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THE POLISH INSTITUTE  
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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POLISH  
DOCUMENTS  
ON  
FOREIGN  
POLICY

11 November 28 June  
1918–1919





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EDITORS

Sławomir Dębski, Piotr Długolecki

THE POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
WARSZAWA 2017

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WARSZAWA 2017

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ISSN: 2449-6774  
ISBN: 978-83-64895-89-0

PUBLISHER  
Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych  
ul. Warecka 1a, 00-950 Warszawa  
[www.pism.pl](http://www.pism.pl), [www.pdd.pism.pl](http://www.pdd.pism.pl)

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PRINTED BY  
Centrum Poligrafii Sp. z o.o.  
ul. Łopuszańska 53, 02-232 Warszawa

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## INTRODUCTION

### THE END OF THE FIRST COMMONWEALTH

In the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Enlightened Europe of Voltaire and Rousseau witnessed an unprecedented assault on the peace and freedom of a European nation; an assault through which the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, one of Europe’s largest states, was partitioned between the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia, and Habsburg Austria—countries that divided the Commonwealth lands among themselves. There were numerous instances during Europe’s history when the territory of a state was conquered, occupied, and annexed by another, but there was none like this. This process started in 1772, was continued in 1793 and completed in 1795, culminating with the partitions terminating the existence of the Commonwealth and eliminating a sovereign Poland for 123 years.

Throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as Poles repeatedly tried to regain their independence, they developed two alternative and competing political approaches. The goal of the first was independence, while the goal of the second was operational freedom within the Russian Empire. The first would have developed as an insurgency against Russia, wherein the Polish uprising should ideally have been coordinated with a major European conflict, and the resolution of the Polish question would become part of a wider European peace settlement. The second approach sought negotiations on a political resolution with Russia and its various liberal circles, leading to a compromise that would result in greater autonomy for Polish territories within the Russian Empire

and broader political rights for Poles. Russia served as the principal point of reference for both options. This was an obvious development if we bear in mind that 63% of the territory of the Commonwealth was within the Russian Empire immediately after the partitions, and as much as 82% by 1832, after the annexation of the Kingdom of Poland by Russia. This Kingdom—a political entity in a personal union with the tsar as king—was established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and hence was frequently referred to as the *Kongresówka* or Congress Poland; it ultimately ceased to exist in this framework in 1831.

Thus, because it was the Russian Empire (and not Austro-Hungary or Prussia) that was the principal beneficiary of Poland's partitions, Poland could not have been restored by regaining the territories incorporated into Prussia and Austria, as those Polish territories were simply insignificant portions of the pre-partition Commonwealth. Thus, any hope for the recreation of the Polish nation had to arise either with the defeat of Russia, or with its affirmative acquiescence.

The first option explains the support Napoleon received from the Polish political elites and why they saw the major European conflict waged by the French Emperor as an opportunity for restoring Poland's independence. Thus, Polish troops served alongside Bonaparte's forces in Spain and during the incursion into Russia. The corollary effect was that there was a momentary rebirth of Polish statehood on some territory annexed by Prussia and Austria. The quasi-state, established by Bonaparte's directive, was designated the Duchy of Warsaw. Significantly, it was not referred to as Poland (neither Commonwealth, Kingdom, or Duchy), because the majority of Polish territories continued to be ruled by Russia. Paradoxically, it was Napoleon's defeat that led to the restoration of the designation "Kingdom of Poland," if only to the European political dictionary. It was at the Congress of Vienna that the Kingdom of Poland was bound to Russia by a personal union. The Tsar of Russia, Alexander I, became the king of the Kingdom of Poland and concomitantly, the existence of a Polish political nation was recognised and given the constitutional privilege of having distinct laws. The gradual curtailment of those privileges and the violation of other rights by Russia led to pro-independence armed insurrections, including (most significantly) the November Uprising (1830–1831) and the January Uprising (1863–1864).

The second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century brought a great clash of liberal ideas, which later gave rise to nationalism and socialism (originating from Marxist thought). Within the Polish political elite, this pan-European ideological antagonism compounded the earlier rivalry between those supporting insurrection versus those proposing conciliatory processes with Russia and the remaining partitioning powers. Thus, the two Polish schools of political



thought evolved into two political camps that took shape prior to the outbreak of the First World War. The first arose from socialist revolutionary circles and the Polish Socialist Party, and was identified with its leader, Józef Piłsudski, while the second developed as the National Democrats, headed by Roman Dmowski.

### THE FIRST WORLD WAR

In analysing the impending major European war, Dmowski and his supporters saw a chance for the re-establishment of Polish statehood through the victory of Russia and its allies, France and Great Britain. Siding with the Entente Cordiale, in which Russia was a powerful pillar, would ostensibly frame the Polish question as a subject for the great European post-war negotiations, and thus as a matter of political concern not only for Russia but also for its western allies. At the same time, the faction aligned with Piłsudski sought to exploit Austro-Hungarian and German military plans involving Russia to form Polish military units, initially designated to the fight against Russia but ultimately to support the case for re-establishing Polish statehood once Russia was defeated. The outbreak of the First World War, and especially the collapse of the Russian Empire in the wake of the 1917 Revolution, indeed brought the Polish question into the mainstream of European politics. Poland became an element in the political programmes of all the belligerents, as all of them sought the support not only of the Polish people but also Polish recruits.

On 5 November 1916, by a joint decree of Emperors Wilhelm II of Germany and Franz Joseph of Austria, the issue of the re-establishment of the Polish state on the map of Europe was positioned in international political discussion. This pronouncement vowed the creation of a Kingdom of Poland from the territory of Congress Poland, envisioned by its authors as a puppet state controlled by the Central Powers. To a certain degree, in response to this initiative of the Central Powers, the reconstruction of a sovereign and independent Poland, with access to maritime ports, became a joint political aim of the United States and the Entente. This goal took actual shape after 1917, when it became evident that the Russian Empire, a member of the Entente, would not survive the war.

In 1918, during humanity's first worldwide war, uniquely propitious circumstances began to materialise related to the Polish question. The three partitioning powers were defeated, and this despite the fact that they had commenced the war as members of opposing camps. The downfall of the

empires that had divided the territory of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth produced a political vacuum.

This vacuum was gradually filled by the victorious Entente powers and the United States: France sought to systematically constrain the potential of defeated Germany, while Great Britain was interested in building a new balance of power. The United States, a young country of great potential and growing ambitions, attempted to establish President Woodrow Wilson's idealistic vision of building a new world and grounding international relations on a footing of moral values and democratic principles.

### THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

The Armistice of Compiègne concluded war operations in western Europe, but in the eastern part of the continent the war continued. Additionally, new local armed conflicts began to erupt. In Russia, the armies of the Entente and the U.S. were fighting against the Bolsheviks, who had broken with the Entente upon signing peace treaties at Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers (3 March 1918) and with the Ukrainian Republic (9 February 1918), which concluded hostilities between those entities. On 27 December 1918, an anti-German uprising broke out in Wielkopolska, a part of the former Commonwealth then under German rule. Red Army units moved west, following in the footsteps of the German Ober-Ost divisions withdrawing from Ukraine, the Baltic countries, and Belarus. In January 1919, the first military clashes took place, initially between Red Army and Polish self-defence units, and later with the regular Polish Army. The army had been organised swiftly by Piłsudski, who was serving as Interim Chief of State of Poland and supreme commander. Thus, the Polish-Bolshevik War began. Polish-Ukrainian battles over Eastern Galicia had been ongoing since November 1918 and, near the end of January 1919, Czech divisions entered Śląsk Cieszyński (Teschen Silesia), which led to a crisis in Polish-Czech relations. In March, a Bolshevik revolution in Budapest was victorious, which additionally complicated matters in that part of the European continent.

All these developments meant that the reconstituted Polish state had to ensure that it held the best possible negotiating position in Europe. Thus, the cooperation of all the political factions was essential—those within the country as well as the Paris-based *Polski Komitet Narodowy* (Polish National Committee, or PNC) established in 1917 and headed by Dmowski. Cooperation between the groups developed based on the most convincing

arguments: the unique moment and the approaching Peace Conference that was to determine the nature of post-war Europe, including the boundaries of Poland. The two main competing political camps, namely the authorities in Warsaw and the PNC in Paris, had attained monopoly positions in different but indivisible spheres of reborn Poland's sovereignty. The pro-independence left had managed, without bloodshed, to take control over a significant part of Polish territory, while the PNC enjoyed a privileged position in representing Polish interests to the Allied powers.

As a result of negotiations, which were conducted in Paris between representatives of the PNC with Piłsudski's envoys (the "Warsaw delegation"), as well as in Warsaw, an agreement was reached. On 16 January 1919, the government, with Ignacy Paderewski at its head, was formed and subsequently gained international recognition and began to establish diplomatic relations with other nations. The second result of this compromise can hardly be overestimated: it became possible to form a joint Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference and thus to include Poland in the victorious Entente camp.

Consequently, when the proceedings of the Peace Conference were inaugurated on 18 January 1919 in the French Foreign Ministry's *Salon de l'Horloge* at Quai d'Orsay, representatives from Poland were among the 70 delegates from 28 countries. The official delegates were Dmowski, chairman of the PNC, and Paderewski, Poland's prime minister and minister of foreign affairs.

Achieving consensus was crucial to the Polish case. The various threats and conflicts—as well as the grave consequences of European and American reaction to a wave of anti-Jewish pogroms in Polish lands—forced the Poles to coordinate their organisational and military activities within the country, and also with corresponding diplomatic steps initiated in Paris, London, Rome, and Washington.

Polish foreign policy faced a major challenge of safeguarding an influence on the direction of the Paris Peace Conference, in particular on the Great Powers' decisions in Polish matters. Of primary significance here were Poland's new boundaries, its access to the sea, and the postulate that Gdańsk (Danzig) be included within its borders. The Great Powers' position with respect to Poland's border disputes with Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Lithuania, as well as Ukraine (which was not internationally recognised as a state), was also critical, and another stumbling block involved policies towards Red and White Russia.

The emerging Polish state needed political support and material aid not only to organise and equip its army for the expected battle over the eastern

boundaries, but also for the economy and civilian population. Thus, great importance was attached to efforts to transfer the volunteer Polish Army in France (referred to as the Blue Army from its uniform colours) to Poland. Led by General Józef Haller, this army had been established at Dmowski's initiative on the basis of a 4 June 1917 decree issued by French President Raymond Poincaré. A swift purchase of arms and war materiel was also of vital importance. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of Poles, including prisoners of war (who had been obliged to serve in the armies of the partitioning powers), began to turn to the young country and its nascent diplomatic services for aid and advice. Gaining control over the chaos arising from both the pressure of time and the scale of needed essentials was no small undertaking.

These issues led to a status quo in which Poland became an important player in European politics in the first half of 1919. As a result, Polish independence and related matters gained significant attention at the Peace Conference.

The Versailles Treaty was signed on 28 June 1919. It restored the Polish state on the map of Europe—over 120 years of political and military efforts ended with success. This was, however, a different Poland, comprising a politically different nation than the one that had witnessed the fall of the First Commonwealth.

### FORMATION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE DELEGATION AND THE CREATION OF A FOREIGN SERVICE

Achieving this goal required not only agreement, but above all daily organisational, administrative, technical, propaganda, and bureaucratic efforts. The commencement of the peace proceedings in Paris converted the French capital into the centre of the world during that period. For these reasons, it was there that an efficient bureaucratic machine had to be organised by the Polish side to accomplish the necessary tasks.

Initially, these tasks were undertaken by the administrative apparatus of the PNC headed by its secretary, Józef Wielowieyski, later merged with a delegation of *Biuro Prac Kongresowych* (Conference Working Delegation), which came from Warsaw. This joint representation received support from experts (scholars), who provided the Polish Delegation with economic, legal, geographic and historical expertise. At its peak, the support team numbered about 100 people.

The Polish Delegation had to deal with the challenges arising from changes in the conference agenda and the evolution of its decision-making groups, which resulted in organisational and informational chaos.

An equally significant task involved the consolidation of power within the country and the creation of a foreign service, along with a network of diplomatic and consular facilities and tasks. The urgent need to organise legations ensued not only for political reasons but also—or on occasion, above all—from the need to provide care for Poles who had found themselves beyond Poland's borders. In many cases, contact with a legation, which had the ability to confirm an individual's status as a member of the Polish nation and to issue a passport, resulted in a radical improvement in the situation of former citizens of the defeated powers. A Polish official was a real and symbolic affirmation of the restoration of Polish statehood.

There were instances where foreign representation was duplicated when a delegation of the government in Warsaw and a delegation of the PNC were both functioning in the same city. The above-mentioned agreement between the government and the PNC made it possible to gradually eliminate such duplication.

At the same time, the expansion of the foreign services structure in Warsaw continued. In November 1918, Leon Wasilewski was appointed head of the diplomatic service in the newly-formed government of Prime Minister Jędrzej Moraczewski. In January 1919, Paderewski, a world-famous pianist and non-professional politician, served as prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. At the end of January, there was also a formal change to the name of the ministry—the Ministry of External Affairs became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministry's structure was continuously modified to reflect the development of Poland's foreign relations.

## THE BASIS AND PRINCIPLES FOR SELECTING AND EDITING DOCUMENTS

The present volume contains documents from the first eight months of Poland's reborn existence. It was decided to select 11 November 1918 as the starting date. This day, when the Regency Council transferred military power to Piłsudski, is generally accepted in historical studies as the date of the country's rebirth, despite the arbitrary nature of the choice. It is also deeply rooted in tradition through the annual celebration of National Independence Day. The selected end date for the included documents is 28 June 1919, that is, the

day when the peace treaty was signed. This date marks a symbolic closure of a segment of Poland's diplomatic undertakings and a settlement of many issues of central importance to the nature of the country's new statehood, although 28 June clearly did not conclude Poland's struggle for its sovereignty. The eastern boundaries of the country were not officially confirmed until 1923.

The present volume (with the exception of June 1919) is based on source material published in two successive volumes of *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne* (Polish Diplomatic Documents, or PDD).<sup>1</sup> The majority of the June documents will appear in a second volume illustrating the year 1919.<sup>2</sup> Additional material, disclosing the work of Polish diplomats and experts during the Versailles Conference, has been garnered from various documents published by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych—PISM).<sup>3</sup>

The sources presented in this volume have been selected from these publications. In choosing archival records for the English-language edition, an effort was made to impart a complete image of the international activities of the Republic, while generally omitting documents concerning the country's internal matters or illustrating the intra-Polish negotiations.

The publication of documents in the PDD volumes was preceded by extensive research in both Polish and foreign archives, most important here being Archiwum Akt Nowych (the Archive of Modern Records), Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (the Central Military Archives) and the records held by the Józef Piłsudski Institute in America.

The documents presented here have been translated into English for the needs of the present publication; however, 59 were originally written (in 1918 or 1919) in English or French. These have been published in their original language versions, and the authors' varying degrees of fluency in foreign languages should be noted here. Nevertheless, excessive corrections were avoided and instances of stylistic awkwardness were not removed, with the changes limited to rectifying obvious spelling or punctuation errors only. Documents from 1918–1919 originally written in English are marked by the

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<sup>1</sup> S. Dębski (ed.), P. Długołęcki (assist.), *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1918 listopad–grudzień*, PISM, Warszawa 2008; S. Dębski (ed.), *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1919 styczeń–maj*, PISM, Warszawa, 2016.

<sup>2</sup> S. Dębski (ed.), *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1919 czerwiec–grudzień*, PISM, in preparation.

<sup>3</sup> M. Przyłuska-Brzostek (ed.), *Ekspertyzy i materiały delegacji polskiej na konferencję wersalską 1919 roku*, PISM, Warszawa, 2009.

abbreviation “ENG” in the document footer. Publication of a document in French means that this material was originally written in French by the author.

In the case of documents that have been translated into English, the specific and diverse nature of the Polish language at the time should be borne in mind. The authors of the documents came from varying milieus, from different partitions, and had studied in different cities and countries. They also had diverse experiences resulting from their occupational backgrounds (on occasion in the diplomatic service) in different national administrations. This resulted in significant variations in the Polish language. Furthermore, many of the documents of the time were written in haste, chaotically, without thought to the possibility that they might ever be published, and these factors cannot but have an impact on the English translation.

A few remarks should be made on the formal traits of the documents. The (far from ideal) cipher communications at the time had the editors dealing with documents that are not fully legible, or fragments of which are not completely comprehensible. Fragments of the original document that could give rise to uncertainty as to their meaning have been marked with the word “sic!” in square brackets. Illegible text, on the other hand, has been indicated by an ellipsis accompanied by an editorial footnote.

Comments, handwritten notations, and signatures are in italics, while fragments of a text which were manually crossed out have been omitted as not adding crucial information to the gist of the document.

Original footnotes marked by the symbol “x” have been retained in the text and are interspersed in sequence between contemporary editorial footnotes. Editorial footnotes have been restricted to the minimum necessary for understanding the published documents.

The vast majority of the documents have been published in their entirety. Those that are published as fragments have a header informing the reader of this fact; the omitted part is marked by an ellipsis in square brackets and a footnote informing the reader of the content of the omitted fragment.

The names of towns and regions have been presented in their English counterparts wherever such exist (for instance, Wilno/Vilnius). The names of small localities have retained the Polish name (for instance, Żółtańce or Huta Szczawiecka). Russian, Belarusian, or Ukrainian surnames have been transcribed into English.

The key below each document reveals its earlier publication source, using the following abbreviations:

PDD 1918 – S. Dębski (ed.), P. Długolecki (assist.), *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1918 listopad–grudzień*, PISM, Warszawa, 2008;

PDD 1919 – S. Dębski (ed.), *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1919 styczeń–maj*, PISM, Warszawa, 2016;

E&M – M. Przyłuska-Brzostek (ed.), *Ekspertyzy i materiały delegacji polskiej na konferencję wersalską 1919 roku*, PISM, Warszawa, 2009.

The archival reference code has been provided for documents to be published in the PDD June–December 1919 volume.

This volume includes an index of personal names, along with information about each individual's title and function in the period between November 1918 and June 1919.

The aim of the editors of the present volume is to make the Polish source material, illustrating the activities of the country in its first months of independence, available to a broader circle of researchers. The editors did not propose to cite or discuss existing scholarly literature on the Polish question at the Peace Conference or the activities of Polish diplomats with respect to the eastern boundaries. It is appropriate to mention that despite the passage of time, the work that most fully illustrates Polish endeavours in this respect is still the monograph authored by Danish historian Kay Lundgreen-Nielsen, *The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference*.<sup>4</sup>

*Sławomir Dębski, Piotr Długolecki*

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<sup>4</sup> K. Lundgreen-Nielsen, *The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Policies of the Great Powers and the Poles 1918–1919*, Odense University Press, Odense, 1979.



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## DOCUMENTS



## 1

*11 November 1918, minutes of the meeting of the PNC in Paris*

Protocol from the meeting of the  
Polish National Committee<sup>1</sup> held in Paris  
on 11 November 1918

No. 151

PRESENT: Acting Chairman Maurycy Count ZAMOYSKI.

Members: Franciszek FRONCZAK, Stanisław GRABSKI, Erazm PILTZ,  
Jan ROZWADOWSKI and General Józef HALLER.

Chairman: Maurycy Count ZAMOYSKI.

Count ZAMOYSKI raised the need for an official statement to be made by the Polish National Committee on the occasion of today's signing of the Armistice between the Allies and Germany. It was decided that Count Zamoyski would call on Mr. Clemenceau, possibly tomorrow, 12 November. While extending his congratulations, he will present a note to obtain a statement from the Allies about the incorporation of the Russian partition into Poland. The draft of the note, to be adopted tomorrow by the Political Commission, will be drawn up by Professor Grabski.

Messrs. Rozwadowski and Zamoyski's draft of the Polish National Committee's official protest about the seizure of Lwow and Eastern Galicia by the Ruthenians was adopted and Count Zamoyski was entrusted with including the final amendments made to it.<sup>2</sup>

Major Fronczak reported that the American Red Cross is ready to take on the matter of supplies to Poland if the Polish National Committee turns to it officially. Mr. Fronczak was entrusted with drawing up the draft of a letter from the National Committee to the Red Cross, to be adopted by a commission composed of Messrs. Zamoyski, Rozwadowski and Major FRONCZAK.

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<sup>1</sup> The Polish National Committee (PNC) was formally established on 15 August 1917, in Lausanne by politicians connected with the National Democrats. Roman Dmowski became its chairman and Maurycy Zamoyski his deputy. The PNC sought to rebuild the Polish state with the help of the Entente powers and was recognised by the governments of France, Great Britain, Italy and the U.S. as Poland's official representation.

<sup>2</sup> The Ukrainian Military Committee, with the help of Ukrainian units of the Austro-Hungarian army, occupied the most important public buildings in Lwow on 1 November 1918, thus setting off the Polish-Ukrainian war.

It was resolved to delegate Prof. Grabski do deal with relations with Czechoslovaks, Romanians and Yugoslavs.

With that the meeting was closed.

Chairman  
Secretary  
*Tadeusz Romer*

*PDD 1918, doc. 1*

## 2

*12 November 1918, note from the PNC representative in London  
to the British Foreign Secretary about the participation  
of PNC representatives in the Peace Conference*

12 Novembre 1918

Son Excellence  
Monsieur A. J. Balfour  
Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères  
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères  
S.W.I.

Excellence,

Le Comité National Polonais m'a désigné pour demander au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté son consentement à l'admission des représentants du Comité National Polonais aux conférences des Pouvoirs Alliés durant toutes les discussions ayant trait à la Pologne.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Excellence, avec la plus haute considération, votre très obéissant et humble serviteur.

(Signé) L. Sobanski

*PDD 1918, doc. 5*

## 3

*12 November 1918, note from the PNC representative in London  
to the British Foreign Secretary about Polish territories*

November 12th 1918

The Representative of the Polish National Committee begs to acknowledge the receipt of the Note of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated November 8th<sup>3</sup>, and has the honour to bring to the knowledge of His Excellency that no news has yet reached the Polish National Committee of the creation in Poland of a Government which could communicate with the Polish National Committee in Paris. Nevertheless, even before the establishment of an independent and permanent Polish Government, the Polish National Committee deems it its duty to assure His Majesty's Government that the Polish Nation is perfectly aware of the necessity of avoiding, before the conclusion of a general peace, any action which may prejudice the decision of the peace conference in connection with all questions concerning the future frontiers between Poland and the neighbouring nations. But, at the same time, the Polish National Committee understands that any temporary measures of military or other nature, taken to maintain order or in just defence against the enemy Powers, will not be considered by His Majesty's Government as contrary to the intentions of the Allied Powers or as infringing the principles of justice on which the future peace is to be based; especially as Poland hopes for an intervention of the Allied Armies on its territories, in order to co-operate in maintaining order and in realising the future terms of peace.

The Polish nation also is confident that the Governments of the Allied Powers, guided by the same principles, will consider the just claims and interests of Poland and will not permit the adjacent States or nations to take any action of a nature to prejudice or forestall the decisions of the Peace Conference.

*PDD 1918, doc. 6 (ENG)*

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<sup>3</sup> This note stated: "The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs desires to inform the Representative of the Polish National Committee in London that His Majesty's Government would view with serious displeasure any military or other action of the Polish Government in East Galicia, or elsewhere, of a nature to prejudice or forestall the decisions of the Peace Conference"; AAN, KNP, 1883.

## 4

*13 November 1918, note from the Secretary General of the PNC  
to the Entente governments  
about the occupation of Lwow by Ukrainian troops*

Paris, le 13 Novembre 1918

OPINION DE M. WIELOWIEYSKI SUR LE RECENT ATTENTAT  
DES UKRAINIENS CONTRE LA VILLE DE LWOW.

Il est parvenu à ma connaissance qu'une partie de l'opinion anglaise et même certains milieux gouvernementaux rendent les Polonais responsables des luttes qui ont eu lieu entre eux et les Ukrainiens à Lwow (Lemberg). Je crois que cette opinion est fondée sur un malentendu.

Lwow est une ville comprenant 86% de population polonaise, c'était le centre administratif de la Galicie: c'est là que résidait le Vice-Roi et que siégeait la Diète. C'était l'un des deux centres intellectuels polonais de la Galicie, avec son Université et son Ecole polytechnique. Depuis le XIV-e siècle il n'a jamais cessé d'être une ville polonaise. De plus c'était le centre même de l'action ententophile en Galicie. Ce sont les troupes austro-allemandes et quelques détachements ruthènes qui sont venus s'emparer du pouvoir à Lwow. L'initiative de la lutte revient donc aux Allemands et aux Ukrainiens qui sont responsables de l'effusion de sang et qui ont amené le meurtre et l'anarchie. Au nom de qui l'ont-ils fait? Au nom de l'Archiduc Guillaume, à qui, depuis longtemps les Allemands destinaient la couronne ukrainienne. La responsabilité de cette collision retombe donc sur les Germano-Ukrainiens et aucunement sur les Polonais<sup>4</sup>.

Les Polonais se sont défendus au nom de tous leurs droits contre l'agression ukrainienne. Qu'annonce-t-elle cette agression? Nous pouvons en juger par ce qui est arrivé en Ukraine: anarchie, lutte sociale et arrêt de la production agricole normale qui, surtout par les temps courants, joue un si grand rôle vu les énormes difficultés d'approvisionnement.

Nous, autres Polonais, nous sommes et nous voulons rester un élément d'ordre. Nous savons parfaitement bien que la question des frontières doit être réglée au congrès de la paix. Nous y ferons valoir nos titres et nos arguments et nous sommes certains d'être non seulement écoutés mais de gagner notre cause qui est une cause juste. C'est pourquoi nous attendons ce congrès en

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<sup>4</sup> German units did not take part in the fighting in Lwow. The PNC deliberately suggested their involvement to cast the Ukrainians in an unfavourable light.

toute confiance. Nous savons que non seulement Posen et Dantzig, mais Vilnius et Lwow seront adjugés par le congrès à la Pologne. Nous en sommes sûrs, car pour Lwow comme pour Vilnius (sans préjudice pour l'indépendance de la Lituanie dans ses limites ethnographiques), nous possédons des titres non seulement historiques mais ethnographiques que nous pouvons faire valoir.

Nous n'envoyons pas de troupes pour occuper Posen, mais nous pouvons exiger que le même principe soit observé par les Ukrainiens à l'égard de la Galicie orientale. Pas plus les Ukrainiens que les Polonais n'ont le droit de décider par voie de fait des futures frontières de leurs pays respectifs.

Le status quo d'avant-guerre doit être respecté jusqu'au moment de congrès de la paix. Ce point de vue a été adopté lors de l'armistice.

Quelle a été l'impression produite en Pologne par l'agression des Ukrainiens? L'impression que c'est une violation flagrante de nos droits les plus légitimes, une violation que les Allemands eux-mêmes n'ont pas osé tenter dans le fameux traité de Brest<sup>5</sup>.

Qu'est-ce qui a pu provoquer cet esprit agressif des Ukrainiens? Étudions seulement les résultats donnés par le mouvement ukrainien pendant les quatre années de guerre. Ce n'est que l'anarchie, la lutte sociale et la germanophobie [sic!]. Tolérer l'attentat des Ukrainiens contre Lwow serait d'encourager l'anarchie.

Notre pays se trouvant actuellement entre la Russie bolcheviste et l'Allemagne en révolution aura de durs moments à passer et devra déployer une grande énergie pour faire prévaloir au nom du patriotisme la paix sociale et l'esprit d'ordre et de travail.

Il est dans l'intérêt des Alliés, que la Pologne triomphe facilement de la propagande bolcheviste. Si l'épidémie du bolchevisme devait se répandre en passant par la Pologne jusqu'en Allemagne, en Autriche et en Hongrie, elle pourrait devenir un danger auquel les grandes Démocraties alliées ne seraient pas à même de faire face.

Les lourds sacrifices et les grandes privations de la guerre ont créé chez tous les peuples un fond de nervosité avivant les luttes sociales. Seul le patriotisme peut conjurer ces luttes. Il faut donc respecter non seulement les sentiments mais même les susceptibilités nationales; il faut que tous ceux qui veulent l'ordre dans le monde et la prospérité de l'humanité, se donnent la main pour résister solidairement à l'assaut du bolchevisme et de l'anarchie.

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<sup>5</sup> In early 1918, the Central Powers (and their allies) signed two peace treaties in Brest-Litovsk. The first (signed on 9 February 1918) was concluded with the Ukrainian People's Republic while the second (signed on 3 March 1918) was concluded with the Bolshevik government of Russia.

La question des frontières, la question des divergences d'intérêts des nationalités voisines devront se décider au congrès. En ce moment nous ne pouvons que constater et affirmer de la manière la plus catégorique que dans l'attentat de Lwow, ce n'est pas nous qui étions les agresseurs, que tout au contraire nous nous y sommes trouvés en état de légitime défense, et que cet attentat a toutes les marques d'un assaut de l'anarchie contre les éléments d'ordre et de prospérité nationale.

*PDD 1918, doc. 8*

## 5

*16 November 1918, telegram from Józef Piłsudski  
to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces  
about the transfer of Haller's Army to Poland*

CONFIDENTIEL

Paris, le 17 Novembre 1918 – 11 heures

Radio reçu de Varsovie – en français  
Nr 271 le 16/11 2020

Généralissime FOCH, grand Quartier Général des Troupes Alliées France.

Dans ma qualité de Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Polonaise je viens prier le Gouvernement français et votre Excellence de bien vouloir prendre les dispositions nécessaires afin que les troupes polonaises faisant actuellement partie de l'Armée française<sup>6</sup> soient dirigées aussitôt que possible en Pologne et incorporés dans l'armée qui se trouve désormais réunie sous mon commandement. La Nation polonaise qui a subi pendant si longtemps l'occupation du pays par des troupes étrangères se prépare actuellement avec le plus grand enthousiasme à recevoir sur le sol natal les fils de la Patrie, dispersés dans le monde entier. Dans une réponse favorable du Gouvernement

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<sup>6</sup> The army in question is the Polish Army in France (the so-called Haller's Army), a military formation established in April 1917 by means of a decree issued by the French president. By virtue of the Polish-French agreement of 28 September 1918, the PNC assumed political sovereignty over this army. In 1919, it was estimated at about 68,000 soldiers. It was transferred to Poland between April and July 1919.



français, la Nation polonaise verrait une nouvelle preuve de générosité et un signe précieux de bienveillance de la France pour la cause polonaise.

(Signé) Piłsudski

*PDD 1918, doc. 18*

## 6

### *16 November 1918, dispatch of Józef Piłsudski notifying of the establishment of the Polish State*

En qualité de Généralissime de l'armée polonaise je m'empresse de notifier aux Gouvernements et aux peuples belligérants et neutres l'existence d'un Etat Polonais indépendant comprenant tous les territoires de la Pologne unifiée.

La situation politique en Pologne et le joug de l'occupation n'ont pas permis jusqu'ici au peuple polonais de s'exprimer librement sur son sort. Grâce aux changements qui se sont produits à la suite des victoires glorieuses des armées alliées la reconstitution de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté de la Pologne est désormais un fait accompli.

L'Etat Polonais renaît par la volonté de la nation entière se trouve basé sur des principes démocratiques. Le Gouvernement Polonais remplacera le règne de la violence qui pendant cent quarante ans a pesé sur la destinée de la Pologne – par un régime d'ordre et de justice. Appuyé sur la vaillante armée polonaise, réunie sous mon commandement, j'espère que dorénavant aucune armée étrangère n'entrera en Pologne sans notre volonté formellement exprimée.

J'ai le ferme espoir que les puissantes démocraties de l'Occident prêteront leur secours et leur fraternel appui à la République Polonaise reconstituée et indépendante.

Généralissime Piłsudski  
Pour le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères:  
Filipowicz

*PDD 1918, doc. 19 (enclosure)*

## 7

*21 November 1918, note by the Minister of External Affairs  
about his discussion with the German envoy*

Discussion with the German Envoy

At 11:00 AM on 21 November, the German envoy<sup>7</sup> appeared in the company of two officials and delivered a copy of a document from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I append a copy of this document<sup>8</sup>.

I turned and spoke to him as follows: “Je suis enchanté de Vous pouvoir saluer, en qualité de premier représentant de la République Allemande, avec laquelle le Gouvernement Polonais Populaire désire garder les relations les plus cordiales, comme avec son voisin occidental le plus proche.

Personnellement je veux exprimer ma grande satisfaction de ce que le Gouvernement de la République Allemande Vous a désigné comme son représentant, le commandant Piłsudski m’a beaucoup parlé de Vous.

Votre arrivée, Monsieur le Ministre, est d’autant plus bienvenue, que nous serons obligé de nous occuper de suite d’une grande quantité d’affaires.”

The envoy declared that he and the German government desired to maintain the best possible relations with the Polish State and to overcome the difficulties that could arise presently. In connection with this, I mentioned one very urgent matter: the incidents of the war zone near the Bug, where citizens of the Polish state were very seriously harmed by the German army.

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<sup>7</sup> The German foreign ministry, in response to the note of 27 October 1918, notifying the formation of Józef Świeżyński’s cabinet, communicated the following day its agreement to establish diplomatic relations between Germany and Poland. A German envoy, Harry Kessler, arrived in Warsaw on 20 November 1918. The following day, the Polish foreign ministry issued a communiqué about the establishment of diplomatic relations with Germany.

<sup>8</sup> In a note describing the presentation of Harry Kessler’s credential letters to Piłsudski, its author observed: “Kessler opened his speech by expressing hope that the Germans and Poles, being neighbouring nations, would forget the past and in the future live in agreement and friendship whose durability and sincerity would be the best guarantee of democratisation in both countries [...]. Herr Kessler recalled the need for a strong army. Commander Piłsudski responded that a strong army was an important task, but he didn’t expect unrest or upheavals. Peace is all that’s needed. The most important matter now is to put an end to the *ex lex* state and to convene a constituent assembly. [...] He reiterated that he had no fear of the social movement in Poland; the only threat came from the national movements on the eastern and western borders, i.e. Ruthenian and German.”; AAN, Zbiór Zespołów Szczałkowych, 257.

The envoy declared that he had already sent a telegram to Berlin on this subject and that he hoped the matter would be resolved favourably. He also raised the question of the persons arrested in Warsaw, to which I replied that the arrests had been preventive in nature, as it is better to arrest someone temporarily than abandon him to an enraged crowd.<sup>9</sup> The envoy then asked about the Pokrzywnicki affair, if he had indeed been executed. I answered that as far as I knew this was absolutely out of the question and that no German official had been executed.

During the further course of the discussion, the envoy expressed the hope that material damages that German citizens had incurred during the disorders would be considered and that this matter would be settled favourably and amiably.<sup>10</sup>

Mr. Filipowicz said: The German envoy asked that their ordinary and encrypted telegrams be accepted for transmission. I responded in agreement, requesting in return the free passage of our Polish telegrams and the free passage of our telegrams through Germany in general. The German envoy declared that he agreed with this, after which the legation counsel noted that a disposition had been issued a week earlier to allow Polish dispatches to and from Galicia through Wrocław.

I also informed the envoy that a unit of Austro-Hungarian heavy artillery battalions that had been on the French front until recently was marching through Germany and that those units were being denied use of the railways and were not given provisions. The envoy replied that the shortage of railway cars had to do with the confiscation by the Entente of significant quantities of rolling stock, that this causes the great majority of German units to have to march home, and that he would take necessary steps to ensure better provisioning.

L. Wasilewski

*PDD 1918, doc. 37*

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<sup>9</sup> The person in question is an official of the German police who had been arrested in November 1918. He was released on 2 December 1918 and left Warsaw.

<sup>10</sup> The events in question, having to do with the disarming of German soldiers and the taking over of public utility buildings in Warsaw, began during the night of the 10<sup>th</sup> to the 11<sup>th</sup> of November 1918.

## 8

*22 November 1918, letter of the Supreme Commander  
of the Polish Army in France to the PNC in Paris  
about the transport of troops*

*Highly Urgent*

Paris, 22 November 1918

To the Polish National Committee in Paris

In view of the need for the quickest possible transfer of the Polish Army from France to Poland, I submit the following:

1. Flexible and quick concerted action is necessary to organise three rifle divisions and the First Training Division, in addition to the existing Polish division.

2. For this reason, it is necessary to place the Polish Army to be brought to Poland and its Chief Command under the direct command of Marshal Foch. As soon as possible, he will take all the necessary steps to reform the four French infantry divisions placed at the disposal of the Polish Army into three Polish rifle divisions and the First Training Division.

I append the project sent to the Ministry of War.

3. The Polish troops under the command of General Haller should be sent to Poland through Danzig in time for them to land at Danzig in the second half of December of this year at the latest.

4. In addition to their requirements, these Polish troops also will take along at least uniforms, equipment, arms, ammunition, as well as food for the conscripts for one year (born in 1897), i.e., for 70,000 men.

5. A French Military Mission attached to the Polish General Staff should be set up in Poland, if possible under the direction of General Vidalon, who is already familiar with Polish Army matters and has excellent knowledge of the subject.

6. The French-Polish mission in Paris<sup>11</sup> should cease to recruit in America and, from now on, deal only with recruitment in France, Italy and England until recruiting pool among prisoners of war is exhausted (till the end of March

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<sup>11</sup> The French-Polish Military Mission in Paris was established by France's war ministry for the purpose of organising the Polish army in that country. It existed from 8 June 1917 to 15 July 1919.

1919 at the latest). It should carry out a short (3 to 4 weeks) training of the recruits and send them to the frontline of the Polish Army in Poland, *and dissolve itself after the recruiting pool is exhausted*.

7. It is now necessary to draw up the political programme, approved by all Allied Governments, for military and political action on the territory of the entire Unified Poland.

The Allied governments should also send economic and political missions under a single director appointed by the Allied States.

Otherwise, as can already be heard, each Allied State will pursue its own political, economic, or any other type of initiative such as, for example, the YMCA, the Red Cross, etc.

Any action of the Allied States on Polish territory should be carried out after agreement with the Polish National Committee.

*J. Haller*  
General  
Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army

*PDD 1918, doc. 41*

## 9

*22 November 1918, note from the Secretary General of the PNC  
in Paris to the PNC representative in Bern  
about current affairs*

Paris, 22 November 1918.

CONFIDENTIAL

General Secretariat of the PNC to the PNC Delegate in Bern

### NOTE

1. The present political situation in the country seems to indicate that a reaction is emerging there against solely leftist governments, and that even Piłsudski's popularity could fail to stand the test of fire, both on account of the internal state of the country and on account of its external stance on the

eve of the peace negotiations. It is now becoming necessary for the Committee to intervene directly to bring about internal political consolidation, to settle external relations and matters related with the military occupation of the country, to ensure its rational provisioning, and to join the negotiations at the Peace Conference on favourable terms.

For this purpose, in the coming days the Committee will be sending to Warsaw its delegation composed of Mr. Grabski as its head, Major Fronczak for provisioning matters, and two military liaison officers. The delegation is to proceed to Poland through Italy and Budapest.

2. In coordination with the Allied Governments, the decision was made to transfer the Polish troops stationed in France to Poland through Danzig as soon as technical conditions allow for free navigation on seas cleared of mines, i.e., in a couple of weeks. General Haller will arrive in Poland at the head of the troops. In the meantime, the size of the army will be very significantly increased, by about 50,000 men, through the influx of Polish prisoners of war from Italy.

3. The French, Italian and American governments have agreed to the presence of Committee representatives during the inter-Allied peace negotiations, which are to begin in a short time in Versailles. The response of the English government is expected in the coming days. On our side, preparations are proceeding apace for an objective defence of the Polish question—first and foremost, pushing through the boundaries issue—during the peace conference.

4. In connection with this, the Committee asked Allied governments to grant it the official attribute of 'de facto government' in matters of Poland's internal policy, political sovereignty over the Polish Army, and consular care over Poles abroad. Such an official framing and clarification of the attributes that the Committee already possesses in practice is needed, both on account of the approaching peace conferences and the political situation in Poland. This matter is on the right track.

5. We are appending materials that concern the aggression of the Ruthenians on Eastern Galicia, which English circles that are hostile to us have attempted to use against us at the Foreign Office. Our clear and emphatically formulated stance in this matter has made a most favourable impression.

6. In similar conditions, the Foreign Office issued a statement in glaring form and in a manner most unpleasant to us about alleged pogroms of Jews, with no regard to English circles that are favourable to us. It met with rectification

of the tendentious information and the exposure of the Jewish campaign—an undeniably favourable outcome for us.<sup>12</sup>

7. In general, our opponents' campaign naturally intensifies as the Peace Conference approaches and as incidents back home do not always show the Polish question in a good light. Examples are appended. In the event, utmost prudence seems called for.

Please clarify the role and activities in Switzerland of Mr. August Zaleski, who was supposedly appointed as the official representative of the Warsaw government.

8. Any day now we are expecting the arrival in Paris of Mr. Dmowski, whose presence here at this time is of fundamental importance.<sup>13</sup> We are awaiting impatiently the arrival of Mr. Stroński and Count Jan Żółtowski. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has informed us that the matter of their visas and passports has been settled.

*(Signed) J. W.  
T. R.*<sup>14</sup>

*PDD 1918, doc. 42*

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<sup>12</sup> Rumours about pogroms of Jews in Polish lands were publicised in the press from the spring of 1918 on. The local population did indeed harbour hostile attitudes toward Jews, who were seen as sympathising with the occupiers and partitioners. In the fall, the number of anti-Semitic incidents in various towns began to grow. The first pogrom took place in Kielce on 11 November 1918 and four people were killed. Then, in Lwow on 22-23 November 1918, when the city had been taken by Polish forces, a pogrom of Jewish inhabitants took place in which several dozen people lost their lives and several hundred were wounded. In 1919, pogroms took place in Pińsk, Lida, and Vilnius after those towns had been taken by Polish troops (a total of 120 victims). The PNC usually denied reports about anti-Semitic incidents and stated that they were being blown out of proportion by German propaganda. In January 1919, the British Foreign Office gave intelligence information to the PNC corroborating efforts made by Germany to discredit the Polish cause in the eyes of the Allies. The matter of the pogroms was examined by a British-American investigative commission led by Henry Morgenthau. Questions on this subject were also asked by deputies to the Constituent Assembly.

<sup>13</sup> The following day, on 23 November 1918, Dmowski was already in Paris, where he chaired a PNC meeting.

<sup>14</sup> Józef Wielowiejski and Tadeusz Romer.

## 10

*[after 22 November] 1918, letter from the government representative  
in Bern to the Minister of External Affairs  
about the protests of Jewish milieus (with enclosure)*

To the Minister of External Affairs in Warsaw

In reference to my letter of the 20<sup>th</sup> of this month on the Jewish question, No. 479/B/18, I have the duty to report that the anti-Polish propaganda concerning the unrest in Galicia is ongoing. Our press office's protests find no understanding with the agitated public. As I mentioned in my telegraph, I find that the only way to settle this matter is for the government to issue a clear and energetic statement on the international stage giving assurances and guarantees about the treatment of Jews in Poland. On account of the Reuter's note of the 16<sup>th</sup> of this month,<sup>15</sup> and which is already familiar to you, I sent to the English minister in Bern a letter, of which I append a copy herewith. In reply to this letter, the minister has instructed one of his officials to inform me that the letter has been forwarded to London and that he personally has little hope of the Warsaw government being recognised by the government of Great Britain.

The circle of Polish Jews here wishes that Polish Jews would join the protests against the systematic dissemination of false rumours about pogroms in Poland. For this purpose, they turned by telegram to Consul Eiger, asking him to send them details about the incidents in Galicia. I kindly ask the Ministry to graciously support this undertaking, as a statement made by Polish Jews would be of great importance. I take the liberty to point out that the anti-Polish campaign in the Jewish matter is only one link in the chain of anti-Polish activities, of which the three most important elements are: 1. German agitation in Poznań Province, 2. Ukrainian agitation, 3. anti-pogrom agitation. With the help of such campaigns, our foes are seeking to produce an anti-Polish climate to serve as a background for the disregard of our cause during the Peace Conference.

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<sup>15</sup> Reuter's news agency reprinted British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour's declaration of 14 November 1918 about pogroms in Eastern Europe.



[Enclosure]

November 22nd, 1918

Your Excellency,

I take the liberty of approaching you on the following subject.

On November 16th His Majesty's Government have published through Reuter's Agency a statement of their attitude towards the alleged antisemitic pogroms in Warsaw.

I note with particular satisfaction that His Majesty's Government make their attitude subject to the verification of the facts.

I am in a position to inform Your Excellency that the disorders which recently took place in Poland had no political character and were conducted by bands of hungry deserters mainly from the disintegrated Austrian army together with some members of the poorer classes of the population, which are brought to absolute starvation by means of military requisitions and by the strict application of the blockade to Poland.

The excesses committed by these bands were by no means directed against the Jews as such, but against the more wealthy classes and especially shopkeepers. As 75% of the shops are in the hands of Jews they naturally suffered more than other nationalities, although there were also some cases when country houses and estates of Polish nobles were subject to same treatment.

It is largely owing to these excesses that the Regency Council<sup>16</sup> found it advisable to appoint a military Dictator, whose duty it will be to maintain order during the transitional period through which my country is just passing. The person of The Dictator, Gen. Joseph Pilsudski, whose democratic and progressive views are well known, furnishes a sufficient guarantee that he will omit no efforts to prevent any breach of order. To suppose that his Government could but oppose most strongly any antisemitic tendencies would be impossible.

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<sup>16</sup> The Regency Council was established in September 1917 by Germany and Austro-Hungary and dependent on them. It was supposed to exercise (along with a government it was to create) administrative power in the Polish Kingdom formally and temporarily. In the first half of November 1918, it turned power over to Józef Pilsudski and dissolved itself. It was composed of Archbishop Aleksander Kakowski, Zdzisław Lubomirski, and Józef Ostrowski.

To fulfil his task successfully Gen. Pilsudski will need the moral support of the Allies, a proof of which would be found in the immediate recognition by them of the new Polish Government which is being formed by the Dictator.

I hope that His Majesty's Government, who so often showed their sympathy towards the Polish Nation, will this time also help them to meet the difficult situation which Poland has to face, by no longer withholding their recognition of a Government which has behind in the undisputed confidence of the majority of the Polish Nation.

I am, Sir, Your Excellency's obedient servant.

*PDD 1918, doc. 44 (ENG, enclosure)*

## 11

*23 November 1918, report from the PMO delegate in Paris  
to the Interim Chief of State (with enclosure)*

Secret

Report No. 2

The aim in pursuit of which we were sent to Paris was twofold:

- I) to secure funds to sustain the armed effort against the Germans;
- II) to collect as much comprehensive information as possible.

Point 1: Although the mission of Messrs. Strug and Sokolnicki was granted approval for financial support for remaining in the country from General Lavergne, the chief of the French mission in Moscow, this money was not paid out at any time or in any amount. This was due to:

- 1) The situation of the Coalition in Russia (Coalition legations deprived of the means to communicate with their States, imprisonment of mission and legation members, and break with the Coalition).
- 2) A misunderstanding of the PMO's<sup>17</sup> position (the French saw the PMO as an organisation entirely subordinated to Coalition agents, as was the case, for

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<sup>17</sup> The Polish Military Organisation (PMO) was formed in Warsaw in October 1914, on the initiative of Pilsudski. Initially, its aim was intelligence and sabotage directed against Russia, but from 1917 it also secretly acted against the Austrian and German occupiers. It helped take power in Galicia and in disarming German soldiers in the Congress Kingdom. In 1918, the organisation was incorporated into the Polish army.

example, with the Russian Social-Revolutionaries. General Lavergne's report to Paris was written in this spirit). I protested against this view of the matter to Captain Lozant, General Lavergne's agent in Moscow, as I have mentioned in my report No. 1.

3) The National Committee's hostile position (Professor Grabski told me that while he was still in Murmansk, he did everything in his power to prevent money from being sent to the PMO).

In light of the above, the matter had to be raised once again in Paris. The difficulties with which we met upon leaving Paris were so great that my wife and I were still in Paris on 18 October, while Mr. Zwisłocki was still there three weeks later. During this period, it became impossible to pursue the matter. It could not be raised in any case as an agreement with General Lavergne was necessary to do so and he was en route from Murmansk to Paris at the time. In the meantime, Austria fell and the Coalition ceased to be interested in the military movement in Poland. The matter of the military movement became our own internal matter and even such a movement began to be looked upon with fear on account of Bolshevism. Of this entire matter, all that remained is the question of reunification with the country. The day after our arrival in Paris, Lieutenant Mościcki left from here, sent by General Haller, who was supposed to bring 80,000 francs for the establishment of a link with the PMO. I was not able to establish my own contacts given a lack of funds and people, which were denied me by General Haller.

I was received by General Haller as if I were superfluous. I was forbidden by Messrs. Strug and Sokolnicki from establishing closer contacts with the National Committee. I could only accept a seat, offered me by the National Committee, at the Military Commission established in affiliation with the Chief Command. This was the only way to gain some insight into the situation.

2) I am now moving to Point II. Information, which I break down into the following points:

1) Information about the Coalition's attitude with regard to the Polish question,

2) Information about the National Committee,

3) Information about the Polish Army in France and materials for this army.

1. The attitude of the Coalition to the Polish question is generally known from the enunciations of President Wilson and the Versailles Council—I thus won't repeat everything, wishing only to indicate in a rough outline the differences between the grand principles for the world and that which is being thought and attempted. Most unexpectedly, the greatest difficulties are

being raised by the Americans. Wilson stands for the principle of supporting the least cultural nations. According to his theory, the Lithuanians, Ruthenians and Byelorussians are the most deserving of support. Of 7 members of his advisory council, 3 are Jewish, hence the disinclination to cede Danzig and the lower course of the Vistula (Dmowski was supposedly settling this matter). In England, where our Danzig interests stood the best chance, Jews are strongly active against the Poles, with Namur (Bernstein) and Steed<sup>18</sup> standing out especially in this respect. They are a constant source of information aimed at the English government about pogroms of Jews in the Kingdom<sup>19</sup> and Galicia, hence our unfortunate standing. Trying to salvage its capital, England has recently been seeking to rebuild Russia (Skoropadsky's fall,<sup>20</sup> Denikin's dictatorship<sup>21</sup>) so as to turn it into a new India, hence the lesser interest shown to our cause. France is the most favourably disposed toward us. Here too, Jewish-Masonic coteries are active in our disfavour. Recently, Izvolsky<sup>22</sup> resumed his activities—externally supposedly favourable to us of course, but in fact very harmful. A period of struggle against Poland has begun, with attempts to confine us to the tightest possible boundaries. Everything is thus being used against the Poles. Ineptitude for state life (the inability to reconcile at the most critical moments), anti-Semitism, reactionism (Dmowski and the National Committee), Bolshevism, and anarchy (the socialist government, fighting with the Ruthenians and Jewish pogroms)—all are faults attributed and alleged at the right moment, at the right place, and before the right people. The impressive organisation of the Czechs, their skilful internal policy and genius in pursuit of the minutest benefits have brought them to the foreground and pushed Poland way to the back. Our activism, the unpopularity of the National Committee and its external policy based on relations and connections, not on the country's

<sup>18</sup> Lewis Bernstein Namier, an influential official of the Russian section of the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence Department and Henry Wickham Steed, foreign policy editor at *The Times*, were the chief representatives of the milieu favouring the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian state and the emergence of democratic nation-states in its stead. As an official of the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence Department, Namier took part in the process leading to the formation of most British government decisions about Polish matters.

<sup>19</sup> This refers to the territory of Congress Kingdom of Poland (also called Congress Poland), a state created in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna and ruled by Russian tsars. Following the defeat of the anti-Russian November uprising of 1830–1831, the Congress Kingdom lost its status of an autonomous state.

<sup>20</sup> Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, who stood at the helm of the Ukrainian state, began to lose power as the support of Germany and Austro-Hungary ended with the two states' capitulation.

<sup>21</sup> In September, Gen. Anton Denikin took command of the Voluntary Army.

<sup>22</sup> Aleksandr P. Izvolsky, former tsarist ambassador to Paris, was against France's involvement in settling Polish affairs. In the fall of 1918, his position softened.

real or moral strength, and, lastly, our own policy shut in the confines of its backwater, have taken away from Poland the prime role among future Slavic states and deprived it not only of political but also cultural influence. I have no right to criticise, but it is my right and obligation to express my impressions. The Coalition has only one view of matters—one that is consistent to all its members, whether English, French, or American. It is victorious, it will order the world, no one can take this away from it, and this view has to be taken into account. Everything will be decided at the Versailles Conference between the countries of the Coalition, the Peace Conference will only formally sanction what the Coalition decides at Versailles. All else are words and will remain words. There are no fundamental differences between the Coalition countries. The Coalition will not give up its ideal of democracy and will shape the world accordingly. Its present preoccupation is to restore Europe's former economic effectiveness as quickly as possible. And only countries that will soonest take up real work will be able to count on its support. I now wish to say a few words about Poland's external policy—in the period following the signing of the Armistice by Germany—which is connected with the name of Commandant Piłsudski, as it is alleged that he follows the political line of the Regency Council, i.e., its Central-European orientation. The Allied governments consider this policy to be aimed directly against the Coalition. Proof: The government in which Głąbiński is minister of foreign affairs<sup>23</sup> and which appointed the Commandant as minister of war<sup>24</sup> sent a dispatch full of courtesies to Solf while ignoring the Coalition altogether.<sup>25</sup> After a time, we find out that the Commandant had nothing to do with this government. Wilson and Foch then received a dispatch via Berlin from the Commandant, demanding the return of Polish troops (General Haller did not receive the dispatch, as it was intercepted in Berlin). Conclusions: The dispatch was sent by the Commandant under the influence of the Regency Council, which had yet to rid itself of its former sentiments. Lastly, the Commandant's circular, failing to notify the government in keeping with accepted usage, but speaking of not allowing any foreign troops to be deployed in the country, was received here as an act hostile to the Coalition and, in this sense, it is exploited by all manner of German, Jewish, and most probably even Czech agents. The

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<sup>23</sup> Stanisław Głąbiński had been a politician in Austro-Hungary and a deputy to the State Council. He was foreign minister in Świeżyński's government from 26 October to 4 November 1918.

