve of it. Military rule is ideologically dubious, to say the least. One can hardly imagine Moscow urging relaxation. Nor would Poles (who might reasonably say: 'We are now following your advice and have to see it through') necessarily pay much attention to their half-hearted remonstrances. In any case, it would seem better from every point of view for us to treat this as a Polish affair, as long as it remains so. This means, of course, holding Polish rulers responsible for what they do or fail to do. Moscow might, however, be told that since Poles, by following Soviet advice, have made it politically impossible for us to consider bridge financing, Moscow will have to find the money if Poland is to avoid default.

Fraser

Library and Archives Canada, Department of External Affairs fonds, Vol. 16026, File 20-POLND-1-4, Pt. 15.

CANADA

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**23 December 1981, Telegram
from the Canadian embassy in Warsaw
to the Canadian Department of External Affairs**

Warsaw, 23 December 1981

Confidential

Return to Stalinism?

Summary: Western reports of a return to Stalinism within Poland are not without some justification and have been used by certain observers as evidence that PM Jaruzelski is no longer fully in control in Poland. As with all things Polish, however, this assessment would seem exaggerated, or at least premature. The Polish government, while adopting a neo-Stalinist rhetoric, would appear to be seeking a 'third option' which may include the introduction of economic reforms 'from the top' (a Polish attempt at the Hungarian experience?) and a revamped apolitical Solidarnosc trade union. The chances for the success of such a scheme have been dismissed by the harshness of military rule and the alienation of most sectors of Polish society.

2. Report: Events in Poland have shorn many of us of our Polish acquaintances and contacts. As a result, we have resorted to the time-honoured techniques of scouring the papers, news reports and television for indications of government policy, trends and personnel changes. Our conclusion after nearly two weeks of martial law points to a clever policy of tough words and firm action on the pacification front coupled with soothing promises of economic reform and no return to pre-August 1980 methods of government.

3. Indications of 'Stalinist' tactics are especially prevalent in the communications field. The government has launched a propaganda barrage stressing law, order, work and discipline. The government campaign has also taken the form of printing letters from Solidarnosc activists who claim to have been led astray by solidarity political extremists. There is little evidence that this is having the desired effect. Poles stopped believing what they heard on the radio and television a long time ago and what is happening now reinforces that attitude. There is such distrust that a spontaneous boycott of the party paper (*Trybuna Ludu*) appears to have sprung up in Warsaw. The government has moved effectively to control the flow of information. Interpress has been disbanded, its formal functions reverting to the press office of the MFA. On the other hand, the government has set in motion a new news agency called Workers National Agency whose functions include providing press, radio and television with information on current problems in Poland.

4. Polish newspapers have started carrying long articles on fraternal countries, including East Germany, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Much coverage was given to an East German convoy of trucks bringing 'supplies' which parked in Warsaw Victory Square, the scene a few days earlier of silent vigils against military rule. No mention was made on the other hand of the huge Dutch convoy which brought food packages for distribution through the Church. Incidentally, the military attempted to assume responsibility for distribution of these gifts and only relented when the Dutch truck drivers threatened to burn them all.

5. Each day brings news of further personnel changes and includes Wojewodas (provincial governors) and heads of factories and other enterprises. The prevailing pattern of dismissals would appear to spell the end for incompetents and those considered disloyal to the system (regardless of the degree of competence). Falling into the latter category was the former energetic president of Ursus who was considered suspicious by reason of his excellent contacts with the Solidarity chapter in his factory.

6. Many intellectuals are still detained although few, if any, have been formally arrested or charged with anything specific. Likewise, while the papers accuse Solidarity intellectuals with having misled workers within the union movement, the intelligentsia per se has not yet been a target of government propaganda. The authorities probably do not know what to do about this group, always livelier than counterparts in other Eastern European countries, even in the days of Gomulka. Once short-term exigencies are met, Polish government will have to decide (a) just how much free thinking it can allow, (b) and how it can prevent more.

7. Throughout martial law, the Church has assumed a low profile. There is, of course, activity behind the scenes between the Church, government and what remains of Solidarity and reports indicate the Church has intervened effectively on behalf of certain detained persons. The Church's policy has been one of quiet diplomacy with a view to maintaining its position as possible mediator. Primate's letter read out in Church on December 20 was one of sadness and helplessness in the face of superior force. It did not deplore the abuse of human rights or call on the government to moderate its actions.

8. The government has recognized the importance of agriculture and has adopted a carrot and stick approach in dealing with it. The United Peasant Party, political representative of the peasant masses, has been allowed to reactivate and its newspaper is now the third one (after *Trybuna Ludu* and *Zolnierz Wolności*²⁵⁵) published nation-wide. On the other hand, farmers have been advised of their responsibility for feeding the nation and have been warned that if they refuse to sell to the state, measures can always be taken to make them do so. It is hard to believe

²⁵⁵ *Zolnierz Wolności* (Polish: Soldier of Freedom)—a propaganda newspaper of the Polish Army issued in communist Poland.

that the Polish peasant will be cowed by such talk or that any measures the Polish government might take would even be completely effective.

9. In the industrial sphere, the government continues to claim that work is returning to normal. While this would depend on what is considered normal in Poland, it would appear from all accounts that most enterprises and firms are on 'Italian strike,' that is, workers are going to work but doing nothing while there. We have had no reports on the cost of this to the economy but it may well be an effective way of proving to the government that Poland will not work until the authorities reach some sort of accommodation with workers, even if the alternative means living in misery.

10. Despite some of the external features of orthodox propaganda which have led certain observers to conclude that Poland is returning to the 1950s, the government's spokesmen continue to stress the authorities' intention to introduce economic reforms. There is evidence as well that the government envisages a reappearance of Solidarity, although in changed garments. In a gesture to the Church, the government has suspended curfew for the evening of December 24 to the morning of December 25, allowing Poles to participate in midnight Mass and traditional Wigilia celebrations. They have also promised to broadcast on radio both midnight Mass and the nine o'clock Christmas Day Mass. Regular radio broadcasts of Sunday Mass were one of the gains won by Solidarity in August 1980.

11. What does this mixture of armed force, propaganda promises of reform and gestures to the Church signify? To Poles, the latter two items will be considered a smokescreen to cover the brutal reality of armed occupation. Such gestures are not likely to convince Poles that the government/party has good intentions and that having cleaned up the mistakes of the past they will lead Poland to a brighter future. It is hard to imagine that Poles will accept the idea of only 'half a loaf' of the freedoms to which they have become accustomed. To agree to it, particularly under present duress, would risk destroying the credibility of leaders such as Walesa, who has apparently refused to do so up to now. It remains to be seen whether there is any acceptable basis for future cooperation—or, indeed, whether the government can induce any credible negotiating partners to begin talks. The intellectuals, even those who are, or were, locked up, probably do not have mass appeal. The workers are sullen and uncooperative and the Church maintains, in public at least, a hands-off attitude. Lay Church members have also been alienated with the dissolution of PAX which probably resulted from PAX Chairman and State Council member Ryszard Reiff's refusal to endorse the imposition of martial law.

12. The costs of the government's actions are adding up. Did Jaruzelski foresee this or did he, as some suggest, seriously miscalculate? What was the Soviet role? We may never have answers to these questions. What does appear to be happening, however, is that the government is clipping the harsher edges of military rule in the hope that it might regain some degree of trust from the people and facilitate the

search for a new *modus vivendi* with society, the Church and the workers regarding the parameters and the functioning of the Polish political system.

Library and Archives Canada, Department of External Affairs fonds, Vol. 16026, File 20-POLND-1-4, Pt. 15

NATO

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**23 December 1981, Summary Record of a restricted meeting
of the North Atlantic Council
(Excerpts)**

NATO SECRET

PR(81)82

To: Secretary General

Cc: Deputy Secretary General

ASG, Political Affairs

From: Acting Deputy Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a Restricted Meeting of the Council
held on Wednesday, 23rd December 1981 at 10.15 am²⁵⁶

[...] ²⁵⁷

II. THE SITUATION IN POLAND

Signed by A. Synadinos.

Attendance: Restricted

Agenda: Yes

Meeting place: Room 1

[...]

II. THE SITUATION IN POLAND

3. The CHAIRMAN said that he had convened the present meeting mainly to give Permanent Representatives the opportunity to exchange views on the latest developments in Poland. He went on to say that he had received from Secretary Haig a letter (also sent to all Allied Governments). He had replied that he entirely agreed with its content. He had also seen Mr. Eagleburger, who, on his way to Paris, had informed him about the conversations he had had in various capitals and who, without mentioning any specific measures that might be taken, had pointed out that a Soviet invasion was not entirely ruled out and that the Soviet leaders should know in advance what a direct intervention would cost to them. In particular, it would be the end of the Geneva talks. A NATO Ministerial Meeting taking place even without a Soviet intervention would constitute a dissuasive step. However, if

²⁵⁶ The text of summary report was distributed on 8 January 1982.

²⁵⁷ Excerpts marked with [...] are not declassified.

such a meeting did not lead to concrete results, it would be counterproductive. He had finally underlined that there was a growing irritation in Washington and that his Government was considering specific measures; it would inform and consult its Allies in due time.

4. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE said that he had nothing new to report on the military situation in Poland. The Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces were continuing routine training. There had been no large scale deployment. The security forces had complete control of the communications, of the borders and of the airspace.

5. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he could agree with Mr. Eagleburger's line on the convening of a NATO Ministerial Meeting. He pointed out that the range of responses to a Soviet invasion of Poland should be kept as contingency planning. If measures were taken in advance they would lose their deterrent value.

6. In Poland, he had the impression that the situation was quietening even if there were still signs of resistance. He went on to say that on 22nd December, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw had made a demarche to the Polish Government in his capacity as Representative of the Presidency of the Ten. The text of the demarche was as follows:

'The Governments of the Ten have heard with great concern the numerous reports of the suppression of trade union rights, internment, inhuman conditions of detention and even deaths in Poland in recent days. They denounce the grave violation of the human and civil rights of the Polish people which is implied in these reports. They have noted the Military Council's stated desire to return to renewal and reform, but are concerned that this stated aim seems difficult to reconcile with the actual situation.

In their Declaration of 15th December their Foreign Ministers made clear their views. The Ten consider that they must now express the growing concern shared by public opinion and Governments about developments in Poland.

Moreover, they consider that in Europe, where mutual trust is based on respect of the Helsinki Final Act, the current repression in Poland constitutes clear violation of the fundamental principles of this act which they cannot ignore.'

7. Czyrek had replied that Poland had no diplomatic relations with the Ten and that he could therefore not accept this demarche, which in any case constituted an interference in the internal affairs of his country based on false information. He had had the impression so far that the British Government had understood the purpose of the measures which the Polish Authorities had had to take in order to prevent a further deterioration of the situation. He had then reiterated the usual justifications of the Martial Law and promises that provided the process of normalisation would go forward successfully, it would be brought to an end.

8. As for further action, his Government had considered how the Madrid Conference might be used to deter any Soviet direct involvement in Poland. He had been instructed to bring to the Council's attention the following proposal:

'The Governments of the 16 (the 15 plus Spain) should consider instructing the Embassies of one of them in NNA capitals as soon as possible to speak to Governments on the following lines:

(a) The extremely serious situation in Poland is highly relevant to the handling of the Madrid Conference. It represents a violation of the Final Act of unprecedented magnitude. It must affect the question of the resumption in Madrid on 9th February;

(b) It is desirable to devise a policy which takes account both of the importance of Poland and of the importance of the CSCE process. We have very much in mind the value of the efforts contributed by the NNA to the process, including their most recent comprehensive draft;

(c) We have been asking ourselves what courses of action are open in February. It is necessary to think ahead and be well prepared. The options we at present see are:

(i) request earlier resumption of Madrid Conference Experts to discuss Polish situation

(ii) not to return to Madrid, explaining publicly the reasons

(iii) to return to Madrid, make statements about Poland and then leave the Conference

(iv) the same, but without leaving the conference

(v) to return to Madrid and ask the Polish and probably the Soviet delegations a number of questions about the situation in Poland, making clear that our further activity at the Conference will be influenced by the replies

(vi) to return to the Conference and present some new draft documents relevant to Poland or amended versions of existing drafts.

(vii) to resume as planned and proceed with business as usual.'

9. He hoped that the Council could agree to discuss these various possibilities at a further meeting to be held the coming week.

10. Turning to food aid, he said that the United Kingdom would take its share of the measures decided by the Ten, in particular the delivery of 8000 tons of beef. Deliveries would proceed but no convention would be signed and the United Kingdom Embassy in Warsaw would seek assurances that the meat would reach its destination and would not fall into the hands of the military authorities.

11. On economic aid he recalled a previous statement to the effect that for the time being no decision had been taken by the British Government, which had no intention to invoke the cancellation clause of the Fifteen Countries Agreement about the rescheduling of loans.

12. On refugees, he said that he was not able to quote any figure about the number of Poles at present in the United Kingdom. Anyone coming to England as a visitor would receive a two month visa and each case would be settled on its merits.

13. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that, as was the case with the Chairman of the Military Committee, he had nothing really new to report. Amongst the information collected by the Danish Embassy in Warsaw, he had noted that according to a Polish Professor, there had been 50,000 people arrested and amongst them ten Generals and some soldiers. According to the same source 60 people had been killed. The locally recruited staff of the Australian Embassy had been approached by the police at their private address and had been asked to sign a declaration of cooperation and loyalty; all had refused. From an ecclesiastical source, it appeared that the military leaders were more and more concerned about the developments and would like to negotiate with Walesa and those Solidarity leaders not yet arrested. The role of the Soviet Union in the declaration of emergency had been confirmed, but it was also felt that Jaruzelski would be able to find a solution if only he had the possibility of doing so in all independence.

14. His Authorities greatly appreciated the consultations carried out in the various capitals of the Alliance. His Foreign Minister had read with great interest Secretary Haig's letter and agreed that in the present situation, Allied Governments should avoid giving the impression of passive acceptance but also taking any steps which could justify a Soviet intervention. This applied in particular to the economic measures which might have a negative influence on the situation and on the condition of the Polish people. Although it was difficult to judge whether or not Jaruzelski would have the possibility of finding an acceptable solution, it was worth trying to make him hold his promises of resuming the dialogue with the parties.

15. His Government would continue its economic and humanitarian assistance and would make available a further 2,000,000 Kroners as emergency relief, to the Danish Red Cross, to be used for delivery of food, medicine and blankets. It had also endorsed the EEC decision to deliver 8000 tons of beef, provided there would be guarantees of safe distribution to those in most urgent need. It would still be ready to give export credits but had suspended any decision on new Government loans.

16. As for the CSCE process, although he agreed that what had happened in Poland was a violation of the Final Act, he would have to consult his Authorities before he could comment on the United Kingdom's proposal.

17. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government continued to attach great importance to close consultation about the developments in Poland, in order that Allied Governments could coordinate their action as much as possible. He also suggested that something should be done through national means to convince public opinion that what it considered as an absence of reaction from

NATO was justified and that in the present circumstances is preferable that the Alliance was not in the foreground.

18. He circulated a Resolution adopted on 18th December by the Bundestag at almost unanimity stressing its concern and solidarity with the suffering Polish people and appealing to the Polish Government to prove its credibility by releasing those who had been arrested and by restoring the liberties. It invited the German Government to keep the question of governmental aid open as long as repression continued. However, aid measures already agreed should be implemented.

19. He also circulated a report on a meeting, held on 19th December, between Mr. Genscher and the Polish Chargé d'Affaires in Bonn. Mr. Genscher had wished to hand him over the Bundestag's Resolution. The Chargé d'Affaires had turned down the Resolution which he saw as an interference in his country's internal affairs. Mr. Genscher had rejected this argument and had once again emphasised his interest in receiving convincing information as to the way in which the policy of reform, national conciliation and renewal was to be continued. He had also expressed his interest in knowing about the prospects of a meeting between General Jaruzelski, Archbishop Glemp and Walesa and suggested that it would be beneficial if Representatives of the International Federation of Free Trade were allowed to see Walesa. The Chargé d'Affaires, while turning down the Bundestag's Resolution, repeated that his Authorities were prepared to continue reforms and to cooperate with Solidarity but not with extremists elements and were equally prepared to cooperate with the Church.

20. He went on to say that his Government would find it useful that Allied countries undertook high level demarches in Warsaw in order to increase pressure on Polish Authorities. Similar demarches might be made in Moscow and in other Warsaw Pact countries. Attempts should also be made to rally support from the Neutral and Non-Aligned countries.

21. For the time being, he was hesitant about the opportunity of taking any action about the future of the Madrid Conference. He felt that before taking a rigid attitude, Allied Governments should first contact NNA participants and Spain and wait for the results of the visit in Poland of the special emissary of the Pope, Mgr. Poggi.

22. As regards the economic aid, he was of the opinion that at the present juncture, it would not be advisable to invoke the cancellation clause contained in the Fifteen Countries Agreement for the rescheduling of credits for 1981. Given the circumstances, his Government which would have been prepared to discuss with the Poles the rescheduling of their debt in 1982, had decided to leave the question open.

23. On food aid, he recalled that the FRG would contribute to EEC programmes, provided the Polish Authorities could give the necessary assurance about the recipients.

24. He finally touched on the problem of Polish refugees whose number was increasing. There were at present 80,000 Poles under tourist visas in the FRG, most of them in West Berlin. He could not say how many would seek permanent residence.

25. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE expressed his Authorities appreciation for the on going consultation on developments in Poland and on the most appropriate course of action on the part of the countries of the Alliance. He recalled that the situation in Poland had determined in Italy great concern and unanimous feelings shared by all sections of public opinion and political parties. A full debate had taken place in the Italian Parliament. A resolution had been overwhelmingly approved advocating the resumption of an orderly evolution in that country. It was already clear that the Martial Law would not resolve Poland's enormous political, social and economical problems. On the contrary those problems could become more intractable and difficult. The only way to avoid further deterioration was to restore the reform process through negotiation and reconciliation.

26. His Authorities considered that the feelings and points of view of public opinion and Governments must be made clear to the Polish Authorities and that their willingness to cooperate in several areas, mainly in economic assistance, would depend on the moderation and on the willingness of those Authorities to resume internal dialogue. However any step which might, a posteriori be construed as an element fit to justify a direct intervention from the Soviet Union was to be carefully avoided. At the same time he agreed to consider whether some initiative on their part directed towards the Soviet Union could be timely and appropriate and what should be its nature and limits.

27. The action of his Government in connection with the Polish crisis had been basically inspired by the requirement of giving expression to the deep feelings and emotions of the Italian public opinion. However the developments in Poland could no longer be considered as a purely internal matter; they had to be placed in the framework of the Final Act of Helsinki.

28. First of all his Authorities considered that the time had come to express and reiterate to the Polish Authorities in Poland, the Alliance's views. On December 22nd the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw had presented a note to the Polish Foreign Ministry to deplore the current repression in Poland. He had drawn the attention of the Polish Authorities to the deep concern of the Italian Government and people for the serious violations of human and political rights as outlined by the Helsinki Final Act. He had then expressed hope for a return to political methods through a resumption of the dialogue with the popular forces.

29. On the economic side, Italy would continue its assistance in providing food stuffs and humanitarian aid, provided that this assistance reached those it was intended for. Since these programmes were from Government to Government, it was not possible to consider channelling them through private organizations such

as Caritas. However the possibility of finding some other appropriate channels was under careful consideration.

30. As far as financial assistance, the prevailing orientation had been to wait and see. His Authorities were agreeable in principle to a suspension of such financial assistance in case the situation in Poland did not show any sign of early improvement. The suspension of western financial assistance to Poland must also represent a signal and an additional burden for the Soviet Union.

31. In essence, his Government's present orientation towards Poland could be summarized as follows: to exert political pressure, bilaterally, but to consider positively also a coordinated action. On the economic field to avoid action which could cause damage to the Polish population in such a hard winter, and to indicate both to Poland and to the Soviet Union that a negative evolution in the Polish situation might also represent a high price in terms of relations with the West.

32. He went on to say that NATO had considered three possible scenarios: internal repression, external military intervention and internal repression supported by the Soviet Union. The third and last of the three scenarios which had become reality was also the one to which the Alliance had given only limited attention. As a consequence, the West had never warned the Soviet Union that its external support to an internal repression would be considered tantamount to an outright intervention.as he saw it.

33. The problem at present was basically political, to decide whether or not to equate external Soviet support to a military intervention. If the answer was in the affirmative, Allied Governments should adopt the measures contained in the contingency catalogue. Otherwise, they should study what kind of political pressure was to be applied on the Soviet Union.

34. His Government thought that underlining the political interference by the Soviet Union was appropriate, because it was this interference that had in large measure prompted Jaruzelski's initiative. It could be appropriate, in this situation, to exert pressure on the Soviet Union, asking it not to prevent but, on the contrary, to foster the resumption of the political dialogue in Poland. In this connection, the military repression should in the first place be terminated.

35. Among the instruments available to exert pressure on the Soviet Union, his Government would hesitate for the time being to have recourse to economic measures. It would prefer to try to convince Moscow that the Polish events might have a negative impact on two basic elements of the East/West dialogue: the Geneva negotiations and the Madrid Conference.

36. In sum, his Government was of the opinion that a political approach by the West vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was for the time being preferable, if only to avoid giving pretexts or incentives for a military Soviet intervention which would certainly seal the end of the dialogue for many years ahead.

37. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE^{E258} said that the first act of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs had been to make a vigorous statement to Parliament and to summon the Polish Ambassador to Brussels to express to him the emotion of opinion and the Parliament over the repression. He had recalled to him that Belgium, which had welcomed many Poles at various points in history, felt profound sympathy for Poland and was deeply interested in developments in the situation. He had expressed a wish that the Poles could resolve their problems among themselves while respecting the principles of the Final Act. He had also expressed his regret that the Polish authorities, in violation of the Vienna Convention, had made it impossible for the Belgian Government to communicate with its Embassy in Warsaw and had restricted the movements of Belgian diplomats. The Polish Ambassador had attempted to justify these measures by the necessities of the present situation and had given assurances that they would be temporary. He had specified that Trade Unions had not been outlawed but simply suspended and that the government wanted to resume the dialogue with all the social partners, including Solidarity, as soon as possible.

38. He agreed on the usefulness of the demarches proposed by the German Representative. As for aid to Poland, he recalled that government aid went through the EEC and that private food aid continued, but that the government had asked various organisations to get every possible guarantee regarding the recipients. Concerning medical aid, the Red Cross was the intermediary and it had not encountered any difficulties thus far. For financial aid, no decision should be taken before 14 February 1982.

39. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE expressed his appreciation for the efforts made by the United States Government to inform their Allies. His Authorities had noted with interest the balanced approach in Secretary Haig's letter. They were favourable to intensified Allied consultation before announcing any measures. This would demonstrate to the public opinion and to other Governments the efficiency of the Alliance.

40. He went on to say that the present Canadian approach to the situation in Poland took as its starting point recognition of the tragic character of what had been happening in that country. However, this understandable emotion should not blind Governments to the realities being the geopolitical situation of the Poles.

41. Given these realities, it was the Canadian policy as reiterated by the Prime Minister on December 18th, that the Poles should be left to resolve their own problems without outside interference. His Government maintained the hope, that with restraint and good judgement by all concerned in Poland, this would be possible without triggering overt Soviet intervention. It deeply regretted that the process of

²⁵⁸ Paragraphs 37 to 38 have been translated from French for the present publication.

internal reconciliation had been interrupted by the imposition of Martial Law, and hoped that there would be an early return to dialogue between the principal parties.

42. Realistically, however, Allies must recognise that under the present circumstances choice did not lie between the good and the bad, but rather between the bad and the worse. Worst of all would be civil war and overt Soviet intervention. Their main effort, therefore, should be exerted to preventing this eventuality. They should base themselves for the time being on the assumption that there was still a possibility of a moderate outcome, and they should do their best to discourage continuance of the repressive regime.

43. He felt sure that none of them were naive enough to think there was no Soviet complicity in the events in Poland; but such complicity was an unavoidable fact of life in Eastern Europe. However, if they tried to make the Soviet Union pay a price for its intervention before it actually did so directly, they would have used up their leverage and the Russians would have little to lose. So it was important to maintain a distinction between the way the Polish and Soviet Authorities were treated at the present time.

44. In light of these considerations» his Authorities were of the opinion that at the present juncture the following steps might be considered:

(a) to maintain food aid to the Poles in the interest of short term stability

(b) to continue to fulfil existing contractual commitments for longer-term economic aid for the time being, but to undertake no new initiatives under current circumstances

(c) to consider what package of positive economic measures would be appropriate in conditions where the Poles repeal Martial Law, release prisoners, permit the re-establishment of Solidarity, and begin reconciliation talks

(d) to take no economic measures against the USSR for the time being

(e) to make high-level demarches in Warsaw expressing concern over the situation, urging the Polish authorities to exercise restraint and to seek a broad national consensus, and asking them how they intend to fulfil their promises and to solve the crisis in a manner consistent with the financial and human rights commitments Poland has entered into

(f) to make further high-level demarches in Moscow to reiterate the principle of non-interference and to warn of the grave consequences of intervention, and

(g) to keep a close watch on developments in Poland, including particular efforts of the Catholic church to restore a dialogue and withholding any plans for an emergency NATO Ministerial Meeting for the time being.

45. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE²⁵⁹ wanted to obtain from the Military Authorities information about how much warning they thought they would have if a Soviet intervention were about to take place. He had been struck by the fact that

²⁵⁹ Paragraphs 45 to 52 have been translated from French for the present publication.

Soviet aircraft had recently been able to land in Warsaw without the intelligence services detecting it. It was subsequently shown that these were only transport aircraft. But what would have happened if they had transported invading troops?

46. His government had to adjust its attitude in the Polish crisis, taking into account the positions of the countries of the East, in particular the USSR, but also the reactions of French public opinion, which was particularly sensitive to everything concerning Poland.

47. He would submit for the attention of his authorities the United Kingdom's proposal concerning the CSCE. He thought that even if there was not Soviet intervention in Poland, it could not be envisaged that the Madrid Conference would resume as if nothing had happened during the recess and that various perspectives had to be envisaged. A consultation with the Neutral and Non-Aligned seemed very appropriate to him.

48. Concerning the diplomatic demarches suggested by the German Representative, he recalled that his government had already made a certain number of demarches based on the statements made by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister.

49. Regarding aid, he said that food and humanitarian aid supplied by France was continuing through the intermediary of various organisations, in particular the Red Cross. But his government had not taken any decision concerning new credits or rescheduling previous debts. He wondered whether the military administration could be considered a valid interlocutor and if any new aid should be conditional upon a favourable political evolution.

50. The LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE said that his government had favourably welcomed Mr Haig's letter and that it agreed with his analysis. His authorities had already sent a message to General Jaruzelski to share with him the deep emotion of opinion in Luxembourg. It seemed to him that if a demarche had to be made to the Soviet Union, care would have to be taken not to give it the form of an accusation and to carefully consider the content of the message.