<sup>24</sup> Świeżyński's declarations about entrusting the military affairs portfolio to Piłsudski were mainly of a propaganda nature, since this position remained unfilled.

<sup>25</sup> This refers to the notification of the formation of the Świeżyński cabinet given to Wilhelm Solf, Secretary of State at the German foreign ministry. The Świeżyński government lasted until 4 November 1918, when it was replaced by the temporary government of Władysław Wróblewski.

mildest explanation for this circular by people who are particularly favourable to Poland is that it is a weapon aimed against the National Committee and against its presumed intention of returning to the country under the protection of Coalition bayonets. Thus, it is seen at the very best as a party matter brought onto the world stage. This series of unpleasant impressions was sealed by the news, carried by all the French dailies, that the Germans had sent Ambassador Kessler to Warsaw—this at the time when the Polish government had issued an almost threatening note to the Coalition. Conclusions about an existing understanding with Germany are thus easy to draw. In character was my discussion with Commander Aublet, a man most friendly to us, knowledgeable about Polish affairs and one of the office heads at the ministry of foreign affairs; he asked me about Lednicki's whereabouts and the nature of his party's influence,<sup>26</sup> as most assuredly all these things—the note to Solf, the dispatch to Foch, and the circular—must have been carried out under his inspiration as he must be the hidden spring behind the actions of the present government. The impressions I relate here were obtained by me directly from people who have certain, and at times very great, influence on Coalition policy. In my defence, I have only my faith that the policy of the Commandant is driven by Poland's national interest, without orientation or partisanship. Empowerments and clear instructions from Poland are required there. For the Coalition, in our political and geographical situation, there can be no question of our neutrality. We can be either with the Coalition or against it.

2. The position of the National Committee with regard to the Coalition is very strong. It is made up of people who stood by the Coalition in bad and good times. It is not for me to criticise the Committee on account of its partisanship, its reactionism, its greediness, etc. It will be done by others to better effect. I am inclined to say in its defence that it has done much in difficult, at times hopeless, conditions. The question of Poland's boundaries, the question of prisoners of war, and, lastly, the question of the Army—not of a band of volunteers—and its command, are in my view truly praiseworthy. If Poland wishes to conduct a policy that is favourable to the Coalition, it can't overlook all the work of the Committee, while ignoring it altogether makes for a peculiar expression of unity and cohesion at home.

As a contribution, I append my discussion with Deputy Foreign Minister Legrand.

On the other hand, the Coalition is fully aware that the Committee does not represent the entire nation and that this is why the Committee was not

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<sup>26</sup> Lednicki, chairman of the Liquidation Commission for the Polish Kingdom, opposed creating Polish military formations in Russia to fight against the Germans. He also refused to subordinate the commission to the PNC.

granted the rights of a *Gouvernement de fait*, as were granted to the Czech Committee.<sup>27</sup>

A word of caution: Committee members claim that the French had proposed that the Committee proclaim itself a *Gouvernement de fait*, but the Committee did not want to do this. The matter was quite to the contrary: The Committee wanted such rights, but the Coalition didn't agree.

I will not write about the organisation of the Committee, as this would take up too much space and these matters are well known. As far as its members are concerned, their traits are too well known in the country for me to add anything. Dmowski is the soul of the Committee and his best collaborators are Seyda and Wielowieyski. The Committee would be nothing without those three individuals. For example, I can relate the following event: No one from the Committee was present at the Versailles conference when the conditions of the Armistice were laid down. Dmowski was in America while Seyda and Wielowieyski were in bed with the flu. Besides them, no one in the Committee would have thought through such an important matter. The present situation of the Committee cannot continue. The Committee has to be either abolished or its policy approved. In any case, it is not up to me to engage in such a far-reaching assessment of the Committee. I must mention that Dmowski is disliked in England as too little the gentleman and in France for his excessive self-assurance. In contrast, Sobański is quite well thought of by the English government, and Skirmunt by the Italian. Grabski is known rather for his comic traits, whereas Piltz has many friends at the ministry of foreign affairs. All of the internal work is directed by Wielowieyski.

3. Information about the Army will be provided by Mr. Zwiśłocki. I will only say that there were attempts to turn it into a partisan army and, while they were successful in relation to a few, mostly staff, officers, the soldier is far removed from any political scheming. As soldier material, former prisoners of war are excellent, and the Americans the worst. They are already displaying an unwillingness to return home. All hate French officers and extend this sentiment to Gallicised Poles. The mere fact that a Pole took command of the legions there incredibly raised the soldiers' morale. The army that will return home will thus be a Polish army and there is no need to fear it. It only needs to be given Polish officers. In England, France, Italy, and Serbia, there are about 100,000 Polish prisoners of war. A large number of them, about 50,000, are already expressing the desire to join the army. A governmental order or a proclamation would bring most of them into the ranks.

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<sup>27</sup> This refers to the Czechoslovak National Council, created in 1916 under the chairmanship of Tomáš Masaryk. In the summer of 1918, the council was recognised by the Entente Powers and the U.S. as the representation of the new state.

I will take the liberty of ending with a couple of observations of a strictly technical nature. A matter of prime importance is to send people here with knowledge of foreign languages and with full plenipotentiary powers. The matter of the peace conference is a matter of utmost importance that can't be left in the hands of the Committee. Economic, industrial, and military technology matters are already topical and require immediate attention from professional people. Financial matters can only be settled here. Major Fronczak, who is leaving on food-related matters, is a man of great noble-mindedness and is known in America, but a poor organiser. And lastly, the staff of General Haller needs to be filled with ideal-minded people and if the prisoners of war are to be turned into an Army, there is a need for officers from the PMO there as well.

(signed) S. Hubicki

PS. I feel it is my duty to attest to the highly diligent and devoted demeanour of Mr. Zwiśłocki during our collaboration. He shows a high understanding of matters, stands unfailingly by the ideology the 1<sup>st</sup> Legion has bred in him, and always knows how to combine it with practicality and precise execution. He deserves to be singled out on all counts.

(signed) S. Hubicki

[Enclosure]

Report from my talk with Deputy Minister Legrand on 22 November 1918

While submitting a short memorandum at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the PMO and its activities so as to familiarise somewhat Coalition governments with that milieu formed by the present Polish government, I had the following talk with the Deputy Foreign Minister:

1) Thus far, we did not take a stance externally because we didn't want to harm the work of the Polish Committee and, above all, to give cause for suspicion that there is no understanding between the two camps back home. At present, we are forced to emerge from our reserve, not waiting for further instructions, because it has come to our attention that the Coalition governments are suspecting our present government of wishing to continue the pro-German policy of the Regency Council on the one hand, and of Bolshevik tendencies on the other. Setting aside the impossibility of reconciling the two allegations, we wish above all to respond to the allegation of Germanophilism by recalling the Moscow conferences, the PMO's military activity against Germany, its participation in the revolution in Austria, etc. Besides these reasons, which induced us to come forward—in an entirely unofficial capacity



as we do not have the right to do so officially, as envoys not so much of the government, but only of the organisation that has prepared this government—we wish to request that the French government would wish to remember, before official representatives arrive, that the people they have here are not endowed with full powers from the government but enjoy the confidence of those who stand at its head and who have extended it to us before forming the government and who haven't as yet retracted this confidence. Perhaps we could provide, as a complement to what the Committee is doing in this area, certain clarifications and characterisations that would help the Coalition governments to orient themselves in the present situation, which is so unclear to them.

Legrand's response: You know that France has always been most friendly to you. In the last few years, the Polish Committee has contributed much to this friendliness through its unflinching stance with regard to the Coalition. Poland undoubtedly does not know how much it owes to the National Committee and we find it sad to think that, in the face of such achievements it should hold certain party differences against it. If you can do something for Poland, then do what is needed so that your country would wait to settle party differences until Poland is truly at peace about its fate. For now, may it unite in a common effort, like the Czechs. After all, the Czechs did not come out badly at all with their friendship with France. Why do you fear us, what is the meaning of this fear of our troops, which others ask for? If this is fear of the Polish troops from here, then so much the worse. Are the differences between you so great as to lead to fighting? We are certain that these are misunderstandings and we have faith that your government is favourable to us, but we desire above all to have the means of coming to an agreement with you, because the Committee, which has worked so well for you and for which we have great respect, is presently in a position that prevents it from taking any action. Other people, with greater powers than it has, have not been sent so far, and time is pressing. Remind your people in Poland that in a couple of days the first steps leading to the peace accords will begin. This is a decisive moment for you. You have lost much by your own fault, and if you don't act as one man now, you will irretrievably lose everything. You probably don't feel the danger and the urgency of the moment there. We are far less concerned with your internal matters, so forget about them for the benefit of external ones, because these are, above all, matters about which the French government wishes to hear your opinion before taking steps that could be detrimental to you.

In response, we stress that we are certain that only home matters of the highest order could have led to delayed action with regard to the Coalition, because we know well that only a strong Poland can be useful for the Coalition, and for it to be strong, there is a need for not only territory and people, but order in those areas and among these people. In our opinion only one government

can instil such order—our government. It may not be a government formed of diplomats, but of people loving their country sincerely, perhaps coarse in a soldierly fashion, but upright above all, and a government truly popular and democratic.

The Deputy Minister has once more repeated the desire that the Polish government appoint someone from the Polish Committee as persons with whom they are used to working, and in whom they trust without reserve.

(signed) Dr S. Hubicki  
Paciorkowski

23 November 1918

*PDD 1918, doc. 46*

## 12

*25 November 1918, note from the Minister of External Affairs to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs with a protest against the arrest of Polish diplomats and the violation of the extraterritorial status of the Polish mission in Moscow*

le 25 9-bre

Au MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES  
de S.M. le roi du Danemark

Vu l'impossibilité de communiquer directement avec le Commissaire des Affaires Etrangères de la République Russe, j'ai l'honneur de prier le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères du Danemark de bien vouloir communiquer au Commissaire du peuple des Affaires Etrangères de la République Russe la dépêche suivante:

Au commissaire du peuple des Affaires Etrangères de la République Fédérative Russe des Soviets Mr Tchitcherine à Moscou.

Il est parvenu à la connaissance du gouvernement polonais que le personnel de la Légation Polonaise à Moscou est interné, que plusieurs fonctionnaires furent arrêtés, que le local de la Légation ainsi que les documents sont pris en possession par le Commissaire pour les Affaires Polonaises du Gouvernement

des Soviets<sup>28</sup>. Nous avons prié le Gouvernement Royal du Danemark d'éclaircir cette affaire et de prendre en cas de besoin sous sa haute protection nos concitoyens en Russie. Nous réclamons des explications immédiates et protestons énergiquement contre la violation du droit international. Je vous prie, Monsieur le Commissaire, de donner immédiatement les ordres nécessaires pour la mise en liberté du personnel et l'assurance de l'intégrité de notre Légation afin d'éviter des confusions possibles. Le Gouvernement Polonais prévient le gouvernement Russe que jusqu'à réception d'explications suffisantes il ordonne des répressions contre les citoyens russes se trouvant sur ses territoires.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

*PDD 1918, doc. 48*

### 13

*[before 26 November] 1918, note from the Minister  
of External Affairs to the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs  
with a request for the protection of Polish citizens  
and institutions in Russia*

27/11/18

From Warsaw  
To Karlsborg (Sweden)  
Minister of Foreign Affairs Wasilewski  
To Minister of Foreign Affairs of S.M. King of Denmark

In order to avoid further complications the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Warsaw, L. Wasilewski, inform the Russian Government that reprisals will

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<sup>28</sup> At the news of the dissolution of the Regency Council, the takeover of power by Piłsudski and the formation of the Jędrzej Moraczewski government, and the omission of the Russian authorities among the addressees of the letters notifying the emergence of the Polish state, the Bolshevik authorities occupied the offices of the representation of the Regency Council in Moscow and its section in Petrograd, and arrested some of its employees. The offices and the archives of the representation were sealed by the Cheka. The liquidation of this post constituted a violation of the principle of the presumption of continuity in the functioning of diplomatic representations.

be taken on Russian subjects in Poland if the safety of the Polish Legation is not assured. The personnel of the Legation is interned, several members imprisoned, Legation offices and documents seized by the Soviet Government. The Polish Government requests the Minister of Foreign Affairs of S.M. King of Denmark, to take Polish subjects under his protection, as well as Polish organisations now in Russia. He requests the Danish Minister to inform the Soviet Government that he claims international rights for the Legation, and, if necessary, the right to withdraw the Legation. The Minister hopes that the Danish Government which has so often assisted our compatriots during the War will not refuse his request and sends his grateful thanks<sup>29</sup>.

(Sd) Minister of Foreign Affairs  
L. WASILEWSKI

*PDD 1918, doc. 51 (ENG)*

## 14

*26 November 1918, letter from the Deputy Minister  
of External Affairs to the Interim Chief of State about a conversation  
with the German envoy*

Warsaw, 26 November 1918

Commandant!

I received a verbal report that your report addressed to Marshal Foch made the most positive impression at the French legation in Bern. Count Kessler called today. At one point of the discussion, I asked him directly if Berlin is responsible for Ober-Ost, or not. He responded that it is. Count Kessler went on to say that he had received a verbal report that the German forces subject to the Ober-Ost<sup>30</sup> wish to reach Germany as fast as possible, and that there is a danger that, disobeying orders, they could on their own initiative surge

<sup>29</sup> Harald Scavenius, the envoy of the Kingdom of Denmark in Moscow, informed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on 7 December 1918 about Denmark's decision to represent Polish interests in Russia.

<sup>30</sup> Ober-Ost is the colloquial name for the western territories of the Russian empire under the German military administration. It was sometimes also used synonymously with the Eastern Front. The term comes from the name Gebiet des Oberbefehlshabers Ost.

through the Congress Kingdom toward the west. Count Kessler did not use the term "I warn you" with me, yet I understood his information as a warning.

Filipowicz

*PDD 1918, doc. 53*

## 15

*26 November 1918, note from the PNC representative in Paris  
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France*

Paris, le 26 novembre 1918.

Monsieur E. Piltz, délégué du Comité National Polonais à Paris,  
à  
M. Pichon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères  
à Paris

Monsieur le Ministre,

En réponse à la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser le 22 novembre, j'ai l'honneur de faire part à votre Excellence de l'avis du Comité National Polonais sur l'accueil qu'il a lieu de faire à la demande du général Piłsudski pour l'envoi en Pologne de l'armée polonaise se trouvant en France, afin de l'incorporer dans l'armée qui est placée sous son commandement. La demande de transfert de l'armée polonaise en Pologne, avait été faite dernièrement par le général Haller qui exprimait en ceci le désir du Comité National Polonais, mais le Comité ne prévoyait pas que cette armée put être soumise au commandement du général Piłsudski.

Depuis que le général Haller a adressé sa demande à Monsieur le Président du Conseil, Ministre de la Guerre, le Gouvernement polonais a subi un changement. Un nouveau cabinet a été constitué sous la présidence de M. Moraczewski<sup>31</sup>, et le général Piłsudski y est devenu Ministre de la

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<sup>31</sup> The government of Jędrzej Moraczewski lasted from 17 November 1918 to 16 January 1919 (until the formation of the Ignacy Paderewski government).

Guerre<sup>32</sup> tout en assumant en même temps le commandement en chef des armées.

A la suite de ces changements le Comité National Polonais considère l'envoi de l'armée polonaise en Pologne impossible avant que la situation politique ne se soit suffisamment éclaircie. Cette attitude du Comité est motivée par les considérations politiques suivantes:

La situation intérieure en Pologne est actuellement très dangereuse. Le pays est plain d'agents bolchevistes, récemment venus de Russie et qui trouvent un appui dans deux partis: le parti social-démocrate du Royaume de Pologne et de la Lituanie, et le BUND, organisation socialiste juive. Afin de pouvoir résister avec succès à cette propagande qui mène, ainsi que cela fut en Russie, le pays à l'anarchie, deux conditions sont indispensables:

1. un gouvernement formé d'hommes forts et pondérés dont l'attitude conformément à celle de l'immense majorité du pays, serait nettement contraire au bolchevisme;

2. une armée même peu nombreuse mais bien disciplinée et suffisamment garantie contre l'influence des idées et des méthodes des bolchevistes.

Or, le gouvernement actuel de M. Moraczewski, composé des représentants de deux groupements politiques, le parti socialiste polonais et le parti populiste du Royaume de Pologne et dont tous les autres partis nationaux représentant la majorité de l'opinion publique sont exclus, dénote 2 côtés faibles:

1. Il représente la minorité de l'opinion publique en Pologne et ne donne pas de garantie de stabilité.

2. Le caractère politique des deux partis qui composent ce gouvernement ainsi que les personnages qui y participent ne donnent point la garantie que ce gouvernement ne subisse la même destinée que le gouvernement de Kerensky en Russie et qu'il n'amène graduellement la Pologne au bolchevisme.

Les partis mentionnés ne sont arrivés au pouvoir que parce qu'ils disposaient d'une organisation militaire secrète qui a formé les premiers éléments de l'armée commandée aujourd'hui par le général Pilsudski. Cependant cette armée est en même temps une organisation politique et en conséquence elle n'est pas suffisamment prémunie contre la désorganisation. L'incorporation dans cette armée des troupes polonaises créées en France pourrait entraîner la

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<sup>32</sup> As it dissolved itself on 14 November 1918, the Regency Council turned its powers, and the mission of forming a government, over to Pilsudski. The latter assumed the portfolio of the Ministry of Military Affairs on 17 November 1918. After assuming the function of Interim Chief of State on 23 November 1918, he resigned the post of minister and entrusted the ministry to its director, Col. Jan Wroczyński, while retaining full command over the Polish army.

désorganisation de cette seule force armée polonaise, ayant actuellement le caractère d'une armée régulière.

Le Comité National Polonais considère l'armée polonaise en France comme le noyau de l'armée du futur Etat polonais, et il estime de son devoir de la préserver de la désorganisation et de maintenir sa discipline militaire. Aussi est-il d'avis que cette armée doit rester sous le commandement de chefs militaires et non de politiciens et qu'elle doit garder, jusqu'à la constitution définitive de l'état polonais, une liaison étroite avec l'armée française, ce qui serait la meilleure garantie de son caractère exclusivement militaire. La Pologne n'a plus eu d'armée nationale depuis bientôt un siècle, aussi la formation d'une armée bien disciplinée n'a-t-elle été possible que grâce à l'aide bienveillante que la France a donné à la Pologne et dont les résultats ont été des plus heureux.

Dans la situation dangereuse où La Pologne se trouve actuellement, le Comité National Polonais considère comme très désirable la participation dans le Gouvernement de partis socialistes qui jusqu'à présent s'opposent au bolchevisme, même si cette participation devait être bien plus considérable que celle qui leur est due par rapport à leur importance. Le Comité a l'intention d'arriver à une entente avec les partis qui forment le gouvernement actuel et d'amener la création d'un gouvernement de coalition. Seul un tel gouvernement aura l'appui de l'opinion publique du pays et l'autorité voulue ce qui sera une condition de sa stabilité, et d'autre part seul un Gouvernement ainsi constitué donnera les garanties que le pays sera protégé contre la propagande bolcheviste.

Le Comité vient d'envoyer en Pologne un de ses membres, le professeur Grabski, en lui donnant les instructions pour travailler en ce sens.

C'est une tâche bien difficile vu que les partis qui se sont actuellement emparés du pouvoir sont peu enclins à un compromis, mais le Comité National Polonais espère tout de même voir ses efforts couronnés de succès.

C'est seulement lorsque en tel gouvernement aura été constitué que l'armée polonaise pourra être envoyée de France en Pologne, à condition qu'elle reste sous un commandement purement militaire et en liaison étroite avec l'armée française.

Le Comité National Polonais maintient sa demande exprimée par le général Haller à Monsieur le Président du Conseil, Ministre de la Guerre, et il prie que les préparatifs concernant l'envoi de l'armée polonaise en Pologne ne soient pas interrompus, mais il fait dépendre le moment de son envoi, des conditions politiques mentionnées plus haut.

Le Comité National Polonais est d'avis que la demande du général Piłsudski, adressée au Maréchal Foch, ne devrait pas recevoir une réponse négative en principe, mais que le général Piłsudski devrait être informé que le gouvernement français ayant reconnu par l'accord du 28 Septembre

1918 l'autorité politique du Comité National Polonais que le Gouvernement de Varsovie devrait s'entendre à ce sujet.

Veillez agréer, je vous prie, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma très haute considération,

(signé) ERASME PILTZ

*PDD 1918, doc. 55*

## 16

### *27 November 1918, instruction from the Interim Chief of State in the matter of Eastern Galicia*

Warsaw, 27 November 1918

#### Instruction of the Commandant in matters of Eastern Galicia

1. The Eastern Galicia question rests upon two political principles 1) Emperor Charles' manifesto of 16 October reserving certain Galician-Ruthenian rights,<sup>33</sup> and 2) the Coalition's implied position ruling out the concepts of Ruthenia or Ukraine and bringing the matter of Eastern Galicia down to the question of the boundary between Russia and Poland.

The Poles overcame the first principle of Eastern Galicia using open force by breaking out militarily toward Przemyśl and Lwow, but failed to observe the second by conducting negotiations with Ruthenian national representatives. In the military campaign that began, it is necessary to provide political foundations to the Army otherwise what remains is an army that knows not what to abide by.

There will always be conflicts between neighbouring nations and states. Poland, like others, is aggressive in relations with its neighbours, raises historical, political, and ethnic claims, etc. Such precisely is the situation with the Ruthenians. Given the existing conflict, the former as yet unresolved position of Austria, given the lack of clarity in the Entente's positions and unsettled matters with the Ruthenians, the situation in Eastern Galicia still remains for us impossible to determine politically.

The way out of this situation is military occupation of Eastern Galicia. Such are the consequences that this entails: The Army legally governs.

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<sup>33</sup> This refers to Emperor Charles' manifesto about the federalisation of the monarchy.



General Rozwadowski is a governor of sorts, a ruling organ to which all civilian institutions are subordinated. This does not rule out for us any political option, does not preclude any action such as further negotiations, or, for example, does not remove the civilian authorities, but these civilian authorities cannot be commissions governing jointly but only organs appointed by the military authorities for the sole purpose of managing public service departments.

*PDD 1918, doc. 57*

## 17

*27 November 1918, telegram from the Interim Chief of State to the President of the USA with a request for intervention in the matter of Polish prisoners of war in Russia*

Le 27 novembre, [191]8

A Monsieur Wilson  
Président des États Units de l' Amérique  
du Nord

### Télégramme

Au nom du Gouvernement Polonais je m'adresse à Vous, Monsieur le Président, avec la très intense demande de vouloir bien exercer Votre influence afin que les autorités russes sollicitent le retour le plus prompt des prisonniers de guerre polonais, appartenant aux anciennes armées allemandes et austro-hongroises qui se trouvent depuis quatre ans en Sibérie et au ...<sup>34</sup> qu'elles prennent soin du ravitaillement et de l'habillement de ces prisonniers.

L'État vraiment désespéré dans lequel se trouvent aujourd'hui ces prisonniers, me font espérer, Monsieur le Président, que ma demande adressée au nom des plus pauvres trouvera Votre accueil favorable.

*PDD 1918, doc. 58*

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<sup>34</sup> Illegible fragment.

## 18

*[after 27 November] 1918, instruction from the Interim Chief  
of State in connection with the preparations for the departure  
of the Warsaw delegation*

## INSTRUCTION

## I. Poland's attitude toward the Coalition.

Poland should express its desire and readiness to enter into a close alliance relationship with Coalition states. One should take into account, however, that this desire has been unilateral so far and, for the alliance to have any practical meaning, the Coalition has to express such a desire and define the terms of such an alliance relationship. Until this happens, and more precisely until Poland becomes part of the Coalition, Poland will be de facto weaker than Germany and subject to its goodwill. Only with the presence of Coalition representatives in Poland and the existence of a treaty of alliance will Poland gain the ability to defend itself.

Thus, the most urgent need to which the attention of Coalition states should be drawn is for those states to send empowered representatives to Poland. It should be presented as infinitely harmful that, at this time, Poland should have relations only with Germany and the castaways of Austria. Poland must maintain those relations because of the need to liquidate a wide range of matters that, otherwise, would be liquidated anarchically, in a manner that would be detrimental to the country and which could involve bloodshed. These relations are commented upon unfavourably in Poland. I also think that the Coalition is satisfied with this inadequate and not fully empowered Polish political representation that is present in Paris. There is, therefore, an unpleasant surprise at the fact that official representatives of Coalition states have not yet arrived in Poland.

It should be stressed as highly desirable that the envoys assigned to Poland be people of a rather democratic demeanour, suited for relations in present-day Poland. Naturally, this does not rule out appointing legate councillors or other people able to maintain social relations with all spheres of Polish society.

It should be stated that governing circles of the Polish state will establish relations with the Polish National Committee in Paris and will see to the laying of proper foundations for the future of those relations. Above all, thanks should be extended to the Coalition states for having allowed the creation, by the intermediary of that Committee, of a Polish Army by the side of the Coalition. The request should be repeated for the quickest transfer of that Army to Poland and its integration with the forming National Army. It is on this

assumption that not only an amiable attitude toward the National Committee but also a most friendly and close collaboration will emerge. Not without two reservations, however: a) certain persons belonging to the National Committee are unpopular in Poland and they undoubtedly, and above all, include Mr. Roman Dmowski, who is excessively involved in party conflicts in Poland. Therefore, in all configurations the Committee should either be treated impersonally or some other person, such as Mr. Ignacy Paderewski or Mr. Maurycy Zamoyski, for example, should be induced to assume its leadership; b) it has to be accepted at the outset that the Committee recognises the authority of the central government in Poland, as there is universal hostility in Poland to émigré governments, and widespread expectation that governments will be answerable to the people in the country and to the country. Each émigré government carries the attribute of irresponsibility and the affairs of émigré governments remind the nation of servitude. In the nearest future, governing circles in Poland will send an empowered representative who will discuss and settle the question of relations with the Polish National Committee in Paris.

## II. Internal affairs in Poland.

The state of affairs in Poland should be laid out in full and the appropriate reasons for the actions of the Chief of the State should be indicated against this background. Independent Poland continues to be threatened from all sides: internally and externally by the plague of Bolshevism and also by Germans, whether marching across Poland's borderlands or supporting Bolshevism. This situation is made the more difficult by the absence of military and transport technology whose use would make it possible to repulse threats.

The danger of Bolshevism is a threat above all to Lithuania and the Byelorussian borderlands of the Polish state, i.e., territories being presently evacuated by the Germans. In the wake of the evacuating Germans, foreign or local Bolshevik bands appear immediately, and the entire country, famished, dilapidated, and tattered, is left to its fate and living under the threat of slaughter. The Bolshevik danger also threatens Poland proper, especially the territories of the Congress Kingdom, formerly occupied by Germany, where the Germans systematically tolerated Bolshevik agitation conducted by foreign elements and financed at great cost by Russia, and maintained for the longest possible time forms and methods of government that could only bring the threat of anarchy closer.

This threat of Bolshevism only takes on its appropriate significance when one considers Germany's attitude toward Poland. One should, above all, present the condition in which the country found itself in the first days of November with regard to German violence, and the peaceful, organised approach—countering anarchy and weakening the Germans—that the Polish

governing circles adopted in the evacuation of German forces and taking power away from them.

Furthermore, one should lay out the present nature of German policy, which can best be seen in relation to Lithuania and to Bolshevism. In Lithuania, the German military authorities do not allow any local Polish circles to organise or to counter the threat of anarchy. They are evacuating from Lithuania in an intentional manner, from the north, starting in such a way as to give access to the Bolshevik wave, exclude all contacts with Poland. At the same time, until the last moment the Germans are supporting institutions they themselves established (Taryba<sup>35</sup>) and whose internal emptiness they know well but whose removal they leave to others, however, so that the odium of turning against Lithuanian sovereignty will fall on others. This way, till the end and in future memory, Germany will be recalled as the defender of Lithuanian independence and the promoter of Lithuanian imperialism. The attitude of the Germans toward Bolshevism continues to be indicated by the fact that in all the places from which they withdraw, the threat of Bolshevism appears directly and is accompanied by social disorganisation that is absolute and planned in advance.

The focal points of Poland's present conflict with Germany have to be listed on this basis: 1) the approaching return, through Poland, of Russian prisoners of war, in the number of about 2 million and overwhelmingly infected with Bolshevism; 2) relations with the German army, numbering about four times the formed Ober-Ost,<sup>36</sup> returning to Germany and looting and destroying the country on the way, hounding its Polish inhabitants, and behaving provocatively toward the Polish Army; 3) the deplorable financial state in which our country was left, 4) German threats levelled against Poland: Bolshevism, anarchy and plunder.

The development of Polish internal policy in such conditions should be presented. The state of the country's affairs as left by the Germans almost precludes their normal development and ordinary manner of resolving difficulties. Poland was for over a century kept by its partitioners in conditions that were abnormal and intentionally brought down in social development. As a result, conditions have arisen that are no longer known in the rest of Europe and which need to be overcome using extraordinary means so as to save the nation from the threat of loosening social ties and from the onset of Bolshevism. The Chief of the State established a leftist government firstly so that the electoral law could be promulgated by the Left—not because it will thus be more democratic—but so as to preclude the emergence, even for

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<sup>35</sup> This refers to the Lithuanian State Council established in September 1917, and led by Antanas Smetona.

<sup>36</sup> The forces of the Ober-Ost in November 1918, were estimated at about 500,000 men.

a moment, of suspicions among the wide popular strata of the existence of a desire to trick the people in this respect. Secondly, to gain for the government formation that part of the Left, thus guaranteeing the maintenance of peace and order in the country. In this manner, the Left itself must allow for a whip to be twisted for its own back in the form of regulations and laws that it would itself promulgate and which, from that moment on, will be binding upon it and serve to restrain it. A Left government is like a Pasteurian injection of disease that elicits an ostensible and momentary disorder of the organism, for the purpose of shielding that organism from a disease that is even worse. The Left government will be short-lived and will either be reconstructed encompassing all the provinces or, if the reconstruction proves unsuccessful, removed entirely to be replaced by a government of experts that will honestly and impartially organise elections to the Constituent Assembly. If such a government is established, a special advisory body will be organised for the Chief of the State to conduct foreign policy.

The need to convene a Constituent Assembly in Poland should be defended with firmness and consistency. The Polish State is being built entirely afresh and it possesses no tradition and no customary or legal base. The State possesses no legal foundation for its existence and the individual forms of its orientation are, in fact, continued *ex lege* states. In such conditions a) a Constituent Assembly would give the country the first sense of law being instituted without foreign involvement; b) only a Constituent Assembly can provide a counterweight to Bolshevism, which is nothing more but a minority dictatorship and which can't function where a legally constituted majority exists. Fears of excessive radicalisation of the Constituent Assembly or of the country by the Constituent Assembly are baseless—the Constituent Assembly in Poland will be elected by a vast peasant majority; c) the Constituent Assembly will be the only way to merge Poland's provinces into one, to level differences between provinces, and to truly unify the country.

### III. The Boundaries of the Polish State.

Poland's future boundaries should provide it with the possibility of expansion to the east and a full range of colonisation activities. Colonisation in the east is the necessary condition for the rebirth and development of the country's ruined industry, the only means to employ the unemployed masses who will otherwise be condemned to compulsory emigration. The Congress Kingdom and Galicia have the densest agricultural population in the world (Kielce Province, deprived of industry, has a population of 101 per km<sup>2</sup>). Poznań Province also has a dense agricultural population that is in part emigrating to the west. Our expansion can turn neither to the west nor to the south. The territories for Polish colonisation lie in the east and it is in this direction that Poland must go if it is to maintain itself from its work.

It should be stated that we desire good neighbourly relations with Russia. Placing those relations on a friendly footing is made easier by the fact that the expansion of both nations is proceeding eastwards. Russia, ruined and exhausted by shed blood, is not able to revert to its westward expansion. Without depriving Russia of any of its own lands, and especially without reaching for any of its agricultural resources, Poland must secure for itself a sufficient area of expansion and to set a comfortable and lasting state boundary in the east. This boundary should encompass Lithuania, the area of Pińsk, the western part of Volhynia and the industrial areas of middle Galicia.

Lithuania should be united with Poland on account of the necessity of colonisation, historical community, religious tradition, memories of the former union, and, finally, the enormity of cultural work performed by the Poles there. Parts of Lithuania and western Volhynia, between Brest-Litovsk and Baranowicze or on the banks of the Styr, for example, are entirely destroyed by war and are presently a desert awaiting new work and new input. Ethnographic Lithuania constitutes one unit that is nationally related to Latvia and the destiny of both countries should be common. Should it be decided that this country will be a part of Poland, the Polish State would guarantee those nations' full and complete rights of autonomy and within the Polish state as a whole all national minorities would be secure. In particular, Poles had and have nothing against the Lithuanians and will not harm them. In the last resort, however, should Lithuania as a whole not be part of the Polish state and was to be joined to some other state organism, in this case Poland would have to insist that Lithuania proper be limited to its ethnographic area, without the Byelorussian Minsk area or the Polish Vilnius area. Polish influence in Lithuania is presently that country's only social mainstay against Bolshevism and if we are not allowed to build up Lithuania as a barrier, the flooding of those countries by Bolshevism is unavoidable.

In Galicia, our national minimum is the line encompassing Lwow and Kałusz. As part of a voluntary agreement with Russia, we would be willing to cede part of Eastern Galicia in exchange for Russian concessions in Lithuanian and Byelorussian areas.

Poland's eastern boundary must be laid out in cooperation with Russia, provide Poland with the advantage of a direct rail line from Vilnius to Lwow through Kowel, while leaving the belt of the Pripet marshes and forests between Russia and Poland. The area of Pińsk, which is entirely destroyed, constitutes a boundary of swamps and is unsuited for the movement of large military forces. The Polish eastern Równie-Pińsk-Vilnius rail line should pass through this area and, at the very least the Drohobycz-Lwow-Kowel-Pińsk-Łuniniec-Baranowicze-Vilnius rail line should be left in Polish hands. In this manner, Russia is being ceded all fertile areas that do not require any reconstruction

input or work. We in turn take destroyed areas that will be receptive to our strong colonisation pool.

As far as Poland's western boundaries are concerned, there are no differences of opinion. It should be emphasised that the present Polish government does not differ on this point with parties of the Right, evidence of which can be seen in the act on the Constituent Assembly, which includes all areas of Poznań Province, Upper Silesia, Western Prussia, and the Olsztyn [Allenstein] Regency of East Prussia.

The vitality of the Polish state is directly and entirely dependent on Poland's access to the sea—on obtaining Danzig. The Russian authorities ruined transportation, did not allow the development of railways or navigation routes, obstructed the regulation of the Vistula, and didn't build canals. For example, the transport of coal, wheat, sand, and stone took the costly rail route, and could not be floated. The importance for Poland of water routes and access to the sea is thus the greater, as without it we would be forced to rely solely on Germany. The east-Prussian port in Memel, and the one in Libau, is part of the Lithuanian complex and should belong to it. In connection with the prospect of Danzig's incorporation into Poland, Polish navy cadres are already being organised and technical work is being carried out in Modlin, in preparation for transfer to liberated Danzig. It is in Poland's interest that no obstacles be placed in the way of the return to Poland of sailors from Pula detained in Swiss Bern.

#### IV. Economic and financial matters.

The complex of economic and financial matters between the Coalition and Poland will necessitate a large-scale accord, one concerning the reconstruction of Poland as a whole. Poland needs to build railways and waterways intentionally neglected by the partitioners, it has to build and organise cities, it has to carry out the slow and gradual rebuilding of heavy industry and, finally, merge into one the different economic organisation of various Polish provinces. All this will require considerable financial outlays as well as technology—assistance that the Coalition must provide. This will require, above all, large-scale loans guaranteed by the Polish State and, therefore, the consolidation of State credit and of a circulating currency in connection with which it would be advisable to include Poland in the Western European monetary system and to peg its currency unit to the franc. Against the background of the preparations for this general economic and financial accord, immediate assistance will be required, such as:

- 1) a loan for immediate public works and for melioration of transport;
- 2) turning over to Poland part of the rolling stock (engines and cars) from the total stock seized from Germany;

- 3) assistance in the form of provisions for Poland, i.e., above all, food for starving Lithuania and food for Poland proper;
- 4) first aid goods;
- 5) agricultural machinery and artificial fertilisers;
- 6) machines and resources for the immediate start-up of the railway industry, at least of its most urgent part.

*PDD 1918, doc. 62*

## 19

*28 November 1918, telegram from the Interim Chief of State  
to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces  
in the matter of the withdrawal of German forces from the East*

le 28 novembre [191]8

Maréchal Foch  
GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL  
France

Télégramme.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à Votre connaissance ce que suit:

D'après l'article 9 du traité d'armistice, le Gouvernement Allemand s'est engagé à évacuer les territoires occupés par ses troupes sur le front Oriental<sup>37</sup>.

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<sup>37</sup> Questions pertaining to the evacuation of German units from the territories lying to the east of Germany's eastern boundary as of 1 August 1914, were addressed primarily by Art. 12 of the Armistice of 11 November 1918. It stated: "Toutes les troupes allemandes qui se trouvent actuellement dans les territoires qui faisaient partie avant la guerre de l'Autriche-Hongrie, de la Roumanie, de la Turquie, doivent rentrer immédiatement dans les frontières de l'Allemagne, telles qu'elles étaient au 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914. Toutes les troupes allemandes qui se trouvent actuellement dans les territoires qui faisaient partie avant la guerre de la Russie devront également rentrer dans les frontières de l'Allemagne, définies comme ci-dessus, dès que les Alliés jugeront le moment venu, compte tenu de la situation intérieure de ces territoires". H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. 1, Encl. V, Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, London 1920, p. 465.



Les troupes allemandes par contre en violation du dit article occupent non seulement les territoires de l'est de la Pologne, menacent les frontières du Nord, mais en outre y font sévir une dictature militaire, saccagent le pays et travaillent à envenimer les rapports entre les diverses nationalités habitant ces territoires.

Sont portées à la connaissance du Gouvernement Polonais journellement des rapports et des plaintes de pillage d'incendie et de meurtre nouveau.

Je Vous prie, Monsieur le Maréchal, de bien vouloir user de Votre autorité et intervenir auprès du Gouvernement Allemand au nom des Alliés d'évacuer les dits territoires dans le plus bref délai et en se servant des voies et routes désignées par le Gouvernement Polonais.

Considérant que le passage des troupes allemandes par le territoire de la Pologne sans entente préliminaire avec le Gouvernement Polonais serait une nouvelle action ennemie je Vous prierais d'intervenir auprès le Gouvernement Allemand.

Piłsudski

*PDD 1918, doc. 63*

## 20

*28 November 1918, letter from the PNC representative in London  
to the PNC Chairman in Paris  
about discussions conducted at the Foreign Office*

28 November 1918

To the Chairman of the Polish National Committee  
in Paris

I received the post of the 26<sup>th</sup> of this month.

Here is the result of the talks I held at the Foreign Office after my return from Paris:

The English government, having obtained a similar notification as the French about the sending of a delegation by the Polish government replied, or is intending to reply, that it has nothing against discussions with these persons, but only in an informative capacity, as it can only recognise the coalition

government in Poland, which, until the time of the Sejm, is solely competent to represent public opinion and the will of the nation. This position of the government is the reason why the FO hasn't yet replied positively to our request that representatives of the Committee be allowed to take part in the peace conference.

Drummond, to whom I presented our information about the state of affairs in Poland and our position, shares the latter entirely, and said on the occasion that in order to take full account of the situation in Poland, the government feels it necessary to send as fast as possible to Poland a special mission not having the character of a diplomatic mission, but being strictly informative and which would be in a position to view the situation on the ground and provide the Peace Conference with the most readily needed data. It should be understood that I insisted on the necessity to send the appropriate people who are familiar enough with the matter at hand not to fall prey to this or that local orientation and on whose goodwill we can count. As this will be a temporary mission, there are chances that, besides one or two military persons, the FO will send Gregory. This will definitely take place in the coming days and those persons will go through Paris and Switzerland, and will thus meet with the Committee. Most probably they will be accompanied by Captain Stuart Hay, about whom Mr. Kozicki wrote in connection with the American intrigue.

The War Office notified Marshal Foch, that it agrees to the proposed sending of the Polish Army through Danzig for which, naturally, the cooperation of the English fleet will be necessary. From the information they possess here, it is to be deduced that the Germans will make no difficulties in transferring the troops from Danzig by means of the German railways as any anti-Bolshevik action will be looked upon favourably there. The English fleet has been invited to Kiel by the Germans themselves.

Please obtain from the Franco-Polish mission the hasty opening of loans to cover the costs of transferring prisoners of war from here to France, something Lieutenant Górski asked for on 1 November. Malville is au courant, while we must pay in advance, which is impossible.

Wł. Sobański

*PDD 1918, doc. 64*

## 21

*[November] 1918, pro memoria of the Ministry of External Affairs [?]  
about foreign policy*

## Pro memoria

Polish foreign policy will be non-existent until regular diplomatic relations are established with the Coalition.

1) A number of private delegations to Coalition states have left or are on the point of leaving. These delegations, some of which are of a political character (Grabski, Konopczyński, Stroński), other of an economic character (the delegations of the Cracow Liquidation Commission<sup>38</sup> and Warsaw industrial circles) and others of a semi-scientific and semi-political character (before Bartoszewicz, now Romer), are giving rise to general confusion. This confusion harms all our real interests, as economic, financial, military, and other such interests can only be advanced and settled at the present time through diplomatic discussions and argumentation. Moreover, this confusion is politically ascribed to no other than the Warsaw government or to its inexistence. Typical example: duplicate passports (the government's diplomatic ones and those of the Liquidation Commission), which give rise to amused consternation in Switzerland, the more regrettable as it gives the impression of the existence of three Polands.

2) The policy of the National Committee is uncertain, unstable, and weakened, there are cleavages (Zamorski in Italy, K.M. Morawski in Lausanne), and its influence is waning (Jewish counter-action in Scandinavia, America, and Switzerland, Czech, Ruthenian and Lithuanian counter-action in America). Undoubtedly, this is momentarily beneficial for the government, and undoubtedly harmful for Poland. The Committee is grasping for means of survival such as military intervention and civil war in Poland (projects of turning Poland into a military base against Russia, Haller's landing in Danzig, probably in the coming days). It is now possible to topple the National Committee, but only being there.

3) The National Committee is discredited in the eyes of the Coalition, but only the National Committee represents Poland. As a result, Poland is discredited and party fragmentation is only one of the factors removing our influence from the stage. Each further day of our absence entrenches in diplomatic circles the notion that Poland is in chaos, i.e., non-existent.

*PDD 1918, doc. 75*

<sup>38</sup> The Polish Liquidation Commission was a temporary organ for the Austrian Partition and Teschen Silesia, established on 28 October 1918, by, among others, Polish deputies to the State Council in Vienna.

## 22

*1 December 1918, note by the Deputy Minister of External Affairs  
about policy toward the Entente states and the PNC in Paris*

Pro memoria about the stance toward the Entente  
and the Polish Committee in Paris

1) The most appropriate way to proceed in the above matter would be to seek an agreement with the Entente, not through an existing agreement with the National Committee, but to establish relations with the National Committee having first established direct relations with the Entente.

2) The so-called junctim between the settlement of matters with the Entente and coming to an agreement with the Paris Committee should be resolved by taking the path indicated above.

3) The proposal that the government should offer Mr. Dmowski the position of delegate to the Peace Conference as a basis for negotiations with the Paris Committee probably corresponds to the wishes of the Committee and Mr. Dmowski, yet for us to accept it would be a political and tactical error. Politically, such an approach would weaken the position of the Polish government with regard to the Entente. Tactically, it would place in Dmowski's hands everything that he wishes for in the given circumstances.

4) The position of the National Committee with regard to the French government is weakened because the Paris Committee has been receiving for quite some time about 15,000 pounds sterling monthly from the disposable funds of the French Ministry of War.<sup>1</sup>

5) The English and North-American ministries of foreign affairs naturally know about the Polish Committee's dependence on France.

6) Against the above background, London and Washington hold a number of quiet grudges with regard to Paris. Anglo-Saxon politicians think that the Entente should stand as one with regard to the Poles. The financial relationship between Paris and the Polish Committee stands in opposition to this concept

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<sup>1</sup> The PNC was initially financed from membership dues, private subsidies, collections organised by the Polish community in America, and from loans granted by the French government with the future revenues of the Zamoyski family as collateral. From 1918, the activities of the PNC were in large measure financed from loans made by the governments of France (150,000 francs per month) and Great Britain (75,000 francs per month). The debt was supposed to be reimbursed by the future Polish state, something the members of the Committee were personally responsible for.

and may lead to the Polish question becoming a French monopoly, something that would be inconvenient for the other Allies.

7) During the discussions of our representatives with the Entente, any mention of the question of the Polish Committee should be preceded by the declaration that the Polish government is ready to assume the sums Paris paid out to the Polish Committee.

8) After reaching an appropriate settlement in this respect with the Entente, the Polish Committee should be called upon to subordinate itself to the government.

T.F.

*PDD 1918, doc. 76*

## 23

*1 December 1918, note of protest by the Minister  
of External Affairs to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs  
in the matter of Polish diplomats*

WASILEWSKI à TCHITCHERINE,  
VARSOVIE, le 1/XII/18

Au Commissaire du peuple des Affaires Etrangères  
de la République Russe socialiste fédérale soviétique  
Monsieur Tchitcherine à Moscou

J'accuse réception de la dépêche du Commissariat du peuple pour les Affaires Etrangères du 28 Novembre 1918 Nr 571.

Le Gouvernement de la République polonaise proteste une fois encore avec vigueur contre les actes de violence dont notre Ambassade à Moscou ainsi que sa dépendance à Pétersbourg ont été l'objet et continue d'exiger l'enlèvement immédiat des scellés de la maison, des bâtiments, du mobilier des documents ainsi que des caisses de l'Ambassade et la restitution du tout au conseiller d'Ambassade Jean Zarnowski à Moscou ainsi qu'aux personnes par lui désignées. Le Gouvernement Polonais rend le gouvernement soviétique russe responsable du sort de son ambassade et de ses dépendances ainsi que de sécurité des employés et de leur famille.

Prenant en considération que le Gouvernement de la République russe soviétique ainsi que leurs organes subjugés se sont laissés aller plusieurs fois à des actes de violence inadmissibles envers nos institutions officielles et à des attentats à la vie et aux biens des citoyens polonais, le gouvernement de la République Polonaise se voit dans l'impossibilité absolue de se prononcer sur la question de ses relations avec la République russe soviétique tant que l'incident de notre Ambassade à Moscou contraire à tous les principes du droit international ne sera pleinement liquidée.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

*PDD 1918, doc. 79*

## 24

*4 December 1918, note from the Minister of External Affairs  
to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs  
in the matter of the Polish mission*

WASILEWSKI à TCHITCHERINE,  
VARSOVIE le 4/XII/18

Au Commissaire du Peuple des Affaires Etrangères  
de la République Russe socialiste fédérale soviétique  
Monsieur Tchitcherine à Moscou

En réponse à la dépêche du 3 Décembre courant, N. 23 w 167, le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères avise. Tant que le Gouvernement Polonais n'a pas pris d'autres décisions concernant la représentation du Conseil de Régence en Russie, elle doit être considérée sans commentaire comme la représentation officielle de la République Polonaise. Nous exigeons la restitution immédiate de l'hôtel de notre Légation, des biens, des documents pris ainsi que la garantie du départ sans empêchement de notre Légation qui a le libre passage assuré par la territoire de l'Ober-Ost. La liste du personnel de la Légation quittant Moscou sera présentée par le conseiller Zarnowski et la liste du personnel quittant Pétersbourg par le conseiller Joseph DANGEL. Le Gouvernement Polonais rappelle que les membres de notre Légation qui resteront sur place pour garder la propriété de la Légation sont inviolables et rend le gouvernement soviétique russe responsable de tout attentat au droit d'exterritorialité. Le Gouvernement Polonais ne pourra traiter aucune des questions qui intéressent

le gouvernement soviétique avant d'obtenir entière satisfaction aux demandes qu'il formula.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

*PDD 1918, doc. 85*

## 25

*5 December 1918, telegram from the Deputy Minister of External Affairs to the Chairman of the Joint Foreign Committee with a request that the journalists be sent to investigate the matter of pogroms*

5. Dec. 1918

Priority.

Varsovie, Karlsborgradio  
Mr Lucien Wolf, Jewish Chronicle

Kindly request on our behalf jewish board for foreign affairs<sup>2</sup> to send us in communication with correspondents of the times, manchester guardians whom we invite to Poland a special correspondent or delegate specially interested in jewish problem investigate personally state of these affairs Poland.<sup>3</sup>

Filipowcz under secretary for foreign affairs

*PDD 1918, doc. 89 (ENG)*

<sup>2</sup> This refers to the Joint Foreign Committee established by two organisations of British Jews: The Anglo-Jewish Association and the Conjoint Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews.

<sup>3</sup> This invitation was extended by the Polish government in connection to reports about pogroms that appeared in *The Times*, *The Guardian* and *The Manchester Times*.

## 26

*6 December 1918, note from the PNC representative in London  
to the Chairman of the PNC in Paris about the possibility  
of transferring Polish troops to Poland  
and about the discussion with the French ambassador*

6 December 1918

To the Chairman of the Polish National Committee in Paris

## Note

1) I have been informed that England and France are now sending a great number of ships to, among other places, Königsberg and Danzig to pick up prisoners of war and, as they are sailing empty, they could be used to transport our troops; that the Conseil interallié pour le transport maritime is located here; and that detailed data about what the Polish military will need and when should be presented here without delay. This is the more urgent as the allocation of tonnage for a certain time is now under way and that later this could involve technical problems.

2) Today, I saw Mr. de Fleuriau who told me, on his own initiative and in very vague terms, that the moment of peace is approaching and that it would be desirable for our boundaries on the German side to be set forth not only by the Peace Conference, but also by means of fait accompli on our part. This is more or less the same thing that Mr. Berthelot told the Chairman of the Polish National Committee. From the conversation with de Fleuriau, I deduce that the subject was discussed during the stay of Foch and Clemenceau, and that France would like to see our troops in Poland as soon as possible.

Please let me know what is being done in this matter. It would seem that England could give us aviation and armoured cars.

*PDD 1918, doc. 93*



## 27

*8 December 1918, communiqué by the Polish National Committee  
about reports of pogroms of Jews in Poland*

COMMUNIQUE  
DU  
COMITE NATIONAL POLONAIS.

Depuis quelque temps on parle dans la presse de „pogrome” dont la population polonaise se serait rendue coupable envers la population juive en Pologne.

Le Comité National Polonais qui dans son action politique a toujours reconnu les principes, que dans l'Etat polonais libre et indépendant les citoyens de confession juive devront bénéficier des mêmes droits que tous les autres citoyens, ainsi qu'il en est dans les Etats occidentaux, et que tout acte de violence commis envers une population sans défense n'est que brutalité sauvage qui doit être condamné sans réserves et sévèrement puni – s'est enquis de suite sur l'exactitude de ces dires. La méthode des «pogroms» n'a jamais existé en Pologne, et il est difficile d'admettre que la population polonaise ait pu perdre pendant les quatre années de guerre les sentiments humanitaires dont elle a toujours fait preuve.

Le Comité National Polonais doit constater en premier lieu que tous ces rapports alarmants proviennent soit de la presse allemande soit de sources juives. Par contre, le Times et le Daily Mail donnent une correspondance de J.M.N. Jeffries, d'après laquelle les incidents qui ont eu lieu apparaissent sous un jour différent dégageant la Nation polonaise de toute responsabilité.

La Comité National Polonais, se basant sur les renseignements précis qui lui sont parvenue, est à même d'affirmer qu'aucun des incidents qui ont eu lieu en Pologne, et dont la population juive a souffert, n'a eu à sa connaissance le caractère d'un «pogrom» organisé par la population polonaise contre la population juive sans défense.

Dans certaines localités de la Galicie occidentale la population affamée s'est jetée sur des dépôts dans lesquels des commerçants malhonnêtes avaient emmagasiné des vivres, afin d'en faire hausser les prix. Ces accapareurs étaient pour la plupart de confession juive, mais ce ne fut pas à cause de leur confession qu'ils ont souffert.