51. His government was in principle favourable to welcoming Polish refugees on the territory of Luxembourg. Its aid to Poland was given in the framework of the EEC and through the intermediary of private organisations.

52. As regards the CSCE, his government did not want to leave the Madrid Conference. He thought it appropriate for work to resume and for the West to protest the actions of the Polish government.

53. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE circulated two documents, one on the situation in Poland, the other on the treatment of refugees in the United States.

54. He pointed out that the West was facing a critical juncture which would determine the future of East/West relations. He felt that due to the loss of credibility of Jaruzelski's regime, it could not be excluded that more violence would lead to

a further worsening of the situation, while the machinery for Soviet intervention was ready on the spot.

55. He went on to say that even if there had been so far no direct Soviet intervention, its knowledge and support of the imposition of the Martial Law was evident and his Government felt strongly that the Soviet Union should be warned that even if it was not a direct instrument in the repression, it would have to pay the price for its involvement. It was an Alliance responsibility to prevent any further deterioration which could lead to direct Soviet intervention. Time had come, he felt, that Allied Governments should consider specific measures which they would apply at the appropriate time to exert pressure on Polish and Soviet Authorities, as well as yardsticks to measure the various developments.

56. As regards specific measures, he recalled those which his Government had already taken (request to US Banks not to loan new credits to Poland; suspension of shipping or surplus dairy products to Poland; suspension of the import/export arrangements etc). Further measures were under consideration in Washington. As for the yardsticks, they would be the reconciliation between the Government, Solidarity and the Church, the restoration of syndical rights and the release of detainees.

57. He had welcomed the United Kingdom's suggestion on CSCE. He hoped that at its next meeting the Council would agree on how to take contacts with the Neutrals and Non Aligned and with Spain. The United States were prepared to approach Spain. He also welcomed the German suggestion on demarches to be made to various Governments. He welcomed the idea of approaching Free Trade Unions. This would show to public opinion that they were on the same side as NATO and might ease the way for a better understanding of defence needs among the workers in member countries. He felt sure that his Government would join in any protest action against the violation of the Vienna Convention and would welcome more information on problems incurred by Allied missions in Warsaw.

58. In conclusion, he emphasized that his Government considered that the present situation was of the utmost gravity and the Alliance's ability to influence developments would depend on its ability to react rapidly and by appropriate means. He suggested a further consultation at the next Council meeting on measures to be taken.

59. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities greatly appreciated the way in which the consultation on the situation in Poland was taking place. This process, he felt, would be even more fruitful if the Neutrals and Non Aligned were included. They should preferably be approached by individual members so that the demarche had less of a NATO label. He welcomed the United Kingdom suggestion on the Madrid Conference. His Authorities would study the various possibilities. They were also studying the various United States signals, which were in general of a moderate character. They were not in favour of a Ministerial

Meeting prior to a Soviet intervention. They would find it helpful if the role of the Soviet Union and General Jaruzelski's decisions could be clarified further. Could it be proved that he was in the hands of the Soviet leaders, it would then be easier to decide on an action against the Soviet Union, whether political or economical.

60. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE²⁶⁰ said that the Polish cause was eliciting a lot of sympathy in his country. Nevertheless, public opinion felt a certain sense of powerlessness over what the Alliance could do. His government agreed on the need for action, provided that such action was prudent and realistic. Before considering measures, he thought that the following question should be answered: What would the Allied governments be able to do if the worst should happen? In the present circumstances, he recognised the importance of the role that the Vatican and the Polish Church could play.

61. He recalled that in a statement to the Constituent Assembly, his Prime Minister had underscored that peace and stability had to be considered from a global perspective, that he had expressed his real concern over the political, economic and social situation in Poland, but that he had insisted on the absolute right of the Poles to find the solutions themselves. He had expressed the hope that stability in Europe and East/West relations would not suffer too much from it. He finished by joining those who had recommended that consultations should continue.

62. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said his Authorities were of the opinion that Allied Governments should continue to exert pressure so that the dialogue could resume between all concerned in Poland and that Human Rights be respected. They would continue their humanitarian assistance to the Poles, so far as they had received the assurance that it would reach the recipients. They would act in consultation with organisations concerned. They felt that it was important that no statement made by Allied Authorities as regards this humanitarian assistance could provide reasons to the Soviets to pretend that this was an interference in Polish affairs.

63. As for economic aid, he said that his Government had granted Poland 33 million Kr. in 1981 for food deliveries but had taken no decision as regards the credits for 1982. The question of the appropriation of 42 million Kr. in 1982 was under consideration. The Norwegian Parliament had authorised the transfer to 1982 of 30 million Kr. for exports not spent in 1981.

64. As for the refugees, they would be received according to the regulations in force in his country. Various practical measures to welcome them were under study.

65. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE²⁶¹ recalled that since the start of the crisis his government had adopted a very clear line and had unceasingly expressed its concerns to the Polish Ambassador in Lisbon, since communications

²⁶⁰ Paragraphs 60 and 61 have been translated from French for the present publication.

²⁶¹ Paragraph 65 has been translated from French for the present publication.

with the Portuguese Embassy in Warsaw were completely interrupted and had still not been re-established despite three vigorous protests. He thought that the moment where the Polish crisis had been purely internal had been passed and that concrete measures should be considered.

66. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government, guided by a deep sense of sympathy for the Polish people, was following with grave concern the state of emergency measures in Poland and had expressed its deep sorrow over the recent dramatic events. Greece, together with other European countries, expected that the states which had signed the Final Act of Helsinki would abstain from any form of interference in Poland's internal affairs. His Government believed that Poland 'must solve its problems alone and without the use of force, in order that the process of reform and renewal might continue.

67. The ICELANDIC REPRESENTATIVE said that the Government, the Parliament and the public opinion in his country were deeply concerned and indignant about what was happening in Poland. Efforts were being made to give humanitarian aid to the Polish people.

68. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Council meet again on Wednesday 30th December in order to review the United Kingdom proposal on the Madrid CSCE Conference and the German proposal on demarches to be made in Warsaw Pact countries and in some other capitals, on the basis of reactions from national authorities. The Council could also discuss any concrete proposal that individual member Governments were planning to take in order to exert pressure on Poland and on the Soviet Union.

69. In view of recent developments, he wondered whether the time had not come for him to make a statement to the press, under his own responsibility, in which he would express the Council's growing concern.

70. This suggestion, having been supported by several Permanent Representatives, he proposed the following statement:

'The North Atlantic Council continued its on-going series of close consultations on the Polish situation.

In particular, the Allies strongly condemned the use of force which has characterised the current state of Martial Law.

The Allies noted the nearly universal reprobation, for the many actions taken by Polish Authorities in violation of human rights in general and the Helsinki Final Act in particular; for example, the suppression of Trade Unions and extensive press censorship.

The Allies recall the promises made by the Polish Government concerning renewal of the internal dialogue, temporary nature of Martial Law and the commitment to continue the reform process, and express their firm hope that these promises will indeed be fulfilled.

The Council also expressed strong concern over the many violations of the Vienna Convention, which had served to isolate foreign embassies in Warsaw and to restrict the flow of information.'

71. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that this might be interpreted as reflecting the Council's unanimous position; this was not the case, since governments had not been consulted.

72. After an exchange of views, the LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE put forward the following statement which was accepted:

'The North Atlantic Council today continued its close consultation on the situation in Poland.

'It reviewed with great concern the most recent developments in that country.

'The North Atlantic Council will be meeting again shortly to continue these discussions.'

NATO Archives, PR(81)82

GERMANY

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**25 December 1981, Telegram
from the State Secretary
of the German Federal Foreign Office, Berndt von Staden,
to the German Ambassador in Warsaw, Georg Negwer:
a letter from the German chancellor to the Polish prime minister**

214-320.10 POL-3182II/81 secret

25 December 1981

Sent: 26 December 1981, 01.30

Telegram No. 6659 Plurez

Citissime at night

For Ambassadors or authorised representatives

Re: Situation in Poland;

here: Message from the Federal Chancellor to General Jaruzelski

1) I ask you to convey the message from the Federal Chancellor to be found in the annex at the highest possible level without delay along with a courtesy translation to be drawn up at the mission.

Telegram requested.

2) Additional information for Washington, Paris, London: It is important to Federal Chancellor Schmidt that the message is not published but he requests highly confidential sharing of the content at the highest possible level of government.

Staden

Annex to follow

Dear First Secretary,

I write to you, General, deeply concerned because cooperation between East and West is directly affected by what is happening in your country.

You will understand that the Federal Republic of Germany is following these events with particular interest because the process to build German-Polish understanding based on the Warsaw Treaty²⁶² has advanced in recent years, has made key contributions to cooperation between West and East and is supported by public opinion in my country. Above all given the tragic backdrop of German-

²⁶² The Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland concerning the basis for normalisation of their mutual relations was concluded on 7 December 1970.

Polish history over the last two centuries, we Germans cannot be indifferent to Poland's fate.

We are therefore greatly pained by the news of widespread arrests in your country, of the use of violence, even of fatalities. Many reports indicate that there has been grave interference with human rights and fundamental freedoms in the last twelve days.

As a co-signatory of the Helsinki Final Act, the Federal Government and with it its friends and allies are relying on the pledge you gave on 13 December 1981 that you desire to relaunch the policy of reform, democratisation and renewal and not to return to the time prior to August 1980. The Federal Government also calls to mind the declarations that you, General, made to Federal Foreign Minister Genscher in March 1981 as the deep impression they left has determined its policy since that time.

The Federal Government will face difficult decisions when it comes to continuing its support for Poland to overcome its economic difficulties based on the German Bundestag decision of 18 December 1981.²⁶³ These decisions will essentially depend on the Military Council acting upon your pledge of 13 December.

If national reconciliation succeeds, the threats posed to cooperation between East and West stemming from the unrest in Poland can be averted.

The Federal Government remains firmly convinced that all signatory States of the Helsinki Final Act must refrain from all interference in Poland's domestic affairs whether direct or indirect, and from using or threatening to use violence. The Federal Government will continue to uphold these fundamental principles strictly.

Helmut Schmidt

Yours sincerely,
Federal Chancellor

End of annex

**Political Archive of the German Federal Foreign Office, B 150, vol. 521
(AAPD 1981, Doc. No. 387)**

²⁶³ The CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP parliamentary groups in the German Bundestag called upon the Polish Government to continue the reforms launched in August 1980 and release those detained since the imposition of Martial Law on 13 December 1981. The continuation of the Federal Government's economic assistance was made dependent on steps being taken by the Polish military government.

TURKEY

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**25 December 1981, Cipher
from the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Ercüment Yavuzalp,
to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

CONFIDENTIAL
VERY URGENT

C I P H E R

TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1) It is difficult to establish to what extent the Soviets are involved in the latest developments in Poland. That said, it could be confidently expressed that the Soviets are at least aware of such a development, and they approve it. The rumours that the plans were prepared by the Soviets themselves, and that they were imposed upon the Polish Prime Minister with an ultimatum, are slightly extreme. At this stage, it is without doubt that Jaruzelsky would not undertake such an action without notifying, and receiving the approval of, the Soviets.

2) Even if the Soviets cannot approve this method under normal conditions, the nature of this development in Poland shows that it is adopted by the Soviets since it appears as a method preventing the affairs from getting any worse, at least to some extent, without causing much political disturbance for the Soviets. Even though the action, as it is, presents itself as a Soviet intervention by proxy, I assume it would be right not to compare it to other interventions due to its nature. The mutual point between Polish Prime Minister and the Soviets is a concern shared by both sides about deteriorating situation, and that they agree on the necessity of bringing an end to this. However, deterioration for Jaruzelsky is the emergence of circumstances inviting Soviet intervention, while it is losing Poland for the Soviets. At this stage, both sides have common interests in military takeover. This inevitably brings both sides to support each other, creating a shared destiny. However, once the situation is taken under control, there would probably be divergence on how to proceed. Therefore, disturbance in Poland will continue despite the military takeover.

3) Resistance in Poland could be the first indication of inevitable centrifugal forces awakening in the Soviet Empire. It is only natural that the communist regime propagandised as a regime that will provide the public with the best for more than half a century and promised a welfare above the living standards in the USA during the 1980s [but] is still far from even meeting the minimum requirements of the masses will lead to some movements in the regions where a comparison between the dispraised regimes and those of their own can be made, and where the oppression is relatively less. Recent events in Poland, which can be characterised as a region of

such nature, must be examined within this framework. Nevertheless, it would be as inaccurate to consider that this will happen overnight and at a pace faster than it normally would, as to consider that this incident is reversible and reckon that Eastern Europe will remain under Soviet tyranny for good. Removing this tyranny is a long-term process. As in the case of Poland, showing impatience and attempting to proceed with the developments at an unrealistic pace will only delay the process itself.

4) From this standpoint, it becomes difficult to understand the reaction of the West, and that of the USA, in particular. It is obvious that the conditions are not mature enough for a development at a pace, and in a direction, required by the Solidarity Movement, and such impatience and effort in this direction will not only result in bloodshed in Poland but also distress world peace. Given that Poland, obviously, will not be left alone with its own chaos and an effective solution to replace this chaotic situation is not there yet, and finally the reform movement is irreversible, and that it is more or less certain this process will continue somehow yet at a slower pace; could such intervention of Jaruzelsky at this stage be regarded as saving the USA and the West from a situation in which they would face challenging options? Although the West would not openly approve this movement, to what extent their efforts aiming at the movement's failure will be to their benefit unless they have a valid state of emergency plan at hand? As I have previously presented, the Soviet attitude towards Poland differ from that towards Afghanistan. One can speak of violation and extortion in Afghanistan. In Poland, however, they are to defend and protect their acquired status. Despite this, they have tolerated many things in Poland that are otherwise indigestible for them. Their consent to military intervention per se is a regression on their part. Besides, there is a possibility for more regression in the future. In this case, it becomes difficult to find the reasonable basis for a stronger reaction compared to that given to the Afghanistan incident. It is more likely that the Soviets finding themselves in a cornered, aggrieved and cracked down situation will yield results contrary to what is expected.²⁶⁴

Respectfully,

YAVUZALP

Turkish Diplomatic Archives 368/110390

²⁶⁴ The document was also sent to the Turkish Embassies in Warsaw and Washington DC, and to the Turkish Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York.