A Kielce, dans le Royaume de Pologne, un groupe de 300 adolescents juifs fait une démonstration dans les rues de la ville en poussant des cris: «Vive Lénine! Vive Trotzki! A bas la Pologne!». La population outrée se jeta sur eux, une rixe sanglante s'ensuivit dans laquelle environ quarante manifestants

périssent. Ils subirent ce sort non pas parce qu'ils étaient juifs, mais parce qu'ils étaient Bolcheviks, avaient offensé les sentiments nationaux polonais, et semaient l'anarchie dans le pays.

Lorsque les troupes polonaises passèrent par Uscilug, un détachement de 500 Juifs armés de fusils fournis probablement par les Allemands, fit feu sur les Polonais. Ceux-ci ripostèrent et dispersèrent leurs agresseurs en tuant 14 et blessant 47. Voici un autre cas. Le commandant Belina envoya dans la ville de Wlodawa un détachement polonais qui, pendant la nuit, fut attaqué par les Juifs. Plusieurs des agresseurs et un homme du détachement furent tués. Ces incidents ne peuvent être qualifiés de «pogroms» de la population juive sans défense.

Dans de nombreuses localités de la Pologne autrichienne ainsi que de la Hongrie et de la Bohême, des bandes de soldats provenant de l'armée austro-hongroise désorganisée ont commis des actes de violence dont la population juive a aussi été victime. On ne peut pourtant pas imputer ces actes à la population polonaise.

Pendant la courte période où la ville de Lwow était entre les mains de la soi-disant armée ukrainienne, composée en grande partie de soldats allemands et autrichiens, les prisons furent ouvertes, et les détenus de droit commun mis en liberté. Lorsque les Polonais reprenaient la ville, ces forçats pillèrent le quartier juif n'épargnant point la population chrétienne. Après s'être rendu maître de la ville, le commandement polonais fit passer en conseil de guerre ces bandits dont 60 furent fusillés et 1.500 emprisonnés. De ceux-ci, 60 pour cent étaient de Ruthènes, 30 pour cent des Polonais, et 10 pour cent des Juifs. Dans ce cas, il ne peut plus être question d'un «pogrom» de la population juive, organisé par la population polonaise.

Le Comité National Polonais signale la situation difficile de la Pologne qui, entre la Russie bolcheviste et l'Allemagne révolutionnaire, est exposée à une propagande fort dangereuse, à laquelle les Juifs prennent, hélas, une part très active. En même temps, les bandes de soldats allemands et autrichiens ainsi que les prisonniers russes, revenant l'Allemagne, traversant le pays, et se laissent aller à des excès qui atteignent toute la population aussi bien polonaise que juive. La Pologne ne possède pas une armée suffisante pour se défendre contre ces éléments d'anarchie et désordre. Elle ne la possède pas, parce que les Polonais n'ont pas voulu, en créant en Pologne une force armée pendant la guerre, donner aux Allemands la possibilité de prélever sur leurs troupes d'occupation des contingents qu'ils auraient envoyés sur le front occidental.

Dans ces conditions, ni le Gouvernement actuel en Pologne ni le Comité National Polonais à Paris, ne peuvent garantir pleinement l'ordre public ni la sécurité de la vie et des biens des habitants. En faveur de la population polonaise il faut relever le fait, que le pays, se trouvant dans des conditions aussi déplorables, ne fut pas tombé dans l'abîme de l'anarchie.

Le Comité National Polonais apprend avec une vive joie que des officiers appartenant aux armées alliées sont partis pour la Pologne, afin de se rendre compte sur place de l'état des choses. En attendant, le Comité National envisage de son devoir de signaler à l'opinion publique des pays alliés le caractère tendancieux des récits gais jusqu'à présent qui font clairement paraître l'intention des Allemands de compromettre la Pologne aux yeux du monde civilisé, dans l'espoir du pouvoir faire profiter la cause de l'Allemagne au dépens de la Pologne.

*PDD 1918, doc. 101*

## 28

*10 December 1918, note from the PNC representative in London  
to the British Foreign Secretary about food aid for Poland*

10th December 1918

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  
Foreign Office

Excellency,

I have received from the General Polish Relief Committee at Warsaw the news that it is urgently necessary for the immediate needs of the starving population, to send to Poland a certain quantity of food and clothing.

The relief of Poland has ceased to be a work of charity which interests only Poland and charitable people, who, on account of the blockade, were prevented during the three years of German occupation from aiding, although Poland was suffering from starvation and the Austro-German requisitions. It is now a question, not only of justice towards a people which has greatly suffered through its resistance to the politics of Berlin and Vienna, but before all one which affects the well-being, the interests of the health of all Europe. For it is evident that if the population of the countries devastated by the war are left to their own resources, they may become a centre of infection for diseases which may spread through all Europe, not to mention the danger of anarchy for which starvation affords so favourable a soil. Starting from this point of view of the common danger and the common interest, the Allied Governments have decided to create an organisation and to assign it to the Food Controllers of the United States and of Great Britain.

This problem has been decided in principle, but I learn from Mr. Hoover, that in order to send the indispensable relief as soon as possible, it is necessary

to open a credit of from one to two million pounds in a neutral country in order to pay for the goods which, in this case, might be sent immediately, before the United States Government has obtained from the Senate the credits necessary for the share of the United States.

I would venture therefore to ask if it would be possible for the British Government to give once more a proof of its goodwill towards Poland by opening this credit before the Allied Governments have decided in common accord from what sources the expenses of Polish relief will be covered.

This financial aid is all the more needed as public charity however large would be inadequate, and on the other hand as the Polish State is still in process of being formed, it would be premature to try and foresee in what way the expenses incumbent upon it could be covered.

I have the honour to be, Your Excellency's most obedient and humble Servant,

/signed/ L. Sobański  
Representative of the Polish National Committee

*PDD 1918, doc. 103 (ENG)*

## 29

*10 December 1918, dispatch of the Deputy Minister of External Affairs to the government representative in Bern about the Warsaw government's takeover of the financial obligations of the PNC in Paris*

10 December 1918

To Mr. August Zaleski in Bern

CONFIDENTIAL

Please communicate, on a confidential basis, to the official French circles that the Polish government is ready to assume all the sums advanced till this day by the French government to the Polish National Committee in Paris.

On behalf of the Minister of External Affairs  
Tytus Filipowicz, minister plenipotentiary

*PDD 1918, doc. 106*

## 30

*11 December 1918, memo from an official with  
the Polish Liquidation Commission in Cracow to the PNC in Paris  
about Polish-Czech relations (excerpt)*

[...]⁴

On the Czech-Polish question

Memorandum to the Polish National Committee in Paris

A. State of Affairs

I. The present mood in Prague is highly anti-Polish. The entire Czech public follows in the tracks of Prague and the dailies. This mood radiates from the centre, i.e., from Prague, and not from outlying areas where, on account of border tensions, its source would be understandable.

This anti-Polish mood is intensifying.

At the end of October Polish-Czech relations were correct and friendly. The Czechs stood by the provisions of the Ljubljana Accords,<sup>5</sup> mutual assistance between two national states about to emerge and we had many friends and sympathisers, especially in Young Bohemia intelligentsia circles. The change dates from the first days of November, more or less from the date the “Lublin government”<sup>6</sup> was formed in Poland, and things have been deteriorating daily ever since.

The present state has become so volatile that all types of unfriendly actions, including military ones, can be expected.

II. Symptoms of anti-Polishness.

Systematic propaganda in the press, both in the capital and in the provincial press of all stripes.

It is led by *Národní Listy*, the organ of Kramář and the *Štátoprávna demokracie*.

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<sup>4</sup> The title page, containing a list of contents, was omitted.

<sup>5</sup> This refers to the conference of the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Czechs, and Poles held on 17 August 1918 in Ljubljana, where the representatives of the Slavic nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire passed a resolution about close cooperation in mutual assistance in the name of full independence.

<sup>6</sup> A reference to the Temporary People’s Government of the Polish Republic established on 7 November 1918, in Lublin by Ignacy Daszyński. This government resigned on 11 November 1918, and turned its powers over to Piłsudski in connection with the latter’s assumption of power from the Regency Council.

Substance:

a) Accusations against the Poles on account of their entry to Teschen Silesia and taking power there: Statements that Silesia is part of the lands of the Crown of St Wenceslas; that those countries in their entirety are to fall to Czechoslovakia in the spirit of Wilson's declaration.<sup>7</sup> Statement that the Poles in the Teschen area are the newcomer workers from Galicia; while the Silesians are Czechs using a corrupted dialect somewhat akin to Polish but much closer to Czech. Where this is not the case, polonisation is being blamed.

b) Accusations against the Poles aimed at discrediting us in the eyes of the Entente: That we pursued a pro-German policy against the Entente (citing statements made by the former head of the National Committee in Cracow, mentioning the Legions in Austria, etc.).

c) Allegations that Poland is in disorder, disorganised, that Bolshevism flourishes there and that, therefore, Poland cannot be Western Europe's rampart against Russian subversive ideas and against German expansion.

Allegations b) and c) are contrasted by:

α) the Czechs' determined and united position in support of the Entente and against the Central Powers since the beginning of the war;

β) the strength and power of the united Czechoslovak state in which all people collaborate in building up the state;

χ) order and peace in the Czechoslovak state being a guarantee against Bolshevism.

δ) in the press, positive information about Poland is systematically omitted and negative information highlighted.

2. Efforts to rescind the temporary agreement concluded in Silesia between the Polish National Council in Teschen and the Národní Výbor in Moravska Ostrava, while presenting it as an insignificant local event to which the Czechs were forced by Polish activities.<sup>8</sup>

3. Difficulties in the shipment of merchandise, both from and in transit through the Czech lands to Poland.

4. Propaganda among the population in certain areas:

<sup>7</sup> This is probably a reference to President Wilson's speech of 8 January 1918, whose Point 8 announced the creation of conditions allowing for the independent development of the nations of Austro-Hungary. Point 13 of this speech concerned the creation of a Polish state out of the territories inhabited by Poles.

<sup>8</sup> This refers to the agreement concluded on 5 November 1918, between the National Council of Teschen Silesia and the Czech National Council for Silesia about the course of the boundary in Teschen Silesia.

a) By Czech officials in Silesia who remained in the Polish part, officials of the Koszyce-Bogumin Railway for example.

b) By better provisioning the population in mountainous regions than further in the Czech lands so as to present Polish conditions as supposedly worse and agitate on this basis among Silesian miners against Poland.

### III. Reasons for the action.

The aim is to take Czech Silesia away from the Poles and to paralyse Polish activeness in the areas of Orava and Spiš.

As they concluded the Ljubljana Accords of June [sic!] 1918,<sup>9</sup> the Czechs agreed to an ethnographic boundary between their country and Poland, and thus to cede Silesia to Poland. In the first days of November 1918, they still held that position and approved the local Silesian agreement.

What then could have caused their change of mind?

An analysis of the facts, the opinions of persons familiar with the situation, and a systematic arrangement of the statements made by various Czech officials lead one to the following conclusion:

1. The Czechs, being admirers of force in the Prussian fashion, disregard the present Polish government, knowing that it has no support from either society or the Entente.

2. They themselves grew accustomed to the use of force, both their own and the one drawn from the strong support of the Entente, with which they seem to enjoy truly considerable influence.

3. While the Polish situation looks worse from the outside than it truly is (because inflamed internal disputes provide grounds for the negative criticism of everything that goes on in Poland), the opposite is true in the Czech lands, where there are significant inter-party tensions (in the *Národní shromáždění*) and where organisational work is at the nascent stage, just as in Poland. All these differences influence the Czechs' subjective sense of self-assurance with regard to us.

4. Czech imperialism grows from day to day. The Entente's handing over to them of Slovakia in boundaries that extend considerably beyond the areas of Slovak settlement has whet their appetites even further.

5. Teschen Silesia is an immensely rich country of enormous economic importance:

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<sup>9</sup> This refers to the Ljubljana conference of 17 August 1918. The Czechs already favoured this approach in the middle of May 1918 while they were conducting talks in Prague with representatives of the National Democrats.

a) Its geographic location and the rail lines leading to Bogumin from Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, and Cracow make Silesia a country of great trade and transit value.

b) A third of the coal mines in the Ostrava-Karviná coal basin are located on the Polish side. It produces daily 600 railcars of excellent-quality coal that the Czechs need for their metallurgical and gas industries.

c) Ironworks, rolling mills, wire and nail plants, the only saccharine manufacturing plant in the former Austro-Hungary, and an enormous rice husking facility are also located on the Polish side.

6. The dispute between the Czechs and the Germans living in the lands of the Crown of St Wenceslas (strongly industrialised northern Bohemia, Orava Silesia, northwestern and southern Moravia), has intensified sharply and became very painful for the Czechs on account of the bilaterally ruthless and depleting struggle.

The Czechs' position on boundaries is that of the lands of the Crown of St Wenceslas (which include Orava and Teschen Silesia) while the Germans refer to Wilson's principle of the self-determination of nations. The occupation of Teschen Silesia by the Poles is the affirmation of the ethnographic over the historical principle—one that is, therefore, inconvenient for the Czechs.

#### B. Fears

1. The Czechs can cause us much harm with the Entente, but I doubt to the extent of them gaining the incorporation of Silesia as Czech lands.

But on other boundary issues such as the Orava-Spiš and, further on, the boundaries of the settlements of the Lemkos, who live on both sides of the Carpathians and whom the Czechs wish to incorporate into eastern Slovakia. [sic!]

2. Supporting the claims of the Old-Ruthenians (not Ukrainians) to Eastern Galicia (on the same ethnographic basis that we refer to in relation to Silesia!) and striving to rebuild Russia with the inclusion of eastern Galicia (Kramář favours this).

In such a situation, the Czechs would gain a common boundary with Russia and Romania, as well as influence over the Boryslaw Oil Basin. We would then become less indispensable to them economically by half.

#### C. Conclusions

More attention should be paid and energetic countermeasures taken in the Czech question.

I. with the Entente;

II. at home;



### III. in Czechoslovakia.

Ad I. The Polish National Committee in Paris should receive informational material from home on a continuous basis.

With regard to Entente states, [we should] counter Czech oversimplifications concerning our historical and ethnographic rights to Silesia and further stress that we stand by the Czech-Polish accord discussed at Ljubljana, concluded temporarily in Teschen, and upheld by the Narodni Vybor in Prague.

Perhaps it would be possible to induce the Czechs to take common action about Upper (Prussian) Silesia: To support their historical and ethnographic claims to left-bank (Oder) Silesia, with the exception of the Opole area, in exchange for their support in the matter of Silesia on the right-bank of the Oder (and the Opole area), coming together in the south of Teschen Silesia.

I should mention here that the Czechs at home are facing the German and Jewish questions (anti-Semitism much sharpened for economic reasons and also the Jews' opting for Germany). The internal Polish question could split them up.

It should be added that Teschen Silesia is uniformly conscious and concordant nationality-wise, [and] the conscious people stand unconditionally behind Poland irrespective of political camp. I was told by two sources on the Teschen National Council that they will defend the Polishness of Silesia "to the last drop of blood."

Countering the Czech slanders thrown at us before the Entente will be made easier for the Polish Committee by our press, in which we will conduct a review of the Czech press and a substantive polemic with the invectives.

### II. At home.

In Warsaw and Cracow, it was decided to:

- 1) conduct a consciousness-awakening action in the Borderlands;
- 2) strengthen the civilian administration in Teschen and reinforce the ones in Orava and Spiš with military garrisons;
- 3) Support provisioning there energetically;
- 4) Refute Czech allegations and oversimplifications in the press.

### III. In the Czech lands.

There is the intent to send a special diplomatic mission to Prague to negotiate the Silesian and Orava-Spiš questions.

It would be indicated for this mission to include a delegate from the Polish National Committee in Paris who would be familiar with the Entente's position on the Polish-Czech question.

The mission will go to Prague most probably around 20 December, when Masaryk will be there.<sup>10</sup>

I presented the above state of affairs and conclusions to Prof. Stanisław Grabski and to Prof. Głębiński verbally. I did the same to Minister Wasilewski without, however, telling him of the intention of involving in this the Paris Committee.

I gathered my information from my stay in Teschen and Prague, whence I returned directly following a stay of a few days, and where I had been sent by the PLC in Cracow to conduct trade negotiations and gather political information.

Warsaw 11 December 1918

*Antoni Doerman* in Cracow  
PLC, Section of Industry and Trade  
Deputy Head

*PDD 1918, doc. 109*

## 31

*[before 12 December] 1918, telegram from the Minister of External Affairs to the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs protesting the behaviour of Ober-Ost units*

Telegram from Monsieur Wasilewski  
Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to Dr. Solf, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  
Berlin

In the name of the Polish Government I have the honour most urgently to call the attention of Your Excellency to the conditions in what has hitherto been known as the Polish "Etappengebiet" and in the districts of Lithuania and White Russia which were previously under the orders of the General in command in the East (Oberbefehlshaber Ost): at the same time I protest solemnly against the despotic rule which, in defiance of international law, has been exercised by the German troops in those regions and particularly against the numerous

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<sup>10</sup> The mission, composed of Stanisław Gutowski, Jan Ptaśnik, and Damian Wandycz, left for Prague on 17 December 1918.

cases which have come to my notice of interference with the sovereign rights of Poland, as also against the ill-treatment and despoliation of the inhabitants. In the name of, and on instructions from my Government, I declare that the immediate cessation of these abuses and a prompt evacuation of the above mentioned districts are necessary if loyal and neighbourly relations are to be maintained and promoted between the Polish and German peoples. At the same time I am instructing the Polish Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to lay before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the documents relating to individual cases in which the German troops have exceeded their rights in the eastern districts.

*PDD 1918, doc. 113 (ENG)*

## 32

*12 December 1918, telegram from Ignacy Paderewski  
to the interim representative of the PNC in the USA  
about aid for Poland and developments in Eastern Galicia*

1201, Milwaukee Avenue, Chicago

Paderewski to Smulski<sup>11</sup>

Formed under auspices of Pilsudski new Moraczewski cabinet consisting almost exclusively of persons from Congress Kingdom decidedly socialistic has not been so far recognised by powers. Poznań, Galicia, Silesia have declined cooperation thus withholding approval. Under the circumstances our committee must postpone decision awaiting reasonable changes capable of assuring lasting ministry. Meanwhile suffering in Poland is extremely acute. According wire from Warsaw Relief Committee following immediately needed Poland; stop; two thousand carloads rye and wheat three hundred carloads sugar; stop; for children condensed milk, cocoa rice, canned meat fish; stop; two hundred thousand sheets; stop; for children sixty thousand complete outfits including suits underwear overcoats shoes; stop; adults one hundred seventy five thousand complete outfits; stop; thirty five thousand blankets; stop; Am afraid task too huge for Poles in America; stop; Great charitable organisations have little if any interest in Poland. Kindly communicate with

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<sup>11</sup> Following Ignacy Paderewski's departure for Europe, the function of PNC representative in the U.S. was taken over by Jan Smulski, who could only act as a temporary spokesman for Polish affairs because of his American citizenship.

Judge Mayer; stop; perhaps his committee if already organised may offer assistance. Prospects of help from inter-allied food administration very remote. They expect Polish government to deposit two million pounds sterling for carrying efficiently relief work. Polish government in present formation cannot raise such loan. Violent anti-Polish campaign making task still more difficult. You are requested to make it widely known that the disturbances in Lemberg and elsewhere in Eastern Galicia had nothing to do with alleged anti-Semitic feeling in Poland. During the fighting between Ruthenians and Poles, Polish and Jewish residents have suffered alike. Disorders were due to criminals released from prisons of whom sixty were immediately shot by Polish troops and fifteen hundred arrested. Out of that number sixty per cent Ruthenians, thirty per cent Poles and ten per cent Jews. It is of utmost necessity that the commission for which I applied to Mr. Phillips be sent without delay to investigate the affairs and establish facts officially, otherwise this distinctly German propoganda will cause us infinite harm. Expect news from you soon if by cable care of Committee Paris or American legation Bern. Am leaving for Paris contemplating journey to Poland. Kindly accept and convey to National Department<sup>12</sup> to all friends and to entire beloved emigration words of heartfelt greetings of faithful and sincere affection and of profound gratitude. More than ever before Poland needs your support.

*PDD 1918, doc. 115 (ENG)*

### 33

*13 December 1918, note from the Ministry of External Affairs  
to the German envoy about the suspension of diplomatic relations*

13 Novembre [sic!] 18

A SON EXCELLENCE  
le Comte DE KESSLER,  
Ambassadeur de la République Allemagne à Varsovie

Par notre note de 27 Novembre dernier, No. 2549, adressée à Berlin au nom de M. le Secrétaire d'Etat Solf, nous avons fait comprendre que la question de l'évacuation immédiate des territoires de la Pologne à l'ouest de

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<sup>12</sup> This refers to the Polish National Department, established in 1916 as the representation of the Polish community in the United States.

la ligne du Bug était pour nous une affaire urgente et primordiale. Lors de la conférence que nous avons eu à Varsovie avec l'ambassadeur allemand, après avoir obtenu la réponse du Gouvernement de Berlin, nous avons accentué très distinctement, tout en prenant en considération les difficultés techniques de l'évacuation, que nous jugions la date du 23 Décembre comme terme définitif pour l'évacuation en bloc de ces territoires. En réponse à notre déclaration, qui dans les circonstances actuelles était pourtant exceptionnellement modérée, le comte de Kessler annonça que notre désir ne pouvait être réalisé, par contre il promit d'y accéder, mais progressivement et beaucoup plus tard. Il en résulte donc que dans cette question d'une importance primordiale qu'est pour nous l'évacuation du territoire de la Pologne à l'ouest de la ligne du Bug, une entente parmi nous et le gouvernement de Berlin n'est pas possible. Nous n'avons également pas pu arriver à nous entendre au sujet des mesures à prendre pour assurer un minimum de sécurité à la population polonaise de la Lituanie et de la Russie-Blanche. En plus, le maintien de l'ordre social et constitutionnel non établi encore dans l'Etat Allemand et ce qui s'en suit la conduite des éléments militaires dans l'Ober-Ost, conduite qui n'est pas sans éveiller chez nous des doutes et des craintes, crée une situation qui ne laisse prévoir aucunes chances d'amélioration.

Espérant que dès le rétablissement de conditions normales les relations entre l'Etat Polonais et l'Etat Allemand rentreront dans les voies régulières, je suis d'avis que les faits précités sont de nature à faire suspendre les relations diplomatiques entre ces deux Etats. En exprimant cette conviction, je me vois forcé de prier Son Excellence le comte de Kessler de vouloir bien, lui ainsi que les membres de l'Ambassade, quitter immédiatement le territoire de la Pologne.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

*PDD 1918, doc. 120*

## 34

*16 December 1918, telegram from the PNC envoy (from Warsaw)  
to the PNC in Paris about talks with the Interim Chief of State*

Brought by the Warsaw Delegation  
Radio telegram from Mr. Stanisław Grabski to the PNC

Warsaw, 16 December 1918

Paris. Ministère des affaires étrangères  
Pour le Comité national polonais

My negotiations with Commandant Piłsudski produced unity in the matter of Polish boundaries as presented by the National Committee. Commandant Piłsudski points out that in this matter it is necessary for strategic reasons that the rivers forming the boundary, the Ula, Berezina, Sluch, Horin and Ushitsa, be entirely in Polish hands, i.e., that the state boundary be appropriately situated beyond them.

Also in agreement with Commandant Piłsudski, I request that you please inform the French government and Marshal Foch that the evacuation of German troops from Byelarusia as is now taking place is exposing that country to the most terrible threat from the Russian Bolsheviks who, having gathered substantial forces, immediately occupy the areas evacuated by the Germans. The Germans, in turn, do not allow the local population, especially the Poles, to organise in self-defence. In the Minsk region, which the Germans have already handed to the Bolsheviks, the Polish population is being massively slaughtered. The Germans are acting in conjunction not only with the Russian Bolsheviks but also with the Lithuanian Taryba, to which they are already handing over the administration in Vilnius. Only Poland, in collaboration with the local population, irrespective of national differences, can defend Byelarusia from the Bolsheviks. But this would require that the evacuation of German troops take place in exactly the opposite fashion than now, i.e., in such a way so that the Germans hold on to the eastern boundaries where they come into contact with the Bolsheviks while giving parts of western occupied areas by zones to the Poles to organise the country.

The first such zone the Germans should immediately cede to the Poles would reach from the boundaries of present day Poland to the WYSZTYNIEC–WIŻAJNY–SZTABINKI–BIERZNIKI–PORZECZE–ZABŁOCIE–WAWIÓRKA–LEBIODA–ORLE-Miasto–SZCZARA–ZELWA–PRUŻANY–KOBRYŃ–KOWEL–CHOBUŁTÓW–LITOWIEC line (inclusive of all the localities).

As to the railway line in this ceded zone, a special arrangement would have to be made between the Polish and German railways so as to give the Germans guarantees of safe passage pending the complete evacuation of Ukraine, on the following lines:

1. Hołoby–Kowel–Brest-Litovsk–Grajewo–Łyka<sup>13</sup>;
2. Białystok–Grodno–Vilnius;
3. Czeremcha–Wołkowysk–Lida–Vilnius;
4. Lida–Mołodeczno;
5. Brest-Litovsk–Liniewo;
6. Brest-Litovsk–Kobryń;

Namely, through:

- a) shared railway management (railway directions in Brest-Litovsk and in Vilnius),
- b) shared oversight of transports;
- c) mixed railway crews;
- d) mixed commissions at junction points;
- e) military protection of the rail lines by the Germans.

After the takeover of this zone and the organisation on its territory of civil and military administrations, further cessions by the Germans of areas to be discussed at a later stage should take place.

They need not only to refrain from hindering the organisation of self-defence, but to provide all manner of freedom of action to that end ...<sup>14</sup> from Warsaw and the arms that are indispensable for this. Poland guarantees their unhindered and regular transit to Germany. For the purpose of monitoring the Germans' evacuation in the above-mentioned manner, one that Marshal Foch can impose on them on the basis of the armistice conditions, it would be desirable for him to send a military mission to Vilnius to act jointly with the Polish military authorities sent from Warsaw.

In addition, also in agreement with Commandant Piłsudski, I report that fundamental concordance was reached during the discussions between Commandant Piłsudski and the National Committee in foreign policy matters. He recognises that Poland stands in the ranks of Entente states and nations. He did not object to Kessler's arrival on his own initiative in Warsaw only because, as there was no direct contact between Poland and the armies of

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<sup>13</sup> Elk (German: Lyck).

<sup>14</sup> Illegible fragment.

the Entente, he had to consider the threat represented by 400,000 German troops in Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine with a disposition toward Poland that is extremely hostile. Commandant Piłsudski is ready to enter into a state of war with Germany, place all the armies being organised in Poland under the supreme command of Marshal Foch, the Commandant in Chief of all Entente forces, and alongside the armies of other Entente states and nations. He is also ready to charge the Polish National Committee in Paris with the task of representing Poland during the negotiations between the Allies at the Peace Conference while, at the same time, the Committee reorganises itself by including representatives sent from the country. I agreed to this in the spirit of our own resolutions and the revision of the military convention concluded between the Committee and the French government appropriately to the needs of forming the army at home and not abroad.

To my observation that the resolution of all these issues requires the formation of a government uniting all Polish provinces and all important parties, Commandant Piłsudski, having first declared that he favours rapid national unity and consensus as a principle, has empowered me to negotiate with all parties to lead to the emergence of such a government, despite his personal doubts whether the mission that I took on could in the present situation succeed in reconciling parties in the Congress Kingdom. This, in his view, wouldn't preclude the possibility of forming a government unifying all the former partitions.

And lastly, I find, on the basis of my own observations that despite considerable Bolshevik agitation in Poland, the people are calmer than in neighbouring countries of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

*PDD 1918, doc. 131*

## 35

*16 December 1918, letter from the Chairman of the PNC to the PNC envoy (to Warsaw) about the formation of the coalition government and about transferring Haller's Army to Poland*

Paris, 16 December 1918

Dear Stach,

There is no need to lecture you on how important it is that you facilitate, in all possible ways, Paderewski's rapprochement and understanding with



various elements and the emergence of a coalition government. He needs to be put forward as a banner of national unity.

We are entirely aware here of the desperately difficult situation in which the country finds itself now, surrounded by dangers from all sides. A large-scale intervention by the Allies in Eastern Europe is indispensable, and I am certain it will take place soon. But they are not ready for it. The French army of d'Espèrey to the south is numerically too weak for the tasks it faces while intervention from the north will only be possible after the Allied fleet gains adequate control of the Baltic—something that is presently under way. We are now taking steps aimed at: 1) the evacuation of German troops from Lithuania and East Prussia to Germany and their replacement with Allied units; 2) the occupation by the Allies of the Danzig–Thorn rail line to ensure permanent communications with Warsaw; 3) the establishment, as far as possible, of Allied garrisons in the lands of the Prussian partition so as to ensure food supplies for Poland in the Poznań province and to make sure the Prussian partition can freely participate in the political organisation of Poland; 4) the shipping of food to Poland through Danzig; 5) the shipment of arms and ammunition in substantial quantity so that the army can be organised swiftly.

On our part, we will be ready to send our army—two full divisions and one training division. By no means will it be possible to equip a second division and to overcome the shortcomings of the first earlier. To send unprepared troops would be downright dangerous.

The moment is approaching when the Polish question will come to the fore either as that of the sole Eastern European nation that Europe can rely on, one struggling with unbelievable difficulties and on that should be helped, or as an important territory where the Poles themselves can't achieve anything. This depends on the course of events at home, on whether a serious and decidedly pro-Allied government (one that does not flirt with Germany) emerges there.

Work to this end with all your strength.

Very warm regards to you and all friends,

Yours, Roman

## 36

*17 December 1918, transcript of the Minister of External Affairs's  
press conference about foreign policy*

17 December 1918

Conference of Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Wasilewski  
with press correspondents

Minister: I wanted to offer some clarifications about the views of the Ministry of External Affairs at a moment of such consequence and I take advantage of the fact that a month has passed today since I was nominated Minister of External Affairs by Commandant Pilsudski. In assuming this task, I found myself in the fortunate position that, in such a responsible position, I could immediately make use of work to which I had been dedicated as a researcher and publicist. I immediately ran into the matter of Poland's boundaries, that of the Borderlands and all the issues that form the most important single complex for the Polish state—the issue of its boundaries. One of the first steps was to begin preparing for the Peace Conference. We should arrive at the Peace Conference at which the Polish state's boundaries will be determined with well-prepared files concerning all those areas which the Peace Conference will address. The person in charge of these tasks will be Mr. Pułaski, whose energetic action leads us to believe that they will be carried out thoroughly. All efforts in this respect which have until now been scattered and quite loosely undertaken, were concentrated at home. We concentrated the previously prepared material by individual institutions and people, in order to create the largest possible gathering of the materials needed. These files which are left for a future settlement, except those strictly economic, deal with our Borderlands, former Polish boundaries. On that account, we saw it appropriate to gather as much data, based on ethnography, history, and culture, as possible to be prepared to face claims of our neighbours from the west, south or northeast and to refute them as unjustified.

Shortly after assuming the portfolio of Minister of External Affairs, I found a situation in which the territorial extent of the ministry's competence had yet to be determined. Due to territorial fragmentation into provinces, we were uncertain if even some of the most genuinely Polish locations wouldn't come under the competence of the Ministry of External Affairs. Above all, we can now state with the greatest satisfaction that Teschen Silesia and Galicia cannot fall within the competence of the Ministry of External Affairs because Teschen Silesia in its entirety found itself strictly connected with Poland, as did Galicia. Unfortunately, areas that have suffered most—the Prussian

Partition [including] the Poznań area, Silesia, and Western Prussia—continue to fall within the competence of the Ministry of External Affairs. Of course, we will strive to redress this terrible situation as soon as possible so that all such matters can be removed from the competence of the Ministry of External Affairs and placed under that of the ministries that look after the country's internal matters.

Treating Galicia as an integral part of Poland does not remove the difficulties that do exist in the south and east. As I said, I have been dealing with this question for a long time, and in taking on the position of Minister of External Affairs, I came into contact with matters that were not only familiar to me but also well known. As I received delegations from the north-eastern Borderlands or from Orava and Spiš, I could always sincerely promise that the issues brought to me by their Polish inhabitants are of great concern to me, that I am familiar with them and can make a competent decision. The first delegation from Teschen Silesia moved me by its conviction that there were no divisions among them, that all parties act hand in hand, and that one party represents most of the population. The delegation from Teschen Silesia representing those Polish inhabitants who consider themselves an integral part of the Polish population and of areas whose fate could be contentious given the Czech claims, turned to me. I studied the question with Prof. Masaryk, who plays a fundamental role in Czech affairs and had been my professor.<sup>15</sup> I know those questions of Polish-Czech relations in the Teschen area very well. I was in Prague not long ago, during the popular congress, in order to discuss those matters.<sup>16</sup> This question has to be resolved amiably between Poland and the Czechs, between Warsaw and Prague. We will defend using all means the cause of Poland's sovereignty over the disputed district, a small area, the enormous majority of whose population is entirely Polish. The point is only to settle the fate of the westernmost edges of the Teschen area, so it is settled amiably. Territorially and historically we are so closely linked that we will need to have a common policy, we will have to cohabit.

The question of our relations with the Czech-Slovak state is linked with the question of Orava and Spiš, tiny areas inhabited by a Polish population. I personally know the affairs there and I know that this population is Polish. I presume that it will be possible for the Slovaks and the Poles to bring about a settlement that will not only secure our influence in these areas but integrate them into Poland. As the Czechs are Czechs and Slovaks, we will have to meet

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<sup>15</sup> Wasilewski had attended Prof. Masaryk's lectures at Charles University in Prague in 1895.

<sup>16</sup> This is probably a reference to Wasilewski as a member of the delegation of Polish socialists to the celebrations commemorating the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the National Theatre in Prague on 16 May 1918.

with certain pronouncements by the Czechs, but I hope it will be possible to settle it. Today, a delegation is leaving for Czechoslovakia to inform the Czechs about what is happening in Poland and gather the opinions of prominent Czechs about our future relations and prepare those issues for negotiations and agreement so that we can settle all questions that have arisen from our neighbourliness, in Teschen Silesia or in Orava and Spiš.

I attach special importance to this question and I will strive, on the one hand, to secure a guarantee for Polish interests and, on the other, bring about an agreement with the Czechs in order to ensure Poland of free and easy coexistence with the Czech nation.

At the same time, the matter of the south-western [sic!] Borderlands came to the fore. This issue became very important upon the initiative of the Ukrainians, who questioned the predominance of the Polish element in a city such as Lwów—one of the most Polish of cities. We can firmly state that the entire nation is going to defend the Polish claims, which are entirely justified ethnically. I personally held the view that we have to reach an agreement with the Ruthenians that reflects our common interests. The Polish population in the eastern Borderlands is so mixed with the Ruthenian one that a strictly ethnographic boundary was and remains out of the question. In normal conditions, the share of the Polish population will always tip the scales in our favour. The drive eastwards was held back on instructions of the Russian government. In Eastern Galicia, where the government couldn't establish sufficient control, the Polish population is in a very considerable majority. The question of Eastern Galicia and the question of Ukrainian relations have now reached a stage where it is not some diplomatic manoeuvre that will settle the issue but armed force, at least for now. Presently, Eastern Galicia finds itself in a state of war, in a state of conflict with the Ukrainians and there can be no question of a diplomatic resolution for as long as this conflict lasts. We have sent there our delegate to gather information the Ministry of External Affairs needs to take certain decisions, but for the time being it is a question of war, and it is the government circles that deal with the army which have the last say. The continued existence of the entire Polish element in Eastern Galicia is at stake.

Moving on to the question of the eastern territories that include Lithuania and Byelorussia, the vital interest of the Polish state in the settlement of these lands' future remains unchanged. We are dealing here with a more complicated matter. On the one hand, there are undoubtedly Polish lands there with a population just as undoubtedly Polish. On the other hand, we have there a population of an undecided ethnic profile that leans towards Polishness on account of politics and tradition. Furthermore, we have there a non-Polish population with potential for unrest. All these are matters require preparatory

groundwork for the final settlement of the Lithuania and Byelorussia question as part of the settlement of the eastern question. As these are very vast matters, and because the ministry is still dealing with them, it was decided that a special department would be set up at the ministry to deal with the question of Lithuania and Byelorussia. Our position is that Russia's boundaries should be removed as far to the east as possible. Of course, we will be doing everything that we have to in order to make sure that those regions which are linked with Poland ethnographically and culturally—on account of present or future economic relations or of their leanings toward Polishness—would be linked with Poland in one way or another. This would entail the complete removal of any signs giving the appearance that we could be predators wishing to impose our will through violence and deprive people of their nationality. We wish to act in the spirit of the Polish tradition of "the free with the free, the equals with the equals," so that nothing would be lost of the cultural achievements that exist there and which have great development potential.

We are in the unfortunate position that the matter of boundaries and of the Prussian Partition lies beyond the scope of the agencies shaping the internal structure of the Polish state. The matter of the Prussian Partition belongs to the Ministry of External Affairs, which has sent a delegation in an attempt to communicate with the local authorities in a semi-official manner. This delegation noted that among the Polish population, among the peasants, workers, town-dwellers, and the intelligentsia, there is strong support for unification with the rest of Poland and that the state of affairs that exists there will most probably come to an end in the near future. On our part, we will be doing everything we can so that this partition, like Galicia and the Teschen area, finds itself under the common state roof so that the entirety of Polish lands becomes subject to one idea and one state organisation.

I will now move on to foreign affairs in the strict sense of the term, because the matters of which I have just spoken have to do with the question of settling Poland's boundaries but are internal matters. Only as a result of Poland's fragmentation did they become a matter of foreign policy for so many years.

We have found ourselves severed from the rest of the world. When I took over the ministry, we had no foreign state representative here. For communication reasons, we were in a highly difficult situation and in the initial days we were unable to communicate with anyone abroad, especially with Coalition members. I must go back in time here and stress that I—and Mr. Moraczewski, the present head of the Cabinet—were among those politicians who held for quite some time a hostile view of the Central Powers, even when Mr. Moraczewski was a deputy to the former Austrian parliament and such a stance entailed some danger. As for myself, as early as 1916, when I was an official with the Provisional Council of State, where I ran the nationalities

department, I had to leave Warsaw precipitously because I was suspect to politicians of anti-Coalition circles and not looked upon well by the occupiers. In Galicia, I was one of those who, in February 1916, established relations with Coalition states—through Russia, as this was the only way to communicate with the West at the time. We sent our representatives to the West, some of whom managed to reach Paris, some only Moscow and Jassy, where they established relations with representatives of the Coalition.

In connection with hearsay disseminated in the press about the present government's supposedly wavering position with regard to the Coalition, I must state that it is entirely unfounded and contradicted by facts speaking for our previous position, when we were acting in the name of the group known as the Piłsudski camp, based on the PMO.

Even prior to Piłsudski's arrest and incarceration, it became entirely clear that the PMO's position with respect to the Central Powers was a hostile one.

The situation in which we found ourselves was that there were no representatives of foreign powers here. As the representative of Germany appeared shortly thereafter, we were forced into a situation where the only representative was that of the German state. This was highly inconvenient in both external and internal terms. We had to reckon with a great threat, however: the disintegration which disorganised the Russian army and began to creep into the [German] army, which is located in so-called Rear Areas. That army, almost half-a-million and perhaps even over one-million strong, in a state of disintegration, will be a threat when trying to break through Poland on its way back home. We have to take countermeasures to prevent what happened in Podlasie and in Międzyrzec Podlaski. We wished to take advantage of Mr. Kessler's presence to localise this problem. Through Kessler, we entered into direct negotiations with the authorities of the Ober-Ost and we conducted negotiations for quite a long time and brought them to the end ... well, not entirely to the end, but we reached the main result—localisation of the danger, and those Rear Areas no longer feel the pressure that the German army was still exerting just a couple of weeks ago. Now, we know that it is leaving Międzyrzec Podlaski and we are hoping that what we have begun in the nearest regions of Lithuania will continue further, and that the evacuation of German troops will take place in a more normal fashion. A large portion of the troops entered East Prussia, taking the northern route, and we are certain that the threat has been eliminated.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> This is a reference to armed clashes between the PMO and Ober-Ost units in the Podlasie region, where PMO units began to disarm the Germans on 10 November 1918. On 15 November, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment of Hussars of the Guard, on a pacification mission, crossed into Podlasie. On the 16<sup>th</sup>, an armed confrontation between the

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As far as what took place in the last few days, you are aware that diplomatic relations with Germany are non-existent.

I still must say a few words about the episode that was brought about by Mr. Filipowicz's letter<sup>18</sup>. Mr. Filipowicz was not a deputy minister and there are no grounds to speak of a government crisis. Mr. Filipowicz was not appointed to this position by either the previous or the present government and he was acting on his own initiative. I will draw your attention to two dates. The matter of breaking relations with Germany had already been discussed for a long time and on Friday the 13<sup>th</sup>, I obtained approval from the Chief of State to issue Kessler his papers on Sunday. This was decided on Friday the 13<sup>th</sup>, and despite Mr. Filipowicz's statement, the matter was not retracted or modified, but was settled as had been decided on Friday. I thus wanted to present this short clarification so that the press would not be misinformed, because I read in the press that the decision had been retracted or postponed. Nothing like this took place and that which had been decided on Friday was carried out on Sunday according to plan. This is more or less all I wished to tell you.

I wanted to draw your attention to yet another matter of so-called Bolshevism. The very term Bolshevism is used [in Poland] in the most varied meaning: violence and robbery which take place here and there are treated as Bolshevism, as the directives of the Soviet authorities in Russia, even though there are fundamental differences between one and the other. [In Poland] Bolshevism is used in connection with all emanations of anarchy, all this is defined using the general term Bolshevism. I would like here to stress our position with regard to the real Bolshevism, to Bolshevik Russia.

My own position coincides absolutely with that of the Polish Socialist Party. In contrast to Bolshevik Russia, that party's position is that it is not for a minority dictatorship to decide on the settlement of fundamental issues, but for a constituent assembly. The present government's stance is that a constituent assembly will be the expression of the will of the entire nation, and that the government will subject itself to the will of that body. We do not wish to impose anything, we do not wish to introduce from above any fundamental social reforms of a character affecting the bases of the social order and all those things we reserve for the constituent assembly. That is the fundamental difference between the stance held by the Soviet Government and the position of our government. The republic of the Soviets is based on a different assumption. The present rulers of Russia have dispersed the

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hussars and a PMO unit took place in Międzyrzec Podlaski and led to the death of 22 PMO fighters and several dozen of the town's inhabitants.

<sup>18</sup> This refers to a letter sent to the editors of *Kurier Poranny* on 17 December 1918 by Tytus Filipowicz, who explained the circumstances of his dismissal, criticising Minister Wasilewski.

constituent assembly and have replaced it with a dictatorship of a minority that imposes its views on society. In view of these differing views, our own position with regard to Russia as a state becomes clear. In this context, I must state that given that a couple of days after I took over the portfolio of foreign affairs, news reached us of this violence inflicted on the Polish representation that the government had established in Russia, we cannot establish relations with Russia until this violence is undone, until the rights of a Polish citizen are fully reinstated. Pending this, we have asked the Danish representation to take over the supervision of Polish citizens there.

This is all I wanted to tell you.

If you wish to ask me questions, I will be able to answer, but I will have to refuse to answer questions regarding those issues that I consider unresolved as of yet.

Mr. Hłasko: What have you done in relation to the Coalition? There is, in fact, not the slightest sign of any efforts to establish relations with the Coalition. We have not seen any steps in this direction since the formation of Mr. Moraczewski's government and we know only that the Coalition has good relations with the National Committee while it would seem the government has nothing in common with that National Committee.

Mr. Wasilewski: Above all, I must say that Kessler's arrival was entirely unexpected.

One of the journalists: Also to Mr. Piłsudski?

Mr. Wasilewski: Yes. After Beseler's departure<sup>19</sup>, it seemed that the Germans would break relations altogether, and when Kessler arrived a couple of days later, it was entirely unexpected.

One of the journalists: The Ministry of External Affairs sent out a communiqué to the press that Count Kessler had gained agreement. Agreement is issued prior to arrival in the receiving country.<sup>20</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>21</sup> had sent a communiqué to all dailies that Mr. Kessler had obtained agreement from the Polish government. You have perhaps forgotten,

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<sup>19</sup> Beseler left Warsaw on 12 November 1918.

<sup>20</sup> The foreign ministry's press department stated on 23 November 1918 that: "In connection with the imprecise information which has appeared in the Warsaw press after the arrival in Warsaw of the German delegation, it is stated that the Polish government has extended its agrément to the German delegation, and that this delegation is composed of 7 higher officials and staff of lower rank. There are no officials of the former occupation authorities among the members of the delegation." *Monitor Polski*, No. 211, 23 XI 1918.

<sup>21</sup> It was, in fact, the "Ministry of External Affairs"; the name "Ministry of Foreign Affairs" was introduced on 27 January 1919.



but in any case, this is a very important thing as it is a contradiction between the communiqué and what you have now stated. I presume that the press communiqué was a way to calm down the public, which realised that this arrival had been imposed on the nation.

Mr. Wasilewski: Let me repeat once again that the arrival was a complete surprise. I do not recall such a communiqué. Perhaps a diplomatic informality took place, but prior to the arrival of Mr. Kessler, nothing was known either of his arrival or about him.

I will now move to the second question raised by Mr. Hłasko. I will not speak of matters which are still in progress and which have not been finally settled. From the outset, we have sought to establish relations with the Coalition and very recently we have found out that the first delegate whom we had sent was held back in Switzerland on account of the closed Swiss boundary, and has presently arrived in Paris. We had news that he achieved certain results that we expected. Mr. Sokolnicki, a delegate to Coalition states, arrived through Jassy and Lwow, and brought information that these relations had been established and that their development now only needs to be continued. This matter is still not finalised and we are in the process of establishing these relations.

As far as the Paris Committee is concerned, as you know, a representative of the Committee, Mr. Grabski is here, who has conducted the negotiations with the representative of the state and who communicates with the Moraczewski government. I am certain that this question will be resolved in the coming days. Of course, I can't say with what outcome, but this matter will be settled and, therefore, I still can't talk about it. I am personally convinced that an understanding with the Paris Committee must be reached. We recognise the work of the Committee, especially in the military field, and we consider it to be a very serious achievement. I am convinced an understanding will be reached. On what terms and in what form, I can't yet say.

Journalist (to Mr. Wasilewski): Did Kessler's arrival postpone the issue of the Poznań Province?

Mr. Wasilewski: This boundary existed before Kessler's departure [for Warsaw] and it existed in even greater measure after his departure, but this can't be ascribed to the Polish government. We know from the declaration of a representative of Poznań Province that the public does not wish to push ahead by violent means and will await the resolution of the Prussian Partition question through the settlement of international relations, that it is behaving entirely loyally toward the German state and that local communities have delegated their representatives to the local German authorities. The public itself recognises the adherence of Poznań Province to the German state pending the resolution of this issue by the international Peace Conference. Unfortunately, events there have unfolded in such a manner that there wasn't either any disarmament of

the Germans or their forceful eviction. Of course, there are reasons for this but while in Galicia and in the Congress Kingdom we managed to attain the position of a free state, this proved impossible to carry though in Poznań Province. This boundary existed prior to Kessler's arrival as it does presently.

Mr. Hłasko: You stated that you have been a member of the PPS for 25 years. Do you consider the party's resolutions as binding?

Mr. Wasilewski: Yes, of course.

Mr. Hłasko: In that case you can't conduct a pro-Coalition policy.

Journalist: Can the daily *Robotnik* be considered semi-official?

Mr. Wasilewski: Absolutely not. Since the government also includes PPS members, then *Robotnik* can express the views of those government members, but it is not an organ of the government. *Robotnik* doesn't have to print government communiqués.

Journalist: If, from a semi-official publication, I learn something entirely different from what you say, this is misleading of public opinion.

Mr. Wasilewski: The PPS party has its factions—the right, the left, the centre—and individual party members can have a critical view of the government's position, or be hostile to it as a matter of principle.

Mr. Hłasko asks about the red banner on the castle.<sup>22</sup>

— As a member of the *Robotnik* editorial board, I must point out that no member of the government has anything to say about *Robotnik's* editorial line. The government has nothing to do with matters having to do with *Robotnik*. We have no intention of wearing the badge of a semi-official paper.

— The minister, as the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is seeking to establish relations with the Coalition. You can't state at what stage this matter is because it is unfinished; in any case, is the desire of the entire government to establish the friendliest of relations with the Coalition?

Mr. Wasilewski: Unconditionally.

[Mr. Wasilewski:] That you think by establishing the friendliest of relations with the Coalition you will derive the greatest benefits for Poland.

Mr. Szczepanik asks if a declaration is expected.

Mr. Wasilewski: After the matters that are in progress are settled, such a declaration will be indispensable.

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<sup>22</sup> Following the PPS demonstration against the Regency Council on 13 November 1918, a red banner was hoisted above Warsaw's Royal Castle. It was taken down by the military authorities on 14 December 1918.

Mr. Hłasko asks if the Borderlands commission will be admitted to the Peace Conference.

Mr. Wasilewski: This is a purely scholarly commission that will provide scholarly materials to the Polish delegation, irrespective of what delegation it is. Its materials will be so valuable that even if it is hostile to the present government, this government will make use of those materials. The question of Orava and Spiš, or the settlement, were prepared by experts who are familiar with the subject.

Mr. Nowicki: Would you not agree that, given that the Sejm has not been convened and given the lack of contact between the public and the present government, it would be a good thing if conferences like this one on matters subject to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were held more frequently? I must say that your arguments were instructive, that I found out about much and that I more or less gained material that will serve me in the future as an indication in what I write. It seems to me that it would be indicated, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government, the press, and, therefore, for the public, if you organised this type of conference as often as possible and if you gave us more information from the area of foreign affairs. If the Central Powers follow a different method and keep foreign policy matters under cover, this is due to those states' construction, to the fact that they are monarchies in which it is thought that only the monarch can pronounce himself on foreign affairs. We are a People's Republic, you are mandated by us, and we have the right to know what you are doing. For us, in order to shape public opinion, it would be indicated for you to instruct your departments to provide as much information to the press as possible, and so that such meetings would be organised at least 2-3 times a month. You said that the absence of an understanding has led to the press having erroneous information about matters. This is due to the fact that we did not know what you were doing while you, in the pattern of the former governments, kept everything hidden. The time for cabinet politics has passed, Mr. Minister, and it would be desirable for such conferences to take place as often as possible.

Mr. Wasilewski: I eagerly agree with this proposition, but I must say that my entire activity is very recent and there was very little such material. I didn't want to appear after just a couple of days to make some unfounded promises, but for the future I will of course share that which I have in my hand. You rightly said that the times of old diplomacy are gone, but not entirely. We have the seeds of new forms with remnants of the old. Gradually, a balance will be reached. I presume that after the Peace Conference, things will fall into place in such a way that the old ways in diplomacy will be gone. Involved as we still are in old ways, we must make use of the rest of such methods.

Dr. Winiarski (editor of *Dziennik Powszechny*): If I remember your words correctly, the Polish government broke relations with Russia as a result of the brutal violence inflicted on the Polish legation. I will take the liberty of drawing the logical consequence from those words, that [if] by chance the Soviet authorities recognised their fault and repaired their error, by the same the Polish government would not ...<sup>23</sup> causes to maintain existing relations?

Mr. Wasilewski: Presently those relations are broken. Whether they will be restored and in what manner will depend on the Soviet authorities. We are expecting redress and it is taking a long time. We have not obtained redress and, in any case, the course of events in Russia gives no cause for such.

Mr. Ehrenberg: You do not take into account a possible Bolshevik march on Poland?

Mr. Wasilewski: These are matters that our Department for Lithuanian and Byelorussian Affairs is following very closely. You can see that all manner of bodies are dealing with those questions. The Ministry of War has taken appropriate measures; then the government took steps in the financial sphere to preclude the further spread of Bolshevism.

*PDD 1918, doc. 137*

### 37

*18 December 1918, telegram from the Interim Chief of State  
to the King of Great Britain about the establishment  
of diplomatic relations and military cooperation*

le 18 décembre 1918

A Sa Majesté  
GEORGES V  
Roi de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande  
Empereur des Indes etc.

Sire!

Ayant assumé le charge d'organiser le gouvernement et l'armée polonaise au moment où les brillantes victoires des Alliés ont déterminé le triomphe

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<sup>23</sup> Illegible fragment.

définitif de l'Idéal de Justice et de Droit, je me permets d'exprimer la ferme conviction que mon vif désir de nouer des relations diplomatiques entre l'Empire Britannique et la Pologne reconstituée dans son indépendance et sa souveraineté, sera accueilli de la part de Votre Majesté avec bienveillance et sympathie.

Le Gouvernement Britannique a témoigné maintes fois dans le passé, et spécialement au cours de cette guerre, un très vif intérêt à la cause de la Pologne, et prêté plus d'une fois son précieux concours diplomatique à nos revendications nationales. Les brillantes victoires des Armées de Votre Majesté ont largement contribué à l'affranchissement et à l'unification de notre patrie.

Il me tient, pas conséquent, tout spécialement à cœur de consacrer d'une façon plus étroite la confraternité d'armes, établie entre la jeune Armée polonaise et la glorieuse Armée britannique, et de rendre toujours plus intimes les liens d'amitié qui rattachent la République Polonaise au puissant Empire Britannique.