POLAND

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**26 December 1981, Informational note
by Eugeniusz Noworyta, Director of the 4th Department
of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
concerning the position of Western countries
on the internal situation in Poland**

Warsaw, 26 December 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATIONAL NOTE

The evolution of West European governments' stance
with regard to events in Poland.

I. The initial reactions of West European governments to the introduction of Martial Law in Poland were prudent and anticipatory. They stressed, above all:

a) The hope that the crisis would be resolved by Poland itself, without outside interference,

b) The expectation that the introduction of Martial Law would not hinder the renewal and reform process.

This general tendency found expression in the joint declaration of EEC foreign ministers made in London on the 15th of this month. Certain countries expressed, in addition, the intent to reduce certain forms of economic cooperation.

II. As events unfolded, the position of West European governments sharpened. There was also increased pressure from trade unions, political parties, especially socialist parties, and increased US pressure on West European countries. The coordination within the EEC and NATO in Polish matters was increased.

This found its expression in a series of new government statements and speeches, and parliamentary resolutions.

1) In them, the present position stressing the need for Poland to resolve its problems by its own efforts and without outside interference was maintained, although in some assessments the idea was explored that the action of the WRON may be a Soviet intervention carried out 'through Polish hands' and that the Polish crisis represented a threat to peace and *détente* (Italy).

More positive, against this background, is the position of the authorities of Greece, Denmark and Norway, which expressed understanding of the circumstances underlying the introduction of Martial Law, and that of the municipal authorities of West Berlin, which thought the imposition of Martial Law in the current circumstances to be a 'lesser evil' as compared to the alternative threat of confrontation.

2) There was widespread condemnation of the imposed measures, which were described as contrary to human rights and the provisions of the CSCE Final Act; certain parliaments (those of Germany and Italy among others) bound their governments to take steps that would force the Polish government to discontinue acts of repression.

3) Attempts were made to internationalise the situation in Poland; this was reflected in France's raising of the Polish question during the Madrid meeting; in Mitterrand's idea to introduce this matter during discussions at the United Nations; in the proposal to send an ILO fact-finding mission to Poland; in the discussion of Polish affairs within the organs of the West European community and NATO; and at international conferences of (social-democratic) parties and trade unions.

4) The introduction of restrictive measures was announced with regard to aid for Poland and to resolving our financial problems, but up to the limits allowed by existing interests. In principle, all West European countries are in agreement about the suspension of talks on debt refinancing for the year 1982. As far as food aid is concerned, the readiness to continue it is still expressed (by Germany and France), but within the scope of obligations already incurred towards Poland and as an act of charity.

Conditions are being raised with regard to new forms of assistance: The EEC makes the supply of the third tranche of deliveries conditional on developments in Poland, while the FRG does not rule out the possibility of granting further aid and makes this dependent on the approval of the Bundestag. The Socialist International adopted a more constructive stance and called for not exerting economic pressure on Poland. In principle, the main West European countries are inclined towards suspending financial loans while possibly maintaining food aid, subject to guarantees concerning its distribution.

III. Despite the efforts made by the US—reflected in Eagleburger's mission, among other things—to harmonise the position of West European countries with American measures, the countries of Western Europe continue to maintain a certain distance with regard to Washington's hard stance, and in some of them criticism of it has been expressed (such as the Chancellor of Austria, the mass media and SPD activists in the FRG). It can be assumed that, despite the general hardening of the position of Western countries, which are seeking to exert strong pressure on Poland in order to obtain the release of the internees and the revocation of Martial Law (this was specifically mentioned in the Bundestag resolution), differences in their approach to Polish affairs will continue. It is to be expected that the most radical position will continue to be that of France and Sweden, while the more moderate positions will be taken by Great Britain and the FRG (on account, among other things, of their general political aims, including their policy towards the USSR, especially following L. Brezhnev's visit to Bonn), and also by some smaller countries (Denmark, Greece, Norway, and Spain).

IV. Assessing the position of West European governments, the following can be expected:

1. Progress in the realisation of the aims spelled out in the WRON program: consolidation of power, containment of economic deterioration, and political and social stabilisation on the basis of reforms and a national understanding, and thus removal of the threat to the balance of power in Europe resulting from the situation in Poland, and also the gradual removal of the limitations inherent to Martial Law, will have a calming effect on the position of West European governments and will neutralise US pressure.

2. Propaganda and political actions (including those of an international nature) will be continued and even enhanced by Cold-War and anti-socialist factors in order to undermine the WRON premises and efforts aimed at stabilising the situation in the country, and even to incite resistance to the dispositions of the authorities.

E. Noworyta

AMSZ, DSiP 27/84, w. 2 (PDD 1981/II, Doc. No. 517)

ITALY

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**26 December 1981, Telegram
from the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw, Marco Favale,
to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Warsaw, 26 December 1981

Secret
Absolute Priority

No. 4142/1-3

[Subject:] Assessment of the situation in Poland

The dust begins to settle in Poland, and some initial evaluations can be integrated or better specified.

From the Warsaw perspective, there is the imperative need for a vigorous protest action by governments and, perhaps more than by governments, by Western and European public opinion, but also, as far as possible, by the Third World, at which the struggle and the ideology of Moscow's proselytism are aimed. This protest recalls the one that democratic Europe raised in 1863: the Helsinki accords are the modern embodiment of that principle of nationality with which European and Italian diplomacy wrote its most beautiful pages.

If we make a first 'status' of the situation, however, we can better identify some modalities, as well as the perimeter of this action, above all European, and precisely:

A) Monsignor Dabrowski, in whose hands the 'negotiation' in Warsaw now practically rests, told me yesterday at the station—where we met while greeting Monsignor Poggi returning to Rome—that he saw a good chance of starting it. He planned to recover Walesa and nine other members of the presidium, that is ten out of twelve in all (Walesa having so far refused, alone, any dialogue). Dabrowski has always been optimistic. I am a little less so, above all because there is—or rather there was—the national commission, a kind of central committee, with the heads of the M.K.Z. regional, which are notoriously much less moderate than the presidium (its political office) and have contributed a lot to filling Polish prisons. And I don't know how, 'in the heat of the moment,' the country would react.

However, the possibility that the presidium, even if not truly representative, meets and negotiates, cannot be neglected: it would constitute a restraining factor for this action.

2) The general, inviting Hungarian experts as reform advisors, knows—and has always known—that the 'Hungarian model' is the 'limit' set by Moscow. However, Monsignor Dabrowski said: 'Poland is not Hungary. This is a land of conspirators

and insurgents' (which is a bit like what he said to the professors, see my 4136, but this time in a better and more patriotic sense).

Therefore, it may be that he hopes to get more than what Hungary did. Moscow needs him for a political solution to the crisis.

3) If this Western and European action is too drastic and will humiliate Jaruzelski too much, especially at a time that is so difficult for him and for Polish national and military pride, it could play to the game of the 'colonels' and secret police (perhaps the same ones to which the 'error' of the Katowice events dates back). I see this as a growing concern among many of my EEC colleagues.

It is true that, if Jaruzelski were not enough, Moscow has the ways and the means to discipline them in the long run, but the whole staging of the 'indirect' intervention, for which it must no longer appear, can hinder it. Not to mention that a worsening of the situation (of the 'lazaretto' or 'Northern Ireland' type, which Jaruzelski apparently fears) could tie its hands towards the 'colonels.'

4) A common European policy on economic aid is a determining factor in this action, also as an element of autonomy towards a European Poland vis-à-vis the United States. This policy should take advantage of Poland's economic and financial dependence on the West—and Moscow's inability to replace it—in order to widen the bargaining line as much as possible in Warsaw and Moscow, but it should also be flexible and avoid too rigid conditions. It can also benefit from the technical difficulties not only in distinguishing exactly what is economic aid and what is food aid (unless the latter is intended only as gift packages or charities), but also in combining very different categories under one only label. So, at least from here, it is not clear how to revoke the credit lines that have been already granted or the 'debt restructuring' for which private bilateral agreements and related acquired rights have already been settled or are being settled. Interbank agreements have always been out of the government's decision-making process. New restructuring or new credit lines require for technical reasons that many economic and financial questions about the future of Poland are clarified, etc.

Moscow's 'indirect' intervention appears from Warsaw even more than a gesture of oppression, as one of desperation caused by the ideological, political, economic and above all national crisis of the empire, which has its epicentre in Poland. Despair and awareness of the depth of the crisis and of its risks in many ways echoed or reflected here ('we have crossed the Rubicon,' 'we are ready for anything') or detected by warnings placed in default through a third party (attention to avoid the 'internationalisation of the crisis' 'in Europe or in other areas'). This crisis—and Moscow's related interest in finding a political solution in Poland as soon as possible—offers the West and Europe more room for maneuver, as long as it is kept in mind—as it always happened in Modern European history for empires that oppress their nationalities—that fear is a bad advisor.

A Catholic exponent of Solidarnosc, not harassed also because he had so far appropriately kept himself in reserve, told Maresca that the dangers of 'lazaretto' or 'Northern Ireland' in Poland are not far-fetched (but perhaps they are 'pour cause' exaggerated by Jaruzelski and especially by the colonels).

In the meantime, he told him, 'the economy is at its extremes. Industrial productivity is very low. The unrest among the workers is very strong, as is the evidence of the expulsion of about a hundred managers, due to "insufficiency in the conditions of martial law," according to the official motivation; that is, for not being able to prevent strikes or delays and to resume production. Agricultural supplies are scarce. If you add to this the complication caused by the lack of communications and the discontinuity of supplies, you get a very bleak picture of the industrial situation in the country'.

'Spirits are excited.' 'Bujak is still taking shelter at the French consulate in Gdansk. He had in fact left the meeting of the national commission before the police's intervention, and he is in contact with Mazowsze (he allegedly refused to abandon his hiding place despite the promises made to him by the military authorities, since he does not trust them). And so is the case for many other union leaders who live in hiding. Of Mazowsze's presidium alone: Switalski,²⁶⁵ Kulerski, Kłopotowski, Rusinek, all already very active, with a following of young people, are organising resistance to the regime.'²⁶⁶

Favale

ASMAE, DGAP VI, 1981, b. 240, fasc. *Polonia. Stato di assedio, dicembre 1981, A/1 Pol.*

²⁶⁵ Witold Świtalski.

²⁶⁶ The first and second part of the telegram was sent on 26 December and the third on 28 December 1981 (only to correct misspelled words).

NATO

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**30 December 1981, Summary Record
of a restricted meeting of the North Atlantic Council**

NATO SECRET

PR(81)84

To: Secretary General

Cc: Deputy Secretary General
Acting ASG, Political Affairs

From: Acting Deputy Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a Restricted Meeting of the Council
held on Wednesday, 30th December 1981 at 3pm²⁶⁷

Chairman: Mr. M.A.H. Luns

Mr. E. Da Rin

THE SITUATION IN POLAND

Signed by A. Synadinos

Attendance: Restricted²⁶⁸Agenda: Yes²⁶⁹

Meeting place: Room 1

THE SITUATION IN POLAND

1. The CHAIRMAN said that, as had been agreed by the Council on 23rd December, the primary purpose of the present meeting was to carry forward an exchange of views on concrete Allied responses to the situation in Poland. These responses might be grouped into three general categories: economic and broadly related measures; actions within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and, finally, diplomatic initiatives, including demarches in Warsaw Pact and other capitals. Some governments, most notably that of the United States, had taken a number of specific steps in the economic field.

2. As regards CSCE, he recalled that the United Kingdom's Chargé d'Affaires had circulated on Wednesday 23rd, a paper outlining a range of options for consideration

²⁶⁷ The text of summary report was distributed on 18 January 1982.

²⁶⁸ Excerpts marked with [...] are not declassified.

²⁶⁹ No agenda recorded.

within the context of the Madrid CSCE Follow-Up Meeting. In so doing, he had emphasized that, as pointed out in the UK paper, the Allies should strive for an early consensus on how to manage the Polish issue at Madrid. He would only add that the fifth paragraph of the 11th December Communique of NATO Foreign Ministers had highlighted the relevance of the Helsinki Final Act to developments in Poland.

3. On the subject of diplomatic demarches, the German Ambassador had taken the lead in stressing the need for consultation on what the Allies could, and should, be saying in Warsaw, Moscow, and, possibly in other Warsaw Pact and in selected neutral and non-aligned capitals about the Polish situation. Subsequently, he had circulated by letter of 29th December further German ideas in this connection. He hoped that the Council would be in a position today to reach some definite conclusions on all these matters. At the end of its deliberations, the Council would likely want to consider carefully what should be said to the press given the great public interest in how the Alliance was reacting to developments in Poland.