Moi et ma nation, nous prions Dieu qu'il vous ait, Sire, en sa sainte et digne garde.

*PDD 1918, doc. 141*

## 38

*19 December 1918, unsigned instruction for the Warsaw delegation*

Warsaw, 18-19 December 1918

### Instructions<sup>24</sup>

#### I. History of relations with the Coalition.

1. The National Committee. Relations with the Entente were maintained in the past by the National Committee in Paris. The Committee is made up of 13 members and is headed by Mr. Dmowski, its chairman. Mr. Erazm Piltz has the greatest influence in France and Mr. Paderewski in America. Mr. Wielowieyski is secretary for military affairs; Mr. Maurycy Zamoyski was

<sup>24</sup> Historians universally attribute the authorship of this document to the Interim Chief of State. However, the form and contents of the instructions raise doubts. It is probably a synthesis of resolutions agreed upon during foreign policy meetings attended by both Pilsudski and Wasilewski.

acting chairman for a time; while Mr. Grabski was sent to Warsaw. The National Committee is recognised as the representative of Poland at the Entente and by this virtue it issues diplomatic passports to Poles. In this character, it concluded a military convention, but only with France. France finances and technically equips the army, whose commander is appointed by the National Committee and then approved by the French government. The army is recognised as an *armée belligérante alliée*, its staff is French, and the appointment of its officers takes place in such a manner that France provides an officers list, from which the National Committee chooses. The Command is Polish, the instructors are French, officers are appointed by the Commandant, from a certain rank up, with approval from the National Committee. In practice, divisional commanders are French, among the officers there are many French and Franco-Poles. The army is somewhat mixed in character. The National Committee chose from its members a military commission; there is a mission franco-polonaise for technical matters and for communications between the army and the Ministry of War. Mr. Wielowieyski is the secretary of this mission and, at the same time, the chairman of the national Committee's military commission. Representatives include Mr. Modzelewski in Switzerland, Mr. Sobański in London and Mr. Skirmunt in Rome. The National Committee is dependent financially on France, which pays it permanent monthly subsidies through the intermediary of the Ministry of War.

Observations: The National Committee's greatest protector is France. In England and America, the National Committee is not popular on account of the influence of Jews there. The National Committee's most influential individuals are Messrs Dmowski and Piltz. The mention by Mr. Legrand from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that France would find it desirable if Mr. Piltz became a candidate for Minister of External Affairs or, failing which, ambassador in Paris is worthy of note. This position is already filled by Mr. Piltz, perhaps not only with regard to France. The weak aspects of the National Committee are its unilateral dependence on the French Ministry of War and the fact that, the same as our Supreme National Committee<sup>25</sup> always claimed, that the entire country is under his influence and that as soon as the country becomes free, power will be in their hands.

2. PMO affairs: Since April 1918 indirectly, and since the beginning of June directly, the Polish Military Organisation established relations with the Entente and maintained them mostly with France, at first in Moscow (Mission

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<sup>25</sup> The Supreme National Committee (SNC) was a Polish pro-Austrian political organisation established in August 1914 in Cracow by Galician politicians. It is on this committee's initiative that the process leading to the formation of the Polish Legions was begun. In 1917, after the establishment of the Regency Council, the SNC decided to dissolve itself, a process that lasted until 1920.

militaire française, General Lavergne), then in Jassy (French legation in Romania). The basis for these relations was the desire to bring about an armed uprising in the German rear, and especially a revolution in Austria, and the request for aid to the movement being prepared. The result of this initiative by the PMO was the rise of a competitor to the National Committee in relations that had been monopolised by the latter until then. The difficulty in those negotiations was the establishment of in whose name one was to address foreigners. This difficulty was resolved by choosing the name of Piłsudski and this proved reliable in negotiations.

## II. General principles.

1. There should be no room for any personal or partisan considerations while working as a diplomatic representative. All political passions brought about by Poland's internal matters should be kept on a tight rein, the heart ordered to be silent even when disgust arises, interests pursued solely as interests and nothing else.

2. Piłsudski's return, the change of government in Poland, the settlement of new relations—all this took place too fast for Piłsudski to obtain sufficient information and discernment in the state of affairs. As a result, he placed too much weight on internal matters, too little on external ones, and a few mistakes were made, like the telegrams to certain governments and to Foch.

3. The mission represents Piłsudski, and not the Warsaw government, Piłsudski as the chief of the army and the representative of the state now being formed. The mission represents the government by other means and in the appropriate circumstances, but formally represents Piłsudski and the army.

4. At the Entente there are various different complementary or mutually neutralising forces. Military force is represented above all by France, which organised English and American troops and the Chief Command of the Coalition. Yet it was England which, through the participation of its troops in the last battle, tilted the balance while America exerted enormous influence through its supplies of technology, materials, and reserves. In England and America, the influence of Jews can be strongly felt. The general mood within the Entente is above all anti-Bolshevik. In other matters, possible frictions should be kept in mind.

## III. Polish affairs.

1. Piłsudski's role in forming a socialist cabinet: The difficulties in establishing the Polish state can be reduced to a number of questions: What is presently the Polish constitution? Is there a dictator or not? What is the legal role of the highest authorities? The only way out of those difficulties was to recognise the ex-lex state as a certain provisional necessity. For a hundred years, all we had was foreign, presently the foreign forms of statehood are

in ruins, and we cannot in their stead use solutions used in the past. Various forms of government suited to local conditions thus emerged. They required that central authorities be established, as a result of which Piłsudski, reserving the command of the army, formed a government answerable only to himself. Wishing to emerge from such an indecisive and unnatural situation, in creating the government he made it conditional: A Constituent Assembly that would later create the legal bases for the country, give Poland its first legal acts, and find a legal way to address internal political issues. In connection with this, it was decided that the army would swear an oath. The command swore an oath to the effect that the constitutional oath would be taken in the future by institutions that the Constituent Assembly would ultimately create; as a result, the army is not legally subordinated to the government. When Piłsudski formed the cabinet, he renounced any part or influence in civil matters. From the outset, Piłsudski sought to form a cabinet representing all the provinces and the main political currents. This aim was not successful for several reasons: Given the lack of political life, in the Congress Kingdom there is total fragmentation with various parties' claiming to represent the nation. The parties themselves represent little and carry on the greatest disputes among themselves. This situation can only be remedied by a Sejm that can provide a sense of direction and enable the formation of a majority. After the partitions, Polish provinces evolved their distinct life and their distinct political language. In such circumstances, the time allowed for reaching an understanding must be longer. Yet, in the situation in which Poland found itself in November, time didn't wait and it was necessary to take power and to form a government. In this respect, the Congress Kingdom was in a different situation from that of Poznań Province or Galicia, whose conditions were more or less fixed and lawful, and required that a government be formed immediately. This task was taken up by the radical segment of society and when the cabinet was being formed, it was necessary to take into account the radical majority. The latter knows how to take on responsibility and are not afraid while others exhibit disastrous fearfulness. All hesitation in this respect would have been costly, because Poland finds itself between two states that continue to exert on it their influence from the past and both find themselves in a state of anarchy and disintegration threatening to spill over to Poland. Such was the basis for the attempted experiment: To inoculate a mild disease to avoid a greater one. *Similia similibus curantur.*

2. Reasons for delays in relations with the Entente. In answer to the question why relations with the Entente were not established immediately, it should be said that Piłsudski did not wish to come forward as a competitor to the National Committee. He considered that the duty of Poles was to first come to an understanding with each other internally and only then to make a unified stand externally. Furthermore, there is a need to explain the necessity



for the foreign delegation to rest upon unified notions recognised everywhere. In all of Poland, such notions already include elections to the Sejm, and the army. In contrast, the government still is neither unified nor recognised everywhere. In the matter of the dispatch to Marshal Foch [and] Wilson, the dispatches were erroneous. Above all, there is no such thing as Polish-American troops, only American troops among which are soldiers who are Poles and Polish-French troops. The offensive aspect was to send the dispatch directly to the General, and also the demand that Polish troops be withdrawn from France. The timing was wrong because the war was formally still underway and it, along with the reservations about our independence, was understood as a rejection of Entente forces—an offensive act. In defence of those errors, one should also point out that as he arrived in Poland, Piłsudski commanded only 4,000 troops. In the highly dangerous situation in which Poland then found itself, there was simply a lack of military power, so to bring troops to Poland as quickly as possible, Foch, as the Commander-in-Chief of all Coalition forces, was contacted directly. The reservations about the arrival of Entente troops were not an expression of opposition. The sole point was to ensure that Entente forces that would find themselves in Poland would arrive based on normalised relations—so that the Entente did not come to command militarily in Poland—with all its intrinsic difficulties and dangers in connection with internal public opinion. All suspicions in this matter should be countered with other facts about the sentiment of Poles toward the Entente, about Piłsudski and his personal attitude, particularly toward France, characterised by two traits: French military tradition, with which he became imbued, especially the Napoleonic era through his military studies, and his sincere democratic convictions.

#### IV. The attitude about the National Committee.

1. The Warsaw negotiations (with Mr. Stanisław Grabski): The result of the meetings between Piłsudski and the representative of the National Committee was the dispatch of Mr. Grabski to Paris, drawn up together with Piłsudski, and the temporary agreement concluded in the matter of the government and in the matter of the delegation being sent in Piłsudski's name to the Entente states.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> The Warsaw Delegation (a delegation of the Interim Chief of State to the Entente states and the PNC) departed for Paris on 24 December 1918. Its task was to achieve a compromise with the PNC and to form a common representation to the Peace Conference. Its initial members included Kazimierz Dłuski (as chairman), Antoni Sujkowski and Bolesław Długoszowski-Wieniawa, while the function of secretary was entrusted to Michał Sokolnicki. During the weeks that followed, the Warsaw Delegation grew with the inclusion of additional collaborators and delegates arriving from Poland.

The jointly written dispatch contains, a) a statement about the concordance of views concerning general matters and Poland's future, especially with regard to Poland's boundaries; b) a request to the Entente for intervention with the relevant German authorities and assistance against the Bolshevik onslaught to save Lithuania from anarchy; c) the ascertainment of a state of peace and order in Poland. This dispatch was sent on 16 December using a radio in the possession of the Polish authorities and the Eiffel Tower cipher made available to Mr. Grabski.<sup>27</sup>

Piłsudski's agreement with the representative of the National Committee contains: a) the promise of a change of government, during the period prior to the troops' landing in Danzig, to a government made up of a governing council, representatives of various parties and provinces and a ministry of experts; b) bilateral commitment to mutual moderation, patience and avoidance of sharp internal attacks during the period of transition and struggle against Bolshevism; c) "sending of a delegation abroad by Piłsudski to conduct negotiations with the Paris Committee and, together with it, with the Entente." Mr. Grabski sent an encrypted dispatch about the departure of the delegates and gave a letter to the delegation to facilitate its understanding with the National Committee.

The delegation sent by Piłsudski has been instructed to do everything possible to come to an agreement as quickly as possible with the National Committee. The point of departure for the agreement with the Committee is to be the dispatch. Should the National Committee recognise Piłsudski as Chief of State and not insist on the removal of the government in Warsaw, the delegation will not insist on any major or fundamental changes in the structure, makeup, and presidium of the National Committee in Paris. It will be desirable, however, to overhaul the Committee by adding to it a number of representatives from the country, forming an institution that is by nature a state representation, while sacrificing its present all-national form. If the National Committee equates the question of the representation of Poland externally with the matter of the government's reconstruction, the delegation can, in the name of Commandant Piłsudski, adopt the condition of the government's reconstruction, with the reservation, however, that the timing of that reconstruction be left to Piłsudski's discretion. The choice of timing has to be left to Piłsudski because in the struggle he is waging against the disintegration of the state, he is supported by the country's left, and that in order to avoid anarchy in the country, in the future he must incline the left toward national imperialism. The last concession to the National Committee can be the formation of a cabinet of experts. If the National Committee wishes for changes to take place quickly, it should contribute to the sending

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<sup>27</sup> See document No. 34.

as soon as possible of news that food is being shipped to Poland and that the Entente has agreed to extend a loan to Poland. A telegram bringing this news could contribute to accelerating the change of the cabinet. At the same time, the overhaul of the Committee into a Polish state representation has to be accompanied by a cessation of financing of the Committee by the French government, with the understanding that past subsidies would be taken over as debt by the Polish state.

#### V. Relations with the Coalition.

1. The task of the delegation sent with the aim of coming to an understanding with the National Committee is to conduct, along with it, negotiations with Entente states. The task of the delegation, therefore, will be to manoeuvre delicately so as to allow it to initiate direct talks with the Entente without delay. The delegation is above all to embark on an informative mission and to correctly represent Poland with regard to the powers of the Coalition. It is not a government delegation, and should it proceed to the notification stage, alone or in conjunction with the National Committee, it will not be notifying the Polish government and not the state's lawful political system, but the authority of Commandant Piłsudski.

2. Military matters. The delegation will present all the difficulties that shaping the Polish army entails: a) the variety of military formations and the difficulty in unifying and regulating the whole; b) the diversity of armaments due to the weapons obtained from all the armies of the partitioning states; c) insurmountable difficulties with outfitting an army of 100,000 men given the lack of resources and materials in the country, etc. d) the bad state of transport, especially rolling stock of which the country was stripped (the figures given to the Entente by Hindenburg concerning railway cars and engines left behind by the Germans most certainly include those cars and engines that were abandoned on the territory of the Ober-Ost). In such conditions, aid from the Coalition army is highly desirable, above all as far as it concerns complements in materials and rolling stock, then in the area of army organisation. In this last area, the aid can be limited to the sending of high-ranking officers by the Entente, a) as military administration officers; b) higher officers for the purpose of training officers; Poland has great numbers of officers, for the time being even in excess, but needs schools for officers, whose education leaves much to be desired.

The delegation will express its readiness to conclude a military Convention, but discussions about this Convention should rather be conducted with France and this Convention has to be different from the Convention that France

concluded with the National Committee.<sup>28</sup> The Convention concluded with the National Committee was concluded in émigré conditions, it is presently completely exotic, its provisions collapse with the cessation of the war, and a new Convention has to be concluded with the country, not émigré circles. A fundamental change must take place toward the country's administrative independence in military matters, demands that high-ranking officers, such as the chief of staff be French, is inadmissible, because each such officer would first have to become a Polish citizen to fill his function. The Polish army also doesn't need any foreign instructors as there is already an excess of Polish officers and they only lack higher specialised training. What would be desirable is a military mission, possibly a French one, to help in the organisation of administration and in training the Polish army, but one that would not be serving in the Polish forces. The consultations about the Convention have to result in sending a dispatch stating what the delegation managed to obtain in this question and if the time has come to send a significant military delegation concerning the Convention.

3. Supply issues: The delegation will define quick provisioning aid as the only salvation against internal social disintegration, and the very news about this aid will lead to the appearance of hidden stocks.

4. An external loan in the amount of 2 billion francs should become the basis for the introduction of the franc currency in Poland, and only this loan will allow Poland to establish external trade on a rational footing, above all through the removal of depreciated foreign currencies from our country.

5. Industrial matters.

VI. Poland's foreign relations.

1. Lithuania and the Eastern Borderlands: in all matters regarding the Eastern Borderlands from Eastern Galicia to Lithuania and in all that has to do with Russia, one should be united in presenting the direction set out by the National Democrats. One should strive to explain to the Entente governments that Russia, having undergone a long-lasting and serious internal illness, will for a long time remain weak and have a demoralising influence on its neighbours. It is thus in the interest of the West and organised life of the state and society in the east of Europe, above all, to rebuild Poland, which could arise earlier and become capable of normal existence.

2. The Ruthenian and Lithuanian questions. One should not be excessively against Ukraine, one should rather speak in favour of an independent form of

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<sup>28</sup> This refers to the Convention of 28 September 1918, concluded by the PNC with the French government and concerning the activities of the Polish Army in France (Haller's Army).

Ukrainian statehood and to take a stance of friendly neutrality with respect to this newly emerged state organisation. The Lithuanians, in contrast, should be supported, their distinctiveness should be recognised everywhere, and the necessity of union with Lithuania stressed. The Lithuanians should be left to choose the form of their future state and of its internal relations, but the benefits to be gained by Lithuania from inclusion in the Polish complex should be explained, and the question of Lithuanian nationality and statehood should not be linked with the matter of Polish-Byelorussian lands and with Vilnius as a Polish city.

3. The Jewish question, pogroms. Indeed, it is true that the Poles' relations with the Jews are bad. This is due above all from the fact that the Jews always supported our enemies, the best proof of which is Poznań Province, where the Jews sided with the German side for no reason and without any persecution at Polish hands. News of pogroms are greatly exaggerated, and are caused by the Bolshevism of the Jews primarily, and then by usury and profiteering from food supplies. The Lwow pogrom was caused by the freeing of criminals from jail by the Ruthenians, and also by the fact that Jewish soldiers and militia fought alongside the Ruthenians against the Poles. The relationship between Poland and the Jews is illustrated by the fact that Poland promulgated, as the first step taken in its emerging statehood, an electoral law and other local government acts that didn't provide for a single denominational limitation, and that this fact was accepted without opposition by all of public opinion irrespective of political affiliation. The army's attitude toward the Jews is indicated by the stern measures, arrests, and other such, carried out in Lwow and the uncompromising orders given by the chief command for the purpose of preventing further pogroms.

4. Teschen (relations with the Czechs). It should be declared to the Entente states, that we do not wish to, nor will we, wage war against the Czechs, but on the other hand, the Entente should be asked to weight this matter seriously and conscientiously and to issue a decision that would further a just settlement of relations between the Poles and the Czechs. As far as Poland is concerned, it wishes to have friendly relations with the Czech state, as is indicated by the temporary understanding with the Czechs in the matter of Silesia and the sending to Prague of a delegation simultaneously with the one to Paris, as the first Polish delegations.

*PDD 1918, doc. 145*

## 39

*19 December 1918, report of the government representative in Bern  
to the Ministry of External Affairs  
about the relations between coalition powers*

Bern, 19 December 1918

To the Ministry of External Affairs in Warsaw

Report No 52

Clemenceau and Wilson

France's official policy has reached an imperialist stage and, in so doing, stands in contradiction with Wilson's 14-point programme. The French peace aims are indicative of a certain blindness, which is understandable after the victory. Extreme demands have been raised, like the necessity of territorial guarantees in Germany to ensure France's possession of Alsace and Lorraine. Furthermore, the French peace programme allows for the partition of Germany, demands for unusually high war reparations and an economic boycott.

Similarly, English policy also mostly takes into account the benefits to be derived from victory over Germany. The first of the English conditions is the matter of the German fleet, which England would wish to take over, in whole or in part. The preservation of England's monopoly on the seas, with the simultaneous disarmament of all land armies, a protectorate in the German colonies, ensuring for itself extensive influence in southern Russia and in the Near and Middle East—such are the further points of Great Britain's program.

Just as the French ones, they stand in contradiction with Wilson's humanitarian and pacifist programme.

Hence, the community of interests finding its manifestation in the secret French-English covenant, whose very existence seems strange in light of Wilson's condition precluding separate alliances in the future. The French-English imperialistic covenant, concluded not without some tensions on the eve of Wilson's arrival with the clear intent of placing in front of him fait accompli, and at the price of some concessions by both sides. England is ready to support France in the matter of war reparations, the partition of Germany, and economic reconstruction, but obtains France's acquiescence for its fleet, maritime and economic plans.

This led to the struggle for the future peace in Europe between Clemenceau's imperialist tendency and Wilson's humanitarian one. Wilson, however, is meeting with problems not only in Europe but above all in America,

where the Republican Party has won an outright majority. While in Europe he enjoys the gratitude of the French and the English, in governing councils his position is weakening, given that the real aid of the United States is becoming less needed, and in this way Wilson's main argument, one speaking to the general interest, became immaterial.

Wilson's partisans in Europe are the socialist parties. The English Labour Party, the French majoritaires and minoritaires have come out entirely in favour of his programme. Wilson thus depends on the European opposition and his success, therefore, depends in large measure on the outcome of the struggle the socialists have launched against governments in all European countries. In France, the socialists have openly pronounced themselves in favour of Wilson and against Clemenceau. The Confédération générale du travail handed a memorial to the President reminding him of its principles. Socialist parties have expressed confidence in him. It is characteristic that Clemenceau spoke very energetically against French idealists' manifestations of support for Wilson. A workers' demonstration during Wilson's reception in Paris was prohibited.<sup>29</sup> A march by war invalids shouting "Vive la république allemande" was dispersed. What's even more characteristic is that Wilson, whose first toast in Paris could have been seen as surrendering to the power of imperialist concepts, took the side of the demonstrators, and expressed loyalty to his ideals to socialist deputy Renaudel.

*PDD 1918, doc. 148*

## 40

### *21 December 1918, letter from the Interim Chief of State to the Chairman of the PNC in Paris*

Przemyśl, 21 December 1918

Dear Mr. Dmowski,

As I send a delegation to Paris to come to an understanding with the Paris Committee and then to find in common an understanding with the Entente, I am asking you for all possible facilitations during the negotiations. Please believe me that I would most of all wish to avoid dual representation of Poland before the Entente and I am striving for unified representation of Poland's

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<sup>29</sup> Wilson arrived in Paris on 14 December 1918.

interests, as only then will they be appropriately taken into account. These aims are the explanation for why I have waited so long with this issue.

On the basis of our long-standing acquaintance, I feel that in this instance and at this important moment at least some people, if not the entire country, have to rise above the interests of parties, cliques, and groups, and I would wish to count you among them.

Please accept assurances of my deep respect, with which I remain,

J. Piłsudski

*PDD 1918, doc. 154*

## 41

*24 December 1918, dispatch of the Minister of External Affairs  
to the Prime Minister of France against the passage of German  
troops through Polish territory*

A Son Excellence  
Monsieur Georges Clemenceau  
Président du Conseil  
Ministre de la guerre  
Paris

Radiotélégramme.

Le Gouvernement Polonais fut avisé le 22 Décembre radiotélégraphiquement par le Gouvernement Allemand que le parti républicain Ukrainien ayant refusé de ratifier le traité conclu par le Directoire Ukrainien avec les autorités allemandes la ligne de retraite Rowno Holoby a été barrée aux troupes allemandes. Stop.

Ces troupes allemandes que leurs officiers n'ont plus en main marchent à l'état désorganisé vers la Pologne pour tenter de se frayer un passage en Allemagne. Stop.

Le Gouvernement Allemand invite le Gouvernement Polonais à autoriser et seconder immédiatement le passage des troupes allemandes à travers la Pologne en menaçant qu'au cas contraire des centaines de mille soldats allemands se frayeront un passage par la force. Stop.



Le Gouvernement Polonais a adressé une protestation énergique au Gouvernement allemand contre cette nouvelle violation du droit international, en lui communiquant qu'il s'opposera d'une façon catégorique au passage des troupes allemandes armées à travers la Pologne. Stop. Le Gouvernement Polonais ne subira le passage des troupes allemandes qu'à la condition expresse que les susdites troupes soient préalablement désarmées par les autorités militaires polonaises. Stop.

En portant les faits précités à la connaissance des Gouvernements des Pays Alliés nous prions Votre Excellence de vouloir bien prêter un appui efficace à notre action en vue d'empêcher le passage des troupes allemandes armées à travers le territoire de la Pologne. Stop.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

*PDD 1918, doc. 167*

## 42

*25 December 1918, letter from the special envoy  
of the Interim Chief of State to Prague: Relations with Czechoslovakia  
and the situation at the Peace Conference*

Prague, 25 December 1918

Dear Commandant,

In keeping with the instructions I received, I did everything that could be done to mitigate our dispute with the Czechs. Yesterday, I received assurances from President Masaryk about his wishes for a peaceful and friendly settlement of relations with us. For the time being then, the danger of conflict was staved off. At this time, however, I still can't say if he will be able to settle favourably the question of mutual diplomatic representation and the Polish-Czech mixed commission for the settlement of current matters, and to prepare the ground for the future permanent agreement.

Dr. Kramař is one of the principal obstacles. I know about this, but I am trying to maintain friendly relations with him for the sake of good cooperation. Kramař listens to Locher, the Czech consul in Cracow, who can't stand the fact that he wasn't received officially at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw,<sup>30</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Locher met with Wasilewski in Warsaw in November 1918, but since Locher refused to recognise the Moraczewski government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs quickly ended the discussion.

even though he wasn't duly empowered. Locher is trying to convince everyone here that the present Polish authorities are not competent enough to pursue foreign policy. Locher claims that Prof. Stanisław Grabski supposedly told him that it isn't worthwhile to negotiate with the present authorities, because they could fall in the near future, and Poland would not honour any accords made with them. It seems to be such a monstrous calumny, that I feel it should immediately be brought to the attention of Prof. Grabski who, I hope, would not fail to deny such claims unequivocally. Our relations are deplorable indeed if they allow foreigners to play such games.

The present moment calls for the absolute unification of our policy. The authorities and all political actors should keep this in mind. Otherwise, work in this area cannot be effective. These situations, which one has to suffer to secure even the most obvious national interest, like the one for which you have sent me, are downright humiliating. They continually point out and wish to exploit our discord. The Czechs continually refer to the fact that these or other Polish political groups have undertaken certain obligations by which Poland is not abiding. Kramář alleges the failure to keep the agreement supposedly concluded by Count Skarbek and Mr. Głębiński.<sup>31</sup> President Masaryk has doubts if he can enter into relations with the present Polish authorities with respect to the obligations undertaken by himself, on the one hand, and by Mr. Paderewski and Mr. Dmowski<sup>32</sup> on the other. He pronounces such doubts during a conversation, which, besides this, he is trying to maintain in a tone that is not only kind and friendly, but factual at the same time. To all this we can answer only that these are current matters that can suffer no delay and must be dealt with by authorities of a *gouvernement de fait* character, as only this argument is convincing.

Besides this, another matter hampers our actions immensely: the lack of any plan. Generally, we do not have a basic political plan but we only have in erudo aspirations that are more or less wide. I think that even the Paris Committee does not have any plan, so it must have reached a number of

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<sup>31</sup> This refers to a verbal agreement reached in Paris on 16 May 1918. The Polish side was represented then by Głębiński, Skarbek, and Kasproicz, and the Czechs by Kramář, among other people. It was agreed that Teschen Silesia would be divided along ethnographic lines by a commission represented by five members of each party. In November 1918, through the intermediary of Locher, Kramář proposed to Głębiński that the agreement be renegotiated and that Poland renounce its rights to Teschen Silesia in exchange for territories in Prussian Silesia. Głębiński thought the idea absurd and rejected it.

<sup>32</sup> This is a reference to a conversation that took place between Masaryk, Dmowski and Paderewski in September 1918 in the United States, during which no agreement was reached in the matter of Teschen Silesia.

provisional arrangements with various external actors; these arrangements require some coordination and or at least a common denominator. It is high time now to start thinking about drafting such a plan, which we will need at the Peace Conference. Who is to create such a plan? The Commission for Peace Conference matters is responsible only for collecting materials. The Paris Committee alone does not seem to be entitled to do this, given that until now it has only been getting familiar with our eastern policy. It is also doubtful if the delegation sent to Paris could contribute to drafting such a plan, because of all its members only Mr. Sokolnicki is practically familiar with foreign matters. I have for a long time been advising that a advisory council be formed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consisting of those professional diplomats we have. Some time ago, I suggested to Minister Wasilewski the candidates for the council. Unfortunately, this project has not yet been implemented. It is a great pity, because such a council could be entrusted with creating the draft of such a political plan for the Peace Conference. Such a draft could then be presented for approval to the political authorities.

If we go at the Peace Conference without a proper political plan—which will most probably be the case if nothing changes—we will find ourselves among other nations like penguins among birds: with wings too short to fly.

With the deepest respect, I remain,

Your servant  
St. Gutowski

*PDD 1918, doc. 171*

## 43

*26 December 1918, letter from the special envoy  
of the Interim Chief of State to Prague:  
Conversation with the President of Czechoslovakia*

Prague, 26 December 1918

Dear Commandant,

In yesterday's letter reporting on my conversation with President Masaryk and which I wished to send off to Warsaw as fast as possible, in my haste I omitted to mention two details that are worthy of attention.

President Masaryk pointed out that he understands perfectly the necessity of maintaining good Czech-Polish relations until they are ultimately settled, and he also appreciates fully the need to create a temporary mechanism for communication. His only doubts have to do with the form—"about the formal question," as he put it. Then, when we were leaving, in shaking my hand, President Masaryk repeated that "il faut traiter nos rapports mutuels dans un esprit d'amitié et avec souplesse." This is a clear allusion to the fact that he would wish to act using different means than Dr Kramář. I think that the measures recommended by President Masaryk have gained the upper hand. The tone of the press, even the pro-Kramář one, has become less sharp toward us. I have just found out—confidentially—that the government has informed Beneš about its conciliatory position with respect to us, because it is of the opinion that "a bloody conflict would create a gulf between both nations for two generations." The Minister for War, Klofáč, in response to a request by General Iwaszkiewicz's envoy in the matter of facilitating the purchase of uniforms and arms for the Lithuanian-Byelorussian division, today received from him a promise to provide aid. The industrial and trade circles generally insist on maintaining good relations with Poland.

Along with those positive aspects, there are other, less positive ones. The Czechs are allegedly working to bring about the occupation of Silesia by Coalition forces. An English major, whose name was not communicated to me, supposedly went to Silesia to study the coal question on the ground, given the necessity of supplying fuel to the countries of former Austria. The Czechs insist greatly that, since Silesia came into Polish hands, coal production has fallen by two-third; that Bolshevism is thriving in Poland, whereas in the Czech lands normal working conditions prevail. In my opinion, we should pay close attention to this question and do everything in our power to increase production. In itself, the mission of the English major cannot be considered undesirable by us. It's just that the role of his informants should not be played solely by Czechs and Germans, and his relations with the Teschen National Council should turn out favourably. It would be good to inform the Teschen National Council about his possible arrival and recommend that he be greeted with the greatest kindness.

In connection with the news published in the *Wiedeński Kurjer Polski* about the arrival to President Masaryk of the PLC congratulatory delegation headed by Professors Romer and Czekanowski, I wrote a letter to the Governing Commission insisting on the necessity of coordinating this with the task which was entrusted to me.

All these matters will be reported on in greater detail by Prof. Ptaśnik, who is taking this letter to Warsaw.

With the deepest respect, I remain,

Your servant  
St. Gutowski

*PDD 1918, doc. 176*

## 44

*[before 27 December] 1918, instruction from the Minister  
of External Affairs to the secretary of the Warsaw delegation  
about the situation in Ukraine*

To Mr. Michał Sokolnicki  
Secretary General of the Polish Delegation in Paris

### Instruction

Please clarify whether the facts outlined below did in fact take place and verify their political significance:

1) Bulletin II of the Ukrainian People's Republic's High-Command Headquarters, of 28 November, contains the following passage: "The delegation of the Ukrainian National Union that travelled to Jassy to confer with representatives of the Powers, brought highly valuable information. During the negotiations with empowered representatives of the Powers, it was explained that the independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic, as is that of Finland, has been settled by the Entente. Romanian troops will not be sent against the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The armies of the Entente will under no circumstance take action against the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic."

At the same time, news arrived to the Ministry of External Affairs that Petlura's envoys in Jassy had been greeted coolly by the French representative, but very cordially by the representative of England, and by that of the United States especially.

2) The French consul in Odessa, Mr. Émile Hennaut communicated two declarations to the government of Hetman Skoropadsky, on 22 and

24 November. The first stated: "The states of the Coalition intend to support the present authorities in Kiev, personified by the Hetman and his government, in the hope that it would maintain order in the cities and villages until the arrival of Coalition forces." In the second: "In particular in connection with countries of the south of Russia, both occupied and unoccupied by the Germans and threatened by the Bolsheviks, the states of the Coalition express their unshakable will to maintain order in them. This firm intention will be supported in the near future with armed force to the degree required by circumstances. In addition, the states of the Coalition declare that, as of the present day, they will hold personally responsible all party and organisation leaders (irrespective of political orientation) who seek to create havoc and spread anarchy."

In the army bulletin of the Ukrainian Republican Army of 30 November, one can read: "The French consul, persuaded by supporters of the Hetman, inclined his government to stand by the Hetman and to support his government. Our Directorate instructed ataman Bolbochan to explain to the Anglo-French delegation in Sevastopol, that the entire people stands against the Hetman, and that by backing up the Hetman's party, the French will gain the same reputation in Ukraine as did the Germans."

The Russian Bolshevik government intercepted a dispatch from the said Mr. Hennaut to the new government of Petlura about the Russian volunteer army: "The units of this army should keep their arms, and if they should already be disarmed, their arms should be returned to them immediately. Under these conditions the units of the said army will maintain their entire neutrality with respect to the Directorate."

3) Two English officers came to Lwow: Captain Johnson and Lieutenant Biedermann. The latter is in possession of information according to which Romania has received instructions from the Coalition not to cross beyond the borders of Bessarabia in Russia and of Bukovina in the direction of Galicia. In the face of the protests of the Galician Ukrainians against the occupation of Bukovina by Romania, the English mediated between the two sides and held back the bloodbath. On the part of the Galician Ukrainians, Mr. Paneiko left for Paris. Petlura agrees to take over 2/3<sup>rds</sup> of Russia's national debt on the condition that the Coalition recognise the absolute independence of Ukraine.

4) The representative of the Galician Ukrainians in Switzerland, Mr. Yevgen Levicky keeps sending dispatches to the Ukrainian National Council in Złoczów, that the Coalition agrees to recognise an independent Ukraine.

All the facts above require confirmation and proper clarification. It is necessary to answer as quickly as possible the fundamental questions of whether the Coalition would truly be inclined to reconcile itself to fait accompli of Petlura's revolution in Galicia and to recognise an independent Ukraine.

Minister of External Affairs  
L. Wasilewski

*PDD 1918, doc. 180*

## 45

*27 December 1918, letter from the Minister of External Affairs  
to the secretary of the Warsaw delegation  
about the British opinion on Polish matters*

27 December 1918

My Dear!

I am sending you a few bits of information. At the Foreign Office, the director of the Austrian Department is Mr. Namier, who also deals with the Polish section. He is a Galician Jew who hates the National Democrats and, especially, Dmowski, with whom he once had a personal disagreement. The matter concerned some steps Dmowski took (in 1915) with respect to the Austrian government and of which Namier disapproved of. This is the source of the entire dispute. Namier is intriguing against the Paris Committee. The director of the Russian Department, Gregory, is the author of the idea of creating an anti-Bolshevik front out of Poland. The French ambassador in London has great influence on the way Polish affairs are treated. England is against an anti-Bolshevik intervention in Poland and Russia due to the stance of the Labour Party. One more thing: Government circles in England consider Dmowski not to be a gentleman.

Warmly.

Leon Wasilewski

*PDD 1918, doc. 183*

## 46

*28 December 1918, telegram from the Minister of External Affairs to the Prime Minister of France about the situation in Poznań Province*

Radio de Varsovie, 28 Décembre 1918  
reçu le 30 à 16 h. du Chiffre de la Guerre

Monsieur Georges Clemenceau,  
Président du Conseil, Paris

Venons de recevoir nouvelles de Posen, qu'une foule de civils et militaires allemands a assailli le 26 Décembre l'édifice du Conseil National de la Pologne Prussienne à cause des Drapeaux alliés qui ont été hissés.<sup>33</sup> Les Allemands ont arraché de force les drapeaux alliés. Les Allemands se sont servis d'armes à feu, fusils et mitrailleuses. Des deux côtés le nombre des victimes est considérable. Le Gouvernement polonais proteste énergiquement contre cette agression brutale qui constitue une grave injure à l'honneur de la Pologne, ainsi que de toutes les Puissances Alliées. Nous nous adressons par votre intermédiaire aux Gouvernements des pays alliés en les priant d'intervenir et d'exiger du Gouvernement allemand une réparation solennelle et des garanties suffisantes que désormais les habitants allemands de la Pologne prussienne ne se livreront pas à des semblables excès et entreprendront sur terres polonaises aucun acte de nature à offenser la Pologne et les Puissances alliées.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

*PDD 1918, doc. 186*

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<sup>33</sup> This refers to the causes of the outbreak of the Wielkopolska Uprising on 27 December 1918. The uprising ended with an armistice signed on 16 February 1919, in Trier.



## 47

*28 December 1918, note by the Chief of the General Staff about talks with Germany and steps taken to increase the defences of Vilnius*

Warsaw, 28 December 1918

## SENDING TROOPS TO VILNIUS.

1) On 21 December, Captain GÓRKA was sent as liaison officer to the Ober-Ost Command in KAUNAS.

2) Captain GÓRKA presented a memorial to the Chief of Staff of the Ober-Ost Command, General HOFFMANN, about the Germans allowing the transport of Polish troops to VILNIUS for the purpose of organising self-defence to maintain law and order, for protection against Bolshevism and approaching Bolshevik army in Lithuania and Byelorussia as these areas are evacuated by the Germans.

3) Captain GÓRKA reports, on 23 December, by telephonogram, brought by Lieutenant-Colonel PASŁAWSKI in ŁAPY (10:30 PM), that General HOFFMANN agreed to his proposal but leaves the definite agreement to BERLIN. Captain GÓRKA, therefore, asked that BERLIN's decision be sent by radio telegram.

Hence dispatches were sent to the German government in BERLIN—enclosure 1, enclosure 2, and, to the Head of the Coalition mission in BUDAPEST, Lieutenant-Colonel VIX, enclosure 3.

(Prior to this, i.e., on the 23<sup>rd</sup> before noon, in response to a dispatch by the German government, the Polish government authorised the transit of German troops threatened by Petlura's forces in Ukraine on the condition that first the Polish troops would be transported to VILNIUS—enclosure 4.)

4) Lieutenant-Colonel VIX responded on 24 December by dispatch (enclosure 5) that he has no resources available with which to provide aid and he sent the dispatch on to the Command in THESSALONIKI.

5) On 24 December (5:15 PM) General WEJTKO states by telephonogram from Lieutenant-Colonel PASŁAWSKI in ŁAPY, that the last German units are to leave VILNIUS on 5 January 1919, but the real evacuation of the city is to take place 3-4 days earlier. The danger of Bolshevism is increasing with the approaching Bolshevik army. General WEJTKO is powerless in the face of the Germans' categorical refusal to cede their weapons.

6) 24 December (evening) Captain GÓRKA asks by radio telegram, to demand from BERLIN a decision to accept or refuse his proposal within 24 hours.

7) 25 December, 1:30 PM, Captain GÓRKA communicates his proposals presented on 23 December in KAUNAS:

a) to issue immediately, against payment, to the Polish self-defence units 2,000 rifles and 12 machine guns with an appropriate amount of ammunition, and after the evacuation of VILNIUS by German troops another 8,000 rifles and 32 machine guns.

b) from 26 December on, the German authorities will allow the transfer of 4 infantry battalions, 1 cavalry regiment and 2 batteries using the ŁAPY–GRODNO–VILNIUS rail line. These units will march through VILNIUS and will occupy the German positions before the city, only two Vilnius militia companies will remain in VILNIUS.

c) The Polish Army General Staff announces Protocol No. 1 (enclosure 6) to be in force until 1 March 1919, and undertakes to let through 3 German coal trains to KOWEL [sic!].

8) Given that BERLIN's decision did not arrive within 2 days, Captain GÓRKA, at noon 25 December 1918, presented a written memorial declaring that he will wait for BERLIN's answer only until 26 December at 9:00 PM, after which he will leave KAUNAS.

9) Captain GÓRKA was told that if the reply does not arrive by the evening of 26 December, he is to return to WARSAW—enclosure 7.

10) At 11:00 PM on 25 December Captain GÓRKA communicates that he has weakened the ultimatum tone of his written memorial to make it easier for those Germans who are favourably inclined toward his proposal to take a stand, but remains unmoved as to the time of departure at 9:00 PM on 26 December, unless by that time an answer from BERLIN arrives. He expects BERLIN to give a positive answer, however.

11) At 6:30 PM on 26. December Captain GÓRKA communicates the answer of the German foreign affairs office which arrived from BERLIN to KAUNAS.

(Translation: “On account of the holidays, the decision of the government leadership is impossible before tomorrow at noon. Please inform GÓRKA and communicate to him that the evacuation of VILNIUS will not be speeded up. Signed: FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICE—BUSSCHE”)—enclosure 8.

In addition to this, Captain GÓRKA was informed that the people's representatives do not wish to decide on such far-reaching questions and that a meeting of the German government with the secretaries of state and representatives of soldiers' councils is planned for 10:00 AM on 27 December and that the decision will be sent to KAUNAS at about 1:00 PM.

Moreover, Captain GÓRKA proposes that he be allowed to prolong stay in KAUNAS by 24 hours, as in his view his departure prior to Berlin's decision is unfavourable. He asks for permission to submit a written ordinance in this matter in KAUNAS.

Captain GÓRKA was told in answer that no answer to the dispatches sent to the German government had arrived to WARSAW either, that he is to remain for a further 24 hours and prepare the appropriate proclamation in this matter.

12) At 7:30 PM on 27 December. Captain GÓRKA calls by telephone to say that "despite the fact that all military authorities accepted my proposals, BERLIN didn't accept them. I am leaving tonight at 9:00 PM." The Germans are justifying their rejection of the demands by the fact that they can't break the conditions of the ceasefire with the Coalition.

Captain GÓRKA suggests that it would be good for the Polish government to obtain Coalition backing for its demands.

13) Captain GÓRKA was advised to send BERLIN's answer to VILNIUS.

14) A dispatch was sent to Lieutenant-Colonel VIX—enclosure 9.

Szeptycki

*PDD 1918, doc. 187*

## 48

*28 December 1918, report by the temporary PNC representative  
in the USA*

TO THE RESPECTED MEMBERS OF THE  
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE BOARD

To the responsibilities laid on me by the all-Polish Sejm in Detroit<sup>34</sup>, the duties of stand-in representative of Polish affairs with regard to the authorities in Washington also fell on me following the departure of Ignacy J. Paderewski, both on account of the notification of the Washington authorities of this fact by Mr. Paderweski and in my capacity as Chairman of the Executive Council of the National Department.

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<sup>34</sup> This Sejm, an institution representing organisations of the Polish community in the USA, convened in Detroit in August 1918.

Overwhelmed by the sudden nature of many issues to be presented in Washington, I went there on 8 December 1918, for the first time after the departure of Ignacy J. Paderewski to Europe and stayed in Washington and New York from the day of arrival till 22 December, conferring during this time with the State Secretary, Mr. Phillips, with the War Secretary, Mr. Baker, with the Director of the Red Cross Office, Mr. Walling, with the head of the Food Administration Agency, Mr. Walcott, and finally with Jewish representatives.

#### IN THE MATTER OF THE REPRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON

Speaking with me about this question, State Secretary Phillips explained to me that the government in Washington has reservations about allowing for such a representation by an American citizen.

In such a case, I proposed that the government in Washington continue to consider Ignacy J. Paderewski as the main representative of the PNC in Paris and of the Polish question, and me as his assistant until the arrival in Washington of the regular Polish ambassador, to which Mr. Phillips eagerly agreed.

#### THE PASSPORT QUESTION

I then presented to Mr. Phillips the question of indicating the nationality of Poles in passports being issued to them and drew his attention to the fact that describing Poles as subjects of Germany, Austria or Russia is highly offensive to the Poles' national sentiments in present conditions and that this must change. Mr. Phillips answered that he acknowledges our concerns and the Poles' opposition to such a classification and that he believes that this question in any case will soon be resolved through the recognition of the Polish state. He favours, as far as this will be possible, to immediately reassure the Poles in this respect and agreed to new passports, or rather to an attestation of nationality, which will soon be prepared.

#### SENDING MONEY TO POLAND

Further on, I presented to Mr. Phillips the matter of money transfers to the Polish lands, the need and urgency of opening banking relations [to enable] sending money directly to Poland. Mr. Phillips declared that if he receives a relevant report, he will strive to have it considered as, in his view, there will not be any barriers in principle. I prepared such a report and I sent it to the State Department.

## CONFERENCE WITH WAR SECRETARY BAKER

On Wednesday 18 December, at 12:45 PM, I was received by War Secretary Baker in the matter of aid from the American Military Administration for the Polish army.

I presented to the War Secretary the immensely difficult situation of Poland, threatened from one side by the Germans, and from the other by masses of German prisoners of war unleashed and led by the Bolsheviks. I reminded him that, in anticipation of the destruction Poland was facing on that account, Ignacy J. Paderewski had already initiated negotiations with the government in Washington. In particular with the State Secretary and the U.S. Army, so that the government would agree as soon as possible to release non-citizen soldiers of Polish origin from active duty and allow them to be conscripted to the Polish army while, at the same time, agreeing to let recruiting officers enter the camps and recruit there, thus expediting and facilitating the conscription process.

In response to these presentations, the War Secretary pointed to the enormous difficulties brought about in this matter by the conclusion of the ceasefire. "If—he said—Polish soldiers recruited here were to wage war on Russia, the United States would be held accountable for the damages which could arise from this. In the Alabama case,<sup>35</sup> the United States did not rest its claims on the fact that Britain had armed Alabama, but that it allowed it to arm."

To this, I observed that the Polish army is indispensable to defend against the German troops gathered on Polish lands, to protect the population, and to maintain law and order, and is to be transferred from Danzig to Poland for this purpose.

The War Secretary repeated his objections, reminding me that Poles in the United States cannot harbour divided feelings, but must be faithful to the "America First" principle. In response, I tried to explain that it had always been the case, but that vital interests of citizens of Polish descent in the ultimate resolution of the Polish question also had to be taken into account.

In the end, Mr. Baker decided to discuss the matter further with the First Secretary of State, Mr. Polk.

I also reminded him of the matter of setting aside a camp for the army of the Poles in the United States, given that the Canadian government was

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<sup>35</sup> This refers to 1869 demands by the U.S. government from the UK for damages for attacks launched by Confederate ships built in British shipyards, including CSS Alabama.

intending to close the camp at Niagara-on-the-Lake on 1 January given the signing of the cease fire, and only the request of Colonel Martin extended this date to 1 February.

In this matter as well, the War Secretary promised to consider the requests of Polish citizens.

#### CONFERENCE WITH THE "RED CROSS" OFFICE

I spoke with the director of the office, Mr. Walling, whom I found to be very kindly disposed in Polish matters and eager to collaborate with the National Department.

In the MATTER OF THE "WHITE CROSS" he declared that given the signing of the ceasefire, their military functions had ceased, and that the administration of the "Red Cross" sees no reason to limit the further work of the "White Cross" and leaves this matter in the hands of the national Department.

AS TO AID FOR FAMILIES of the Polish army, formerly part of the National Department, the agreement is still in force and the "Red Cross" management will fulfil it.

IN THE MATTER OF FURTHER AID for the Polish Army, the management of the Red Cross finds it necessary to come to an agreement with its main Red Cross headquarters in France, especially on the matter of the Polish Army to be sent to Poland, and believes that the Polish National Committee in Paris will deal with the issue.

IN THE MATTER OF EMERGENCY AID for Poland, Mr. Walling was alarmed by the situation, as on the one hand he considered great assistance and energetic action to be required immediately while, on the other hand, he felt completely tied in this matter as it had been passed in its entirety under the management of the food administration. Hence, he advised me to see the matter through directly with that administration, or else with Mr. Hoover's main office.

At the same time, Mr. Walling informed me in confidence about obstacles and intrigues made by certain foreign circles, about which I am not free to write but about which I will speak openly during a closed meeting of the Council.

ON THE FOOD ADMINISTRATION OFFICE, I met Mr. Walcott, who received me most kindly. He has already been in Poland, and this exactly at the time when the National Department sought to send food supplies to Poland. Based on his personal experience, Mr. Walcott was tending to his report about the situation in Poland at the time and, in his report, he pointed to the necessity that the most intensive assistance be extended to Poland.

I presented to him the enormous anxiety among the 4.5 million-strong population of Polish descent here, that while there is news about aid to other countries even less affected by war, even to Germany, there is no talk of help for Poland. Mr. Walcott admitted that this anxiety is well-founded, and declared that he grieves over it. He also confirmed the secret intrigues of circles that are hostile to us, about which I already knew from Mr. Walling and which were truly restraining. He added, however, that on his part he will step up efforts to help Poland.

Mr. Walcott then immediately contacted under-secretaries of state Phillips and Polk and, with their authorisation, sent to Hoover and to Colonel House telegrams drawn up along with me, in which we stated that “the alarming news from Poland about the misery that prevails there requires the immediate sending there of food, clothing, medical supplies, etc., calming thereby the Poles here, deprived as they are of effective means of aiding their brothers in their home country.”

On 19 December, Mr. Walcott called me [to say that] the steps we had discussed jointly had already been taken, and that Mr. Vance McCormick, who is departing to Europe, will personally supervise the emergency operation.

I enclose a copy of the telegram to Mr. Hoover:

18 December 1918

CABLE TO MR. HOOVER, AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS,  
VIA STATE DEPARTMENT.

Most distressing reports reaching officers of Polish Organisations regarding conditions in Poland since armistice, great destitution, immediate need for food, clothing, and medical supplies. Smulski of Chicago and other leading Poles much distressed over absence reference Polish Relief. State Department now forwarding Polish and Jewish funds to Poland. Catastrophe too vast for private relief should be Governmental undertaking. Polish Organisations representing four million American Poles eager to help with clothing, provisions, and private funds. How soon can entrance into Poland be effected for supplies. Strong feeling here Polish situation so desperate that unless immediately relieved most serious consequences must follow. Think it important you cable reply promptly as possible to relieve minds of Poles in this country, giving them hope of constructive relief programme in as definite terms as possible.

WALCOTT

On 26 [December], Mr. Walcott informed me of the favourable reply by cable from Mr. Hoover, who is immediately sending to Poland Prof. Vernon

Kellogg and Hugh Gibson for the purpose of investigating the needs of the population.

Mr. Walcott's letter also informed me of the sending of 20 tonnes of milk from Switzerland to Poland and asked me for certain information that was important to him, and which I am to hand him personally in New York before 4 January, on which day Mr. Walcott is leaving for France.

### ON THE JEWISH QUESTION

On 10 November 1918 news appeared in the American dailies that there had been a pogrom in the Congress Kingdom during which several Jews had been killed. This news did not at first attract much attention, because at the same time the dailies related that those telegrams from Warsaw which were telling of German troops had been shooting on Poles celebrating the first anniversary of the proclamation of the Polish state, and that many had been killed. Only starting from 25 November did Zionist organisations in America began to publish telegrams about massive slaughters of Jews in the Congress Kingdom and in a number of localities in Galicia, above all in Lwow, where 900 Jews had supposedly been killed and some burned alive in a synagogue. The main sources for these relations was a telegram from the Lwow correspondent of *Berliner Tageblatt* and a telegram from Jewish women from Frankfurt-am-Main about the dangerous situation of the Jews in Poland.

This led to conferences and massive meetings of Jews and in many cities here these took on the form of anti-Polish demonstrations. From the Jewish meetings, a number of telegrams were sent to President Wilson, all of which were capable of harm to the Polish question to a high degree on the eve of the Peace Conference.

On 27 November 1918, Ignacy J. Paderewski, who was readying for his departure for Europe, agreed to a joint conference on this matter with representatives of the National Defence Committee, in order to state in a common declaration that the entire émigré community was against pogroms and boycotts, but it also unanimously protests against the use of unverified and immediately-debunked news of pogroms and against accusations of intolerance and racial hatred of Jews levelled at the Polish nation.

On 28 November, a joint conference of National Department and National Defence Committee representatives took place in this matter and the result of this conference was a collective and public protest against the blaming of Poles for pogroms and a collective telegram to President Wilson about this subject.

On 3 December 1918, representatives of Chicago Jews, namely B.M. Engelhard, the Chairman of the Synagogue Association, Dr. J. Rappaport, M.E. Greenebaum, Israel Cowen, and J. Schnadig, invited me to a conference



during which, after lengthy bilateral explanations and discussions, it was concluded that only a rational and preventive settlement of the economic situation in Galicia and Poland could duly secure the Jews, while the statutory provisions of the Jews' civic equality itself would not settle the Jewish question, even if they were to be affirmed under international sanction. During the discussion, it turned out that the Jews here are not aware of the cultural and economic distinctions between Polish Jews and Jews from Russia and Germany, but they understand that an inadequate settlement of the Jewish question in Poland during the Peace Conference would lead to an anti-Semitic movement and to a dangerous clash of Poles and other nations with the Jews. Prominent representatives of the Jews then jointly pronounced themselves in favour of creating a strong independent Polish state and declared that they do not demand any rights for the Jews in Poland other than those they enjoy in the United States.

During joint meetings with representatives of the National Defence Committee, the principle was adopted that only a thorough clarification of the news harming Poland about the pogroms will make the false reports about them disappear from the American papers columns and will refute the unjust reputation created by these papers. Immediately after Paderewski's departure, therefore, I took steps in the name of the National Department to bring about a mixed commission made up of Polish, Jewish, and American Anglo-Saxon representatives.

An exchange of letters first took place in this connection between myself and Mr. Louis Marshall, the president of the American Jewish Committee, Mr. J. Walter Freiberg, the president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and Judge Julian W. Mack, chairman of the Jewish Zionists and president of the Jewish Congress, which took place in Philadelphia on 15-17 December.