A. Recent developments

4. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that on behalf of the Ten, the British Ambassador in Rome had had, on the 24th and 29th December, two conversations with Mgr Salvestrini,²⁷⁰ speaking on account of Mgr Dabrowski.²⁷¹ Salvestrini had said that in these difficult days the suspension of western humanitarian aid would be a major setback for the population in Poland and would help hardliners to get the country under the Soviet Union. He had said that conversations were still going on between the Church and the Polish Authorities. Mr. Glemp had suggested that the release of Walesa would be a precondition for the opening of negotiations, for which he had offered the Church's good offices. On the other hand Walesa, who did not seem to be badly treated, would only agree to enter into talks with the Polish authorities if his closest advisers were also released. He had added that the Church had so far not been very much affected by the repression. It was able to carry out its humanitarian duties, and priests who had been arrested because of their contacts with Solidarity had soon been released.

5. Referring to the decisions of the Ten, he had said that the Vatican had acknowledged the fact that there was at present no dialogue with the military government. The best way to proceed and to resume the dialogue would be through bilateral demarches or to continue to show firmness and flexibility towards essential objectives. Finally, he had said that Mgr Poggi was of the opinion that Jaruzelski was still holding the same line, minimising the casualties, promising a progressive release of prisoners, wishing that irreconcilable elements of Solidarity would leave the country. He had been irritated by the messages of President Reagan and of the French Government.

²⁷⁰ Achille Silvestrini.

²⁷¹ Bronislaw Dąbrowski.

6. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE turned to the political statement agreed upon by the Ten. He recalled that on 23rd December the British Chargé d’Affaires had announced a gift, to Poland, of 8,000 tons of beef. The contract had been prepared and the British Embassy in Warsaw had sought the necessary assurances about distribution. However, there were still some difficulties about who was going to represent the Community for distribution.

7. He went on to say that on 28th December, it had been decided that the signing of the contract could go ahead and that the Polish Embassy in Brussels would be given the details of the deliveries and distributions, in exchange of the formal assurance that the meat would go to the civilian population. This formal assurance had been received. It was very likely that the military authorities would not risk diverting this food for other purposes. Cross checks would be done on the spot by the United Kingdom up to the 1st January and by Belgium afterwards.

8. Finally, he asked the Chairman of the Military Committee to clarify the assessment given in paragraph 4.A of document IM(81)224:

‘Although reports from Poland are fragmentary and largely contradictory, the situation appears to have calmed, and to be under control of military authorities.

There has been no indication of preparations among Soviet and WP forces for an intervention in Poland. However, a somewhat higher than normal state of readiness by some of these forces has been observed.’

9. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE confirmed the first part of the statement, i.e. there were at present no indications that an invasion of Poland was being prepared. The higher state of readiness had to do with the communications element of the Soviet forces. There was no change in the military readiness in the Soviet Union proper, nor in the groups of Soviet forces in Poland, nor in the Polish Army. The normal training cycle was going on.

10. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE circulated three situation reports issued on 29th and 30th December.

11. He then referred to the reply by Brezhnev to President Reagan’s letter of 23rd December. In this reply, sent on 26th December, Brezhnev was complaining about the United States ‘overt and covert interference in the internal affairs of Poland’ which had been underway for a long time. He had further remarked that ‘by citing the Soviet CP Central Committee of 5th June, 1981 as evidence of Soviet interference in Poland, the United States was itself interfering in normal relations between the USSR and PZPR.’ He had expressed the view that by calling for overthrow of existing state systems in Poland, President Reagan was himself interfering in the internal affairs of another sovereign state, that no one should interfere with what the Polish Authorities were doing in their own home, that the social order in Poland had been chosen by the Poles themselves and that no one could direct the Polish leadership on how to conduct its affairs or on which methods to be used to stabilize the situation in the country. Such attempts grossly violated the international

law and were thoroughly abnormal. He had rejected that military manoeuvres near Poland could be interpreted as connected with the situation in this country. He had concluded by stressing that the United States, and not the Soviet Union, would bear the responsibility of any further deterioration in US/Soviet relations.

12. In reply, President Reagan had issued the following statement:

“The Soviet Union bears a heavy and direct responsibility for the repression in Poland. For many months the Soviets publicly and privately demanded such a crackdown. They brought major pressures to bear through non-public letters to the Polish leadership, military manoeuvres, and other forms of intimidation. They now openly endorse the suppression which has ensued.

Last week I announced that I had sent a letter to President Brezhnev urging him to permit the restoration of basic human rights in Poland as provided for in the Helsinki Final Act. I also informed him that, if the repression continued, the United States would have no choice but to take further concrete political and economic measures affecting our relationship.

The repression in Poland continues, and President Brezhnev has responded in a manner which makes it clear the Soviet Union does not understand the seriousness of our concern, and its obligations under both the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Charter. I have, therefore, decided to take the following immediate measures with regard to the Soviet Union.

- All Aeroflot services to the United States will be suspended;
- The Soviet Purchasing Commission is being closed;
- The issuance or renewal of licenses for the export to the USSR of electronic equipment, computers and other high technology materials is being suspended;
- Negotiations on a new long-term grains agreement are being postponed;
- Negotiations on a new US/Soviet maritime agreement are being suspended, and a new regime of port-access controls will be put into effect for all Soviet ships when the current agreement expires on December 31st;
- Licenses will be required for export to the Soviet Union an expanded list of oil and gas equipment. Issuance of such licenses will be suspended. This includes pipelayers;
- US/Soviet exchange agreements coming up for renewal in the near future, including the agreements on energy and science and technology, will not be renewed. There will be a complete review of all other US/Soviet exchange agreements.

The United States wants a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the Soviet Union. We intend to maintain a high-level dialogue. But we are prepared to proceed in whatever direction the Soviet Union decides upon—towards greater mutual restraint and cooperation, or further down a harsh and less rewarding path. We will watch events in Poland closely in coming days and weeks. Further steps may be necessary and I will be prepared to take them. American decisions will be determined by Soviet actions.

Secretary Haig has been in communication with our friends and Allies about the measures we are taking and explained why We believe such steps are essential at this time.

Once again I call upon the Soviet Union to recognize the clear desire of the overwhelming majority of the Polish people for a process of national reconciliation, renewal and reform.’

13. He went on to say that there was no difference between the attitude of the United States and of the Ten as regards food aid. It had not been discontinued but deliveries would be made through specialised organizations such as Caritas with the necessary guarantees. But he did not see any reason to be soft with the Polish regime. If there was no improvement in the present conditions, further aid measures might have to be deferred.

14. As for the Soviet Union, his government was not seeking confrontation, or trying to influence its attitude in order to find a compromise. It had felt that the Soviet constant violation of the Helsinki Final Act, the fact that Soviet leaders were trying to use the Polish crisis as an instrument to divide the Allies deserved a strong response. It had taken steps in conformity with NATO Contingency papers, in order not to lose its credibility. Additional steps might have to be taken. The United States’ highest priority was the solidarity of NATO.

15. In this spirit, his Government wished that NATO be the framework of any further action to put pressure on Polish military authorities so that they would restore the dialogue with Solidarity and the process of renewal in Poland. It was his firm belief that a concerted action of Allied countries would be the best way to reach this aim. Therefore, it attached great importance to a Ministerial Meeting to be held in NATO at the beginning of January.

16. Secretary Haig was also in favour of an early emergency meeting of the Madrid Conference at Ministerial level to discuss the Polish situation. He had no illusion that the East would agree to this proposal. But this would demonstrate that it was not possible to use the Helsinki process for its stated purposes.

17. He was aware that there were differences of opinion about how much leverage the West had and should use. His Authorities felt strongly that Allies should not be seen as sitting without making a response. The United States’ response had so far been measured; his Government would see what kind of response subsequent events would call for.

B. Ministerial Meeting²⁷²

18. The REPRESENTATIVES of the UNITED KINGDOM, BELGIUM, DENMARK, ITALY, GERMANY, FRANCE, PORTUGAL and TURKEY said that they were in favour of a meeting of the Alliance’s Foreign Ministers, to be held

²⁷² Paragraphs 18 to 23 have been translated from French for the present publication.

in the first two weeks of January, in order to assess the situation in Poland and to consider concrete measures.

19. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE supported this proposal; however, he wanted it to be a demonstration of the Alliance's unity. Concerning the date, the Secretary of State for External Affairs could only be free during the first and third weeks of January.

20. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE noted that his authorities considered that this meeting would be premature. However, it would not oppose the views of the majority. His Minister would be on an official visit in Africa until 12 January so could only be present from 13 January.

21. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE had not received instructions from his authorities. He thought that they would support the majority. However, he thought it was essential for the meeting to be well prepared, to show the Alliance's cohesion; otherwise, it would do more harm than good.

22. The REPRESENTATIVES of LUXEMBOURG, ICELAND and GREECE had not yet received any instructions. They asked for a date to be set so that they could get agreement from their respective governments.

23. The CHAIRMAN suggested Thursday, 14 January.

C. Action to be taken in the CSCE Madrid Conference

24. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE referred to the British suggestion, and to the opportunity of requesting a special meeting of the Madrid Conference. He pointed out that work was due to resume on 9th February in Madrid. Since then, he did not think that the situation in Poland would have changed significantly. He would therefore find it premature for the West to take a decision on the attitude to be adopted at the time. For the same reason, he did not deem it advisable to approach the Neutrals and Non Aligned. In his view, the most realistic option would be as one suggested in paragraph (c) (iv) of the British paper, to return to Madrid, make statements about Poland and then continue the Conference.

25. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities had some hesitation in deciding at present on steps to be taken. If a consensus developed in the Council on one step or the other, they would certainly not stand in the way.

26. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he could support the idea of an early resumption of the Madrid Conference, put forward by the United States. He thought that it was important to focus public opinion attention on the failure by Poland and the Soviet Union to abide by the principles of the Final Act. This meeting could better take place immediately after the NATO Ministerial Meeting. He pointed out that the fact that Poland would be in the Chair at the resumption of the Madrid Conference had to be taken into account.

27. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that there was every reason to think that widespread repression would continue in Poland in the weeks to come and that there was no sign that the Soviet Union might be responsive to

demarches regarding the violations of the Final Act. He was therefore strongly supporting the idea of a special meeting of the Madrid Conference in the first week of January.

28. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he had no objections to an early reconvening of the Madrid Meeting but that he had doubts about the possibility of getting a consensus among the participants on such a proposal. The best that could be hoped, he felt, was that this idea was shared by a majority of participants, which implied that the Neutrals and Non Aligned had agreed to it. He therefore suggested that each NATO country should get in touch with one or two NNA countries, using the British proposal as a framework for these demarches and for instructions to Delegations in Madrid. Italy would gladly contact Yugoslavia and the Vatican.

29. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he would have to report the United States' proposal to his Authorities. For the time being, his position was very similar to the Danish one.

30. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities were still in favour of the resumption of the Madrid Conference on 9th February, as foreseen. Then Western Delegations could reopen the implementation discussions and speak about the measures taken by the military government in Poland and of the involvement of the Soviet Union in the preparation of the state of emergency in Poland prior to 13th December. He could agree to sub-paragraphs (c)(iv) and (v) of the British proposal.

31. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE could support the idea of a special meeting in Madrid. However, he felt that there were numerous procedural problems to be clarified.

32. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that he could go along with the United States proposal of a special meeting in Madrid in the first week of January.

33. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE could have approved sub-paragraphs (c) (iv) of the British paper (to return to Madrid, to make statements but not to leave the Conference). He would report on the United States last proposal.

34. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE²⁷³ thought that the violations of the Final Act committed during the recess would have to be vigorously denounced as soon as the Madrid Conference resumed and that the Western countries had to coordinate their attitude taking into consideration the views of the Neutral and Non-Aligned, in order to determine firm positions that were accepted by the biggest number. He suggested that bilateral contacts should be made first with the Neutral and Non-Aligned and that their results should be shared.

²⁷³ Paragraphs 34 to 39 have been translated from French for the present publication.

35. He recalled that when the Conference had been adjourned, the French delegation had attempted to speak in favour of a resumption in early January; but this idea had not prevailed. He had doubts about the possibility of resuming with any chance of success. Nevertheless, he could join a common demarche. But, like the Italian Representative, he thought that the most important thing was to first convince the Neutral and Non-Aligned.

36. The REPRESENTATIVES of TURKEY and LUXEMBOURG said that they were prepared to support the United States proposal, in spite of the foreseeable difficulties.

37. The CHAIRMAN proposed following the suggestions of the French Representative. Each of the member states of the Alliance would contact one or more Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries and would inform their partners of the results of these efforts.

38. The REPRESENTATIVES of the NETHERLANDS, GREECE, NORWAY and DENMARK said that they could not accept this suggestion without consulting their authorities.

39. The CHAIRMAN asked them to do everything possible so that the Council could make a decision at a next meeting.

D. Diplomatic demarches

40. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE introduced a paper to be used by member countries as guidelines for their démarches in Warsaw, in Moscow and with Third World Countries.

41. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE recorded the positive reaction of his Authorities to what they considered as a good working basis.

42. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities had also welcomed the guidelines contained in the German paper. He suggested to mention under Paragraphs I, II and III, the Allied proposal for an early special meeting of the CSCE Conference in Madrid. He also suggested to insert a new paragraph IV 'Demarches with those countries participating in the CSCE Madrid Conference.'

43. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that he had so far received no instructions but expected a positive reaction from his Authorities. He felt that time had come to consult those countries whose position were close to the Alliance's views on possible actions against the Soviet Union. It might be useful in this respect to reactivate the 'Trio machinery.'

44. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE supported the last Canadian suggestion. He had already been approached by the Ambassadors of Australia, New Zealand and Spain.

45. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE²⁷⁴ agreed with the guidance proposed in the Federal Republic's document. He also agreed with the last suggestion from the Canadian Representative. He would simply add that the emphasis should be placed on the role of the Church in the resumption of the dialogue.

46. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE echoed the very favourable reactions in Italy to the federal government's initiative, in particular concerning the call to the Third World.

47. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his Minister was in general agreement with the German guidelines. He wished to point out however that démarches by member countries in Moscow should preferably be made bilaterally or in the framework of the Ten but not as members of NATO. He supported the idea of gaining support of Neutrals and Non Aligned and inducing them to make similar demarches. As for the Trio machinery, he recalled the role of the Netherlands Ambassador vis-a-vis Australia.

48. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he welcomed the German initiative. His Authorities had already made demarches along this line in Warsaw and with the Polish Ambassador in Oslo. He also agreed on the opportunity of demarches in Moscow. However he had doubts about the wisdom of the second sentence in Paragraph 11(2) of the German guidelines: 'Hint to Soviet involvement and influence on Polish leadership.' As regards the Third World countries, he wondered whether demarches would be appropriate in view of their reluctance to be involved in what they perceived as an East/West conflict.

49. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE²⁷⁵ recalled that his government had already made several demarches in Moscow and other countries in the East. In a certain number of Third World countries, French Ambassadors had also made demarches in order to share the French government's feelings about the Polish crisis. On the whole, these demarches had been welcomed positively, because the situation in Poland was concerning for the Third World. This meant that he agreed with all the points mentioned in the Federal Republic's document.

50. The LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE supported the Federal Republic's initiative. However, he warned against the danger of giving these demarches the form of an accusation.

51. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he welcomed the German initiative and could in general approve the paper before the Council. His Authorities were of the opinion, that the Soviet involvement in Poland was obvious and should be stressed in particular with the Third World countries. He agreed however that these countries were usually sensitive with regard to their independence. He felt that the guidelines should be applied according to national policies.

²⁷⁴ Paragraphs 45 and 46 have been translated from French for the present publication.

²⁷⁵ Paragraphs 49 and 50 have been translated from French for the present publication.

52. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that he fully supported the German initiative. He recalled that his Authorities had already made two démarches to the Polish Ambassador in Lisbon, since they had no contact with their Embassy in Warsaw.

53. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he had been gratified by the positive reactions to his proposals. He felt that démarches should be made as soon as possible. He agreed that they should be made bilaterally, provided that all replies received by individual countries be conveyed to the others. As for the Neutrals and Non Aligned, he suggested the 'Trio countries' should come together to discuss on the best way to approach them. He would circulate a revised version of his document, taking into account comments made in discussion, in time for the next Council meeting.

54. The CHAIRMAN noted that the discussion of the revised version would take place on the following day. He asked whether the Council could agree that the Secretary General make a statement to the press on his own capacity to say that the process of ongoing consultations about the situation in Poland continued.

55. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that he had no objection to a press statement by the Secretary General provided it would be made clear that it was not linked to the Council's discussions and was not made on behalf of NATO.

56. This was generally agreed.

NATO Archives, PR(81)84

CANADA

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**31 December 1981, Telegram
from the Canadian Ambassador in Warsaw, John M. Fraser,
to the Canadian Department of External Affairs**

Warsaw, 31 December 1981

Confidential

Where Does Power Now Lie in Poland?

Summary: No one knows what goes on in the inner circle, but it probably is Jaruzelski and the military who are in charge for all national purposes. Theories that it is really party/police/Moscow running things from behind the scenes are irrefutable but implausible.

2. Report: It should first be said that there is virtually no hard info on power relationships within governing military council or between military/party or military/security police. At present, however, it seems a good bet that the army is entirely responsible for all major decisions, whatever friction there may be with party and/or other security forces on technical issues, such as banking and finance. Existing government organs no doubt tell generals what can, cannot, or must be done. In broader policy areas it is doubtful how much they listen to advice (it certainly does not seem that they listen much to the MFA).

3. Having more or less completed phase one (to seize and hold control over Poland) with unexpected efficiency and less overt and much less violent resistance than there might have been, military leadership must decide where to go now. They may, like the Egyptian army in 1973, have come to the end of what was so meticulously planned, and be rather at a loss, as they move into general policy restructuring. Moreover, there will be a clear requirement to delegate authority—but to whom?

4. It is at this stage that the party may reassert itself. There are some, indeed, who think party hardliners (Olszowski, in particular) have been pulling the strings all along. This seems unlikely. One Polish source claims, indeed, that Olszowski has lost ground. In any case, the party as such is playing no visible role whatever, and appearances by its civilian leaders have been rare and without substance. Even party first secretary (who is never so identified) hardly mentions it. Such self-abnegation is, to say the least, uncharacteristic of CP leading organs.

5. The party as an institution must be further weakened by the purge that is undoubtedly going on. The Cuban ambassador was so informed in briefing by central committee staff, but was unable to say how high it was reaching or who was purging whom. The only public references are to 'strengthening' of the party at

grassroots and cleansing it of 'ideologically uncertain elements' as well as of corrupt and incompetent. It is known that deaths in Katowice sparked wave of turning in party cards by disaffected members. Their attempts to resign were either simply refused or greeted with threats of dismissal from jobs and loss of social benefits.

6. Despite all that has happened since 13 December, army and Jaruzelski himself seem to retain degree of popular respect greater than that which the party has enjoyed for years, if ever. This would, of course, provide the party with motive to use Jaruzelski as front man, but there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that this is so, and most observers think that Jaruzelski really is in charge.

7. While he still has some vestigial reputation as a 'moderate,' it would probably be more accurate to describe him as a pragmatist. He is also thought to be austere, even something of a puritan, with both temperament and military background making him set high value on discipline and sacrifice. While almost totally lacking in personal charisma (as are almost all public men here, except Walesa) he is thought to dominate the military council, although not to the exclusion of debate. He did, apparently, impress 65 leading academics, with whom he met for four hours last week, with his sincerity and willingness to engage in open discussion on most issues.

8. As to the relations between the army and other security forces, notably police, the notion that it is latter who are really in charge is probably engendered by the fact that they have been given most of the dirty work to do. This could be because army conscripts might be reluctant to do it, but is more likely to reflect the wish to tarnish the military image with the public as little as possible. Police are hated (and feared) anyway. At local level and in carrying out security tasks it may well be police who are operationally in charge, and certainly they are now more inclined to swagger than to slink. Embassies in Warsaw have noticed increased pressure on their Polish employees from security apparatus. Were police in charge at national level, however, events of past two weeks would probably have been nastier and more brutal than they were and national explosion that everyone had feared would follow the proclamation of a state of emergency might have done so.

9. No discussion of power in Poland would be complete without asking how much of it in fact lies in Moscow. It is probably true that there has been Soviet assistance (as in printing martial law proclamation posters—if only to ensure that they were not leaked by some Solidarnosc sympathizer in print-shop). Links with security police are thought to be particularly close. It is certainly true that Moscow has been urging that Polish government 'do something' with 'or else' implicit—or perhaps, eventually, explicit. It may be true that some private ultimatum from Moscow (in addition to the public or semi-public ones we know about) set timing for the implementation of Jaruzelski's (contingency?) plans. It seems most unlikely that Moscow dictated precisely what was to be done or was even very enthusiastic about it beyond primordial fact that at last something was being done. There is no evidence whatever, that I know of, to suggest that Moscow has been calling the

shots since 13 December, although Soviet planes still heard flying into Warsaw may well contain a few technical advisers as well as supplies.

10. If Jaruzelski keeps on holding party's head under water, Moscow may begin to have déjà vu nightmare of Pilsudski and try to direct events along more orthodox channels. Up to now, one feels (particularly given some reason for Jaruzelski and his colleagues to be entitled to their confidence), Moscow will accept almost anything that stops Polish rot. Seeing difficulties that Polish authorities have had in imposing martial law effectively, Soviets must be even more inclined to think (at least) twice before intervening themselves. Resistance of Polish workers would not be as passive as it has been; nor could Polish army be counted upon.

11. It is hardly surprising that Moscow has urged repression. During first year of Solidarnosc many experts were convinced that Soviets would do the job themselves rather than tolerate Polish heresies. They could hardly fail to urge corrective action on Polish authorities—particularly the clipping of Solidarnosc wings if not complete suppression. Boycott how we will, Moscow is not now conceivably going to advise/instruct Polish government to let Solidarnosc rise again. Moscow probably feels, indeed, that these subversives are being treated too leniently.

12. Wherever power in Poland now lies, what kind of power is it: power to do what? We have seen a fairly negative use of power since 13 December. Can this be translated into power to shift Poland into forward gear? One must hope so.²⁷⁶

Fraser

**Library and Archives Canada, Department of External Affairs fonds, Vol. 18512,
File 20-POLND-1-4, Pt. 16**

²⁷⁶ The telegram was sent via the Candian Embassy in Vienna.

AUSTRIA

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25 January 1982, Circular by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Vienna, 25 January 1982

Poland; Preliminary Assessment of the Imposition of Martial Law

Information

The [Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs] is currently examining various aspects of the events in Poland. In this context, the assessment of the imposition of the state of war and any consequences to be drawn from it are important. [Here in this office], ideas put forward, also within the context of a meeting with the Federal Minister, have initially resulted in the following points of view.

1) In contrast to the other eastern countries, the political situation in Poland before August 1980 was characterised by two things in particular: by the strong, historically determined position of the Catholic Church and by the relatively low anchoring of the Communist Party (PUWP) within the population. The growth of the Solidarity movement from August 1980, which was primarily caused by the economic and social conditions in the country, went hand in hand with a further erosion of the party, which lost numerous members and was apparently no longer able to fully enforce the principle of the leading role. At the same time, the intrusion of the independent trade union movement into the emerging power vacuum became apparent. Solidarity had to declare itself a trade union, but it undoubtedly pursued political goals that went beyond those of a traditional trade union and made it a political force in its own right. Then again, it was by no means a uniform organisation. In addition to a Catholic-oriented group under Walesa with primarily trade union goals, there were also representatives who emerged from communism with more politically oriented goals. This naturally led to infighting.

The leadership in Moscow and its subordinate group within the PUWP—there were also various factions in the party—increasingly feared losing control over the developments and that the threshold of what was still permissible would be exceeded. The Soviet fears became clear not only in the various reports and comments in the media and in the ‘spontaneous’ letters from workers in various factories but also in the official and published *démarches* (letters from the CC of the CPSU to the Polish CC, Ambassador Aristov’s *démarche*). Accordingly, the Soviet Union undoubtedly exerted increasing pressure on the Polish leadership to bring about a turnaround in the direction of the Marxist-Leninist principles it advocates.

2) The Polish leadership headed by Jaruzelski and, as stated, the Soviet leadership evidently considered the regime in view of the developments of the last weeks—

or months—before December 13, 1981, because of the tendencies that became visible within Solidarity towards far-reaching demands such as free local elections, implementation of a vote of confidence in Solidarity or the population being oriented against the party, and other things being increasingly questioned. This led to the decision to end this process through the use of state power. The army as such is not to be viewed as an actor on the Polish side here, but its political apparatus, as it is in every Eastern army, and the apparently intact apparatus of the Ministry of the Interior (militia). As far as could be observed, the army officers deployed, but not the army soldiers, were equipped with ammunition. It should also be noted that Jaruzelski had become head of the army's Political Commission as early as 1960; a key political function which he would not have been able to assume without the prerequisite of Soviet trust in him; Minister of Defence since 1968, he became a member of the Politburo already in 1971.

The violent suppression of active resistance in the form of factory occupations combined with a strike, as far as is known, was carried out by militia units.

3) In this context, the question of the extent of the Soviet role in the decision on the imposition of a state of war or in the preparation and implementation of these measures is of interest. Not only can it be ruled out that this happened without the knowledge of the Soviet Union; there is much to suggest that this came about with the approval and active support of the Soviet authorities and apparatuses. Such an operation undoubtedly requires months of General Staff preparation, and the manner in which it was carried out would indicate the involvement of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and the KGB. It could already be heard at the beginning of 1981 from the Eastern European side that a 'takeover of political and economic areas by the armed forces' was to be expected.

4) The exercise of power in Poland is currently apparently divided between the political apparatus of the army (Jaruzelski) and the party-affiliated security apparatus. What is new for a communist country, however, is the—at least temporary—formal renunciation of the party's primacy over other social institutions and thus also over the army, a previously sacred rule of communist states. Jaruzelski consciously relies on the army and its reputation among the people; he uses it as a figurehead and thus as a political factor. The apparently badly battered party, whose membership has continued to decline after the imposition of Martial Law, practically did not appear as such at the beginning of the state of emergency. Jaruzelski avoided any reference to it in his speech of December 13.

5) In connection with the recent events in Poland, there is also the question of the relationship between 'Yalta' and the Helsinki Final Act. Here, Yalta is to be understood as code for the post-war order in Europe, which goes back only to a small extent to the written agreements of Yalta, for example with regard to the Polish borders. While these agreements, among others, provided holding free and

secret elections in the states liberated from Germany at the earliest possible time,²⁷⁷ actually, a European order or division of spheres of influence was brought about in a way reminiscent of the principle 'Cuius regio, eius religio.' The borders in Europe have undoubtedly been confirmed by the CSCE.

However, this does not preclude the application of the Helsinki Final Act to demand compliance with the political agreements there. The right to demand the establishment of human rights and fundamental freedoms can be derived not only from the Final Act but also from the Charter and human rights conventions of the United Nations. Accordingly, Austria advocates an early end to the state of war, the release of illegally arrested persons, and a return to the liberalisation process.