This correspondence contributed to the clarification of the two sides' positions and led to an agreement in principle to the idea of the said mixed commission.

Mr. Marshall's letter to me of 10 December spoke of the Jewish position about the Polish question in the following words: "I have tried to make it clear not only to the leaders of the Polish parties, but to the president, that we had no objection to the establishment of an independent Poland with enlarged boundaries, but that we insisted that before the aspirations of Poland could be considered, the boycott, which the Poles were conducting against the Jews should be terminated and that such guarantees should be required which could make it impossible in the future for the Jews of Poland to share the fate of those of Romania."

Such a framing of the question, far exceeding the limits of our competence, called for verbal clarification, and I held for this purpose a two-day long meeting with Jewish representatives in New York on 12 and 13 December. Mr. B. Kułakowski represented the National Defence Committee during these meetings.

Prior to this, I visited Mr. Juliusz Rosenwald at the John Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore and I obtained his full agreement for the creation of a mixed commission to clarify the matter of the pogroms.

During the meetings of 12 and 13 December, Jews were represented by Louis Marshall, Judge J. Mack, and De Hass. On the Polish side, on the first day, participants included, besides myself and Mr. Kułakowski, Mr. Jachelski and Mr. White, and on the second day, also Mr. Dębski and Mr. Heliński.

During the general discussion, there was from the beginning great bitterness among the Jewish representatives, who were complaining mainly about the boycott introduced in Poland in 1912 and maintained that this boycott is still in force and that it produces a significantly worse situation for the Jewish population than the ad hoc pogroms. Of course, I denied categorically that the boycott was going on at the present time and explained how quite similar accusations against the Polish nation based on a local and inadequately ascertained case makes Polish-Jewish understanding difficult, and to what degree and how unnecessarily massive anti-pogrom, in reality anti-Polish, rallies excite irritability among Poles.

I also argued that it can't be beneficial for the agreement to stand the matter on the notion of national minority rights, something Judge Mack ultimately agreed with, and with the fact that the Polish language should be taught in Poland in all schools, i.e., also Jewish ones.

During the detailed discussion, I firmly opposed placing in the declaration to be prepared jointly for the Jewish congress in Philadelphia any admission to the existence in Poland of a boycott and in the draft I included a denial of the news about pogroms, pointing out that pogroms are inconsistent with the character of the Polish people, and that the four-and-a-half-million émigré community in America firmly condemns the pogroms and boycotts and favours religious, political, and economic freedoms in a united and independent Poland on the same basis as in the United States of America.

As a result of the two days of meetings, both sides accepted the creation of a commission with two Poles, two Jews and two Americans who are neither Poles nor Jews "for the purpose of investigating the actual conditions in Poland affecting the Jews and of making a public report of their finding."

In the meantime, the resolution from the yearly Congress of the Federation of Chicago Synagogues arrived and stated the demand addressed to the

Jewish press to refrain “from printing anything that might be constructed as antagonistic to the Poles or in criticism of their action.”

On the 18 December 1918, a notification arrives to the Jewish Congress in Philadelphia and to the National Department that the congress agreed to the creation and sending to Poland of a mixed commission and empowered Mr. Louis Marshall and Mr. Julian Mack to appoint the Jewish representatives of this commission.

The relevant excerpt from Judge Mack’s letter is the following:

“Impressed by your assurance that as the representatives of four and a half million Poles, who in common with us are citizens of the United States, the land which we both love and to which we both yield joyful allegiance, you declare that they believe that the industrial boycott is no longer in force, that they are unalterably opposed to pogroms and boycotts under any circumstances whatever, and that they support the principle that the Jews in Poland are entitled to the same rights and protection as any other part of the people of Poland and that they stand for a government founded upon the same principles of religious, political and industrial freedom as are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, we accept your proposal, etc.”

It was proposed that the relevant commission be made up on the Polish side of Mr. B. Kułakowski, delegated by the National Defence Committee, and of Mr. Leopold Kościński, member of the Management Council of the National Department, former state attorney and lawyer in Detroit Michigan, proposed by the National Department.

As American members of the commission, the National Department in conjunction with the National Defence Committee proposed to the government the following: Graham Taylor from Chicago, James [sic!] Bassett Moore from Columbia University, Judges A. B. Parker, C. S. Barrett, Charles Hughes and Edgar A. Bancroft, the lawyer A. Wilder from New York, and the lawyer Wheeler P. Bloodgood from Milwaukee.

#### THE MATTER OF THE AMERICAN AID FOR POLAND COMMITTEE

On the instruction of Mr. Paderewski, during my conferences with Judge Charles Mayer, a friend of Mr. Paderewski, we reached the conviction that in order to ensure adequate realisation of the initiative of the United States in Poland, it would be indicated to create an American Aid for Poland Committee. In order to create such a committee, I came to an understanding with the powerful and influential “National Civic Organisation” in New York, and I was already notified that this organisation’s executive committee will hold a special meeting on this subject shortly and will delegate persons who could bring us the desired help. Judge Charles Mayer owns several ships which

were called into the national service by the United States government with the onset of the war with Germany. He now wishes to petition the government to immediately release from service one large or two smaller ships, so they can be used to carry food, clothing and other products to Poland through Danzig. We are both presently working to bring this about and will be taking further steps in this matter in Washington.

#### SETTING UP A TRADE AND INDUSTRY OFFICE

During my stay in New York, I also personally dealt with the matter of setting up a Polish Trade and Industry Office. As there already was an office established by Ignacy J. Paderewski and was managed by Mr. M. Kwapiszewski, having first considered the matter and discussed the office's tasks and management principles, I instructed Mr. Kwapiszewski to organise the existing office in that spirit, to hire experts, and to collaborate with existing merchant associations and organisations. Upon my return to Chicago, I presented the matter to the Management Council and brought about a resolution calling to life such an office in Chicago. Both offices will cooperate and will establish relevant association in all cities where we still do not have merchant and industrial associations, so that we can in this manner gather the entire preparatory apparatus to establish trade relations with Poland, as soon as this proves possible. The Chicago Office will be the head office. It will be housed next to the National Department, 2138 Pierce Ave. The New York office has its seat in the Aeolian Bldg., Room 1034.

#### A PRESS OFFICE IN NEW YORK

Ignacy J. Paderewski established an information officer in New York for the American press under the name of Polish Information Bureau. It is located in the Aeolian Bldg., 33 W 42<sup>nd</sup> St., Room 740 and deals with the propagation of Polish issues in American papers and magazines. Its director is Mr. Waclaw Górski. From this source, we already have in serious and influential papers many articles that present Polish matters in a factual and calm manner. It is good and ably-managed work.

#### IN THE MATTER OF THE "WHITE CROSS"

On this matter, counsel was held during a meeting of the Management Council of the National Department at the Gotham Hotel on 22 November 1918, just prior to the departure of Ignacy J. Paderewski and with his participation. After a lengthy discussion and clarification of relevant data,

a resolution was passed to move the Main Office of the White Cross to Chicago, leaving the management of day-to-day affairs to Mrs Anna Neumann. For this purpose, she remained for a few weeks in New York, dealt with everything and presented her report to the National Department, which adopted and accepted it. The "White Cross" office in Chicago will be run by a director appointed to that effect, while the depot and expedition office will remain in New York. They are managed by Mr. Witkowski, and all his tasks remain under the supervision of Military Commission member T. M. Heliński.

#### POLISH MASS RALLY IN NEW YORK

Prior to my departure from New York I hosted a conference of outstanding Poles from New York and the surrounding area, during which we discussed the need to awaken Americans' interest in the national aspirations of re-emerging Poland. It was decided for this purpose to organise a Polish Mass Rally, and to give it adequate publicity on the entire East Coast. This rally is to be held in one of New York's largest halls, or at the Hippodrome, or at the Armory in the second half of January. Dealing with this is a separate committee whose secretary is Mr. Prazmowski. This committee is acting with the agreement of the National Department's New York office directed by Mr. Kwapiszewski.

#### UNITED STATES FOOD ADMINISTRATION

The conferences with Mr. Walcott and my presentations on the matter of immediate aid for Poland in order to avert mass hunger and contain the Bolshevik wave have brought unexpectedly quick results. As the present report was being readied to be sent to the Honourable Members of the Management Council and Supervisory Council, I received the following telegram from Mr. Walcott:

WASHINGTON, D.C., December 31, 1918

JOHN F. SMULSKI, Chicago, Ill.

We must commence the relief of Poland in a broad, practical way, we must insure Hoover's enthusiastic support in Europe by strong, concentrated action here, we have a seven-thousand-ton ship ready in New York, but no funds. This first shipload will cost approximately two million dollars, according to Hoover's table requirement for foodstuff. You must meet me in Washington Friday, to get relief started. Situation critical. No time can be lost.

F.C. WALCOTT

The content of this telegram indicates that the United States Food Commission decided to send to Poland seven thousand tons of food accumulated in the port of New York, but that it needs to cover the cost of two million dollars in all and must do so immediately.

The treasury of the National Department can't, according to its present state, and having other serious obligations, cover half of this sum, i.e., one million dollars, unless our country's dangerous situation and the understanding that now is the time when we could assist in the matter of our country's independence, will incline the entire émigré community to give immediate and significant donations for a ten-million dollar fund. In this spirit, our National Department turned to our entire community, and whether we will be able to effectively aid our Fatherland depends on your warm support. This is our most important request and for as long as it isn't carried out, all other matters must take a back seat. Each of the Honourable Members of our Management Council and Supervisory Council is to exert himself in his area to collect the necessary funds.

Sending our report to the Honourable Members of our Management Council and Supervisory Council I wish to point out that during the New Year I am departing again for New York to speak personally with Mr. Walcott before his departure for Europe, and with the State Secretary in the matter of sending an aid commission to Poland. I will not fail to inform you in detail about these and other national matters when I return.

I wish to extend my gratitude to all for your collaboration and cooperation in the past year. I had great help from you and I also valued highly the goodwill and the precious kindness of my respectable collaborators.

For the New Year, I send you all my wishes for good fortune and for the great happiness that we all yearn for—to finally see the restoration of a Great and Powerful Poland.

With my sincerest brotherly greetings, yours always,

J.F. Smulski

Chairman of the Management Council of the National Department  
CHICAGO, 28 December 1918.

*PDD 1918, doc. 190*

## 49

*29 December 1918, telegram from the Interim Chief of State to the  
Prime Minister of France about the defence of Vilnius*

Radio de Varsovie, 29 Décembre 1918 – reçu le 30

Communiqué par la Guerre  
Monsieur Georges Clemenceau,  
Président du Conseil et Ministre de la Guerre  
PARIS

Les autorités militaires allemandes ont commencé depuis quelque temps une évacuation systématique des territoires dits de l'Ober-Ost en les livrant aux armées rouges et aux bandes bolchevistes. Le 4 Janvier les troupes allemandes évacuent Vilna qui est exposé ainsi à toutes les horreurs du régime bolcheviste si les armées polonaises n'arrivent pas à temps pour arrêter l'invasion des gardes rouges et pour permettre à la population locale d'organiser la défense. Des détachements polonais sont prêts à être expédiés immédiatement à Vilna. Mais le Gouvernement de Berlin vient d'ordonner au Général Hoffmann, chef de l'Armée de l'Ober-Ost de refuser le passage aux troupes polonaises sous le prétexte de l'armistice conclu avec les alliés. Je m'empresse de vous prier de bien vouloir contraindre le Gouvernement allemand à livrer immédiatement passage à Vilna aux troupes polonaises qui ont pour but unique de maintenir l'ordre et d'assurer la sécurité des habitants et d'arrêter l'invasion bolcheviste. Veuillez contraindre les autorités militaires allemandes à délivrer aux organisations locales polonaises antibolchevistes des armes en suffisance pour organiser la défense. Le moindre délai serait désastreux pour la sécurité de la Lituanie et de la Pologne entière.

Pilsudski, Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Polonaise

*PDD 1918, doc. 191*

## 50

*30 December 1918, telegram from the Interim Chief of State  
to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces  
with a request for intervention*

30th December, 1918

To: Paris  
From: Warsaw

I beg of you to compel the German Government to allow free passage of Polish troops at Vilna, which are there to maintain order, ensure the safety of the inhabitants and stop the Bolshevist invasion.

Please compel the German Military Authorities to deliver arms to the Polish Anti-Bolshevist local organisations, in quantity sufficient to enable them to organise the defence and to safeguard Lithuania and the whole of Poland.

(Sd) THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE POLISH ARMY  
PILSUDSKI

*PDD 1918, doc. 193 (ENG)*

## 51

*30 December 1918, letter from the PNC representative in London  
to the Director of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office  
about the situation in Poland*

December 30th 1918

J. Duncan Gregory Esq., FOREIGN OFFICE,  
S.W.I.

Dear Mr. Gregory,

I send you herewith copies of three documents<sup>36</sup> which furnish a striking proof that in spite of all that was said against the Polish National Committee

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<sup>36</sup> This is a reference to the documents that the representative of the PNC in Paris turned over to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 25 December 1918.



and the policy adopted by them, they have the support of an enormous majority in Poland and are authorised to represent the Country. According to the latest news received from Poland it may be hoped that a Coalition Government, supported by the same majority of all three portions of Poland will be formed in the nearest future. This confident statement is based not only upon the victory of our policy but also upon the certitude that the entire Polish Nation will now unite to defend her very existence, menaced by the Bolshevik and German danger. The party-fights will recommence, like in all other countries, after the re-constitution of the Polish State.

In the meantime two things are essential for Poland:

1. Complete unity of all Poles;

2. A strong support of the Allies to resist the menace of the Russian anarchy, supported by the policy of Berlin, which does not alter with the changes of the regime in Germany, and always aims at the destruction of that which in conformity with our secular rights, justice and the principles of right adopted by the Allies, is to be build up again, viz: – a free and really independent Poland. This danger of anarchy, of confusion and darkness does not only threaten Poland and other countries of Eastern Europe, it may easily destroy that which the four years of victorious war have succeeded in securing for the world, a lasting peace.

Poland did not raise an army during the German occupation fearing to be compelled one day to fight with the Central Powers, and finds herself, owing to this her fidelity to the allied cause, almost defenseless in the face of the huge Bolshevik wave. Poland would have now the right to claim from the Allies the realisation of the principles proclaimed by them, as it is most improbable that they could be imposed solely by decisions taken at a conference. It is not, however, the sending out of allied troops to Poland that we claim, as we know very well the fatigue and losses suffered in this war – and also, that liberty should be won by the nation herself. We only ask that the Polish Army in France should be sent to Poland without delay and that a solid allied base be formed for her in Danzig, that means should be given us for the existing Army and for that which can be formed immediately on receipt of munitions, equipment etc. We also ask that an allied military mission should be sent to Poland, to demand from the German authorities evacuation of the eastern frontier of Poland in a manner which would not, as it did up till the present, give the Bolsheviks all the facilities to execute their plan of occupation of Polish territories evacuated by Germans, but, on the contrary, in such a way as to give Polish forces time to organise and get ready to face the Bolshevik invasion. The terms of the armistice permit of it – in spite of that, that the Allies have not secured in the East, as suggested by us, equally solid guarantees as have been obtained in the West, where there are powerful allied armies to watch their

fulfilment. In spite of the present state of affairs in Germany, Germans have not failed to take advantage of it, and they grasp what they can, leaving the rest to be destroyed by Bolshevik gangs. Holding still the railways and strongholds of Eastern Poland, they prevent Poles from organising and sending help to Polish and other nations, mercilessly maltreated by Bolsheviks. Having a free hand in the East Germans deem themselves at liberty to prohibit election of Polish deputies for the Constituante in Posnania and Western Silesia, in spite of their having accepted the fourteen points of President Wilson, by which those territories are recognised as an integral part of Poland.

Germany's plan is quite clear: to take advantage of the general exhaustion and to gain in the East what they were obliged to yield in the West, by means of devastating and weakening Poland and keeping in direct contact with Russia, which Germany is still capable to dominate, provided there is no barrier between them.

It is high time that after having established certain principles, the Allies at least furnish the interested nations with means of their realisation.

Yours sincerely.

*PDD 1918, doc. 194 (ENG)*

## 52

*31 December 1918, note of the senior clerk at the Ministry  
of External Affairs about Colonel Wade's mission*

31 December 1918

RE: The arrival of the English Mission and  
the recommended position for the Ministry for External Affairs

EXISTING RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS:

Decision of the Minister of External Affairs of 30 December 1918

### SUBMISSION

I recommend that the English Mission about to arrive in Warsaw and led by Colonel Wade, should not be treated as a military mission, as was decided on 30 December 1918 during the conference between Minister Moraczewski, Minister Wasilewski and the Chief of Staff.

Justification.

1. According to the letter of 7 December, 1918, N. 621/13, sent by Zaleski from Bern, this Mission is to be “an unofficial fact-finding mission to Poland.”

The official communiqué from London received by the British Embassy in Berne indicates that it is to be a “mission for political inquiries. It is inappropriate to send a Military Mission to Poland at this time...” (enclosure N. 3662/18).

2. The Mission is to include only one military person, Colonel Wade. Mr Kenney, a Foreign Office official (a diplomat), is named as the Mission’s secretary. Kimens, a former English consul in Warsaw, is the attaché.

3. The fact that then Mission is headed by a colonel doesn’t mean it is military, because:

a) Colonel Wade is military attaché with the English Legation in Copenhagen and, thus, a political and military agent.

b) It seems understandable that the Mission is headed by an officer in order to facilitate travel and to give gravity to the Mission at a time of war.

4. Zaleski’s letter of 19 December 1918 refers to the English Mission as a political body empowered to deal with political matters.

5. Zaleski’s dispatch of 27 December N. 4140 “Engländer fahren in rein politischer Mission.”

6. Zaleski’s dispatch of 28 December N. 4225 points out that Poles were included in the English Mission: Kronenberg Leopold (junior) and Stolzmann – both civilians.

Given the primary importance that should be given to possible negotiations with England, I feel that leaving the English Mission solely to information from the General Staff could harm the Polish cause, as the most important political aspects might be omitted in the absence of competent personnel. In my opinion the Mission should be treated as an official one and the Ministry of External Affairs should establish close contacts with it from the very moment of its arrival.<sup>37</sup>

Reporter for British Affairs  
*Jan Ciechanowski*

*PDD 1918, doc. 205*

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<sup>37</sup> Colonel Wade’s mission arrived in Warsaw on 1 January 1919. See doc. No. 55.

## 53

*1 January 1919, note from the PNC to the embassy of Great Britain  
in Paris about the defence of Poland from the Bolshevik invasion*

1-er Janvier 1919

Ambassade Britannique

L'envahissement par les troupes Bolchévistes des anciens territoires polonais continue toujours.<sup>1</sup> Des milliers de gens ont été assassinés et plusieurs personnes ont été enterrées vives. La situation est très critique. Minsk, Wilna et même Grodno sont menacées et une population énorme risque d'être annihilée. Des vétérans affamés sont nourris à conditions qu'ils se rangent du côté des Bolchevistes et l'armée des envahisseurs est augmentée tous les jours par les prisonniers de guerre de retour de l'Allemagne. La Pologne est impuissante, le Gouvernement actuel est trop faible pour qu'il puisse opposer une résistance organisée. Ses troupes sont encore nombreuses, mais elles sont mal équipées et ne disposent ni d'armes, ni de munitions.

A cette heure malheureuse, la Pologne fait appel à ses meilleurs amis en les suppliant de lui venir en aide et de la sauver. L'avance barbare pourrait certainement être enrayée par l'envoi immédiat de 50 000 Américains appuyés par une division française et une division britannique, munies du matériel nécessaire à la grande armée polonaise. Si cet envoi de troupes est retardé, la guerre aura peut être pour résultat l'établissement du barbarisme en Europe, tandis que la population entière de la Pologne cessera d'exister.

*PDD 1919, doc. 1*

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<sup>1</sup> In connection with the annulment of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty in November 1918 (based on the Armistice of Compiègne), the Red Army began to occupy the so-called Ober-Ost, territory being evacuated by German troops. They were resisted by Polish self-defence units. The German government did not agree to let regular Polish troops through on their way to relieve the siege of Vilnius. Acting in the name of the Lithuanian-Byelorussian Socialist Republic, which had been proclaimed on 16 December 1918, on 5 January 1919, the Red Army seized Vilnius. This was seen by the Polish authorities as an act of war. The skirmish between self-defence units from the Vilnius area and Bolshevik units in the vicinity of Bereza Kartuska on 14 February 1919, is considered the first battle of the Polish-Bolshevik War.

## 54

*[before 2 January] 1919, report by the Consular Department of the Ministry of External Affairs for the Ministry of Military Affairs: Situation following the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany*

Report of the Consular Section about the *modus vivendi* with Germany following the break in diplomatic relations

The state [of affairs] that arose as a result of the break of diplomatic relations with Germany calls for the clarification of a number of points.

These points concern:

- a) the situation of German citizens in Poland;
- b) the situation of Polish citizens in Germany;
- c) travel to and from Germany;
- d) communication by mail and telegraph with Germany;
- e) taking money from Poland to Germany.

About point a: according to the press communiqué the German citizens in Poland are temporarily under the care of the Swiss consulate. All German citizens turning to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be directed to the Swiss consulate, without dealing with them directly.

Given that it is not precisely known what will be the German government's attitude toward Polish citizens, steps should be taken to enable the use of retortion or repression with regard to German citizens should the German authorities enact repressive measures against Polish citizens. One should thus turn to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and ask that it order immediately that all German citizens be registered with the relevant police authorities and that lists be drawn up of all German citizens of non-Polish nationality to be found on the territory of the Polish state.

Using various pretexts, visas should not be stamped in the passports of German citizens of non-Polish nationality who wish to return to Germany and turn to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the intermediary of the Swiss consulate until the attitude of the German authorities with regard to Polish citizens in Germany is clarified.

Every exception from this rule requires a ministerial authorisation.

Women reservists whose husbands served in the German army, and who received benefits from the German state treasury during the occupation should be directed to the Swiss consulate.

About point b: the break in diplomatic relations does not entail the necessity to withdraw the Polish consul in Berlin, but, if the Polish consulate in Berlin is to be maintained, Germany could demand that a German consul be received in Warsaw. Considering this, the Danish government should immediately be approached and asked if it would be willing to empower its envoy in Berlin to take care of Polish citizens there. For this purpose, the present personnel of the Polish consulate should be placed at the disposal of the Danish legation. Unless this proves inconvenient for any reason, it should not exclude Mr. Rose. On a temporary basis, one of the Austrian vice-consuls who made themselves available to the Polish government could also be assigned to the Danish legation as expert assistance.

In any case, Mr. Rose can continue in his present functions until the care of Polish citizens is taken over by the Danish legation, unless the German government demands his withdrawal.

Should the care of Polish citizens be transferred to the Danish legation, it will be necessary to ask the Danish Red Cross or the central committee of the Red Cross in Geneva to take over supervision and monitoring of conditions in German prisoner of war camps, and place the present delegates of the Polish consulate at its disposal.

Through the intermediary of the Danish government, the German government should be asked if it intends, despite the breaking of diplomatic relations, to release—as has been the case thus far— ...<sup>2</sup> in the agreed manner, i.e., by groups of 2,000 people. All grievances of Polish citizens against the German government, and ..., so long as the latter can't be realised [...] in the National Settlement Agency.<sup>3</sup>

About point c: The issuing of diplomatic passports ... de route, and sending couriers ... cannot take place, as far as it concerns ... private persons, greater prudence should be shown in this respect than has been the case, and only issued in exceptional cases, having first inquired at the Swiss consulate if they intend to stamp visas in those passports.

Visas in the passports of Polish citizens in Germany should be stamped by the consulate in Berlin until the Polish matters are transferred to the Danish legation, then by the legation and, ultimately, the Danish consulate.

The granting of visas to German citizens for travel to Poland can only be issued upon receipt of authorisation from the central authorities.

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<sup>2</sup> Illegible fragment.

<sup>3</sup> This probably refers to the State Office dealing with the return of prisoners of war, refugees, and workers.

One should come to agreement with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and with the General Staff about ordering more conscientious controls at the border than has been the case, i.e., in those points where controls are still in place because the effective incorporation of the Prussian partition into the Polish state has not yet taken place. Persons arriving from Germany should be subject to a detailed search, just as the ones going there.

About point d: telegraph and telephone communications with Germany is cut off. Letters from and to Germany should be subject to censorship.

About point e: taking into consideration that there are regulations in Germany concerning limits on the amount of money taken out of the country, one should immediately contact the Treasury Ministry about issuing an ordinance prohibiting the export of money from Poland to Germany above a certain maximum sum, without prior authorisation of the Treasury Ministry.

As to the movable and immovable property belonging to German citizens in Poland, no restrictions are being introduced for the time being, until the position of the Germans with respect to Polish property in Germany is clarified.

In the matter of sending merchandise from Poland to Germany, an understanding has to be reached with the Ministry of Trade and Industry for the purpose of issuing relevant ordinances prohibiting or at least limiting this export to exceptional cases when the Ministry of Trade and Industry considers that the export of a certain product is unequivocally in Poland's interest.

The exchange of merchandise between Upper Silesia and the Dąbrowa Coal Basin that is necessary to keep factories and mines functioning in the Coal Basin will be directed by the local Polish-German commission, which was set up ad hoc and enjoys no official status.

*PDD 1919, doc. 2*

## 55

*2 January 1919, letter from the Minister of External Affairs to the secretary of the Warsaw delegation about the arrival of Ignacy Paderewski and about the mission of Colonel Wade*

Warsaw, 2 January 1919

To Mr. Michał SOKOLNICKI

Secretary General of the Extraordinary Delegation to the Entente States

By today's courier, we only have yesterday's press to send (today's has not arrived yet)—Chicherin's last note<sup>4</sup> and the notification about the change of form of government in Ukraine.<sup>5</sup>

In other matters, I wish to inform you that Paderewski arrived in Warsaw yesterday surrounded by soldiers from Haller's army and by English officers. English Colonel Wade declared to the representative of the General Staff who was greeting him on the platform that he has arrived not on a military mission but a political one. The Warsaw population greeted yesterday's guests with enthusiasm—the welcoming crowd were unusually numerous. The army also participated (on its own initiative and with the authorisation of command), the escort was made up of Uhlans, and the infantry stood in ranks by the station and Bristol Hotel.

Once again, I especially stress the Lwow and Vilnius matter, details of which you will receive from Captain Górká, who is departing for Bern today.

Minister of Foreign Affairs

*PDD 1919, doc. 3*

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<sup>4</sup> This refers to the Foreign Ministry note of protest of 30 December 1918, describing the policy of Soviet Russia, whose troops had entered Lithuania and Byelorussia, as aggressive and imperialist.

<sup>5</sup> After the toppling of the Hetmanate, a government of the Ukrainian People's Republic was formed on 26 December 1918.



## 56

*2 January 1919, note from the PNC General Secretariat  
to the PNC representative in London about the PNC Chairman's  
discussion with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces (excerpt)*

Paris, 2 January 1919

General Secretariat of the PNC  
To the PNC Representative in London

## Note

1. We confirm reception of the note from 18 December and 23 December and the diplomatic post from 27 December 1918.

2. We are expecting the arrival in Paris of the delegation of General Piłsudski tomorrow, 3 January 1919, with Polish diplomatic passports we issued in agreement with the French government [...].<sup>6</sup>

4. On 31 December, the Chairman had a long discussion with Marshal Foch, during which he raised the following issues:

a. With regard to the gathering of German troops in the Prussian partition and the latest bloody incidents in Poznań Province, the High Command of allied Armies should come forward with a warning that such behaviour is a disturbance of the peace and a violation of the ceasefire terms.

b. During the renewal of the ceasefire with Germany in January, to preclude further clashes one should introduce as a new condition the obligatory evacuation by Germany of territories 130 English miles inland from the former boundary of the German Empire. Point b. was unusually well received by Marshal Foch.

c. In order to ensure the unhindered passage from Danzig to Warsaw of Polish troops returning from France, in keeping with the ceasefire conditions, the Danzig-Thorn rail line should be manned by allied forces, if only sparsely, perhaps Americans in the majority, at the discretion of the Chief Command of allied armies.

d. The question of the defence of the Eastern Borderlands against the Bolshevik wave takes the form of a protective cordon composed of allied armies (probably again, mostly American) to secure the supply centres in

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<sup>6</sup> The composition of the delegation and a fragment concerning Polish internal matters were omitted.

Poland while the task of Polish troops, which are not very numerous for the time being, would be to maintain order in the country and to build up Polish army cadres.

e. Any facilitation should be put in place to accelerate the transfer of the Polish army through Danzig, on rail to the coast and during the sea passage, which could be undertaken in agreement with the English navy and, possibly, with its collaboration.

f. Three able French generals should be assigned to the Polish army without delay, one as a consultant to General Haller, the second as commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps and the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> divisions, the third as commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> division of the Polish army.

The above conversation between the Chairman and Marshal Foch took place in circumstances that favour success on the issues raised.

These questions are discussed in the same spirit in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with Colonel House. The Chairman intends to discuss them also with Mr. Balfour, if he is able to see him as he passes through. Please shed an analogous light on them in England.

5. We will provide materials for the agreement about the transfer of Polish troops by sea to the English Admiralty as soon as we obtain them. They are presently being drawn up by the Chief Command and by the French War Ministry in agreement with the Military Department of the PNC.

*PDD 1919, doc. 4*

## 57

### *7 January 1919, report by the secretary of the Warsaw delegation for the Interim Chief of State*

Paris, Lutetia Hotel, 7 January 1919

1. The present report is the first written in Paris.

We arrived in the morning of 4 January with a nearly 5-day delay for reasons having to do with tickets, visas, etc. From Switzerland, we sent telegrams through Zaleski in Bern, and on our own from Geneva. In addition to this, Zaleski sent a written report.

2. In essence, the situation is fundamentally changed: France has given up on the idea of a Great Russia, while England never really had it. The fight

against Bolshevism is unpopular and turns out to be almost fictional without using Poland. For the time being, the remedy to all this is to be a great Poland, in its historical boundaries according to France, an idea that raises doubts in England and opposition in America. Given this, the Polish question is the order of the day; there is a torrent of notes and articles in the dailies, even if ill-informed. Our arrival was the event of the day and was written about in one way or another by the papers. The prospect of the Polish case—disastrous three weeks ago—can be described as exceptionally improved today.

3. Even though France was taken aback by England's unexpected decision to send an official mission to Warsaw following the speech by Pichon, we have not yet been officially received by the French government, and won't be until there is an agreement with the National Committee, as we were told yesterday by Mr. Pichon's office. The offices at the Quai d'Orsay, Mr. de Margerie, the director of the Polish Dept., Berthelot, the present one, Laroche, the deputy-director, and Degrand, the officer for Polish affairs, are entirely in PNC hands. Prior to our arrival, matters have been arranged in detail between them and the Committee. Two groups of opposition are emerging against this ministerial course: the first and essential one, whose aim is to topple the Clemenceau cabinet, is led by Briand, the presumed future prime minister, with the participation of Viviani and Franklin-Bouillon, the future foreign minister; while the second opposition group is directed against the offices of the foreign ministry, and possibly against Pichon himself and is led perhaps even by organs of the war ministry. The situation is extremely delicate as, on the one hand, it would be highly dangerous to give the slightest impression that Poles could be contributing to toppling Clemenceau. On the other, our friends reaching for such backing as that of the presidium of the Foreign Affairs Commission (Franklin-Bouillon) and the *Temps* (Herbette) are at the head of a movement directed against Pichon and the present leadership at Quai d'Orsay.

4. Negotiations with the National Committee started today. On the side of the Committee are Dmowski, Zamoyski, Seyda and Wielowieyski. The position of the Committee: Until now, we were not seen as a state delegation but as people close to governing circles in Poland. During the negotiations, it was noted that we are de facto a delegation of the Commandant. Strong demands for the change of government in Poland are probable, as is the tendency to maintain the National Committee, motivated by the possibility of changes in Poland and the need for the continuity of representation during the peace negotiations. We are seeking to dissolve the National Committee, or at least to subordinate it to a jointly-formed delegation for the peace negotiations.

5. We ask for a hasty appointment of delegates to the peace conference in either case: if an agreement is reached with the National Committee or if not.

Mr. Hubicki has resigned from the delegation for special reasons. As a result, Mr. Hempel who was supposedly promised he would be part of the delegation and who is very useful, wishes to leave Paris. We ask that all efforts to be made to send us further instructions and information.

*PDD 1919, doc. 12*

## 58

*8 January 1919, note from the representative of the PNC in Paris  
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France  
about the use of Romanian troops for the defence of Eastern Galicia*

Paris, le 8 Janvier 1919

Son Excellence  
Ministre Stephen Pichon  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Comité National Polonais se croit en devoir d'attirer l'attention de Votre Excellence sur les événements en Galicie orientale, où la situation de la population civile devient de jour en jour plus critique par suite du déchaînement du bolchevisme par des bandes ruthènes qu'encadrent des détachements réguliers allemands.

De tous côtés nous parviennent des témoignages dignes de foi qui s'accordent à dépeindre la conduite sauvage des agresseurs et l'état d'anarchie régnant actuellement en Galicie orientale. Les deux dépêches ci-jointes émanant des autorités polonaises de Galicie, présentent sous son vrai jour la situation et invitent le Comité National Polonais à faire auprès des Gouvernements alliés des démarches pressantes en vue de réprimer sans délai, par leur intervention, le bolchevisme qui sévit dans cette province.

Le Comité National Polonais est persuadé que le Gouvernement Français ne se désintéressera point de cette question qui représente un intérêt vital tant pour la Pologne elle-même que pour la cause de la civilisation européenne en général.

Je suis chargé par le Comité National de prier Votre Excellence de bien vouloir être notre intermédiaire auprès du Maréchal Foch pour provoquer d'urgence, au nom du Haut Commandement interallié, l'envoi en Galicie

d'une division roumaine stationnée sur la frontière galicienne, dans le but de protéger la population sans distinction de nationalité et de confession, contre les attentats de la barbarie bolcheviste.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Le Délégué du Comité National Polonais  
auprès du Gouvernement français:  
(signé) Erasme Piltz

*PDD 1919, doc. 15*

## 59

*9 January 1919, telegram from the Minister of External Affairs  
to the government representative in Bern  
about the situation in the Vilnius region*

Selon [les] nouvelles venant d'Allemagne [les] allemands voudraient combattre contre bolchévistes d'accord avec Entente et Polonais. stop Or à Vilno les allemands ont désarmé les troupes polonaises et les détachements formés sur place pour combattre les bolchévistes et ont livrés la ville aux armées rouges. stop Les allemands ont enlevés aux soldats polonais armes vêtements, souliers, argent, provisions. stop Ainsi les allemands paralysent notre action de défense contre le bolchévisme et livrent des contrées entières aux bolchévistes. stop Les rapports reçus par notre état-major des officiers rentrés de Vilno prouvent que les allemands agissent en accord parfait avec les bolchévistes. stop Si cette action contenue toute Lituanie et Pologne seront menacées d'invasion par armées rouges. stop Veillez porter ces faits à la connaissance des puissances alliées et commission d'armistice avec protestation solennelle du gouvernement polonais. stop Télégraphiez aussi à notre délégation extraordinaire [à ] Paris.

Ministre [des] affaires étrangères  
(signé) Wasilewski

*PDD 1919, doc. 17*

## 60

*9 January 1919, circular by the Press Section  
of the Ministry of External Affairs  
about the project of uniting Danzig with Poland*

Varsovie le 9.I.1919

Nous apprenons de Dantzig ce qui suit:

Les Polonais de la Poméranie affirment avec une juste fierté qu'ils ont sauvé pour la patrie son littoral et qu'ils considèrent comme leur mission de ressusciter dans la nation l'amour pour sa mer historique. Les colonies allemandes, en certaines régions assez importantes, se sont réconciliées avec l'idée d'incorporation à la Pologne. Les commerçants allemands à Dantzig entrent en contact officiel avec la représentation polonaise (Conseil Populaire) et déclarent que pour la grandeur et la prospérité de Dantzig la liaison avec l'état polonais est chose indispensable. L'avenir de Dantzig – le port dépend – selon eux – uniquement de l'union absolue avec tout le pays. L'idée d'un port artificiel en dehors de Dantzig fut accueillie avec consternation. Le consentement de l'Allemagne à ce que Dantzig se détache de son domaine s'exprime dans le fait d'évacuation de magasins militaires qui se trouvaient à Dantzig.<sup>7</sup>

Direction de la presse  
du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères

*PDD 1919, doc. 19*

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<sup>7</sup> It was determined during the Peace Conference that Danzig would not be part of the Polish or German state but would become a Free City (Articles 100-108 of the Versailles Treaty). The Free City Danzig was established on 15 November 1920, following the signing on 9 November of that year of the so-called Paris Convention regulating Poland's rights in Danzig and their mutual relations.

**61**

*11 January 1919, request by the Minister of External Affairs  
to the Council of Ministers to launch an investigation  
into the murder of members of the Russian Red Cross*

Warsaw, 11 January 1919

The Council of Ministers wishes to adopt the following proposal:

1) To delegate immediately an extraordinary investigative commission from the Ministry of Justice and Military Affairs to Wysokie Mazowieckie for the purpose of conducting an inquiry into the murder on 2 January 1919 in the forest near Wylina village of four members of the Russian Red Cross mission.

2) Oblige the said commission to communicate in detail the results of the investigation immediately upon its completion to the ministries of Justice and Military Affairs, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs.

Justification:

Given the seriousness of the criminal offense and the complications that have taken place with the Soviet government as a result and which have found expression in the arrest of members of the Representation in Russia, the inquiry should be given the status of an extraordinary operation, the more so as the Soviet government seems to suspect that agents of the Polish state are guilty of the crime.

Minister of Foreign Affairs  
*L. Wasilewski*

*PDD 1919, doc. 23*

## 62

*13 January 1919, telegram from Ignacy Paderewski  
to the Chairman of the PNC  
about assuming the office of Prime Minister*

13 January 1919

To His Excellency Mr. Berthelot  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
For Dmowski,  
President of the Polish National Committee  
Paris

## Radiotelegram

The present situation requires a change of government. The provisional head of the Polish government entrusted me with the difficult task of forming a council of ministers who would officiate irrespective of political affiliation, under my presidency. Considering the importance of the moment, the highly worrisome state of minds, the growing difficulties, and the almost universal opinion that only my humble services could improve the situation, I find myself obliged to take on this overwhelming responsibility.

The final decision depends on the result of the conference I will hold tomorrow evening with representatives of the Poznań area, the Galicians and the nationalist right. I am unable to hide from you that the given conditions are very hard. Certain incentives justify them entirely.

Commandant Piłsudski demands that the National Committee take on 10 new members, namely Dłuski, Sokolnicki, Sujkowski, Diamand, Thugutt, Wasilewski, Bojko, Patek, Downarowicz, and Ważyński or another Peasant Party member in his place. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be directed by a council composed of the following persons: one delegate from the Poznań Council, one from the Galician Committee, one from the Workers' Committee, one from the party district, and one activist, Bukowiecki, under my presidency. They wish Dmowski, Paderewski and Wasilewski be members of the Polish delegation to the conference. It remains to be learned when the discussions concerning Poland will be held at the Peace Conference. The ministry would present its resignation to the Constituent Assembly, which will be called for 10 February. Loyal to the task that was entrusted to me, I will not express any personal opinion, I will only ask for a response without delay and please consider me justified if, under pressure of events of unprecedented



weight, I accept the weight placed upon me prior to the settlement of the question of the National Committee.

Paderewski

*PDD 1919, doc. 26*

## 63

*14 January 1919, letter from the Supreme People's Council to the PNC  
about the situation in Poznań region*

POZNAŃ, 14 January 1919

To the National Committee in Paris

We take this opportunity to inform you once again of the situation here and ask you most fervently to take all possible steps with the Coalition for the purpose of providing us effective and prompt aid.

We have done everything that was possible so far to keep you informed—Commissioner Poszwiński's letter to Marian Seyda presented the events extensively—with no effect whatsoever. The high hopes that public opinion placed in the Coalition are being replaced by disappointment and bitterness. Paris and London seem not to understand the situation at all—especially London. Their attention, it seems to us, is exclusively focused on turning Poland into a united front against Bolshevism and from that stance our movement is seen as an undesirable diversion.

The English government's semi-official telegram to Warsaw advises us to refrain from "aggressive" steps, as if there could be any talk of aggression while, from the outset till this day, we are simply saving our skin and we do not wish to be destroyed and massacred by stirred-up nationalist German gangs.

Abroad there is no awareness of the fact that after the revolutionary coup, pan-Germanism and the HKT has kept its old predatory strength in the east. This was the basis for the calculations of reactionary and nationalist circles in Germany aimed at stirring up hatred against the Poles and at organising, under the guise of the Heimatschutz, an armed force for the purposes of forcefully overpowering the Polish population and, at a later stage, to return to the old system in Germany. The Supreme People's Council and Socialist Councils of Workers and Soldiers protested against the Heimatschutz, which is made up

of “patriotic” officers and of the worst elements of soldiery lured by high pay, accurately seeing in it a tool of reaction. On several occasions, the [German] government promised to restrain the Heimatschutz, and sent these anti-Polish units anyhow, hiding behind appearances that don’t stand up to any critique. This was the first provocation against the Poles. Sending foreign troops who behaved brutally and, in part looted the inhabitants and were the scourge not only of the Poles but also resident Germans, and irritated the Polish population enormously. HKT activists like Gintschel of the *Posener Tageblatt* and Cleinow (whom even the German Council of Workers and Soldiers ordered to be arrested for incitement) continued to conduct openly their anti-Polish activities. As a result, relations sharpened more and more. We managed to keep the peace despite it all, until the famous events of 27 and 28 December on the occasion of the arrival of Paderewski and the English mission. The fact that grenadiers of the 6<sup>th</sup> battalion, under the incitement of HKT activists, in armed procession, began to rip down English, French, American and Polish banners gave the signal for clashes. At this point, even in the countryside people spontaneously [began] to drive out the hated Heimatschutz units. There was no force to stop this movement. The German military and civilian authorities in Poznań declared that they are not controlling their soldiers and that they cannot take responsibility for maintaining security and peace. As a result, the Commissariat of the Supreme People’s Council had to take power into its own hands, otherwise a vacuum would have been in place. This is how the present situation arose. In principle, our present position is that we do not want to forestall the decisions of the peace conference and for this reason relations with Berlin are not being severed and no incorporation to Poland is being proclaimed (see Annex No. 1). But to turn back *faits accomplis* is impossible. We do not wish to wage war against Germany. But we have to defend ourselves against the Heimatschutz units, which are concentrated in the outlying areas of the province, in Bydgoszcz, Piła [Schneidemühl], Międzyrzecz, Leszno—and as units in neighbouring districts in Pomerania, in Frankfurt-am-Oder, and in Silesia. These units cannot be considered regular troops. They are mostly loose bands of soldiery, whose own officers do not control them, reinforced by armed German civilians from the province’s outlying areas. The Polish minority in these parts is exposed to the most terrible repressions. In Leszno 17 Polish citizens, including the lawyer Rusczyński and Father Kopczyński, were arrested and taken away without any reason. In Sobiejuchy, a dozen civilians coming home from work in the fields were arrested and jailed. In Włoszakowice, the sister of Father Prof. Górny was arrested and abducted, following a search that didn’t produce anything. The number of instances of looting, pillaging, burning of Polish villages (Drażno), and dropping of aerial bombs onto Polish settlements by the Germans are multiplying. The conflict is taking on the traits of a popular fight with all its inherent cruelties. The commissariat wishes to avoid a bloodbath and is seeking

to produce a truce on the basis of the status quo, leaving the matters of the entire partition to the conference. It would be an impossibility to cross out what has taken place. The Coalition should understand this and force the Germans to recognise a demarcation line that would not constitute settlement of the future boundary. We demand that the Coalition send here a military mediation commission and force the Germans to accept a truce. Otherwise blood will be spilt further and Great Poland will face complete destruction. The Germans, reinforced by the population of neighbouring provinces, enjoy a numerical advantage, possess many weapons, much ammunition, and strong artillery and are under the orders of trained officers. In any event, our situation is difficult, the more so as the geographical situation of the Duchy, continually threatened with encirclement from the north and the south, is unfavourable. We need help as a necessity and we have the right to demand it as the most loyal allies of the Entente from the beginning of the war. Do they not themselves understand that abandoning us in this situation would wreck the position of the Entente here for centuries? Also, the matter of turning the whole of Poland against the Bolsheviki is strictly tied to whether it proves possible to conclude a truce here, one that would entrench our authority at least in this part of the Duchy which we occupy (possibly under Berlin's formal suzerainty pending the Peace Conference). Out of necessity, we have begun to organise an armed force—Dowbor-Muśnicki was appointed commander-in-chief—and these troops could march against the Bolsheviki and would give excellent service if we had assured backing here in the shape of a demarcation line guaranteed by the Coalition. Dowbor is asking for a French officer as chief of staff. We are very much in favour and thus we ask for your support in this matter. Finally, the delays in Haller's arrival are having a greatly demoralising impact on spirits. We know that his task is, above all, to march eastward, but if he were to leave as little as the Rear Areas in Royal Prussia, this would be enormously helpful because the repressions there are terrible—prohibition against Polish meetings, speaking in Polish, in a word, the worst dictatorial system. We call upon you to explain to the Coalition the defensive nature of our struggle here and request help at all costs. If the Coalition doesn't hold back the Germans' war-like actions and does not force them to conclude a truce, terrible things will happen. The lives of thousands of people and the future of the entire province are at stake, so do act, by God, without losing even a moment, using all possible means, and without neglecting anything that could finally incline the Coalition to act.

Commissariat of the Supreme People's Council

*Wojciech Korfanty*

*Adam Poszwiński*

*Father [Stanisław] Adamski*

## 64

*14 January 1919, letter from the representative of the PNC in Paris  
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France  
in the matter of prisoners of war*

Paris, le 14 Janvier 1919

A Son Excellence  
Monsieur Stephen Pichon  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères  
Paris

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Comité National Polonais me charge de porter à votre connaissance l'état lamentable de plus de 500.000 hommes, prisonniers et ouvriers polonais dont le sort nous est dépeint par un compte-rendu reçu de Pologne et datant de quelques jours seulement.

Ces malheureuses gens qui supportent assez fréquemment leurs souffrances en commun avec d'autres prisonniers alliés, notamment avec des Serbes, ne se sont guère ressenties jusqu'ici de l'influence bienfaisante de l'armistice.

En effet, les différentes autorités locales allemandes cherchant surtout à se soustraire aux ordres venus de plus haut, se montrent peu soucieuses d'exécuter les ordonnances relatives aux prisonniers. Elles suppriment à ces derniers tous moyens de vivre et les objets de première nécessité tout en refusant de leur donner les wagons nécessaires pour les renvoyer chez eux. A d'autres endroits si quelque nourriture est encore accordée, les portions sont si congrues que ce n'est rien moins que condamner ces prisonniers à une mort lente par la faim.

Pour donner des exemples concrets nous pouvons citer les camps de Güstrow et de Parchim où sont enfermés des légionnaires ayant combattu à Kaniewo sous les ordres du Général Haller. Un témoin oculaire qui est parvenu exceptionnellement à visiter ces camps, raconte les traitements inhumains qui y sont infligés aux prisonniers. Déclarés traîtres à la patrie, ils sont battus et réduits à la faim, on leur enlève argent et nourriture ainsi que tous les paquets expédiés par leurs familles. Dépouillés de presque tous leurs vêtements, ils sont munis de légers habits d'été et de chaussures en papier. Jusqu'ici pour des raisons inconnues les prisonniers des deux camps mentionnés n'ont pas été libérés.

De semblables abus ont lieu à Berxen et à Gütersloh sans que les victimes voient poindre la libération.

Je ne cite que ces cas, afin d'éviter de prolonger indéfiniment la liste. Ces relations douloureuses ne me paraissent du reste en rien exagérées vu que M. le Maréchal Foch constatait l'autre jour l'état peu satisfaisant des prisonniers français rapatriés d'Allemagne.

J'en viens maintenant à des propositions pratiques pour remédier à cette situation lamentable des prisonniers polonais et qui n'a fait qu'empirer depuis la rupture des relations diplomatiques entre le Gouvernement de Varsovie et l'Allemagne. Il paraîtrait indiqué au Comité National Polonais de créer d'urgence une Mission chargée par les Alliés de visiter immédiatement les camps de prisonniers en Allemagne, de vérifier leur état sur place et d'étudier les conditions de leur rapatriement. Je vous serais reconnaissant, Monsieur le Ministre, de bien vouloir présenter l'ensemble de cette question à M. le Maréchal Foch et en particulier ce projet qui ce nous semble pourra apporter quelque amélioration au sort des prisonniers.

Enfin je serais heureux si vous vouliez bien soumettre une autre question encore dont l'importance est aussi très grande.

Il s'agit des prisonniers russes rapatriés d'Allemagne à travers la Pologne en dépit des engagements formels du Gouvernement allemand de les faire passer par la Prusse Orientale et les provinces baltiques. Les convois de ces malheureux expédiés contre toute loi d'humanité sans vêtement et sans nourriture, dans des trains non chauffés, se déversent continuellement sur la Pologne remplissant les hôpitaux de gens incapables de poursuivre leur route et semant dans la population des éléments démoralisés, fauteurs de troubles et d'anarchie. Ces transports sont dénués à un tel point du nécessaire qu'à chaque passage de trains on trouve des gens morts par suite de privation. Cette manière d'agir des Allemands est non seulement en contradiction avec le droit international, mais encore avec la plus simple humanité et provoque le plus des difficultés intérieures en Pologne où les sociétés de secours ne disposent ni de sommes d'argent suffisantes, ni de vêtements, ni surtout de vivres pour faire face à de pareilles misères. Ces sociétés en appellent donc aux Gouvernements alliés pour qu'ils mettent un terme à de pareils abus, en faisant à l'Allemagne les notifications utiles dans ce but.

Espérant, Monsieur le Ministre, que vous voudrez bien prendre en considération ces questions dont dépendent tant de vies humaines, je vous prie d'agréer, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Signé E. Piltz

## 65

*14 January 1919, note from the government representative in Bern to the Ministry of External Affairs about British policy toward Poland*

Bern, 14 January 1919

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw

About England's attitude to Poland.<sup>x</sup>

England's policy with regard to Poland arises from two standpoints:

1. It is an episode in the fundamental antagonism between Wilson and Clemenceau.

2. It is an element of the English cabinet's Eastern European, and especially Russian policy.

In light of the approaching peace conference, two very distinct camps are beginning to form within the Entente. The English-American-Japanese understanding is in opposition to France and Italy, whose territorial and financial appetites, potentially delaying or even precluding a lasting settlement in Europe, are meeting with conscious and decisive opposition from America and England. There is a number of contentious issues. Besides freedom of the seas, the question of disarmament, war reparations, and the League of Nations,<sup>8</sup> there is, above all, the more recent matter of the intervention in Russia and the related Polish question. England and America are against intervention in Russia because they wish for an end to the war. Especially England's internal situation (Labour in opposition, the need for rapid "reconstruction") doesn't allow for further military expeditions. One should not lose sight of England's own interest. England has no interest in rebuilding a strong Russia (historical experience). Quite the opposite, today's state of affairs rules out Russian competition for England in the East for a number of years. Already today, England's pressure in the East is becoming more evident (the Trans-Caucasus, the Black Sea, etc.). Furthermore, Russia's fragmentation provides significant opportunities for England to influence the new states that emerged on

<sup>x</sup> This report is, at once, an answer to Mr Jan Ciechanowski's letter of 22 November 1918.

<sup>8</sup> On 25 January 1919, the president of the USA presented the project of the League of Nations during the Paris conference and proposed to make it part of the peace treaty. On the same day, a special conference commission was formed to work on the provisions concerning the League of Nations. On 14 February 1919, the draft statute of the League of Nations was presented.

former Russian territory. Influence in Finland and Estonia is synonymous with predominance in the eastern Baltic, where a new Gibraltar could emerge easily. England's present policy in Turkey could gain enormously from the existence of a more or less defined Ukrainian state, a future English flank position, if any such Ukrainian state was to be created.

Similarly, English interest is only conclusive in English policy with regard to Eastern Galicia because English capitalists are demanding the incorporation of oilfields into the Polish state. Such interests help explain why England freed itself from French influence and is conducting its own Eastern policy. One of the principles of this policy is respect for self-determination on the territory of old Russia. A second (in keeping with French policy, this time) the notion of an isolation belt. Hence, a certain tendency to recognise or at least entreat the existing Russian governments (General Kolchak, the Omsk government,<sup>9</sup> etc.), including the Bolsheviks. Against this background, England's policy with regard to Poland and its de facto recognition of the Polish government are understandable. A strong and anti-Bolshevik Poland is in England's interest. England needs a strong state on the Baltic and sees the most rational resolution of this question in the creation of a strong Poland in union with Lithuania. It further needs an anti-Bolshevik Poland, because it reserves for it a dual anti-Bolshevik role (against Russia and Germany). This is the explanation for the desire for an orderly and internally cohesive Poland, which is reflected in England's strong interest in Polish internal matters. Similar considerations, but with the dominance of fundamental elements (the right to self-determination, etc.) are also behind America's policy with regard to Poland. America's position is not decided yet and whether the United States adopts the English or French point of view on the Polish question will depend above all on the results brought by the information mission and from the general European climate. In any case, it is telling that *The Times* (28 December) stressed the concordance of English and American policy with regard to Poland.<sup>10</sup>

In some respect, England's entire policy with regard to the National Committee can be seen as an episode in the French-English conflict. Under no circumstances should the importance of this conflict be overestimated, however.