To allow a considerably intensified confrontation between East and West because of the dispute over Poland, appears undesirable in the view [of this office] not only due to Austrian interests but also for general considerations from the viewpoint of *realpolitik*. A fundamental change in the political situation in the Soviet Union and, with it, in the other Eastern European countries cannot reasonably be expected for the near future. A policy of confrontation, however, is likely to reduce rather than increase the prospects of medium or long-term change in line with the considerations that the pluralistic democratic states had associated with the CSCE. From this point of view, too, there is still an interest in cooperation across the ideological borders of Europe.²⁷⁸

Austrian State Archive ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 166.03.00/104-II.3/82

²⁷⁷ This is a reference to the Crimea (Yalta) Declaration on Liberated Europe, agreed upon by the heads of government of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 11 February 1945. The following partition of Europe and creation of the Eastern Bloc was no part of the negotiations.

²⁷⁸ The circular was written and signed by the Counsellor Klas Daublebsky and approved by the head of Section II.3 (Eastern Department) of the Austrian Foreign Ministry, Paul Ullmann. The memo was sent to all Austrian diplomatic posts abroad.

AUSTRALIA

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26 January 1982, Cablegram
from the Australian Ambassador in Warsaw, John Burgess,
to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs (excerpt)

Warsaw, 26 January 1982

C o n f i d e n t i a l

CABLEGRAM O.WS8608

Poland: call on Primate

[...]²⁷⁹

When I called on the Polish Primate, Archbishop Glemp, on 25 January he entered into a wide-ranging discussion of Poland's situation. The Primate was cool and matter of fact during the discussion. He gave the impression of being less worried by the internal situation on this latter occasion than when he received the Minister late in November. He came across as a rather more reserved and self-contained figure on this occasion than last. He did not initiate much of the discussion but responded fairly directly to a series of questions.

2. I conveyed the Minister's best wishes to the Primate and referred to the deep impression which their conversation had left upon the Minister. Subsequent developments had borne out the concern the Primate then expressed. I based the ensuing conversation on the Minister's interest in having the Primate's assessment of the new situation, an interest sharpened by the need for the Government to respond appropriately to the imposition of martial law. I gave the Primate a brief resume of the Australian response to date based on the press release of 19 January.

3. On the issue whether Western economic support to the present Polish authorities should continue the Primate responded very firmly that all food aid should be continued. Poland's food situation, he said, was very serious. He mentioned as an example the likely disastrous effect in the domestic poultry industry were it denied imported feed. When I queried the desirability of arranging and passing such aid through the authorities, he responded by saying that he understood this was a complicated question. While the Church could not exercise direct control over the use to which such aid was put, there were indirect ways in which a degree of control could be exercised. The clear implication was that he favoured continuing Government-to-Government food aid. I then referred to other non-food areas of Government-to-Government economic support, mentioning as an example our own credit facility with regard to wool and hides. The Primate did not respond and I took

²⁷⁹ The summary was omitted.

this to mean that he was concerned almost exclusively with continuing *food* aid. The tenor of what he said, however, suggested that he had few reservations about Western Government continuing other forms of economic support to the authorities.

4. During this part of the conversation the Primate said with some warmth and impatience: 'Reagan's measures are quite wrong.' The West, he said, had acknowledged the Soviet sphere of influence at Potsdam and Yalta. I demurred, saying that whilst the Communist Lublin Government had been acknowledged at Yalta, it was never agreed that the USSR henceforth had the right to determine Polish affairs. The Primate brushed this aside, saying emphatically that Poland had to be oriented towards the Soviet Union and had to be 'socialist' in one form or another.

5. When the conversation moved on to Jaruzelski, the Primate described him as Poland's last chance. To my question whether the declaration of martial law should be seen as a Polish act or as an act inspired by the Soviet Union he replied that it was essentially a Polish act. The Primate said he did not want to give the General more credit than was due to him but he did give him credit for having his own distinctive concept of how Poland should conduct his affairs. He saw him as a committed communist but one who did not believe that Moscow's ways were right for Poland. On the other hand, Jaruzelski appeared not to have any special gifts as a politician and there was not yet any clear national program. The Primate added, though without much conviction, that the General's speech to the SEJM later that day might rectify this situation to some extent. He said the Church looked to the General to give the nation a direction that might have some prospect of popular support. As for the Military Council's continuing commitment to economic reform the Primate agreed that there were grounds for concern that the reforms now being spoken of seemed to have little in common with the reforms under discussion before martial law and were now predicated upon tight central control. The Primate agreed readily that Jaruzelski was at present in a very strong position and that it was unlikely that he would soon be pushed aside by another. He made the comment that it may be difficult to dismantle the Military Council.

6. Turning to 'Solidarity' the Primate volunteered that he had the previous day visited Bialoleka Prison,²⁸⁰ near Warsaw, where interned members of 'Solidarity's' national commission (with the exception of Walesa) were being held. He had been able to talk with them and they had made it clear that if they were released they would work to overthrow the Government. Of course, he said, the authorities could not release them.

7. When I introduced the question of a role for Walesa he commented, though without any great conviction, that there was still some prospect of a new 'Solidarity' headed by Walesa. This he said would be a genuine worker's trade union operating

²⁸⁰ During Martial Law, the Detention Centre and Penal Facility in Warsaw's Białoleka district became one of the country's largest internment centers, where leading Solidarity activists and leaders were detained.

purely as such. The Primate went on to volunteer that the political wing of 'Solidarity' could perhaps find expression in a new political grouping or party which might have a religious/Catholic complexion. While he did not say so I would assume that he envisaged no place in such a new grouping for the non-religious radicals in the 'Solidarity' leadership, the Kurons, Onyszkiewicz etc. I put to the Primate the view often aired in the Western media that Walesa was lost without his advisers. The Primate said he disagreed strongly with this view. Walesa, he said, only needed these advisers when matters of high politics came up. The implication was that he had no business concerning himself with these matters now. During this part of the discussion the Primate spoke of Walesa in quite neutral terms, neither praising nor criticising him. The impression left was that he saw Walesa as a figure of the past who would have no very key role in the future.

8. I found rather surprising the tenor of remarks the Primate made in a discussion of the Polish Party. I put to him the rather bleak view I have formed about the weakness and bankruptcy of the Party, the poor calibre of the talents available to it and its inability to reform itself. The Primate dissented from most of this. He agreed that the Party was now very weak but believed that there were prospects for it to improve itself and its position in society. He said that the Party had to be acceptable to the Soviet Union but that there nevertheless was scope for it to pursue distinctive policies within certain limits. When I mentioned the Hungarian model he commented that something on those lines should be possible. The Primate thought, contrary to the view I had put, that the IXth Party Congress had shown some signs that the Party was able to reform itself and he saw some prospects for it gaining the confidence of the people. He commented that there were some extremists in the Party but felt that under martial law these could be kept in check. He also made the comment that the Party was likely to be smaller in size than hitherto and threw in the observation that if Poland's geographical location was different the Party, of course, would have no influence on the country at all. He passed no comments on any Party figures other than Jaruzelski though I mentioned Olszowski and Fiszbach in the hope he might be drawn.

9. To my question whether the Church was experiencing any difficulties in the performance of its religious mission under martial law the Primate answered that the Church's mission was being respected. (There were, incidentally, no soldiers or militia immediately outside the Primate's palace). He said that some priests had been arrested adding, in apparent justification of the arrests, that those arrested had held very radical views. He agreed very readily to my suggestion that if the authorities came to pursue more repressive policies, the Church might come under pressures of the sort it had experienced in the fifties and sixties. On reflection I doubt whether he would see this sort of development occurring under Jaruzelski, but perhaps under a harder-line successor. I spent some time seeking to obtain from the Primate a view on the Church's role in the present situation and on what

he saw as the most appropriate internal response to the imposition of martial law. He described the Church's role as seeking to stop hatred developing in Poland and expressed deep concern that such hatred was widespread and that many wanted to mount active opposition to the authorities. Attempts to obtain a view in the sort of action he felt would constitute an appropriate response (e.g. passive resistance which I mentioned) drew a blank. The conclusion I drew is that the Primate looks to the authorities taking a course which would attract cooperation rather than opposition. In the course of this part of the conversation the Primate said that the present demoralisation of the country offered certain opportunities to the Church. I came away with the feeling that the Church hierarchy may not be altogether displeased at the demise of 'Solidarity' which for a time seriously challenged the Polish Church's traditional role as the focus of the allegiance of the nation and whose leadership was becoming less and less subject to Church influence.

C o m m e n t

10. The conversation confirmed other indications we have had that the primary response of the Church hierarchy in Poland to the recent turn of events is to adapt rather than to resist. While it is hard for this observer to come to terms with this view, it cannot be lightly dismissed. The Church is still here and in an enviably strong position after a thousand years. During the last three hundred years or so it has prospered under Russian hegemony in one form or another. One would expect it to take a long view and in this instance its prime consideration is probably to put itself in the best possible position to continue its religious mission in Poland over coming decades. Adaptation is therefore an understandable response. To those used to thinking in shorter and more purely political terms, however, there would appear to be some dangers for the Church in adopting this attitude. Some here might see the Church as too much concerned with the protection of its own institutional future and not enough about the contemporary aspirations of its flock. In a sense the 'Solidarity' phenomenon has already demonstrated a readiness of the people to look beyond the Church for the fulfilment of these aspirations and has pointed up a certain weakness of Church authority.

11. During the conversation the Primate made no mention of possible problems with forthcoming price rises, nor of the prospects for direct Soviet intervention. There was not/not opportunity to put questions to him on these subjects and I doubt whether much should be read into these omissions.

12. As I gave the Primate an undertaking on confidentiality and in view of some of the comments I have made, I request limited distribution of this telegram. The summary has been repeated to a number of posts.

Burgess

NAA, A1838, 48/1/3 PART 18

UNITED KINGDOM

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**3 March 1982, Despatch
from the Counsellor at the British Embassy in Warsaw, Ramsay Melhuish,
to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington**

3 March 1982

Confidential

Martial Law in Poland IV: After the War

My Lord,

1. The preceding 3 despatches in this series on martial law in Poland covered the causes of the military takeover on 12/13 December, the part played by Solidarity and subsequent developments in the first 7 weeks of martial law. In this concluding despatch, I have the honour to examine where the present Polish leadership now wants to take this country and how far they look like being able to do so. It is notoriously rash to make a forecast of what is likely to happen in any country, let alone one so precariously balanced as Poland in 1982. But I hope it may be helpful to examine some of the things that might come to pass in Poland, in order to test some of the current assumptions of British and Western policy.

2. This despatch assumes that General Jaruzelski will remain in supreme power as Chairman of the Military Council, Prime Minister, First Secretary of the Party and Minister of Defence, at least until the end of this year. This is in fact the assumption on which all of us here have been working since the imposition of martial law. Its validity has been strongly reinforced over the past weeks. There is now an air of permanence about Jaruzelski which has been particularly marked in his recent appearances in the Central Committee, the Sejm and in Moscow. He has never lacked authority and self-control in his public (and private) image. To this he has now added increasing self-confidence and a marked aura of power. On the day after his return from what seems to have been a successful visit to Moscow, it is difficult to envisage any voluntary abdication from his supreme position here nor, for the foreseeable future, any chance of his being ousted by someone else. There seems, therefore, little point at present in speculating too much on 'After Jaruzelski—who?' lines, except to point out that, whether from Western or Polish (or indeed Soviet) points of view, little comfort could be derived if Jaruzelski fell from power.

3. All the evidence we have received suggests that, leaving on one side his undoubted Polish patriotism, Jaruzelski is a military man first and a Communist second. The support of the army seems crucial to his present hold on all the levels of power. His appointment of military figures to senior civilian posts adds to the

military aspect of his regime which is already obvious enough under martial law. There must be few Generals left who are not now members of the WRON, Ministers, Provincial Governors or holders of other important official positions (e.g. Mayor of Warsaw). His speeches bear the stamp of his military training, backed up by strong elements of austerity and puritanical zeal. He hammers away at the virtues of hard work, law and order, discipline, conformity, responsibility and political stability. Under Jaruzelski's leadership, therefore, the army seems unlikely to retire very far from the forefront of Polish life. With this help, he can be assured that the country will conform to the image in which he would like to see it refashioned. The army is an effective instrument to control what has always been an ungovernable and non-conformist society. This is not to say that he believes that martial law is forever. In his speeches he insist on the desirability of lifting at least some of the martial law restrictions, but he does not appear to envisage the early ending of martial law itself, given the conditions that he says would have to be fulfilled before he does. And, even if more restrictions are gradually lifted over a period of time, as the situation is deemed by the authorities to be returning to 'normal,' a loyal army would constantly provide the means of re-establishing the apparatus of military rule within a very few hours.

4. Jaruzelski's credentials as an ideological leader have appeared to be rather hazy. As leader of the Party since October 1981, he has stood aloof from its in-fighting, and he still appears reluctant to describe himself as First Secretary of the Party, rather than as Prime Minister or Chairman of the Military Council. One could be forgiven for thinking that he believed that the military virtues which he sees as necessary for Poland as a whole could also with benefit be applied to the Party, as though a brisk period of re-training would soon set it to rights. Yet there seems every reason to suppose that insofar as his views on the Party have been developed, they have done so on highly orthodox lines. In his most recent pronouncements, particularly his opening speech at the VII Plenum,²⁸¹ he has clearly tried to emphasise his orthodoxy from the ideological point of view. This emphasis will no doubt have partly been designed to reassure his Soviet neighbours on this score, but it also, I believe, reflects his own preference for discipline and conformity.