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<sup>9</sup> On 18 November 1918, Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak assumed dictatorial powers in the anti-Bolshevik All-Russian Temporary Government (also called the Siberian Government or the Directorate), which had its seat in Omsk in Siberia.

<sup>10</sup> On 28 December 1918, *The Times* carried the article "The Need of Poland", which stressed the community of views between the U.S. and Great Britain about the necessity to defend Poland's independence, which was threatened by Bolshevik imperialism.

The English government does not favour the Committee, whose stance about England is at the same level as that of Mr. Pichon, who is fought by the English cabinet as the personification of the interventionist policy in Russia. In combating those trends, England recognised the Polish government in Warsaw. Hence, the position of the Warsaw government with regard to the West is to base itself on a fundamentally strong England.

A.B.<sup>11</sup>

*PDD 1919, doc. 36*

## 66

*[before 17 January] 1919, memorandum by the secretary  
of the Warsaw delegation to the Foreign Office  
about the situation in Poland*

1. La Pologne traverse des dangers et des crises, mais elle est entrée dans la voie d'organisation d'un Etat et d'un droit d'Etat régulier. Le gouvernement du Général PILSUDSKI a apaisé cette crise et atténué ces dangers. Son gouvernement qui dure depuis le 10 Novembre a arrêté le développement du bolchevisme, réprimé des essais d'émeutes, divisé les socialistes nationaux et modérés avec le bolchevisme et maintenu l'ordre et la sécurité publique du pays sans avoir, à peu d'exceptions près provoqué des répressions ou des effusions de sang inutiles. Le Général s'est voué surtout à l'organisation de l'armée nationale. Il a trouvé au mois de Novembre en Pologne 4.000 soldats ayant passé l'école militaire allemande, donc sans caractère national déterminé. L'effectif est aujourd'hui de 85.000 hommes, dont la plupart volontaires mobilisés de l'organisation militaire polonaise (P.O.W.), organisation secrète qui, pendant la révolution allemande, chassa les allemands du pays, organisa la défense nationale et maintint l'ordre public.

2. Ainsi le régime PILSUDSKI sauva la Pologne de l'anarchie et ceci au moment même, où la situation intérieure économique de la Pologne et la situation extérieure de ce pays présenta les plus grands et les plus imminents dangers. Au point de vue de l'intérieur, la Pologne fut désorganisée, dévastée, et exténuée par le régime allemand: l'industrie tout entière est détruite, les ouvriers chôment, et les usines ne possèdent ni les machines, ni le matériel,

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<sup>11</sup> Adam Benis.



ni les matières premières, tout étant transporté en Allemagne. Sept cent mille ouvriers envoyés pendant la guerre en Allemagne pour travailler aux usines de guerre, rentrent aujourd'hui dans le pays, sans pouvoir trouver du travail. Dans la même situation se trouve plus d'un million de soldats revenant de Russie ou des camps de prisonniers de guerre d'Allemagne. Quant à l'agriculture, on a enlevé les machines, désorganisé la production et surtout on a réquisitionné encore en Octobre dernier des vivres, en laissant le pays dans une crise aigue d'approvisionnement.

Donc le pays est sans vivres, et sans travail, les produits sont chers, et l'argent réduit au cours allemand n'a plus qu'une valeur relative. Nous approchons d'une crise très grave au cas où l'Europe occidentale ou l'Amérique ne viendrait nous secourir avant le printemps prochain.

3. Le danger extérieur de la Pologne est formé par la poussée bolcheviste russe, s'étendant de la Lituanie au Nord, jusqu'à la frontière de la Roumanie. Cette poussée menace en même temps VILNIUS au nord, LEMBERG au sud des confins orientaux de la Pologne. L'aile sud de cette poussée est formée par la Ruthénie galicienne et l'Ukraine; les partis ukrainiens de gauche, qui ont fondé le gouvernement de Petlura, ont été depuis le mois d'Octobre alliés du bolchevisme de l'Ukraine, soutenus par le gouvernement bolcheviste de MOSCOU. Aujourd'hui, l'aide apportée par eux au soulèvement des ruthènes contre les polonais en Galicie au moment même où les armées polonaises sont tournées au nord par les armées de la Russie bolcheviste est l'exécution même de cette alliance.

La Pologne possède aujourd'hui une armée de près de 100.000 hommes, très vite organisée et non suffisante au point de vue des armements, de matériel de guerre et de l'équipement. Cette armée très enthousiaste, bien disciplinée, n'est pas à même de tenir tête sur tout le front oriental sans avoir reçu pendant l'hiver courant l'aide efficace des alliés.

4. La Pologne était représentée jusqu'à présent dans les Etats Alliés et en Amérique par le Comité National Polonais de PARIS procédé par Monsieur Roman DMOWSKI. La Pologne sait que le fait d'avoir reconnu cette représentation, prouve le désir sincère des Etats Alliés et de l'Amérique de rétablir la Pologne indépendante. Aujourd'hui cette représentation se trouve en face d'un pouvoir régulier établi en Pologne par le Général PILSUDSKI qui décida de continuer la politique étrangère du Comité National Polonais de PARIS. La Délégation envoyée par le Général PILSUDSKI à PARIS posait au Comité National de la reconnaître comme représentation de la Pologne à l'Etranger sous la condition expresse qu'il reconnaisse le pouvoir du Chef de l'Etat en Pologne et l'unité de commandement de l'armée polonaise sous le commandement général des Armées Alliées.

5. Les questions les plus urgentes posées par la Pologne auprès des Etats Alliés et de l'Amérique, sont les suivantes:

1) Renforts à l'armée polonaise au point de vue armement et équipement, ensuite par une force suffisante à soutenir la défense polonaise contre l'anarchie orientale.

2) Conclusions pour ce but d'un accord spécial militaire entre les Etats Alliés, y compris l'Amérique et la Pologne.

3) L'approvisionnement de la Pologne.

4) Réglementation équitable des questions d'ordre financier et du contrôle.

Pour arriver aux accords nécessaires, il est indispensable et urgent d'établir des relations diplomatiques avec le gouvernement de la Pologne. C'est dans ce but que la Délégation Polonaise poursuit ses pourparlers avec le Comité National et c'est dans ce but qu'elle entre en relations officieuses avec les représentants des gouvernements alliés, c'est dans ce but enfin, qu'elle désire ardemment l'envoi des missions officielles des Etats de l'Entente et de l'Amérique à VARSOVIE.

*PDD 1919, doc. 47*

## 67

*17 January 1919, letter from the Interim Chief of State  
to the representative of the Warsaw delegation in the matter  
of the formation of the Paderewski government  
and the political situation in the country*

The Belvedere, 17 January 1919

To Dr. Kazimierz Dłuski  
Chairman of the Polish Mission in Paris

In replacement of the Moraczewski cabinet, a new cabinet, whose composition is given in the enclosed papers, came to power today.

The motives for the cabinet's replacement are the following:

The lack of technical means and the lack of the possibility to produce them in Poland made it necessary for the country's foreign policy to strive to obtain financial aid, provisioning, and arms from the Entente.

This aim could most easily have been reached by means of an understanding with the National Democrats.

In internal policy, my aim was to bring about a Sejm without excessively sharp internal struggles that could lead to blood being shed.

This aim could be attained by leaning on part of the left (the People's Party and the Polish Socialist Party), and this led to the division of the entire social left into two camps and weakened the force of its opposition action.

Difficulties consisted in maintaining these two lines in concord and parallel, as one was leaning out of necessity of internal policy to ...,<sup>12</sup> and the second was leaning in internal policy downwards.

Difficulties grew when, contrary to my earlier expectations, that Germany only now ... began to evacuate their occupation territories of the Ober-Ost, the evacuation movement sped up much earlier and consequently the threat of a Bolshevik invasion became very real indeed. The Germans withdrawing from the east are not in the least beaten and demoralised—they constitute a force to be seriously reckoned with. They are collaborating with the Bolsheviks and Poland is facing a necessary war against this German-Bolshevik alliance, a war that only Poland ... has to take on its own shoulders.

Those facts mean that the question of help from the Entente became a most pressing matter, hence the necessity for a Paderewski cabinet, through whom, as I trust, it will be possible to obtain this help.

In keeping with the instruction given to you upon your departure, and paying the price of a cabinet of experts, I wanted to gain the agreement of the Paris Committee, hence I deliberately delayed the issue of creating a new cabinet, so this concession could remain the price for which you would secure the compromise with the Paris Committee. Communication difficulties, the lack of frequent news from you generally and of news how your negotiations went in this cabinet of experts matter, made impossible the swap the cabinet of experts in exchange for the agreement with the Paris Committee.

A catastrophic lack of ammunition, of the German type especially, and totally empty state coffers above all, have forced me to accelerate decisions about the cabinet of experts. The present cabinet, very incautiously, took no steps to ensure technical means of printing new banknotes and, at the last moment, when the financial catastrophe was upon us, became convinced that striking coins can only begin in mid-February. The inhabitants of Poznań Province, who have millions stashed away, didn't want to place this money at the disposal of the Moraczewski cabinet.

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<sup>12</sup> Illegible fragments.

The present cabinet of experts is to facilitate obtaining help from the Entente, which is already promising it, but to an insufficient degree. Secondly, it is to pull the country out of the financial situation.

As to the Paris Committee, the agreement with Paderewski is that 8 or 10 persons appointed by me are to represent Poland in Paris. The list of names that was given to Paderewski is not the definitive one. I deliberately included on it names of persons who would not accept the mandate, and this will provide a pretext to modify the list. The left will be preponderant on the list. In any case, it will include Dłuski, Sokolnicki, and Sujkowski from your mission and it will be complemented by five or seven names, Diamand and Patek certainly among them. Other names have not been fixed yet. The agreement with the Paris Committee will thus be the third benefit of the change of cabinet.

A positive effect is that Paderewski, by assuming his power from me, in so doing recognises me as the Chief of State. Secondly, by thanking the outgoing cabinet, he recognises what has taken place until now in Polish politics and stands in opposition to the passionate and ruthless criticism of the cabinet by the National Democrats, who condemned indiscriminately all of its work thus far. The National Democrats are none too pleased with the change of the cabinet. For a few days, they had given vent to their disappointment with Paderewski, and its intransigence will, it would seem, increase the distance between Paderewski and official National Democrat spheres.

The appointment of a cabinet of experts will bring about difficulties from the left. The issue will be whether the PPS will be able to withstand pressure from below victoriously. It will be the more difficult for it because since the beginning it stood for a Popular Workers' Government as a dogma. The strike announced in protest against the resignation of the Moraczewski cabinet is to be limited by the PPS to a one-day demonstration. I expect that the fast-approaching election date will induce a fever that will soak up a significant quantity of energy and will not allow it to be released in other directions.

As you know, Colonel Wade, officially heading the English mission, is here. As is indicated by the enclosed excerpts from his notes, he advises, in the name of his government, against anti-German actions in Poznań Province. Several days ago, the Entente, through Vix's intermediary, demanded the withdrawal of Polish troops from Hungary's old boundary. Lately, Colonel Wade, during a conference with me, declared the desire to mediate between us and the Ruthenians. Rozwadowski wasn't able and probably won't be able to create in Eastern Galicia any faits accomplis that would be favourable for us in the foreseeable future and prior to the initiation of mediation talks.

Such mediation will be against our interests. Colonel Wade would wish to put an end to our war with the Ruthenians by way of the occupation of Eastern Galicia, i.e., the occupation of Lwow and Borysław, by Entente troops.

I explained to him that in the case of Poznań Province, Spiš and Orava, the decisions of the Entente were to Poland's disadvantage. If in the matter of Lwow the Entente was to decide again in our disfavour, then any government to accept such a settlement would fall under the weight of the public's outrage.

Competition between England and France can be felt. As proof, let me give the fact that as soon as Colonel Wade found out about French General Barthélemy's intention of travelling from Budapest to Lwow (he is to arrive in Cracow tomorrow with 50 of his officers), he immediately expressed his desire to go to Lwow as well.

Sending Dowbor to Poznań was deliberate. I expect that he and his officers, by their lack of acquaintance with the service as by their Russian behaviour, will elicit among the Polish soldiers of the former German army, used as they are to good and responsible officers, dissatisfaction and disappointment with his person among Poznań political agents.

Foreign affairs will be entrusted to the Commission, whose makeup was not yet fixed, and whose chairman will be Paderewski. The Commission will be made up, given the refusal of the socialists, one person from the Peasant Party, one representative of the Inter-Party Circle and one from the centre (Bukowiecki), and then one representative each from Galicia, Silesia and Poznań Province. Personal details have yet to be determined.

The army will be entrusted with the following tasks: 1) the campaign in Eastern Galicia; 2) holding the boundary in Volhynia; 3) aid for the Poznań Duchy, Silesia, and Western Prussia, being liberated now on their own initiative; 4) creating militarily *faits accomplis* in the North-Eastern Borderlands, at least in the area of Suwałki and Grodno; 5) hold the Bolshevik wave away from Polish lands.

Through Polish lands, the Bolsheviks intend to link up with Bolshevism in the west, with the movement of the German Spartacists.<sup>13</sup> The operations of the Bolshevik Soviet armies through the seizure of Vilnius attained an important political and military success, worrying society and exciting local Bolshevism.

Besides this, the army has to maintain law and order within the country.

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<sup>13</sup> The supporters of revolution in Germany. The Universal Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils held in Berlin in December 1918 condemned the socialists' collaboration with the government and called for the formation of a revolutionary government. The Communist Party of Germany, formed on 1 January 1919, in conjunction with the Spartacist Union, decided to launch an uprising in Berlin. The "Spartacist Uprising" (5-15 January 1919) was a failure.

The military campaign against the Ruthenians forced us to direct very important forces in this area. By these same, the front against the Bolsheviks is absolutely too weak, insufficient, and there is a danger that the Polish forces won't be able to hold back the Bolshevik thrust. In addition, the country, by sending off all its soldiers ready for battle, was denuded of units more or less trained and disciplined, something that may potentially lead to the inability to quash internal riots. There are no more human reserves. Good expansion of the army depends on obtaining arms, ammunition, equipment, artillery material, and other technical implements. All reserves captured thus far from the occupiers have been used up and certain parts of battalions are not fully or sufficiently equipped.

The thought brought up by Zwiśłocki of giving us the weapons of the Mackensen army should be supported.<sup>14</sup> Attention should be paid that this does not exclude artillery materials and modern armaments. Technically speaking, the Bolsheviks are well supplied.

The question of the military mission who would be added to the Polish representation has not yet been fully discussed with Paderewski. I would like to send to Paris Admiral Porębski and Major Zwierkowski as sailors, General Romer and Colonel Kukiel for matters having to do with land armies. The task of this mission would be to explain Poland's boundaries from a military point of view and to work toward getting aid from the Entente for the Polish army. It would be good if, in discussions with the military, Wieniawa were to stress the need for Polish high-ranking officers to go to Paris.

Your task at the Paris Committee is, above all, to make sure the Paris Committee doesn't meddle in Polish internal affairs but limits itself to defending Polish interests with respect to the Entente.

J. Piłsudski

*PDD 1919, doc. 48*

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<sup>14</sup> This refers mainly to the troops occupying Romania. They were mainly German and under the command of Field Marshal August von Mackensen.

## 68

*21 January 1919, report by the envoy  
of the Supreme Commander to Budapest for the General Staff  
about the discussion with General Barthélemy*

SECRET

To the General Staff of the Polish Army

in WARSAW

## REPORT No. 1

From my long discussion with French General BARTHÉLEMY, I got the impression that this is the first Entente mission in Poland that could have a far-reaching influence on Polish-Ukrainian relations. General BARTHÉLEMY has far-reaching powers in this respect, he understands and is interested in the Polish question and is decidedly favourably disposed toward us. I can't say, however, what high instructions BARTHÉLEMY received to investigate Ukraine and the Ukrainians. It is very possible that he intends to go straight through Lwow to Eastern Galicia and to Ukraine. This intent should be firmly hindered. In general, as to the entity called Ukraine, thus far the Coalition doesn't have a fixed position as it doesn't know the state of affairs there. It doesn't recognise or support Ukraine, but reserves its decision. The fact the Bolshevism prevails there speaks loudest to them. Our opponents, the Czechs above all, are striving to demonstrate the viability of Ukrainian nationhood and statehood and Ukraine's affairs as normal. Colonel VIX and the French mission are favourably disposed toward Poland, speaking at every opportunity of Poland as a pays allié and truly wishing to help it materially. The first step in this respect was issuing Poland with 17 railcars worth of arms and ammunition from the former MACKENSEN army.

Yesterday, they repeated in writing their specific proposal to turn in their weapons in exchange for coal. I append it here with a request for a prompt reply. This is basically a good thing and beneficial for us, the more so as it is an unpleasantness done to the Czechs, who were first to foist their coal supplies, but dragged things out, lamenting that they have no coal mine in Karvina.

The nation that obstructs us the most in our friendly relations with the Coalition are the Czechs, whose policy seeks to debase our viability as a state and demonstrate our powerlessness in the face of spreading anarchy and Bolshevism in the country. The Czechs' policy is the more dangerous for us as

among supporters of that policy are the English, who find themselves in the role of defenders of the Czechs' grasping aspirations and are their advocates in relation to other Coalition states. Despite this, I think that friendly Polish-Czech relations have to be maintained, if only because they undeniably enjoy a higher standing with the Coalition than we do. The sole means to remedy the situation would be a rapid consolidation of our cause at the very source in London or, indirectly, in Paris, with the deliberate aim of weakening the Czechs' influence in eastern matters on the Coalition or England.

/-/ JERZY POTOCKI

Budapest, 21 January 1919

*PDD 1919, doc. 57*

## 69

*21 January 1919, ciphered telegram from the Minister of External Affairs to the Prime Minister of France about the Ober-Ost's cooperation with Polish troops against the Bolsheviks*

21 Janvier [191] 9

*Mr le président du Conseil  
Clemenceau  
Paris*

Les pourparlers du Dr. Kolankowski, délégué par le Gouvernement Polonais et du capitaine Gaşiorowski délégué par l'Etat Major pour traiter avec le General Falkenhayn, Chef de Armée Oberkommando 10 la question du libre passage des troupes polonaises par Grodno dans la direction de l'Est pour combattre les troupes des Soviets – furent rompus à cause d'un refus catégorique du General Falkenhayn. stop La décision définitive sera prise par le Gouvernement Central à Berlin ou se rendit le Dr. Bühlmann représentant du dit Gouvernement. stop Le terme pour une réponse est fixé au 26 courant 10 heures du matin. stop Nous espérons que le Conseil d'Armistice à Spa<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> This refers to the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission (also called the International Armistice Commission or the Spa Commission), convened on 12 November 1918, by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armed Forces, Marshal Ferdinand Foch.



voudra bien exercer la pression nécessaire sur le Gouvernement Central de Berlin pour obtenir le libre passage des troupes polonaises à Grodno. stop

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères:  
/–/ Paderewski

*PDD 1919, doc. 59*

## 70

*21 January 1919, instruction from the Prime Minister to the PNC  
about aid from the Entente*

Paris

Ministère des affaires étrangères  
Comité National Polonais

Please present what follows to the governments of allied states: The Polish government is in possession of incontrovertible evidence that the Ukrainian uprising has been prepared by the old Austrian government in keeping with the German plan of leading Poland to the greatest possible state of anarchy at the moment when Polish matters will be decided at the Peace Conference; that the Ukrainian military action in Galicia is directed by German officers, that the Ukrainian uprising in Galicia persists and spreads mainly thanks to help in the form of war material and instructors provided by German forces from Ukraine, and the troops of Petlura by volunteers recruited throughout Ukraine; that the Ukrainian uprising, which had been first led by the directors of Ukrainian policy so as to create a distinct Ukrainian province within Austria, is now taking on an increasingly Bolshevik character. The question of the Ukrainian uprising in Galicia is in essence one of the aspects of the internal consolidation of the emerging Polish state, on par with the issue of the Bolshevik propaganda massively disseminated in Poland by the Germans. Poland is determined to deal with it using its own resources. Nevertheless, the army presently at Poland's disposal is insufficient to repulse simultaneously the onslaught of Bolshevik forces seeking to link up through Poland with the German Spartacists and, at the same time, to overcome the uprising in Galicia,

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The commission, sitting in Spa, Belgium, was composed of representatives from the American, British, French, Belgian, and German general staffs.

considering the active assistance it receives from the Kiev Directorate and from German troops in Ukraine, which by means of a special Convention have committed themselves to the Directorate to protect the right flank of the Ukrainian troops active in Galicia against Poland.

Poland found itself in this position above all because the bulk of the Polish nation thwarted all attempts to create a Polish army under the German and Austrian occupation.

The Polish government expects that, in consideration of these facts, allied states will not deny Poland prompt assistance. As far as restoring order in the country, defending against Bolshevik actions in the former Russian partition, and the pacification of the Ukrainian-Bolshevik uprising in Galicia, Poland need no other assistance but war materials necessary to build an army based on universal conscription, and in the acceleration of the arrival to Poland of Polish troops from France. Poland, however, also needs direct military help so that the uprising in Galicia is not continually supplied from Ukraine by German troops and the armies of the Kiev Directorate. Romania could effectively counter this by deploying its troops along the boundary between Galicia and the former Russian Empire. Prof. Głąbiński is travelling to Jassy on a special mission to conduct the relevant negotiations with the Romanian government. Also, to restrain the march of Bolshevik troops on Poland, it would be necessary, along with the arrival of the Polish troops from France, for allied states to begin a military action against the Bolsheviks from the Baltic ports. Given such help, Poland would be able to take up the task lying in the interests of the entire European civilisation—stopping the Bolshevik invasion, one of whose emanations is Ukrainism in its present form. Not only among the Ukrainian people but also in its military, Bolshevik tendencies are as predominant today as in January 1918. The principal difference lies in Moscow's centralism and Kiev's federalism. This difference can be exploited for momentary advantage. But Ukraine, always unpredictable and excessively imbued with Bolshevik agitation, can never be a lasting base for the struggle against Bolshevism. Only Poland could become such a base. At the present time, on account of a lack of ammunition and in order to transfer part of the troops operating in Galicia to the action against the Bolsheviks, the Polish government is forced to embark on truce negotiations with the Ukrainian-Bolshevik insurgents. Wade, sent on a special mission to Poland by the English government, is helping in these negotiations, as is the Anglo-French mission that arrived from Cracow and is headed by General Barthélemy. The government, which, in a proclamation of 16 January announcing its formation, firmly stated it considers the Polish Republic an allied state, requests that Coalition governments issue instructions to the above mission, stating that: 1) Poland is an allied state and that Polish armies are allied troops; 2) that the Ukrainian uprising, which is closely related with Germany, cannot be treated as an equal belligerent party, but

as a movement whose aim is to spread anarchy in Poland on par with the Bolshevik invasion, on the one hand, and to carry out by violence faits accomplis preceding the decisions of the Peace Conference, on the other; 3) that until the Peace Conference defines Poland's boundaries, all of Galicia, which already in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was Polish, and since the 14<sup>th</sup> has interruptedly belonged to Poland, has to be recognised as Polish territory and any possible truce with the Ukrainians can only be military in nature. In no circumstances can it affect that territory's future political affairs. As the Ukrainians have thus far not given up on their demand that Polish forces withdraw beyond the San, a truce with them doesn't seem possible without great losses for Poland. The Polish nation would rather endure a war in the most difficult conditions than to give up any part of the Polish population in Galicia to be exterminated by the Ukraino-Bolsheviks. The wish of the entire Polish nation is to provide the widest possible autonomy for the Ruthenian population in the Polish state. This autonomy should be instituted by the Legislative Sejm of the Republic of Poland, however. To establish it by means of a truce with a revolution of an outstandingly Bolshevik nature would undermine the bases for any legal order in the emerging Polish state. A truce dictated by the will of the allied states and treating by the same allied Poland and the Ukrainians, who have been enemies of the allied states through the entire duration of the war, would give rise to universal gloom in the Polish nation. Poland will be deeply grateful to the allied states for helping in negotiations with the Ukrainians. The Polish government hopes that in a possible settlement with Petlura, the allied states will demand as an indispensable condition that the Ukrainians cease all war operations against Poland and recognise all of Galicia, with the districts of Kamieniec and Płoskirowsk, as Polish land.

Président du cabinet des ministres  
*Paderewski*

*PDD 1919, doc.61*

## 71

*23 January 1919, telegram from the Chief of the General Staff  
to the Interim Chief of State about the situation in Teschen Silesia*

Warsaw, 23 January 1919

To the Chief of State

Enclosed is an excerpt from the dispatch received today from the National Council in Teschen:

Coalition officers came to see the Commanding officer of the local forces, Latinik, and demanded that Polish troops leave Polish Silesia within two hours and announced an immediate occupation. We protest this violation and ask for help and immediate instructions. Brigadier Latinik declared that he will not give in without an order to do so from the Command in Cracow. The situation is dangerous. The National Council considers this action to be a Czech deception and requests immediate instructions, as the deadline passes today at 1:00 PM.

National Council

Dr. Michejda, Father Londzin, Reger

Colonel Latinik's orders from here are:

- 1) Not to give in and answer force with force.<sup>16</sup>
- 2) To direct the supposed Coalition officers to Warsaw.

Chief Command  
Szeptycki  
Divisional General

*PDD 1919, doc. 63*

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<sup>16</sup> On 23 January 1919, Czech troops attacked part of Teschen Silesia and crossed the line set forth in the understanding of 5 November 1918.

## 72

*24 January 1919, report by the representative of the Ministry  
of External Affairs in Moscow for the Minister of External Affairs  
about the repressions against mission employees*

Moscow, 24 January 1919

To the Minister of External Affairs in Warsaw

## REPORT

In addition to the dispatch of 11 January sent via Petrograd (Danish Legation / Helsingfors / Polish Representation), I have the honour to communicate what follows:

During the night of 9 January at 1:00 AM, a unit of Red Army soldiers arrived at the Representation in Moscow, at its head an All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Corruption (VChKa) representative who, in the presence of the head of the local House Committee, conducted a search of the room occupied by the Deputy-Representative, Counsellor T. Mierzyński (a copy of the protocol is enclosed), after which Counsellor Mierzyński was arrested and taken away, the room sealed, and a guard of three Red Army soldiers left at the premises of the Representation.

On the same night, the following officials were arrested in their apartments: the official for special tasks Michał Łubieński and Stanisław de Rosset, members of the Economic Council, Jakub Dunowicz, bank director Michał Żółtowski, and Bernard Zaloman. All were arrested following a search of their apartments.

On that same 9 January, the acting Head of the Representation Office, Mr. Teodor Umiński, having incidentally learned that he was also on the list of persons subject to interning, went voluntarily to the premises of the Representation, where he was arrested. In addition to persons named on the list, there were also the names of Mr. Jakub Minc, Stefan Krasnodębski, Józef Bahan, and Marian Abramowicz, who had not been arrested as of today.

Information obtained the following day through private channels but from official sources revealed that on the previous day, the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had received three almost identical dispatches from Minsk: from the Central Executive Committee of SDKPiL in Russia, from the local Commissar

and from the Rosta<sup>17</sup> telegraph agency correspondent. They stated, based on the account by Leon Alter, who had arrived in Minsk, that members of the Russian Red Cross mission had been executed in Poland. The telegram from the CC of the SDKPiL moreover included a demand that severe repressive measures be used with respect to members of the Polish Representation in Russia and carried, in addition to the official signature, the signatures by name of all CC members.

In the evening of the same day, the Moscow *Izvestia* and the bulletin board communiqué of the Rosta paper carried a 7 January note that was repeated the following day in the official *Izvestia* as a communiqué under the heading "From the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs." We enclose the above communiqué, as well as all the enunciations of the Moscow press and Leon Alter's testimony.

During this time, information began to arrive by telegraph and by post, and was officially confirmed by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, about the interning in Petrograd of Counselor Jan Żarnowski, Petrograd branch officials Konstanty Zmieczorowski, Stanisław Cichocki and Lucjan Altberg, of members of the Economic Council, Henryk Lewestam, Bolesław Grodziecki and Stanisław Korsak, of all the plenipotentiaries of the Representation in the provinces, and even a few private persons, namely: Stanisław Konczkowski in Kaluga; Henryk Günther in Vladimir; Władysław Hołownia in Kursk; Tadeusz Dąbrowski in Tver; Leon Podolecki, his 75 year-old father-in-law Michał Kulczycki, and secretary Dymitr Jastrzębski in Nizhny-Novgorod; Aleksander Mieszczanowski in Saratov; Zofia Sielecka in Viazma; etc.

On the day following the 9 January arrests, during a meeting of the Representation's departmental advisors in Moscow, it was resolved to strive to maintain the organisation of the Representation that was determined during the session of 20 December (commissions: Field, Liquidation and Custodial), while initiating the broadest possible assistance measures for those arrested, enabling the departure of the Representation and clarifying the issue of providing care to Polish citizens remaining in Russia. It was also resolved, until the release of Counselor Mierzyński, to entrust the task of directing the affairs of the Representation to the undersigned, who was appointed by Counselor Mierzyński to be chairman of the Custodial Commission on 20 December and who has been performing the duties of Counselor Mierzyński since his arrest. In light of the above resolution of advisors of 10 January, I issued an appeal (enclosed herein) in which I requested that the guards at the premises of the Representation be removed, that it be made possible to meet with the detained and bring them provisions and linens, and that Mr. Mierzyński's room be unsealed.

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<sup>17</sup> This refers to the central information agency of Bolshevik Russia (Rossiyskoye telegrafnoye agentstvo, or ROSTA).

The said appeal was delivered on 11 January to Mr. Pzhevlotzky, an official of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, in whose competence lies the matter of the Polish Representation. As early as 5:00 PM, following my telephone conversation with the Commissar of the Extraordinary Commission, the guards were removed from the Representation premises. A further consequence of the appeal and personal negotiations was the possibility of meeting with Counselor Mierzyński and the others, as a result of which I was able to visit them several times at the Kremlin, where they had been placed in the Voznesensky Monastery, and given a spacious, lit, and rather well-heated monastic room. The "regime" they had been subjected to generally didn't give cause for complaints, yet the nourishment they receive is quite miserable, so we complement it by sending packages from town directly or by the intermediary of the Danish Red Cross mission. Their stay at the Extraordinary Commission, however, where they had spent the first two days of detention in a cold cell without any food whatever, had been difficult.

During meetings with Counselor Mierzyński, I communicated all ongoing matters of the Representation to him for his final decision and receive instructions from him accordingly.

Soon after the arrests in Moscow, we obtained additional information about the situation of the Petrograd Branch, where arrests had taken place at the same time as in Moscow (the night of 8-9 [January]) and in similar fashion. The only difference was that the detained were not searched, but the safe was sealed. Day-to-day running of the Representation in Petrograd is handled by Mr. J. Dangel, whom circumstances allowed to avoid arrest. One of his first steps was to submit a written protest at the Danish legation against the arrests with an intervention request. In light of the fact, however, that People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin had at the same time also sent a protest against the murder of the Red Cross mission members, the secretary of the Danish Legation, presently running the affairs of the legation, decided he was not competent to decide the matter himself and turned to Copenhagen by telegraph for instructions.

The Danish Consulate in Moscow also refused to intervene. The Secretary of the Danish Consulate in Moscow, Krebs, who was performing the obligations of the consul during the latter's absence, was immediately informed about the imprisonment of Counselor Mierzyński and of the Representation officials. Asked for intervention in this matter, he responded that he can't take any action before obtaining instructions from Petrograd. On that 9 January, Krebs spoke by telephone with Petrograd, after which he declared that he had received clear instructions not to initiate anything concerning the imprisoned members of the Polish Representation before receiving appropriate instructions. On 15 January, asked if he had obtained such instruction, Krebs answered literally

these words: "No, nothing will come of it. The Danish government will not get involved in this matter." The only service the Polish Representation had from the Danish consulate in Moscow was the sending of the above-mentioned dispatch of ours to the Polish government. There was also talk of placing our safe in the Danish consulate, to which the consulate initially agreed. On 17 January, however, not the secretary but the Deputy-Consul categorically declared that he could not host the safe, that there could have been talk of it when negotiations about Danish care for Polish citizens were under way, but now this question had fell through. As consolation for his refusal, the Deputy-Consul stated that he doesn't take in any deposits, even from Danish citizens. It should be pointed out, however, that the Danish Red Cross, especially in Petrograd, does not refuse to care for the imprisoned.

The imprisoned in Petrograd were for a time held in very difficult conditions. Mr. Żarnowski and Mr. Lewestam were placed in a room without windows. In the same room there was also a suspect individual. Mrs. Żarnowska was refused the right to see her husband. Only on 13 January were the prisoners taken to the prison on Shpalernaya Street where, according to the last news we obtained, conditions are bearable.

Moving on to the situation of the Representation and of Polish citizens in Russia in general, I feel compelled to stress that the situation, which is very difficult in every respect, calls for immediate, active, and comprehensive intervention by the Polish government.

The Representation is not only being deprived of diplomatic privileges but also is exposed to new repression, cut off from the country, and completely powerless.

At the same time, from authoritative sources we have even obtained confidential advice that Representation officials and Polish citizens in general, without waiting for the organisation of large-scale departures, tried to leave Russian territory single-handedly, and this as soon as possible, because the situation may deteriorate considerably in the near future.

Given such a critical situation and the complete lack of news from home, and following consultations among colleagues, I thought it advisable to take advantage of the proposal of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and, on 18 January, I delivered at the Commissariat a radio cable to be delivered to Warsaw, and an excerpt of which I enclose.

Acting Representative  
Chairman of the Custodial Commission  
Counselor *Adolf Szczygielski*



## 73

*24 January 1919, letter from the Minister of the Treasury to the PNC  
about the necessity to obtain a foreign loan*

Warsaw, 24 January 1919

To the Polish National Committee in Paris

In order to carry out the enormous tasks that stand before the Polish state, there is a need for funds that the exhausted country cannot provide at present. An internal state loan, despite enthusiasm manifested presently among the widest spheres of society, yielded insufficient sums.

The only way out of the present situation is to draw a large foreign loan. Given the extraordinary urgency and importance of this question, the President of Ministers today sent a relevant dispatch to the Polish National Committee. In reference to it, I earnestly request that steps be taken to delegate representatives of the financial circles of France, England, America, Sweden, and the Netherlands to Warsaw as quickly possible. I stress that negotiations in this matter can only take place in Warsaw, as neither I nor anyone else among representatives of the Ministry of the Treasury can presently travel abroad to conduct the necessary conferences and sign the relevant agreement in light of the extremely important work being done here. Moreover, the task of the representative of the Ministry of the Treasury abroad would be made particularly challenging given the difficulties of communicating with Warsaw. Conducting the relevant negotiations in Warsaw is also desirable because being there, the delegates will be able to assess the situation faster and more precisely.

MINISTER OF THE TREASURY  
Englich

*PDD 1919, doc. 68*

## 74

*24 January 1919, dispatch containing the response  
of the Prime Minister to the National Council of Teschen Silesia:  
Suggestion of submitting to the decisions of the Entente  
and of sending delegates to the Peace Conference*

Dispatch of Paderewski to the Teschen National Council  
(24 January 1919)

I have just communicated your dispatch<sup>18</sup> and have received the following reply from President Paderewski:

I did everything that was in the power of the President of Ministers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This morning at 4:00 AM I sent a diplomatic note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague and I communicated the contents of this note to the allied states by the intermediary of the National Committee. This note has probably just been delivered. We have to await the results of this step. In the meantime, given the violent aggression of Czech forces and the lack of knowledge about their powers and motives, we should do our utmost to save human lives. We cannot oppose the allies, if such are their orders that we temporarily evacuate Silesia. Our troops are not sufficiently numerous and we are too weak to be able to fight with this new and so unexpected foe. We thus have to have faith in the Entente's promises and look in confidence to the future. At the same time, we must do everything we can to gain satisfaction by peaceful means. For this purpose, I advise and request that the National Council, the highest authority of the Duchy of Teschen, immediately send through Hungary a deputation to the Peace Conference to demand justice. This delegation will be willingly joined by Bursche, the Superintendent of the Evangelical Church. The departure of the delegation I consider to be indispensable not only for Silesia but for our entire Fatherland. Please answer without delay and send information about what you resolved to do. Chin up!

Paderewski

*PDD 1919, doc. 69*

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<sup>18</sup> See document No. 71.

## 75

*25 January 1919, dispatch of the Supreme People's Council  
to the PNC about the situation in Poznań region: Request  
for speeding up the intervention of the Entente*

POZNAŃ, 25 January 1919

To the Polish National Committee in Paris

We turn to you again to request that you continue to support our cause energetically, leading the Coalition to intervene. Today is the right moment for the Coalition to demonstrate through action that those who stood by its side with body and soul throughout the war can count on its help. It should be stressed continuously, and you can do so in all sincerity, that the present situation arose solely by the Germans' fault. Political circles in Poland were perfectly aware that the Coalition has no interest in disturbances ending with pleas for its intervention. For this reason, no one here dreamt of gambling with *faits accomplis*, which could only produce gains being but a small part of what we are entitled to. The main effort of Polish policy until 28 December was to come to some form of *modus vivendi* with Germany pending the decisions of the peace conference. But the German government, under increasing pressure from reactionary and nationalist elements, hindered our efforts at every turn. The creation of the *Heimatschutz* (already in November, when things were quietest here!) proved that under the wings of a socialist government, Prussian militaristic elements centred on the War Ministry had reached their goal, i.e., to restore German nationalism and militarism to its former power of using the Polish question as a battlefield. The edge of this operation was turned directly against the Poles, and further plans, as was clear to any observer, followed the slogan of revenge on the West (in the enclosed note, see the statement by General Lepper in Leszno). Against such a background, a conflict had to arise sooner or later. All moderation on the Polish side was to no effect. The outbreak took place upon a provocation and the desecration of allied banners. This gave the Coalition an ideal point of departure for an intervention. Meanwhile, we have been fighting for four days and nothing took place besides a very vague English note.<sup>19</sup> It seems like England is inclined to go sparingly with respect to the Germans in order to use them against the Russian Bolsheviks and is perhaps even willing to do this at Poland's expense. This would be a disastrous error. They seem not to be aware of how strong Bolshevik influence is in

<sup>19</sup> On 16 January, the European press reported that on 8 January, Great Britain had sent a note in which it called upon the German authorities not to provoke the Polish population in East and West Prussia, in Poznań Province, or in Silesia.

Germany itself. The government in Berlin has managed to quash the Spartacist movement, but in Düsseldorf, Leipzig, Bremen, Braunschweig, in Silesia and in East Prussia (Olsztyn!) [Allenstein], Bolshevism is blooming and strong. In the German armies that are still in the east (in the Baltic provinces, in Lithuania and Ukraine), Bolshevik agitation has undermined discipline completely. Fresh reports from the Wolff Bureau in Kiev, that in Ukraine uncontrolled troops are abandoning their posts and securing their transport home through violent means. Who would believe that one could do anything against Russian Bolshevism with such an army. The German government pretends it is ready to embark on a crusade against the Bolsheviks because this helps restore Germany's reputation in Europe and may win it better peace terms. In reality, however, Germany supports Bolshevism wherever they can, as was, among other things, demonstrated to Kessler in Warsaw. In any case, has it been forgotten that the Bolshevik movement developed only through German help? Thus, if England was to assist in the restoration of Germany without taking the German psyche into account in the least and at our cost, this would be the first step toward destroying all the fruits of victory. In Germany, there are only two camps with strength: the reactionary and the Bolshevik. All that can be found between those two extremes is weak, fragmented, and without leadership or programme. An illusory policy resting on Germany's calculations of holding back the Bolsheviks can only lead either to victory for the reactionary forces and Prussian militarism with its quiet slogan of revenge, or to Bolshevik German-Russian brotherhood, because the demoralised German soldier will be susceptible to the Bolshevik infection, even from a foe against whom he is instructed to fight. What threat will then be facing Poland and Europe is easy to understand. Meanwhile, the force of Poland as a factor in the fight against Bolshevism is entirely underestimated. This force would grow immensely upon the settlement, if even temporary, of our cause. If the Coalition were to force Germany to cease fighting and gave us guarantees from that side, it would be possible to send 50,000-60,000 of the most battle-hardened soldiers to the East. But this must take place as soon as possible. An entire panoply of German World War leaders—all the Hindenburgs, Belows, Woyrschs, and Falkenhayns—are getting ready to bring new shine to their mangled glory by means of the easy, or so they think, fight against the Poles. The Coalition must be blind if it is willing to quietly tolerate this attempt at rétablissement of German forces in the East, while losing the favour of that part of the Polish population that forms the best cement of the permanent alliance between Poland and the West. Each day of delay on the Coalition's part leads to more victims. The number of fatal casualties and wounded on our side has crossed 500. The fighting is bloody and fierce. The country devastated by the Heimatschutz hordes in the outlying areas suffers terribly. A people's war knows no mercy and cruelties on the German side are terrible. We are ready

for a truce based on the demarcation line according to the present positions. Otherwise, we must continue to defend ourselves, the fighting will engulf the remaining parts of the partition, and ultimately a Polish-German war would be unavoidable. If the Coalition wishes to avert this, it should act as quickly as possible. Please use all available means to incline the Coalition to act, while remembering about our difficult situation. The economic severance of a small territory with only one rail line to the Congress Kingdom is proving very difficult to bear. We really feel the lack of coal, and freezing weather is fast approaching. Impatience among the population is growing while your and our old adversaries are asking, sneeringly: "Where is the help of this Coalition which you trusted so?" Thus, quick and energetic action is necessary, otherwise who knows what may happen.

The main emphasis continues to be on the following points:

1) The position of the Poles was and continues to be: await the decision of the peace conference as to the Prussian partition. The ruling political circles never intended to pre-empt the decisions of the conference by force of arms. Proof from the last few days: Germans in a part of the country controlled by us were allowed on 19 January to take part in voting in elections to the German Constituent Assembly.

2) The armed movement emerged spontaneously in reaction to news about German provocations in Poznań. No one could stop the agitated masses of the people, because hatred accumulated during decades of Prussian persecution, and the violence of the Heimatschutz in the last few months have inflamed minds to an extreme degree.

3) Responsibility for the events falls entirely on the Ebert government and on Scheidemann, who didn't have the strength to fundamentally alter the anti-Polish system, who made promises that fell apart upon contact with the resistance of the executive organs and who finally gave in to the instigations of the reactionaries who launched the Heimatschutz action as early as November, when the population was as peaceful as can be.

4) The fighting on our side, after the first weeks of disturbances was gradually subjected to a regular framework under a unified command. In contrast, on the German side, this was the fight of individual Heimatschutz gangs and loose bands of civilians, particularly colonists, whom the government had armed as early as November. Plunder, murders, and rapes are multiplying daily (material enclosed). There is no unified command thus far, only individual German generals and commanders in Bydgoszcz, Piła [Schneidemühl], Frankfurt-am-Oder, Leszno, Milicz, etc. who conduct the fighting on their own initiative.

5) As a result, the unpunished lawlessness on the German side exceeds all bounds. Particularly at the station in Krzyż, the German military command

stops and interns hundreds of Polish soldiers who, having been discharged from the army, are returning home, and also civilian travellers, namely workers from the Congress Kingdom, are being sent to concentration camps where they are beaten, starved, and stripped of their belongings and their money. In contrast to this, Germans in Poznań, including the young and able to bear arms, are free to move about entirely freely. Only in areas where fighting is taking place are those Germans with a strong anti-Polish predisposition interned, and those are mostly confined to house arrest.

6) We are not conducting an aggressive policy; we are ready for a truce at any time, but this is made difficult by the wave of German nationalism, on the one hand, and the general disorder, which means that there simply is no one to negotiate with, on the other.

7) An energetic intervention, if only of a diplomatic nature, can immediately bring peace and would free existing Polish forces, allowing them to be sent against the Bolsheviks. If the Coalition at the conference gives us all the territories of the Prussian partition, an army of 150,000 battle-hardened soldiers will stand to fight the Bolsheviks. Of course, the Coalition would have to supply the arms and ammunition.

*PDD 1919, doc. 71*

## 76

### *25 January 1919, letter from the Interim Chief of State to the chairman of the Warsaw delegation*

Warsaw, 25 January 1919.

To Dr. Kazimierz Dłuski

Mr. Patek and Mr. Thugutt received such detailed information and instructions from me that there is no need here to write them out.

I will only emphasise once again that your task is to not allow the National Committee in Paris to meddle in the country's internal affairs and to try to affect those internal affairs by way of pressure from the Coalition.

Within the National Committee, it is necessary to discuss this question and to obtain a clear statement of the National Committee's position about whether it considers itself a mission of the Polish government or an institution

entirely unconnected with the country and, therefore, entirely useless and expendable.

I am awaiting the elections and the Sejm<sup>20</sup> that will reveal the country's political physiognomy. My further decisions will depend on the composition of the Sejm.

*PDD 1919, doc. 74*

## 77

### *26 January 1919, note by the representative of the Supreme People's Council in Paris about the situation in the former Prussian partition*

In the matter of the present situation in the Prussian partition, I decided it was necessary to bring about the allies to make the following decisions:

1) Given our weak forces in the Poznań Province, the lack of ammunition and artillery, especially heavy artillery, I think that the demand of the Supreme People's Council that German forces evacuate the Prussian partition is just, but unworkable at present. The only possible way to resolve the problem in the Prussian partition is to order a ceasefire, and possibly a prohibition, issued to both sides, of taking any further war-like steps. The SPC in Poznań will abide by such a prohibition immediately. If, however, the Germans do not, the Poles would have to defend themselves, as we cannot allow unopposed slaughter and pillage to take place.

2) Railcars and engines to be found within the boundaries of the Poznań and Bydgoszcz districts should remain there. Indirectly, they serve the Coalition, they are used to deliver food, cattle and also ammunition from the meagre stocks in Poznań to the army of our government in Warsaw and Galicia. The moment these railcars are taken away, all this traffic will have to come to a stop, and the allies will have to supply Poland and bring war material and ammunition for Poland and for Haller's army using other railcars—something

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<sup>20</sup> The first part of the elections to the Legislative Sejm took place on 26 January 1919, on the territory of the former Congress Kingdom of Poland and in Western Galicia. In the months and years that followed, supplementary elections were held in other regions of emerging state.

that will entail unnecessary impediments and various other transportation problems.

3) One should strive to ensure that, under the control of mixed commissions, it will be possible to bring to the Prussian partition raw materials, cloth, leather, ready footwear, and especially fats, because the relatively small weekly ration of fat amounts today to 20 g per person and it won't be possible hold out very long on such a ration. There is also coffee and tea, in exchange of which we would give sugar. This would be easy during the demobilisation—we would be ready to acquire it in exchange for cash. According to Poles returning from England, this merchandise is abundant there.

Paris, 26 January 1919

Władysław Grabski  
Representative of the Supreme People's Council in Paris

*PDD 1919, doc. 76*

## 78

*27 January 1919, report by the government representative in Kiev  
for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [?]  
about the situation in Ukraine*

27 January 1919

Confidential No. 46

In the last four days, everything has changed here. It all began with an attempt to arrest Vynnychenko by the military party. The Sich Riflemen surrounded his house during the night, but their leaders, instead of arresting Mr. V. engaged in negotiations with him and everything ended with resounding cries of “glory” in his honour.

Meanwhile, his friend Kovenko, the head of the investigative commission, began to set up a “separate corps” which was devoted to him and which it was attempted to disarm. But in response to the demand that it put down its arms, the corps declared that it would not obey, after which it was thought best not to renew the attempt.

Yesterday, in a conversation with a citizen known to us, Directorate member Andrievsky declared plainly that in a couple of days there will be formal war with Poland and: “We have already taken Vladimir, and between



Rawa and Lublin, Ataman Roshchin is gathering troops which will fall upon the Poles in Lwow.”

The atmosphere at the Bolshevik Work Congress.<sup>21</sup> In the lead, 90% of the Peasant Union<sup>22</sup> passed to the side of the most extreme elements. The Social-Revolutionaries united with them. The radical “Samostiynitsiy,” also to some degree imbued with the Bolshevik spirit, represent the extreme right.

The Galicians (about 40 deputies) are against excessively flashy revolutionary experiments, but they are Polonophobes and subversive and anti-Polish slogans are the sole political guide of the present day.

Mr Karpinsky is terribly worried because the matter of the legation to Poland was postponed indefinitely.<sup>23</sup>

The moment is thus approaching when the departure from here of the delegation will be an unavoidable necessity. I will remain at my post for as long as possible. There is still a shadow of hope: 1) perhaps Mr. Prokopovych will have some influence after his return from Warsaw; 2) perhaps the Coalition will do something or will at least make a sharper declaration; 3) maybe under pressure from circumstances and the desire not to break with the Coalition for the time being, the Directorate and the local government will leave Kiev, which is threatened with a Bolshevik invasion from all sides (Korosteń, Taraszczka, Trypolje and, beyond the Dniester, Koziulec, Nieżyń and closer). In this case, the legation will leave with the government to Winnica (but not to Galicia, because there could be a trip to Tarnopol or Stanisławów [sic!]), and from there to Odessa or to Romania.

As to the Coalition, two Greek divisions have landed in Odessa (the second is still disembarking), the offices in Razdzielna, Mikołajów, and Tyraspol were occupied, as was the rail line to Ungela.

News is circulating today that things went further and that Wapniarka is already in the hands of Romanian units, while the Coalition will demand that the rail line from Wapniarka-Cwiertkowo-Kharkiv be handed over.

In this last city, freed from the Bolsheviks by the Ukrainian leader Bolbochan, the latter was arrested by the Revolutionary Committee created by his own subordinates and the city’s citizens, for having acted in agreement

<sup>21</sup> The Labour Congress of Ukraine, the temporary legislative organ of the Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic, convened by the Directorate, was in session in Kiev from 23 to 28 January.

<sup>22</sup> This was an organisation of small peasants collaborating with the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party (SR).

<sup>23</sup> This refers to the unfulfilled plans to set up Ukrainian diplomatic representation in Warsaw.

with the Don army, which had threatened the Bolsheviks from the east and which, in conjunction with Bolbochan, forced them to leave Kharkiv.

/-/ B. Kutylowski

*PDD 1919, doc. 79*

## 79

*28 January 1919, note from the representative of the PNC in Paris  
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France  
about the current situation in Poland*

Paris, le 28 Janvier 1919

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Stephen Pichon  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères  
Paris

Monsieur le Ministre,

Les télégrammes publiés dans les journaux d'hier et d'aujourd'hui viennent confirmer et compléter les renseignements que le Comité National Polonais reçoit depuis quelque temps sur la situation en Pologne.

Elle est vraiment menaçante.

Dans l'ancienne Pologne prussienne, les Allemands, loin de se départir de leur attitude hostile à l'égard des Polonais, ne songent qu'à étouffer par la force leurs sentiments d'unité nationale. A la première lueur de liberté, la population polonaise avait tenu à manifester sa fidélité à la mère-patrie et son dévouement à la cause de l'Entente. Les éléments allemands implantés au milieu d'elle ont tenté de s'y opposer. Ils n'y ont pas réussi. Ils étaient trop faibles. Berlin est alors accouru à leur secours. Chaque jour de nouvelles troupes prélevées parmi les meilleurs régiments de la Garde sont envoyées à l'Est où elles n'auront pas de difficulté à écraser les détachements polonais levés à la hâte et manquant d'armes et de munitions. Ainsi, c'est par la violence que les Allemands veulent, contrairement à l'avertissement de la Conférence de la Paix, trancher la question des territoires faisant partie de l'ancienne Pologne prussienne.

Du côté russe, un danger peut-être plus terrible encore s'avance. Les bolchevistes semant partout la terreur et le feu sont aux portes de l'ancien

Royaume de Pologne. Ils occupent déjà Minsk, Vilnius, Grodno et Brest-Litovsk, ils vont non seulement s'emparer de la Lituanie et de la Ruthénie Blanche, ils menacent même de pousser jusqu'à Varsovie. En Galicie, les Ruthènes soutenus par l'Allemagne qui leur fournit des officiers, leur procure des armes et des munitions, bombardent la ville ouverte de Lwow (Lemberg) et massacrent les populations paisibles des campagnes pensant prouver de cette manière qu'ils sont les maîtres du pays.

Toutes les nouvelles qui parviennent au Comité National et les renseignements que lui ont apportés ces jours derniers différentes personnalités dignes de foi récemment arrivées de Varsovie, Posen et Cracovie dépeignent sous un aspect plus que tragique la situation en Pologne. Après avoir tant souffert de l'occupation allemande, ce malheureux pays est aujourd'hui condamné à soutenir sur trois fronts à la fois une lutte sanglante, alors que partout ailleurs les hostilités sont suspendues.

Profondément ému de cet état de choses, le Comité National Polonais me charge de soumettre à la bienveillante attention de Votre Excellence les moyens qui pourraient parer au danger dont la Pologne est menacée. Ces moyens consisteraient:

1. A hâter l'envoi en Pologne par Dantzig et Thorn des troupes polonaises et de divisions alliées, chaque jour de retard pouvant avoir des conséquences incalculables.

2. Imposer l'armistice en Pologne prussienne et en Galicie sur les bases du status quo et obliger les Allemands et les Ukrainiens à respecter les engagements qu'ils auront pris, en partant du principe que la question des frontières ne peut être tranchée que par la Conférence de la Paix.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

*PDD 1919, doc. 82*

## 80

*28 January 1919, note from the representative of the PNC in Paris  
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France about Teschen Silesia*

Paris, le 28 Janvier 1919

Monsieur le Ministre,

Chargé par le Comité National Polonais, j'ai l'honneur d'attirer l'attention de Votre Excellence sur la situation regrettable créée par le conflit qui vient de surgir entre les Polonais et Tchèques.

Le terrain et l'objet de ce conflit est la Silésie de Cieszyn (Teschen), pays de 2.283 k.c., comptant 427.000 habitants.

Les arguments invoqués par les Tchèques sont d'ordre historique. Ils remontent à l'époque reculée du XIV siècle, à laquelle ce pays qui était polonais et faisait partie de la Pologne passa sous la domination des rois de Bohême, pour entrer plus tard (XVI s.), avec celle-ci, dans l'ensemble des domaines des Habsbourgs.

Les Polonais dont les droits historiques concernant ce pays sont antérieurs et plus forts que ceux des Tchèques ne se placent cependant que sur le terrain ethnographique. Ils ne réclament que les districts de la Silésie de Cieszyn dans lesquels d'après le recensement officiel de 1910, la population polonaise très consciente de sa nationalité, forme une majorité de 69% contre 11% Tchèque, le reste c'était Allemands et autres.

Les Tchèques eux-mêmes, reconnaissant cet état de choses, ont conclu au moment de l'écroulement de l'Autriche, par l'intermédiaire de leur pouvoir suprême dans ce pays ("Zemski Narodni Vybor"), un accord avec le Conseil National Polonais de Cieszyn, en vertu duquel les districts en question avec le chemin de fer Bogumin-Koszyce (Oderberg-Kaschau) ont été attribués aux Polonais.

Ce fut donc pour nous une surprise complète d'apprendre, par des télégrammes de sources polonaise et tchèque, qu'une grande partie de ce territoire avait été occupée par des troupes tchèques. On assure même qu'une mission militaire alliée se trouvait auprès de ces troupes. La situation créée par ces faits donne lieu à des inquiétudes des plus graves.

Votre Excellence voudra reconnaître elle-même que le Comité National Polonais ne peut laisser sans protestation une pareille façon de régler la question *via facti*. Aussi, le Comité se permet-il, par mon intermédiaire, de soumettre à l'attention de Votre Excellence les observations suivantes.

L'accord du 5 novembre, dont je joins la traduction française, se trouve violé par ces événements. Il devait, suivant le texte même, être observé par les deux partis jusqu'à la délimitation définitive établie par les deux gouvernements respectifs de Varsovie et de Prague. Il faut ajouter que, par un télégramme du 22 novembre, le gouvernement de Prague a reconnu les engagements contractés par son organe silésien. Ce n'est que maintenant que le même gouvernement met en doute la validité de cet accord. Il affirme, de plus, avoir été autorisé par les alliés, avant l'armistice, d'occuper le territoire entier, de la Silésie de Cieszyn. Or, le Comité National n'a jamais eu connaissance de rien de semblable.

Le Comité National Polonais adresse à Votre Excellence la demande de bien vouloir intervenir afin que les troupes tchèques soient retirées du territoire reconnu comme polonais par l'accord du 5 novembre. Une mission militaire interalliée pourrait éventuellement être désignée pour prévenir que de semblables événements ne puissent se produire dans la suite.

Je termine, en assurant Votre Excellence au nom du Comité que, malgré ces événements regrettables, nous ne cessons pas de courir le profonde désir de régler à l'amiable toutes les questions litigieuses entre les Tchèques et les Polonais. Nous sommes persuadés que des rapports d'amitié et des liens d'alliance entre les deux peuples répondent entièrement à leurs intérêts et, seuls, peuvent assurer à l'Europe centrale et orientale une paix durable.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma haute considération.

Le Délégué du Comité National Polonais  
auprès du gouvernement français  
(signé) Erasme PILTZ

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*29 January 1919, instruction from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
to the PNC about the transit of prisoners of war*

WARSAW, 29 January 1919

Confidential

To the National Committee in Paris,  
Care of the Ministerial Counsel Waclaw Babiński

A couple of days ago, the delegation of the International Red Cross in Geneva, headed by Mr. Frick, arrived in Poland. Its task is to investigate the matter of the transport of Russian prisoners of war and to report about the results to the governments of Coalition states. The basic tendency of the members of the delegation, among which there are some Russians, is to protect Russian prisoners of war who are returning home from contact with the Bolshevik army and to preserve them for the anti-Bolshevik army under General Denikin that is to be formed in the south. Given the hostile relations between Poland and the Russian Sovdepiia,<sup>24</sup> this initiative by all means deserves recognition and support from us. But the results of its execution should not entail the transportation of Russian prisoners of war through Polish territory. Given the state of our transportation and provisioning, this would carry the danger of a potential catastrophe in the form of hunger and pestilence, and could have a very bad effect on our internal state of affairs, by bringing to our local communist parties fresh human material in the shape of savage and demoralised masses of Russian prisoners of war returning home. Despite the official assurances of the head of the above-mentioned Red Cross mission, Mr. Frick, that in his opinion that matter of transporting the Russians through Polish territory is not presently taken into account, from the pronouncements of individual Russian delegation members one can conclude that they will use all means to convince the governments of Coalition states that the transportation of the Russian prisoners of war should take place using the shortest and most comfortable route, i.e., through Poland. These efforts should be firmly opposed and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructs Mr. Waclaw Babiński to follow this matter carefully and to take the relevant steps in agreement with the National Committee in Paris, should it turn out that the Russians begin to act in a way that is objectionable for Poland. Data about the supplies and transportation conditions in Poland and the danger represented by the passage

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<sup>24</sup> The territory of the former Russian Empire under the control of the Bolsheviks.

through Polish territory of demoralised masses of Russian prisoners of war who are so highly susceptible to all manner of communist agitation will be the best arguments supporting the rightness of our demands.

At the same time, an excerpt of a dispatch sent to the Ministry by the General Staff and concerning prisoners of war from Romania, is enclosed for the purpose of intervening in this matter with the relevant Coalition authorities.

Minister of Foreign Affairs  
*p.p. Wróblewski*  
 Director of the Consular Department  
*p.p. Maciejewski*

*PDD 1919, doc. 85*

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*[after 29 January] 1919, unsigned note on the Peace Conference  
 delegate's speech to the Supreme Allied Council*

PREMIERE SEANCE DU 29 JANVIER 1919<sup>25</sup>

M. Dmowski rappelle que, dans l'armistice, deux articles se rapportaient à la Pologne.

Aux termes de l'article 12, "toutes les troupes allemandes se trouvant, à la date du 11 Novembre 1918, dans les territoires qui faisaient avant la guerre partie de la Russie, devront rentrer dans les frontières de l'Allemagne, telles qu'elles étaient au premier Août 1914, dès que les Alliés jugeront le moment venu, compte tenu de la situation intérieure de ces territoires."

Et aux termes de l'article 16, "les Alliés auront libre accès aux territoires évacués par les Allemands sur les frontières orientales, soit par Dantzig, soit par la Vistule, afin de pouvoir ravitailler les populations et dans le but de maintenir l'ordre."

Ces deux articles, s'ils avaient été exécutés, garantissaient dans une certaine mesure, la sécurité de la Pologne, notamment si les troupes allemandes qui occupaient une partie du front russe, principalement du côté de la Lituanie,

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<sup>25</sup> This summary was written by the French delegation and made available to Dmowski on 8 February 1919.

avaient attendu, pour se retirer, l'ordre des Alliés. Les Polonais auraient été protégés contre l'invasion des Bolcheviks venant de Russie.

D'un autre côté, si l'accès par Dantzig était assuré, la Pologne pourrait obtenir les troupes, les vivres et les munitions dont elle a besoin.

Malheureusement, la mauvaise volonté des autorités allemandes, et peut-être aussi la révolution, ont empêché l'exécution de ces clauses, et les troupes allemandes du front oriental ont évacué les territoires qu'elles occupaient sans tenir aucun compte des conditions de l'armistice. Non seulement les Allemands ont massacré une partie des populations en se retirant, mais ils ont emporté une grande partie des approvisionnements, des vivres et du matériel de chemins de fer qui se trouvait dans le pays.

D'autre part, il a été impossible, pour la Pologne, de recevoir les armes et les munitions dont elle avait besoin, car la ville de Dantzig est en territoire allemand et à cent cinquante kilomètres de la frontière polonaise. Or, depuis la signature de l'armistice, les Allemands n'ont pas modifié leur attitude à l'égard de la Pologne. Mais ont au contraire, manifesté envers elle une hostilité croissante. Il a donc été impossible d'utiliser le chemin de fer Dantzig-Thorn qui est pour ainsi dire en territoire ennemi.

L'utilisation de cette ligne, garantie par l'article 16 de l'armistice, ne peut avoir lieu que si les Alliés en prennent possession.

Mais on peut dire que jusqu'à présent les deux articles 12 et 16 de la Convention d'armistice, en tant qu'ils concernent la Pologne, sont restés lettres mortes.

Or, il y a en Pologne allemande d'après les statistiques allemandes quatre millions de Polonais, et d'après les renseignements des autorités polonaises, près de cinq millions de Polonais.

Ces Polonais sont répartis dans les quatre provinces de Posen, de la Prusse Orientale, de la Podolie et de la Silésie. Ils représentent la meilleure partie de la Nation polonaise, car l'instruction est très répandue chez eux et on n'y compte pas un seul illettré; ils ont une conscience nationale très développée et un sens très vif du devoir civique. On pouvait espérer que, dès que les conditions seraient favorables, ils s'organiseraient politiquement. Et, en effet, dès la conclusion de l'armistice et au début de la révolution allemande, ils profitèrent de l'occasion pour se donner des institutions polonaises et organiser leur vie nationale. Cette organisation pacifique devait montrer au monde que cette partie du pays est polonaise, en même temps qu'elle viendrait en aide aux autres parties de la Pologne et participerait à la vie nationale polonaise.

Mais les Allemands, dès qu'ils comprirent que cette organisation polonaise pouvait être une menace pour leur domination, furent effrayés de perdre ce



territoire et ils formèrent une troupe spéciale qu'ils appelèrent "Heimatschutz Ost" composée souvent exclusivement d'officiers prussiens, c'est-à-dire de représentants du militarisme allemand, et les concentrèrent dans la province de Posnanie, afin d'écraser les groupements polonais.

Lorsque le représentant polonais, M. Paderewski, se rendit à Posen, accompagné d'un colonel anglais et que la population voulut organiser une représentation en son honneur, les Allemands attaquèrent la population et firent usage de leurs mitrailleuses. Des troubles s'en suivirent et, détail curieux il y avait dans les deux camps des soldats en uniforme allemand, mais les uns étaient polonais et les autres allemands.

Dans cette lutte, les Allemands ont été battus et les troupes polonaises ont occupé la ville et la forteresse de Posen. La poursuite a continué et les Allemands ont été obligés d'évacuer toute la province.

Après avoir chassé les Allemands, les Polonais ont constitué un gouvernement civil qui a rétabli l'ordre dans toute la province et assuré la liberté de tous les habitants.

Ceci prouve que les Polonais considèrent cette province comme faisant partie intégrante de leur pays et tiennent à voir l'ordre y régner, tandis que les Allemands traitent ces régions comme des territoires conquis ou des pays ennemis.

Les représentants des Puissances ont adressé, à tous les peuples, un avertissement au sujet des disputes qui peuvent se produire pour la possession de différents territoires. Les Polonais seront peut-être tentés de considérer que cet avertissement s'adressent à eux et, comme ils respectent les décisions des Grandes Puissances ils ne manqueront pas de s'y conformer très scrupuleusement mais, par la même, ils se trouveront dans un état d'infériorité vis à vis des Allemands, car il est peu probable que les troupes allemandes se conforment à ces instructions.

M. Dmowski demande que les Alliés fassent donner aux troupes allemandes l'ordre d'arrêter toute opération contre les Polonais. Si les Allemands reçoivent cet ordre, il est vraisemblable qu'ils s'y conformeront.

La Pologne allemande et spécialement la province de Posen est la seule région de l'Etat polonais qui ne manque pas de vivres. C'est d'ailleurs, peut-être, une des raisons de la concentration des troupes allemandes en Posnanie. On assure même qu'il y aurait des approvisionnements suffisants pour permettre à cette province d'aider d'autres parties de la Pologne.

L'Allemagne à l'heure actuelle a, comme Janus, une double face: à l'est, elle parle de paix et à l'ouest elle prépare la guerre [sic!]. Les troupes sur le front Occidental reconnaissent leur défaite, mais sur le front Oriental, les

troupes qui y sont concentrées ont encore des idées de conquête; ils savent ce qu'ils ont perdu à l'Ouest, mais ils veulent garder et, si c'est possible, étendre leur action à l'Est, afin d'assurer leur pénétration en Russie.

M. Clemenceau demande à M. Dmowski quelles sont ses conclusions, et si le gouvernement polonais demande seulement l'envoi d'une note à l'Allemagne.

M. Dmowski répond qu'en ce qui concerne la Pologne allemande, le gouvernement polonais ne désire qu'une chose, c'est qu'on arrête les opérations militaires. Il ajoute que les Polonais de Posen seraient désireux de conserver le matériel de chemins de fer qui se trouve dans la province.

M. Dmowski continue son exposé par l'examen de la situation de la Pologne russe. Il explique qu'au lendemain de l'armistice la Pologne russe se trouvait dans une situation difficile. Il y avait là le noyau d'un Etat polonais fondé par les Allemands et par les Autrichiens, le 5 Novembre 1916, et qui était destiné à rester sous la domination allemande si les Empires centraux avaient été victorieux. Ce gouvernement est resté au pouvoir jusqu'à la fin de la guerre. Après l'armistice, ce conseil de régence ne pouvait durer pour deux raisons:

1. Parce que c'était un Gouvernement établi par les Empires centraux;

2. Parce que c'était un Gouvernement conservateur. Dans un pays qui se trouve placé entre la Russie bolchevique et l'Allemagne en révolution, un Gouvernement conservateur ne pouvait tenir.

Le Conseil de régence a remis le pouvoir aux mains du Général Pilsudski, membre influent du parti socialiste et qui jouissait d'une grande popularité dans tous les partis, parce qu'au début de la guerre il avait combattu contre les Russes, et que, pendant la seconde période, il s'était brouillé avec les Allemands et avait été mis par eux en prison.

Le Général Pilsudski a organisé un Gouvernement entièrement socialiste. C'était peut-être habile, dans l'atmosphère de révolution au milieu duquel se trouvait la Pologne, de faire comme quelques animaux qui, pour se défendre contre leur ennemi, adoptent ses couleurs, mais ce Gouvernement s'est heurté à des difficultés formidables. D'une part, les deux grands partis de la Pologne de tendance plus modérée se sont ligués contre lui, d'autre part, il n'avait pas d'argent, et enfin il n'inspirait pas confiance aux Alliés, qui ne lui reprochaient certes pas son caractère exclusivement socialiste mais qui doutaient de ses sympathies et lui reprochaient d'avoir invité un représentant allemand à Varsovie. Le Comité Central de Paris a été sollicité à maintes reprises par les groupements polonais de provoquer la chute de ce cabinet et il est rentré en rapport avec le général Pilsudski pour tâcher de l'amener à abandonner le pouvoir, mais il s'est heurté pendant longtemps à l'intransigeance bien connue de tous les partis extrêmes, car les socialistes ne sont pas moins intransigeants

en Pologne que dans les autres pays. A une date récente, M. Paderewski a été envoyé en Pologne et a été assez heureux pour arriver à un compromis avec le cabinet Pilsudski. Il a aussitôt organisé un Gouvernement de concentration dans lequel les trois grands partis polonais se trouvent représentés.

La formation de ce gouvernement permet d'espérer que les difficultés d'ordre intérieur sont terminées.

Il reste à examiner les complications extérieures auxquelles la Pologne doit faire face. Quand les troupes allemandes se retirèrent vers la Prusse Orientale, en exécution des clauses de l'armistice, laissant à l'Est la Pologne sans protection, elles commirent des crimes de toutes sortes; mais il en est plus grave que tous les autres. Les autorités allemandes cédèrent délibérément la place aux bolcheviks et la refusèrent aux autorités polonaises. Les troupes allemandes n'hésitèrent même pas à donner du matériel de guerre aux bolcheviks. Par exemple, à Vilna, quand les troupes polonaises demandèrent à l'officier allemand un droit de passage en lui faisant remarquer que si les bolcheviks devenaient maîtres de la place, les Polonais seraient massacrés, il leur répondit: "C'est malheureux, mais vous serez massacrés."

Aussi, malgré l'article 16 de l'armistice, les bolcheviks ont-ils avancé en Pologne et ils sont actuellement à moins de 150 kilomètres de Varsovie.

Mais ce n'est pas là leur but: ils déclarent ouvertement qu'ils veulent entrer en contact direct avec les Allemands et principalement avec le groupe spartakiste, afin de propager leurs idées dans l'Europe entière.

La Pologne se trouve ainsi menacée du danger bolchevik et elle est sans défense. Ce ne sont pas les hommes qui lui manquent et ils ne demanderaient pas mieux que de combattre, mais ils n'ont ni armes ni munitions. A Varsovie, la situation est si critique que les habitants de Posen ont été obligés d'envoyer récemment deux millions de cartouches dans cette ville et c'était comme s'ils avaient donné le meilleur de leur sang. On ne peut songer à envoyer des armes et des munitions par l'Autriche, car cette voie est beaucoup trop longue, et si la Pologne ne reçoit pas bientôt des munitions par Dantzig, un grand danger la menace de ce côté.

Mais ce n'est pas le seul danger auquel elle ait à faire face. Du côté du Sud, la Pologne se trouve en conflit avec des bandes ukrainiennes. Les armées autrichiennes, en se retirant vers la Galicie orientale, ont pillé les magasins et distribué les armes et les munitions qui s'y trouvaient, invitant en quelque sorte les habitants à massacrer les étrangers, et, en fait, en Podolie et en Volhynie, on a massacré plus de 2.000 personnes dans des tortures inouïes: certaines victimes ont été écartelées comme au moyen âge. La plupart de ces familles étaient polonaises, car la grande propriété dans ces régions appartenait surtout

à des familles polonaises. Les Ukrainiens se sont même emparés de Lemberg, mais la ville a été reprise par les troupes polonaises.

La Pologne se trouve donc avoir à faire face sur trois fronts, mais elle n'a ni troupes, ni armes, ni munitions. Il y a, il est vrai, des troupes polonaises en France, et le Gouvernement de Varsovie a demandé leur envoi en Pologne, mais il faut pour cela assurer leur transport et les moyens de communication avec la Pologne. On ne peut songer à les envoyer par l'Autriche, la route est trop longue et trop compliquée, la seule voie possible et la plus efficace est celle de Dantzig, mais le chemin de fer de Dantzig-Thorn est aux mains de l'ennemi.

Le Gouvernement polonais avait demandé aux alliés de faire occuper cette ligne, en exécution de l'article 16, par les troupes alliées, mais cette suggestion n'a pas été accueillie favorablement. Le Gouvernement polonais propose maintenant de faire occuper cette ligne par les troupes polonaises, mais à la condition d'obtenir l'autorisation du Gouvernement allemand. Il eût sans doute mieux valu que la ligne Thorn-Dantzig fût occupée par les troupes alliées, car cela ne pourrait donner lieu à aucune difficulté avec les Allemands, mais le Gouvernement polonais est prêt à assurer lui-même la protection de cette ligne s'il y est autorisé par les représentants des puissances et si les autorités allemandes n'élèvent pas d'objection.

Il résulte de cet exposé qu'aucun appui ne peut être donné à la Pologne, qui est menacée d'être écrasée par les Bolcheviks si on n'assure pas les communications avec la Pologne, ce qui ne peut être fait d'une manière efficace que par la voie Thorn-Dantzig.

Aucun pays n'est à l'heure actuelle, à l'abri du bolchevisme, la Pologne peut-être moins qu'aucun autre, car elle a été pendant longtemps sous le contrôle de la Russie, qui y a pratiqué la politique d'ignorance qu'elle favorisait dans toutes ses possessions. Il y a dans la Pologne russe une grande partie de la population toute prête à recevoir le venin bolchevik. En outre, il y a en Pologne une population juive assez importante et les derniers événements tendent à prouver que les organisations juives favorisent le bolchevisme.

Pour toutes ces raisons, il est indispensable que la Pologne reçoive le plus tôt possible des armes et des munitions et il est nécessaire pour cela que les Alliés occupent par ... (?) [sic!] ses troupes, d'accord avec les autorités allemandes.

M. Clemenceau demande à M. Dmowski s'il pourrait fournir quelques indications sur les revendications territoriales de la Pologne.

M. Dmowski répond que la première difficulté territoriale qu'ait rencontrée la Pologne s'est élevée avec l'Etat Tchéco-Slovaque. Il déplore qu'un conflit puisse avoir lieu avec des frères slaves qui doivent, dans l'avenir, être des alliés.

C'est la province de Teschen, situé entre la Galicie et la Moravie, qui est la cause du conflit. Cette province est une province polonaise dans sa plus grande partie et tchèque dans l'autre, mais les populations ne sont pas mélangées et la partie occidentale est presque exclusivement habitée par les Tchèques, tandis que la partie orientale est habitée par les Polonais, ainsi que le prouvent les dernières statistiques autrichiennes.

Les Tchéco-Slovaques ne nient pas que la province soit en majorité polonaise, et les raisons qu'ils invoquent pour contester ce territoire pour des raisons historiques et économiques. Ils prétendent aussi que la population, qui est polonaise de langue, ne l'est pas de sentiments, mais il est bien évident que pareil argument est sans valeur. Au moment de l'écroulement de l'Autriche, les autorités locales polonaises et tchéco-slovaques ont conclu un accord à Teschen, le 5 Novembre 1918 pour partager le pays en deux sphères, l'une attribuable à la Pologne et l'autre à la République Tchéco-Slovaque. Cet accord a été ratifié par le Gouvernement de Varsovie, mais il n'a pas été reconnu par celui de Prague.

Et il y a quelques jours des armées tchéco-slovaques ont envahi la zone qui avait été attribuée à la Pologne. Ce n'est pas là seulement une violation de territoire, mais c'est un acte extrêmement grave, car c'est le premier conflit entre les Alliés. Le Gouvernement polonais n'a qu'un désir: c'est de vivre en paix avec ses voisins, et surtout avec la République Tchéco-Slovaque, mais, par cette agression, le Gouvernement de Prague compromet l'avenir des relations entre ces deux pays.

Le Gouvernement polonais insiste vivement pour que les représentants des Puissances invitent le Gouvernement Tchéco-Slovaque à retirer ses troupes des territoires occupés par elles et à se conformer à l'accord de Teschen.

Le Baron Sonnino demande si la province de Teschen faisait partie de l'Autriche ou de la Bohême.

M. Dmowski répond que cette province appartenait à l'Autriche mais faisait partie de la Silésie.

M. Clemenceau invite M. Dmowski à indiquer quelles devraient être, d'après le Gouvernement polonais, les frontières de la Pologne.

M. Dmowski répond que, des trois Gouvernements qui s'étaient partagé la Pologne, le Gouvernement de Berlin est le seul qui ait eu une politique concernant la Pologne, et qui ait réussi dans une certaine mesure, à l'imposer à la Russie et à l'Autriche.

Au cours de cette guerre, le Gouvernement allemand a fait ce qu'il a pu pour régler le problème polonais conformément à ses désirs, car il avait compris que le règlement de la question polonaise devait être une des conséquences

de la guerre. Le Gouvernement allemand considérait la Pologne comme un danger pour l'expansion de l'Allemagne. Aussi, lorsqu'il se crut victorieux, le Gouvernement allemand organisa-t-il une Pologne aussi petite que possible comprenant à peine huit à dix millions d'habitants sous le nom de Royaume de Pologne, mais il l'entoura de sphères d'influence allemande, en laissant la Pologne allemande à l'Allemagne et la Pologne autrichienne à l'Autriche. En outre, il favorisa la création de deux Etats: la Lituanie et l'Ukraine, qui seraient en quelque sorte des protectorats allemands.

La Lituanie n'a commencé à faire parler d'elle qu'il y a une quarantaine d'années. Le mouvement lituanien est dû, en grande partie aux intrigues allemandes, qui voyaient dans le développement de ses aspirations le moyen de combattre à la fois la Pologne et la Russie. Cette campagne est l'œuvre d'hommes de bonne foi et énergiques, mais elle n'a pas réussi à constituer une nation et on ne peut vraiment parler de l'Etat lithuanien.

On peut dire la même chose de l'Ukraine. L'Ukraine a été inventée par les Allemands. La littérature allemande est pleine d'ouvrages et d'articles sur la nationalité ukrainienne et le mouvement ukrainien a été encouragé par l'argent allemand et autrichien. Il est d'ailleurs tout rédent et encore assez faible.

Ainsi la conception allemande comportait une petite Pologne, de moins de dix millions d'habitants, étouffés par la Lituanie et l'Ukraine d'une part, l'Empire d'Allemagne et l'Empire d'Autriche d'autre part.

Il s'agit maintenant de savoir quelle sera la Pologne qui devrait être reconstituée par les Alliés.

C'est sans doute un problème compliqué et difficile, car, si l'on étudie l'histoire, on verra qu'à certaines époques la Pologne formait un royaume plus grand qu'aucun Etat de l'Europe. Mais la Pologne a été partagée en 1772, par Catherine II et Frédéric le Grand, et soumise depuis lors à trois Gouvernements étrangers.

Quel serait le pays qui dans de telles conditions conserverait une vitalité aussi grande que celle dont témoigne à l'heure actuelle la Pologne.

Si l'on demande quelle est la population de la France ou de l'Italie, ou de tout autre pays, il suffit d'ouvrir un ouvrage de statistique et l'on verra qu'il y a tant de millions de Français, tant de millions d'Italiens etc.

Il n'en est pas de même si l'on demande combien il y a de Polonais. Il est impossible à l'heure de répondre à cette question. Il y a des Polonais de Pologne, il y a des Polonais d'Allemagne, des Polonais d'Autriche, il y a des Polonais de Russie, il y a encore des Polonais qui n'ont pas pleine conscience de leur nationalité. C'est ainsi que, tout récemment M. Dmowski a rencontré en Angleterre quatre prisonniers civils originaires de la Prusse orientale, qui

ne parlaient que l'Allemand, et qui pourtant affirmaient avoir une ascendance polonaise. Il est donc difficile de se baser sur des statistiques ou sur des cartes pour fixer les limites de la Pologne. Il n'y a qu'un moyen d'y parvenir, c'est de prendre comme point de départ les frontières de la Pologne en 1772 et de faire les rectifications jugées nécessaires pour des raisons politiques ou industrielles.

M. Clemenceau propose de remettre la suite de la discussion à la séance de l'après-midi.

Cette proposition est adoptée par l'Assemblée.

La séance est levée à 13 heures.

## 2 SEANCE DU 29 JANVIER

M. CLEMENCEAU donne la parole à M. DMOWSKI pour continuer son exposé sur les revendications de la Pologne.

M. DMOWSKI rappelle qu'il a conclu ce matin son exposé en disant que, pour établir les frontières actuelles de la Pologne, en devait prendre pour point de départ les frontières de la Pologne avant le partage de 1772 et faire des rectifications justifiées par des raisons politiques, économiques et industrielles.

Parmi les territoires perdus par la Pologne, il y en a, en effet, qui ont été germanisés, mais qui n'appartenaient pas originellement à l'Allemagne. Ces territoires sont la Silésie et la partie méridionale de la Prusse orientale.

L'Allemagne a réussi à y établir son influence et sa civilisation par les écoles, par la caserne et parfois même par la peur. Il y a dans ces provinces une partie de la population considérée comme allemande qui est d'origine polonaise. D'après les statistiques, 3 pour 100 seulement de la population de Dantzig serait polonaise, mais on peut être certain que si cette ville était attribuée à la Pologne, de nouvelles statistiques, faites d'une manière indépendante permettraient de constater que 40 pour 100 au moins de la population est polonaise. Lorsqu'au lendemain de la conclusion de l'armistice, les Allemands de Dantzig ont voulu organiser un meeting de protestation contre l'annexion de cette ville à la Pologne, ils n'ont recueilli que 16 signatures.

Les Allemands n'ont pu germaniser ces provinces que par toute une séries de lois anti-polonaises, et si l'on voulait savoir quelles sont vraiment les frontières naturelles de la Pologne, on pourrait dire que tous les territoires où les lois anti-polonaises sont en vigueur sont des territoires polonais.

Il y a là sans doute un problème difficile à résoudre, car la carte ethnographique est très irrégulière. On constate par exemple, dans la Prusse Orientale un îlot allemand à Koenigsberg qui est complètement séparé de l'Allemagne par des territoires habités par des Polonais. Voudra-t-on priver la Pologne de la bande de territoire qui la relie à la mer pour conserver Koenigsberg

à l'Allemagne? Ou bien faudra-t-il isoler le territoire allemand? Certes, l'Etat Polonais ne veut pas être établi sur la violence et il ne veut en aucune façon l'incorporation de l'îlot de Koenigsberg; mais si, sous prétexte de rattacher les Allemands de Koenigsberg à l'Allemagne, on privait la Pologne d'un accès à la mer, l'injustice serait plus grande que celle qu'on aurait commise en annexant Koenigsberg à la Pologne. Beaucoup de personnes sont tentées de penser que la Pologne est si habituée à l'injustice qu'elle peut en supporter d'autres encore, mais si une injustice est inévitable, ne vaut-il pas mieux qu'elle soit faite à l'Allemagne, qui pendant sept siècles en a infligé à ses voisins.

M. CLEMENCEAU demande quelle est la population du district de Koenigsberg.

M. DMOWSKI répond que cette région est habitée par un million et demi d'Allemands environ.

M. LLOYD GEORGE demande quelle est la population de la Prusse orientale.

M. DMOWSKI répond qu'elle est de 5 millions environ, dont 1.200.000 Polonais dans la partie méridionale.

Il ajoute que l'attribution à la Pologne d'un débouché sur la mer est absolument indispensable pour la préservation de la Paix dans l'avenir. Si la côte appartient à une nation et l'intérieur du pays à une autre, il y aura des conflits perpétuels entre les deux voisins. Les populations de l'intérieur s'efforceront d'arriver jusqu'à la mer, et les riverains s'efforceront d'étendre leur influence vers l'intérieur. Cela ressort, d'une manière évidente, de la politique allemande. Lorsque leurs possessions sur la côte s'étendaient jusqu'au Niémen, leur frontière était mauvaise au point de vue économique, et c'est pourquoi ils ont essayé d'absorber les populations polonaises de l'intérieur. Il suffit de jeter les yeux sur le tableau des propriétés de la commission de colonisation allemande en Pologne. Même dans la Pologne russe, le Gouvernement russe favorisait la colonisation allemande, car le Gouvernement impérial considérait que la Pologne était une cause de difficultés pour la Russie et il favorisait le développement de l'influence allemande pour combattre le nationalisme polonais.

Ainsi, ou bien cet îlot de 1 million  $\frac{1}{2}$  d'Allemands sera séparé de l'Allemagne, ou bien la nation polonaise sera exposée dans l'avenir à être séparée de la mer et dans la dépendance économique de l'Allemagne, et exposée, par suite, à des tentatives d'absorption de sa part. La solution du problème exige donc non seulement l'incorporation des territoires où le sentiment national polonais est très fort, et il faut se décider à isoler le territoire allemand de Koenigsberg. On pourrait peut-être établir là une petite république commerciale allemande, comme elle existait avant 1870. Si cette solution était adoptée, il est vraisemblablement qu'un courant d'immigration



polonaise se produira vers ce territoire qui, au bout de quelque temps, finira par perdre son caractère allemand. Mais ne vaut-il pas mieux et n'est-il pas juste qu'un petit état allemand soit exposé à l'immigration des Polonais plutôt que d'exposer toute la nation polonaise à un grand danger en lui refusant l'accès à la mer et en la maintenant sous la dépendance de l'Allemagne.

L'idée d'absorption de la Pologne est si enracinée dans l'âme allemande que BEBEL lui-même n'hésitait pas à écrire dans son livre "Die Frau": "Notre tâche n'est pas de coloniser l'Afrique mais de coloniser la Vistule".

La Pologne ne peut pas être exposée à ce danger dans l'avenir. Elle veut avoir des frontières qui la protègent et qui donnent l'accès à la mer Baltique.

En ce qui concerne les frontières de la Pologne à l'Est, les difficultés sont d'un autre ordre.

En 1772, la Pologne s'étendait à l'Est, jusqu'au Dnieper et à la Dvina, à la suite de l'incorporation de la Lituanie, qui avait conquis des territoires petits-russiens et grands-russiens.

La population des villes est polonaise, mais une grande partie de la population des campagnes n'est pas polonaise de race et son incorporation à la Pologne créerait de sérieuses difficultés.

La frontière de la Pologne de l'Est doit donc être réduite pour laisser à la Russie les populations non polonaises.

Sur ces territoires, deux mouvements nationaux ont pris naissance: le mouvement lituanien et le mouvement ukrainien, qui ne datent que d'une quarantaine d'années et qui ont un caractère spécial. Généralement un mouvement national est dirigé contre les oppresseurs. Il en est autrement en Ukraine et en Lituanie où le mouvement a été dirigé contre les Polonais, c'est-à-dire les opprimés, les maîtres étant les Russes.

C'est peut-être ce qui explique que ce mouvement n'ait pas eu la faveur sur laquelle on aurait pu compter.

Si l'on se place au point de vue de la Société des Nations, il est bien évident que cette Société, comme toute autre société, n'a de chances de développement que si elle est composée de membres solides, c'est à dire de nations bien organisées. Or, une nation c'est un groupe d'hommes capables de s'organiser, d'exprimer leurs vues et d'avoir une politique. Or, que voit-on dans le groupe oriental: une Russie sous un Gouvernement despotique, formé d'une poignée d'hommes. Les mêmes conditions existent sur le territoire de l'Est de la Pologne. La majorité des populations n'ont aucune idée et n'ont pas le moindre sentiment de leur nationalité ni de devoir civique. C'est une poignée d'hommes qui tâche de leur imposer son autorité. Si la Ligue des

Nations acceptait comme membres des Etats tels que la Lituanie et l'Ukraine, elle introduirait dans son sein non des Etats forts, mais une anarchie organisée.

Le monde entier est donc intéressé à avoir dans l'Est de l'Europe un Etat bien organisé, capable d'assurer l'ordre et de maintenir la paix. Il ne semble pas, dans ces conditions, qu'on puisse reconnaître l'Ukraine comme un Etat indépendant. Quand à la Lituanie, si on doit admettre la possibilité de reconnaître son autonomie – et le gouvernement polonais espère qu'elle le sera – est état de trois millions d'hommes devrait être réuni à la Pologne, car il n'est pas capable d'exister par lui-même. La Lituanie donc pourrait être un Etat autonome, uni à la Pologne.

On peut craindre que tout ce qui resterait à l'Est de la Pologne ne devienne la proie de l'anarchie, car il n'existe pas dans ces régions à l'heure actuelle de Gouvernement capable d'assurer l'ordre. La Russie sera pour longtemps encore le pays le plus malheureux du monde, où le despotisme noir risque de succéder au despotisme rouge, car les partis modérés sont trop faibles et trop peu nombreux pour prendre le pouvoir et la masse de la population est trop indolente pour réagir.

M. ORLANDO demande si M. DMOWSKI croit au retour du tsarisme.

M. DMOWSKI répond que c'est bien possible, mais ce dont il est convaincu, c'est qu'une forme de despotisme succédera au despotisme actuel et que si le tsarisme était rétabli en Russie, il y reviendrait avec tous les vices de l'ancien régime.

M. DMOWSKI continue que si la Pologne est prête à renoncer à une grande partie des territoires qui lui ont appartenu autrefois, ce n'est certes pas sans regrets, mais le Gouvernement de Varsovie craint que ces territoires ne soient pendant longtemps la proie de l'anarchie et un danger pour la Pologne, et il tient avant tout à être en mesure d'assurer le maintien de l'ordre et de la paix dans les territoires qui seront attribués à la Pologne.

M. CLEMENCEAU s'enquiert si quelqu'un demande la parole.

Le Président des Etats-Unis remarque que l'exposé de M. DMOWSKI a été si clair et si complet qu'il répond à toutes les questions posées par les représentants des Puissances.

M. DMOWSKI demande à ajouter encore un mot au sujet de la Galicie orientale. Dans ce pays la majorité de la population ...<sup>26</sup> Polonais ne sont que 16.000 sur plus de 465.000 habitants. Mais ... étudie les statistiques, on constate que, dans les professions libérales, les Ruthènes ne représentent qu'une infime minorité de 5 pour 100. On peut donc en conclure que la

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<sup>26</sup> Illegible fragments.

Galicie Orientale n'est pas en mesure de constituer un Etat séparé avec un Gouvernement propre, mais les Ruthènes ont le droit d'avoir des garanties assurant l'indépendance de leur nationalité.

*PDD 1919, doc. 88*

## 83

*30 January 1919, letter from the representative of the PNC  
in London to the Foreign Office  
about the mission of Jewish organisations to Poland*

30. January 1919

Richard Ward Esq.,  
Foreign Office,  
S.W.I.

Dear Sir,

In reply to your letter of the 24th instant, with regard to the request of the Joint Foreign Committee<sup>27</sup> of the Jewish Board of Deputies and Anglo-Jewish Association to afford facilities for passage on board a British vessel for a delegate of the Committee to proceed to Poland, I beg to inform you that the Polish National Committee have no objection whatever to any British Delegation arriving on the Polish soil with the object of studying the Polish problem on the spot, as we are convinced that such an investigation can only be to our advantage.

On the other hand, I would like to point out to you that should the Anglo-Jewish Association intend to take advantage of travelling on board a British vessel to appear in Poland as an official mission of investigation, this would be likely to convey to the Polish authorities and Polish public opinion the impression that the delegate in question have not only the authority but also

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<sup>27</sup> The Conjoint Foreign Committee was established in 1878 as an organisation uniting the Board of Deputies of British Jews (which represented the interests of Jewish citizens of Great Britain and was acknowledged as those circles' official representation since the 1830s) and the Anglo-Jewish Association (which was an organisation established in 1871 to promote the social and educational advance of Jews, mainly in poor countries). It was dissolved in 1917 on account of its stance critical of Zionism, and reactivated in 1918 as the Joint Foreign Committee.

the support of the British authorities to proceed with an investigation with regard to the position in Poland of his co-religionaries. And such, so to speak, semi-official character, would very likely induce the Jewish delegate to regard himself as a judge and to look upon the Polish people as the accusers.

I think it [is] totally superfluous to emphasise the danger of such or other religious expedition going to Poland to make enquiries of a nature as above mentioned, which would only be an encroachment on the rights and prerogatives of other British official mission, already arrived or about to start for Poland.

I am, Dear Sir,  
Yours faithfully,

Representative  
of the Polish National Committee in London

*PDD 1919, doc. 93 (ENG)*

## 84

*1 February 1919, note by the PNC about Polish troops in Russia*

Paris, 1 February 1919

Memo about Polish troops in southern Russia

The Polish army under the Polish government is currently dispersed throughout Europe, and some troops are even in Siberia. It is necessary to know in what numbers, where, and in what morale and material conditions those Polish troops are, and what steps should be taken for those forces to be up to the tasks required of them by the Polish government.

According to the account of Mr. Raczkowski, there are presently 2,000 Polish soldiers in Thessaloniki, and in the very near future this number is expected to increase to 4,000.

The lack of clothing and arms, as well as the failure to secure soldiers' pay has a very negative impact on recruitment into the army, and General Franchet d'Espèrey, to whom Mr. Raczkowski turned, answered that without an appropriate order from Paris he cannot do anything in this matter.

The report of Major Czuma indicates that Polish troops in Siberia, in the area of Krasnoyarsk, numbering 7,000 good soldiers, well-trained and disciplined Austrian prisoners of war, remain idle, as the approach of the Czech-Slovak corps in Siberia to Polish troops is ambiguous.

The rest of the Polish troops in the East is composed of smaller units, some of which have been transferred from Kuban to Odessa; some remained in Novorossiysk to await their transfer to Odessa. Mr. Raczkowski estimates their number at 4,000 men. This part of the Polish forces was the worst-equipped in terms of uniforms, arms, and provisioning. Lately, the question of uniforms and armaments of the Polish army being formed in Odessa has been solved by the agreement between the National Committee and the French High Command.

The lack of news from Murmansk makes it impossible to verify the condition of the Polish troops there.

Therefore, from the reports of the National Committee delegates, one can conclude that the general number of Polish soldiers in the East does not exceed 15,000; their material condition, i.e., uniforms, provisioning, and pay, leave much to be desired. As far as morale is concerned, Major Czuma clearly indicates in his report that the Polish army in Siberia is made up of good, disciplined, and well-trained soldiers. Since the Austrian soldiers of the older formations were untouched by the revolutionary spirit, one may suppose the

Polish army in Siberia presents very valuable material indeed. The withdrawal of those forces would be highly desirable. These soldiers are so much needed at the present moment in Galicia, where they would be defending a cause that is known and dear to them.

The Polish forces from Kuban and the Don were formed from those soldiers and officers who managed, after the disarmament of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Polish corps, to cross the Bolshevik cordons and to join General Denikin's Army of the Don and Voluntary Army. General Dragomirov told me that those people are valuable soldiers of great fortitude in combat.

In summary of all the above, it has to be admitted that the Polish army in the East is a very small military force, as it numbers a mere 15,000 soldiers and that the value of this army in terms of morale is high. Taking into account, however, that the state of a soldier's morale depends on his material condition, it would be a great pity if Poland was to lose a couple of battalions, and perhaps even a couple of divisions of good soldiers. This Polish army thus has to be supplied urgently with everything that is indispensable for a well-organised, modern army. Only then will it certainly be possible to say that, as this army moves deeper into Ukraine, it will grow to a very serious size.

The Polish population in Ukraine is made up mostly of land owners in the countryside and representatives of trade and industry in the towns. It is perfectly aware that ruin awaits it with the collapse of land ownership in those Polish outposts. By defending their future, all Poles in Ukraine will strive to support the Polish army in Ukraine wherever they can. It should be expected that the Polish army in the East, for now only 15,000 strong, will grow without much effort to at least 50,000.

Remembering, however, in what shameful manner the Polish Legions were disarmed by the Germans and how treacherously they were set upon by the Ukrainians in Niemirów,<sup>1</sup> it has to be firmly said today that the Polish army is sufficiently strong to take a stand in defence of the Fatherland and of its own honour, and that it is backed by the Entente, which vanquished the Germans, who were omnipotent in Ukraine.

Being an eyewitness to the last events in Ukraine, I dare say that the Ukrainian movement is nothing but a manifestation of Bolshevism. Those who stand at the head of this movement are unable to direct it, that the so-called

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<sup>1</sup> In the spring of 1918, the Germans and Austrians began to disarm the Polish corps in Ukraine and Byelarus. On 14 April 1918, a Ukrainian unit surrounded three squadrons of the 7<sup>th</sup> Battalion of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps under General Eugeniusz de Henning-Michaelis. After a short battle, the Poles surrendered, some of them were murdered and the rest turned over to the Austrians. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps capitulated in June 1918.

Ukrainian army is made up exclusively of former Russian army soldiers, demoralised by Bolshevik propaganda. They are not significant in numbers and their only advantage over the defenceless population is that they are armed.

I could relate many examples of villages and entire areas terrorised by a small quantity of armed cutthroats who have accepted de nomine the authority of the new Petlura government to be better able to rape and murder defenceless civilians with all impunity.

I personally saw how those who today stand at the helm in Ukraine threw down their weapons and ran into hiding at the approach of insignificant German units. I am convinced that if today they encountered a disciplined and well-armed force, they would run for cover as they did in March 1918 before the Germans and in December in Odessa before the French. In this way many Polish billions would be saved, along with the life of many talented and hardworking Poles whom the present Ukrainian government allows Bolshevik bands to cut down systematically and with impunity. It is thus most important that the Polish army in the East be formed so it can take steps, along with Entente forces, to save the life and property of the Polish population in Ukraine, and to increase the size of the Polish army, which is needed by the Fatherland at the present time plus que jamais.

*PDD 1919, doc. 98*

## 85

*2 February 1919, note from the representative of the PNC  
in Paris to PNC members about the policy of France  
in the matter of Poland's boundaries*

To the Right Honourable Gentlemen

Dmowski, Zamoyski, Wielowieyski and Skirmunt

Note by E. Piltz

On the recommendation of Clemenceau, a special commission chaired by Tardieu was formed to determine the boundaries of the Polish state from the

French viewpoint.<sup>2</sup> General Weygand and Le Rond, Ernest Denis and others were appointed to this commission, and Degrand is to represent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After lengthy discussions, the map of the Committee with slight changes was adopted as the point of departure. The changes include Polish Pomerania—160 kilometres in a straight line, with about 200 [km] of coastline. In East Prussia, for strategic reasons, the eastern boundary of Warmia was shifted farther to our benefit; it was thought fundamentally favourable to create a separate state under military occupation out of East Prussia; the district of Nysa was joined to Polish Upper Silesia. The questions of Teschen, Spiš and Orava weren't touched upon. Independent Lithuania, in a union with Poland—a union, not an alliance, as Gabrys would wish. The eastern portion of Lithuania, more or less from Daugavpils, to the south-west, toward Poland. Livonia is out. The boundary then runs along the Dzvina and Beresina rivers, thus the districts of Polotsk, Lepelsk and Borisov are out; then toward Kamieniec Podolski and the Dniester River along our map. Eastern Galicia is in Poland.

The quoted figures are from memory and may be not entirely correct, but any errors can only concern small details.

Degrand was the rapporteur.

Tardieu's position was very friendly and firm, and Denis' was averse. In all main questions, General Weygand behaved very favourably but said little, while General Le Rond spoke energetically in defence of the Polish concept, and brought with him many materials and maps.

Naturally, this only concerns French policy. The English and Americans will assuredly have much to say.

Paris 2 February 1919.

*PDD 1919, doc. 103*

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<sup>2</sup> The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs commission charged with drawing up the boundaries of the Polish state was established on 28 January 1919.



## 86

*4 February 1919, telegram from the PNC to the Prime Minister  
about the agreement in the matter of Teschen Silesia*

4 Février 1919

Paderewski, Président du Conseil,  
Varsovie  
Radio seize. Quatre Février Stop

Voici le texte de l'accord concernant question Teschen conclu le 1 Février. stop guillemets Les Représentants des Grandes Puissances saisies du conflit qui s'est produit entre les Tchèques et les Polonais dans la principauté de TESCHEN et dont la conséquence a été d'amener l'occupation de la région minière d'OSTRAWA KARWIN et celle du chemin de fer de Oderberg à TESCHEN YABLONKAU se sont prononcés dans les termes suivants Deux points guillemets

Ils croient devoir rappeler d'abord que les nationalités qui ont pris l'engagement de soumettre les questions qui les intéressent à la Conférence de la Paix ne doivent pas prétendre en attendant ses décisions s'assurer des gages ou occuper elles-mêmes les territoires qu'elles revendiquent. Stop

Ils prennent acte de l'engagement par lequel les Représentants de la Nation tchèque ont déclaré qu'ils arrêteront définitivement leurs troupes sur la ligne du chemin de fer précitée. Stop

En attendant la décision du Congrès de la Paix sur l'attribution définitive des territoires la partie de la ligne du chemin de fer comprise entre le nord de TESCHEN et la région minière demeurera occupé par les troupes tchèques tandis que la section de la ligne sud à partir de la ville de TESCHEN et y compris cette ville jusqu'à YABLONKAU inclus sera confiée à la surveillance militaire des Polonais. Stop

Les soussignés considèrent comme indispensable qu'une commission de contrôle soit immédiatement envoyée sur place pour éviter tout conflit entre les nationaux tchèques et les Polonais de la région de TESCHEN. stop Cette commission en dehors des mesures qu'elle aura à prescrire préparera l'enquête sur laquelle le Congrès de la Paix aura à se prononcer pour fixer d'une façon définitive la frontière respective des Polonais et des Tchèques dans la zone contestée. Stop

Le Siège de cette Commission sera dans la ville de TESCHEN. Stop

En vue de sceller l'entente entre deux nations amies qui sont appelées à suivre une politique en plein accord avec celle des Puissances Alliées et associées les Représentants des Grandes Puissances enregistrent la promesse des représentants tchèques que leur pays mettra à la disposition des Polonais toutes les ressources disponibles en matériel de guerre et leur accordera toutes facilités pour faire passer en transit des armes et des munitions. Stop

L'exploitation des mines dans la région de KARWIN–OSTRAWA se poursuivra en évitant toute atteinte aux droits privés sous réserve de mesures de police que la situation exigerait. stop La Commission de contrôle sera chargée d'y veiller et d'assurer en cas de nécessité sur la production le charbon la part qui pourra être équitablement réclamée pour suffire aux besoins des Polonais. Stop

Il est entendu que l'administration locale continuera à fonctionner dans les conditions prévues par l'accord du 8 Novembre 1918 [sic!] et que les droits des minorités seront rigoureusement respectés. Stop

En attendant la décision du Congrès de la Paix les élections politiques et la conscription militaire seront suspendues dans la Principauté de TESCHEN. Stop

Aucun acte impliquant l'annexion actuelle de tout ou partie de cette Principauté soit au territoire de la Pologne soit au territoire tchèque ne pourra être valablement accompli par aucune des parties en présence. Stop

Les représentants de la Nation tchèque s'engagent à faire relâcher immédiatement avec armes et bagages les prisonniers polonais faits au cours du conflit qui vient de se produire. stop Guillemets

Signé: Dmowski Benes contresigné<sup>3</sup>  
Wilson Lloyd George Orlando Clemenceau stop

Prions Gouvernement Polonais de donner des instructions télégraphiques à Cieszyn en vue de l'application immédiate des décisions précitées de la Conférence de la Paix.

Comité National Polonais

*PDD 1919, doc. 107*

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<sup>3</sup> Beneš signed the agreement only on 3 February 1919.

## 87

*7 February 1919, note from the delegate to the Peace Conference to the British Foreign Secretary: Notification of the formation of the Paderewski government and of the independent Polish State*

Paris, 7th. February, 1919

The Right Hon. Arthur J. Balfour  
Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain  
Hôtel Astoria, Paris

Sir,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that Mr. I.J. Paderewski, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, has requested the Polish National Committee to notify the Governments of the allied and associated Powers of the formation of his Government and to request the official recognition of the Sovereign State of Poland by the Governments of those Powers.

The Polish National Committee, official representative organ of the Polish Government, has the honour to support this request before His Majesty's Government.

At the same time the Polish National Committee wishes to draw His Majesty's Government attention to the following:

That the Allied Powers, in their declaration at Versailles on June 3rd. 1918, have recognised Poland as an independent and united State, and that Mr. Paderewski's Government is supported by a vast majority of the Nation in all Poland.<sup>4</sup>

I am Your Excellency's most obedient humble Servant,

(signed) Roman Dmowski

*PDD 1919, doc. 116 (ENG)*

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<sup>4</sup> Identical notes were also given to the ministers of foreign affairs of France and Italy, and to the U.S. Secretary of State.

## 88

*7 February 1919, note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs: Investigation into the matter of the murder of members of the Russian Red Cross delegation*

De Varsovie No. 414

7/II prin.