5. It follows from this that Jaruzelski's policies are likely to be unimaginative, inflexible and even unambitious for Poland. What he would like is a stable and disciplined country, working hard and tightening its belt in order to revive the economy, eschewing dangerous dreams of pluralism and democracy and remaining a faithful ally to the Soviet Union and a member of the Warsaw Pact. He would like to reconstruct the trade unions in Poland as strictly social and economic organisations, as described in the recently published discussion paper. The void left by Solidarity's

²⁸¹ The 7th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party took place 24–25 February 1982.

demise would be filled in this scheme of things by a coming together of the various strains of Polish society, the Party, lay Catholics, unionists, into a widespread coalition movement working in local groups but eventually represented in the Sejm on a national scale. The Party would be revived and reconstructed and reminded that it should be working to play a leading role in the State. But in his mind, it would still be one regiment among others. And under his command.

6. This picture of everyone in Poland working hard with their heads down and asking no questions (unless the correct answers are known in advance) is a grim and depressing one. Nor does it seem likely to deal very successfully with the four main constraints on Polish policy, which I outlined telegraphically to the Department six days after martial law. These were local opposition (in its wider sense), economic problems, the attitude of the Soviet Union and the activities of the West.

7. Jaruzelski has demonstrated in the last 10 weeks that he intends to permit no active opposition to his regime. With the support of the Army, he is likely to continue to be able to keep Poland quiet. Of course the opposition, by which I mean Solidarity supporters and, to a certain extent, the Church, can be grudging about the degree of cooperation they give the military regime but they cannot overthrow it or perhaps even seriously disrupt it. This may not stop them from beginning to stir up trouble when the weather gets better and the more obstructive measures of martial law are lifted. But I do not think they will get very far; and they will suffer a bloody nose, or worse, in the process.

8. While Jaruzelski can probably keep the opposition more or less at bay, with his road blocks, his curfew and his military courts, these can do little [to] solve Poland's enormous economic difficulties. This is the real weakness of his position. In Jaruzelski's scheme of things the 6-day week, no absenteeism and no strikes were intended to ensure higher productivity and a reviving economy. But, because of the legacy of past mistakes, the accelerating economic decline since the summer of 1980 and recent external financial constraints, the economy is far too disorganised to be revived in such a simple way, even if one assumed that there was no internal passive resistance in factories. Hard work is beside the point when there is nothing to work with. Industrial production, apart from a few favoured areas—mining is the most obvious—continues to decline. Even the official government forecasts suggest further deterioration in many sectors before things can improve.

9. The attitude of the Soviet Union is less easy to assess, at least as seen from Warsaw. The Soviet leadership would seem to have three main concerns in Poland, the geo-political security of their Warsaw Pact communication links with East Germany, the ideological sanctity of orthodox Marxist/Leninist concepts with particular emphasis on the leading role of the Party, and the practical importance of having a Polish political leadership that is visibly in control of Poland. So long as these concerns are more or less met, the Soviets will be satisfied. For, above all, as the events of the last 18 months have shown, the Soviet Union does not want to

intervene directly in Poland. Judged by these criteria, Jaruzelski should be able to continue to count on Soviet support at least for the time being. The country is quiet. It will be a model ally, increasingly dependent for its economic health on Soviet and CMEA help and, although Jaruzelski may not be a brilliant student of ideological orthodoxy, by Polish standards he tries hard and there is no obvious heresy. I would guess that for the next few months anyhow, the Soviet leadership would prefer Jaruzelski to any alternative Polish leader, even a more orthodox one. The potential gain from a greater ideological purity or a more subservient leadership in Warsaw would not compensate for the increasing chances of strife in Poland which in turn could bring Soviet intervention closer.

10. The constraints imposed by the West must be considered of less importance in the list of problems facing Jaruzelski or his successor. These constraints are partly political, concentrating on condemnation of Poland's policy in a number of international *fora*, and partly economic. Both matter, the political because the Poles do care about Western reactions, and the economic because Poland needs new credits to supply crucial inputs to the economy. Their impact, however, is marginal to Jaruzelski's main preoccupation with order and discipline. He hopes to be able to avoid economic collapse by Soviet help and by Polish acceptance of a much reduced standard of living. He will also convince himself that there is no way he can safely (from his point of view) satisfy Western demands, even if he wanted to.

11. This analysis leaves little room for any chances of the West securing satisfaction on their three basic conditions. The problem is that the lifting of martial law and the release of detainees would undoubtedly add to the regime's internal security preoccupations, while resumption of a genuine dialogue would conjure up for Jaruzelski visions of the anarchic state of pre-13 December Poland. As the consequences of economic decline in Poland become more obvious, the scope for embarking on more liberal policies would seem to grow even less.

12. The most severe constraint on Jaruzelski over the remainder of this year is likely to be Poland's appalling economic situation. But I very much doubt whether the effect of this economic debacle, even if it is exacerbated by some or all of the other constraints, will be enough to topple Jaruzelski from power. In theory, he could at any time be replaced either by a more hard-line leadership (Kociolek, Milewski or some other currently unknown) that would openly abandon any pretence of looking forward to relaxing the rigours of central control. Or he might be replaced by a more pragmatic leadership (Olszowski or maybe Barcikowski) that would concentrate on trying to revive the economy and might be willing to contemplate paying the price, as they would see it, for resumption of Western help. Either of these alternatives would, as far as one can see, be most unlikely to produce a happier ending to the Polish problems than the depressing course that Jaruzelski has set. It is difficult to believe that a hard-line regime could cope more satisfactorily with the constraints facing Poland than Jaruzelski, and even the Russians might

be unenthusiastic about it if it meant leading to more practical trouble in their troublesome neighbour. A more pragmatic leadership willing to gamble on being able to exploit the possibilities for negotiation with the Church or with Solidarity and willing to contemplate a further wooing of the West seems unlikely to get very far without provoking another bout of repression from the Polish Army or from the Soviet Union.

13. Against this background of Poland's deep-seated difficulties described above, there seems to be no chance that Jaruzelski or any successor can overcome Poland's political and economic problems, while meeting the requirements of both the Soviet Union and the West. The maze in which Poland's leaders find themselves has no easy way out and a lot of nasty blind alleys. This is a bleak prospect for the Poles. It is also, but much less directly, a worrying one for the West. The only countries that can derive some satisfaction from what is going on here, at least in the short-term, are the Soviet Union and most of its CMEA allies. And even they must be concerned about the longer-term prospects. The Polish crisis may yet surprise us all by how long it is going to last.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Moscow, East Berlin, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Prague, Belgrade, Washington, Paris, Bonn, Helsinki and Stockholm, to the UK Permanent Representatives of the North Atlantic Council and to the European Community, and to the Secretaries of State for Defence and Trade.

I am, etc,
M. R. Melhuish

**The National Archives, FCO 28/4906
(DBPO, The Polish Crisis, 1979–1982, Doc. No. 147)**

List of abbreviations

- AAN – Archiwum Akt Nowych [Central Archives of Modern Records]
- AAPD – Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany]
- ABC – American Broadcasting Company
- ACCHAN – Allied Command Channel
- ACE – Allied Command Europe
- ACLANT – Allied Command Atlantic
- AdR – Archiv der Republik [Archive of the Republic]
- AFL/CIO – American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
- AMSZ – Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
- ASG – Assistant Secretary General
- ASMAE – Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale [Historical-Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation]
- BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
- BMAA – Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten [Federal Ministry for External Affairs]
- BZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
- C. – Circolare [Circular]
- C3 – Communication, Command and Control
- CA – Combat Assessment
- CARE – Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe
- CBM – Confidence-Building Measures
- Cc – Carbon copy
- CC – Central Committee
- CDA – Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft [Christian Democratic Workers' Association]
- CDE – Conference on Disarmament in Europe

- CDU – Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands [Christian Democratic Union of Germany]
- CEIC – Canada Employment and Immigration Commission
- CF – Canadian Forces
- CGT – Confédération Générale du Travail [General Confederation of Labour]
- CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
- CINCENT – Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe
- CINCHAN – Commander-in-Chief Channel and Southern North Sea
- CMCM – Chairman Military Committee Memorandum
- CMEA – Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
- COCOM – Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
- COMECON – Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
- CP – Communist Party
- CP. – compare
- CPSU – Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- CSCE – Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
- ČSSR, CSSR – Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
- CSU – Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern [Christian Social Union in Bavaria]
- DBPO – Documents on British Policy Overseas
- DC – District of Columbia
- DDR – Deutsche Demokratische Republic [German Democratic Republic]
- Dep. – Departament [Department]
- DGAP – Direzione Generale degli Affari Politici [Directorate General of Political Affairs]
- DGB – Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund [German Trade Union Confederation]
- DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency
- DIP – Konwersatorium „Doświadczenie i Przyszłość” [Discussion Forum ‘Experience and Future’]
- DPC – Defence Planning Committee
- DSiP – Departament Studiów i Programowania [Studies and Planning Department]
- EC – European Communities

EDC – European Disarmament Conference
EE – Eastern Europe
EEC – European Economic Community
EPC – European Political Co-operation
FBS – forward-based systems
FCO – Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDP – Freie Demokratische Partei [Free Democratic Party]
FM – Federal Minister
FM – Foreign Minister
FOB – Free on Board
FRG – Federal Republic of Germany
FRMAE – France, Ministère des Affaires étrangères [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
GA – General Assembly
GDR – German Democratic Republic
GNP – Gross National Product
HM – Her Majesty
HUMINT – Human Intelligence
ILO – International Labour Organization
IMF – International Monetary Fund
INF – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INR – Bureau of Intelligence and Research
JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC – Joint Intelligence Cell
JIC – Joint Intelligence Committee
KC – Komitet Centralny [Central Committee]
KGB – Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti [Committee for State Security]
KIK – Klub Inteligencji Katolickiej [Catholic Intelligentsia Club]
KNSM – Koninklijke Nederlandse Stoomboot-Maatschappij [Royal Netherlands Steamship Company]
KOR – Komitet Obrony Robotników [Workers' Defense Committee]

KPN – Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej [Confederation for an Independent Poland]

Kr. – Krone

KSS–KOR – Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej – Komitet Obrony Robotników [Social Self-Defence Committee - Workers' Defense Committee]

LES – locally engaged staff

LRTNF – long-range theatre nuclear forces

MARSEC – Maritime Security

MBFR – Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

MC – Military Committee

MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MFN – most favoured nation

MIA – Ministry of Internal Affairs

MIFT – My Immediately Following Telegram

MIPT – My Immediately Preceding Telegram

MKS – Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy [Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee]

MKZ, M.K.Z. – Międzyzakładowy Komitet Założycielski [Inter-Enterprise Founding Committee]

MND – Ministry of National Defense

MOD – Ministry of Defence

MODUK – Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom

MSCs – Major Subordinate Commanders

N+N – Neutral and Non-aligned

NAA – National Archives of Australia

NAC – North Atlantic Council

NAI – National Archives of Ireland

NNA – Neutral and Non-Aligned Nations

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NC – NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NFIB – National Foreign Intelligence Board

NS – NATO SECRET

NSA – National Security Agency
NSC – National Security Council
NSWP – Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact [forces]
OMB – Office of Management and Budget
OPLAN – Operation Plan
OSD – Office of the Secretary of Defense
ÖStA – Österreichisches Staatsarchiv [Austrian State Archive]
PAX – Stowarzyszenie PAX [PAX Association]
PDD – Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne [Polish Diplomatic Documents]
POL – Policy Planning Secretariat
Polimex-Cekop – Polska Firma Importowo-Eksportowa – Centrala Eksportu Kompletnych Obiektów Przemysłowych [Polish Enterprise for the Import and Export of Machinery – Central Bureau for the Export of Complete Industrial Facilities]
Politburo – Political Bureau
POP – Podstawowe Organizacje Partyjne [Basic Party Organisations]
PR – Political Report
PR – Private Records
PRP – Polish People’s Republic
PUWP – Polish United Workers’ Party
PZPR – Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza [Polish United Workers’ Party]
RECCE – Reconnaissance
RFE – Radio Free Europe
ROPCIO – Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela [Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights]
S. – Solidarność [Solidarity Trade Union]
SACEUR – Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT – Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
ŚFZZ – Światowa Federacja Związków Zawodowych [World Federation of Trade Unions]
SITCEN – The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Situation Centre

SOVA – Office of Soviet Analysis
SPC – Senior Political Committee
SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [Social Democratic Party of Germany]
SRI – Solidarność Rolników Indywidualnych [Solidarity of Individual Farmers]
SS-20 – Soviet nuclear ballistic missile RT-21M Pioneer
SSEA – Secretary of State for External Affairs
STANAVFORCHAN – Standing Naval Force Channel
STANAVFORLANT – Standing Naval Force Atlantic
SU – Soviet Union
TASS – Telegrafnoye agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza [Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union]
TNF – Theatre Nuclear Forces
Uff. – Ufficio [Office]
UK – United Kingdom
UKDEL NATO – United Kingdom’s Joint Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN – United Nations
UN SYG – Secretary-General of the United Nations
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC – United Nations Human Rights Council
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
US, U.S. – United States
U.S. Ex-Im [Bank] – The Export-Import [Bank] of the United States
USA, U.S.A – United States of America
USG – United States Government
USICA – United States International Communication Agency
USN – United States Navy
USNATO – United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USSR, U.S.S.R. – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTR – United States Trade Representative

USUN – United States Mission to the United Nations

VOA – Voice of America

VÖEST-Alpine – Vereinigte Österreichische Eisen- und Stahlwerke [United Austrian Iron and Steelworks]

WP – Warsaw Pact

WPO – Warsaw Pact Organization

WRN – Wojewódzka Rada Narodowa [Voivodship National Council]

WRON – Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego [Military Council of National Salvation]

WWII – World War Two

WWIII – World War Three

ZBoWiD – Związek Bojowników o Wolność i Demokrację [Poland's Society of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy]

ZD – Zespół Depesz [Fonds of dispatches]

ZOMO – Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej [Motorised Reserves of the Citizens' Militia]

ZSL – Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe [United People's Party]

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