Moscou

Mr. Tchitcherine  
Commissaire du Peuple pour les Affaires Etrangères  
de la République Russe Soviétique et Fédérale

Comme supplément au radiogramme du vingt neuf janvier No. 1290 nous informons le gouvernement de la République Soviétique que à la suite d'une enquête minutieuse poursuivie par la commission extraordinaire avec Mr. Bronislavski<sup>5</sup>, le membre de la cour d'appel en tête on a mis en état d'arrestation toutes les personnes considérées comme suspectes d'avoir participé au crime commis sur les membres de la commission de la Croix Rouge Russe. Stop Les autorités polonaises poursuivent des mesures rigoureuses dans le but d'élucider toutes les circonstances du meurtre survenu. Stop Néanmoins le conflit entre les deux gouvernements se prolongeant en durée grâce à l'attitude du gouvernement soviétique qui lance des accusations à l'adresse

<sup>5</sup> In November 1918, the Polish authorities agreed to the arrival of the Russian Red Cross mission sent by the Bolsheviks (it arrived in Warsaw on 20 December 1918). It was headed by Bronisław Wesolowski, who demanded that Russian institutions providing assistance to prisoners of war be established on Polish territory. The Polish government refused and on 26 December the members of this mission were interned. On 30 December 1918, the minister of external affairs allowed the mission members to be released from custody for their departure from Warsaw, but on 2 January 1919, they were murdered by the Polish gendarme unit assigned to then as an escort. In the meantime, on 31 December 1918, Commissar Chicherin, in a note to minister Wasilewski, protested the imprisonment of the Bolshevik mission and informed the Polish authorities that Polish diplomatic representatives in Russia had been arrested in response. He also made their return to Poland conditional on the liberation of the Bolshevik mission members. The Polish government launched an investigation into the murders. What followed was the accused blamed their since-deceased commander for the murders. On 6 March 1920, a military tribunal found one of the accused not guilty and condemned the other five to prison sentences of one to two years.

du gouvernement polonais sans avoir toutefois des preuves suffisantes, le ministre des affaires étrangères tient pour nécessaire demander auprès du gouvernement soviétique un délégué spécial en personne de Mr. Alexandre Wienkovski dans le but de entamer par ses intermédiaire des pourparlers avec le susdit gouvernement. Stop Notre délégué sera chargé de s'entendre avec le gouvernement soviétique sur diverses questions soulevées également par ce dernier et que dans l'intérêt réciproque des deux gouvernements il est urgent de résoudre au plus prompt. Stop Que le Commissaire du Peuple voudra bien nous indiquer l'itinéraire que doit suivre notre délégué se rendant prochainement à Moscou. Stop Attendons réponse. Stop

Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Paderewski

*PDD 1919, doc. 117*

## 89

*11 February 1919, report from the meeting  
of the Polish-French Commission of Procurement for the Polish Army*

### COMMISSION D'ACHAT POUR L'ARMÉE POLONAISE

Procès verbal de la séance du 11 février 1919

Présents: MM. Wielowieyski – président, Gen. Haller, Colonel Rémond, Cap. Górka, M. Chamiec, puis Comd. de la Noë, Chef d'Etat Major de la Mission Franco-Polonaise, et député Tetmajer.

Conformément aux ordres du Comité National Polonais, agissant au nom et pour le Gouvernement Polonais, il a été institué auprès du Comité National Polonais une commission d'achat dont le rôle sera de procurer aux Armées Polonaises, soit par de cessions des Gouvernements Alliés, soit par achats directs, des armes, matériel de toute nature, munitions, effets d'habillement et d'équipement, etc., qui leur sont nécessaires pour leur organisation et leur entretien.

Cette Commission est placée sous la présidence de Mr. Wielowieyski, chef de la Section Militaire du Comité National Polonais.

Sont désignés comme membres:

Mr. le Général J. Haller

Commandant en Chef des Armées  
Polonaises, ou un de ses représentants

Mr. Chamiec	Représentant du Ministère des Finances du Gouvernement Pol.
Un représentant du Général Chef de la Mission Franco-Polonaise	
Le Colonel Rémond	de la Section Militaire du C.N.P.
S/Lieut. Borenstedt	de la Section Militaire du C.N.P.
Mr. St. Przewdziecki	Secrétaire de la Commission

La Commission a le droit d'appeler à ses séances un certain nombre d'experts et de spécialistes avec voix consultative. L'objet principal des ses travaux sera d'acheter soit par voie de cessions auprès des Gouvernements alliés, soit par voie d'achat directs auprès de l'industrie et du commerce, le matériel, armes, munitions, effets d'habillement et d'équipement etc. dont le Gouvernement Polonais a demandé l'envoi.

Mr. Wielowieyski ouvre la séance et communique à la Commission la demande de l'Etat Major de Varsovie. Une discussion s'engage sur chaque chapitre de cette dernière.

A savoir:

1) 100000 fusils avec 50 Millions de cartouches.

Comme modèle de fusil, la Commission adopte le modèle français.

2) 50000 de carabines courtes avec 25 millions de cartouches.

Le model français est également adopté.

3) 1000 mitrailleuses avec 15 millions de cartouches.

Le type à choisir est autant que possible le type Hotchkiss.

4) 20000 pistolets pour hommes et officiers.

Mr. le Général Haller propose pour les officiers le type américain et pour les soldats le type français. Sur la proposition de Mr. Wielowieyski et du Colonel Rémond cette question est mise à l'étude.

5) 16000 sabres et 8000 lances destinées à la cavalerie.

#### ARTILLERIE

6) 200 canons de l'artillerie de campagne (60 bat à 4p. type 75 m/m).

7) 40 canons de défense anti-aérienne (20 bat à 2p. type 75 m/m).

8) 80 canons à longue portée (20 bat à 4 p mod. 106 m).

9) 320 obusiers légers de campagne (80 bat à 4p. mod. 120 m).

10) 80 obusiers légers de campagne (20 bat à 4p. mod. 150 m).

Le Colonel Rémond propose adopter pour la dernière série l'obusier français de 155 court ce qui est adopté.

11) 2160 caissons de munitions.

12) 1080000 obus pour les canons ci-dessus soit 1600 coups par canon.  
AREOPLANES.

13) 60 aéroplanes de combat avec 3000 bombes. Sur la proposition de Mr. Wielowieyski le nombre de bombes est mis à l'étude.

14) 500 CAMIONS.

Sur la proposition du Gen. Haller on décide d'acheter si possible les camions dans lesquels toutes les quatre roues travaillent.

15) 100 AUTOMOBILES de combat et petits tanks.

Le modèle de ces machines est mis à l'étude.

16) 40 TRAINS BLINDES.

Une discussion s'engagea sur l'appellation "trains blindés". Mr. Wielowieyski suppose qu'il s'agit des locomotives et des Wagons blindés. On a décidé de demander une explication à l'Etat de Varsovie.

17) 2000000 des grenades à main.

18) 100000 uniformes.

19) 100000 équipements.

20) 200000 collections (linge).

21) 10000 harnachement de trait.

22) 16000 selles avec accessoires.

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#### QUESTION DE L'ENVOI

Le matériel énuméré ci-dessus peut être divisé en deux groupes:

1) celui qui doit être expédié immédiatement,

2) celui dont l'envoi peut tarder quelque temps.

Les choses qui doivent partir immédiatement sont:

les chaussures

le linge

les fusils

les grenades

les avions

les munitions pour fusils.

La question de transport présente beaucoup de difficultés. Mr. Wielowieyski prie d'étudier la question de transport par la Suisse. En outre il est à étudier un achat des wagons. Nous avons besoin de 32000 wagons. On pourrait éventuellement acheter des ateliers entiers en France ou bien des wagons américains.

\* \* \*

#### L'ACHAT DU MATERIEL DE GUERRE.

Pour acheter le matériel en question il serait toute importance à établir:

- 1) Si on pourrait effectuer l'achat directement au Ministère de la Guerre
- 2) ou bien si on devrait acheter chez les fournisseurs aux Armées.

Mr. Chamiec demande si la vente des stocks de l'Intendance Militaire est déjà organisée. Le Colonel Rémond s'engage de prendre à ce sujet des renseignements nécessaires.

Une autre question importante surgit de la discussion: c'est le délai de livraison et le coût du matériel que l'on se propose d'acheter. Mr. Chamiec demande un aperçu des prix. Le mode de paiement serait établi ultérieurement, selon toute probabilité, la Pologne paiera avec des bons de Trésor émis en francs français à 3 ans de date. Le Commandant de la Noë déclare que les demandes pour l'achat du matériel en question doivent être faites d'urgence au Ministère de la Guerre car il y a déjà une demande d'armement pour les 16 divisions du Général Haller (6 Divisions à former en France, et 10 Divisions à former en Pologne par détriement des premières).

Le Commandant de la Noë et le Colonel Rémond s'engagent à donner pour la prochaine séance tout renseignement (nécessaire) pour les travaux de la commission.

Mr. Wielowieyski prend à l'étude la question des automobiles, de trains blindés et celle du modèle de 320 canons 120 m/m..

La dessus la séance est close à 5.20 du soir.

Le Président de la Commission  
Le Secrétaire



## 90

*12 February 1919, note from the delegate to the Peace Conference  
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France  
about German policy toward Poland*

Paris, le 12 Février 1919

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Stephen Pichon  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères  
Paris

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Comité National Polonais reçoit des nouvelles de plus en plus alarmantes concernant l'attitude du Gouvernement allemand et des autorités allemandes dans les provinces polonaises:

1. Dans la Prusse Occidentale, dans la Haute Silésie et dans les districts de la Posnanie qui sont restés jusqu'à présent entre les mains des Allemands, les autorités allemandes emprisonnent et internent les personnalités dirigeant la vie nationale polonaise, elles déportent en masse en Allemagne les hommes en âge militaire et dans beaucoup de cas les troupes allemandes provoquent la population paisible pour avoir un prétexte aux plus dures répressions.

2. En effectuant la démobilisation de l'armée allemande on applique des mesures spéciales aux soldats de nationalité polonaise: ils sont forcés de rester en pays allemand et à continuer le service militaire ou bien ils sont internés dans des camps de prisonniers. Les ouvriers originaires des provinces polonaises ne peuvent non plus rentrer dans leur pays et sont souvent internés.

3. Les autorités allemandes dans les provinces polonaises réquisitionnent ce qui reste de vivres et l'envoient en Allemagne. Aujourd'hui le prix des articles de première nécessité est déjà de trois à dix fois plus élevé dans les provinces polonaises qui se trouvent entre les mains des Allemands qu'en Allemagne.

4. En même temps la concentration des troupes allemandes en Silésie, dans les districts de la Netze (Nord de la Posnanie) et dans la Prusse Occidentale progresse rapidement, ces troupes attaquent les Polonais, et les agences télégraphiques répandent en même temps de fausses nouvelles que les Allemands sont attaqués par les Polonais. Les journaux allemands sont remplis de proclamations appelant les hommes à s'enrôler dans les troupes volontaires spéciales (Grenzschutz, Freikorps Hülsen, Freiwilligen Regiment Reinhard, Abtheilung Löschbrand etc.) afin de combattre les Polonais. Les

présidents (gouverneurs) de la Prusse occidentale et de la Silésie arment même la population civile allemande, et l'excitent contre les Polonais. Dans le centre minier du pays polonais, dans la Haute Silésie, les nombreuses usines d'armes et de munitions sont en plein travail et leur production n'a pas diminuée.

La convention d'armistice, en laissant les provinces réclamées par la Pologne dans les frontières de l'Allemagne n'a assuré aucune protection à la population de ces provinces contre les abus des autorités politiques et des troupes allemandes. Les faits précités démontrent que la situation des Polonais dans ces provinces est devenue insupportable et que l'attitude des Allemands qui, sa basant sur les termes de l'armistice se considèrent maîtres du pays et profitent de la période de l'armistice pour écraser les Polonais, est capable de produire de graves complications.

Le Gouvernement polonais, pour ne pas être accusé de vouloir produire des faits accomplis avant la décision de la Conférence de Paix, garde vis à vis de ce qui a lieu dans la Pologne allemande, une attitude de réserve, bien que l'opinion publique soit amenée par les événements à l'état d'exaspération. Néanmoins les derniers renseignements sur la conduite des Allemands démontrent que tant que les provinces polonaises resteront occupées par les troupes allemandes et administrées par les autorités allemandes, aucune mesure ne sera en état de protéger la population polonaise contre les actes de violence et assurer la paix entre les Allemands et les Polonais.

Vu cette situation j'ai l'honneur de soumettre à Votre Excellence au nom du Gouvernement polonais les mesures qui seules, à notre avis, sont capables d'assurer une existence tolérable à la population polonaise dans les provinces qui appartenaient jusqu'ici à l'Allemagne, et notamment:

1. D'établir provisoirement sans préjuger des décisions de la Conférence de Paix sur les frontières occidentales de la Pologne, une frontière d'armistice entre ce pays et l'Allemagne qui placerait sous l'occupation polonaise les provinces et les districts suivants: a) la régence d'Oppeln (Haute Silésie) à l'exception des districts de Neisse Ville et Campagne et de Grottkau; b) les districts de Namslau, Gross Wartenberg et Militsch de la Régence de Breslau (Silésie moyenne); c) La province de Posen; d) la Prusse occidentale; e) la régence d'Allenstein dans la Prusse Orientale.

2. De maintenir sous l'occupation allemande les districts des régences de Königsberg et de Gumbinnen, à la condition de ne pas y laisser plus de troupes, qu'il n'est nécessaire pour le maintien de l'ordre. Le chemin de fer Königsberg–Dirschau–Konitz–Schneidemühl–Kreuz–Berlin pourrait être réservé pour la communication libre avec l'Allemagne et particulièrement pour l'évacuation des troupes.

3. D'obliger le Gouvernement allemand à libérer tous les prisonniers civils et militaires de nationalité polonaise et à ne pas empêcher le rapatriement des personnes originaires des provinces placées sous l'occupation polonaise.

Le Gouvernement Polonais serait heureux si Votre Excellence trouvait possible de proposer les mesures exposées ci-dessus au Conseil de Grandes Puissances avant le renouvellement de l'armistice.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

/sig./ Roman Dmowski

*PDD 1919, doc. 124*

## 91

*12 February 1919, note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs  
to the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs  
about establishing friendly relations*

Warsaw, 12 February 1919

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian State in Kaunas<sup>6</sup>

In reply to the note of the Lithuanian government of 11 January 1919,<sup>7</sup> the government of the Republic of Poland is honoured to communicate the following: The Polish government's position has always been to recognise nations' right to self-determination. In particular, it recognises this right to its full extent in connection with the Lithuanian nation. In consideration, however, that the Lithuanian government speaks for the Lithuanian state that

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<sup>6</sup> The note was submitted on or about 15 February 1919, and was dealt with at the beginning of March. On 5 March 1919, the daily *Lietuva* devoted an editorial to it and suggested that it may open the possibility of establishing bilateral relations.

<sup>7</sup> This probably refers to the note of 4 January, in which the Lithuanian government protested the appointment of commissioners and other officials and the formation of Polish self-defence units. It demanded the withdrawal of the Polish units that had entered Lithuanian territory without prior authorisation from the Lithuanian government. At the beginning of February 1919, the note was probably communicated to the director of the Lithuania and Byelorussia Department, Prof. Ludwik Kolankowski, who held, at the same time, the position of General Commissioner for Eastern Lands.

encompasses, in addition to undoubtedly Lithuanian areas, also lands inhabited by Byelorussian and Polish populations, which have not only not consented to their inclusion in the Lithuanian state but on many occasions protested against it by means of a number of resolutions and declarations, the Polish government cannot recognise the Lithuanian state in the form and within the boundaries in which the present Lithuanian government would wish to see it. The Polish government is of the opinion that the question of boundaries between the Lithuanian and Polish states should be settled on the basis of the freely expressed will of the people inhabiting the disputed territories, a view to which the Peace Conference will most probably accede.

The Polish government, however, does not see in all this any obstacle to the establishment right now, in the name of a number of shared interests, of direct and friendly relations between both nations' leading responsible agents. Quite to the contrary, it feels that this will make it possible to reach agreement and to remove difficulties by means of concordant good-neighbourly coexistence between the Polish and Lithuanian nations, as is undoubtedly desired by both sides.

Minister of Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of Poland  
/-/ I. J. Paderewski

Department Director  
/-/ Prof. Dr. L. Kolankowski

*PDD 1919, doc. 125*

## 92

*12 February 1919, memo from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
to the Interim Chief of State about relations with Entente states*

Memo to the Chief of State

Poland's clear alignment with states allied with the Entente is the primary and most essential task of the Polish government.

This matter has become the more urgent and topical since Point 16 of the conditions of the ceasefire, extended until 17 January 1919, is entering into the real execution phase. According to the latest sources, General Haller and his soldiers, numbering almost 60,000, have left Le Havre en route to Danzig

and, on about 17 February, he will step onto Polish soil in Danzig.<sup>8</sup> If it doesn't wish to find itself facing military faits accomplis without its participation, the Polish government has to hammer out immediately its policy towards the Polish troops of General Haller and hence, in the spirit of alliance, towards the Coalition. Any other settlement of this issue would create unacceptable duality within the Polish military authorities and could entail the most terrible consequences for the country.

From the military point of view, the following possibilities should be considered.

1. If Poland officially aligns with the allied (Entente) states, this will bring it ...<sup>9</sup> enormous benefits of a military nature, as it will be able to take a stand against the Germans, Ukrainians, etc, as a member of the Coalition, i.e., as the victorious side in this war. Of course, this would entail the necessity of coordinating any possible military action (such as against the Germans or the Bolsheviks), i.e., placing Poland's operational units under the supreme command of Marshal Foch. This would in no way prejudice our sovereignty or the dignity of the Polish state, considering that all Entente countries find themselves in an analogous situation. The chief command over the Polish armies would, of course, remain in the hands of the Chief of State, just as the chief command of the Italian army remains in the hands of the Italian king, that of the Belgian one in those of the Belgian king, etc., despite the placement of the highest military authority over operational troops in the hands of a joint commander. The unity of military action, in addition to benefits of a military nature, produces political equality and strengthens solidarity in the defence of the interests of allied states.

The subordination of the entire armed forces to the supreme command of the Coalition would be out of the question. The competence of the Minister of Military Affairs would remain intact.

2. If the Polish state were to declare its neutrality or continue in its passive stance, we would be threatened with:

a) A downright unfavourable diplomatic situation and complete military isolation in case of invasion by the Germans or the Bolsheviks;

b) A disadvantageous position during the division of resources, in provisioning and the distribution of war reparations;

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<sup>8</sup> In reality, the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces gave the order to transfer Haller's Army from France only on 8 April 1919. The delay was due to the opposition of the British, who feared this army could be used for actions that would pre-empt the decisions of the Peace Conference.

<sup>9</sup> Illegible fragment.

c) The settling of the Polish question at the first stage of the Peace Conference (the conference between allies) without the participation of Polish representatives.

It should be added that allied rights have already been granted to Poland de facto and at present to adopt a passive or neutral stance would be equal to losing all benefits which have already been assured.

The relations of the Polish government with the Entente (15 November–15 January)

The Polish government's first official act in relation to Coalition states was notification dispatches sent by the Commander in Chief on 16 November 1918. At the same time, the minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Filipowicz, turned to the allied states with a request that they send their official representatives to Poland as soon as possible, and the Chief of Staff, General Szeptycki, requested assistance by telegraph in overcoming Poland's communication difficulties.

The above-mentioned dispatches were published in the French press, but the Polish government did not obtain an official response to them.

The subsequent step in establishing closer relations with the Entente was supposed to be the immediate sending of the Warsaw Delegation. For reasons of a technical nature—selection of persons, etc.—this was seriously delayed, until mid-December. However, Mr. Hempel was sent to Paris by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was supposed to prepare the ground for the welcoming of the delegation and to strive for the preparation of an agreement with the National Committee in Paris. Mr. Hempel obtained a passport for travel to France immediately and took energetic steps in political matters and in the press, but proved unable to compete with the strong influence of the National Committee, with which he did not reach an understanding.

At the beginning of December (on the 10<sup>th</sup>), when talks conducted with Kessler about the evacuation of the Ober-Ost revealed the pointlessness of continuing any negotiations with the Germans, the Polish government turned to its chargé d'affaires in Bern with a note in which it was maintained that Kessler's presence in Warsaw had been tolerated solely on account of the threat of invasion by German troops from Ukraine and the obligation to defend the interests of the Polish inhabitants of the Borderlands. Considering, however, the attitude of the Germans during the negotiations and with respect to the fact that the presence of German troops in the Ober-Ost constituted a violation of the Polish state's sovereign rights, the severance by necessity of temporary [relations] with the Germans became indispensable. The Polish government requested that the above be communicated to representatives of the Entente states, adding that it will make the date of Mr. Kessler's expulsion

from Warsaw dependent on the Entente's readiness to extend assistance to us in case the Germans wished to carry out their threats.

In any case, Mr. Kessler's departure occurred before any answer from Bern was received.

In the second half of December (on the 17<sup>th</sup>), the Chief of State sent to the Entente states an extraordinary delegation made up of Dr. Dłuski, Mr. Sokolnicki, Mr. Sujkowski, and Mr. Wieniawa-Długoszowski, and whose task was to first arrive at an understanding and a settlement with the National Committee, and then to jointly notify [the Entente states] of the emergence of the Polish state.

Beginning at the end of December, when relations with Germany were becoming increasingly warlike, the Polish government sent a number of dispatches to Prime Minister Clemenceau, for example, in protest of German violence on the 25 December, of the threat of German troops marching from Ukraine across Poland on the 28, of German provocations in Poznań and, finally, a number of dispatches about the matter of the Ober-Ost and Vilnius. The government insisted that the Germans be forced to carry out the Polish demands in Lithuania, i.e., to let our troops through to Vilnius and to give arms and ammunition to the Vilnius Poles. When in the end the Germans ceded Vilnius to the Bolsheviks, on 14 January the Chief of State sent to Paris a long, encrypted dispatch in which he declared to the governments of allied states that the Polish government wishes to start negotiations with the governments of Entente states immediately for the purpose of establishing a common plan for combating the Bolsheviks. At the same time, Poland requested material assistance, ammunition, provisions for the army, weapons, etc., as well as diplomatic assistance in the form of pressure on Germany to stop paralysing our actions.

The government did not obtain any direct answer to those dispatches, but *Homme Libre*, an organ of Prime Minister Clemenceau, carried at once an article reporting that the dispatch of the Chief of State had been received and adding that his call would certainly be listened to. Before this (after the first dispatch on the Vilnius matter), Marshal Foch recommended that the chairman of the Armistice Commission at Spa demand that Germany accord all freedom of movement to Polish troops in Poland and Lithuania in their combat against the Bolsheviks. At the following meeting of the Commission (about 8 January), Marshal Foch declared that Germany would be held responsible for damage that their behaviour in Lithuania brought to the country and its people. Foch declared that the Polish government is complaining of the Germans' behaviour in Lithuania and, in doing so, became an advocate of the Polish cause in the spirit the Polish government had expressed in its dispatches.

During one of the meetings of the Commission in Spa, the representative of France also demanded that the Germans refrain from provoking the Poles in Poznań. In this way, despite the absence of direct telegraphic replies to our dispatches, the Polish government could see that its wishes in a number of individual cases were being taken into consideration by Coalition states.

Meanwhile, back in Poland, the American food mission organised the entire provisioning campaign for Poland, and the English political mission took energetic steps to defend Poles threatened in Lithuania, Galicia, and Silesia.

*PDD 1919, doc. 126*

## 93

*14 February 1919, report by the Director of the Military Department of the PNC for the PNC presidium in the matter of the transport of Haller's Army*

Paris, 14 February 1919

REPORT  
of the Director of the Military Department  
to the Presidium of the Polish National Committee in PARIS

on the matter of the return of Polish troops to Poland.

### STRENGTH

The strength of the Polish army in France at present is the following:

Already organised:

	Officers	Soldiers
Staff, staff company of the Supreme Command of the Polish Army—units stationed in PARIS	42	309
1 <sup>st</sup> Division	296	10,806
2 <sup>nd</sup> Division	203	8,205
Instruction Division	87	5,838
Intérieur (exercise and training camps)	229	5,036
RECRUITS		
a) Prisoners of war in Italy		24,387
Prisoners of war in POW camps in England		3,400



b) American volunteers		2,000
REGISTERED AND CONCENTRATED IN POLISH CAMPS		
In Italy		17,000
In France—French camps		4,000
In France—English camps		10,000
	857	90,980

We suffer from a lack of officers and for this reason the military command will rely mainly on French officers.

#### ORGANISATION

We are organising six divisions. The rest of the men, which will not be placed in those divisions, will comprise reserve companies and will, transportation facilities permitting, be sent to Poland to replace the losses in the six divisions or will be used to form new divisions on site.

#### ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

The organisational structure of the Polish divisions, modelled on the French type, is shown in Annex no. 1.

#### PROVISIONING

We are planning that each division will take along in its stock a double supply of arms and uniforms to be able to grow two-fold once in Poland.

Provisioning for a time will come from France, warehouses, and a commissary office in Danzig, which we are calculating to have reserves for six divisions for six months.

The conditions for the service of French officers in the Polish army are covered in two agreements of the National Committee with the French government, copies of which I am enclosing with these presents (Annexes nos. 2 and 3).

By virtue of the latest agreements with the Coalition, the matter of the transfer of troops presents itself as follows: The French mission to Danzig, which is to see to the transfer of the troops from Danzig to Poland as the responsibility of the Coalition. The sea crossing is to be secured by the English Admiralty. The responsibility of the Polish ministry would be to prepare quartering in Poland, to ensure transportation from the 1914 boundary, as well as to draw up the overall plan of further organisation of the work of the commissary and health-care services in conjunction with the Command and the Military Department of the Polish National Committee.

## HEALTH CARE

For the purpose of discussing the sanitary question, senior doctor LIGOUZAT (a Frenchman) will arrive in Warsaw. His task will be to recruit Polish doctors for our army—for the reason that the posts of military doctors cannot be filled with Frenchmen as they don't know the language; as well as drawing up, by the Warsaw Staff and with the Health Ministry in Warsaw, of the sanitising of the region in which the troops will be quartered and laying out the entire work plan for the health service of the Polish army.

## POINTS TO BE CLEARED UP WITH THE POLISH GOVERNMENT

In the opinion of the Military Department, one should immediately clarify the following matters with the help of the Polish government:

1. Deciding on the principles following which all the Polish troops, as Coalition troops, are going to be placed under the supreme command of Marshal Foch—with the same rights as the armies of all other allied states—as is already the case with the army commanded by General Haller.

2. The unification of both armies by the introduction into the army located in the Congress Kingdom of the same organisational principles under which the Polish army in France has been built. Until the institution through legislation of the military penal code, the French penal code, which has been used with some changes by the Polish army in France, should be introduced to all the troops.

3. Deciding with the War Ministry the matter of organising purchases and deliveries, and with the General Staff the matter of military attachés. At the same time, for as long as the Committee remains the supreme representation of Polish policy among the allied states, i.e., until the matters of the Peace Conference are finished and the general peace is signed, in the opinion of the Military Department these matters should be conducted in agreement with the National Committee.

4. Deciding on the competence of the Military Department and its relations to the government in Warsaw, as has already been laid out in detail in the report to the War Minister (Annex no. 4).

Director of the Military Department of the PNC  
*Wielowieyski*

*PDD 1919, doc. 133*

## 94

*16 February 1919, report by the government representative  
in Teschen Silesia*

Confidential

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
in Warsaw

Given that I am very busy with contacts with the Coalition Mission, representatives of the National Council, Colonel Latinik, etc., and we have little free time, I will limit myself to presenting the more important questions and events, irrespective of chronological order.

The Coalition commission that arrived in Teschen on the 12<sup>th</sup> of this month is complete, now that its fourth member has arrived. It's an Italian whose name I don't know yet. As I already mentioned by telegraph, the commission also includes the three following members: The French representative Grenard, a former consul in Moscow, the Englishman Colonel Coulson, and the American Professor Coolidge.<sup>10</sup> The latter told me he knew President Paderewski well (not to be confused with another Coolidge who deals with provisioning matters).

Besides this, Major Fordham—an Englishman, a member of General Barthélémy's Mission, and a sincere friend of ours—was posted to the Commission. The chairmanship went to Mr. Grenard. The most intelligent of the Commission members is Mr. Coolidge; Colonel Coulson seems to be only slightly familiar with military matters. Commission members, who probably knew very little about the question of Silesia, devoted the first few days to acquainting themselves with the general situation. They began working very slowly, and this is also the reason why the settlement of even the most pressing matters takes so unusually long. Despite this, the Czechs didn't neglect anything, not only to surround the Commission with their own people, but also to malign us in their eyes by stating the most obvious lies. The Commission has taken a stand that is favourable to us, one which is confirmed as it acquires a more detailed knowledge of the question. It is already rather well acquainted with ethnographic matters, and presently the main point remains the coal issue. The Czech's main argument is that, as they claim themselves, their own coal production is insufficient to cover their needs, so they must get the Polish mines. Our defence will seek to show that: 1) that the coal is located on our territory,

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<sup>10</sup> This refers to the Inter-Allied Commission for Teschen Silesia. The fourth representative was Alfredo Tissi.

therefore the Czechs have no right to it; 2) that Silesian coal is our only source of coking coal and supplies the entire country, and 3) that the production of Czech mines is, in fact, very significant and should be entirely sufficient. I think that on the basis of the materials gathered by the National Council it will not be difficult to demonstrate these three points in detail. As most probably the entirety of the coal question would not have been settled in a few days, but over at least a couple of weeks, I raised the necessity to settle the question as fast as possible, if only temporarily, to provide us an indispensable quantity of coal. I sent a telegraph on this matter to the ministry, asking for information about the most pressing needs and for the preparation of the requisite number of railcars.

As I already mentioned by telegraph, the Commission wishes to interpret the Paris Treaty<sup>11</sup> while keeping to the text as faithfully as possible. It had initially wanted to leave the Coal Basin under Czech occupation, but presently, following Colonel Latinik's far-reaching demands made to excellent effect as well as my own verbal clarifications, it is gradually changing its stance and is inclined to grant us extensive concessions. I am worried at the thought, however, that the conditions proposed may prove exceedingly cumbersome for the Czechs. Presently, the Commission intends to turn the Coal Basin into a zone free of any troops and under the sole administration of civilian authorities in keeping with the accord of 5 November. It would like to extend this neutral zone to the entire territory lying between the Teschen-Jabłonków rail line and Ostrawica. The entire northern rail line would thus remain in our hands. The station at Bogumin would be occupied by both sides. The fate of the town of Bogumin is undecided. I would not consider the creation of the militarily neutral zone as unfavourable for us, because it entails the evacuation of the Czech troops from the entire Coal Basin and, most probably, from almost the entire Duchy. Given that, in my opinion, the stance of the Commission will be increasingly favourable to us, I feel that we should not begin with overly high demands. On the day of my arrival to Skoczów, the Commission was talking of the Czechs evacuating Teschen within a few days, and the delays in issuing this ordinance, as I mentioned by telegraph, should not be taken as a change of views in our disfavour by the Commission but, quite the opposite, that it has become aware that it had not taken into account the entire range of our postulates in its first project and that it has begun to examine the matter anew. We thus didn't insist too much on the evacuation of Teschen initially, understanding that this could entail a less favourable resolution of the entire matter. According to today's news, I think that the Czechs should leave the town around Wednesday.

I also raised a whole range of other questions, for example, restoring rail and telegraph connections, the release of all prisoners and interned persons (about

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<sup>11</sup> This is a reference to the Polish-Czechoslovak disarmament agreement of 1 February 1919 (see document No. 86).

which the Commission sent out telegrams today) and a couple of others. I am held back, however, by a lack of official powers clearly stating the scope of my competences to the Commission. As a result, on many issues I was unable to speak out energetically enough. Therefore, if I am to remain here for a few more days, please be sure to send me temporary powers in French and English by telegraph as quickly as possible. Their absence can prevent all action on my part entirely. Given the lack of such powers, I also asked the ministry to telegraph the Commission and request that the deliveries of coal be resumed and ammunition let through. I think that my mission, which consisted of finding out about the situation and establishing the first contact with the Commission, is nearing its end. It would be advisable to send here an official representative of the government from among people of repute in the political world who would continue the negotiations. I wish to stress, however, that this should be done as quickly as possible and that the present state of affairs cannot last for long. At the same time, if this representative were to arrive here only in a couple of days, I once again ask for temporary powers. A good candidate for government representative would be Professor Stanisław Grabski, who has personal ties with Silesia (his sister is here), he knows Grenard, and is well thought of by the Entente. He should come here for about two weeks, after which he could be replaced by someone else, like Mr. Warchałowski, for example, who has recently arrived from Paris, as I already mentioned, and while he is presently in Cracow, he intends to return here. Mr. Warchałowski does not have the official powers from the National Committee and has expressed his readiness to collaborate here with representatives of the government as the need arises (he brought a lot of interesting information from Paris and it would be advisable to request that he travel to Warsaw). An official representative of the staff should also be sent to remain continuously with the Commission. He should be fluent in French and English. I consider it unadvisable to entrust the National Council with representing the government, because: 1) the Council or its representative would not embody the necessary dignity in the face of the Commission and local agents; 2) there are no people here who are sophisticated enough politically to carry through what is, after all, a quite intricate task. On the other hand, the Council, which will readily work with the government delegate and feel the need to rely on him, can provide much information of great significance. Finally, I wish to point out that, in my opinion, after a while, when the Commission will acquaint itself with the situation in detail, it would be advisable to request that it deal with the question of Čadca, Spiš and Orava—a matter that may prove to be of first-rate importance. The first steps should be taken in Warsaw (with the Noulens' mission<sup>12</sup>). I feel, however, that it is presently a bit too early for this.

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<sup>12</sup> This refers to the Inter-Allied Mission sent to Poland by virtue of the decision of the Supreme War Council of 22 January 1919, to investigate the situation in Poland, especially the Ukrainian-Bolshevik-Russian question, the Polish-Czech problem,

I think that my mission here will be entirely finished with the arrival here of a government delegate. Please send me detailed instructions and keep in mind the need for rapid decisions.

/-/ Stanisław Dangel

I am temporarily lodged along with Colonel Latinik in Skoczów, and am in Teschen every day. The matter of provisioning, which I mentioned by telegraph, is enormously urgent. There are burning needs, so ask earnestly that this matter be dealt with as quickly as possible. When the Czech troops are evacuated, Silesia may find itself in a downright critical situation. It would be a good thing if someone who is fluent in French and English would be sent here to carry out translations, of which there is a great quantity. There is a total lack of local resources. Council member and consul Pindor is completely insufficient.

I received the materials sent to me from Warsaw by members of the Council. The telegram about the position of Ministry about the occupation of the country arrived yesterday. I have sent four telegrams to Warsaw thus far. I have not received a reply to them.

Skoczów, 16 February 1919.

*PDD 1919, doc. 136*

## 95

*20 February 1919, note by the Economic Delegation:  
Project for the qualification of war losses*

le 20 Février 1919

### PROJET POLONAIS

Les catégories des dommages de guerre sont les suivantes:

1. – causés aux personnes;
2. – causés aux biens;
3. – causés aux Etats par toutes les dépenses imposées par la guerre.

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and the situation in Poznań region. The mission's chairman was Joseph Noulens. The mission arrived in Warsaw on 12 February 1919, and its activities ceased on 19 March 1919.

1. Dommages causés sur le territoire de l'Etat ainsi qu'en dehors de ses limites à ses citoyens par toute atteinte à leur vie, à leur capacité de travail ou à leur liberté du fait de l'ennemi par exemple:

a) Les dommages physiques, causés par un fait de guerre, qui a occasionné une blessure, une infirmité ou une maladie.

b) Les dommages physiques même en absence de toute blessure, infirmité ou maladie, occasionnés par les emprisonnements, par les déportations ou par toutes violences exercées par l'ennemi.

c) Si la victime a succombé par les violences exercées par l'ennemi, la réparation sera due au conjoint survivant, aux descendants et ascendants.

d) Dommages causés par l'impossibilité de travailler ou d'obtenir une juste rémunération du travail.

Observations. Dans certains pays occupés vu la destruction de l'industrie, les ouvriers étaient forcés, pour se sauver de la mort, de la faim, de s'engager en Allemagne, après avoir signé des contrats soit avec les agences du gouvernement, soit avec les entrepreneurs.

Aussitôt arrivés en Allemagne, ces malheureux se sont trouvés dans un état d'esclavage complet, privés de la liberté personnelle et de tous droits civils.

C'est évidemment une catégorie des travaux forcés.

e) Les dommages causés par les faits de la guerre sur le territoire de l'Etat aux biens mobiliers et immobiliers appartenant sans distinction de nationalité, aux particuliers, aux personnes morales, ainsi qu'à l'Etat par exemple:

a) Toutes les réquisitions opérées par les autorités ou troupes ennemies y compris les prélèvements en nature, les impôts, taxes, amendes, contributions de guerre dont auraient été frappés les particuliers et les personnes morales.

b) Toutes les ainsi nommées: „Expropriations”, achats amiables, administrations forcées, séquestres, liquidations, forcées etc. etc. concernant les biens mobiliers et immobiliers.

c) Les enlèvements de tous biens, meubles et de tous objets, leurs détériorations ou destructions partielles ou totales. Entre autres enlèvement de locomotives, wagons, rails, etc. etc. Quels que soient les auteurs de ces enlèvements détériorations ou destructions.

d) Les détériorations d'immeubles bâtis ou non bâtis, y compris les forêts, les destructions partielles ou totales d'immeubles bâtis, les enlèvements, détériorations ou destructions partielles ou totales d'outillages, d'accessoires et de bestiaux, appartenant à une exploitation commerciale, industrielle ou agricole en qualité d'immeubles par destination, la destruction du sol, quels que soient les auteurs de ces destructions et détériorations.

e) Les dépenses occasionnées aux villes, communes et autres unités ainsi qu'aux organisations sociales, administratives par la nécessité de nourrir, habiller, soigner, en un mot entretenir la population privée de la faculté de gagner sa vie.

f) Les emprunts d'Etat dont la souscription a été imposée à la population.

g) Les dommages occasionnés par l'émission spéciale des billets de banque ou autres valeurs faites pour les pays envahis.

h) Les dommages occasionnés par la diminution de la valeur de l'argent dont les puissances ennemies se sont servies pour couvrir ses créances dans les pays envahis.

i) Tous dommages causés par l'ennemi aux biens meubles et immeubles, appartenant aux citoyens de l'Etat ainsi qu'à l'Etat même se trouvant dans les limites de quatre puissances ennemies.

Observations. Cette liste n'est pas complète, nous nous réservons le droit de la compléter.

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Sous le dommage de guerre, nous attendons en général:

1) La perte éprouvée par le sinistré.

2) Le gain dont il a été et dont il sera privé jusqu'à la restitution – comme suite immédiate et directe de l'acte commis par l'ennemi.

Le dommage de guerre doit être dument constaté.

Les dommages d'ordre moral ne sont pas sujets à réparation.

Les bases d'évaluation des dommages seront communes à tous les pays.

*PDD 1919, doc. 142*



## 96

*20 February 1919, exposés of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs about Polish foreign policy (excerpts)*

Esteemed Chamber!

[...] <sup>13</sup>

During the entire course of the war, Poland was forced to maintain relations with the governments of the partitioners, because it was unable to pursue its own foreign policy. It was conducted loosely abroad by all manner of people of undoubtedly good faith and good will (voices from the Left: “But they sold Silesia!”). Gentlemen, I am speaking to you with the deepest respect. I ask that you also show me a modicum of respect in return (loud applause from the centre and the Right, cries from the Left: “This is not a concert or cinema! Can’t we comment?”).

Gentlemen, let me move on, or rather return, to our foreign policy (voices from the Left: “Talk about Silesia!”). The time for Silesia will come also. Please be so kind and allow me to carry on with my exposé as planned. Polish policy could not be conducted from abroad because Poland had no representation with respect to the Allied states. It was then, in August 1917, the Polish National Committee in Paris was established (bravos, applause). I was working in America then. At the time, a Polish volunteer army was emerging there to fight against the Central Powers (long-lasting applause, except from the Left). It seemed to me, it seemed to us, that Poland should show the world that it is able to freely fight against Germany! (loud applause, except from the Left). An army was thus created and this needed oversight, care, and above all political authority. We could not turn over this army to the foreign, unauthorised hands. Poles were necessary for this (bravos). Consequently, I joined the Polish National Committee as a member and plenipotentiary for America (voices: “True!”). The composition of the Polish National Committee had certain gaps, which have now been carefully filled. At the request of the Chief of State, Messrs. Dłuski, Sokolnicki and Sujkowski have been in Paris for the past few weeks, they are now members of the Polish National Committee and were members of that committee during the hearings about the question of Teschen (voices: “aha! aha!”). Messrs. Thugutt, Wasilewski, and Patek departed for Paris to join them, and others will follow shortly. Despite many inducements and suggestions, the Polish National Committee never titled itself as the Polish government (objections from the Left, Mr. Daszyński calls out: “Why then did

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<sup>13</sup> Fragments about the internal situation (including fragments about the need to reinforce the army) were omitted.

Mr. Pichon call it *gouvernement régulier polonais*?”). I am not responsible for Mr. Pichon, only for the National Committee (cries from the Left: “Why then was Mr. Dmowski appointed Polish representative at the Peace Conference?”). The choice of Mr. Dmowski was approved by the Chief of State (cheers and applause from the Right). The Polish National Committee never titled itself the Polish government. It reached for power in Poland simply, drawing its dignity and strength from quiet yet solemn assurances by home country and émigré representatives that most of the nation stood on the side of France, England, Italy, and North America (loud applause, except from the Left). Boldly and in pursuit of sacred duty, it took on a position unfilled by anyone. Its task was to defend Poland. It sought to fulfil this task conscientiously and honestly, and fulfilled it as it wanted, i.e., conscientiously and honestly (applause, except from the Left. A cry from the Left: “What do we care about the Committee!”). Today, the Polish National Committee is only the Polish delegation to the Peace Conference and is acting on the instruction and in the name of the Polish government (bravos). One of the main tasks of the present government was to define Poland’s policy towards the Entente, to establish possibly the closest and friendliest relations with the victorious allied states.

And it would seem that we succeeded. The formation of our government was greeted exceedingly kindly and cordially by the following countries, in chronological order: the United States, France, Italy, England, and, on the day before yesterday, by Romania (bravos and applause). The four great powers did not stop with words. They sent us here their substantial representations, this inter-allied mission whose clear task it is to bring us aid (bravos). Tens of railcars with weapons and ammunitions have already arrived (bravos and animated applause). Rail cars from the American Red Cross have already arrived with gifts that are very valuable to us, with medical supplies for Polish soldiers (animated applause) who have suffered so terribly during this war. Food is arriving in great quantities (bravos and applause). Yesterday, 80 rail cars arrived in Warsaw with the finest wheat flour (applause). Further supplies are coming and we would be able to look more jauntily upon the future were it not for a handful of troublemakers threatening internal public order (cries in the chamber: “Rightly! Rightly!”) and were it not for the state of our relations with our nearest neighbours (a voice in the chamber: “Shame!”)

Our relations with our nearest neighbours are the matter that is most deserving of this chamber’s pressing attention. So far, the result of the World War has indeed been the triumph of the Polish idea. What happened is something even the boldest didn’t dare to dream, something only believers and those confident, following Mickiewicz’s example, prayed for to God fervently, a miracle! And so, for the glory and salvation of the Polish nation, all the three predatory and despised imperial thrones collapsed and lay in

ruins! (widespread, long applause and bravos). But did they collapse for good? (Father Okoń: "For good!") Let's take a closer look at this situation.

So far, only one monarchy has collapsed, seemingly for good—that is the Austrian empire. About Germany and Russia, we can't say this so boldly and with certainty. The German revolution has traits of insincerity (cries from the Right: "True!"). German republicanism seems hypocritical (cries from the Right: "True!"). After all, only recently, a few days ago, those republicans dared to refer to our beloved brothers from Poznań Province as German subjects (voices from the chamber: "Shame! Down with the Prussians!"), and a dozen of our soldiers who had fought in defence of their own life those republicans condemned to 145 years in prison (voices from the chamber: "Shame!"). Marshal Foch ordered them to stop fighting. They obeyed the order, but in German! Because they fought with ever-greater fierceness, to the last moment, inflicting upon us by means of explosive shells and poisonous gasses, losses not only among the ranks but also among the civilian population (voices in the chamber: "Shame!"; Deputy Korfanty: "And continue to fight today!"). And as Deputy Korfanty, present here today, declared, they are still continuing to fight today.

Esteemed Chamber, Poland needs a great army! (long-lasting applause and bravos).

From the northeast, from the east a plague is approaching. From the northeast, I repeat, the bloody wave of Russian Bolshevism flows. Its high priests promise anyone who converts to this new faith worldly happiness and paradise on earth. We know this language—those who once upon a time sought to convert the Polish people to Eastern Orthodoxy spoke this language (bravos, applause). The east has not changed. Bolshevism will fall because it must fall and—I hope I am mistaken—on its ruins may emerge not only a republic, but a new tsarist entity. Meanwhile, in this raging and chaotic Russia, hundreds of thousands of our compatriots live, they live in hunger, in the cold, in misery, in dread, and in fear. Thousands have already been executed. Minsk, Pińsk, and our Vilnius are in Bolshevik hands. The danger is terrible and great.

Esteemed Chamber, Poland demands a great army! (applause and cries: "Long live the army!")

The defence of Lwow against the Cossacks in the 17<sup>th</sup> century remains one of the most beautiful moments of our history, but the defence of Lwow of the last few months, weeks and recent days is perhaps even more beautiful and laudable! (bravos). It was taken up by women, girls and our children (Cries: "Glory to them!"; Deputies rise for a moment), and it is led on fearlessly and courageously by our meagre but heroic troops. To the women and the men defending Lwow—Glory! (widespread cries: "Glory!") Lwow is ours! The land of Lwow, those Cherven Cities were already ours when, along with Przemyśl,

almost a thousand years ago, Vladimir the Great conquered it from the Poles. Taken back by the Poles, conquered again by the Ruthenians, in 1140 this land became an independent state and ceased to exist after 200 changeable and stormy years. Since 1340, that is, from the moment when these lands passed by way of inheritance from their last ruler, Bolesław of Masovia, to Casimir the Great, Lwow and Red Ruthenia have been an integral and inseparable part of Poland. No one in Poland needs to be told what Lwow represents for Poland and how dear and indispensable it is (voices: "Rightfully so"). In the southeast, Lwow is the most powerful bastion of Polishness, it is a seat of Polish thinking. While Warsaw is and remains the heart of Poland, during the long years of oppression and bondage, Cracow and Lwow were like two lungs through which the entire nation absorbed the air necessary for free life (bravos, applause on the Right). Lwow was Polish, is Polish, and will remain Polish! (bravos).

But it isn't only about Lwow. While I am not at all an imperialist, I would sincerely wish, on account of state unity, strength, and security, and while granting to everyone full and equal civic rights, that only Polish speech be used in the government offices, courts, and state schools in areas that are ethnically purely Polish. I think, however, that in the Eastern Borderlands, the prevailing order should be different (voices: "Rightly"). In keeping with our forebears' most beautiful tradition, which led various nations to huddle around the Polish hearth and which, it is our hope, will continue to inspire them to seek protection in confidence under the wings of the Polish Republic, we should not place any barriers in the way of those nations' separate development but, to the contrary, we should extend to them our fraternal helping hand (bravo). May the heretofore spiritually frail plants of humanity grow and flower happily, bathed in the rays of Polish liberty! May they develop the colours and shapes of their feelings and thoughts of distinctiveness! In the noble drive for the sun and for light, we Poles do not hold back anyone! But this does not entail that we should renounce or own rights to those territories, those Borderlands that were cradle to the Żółkiewskis and Sobieskis. We made those lands fertile by the blood and bones of our forbearers, the greatest Polish heroes, we impregnated these lands with our hard work, and we later raised it with our Polish culture. We built cities, bastions, fortified towns, and strongholds there, we erected Catholic and Greek churches there (from the Right: "Hear, hear"), and established Polish and Ruthenian academies there. Red Ruthenia, Volhynia, Podolia, and Ukraine are presently home to over 3 million Poles. Not 3 million Polish gentry, but 3 million Polish people!

We must remember them, and for this reason we may not, and we will not, renounce our rights to peaceful coexistence and to participate in the peaceful development and progress in the Borderlands! (bravos).

Let me move on to the question of Silesia. It is a very fresh, yet old matter. By a strange coincidence, a strange turn of fate, it falls to this High Chamber, which is made up in such large measure of peasants, to debate on the matter of the King of the Peasants. Because if Lwow and Red Ruthenia are ours thanks to Casimir the Great's legacy, the matter of Teschen is our inheritance from him. The great, wise, and just monarch, author of the Statute of Wiślica, the founder of the Cracow Academy, the one who turned Poland into a great European power, in 1335 ceded to the Czech Crown all his Silesian lands, including Teschen. Austria took over those lands along with all the lands of the Czech Crown and held on to Teschen till the last moment of its existence. When Austria's approaching collapse become evident, the farsighted and courageous Czechs began to make great efforts to rebuild the Czech state in its historical, so they claimed, boundaries, that is, with Silesia. And fate strangely favoured them. At the beginning of the war, the insufficiently prepared France and the suddenly surprised England, placed great store in Russia's military strength and believed steadfastly in its victory. They considered all opposition to Russia as harmful to their own interests and while we fought enthusiastically and rightfully against the Tsarist armies, while our glorious Legions brought to the armies of the oppressors many setbacks (applause and bravos) and many defeats (voices from the Left: "Hail to the creator of the Legions!"), the Czech not only did not want to fight but, on the contrary, they gave themselves up, passing in the thousands to the Russian side. The compliant press stressed these facts, presenting them in the Czech's favour and to our disfavour. At the end of the war, when in Russia a project emerged to create our own national army, certain Polish politicians who lived there at the time opposed the idea strongly (voices: "Shame!"; protestations and voices: "Unfortunately!"). The corps of Dowbor-Muśnicki, which was expected to accomplish many great things, was disarmed (voices on the Left: "He allowed himself to be disarmed!"). Meanwhile, the Czechs immediately began to create their own army in Russia and that army, thanks to the collaboration of the European and American press, gained enormous publicity and so the Czechs became the darlings of the allied states. Things would not be well with Silesia had it not been that error committed by the Czechs, meaning their assault on Teschen (voices: "Shame!"). In six days after our government was formed, Czech troops entered Teschen Silesia by deceit. I use the term "deceit" with full cognisance of this place, the moment, and my position. I am thus speaking cautiously (bravos). The command of the Czech troops, most evidently acting without the agreement of their own government, entering our territory, calling themselves Entente troops, and issuing a proclamation to the Polish people signed by four officers who had no authorisation from their government to do so (Deputy Korfanty: "Hear this!"), have committed acts defined by other, more appropriate terms (voices: "Those are traitors!"). This proclamation of

the Czech troops was belied by the inter-allied commission in a manner that was firm and final (bravo). I will say no more about the suffering endured by our civilian population, or about the behaviour in Silesia of those Czech troops, because this would excessively lengthen my speech. If our government had an army of five hundred thousand, that army which could easily have been formed a year and a half ago in Russia, we would have no need to defend Lwow or Teschen and we wouldn't have war on any front (applause). The government had no such army, and was unable to form it in those three weeks, or rather six weeks. The government thus did what it could: it issued a complaint and an energetic protest. The Peace Conference immediately took our complaints to be discussed. The people upon which the fate of the world depends in the near future, wishing to prevent bloodshed and not expose the civilian population to further suffering, decided to bring an end to war operations and ordered a ceasefire on conditions, which, like all compromises, are not entirely pleasant for either side. All those conditions are only temporary. The Czechs are to temporarily obtain the Bogumin-Koszyce railway and occupy the coal mines, having first undertaken to deliver half of the coal to us (clamouring from the Left). The Teschen National Council (voices from the Left: "It has run away from Teschen!" and "The Czech artillery is in Teschen!"). I am grateful for this news, because I rested my speech on news from yesterday evening that told me that the Teschen council had resumed its functions (voices from the Left: "It returned to Bielsk!"). Thank you, gentlemen, for these clarifications. Today, I admit that I didn't yet read the dailies, and perhaps you will be kind enough to forgive me (merriment). In any case, gentlemen, we expect a just verdict, which will be announced in a couple of months at the peace conference. [...] We expect this verdict with the greater right, the greater justice, and the greater boldness as the peace conference at the very outset of discussions on this subject declared solemnly that whoever uses force at the present stage only proves that his claims are not just.

Honourable gentlemen, our cause was defended with courage, ability, and honesty. Among the material evidence presented to the conference was a map of Teschen drawn up some time ago by the Polish National Committee. It was seen at my office by a member of the Teschen council, the honourable and deserving Deputy Father Józef Londzin, who declared to me that the Teschen National Council is in complete agreement with this map, and no one would wish to suspect the Teschen National Council of a lack of patriotism (applause, Speaker Trąpczyński presides over the debates again).

All in all, in Silesia, our troops, miners, workers, the entire population, all behaved heroically (loud applause). With all my heart, I join the cry that resounded from these benches last Friday: Hail our Silesian brothers! (widespread cries: "Glory!").

The inter-allied commission—the representation of France, England, the United States, and Italy—which is presently in Warsaw, is dealing with the Teschen question diligently, carefully, and conscientiously (voices: “But unsuccessfully”). [...] Gentlemen, it has been many, many years, since our capital hosted within its walls so many such eminent guests. I felt very happy when I saw the cordiality and gaiety with which the High Chamber greeted this representation because, should we honour it worthily, humbly and, obsequiously, as some poor children of an injured widow? No! Like dignified sons of a great nation that is glad to greet in its home the representatives of the greatest, noblest, and finest nations in the world (loud applause, deputies rise and bow in the direction of the loge of the mission of the Entente states).

We have other things to settle with the Czechs. Before I was here, a few weeks ago, the Czechs took our land in Spiš, in Orava and in parts of Trenčín County. A handful of our brave troops left these areas without firing a shot because they had to. But why did we all accept news of this without a murmur, without protest, without outrage? (voices on the Left: “Deputy Moraczewski”). Why? After all, these Polish lands bordering on the most beautiful corner of our country, to these skyrocketing Tatra mountains, are home to over a hundred thousand Poles, that is, incomparably more than between Teschen and Frydek County. Why this indifference? Is it because there is no coal there? But in Spiš there are rich deposits of marble, in Orava there are enormous sources of peat and, above all, in those fertile valleys wheat grows and matures. From there, our highlanders from the Tatras draw, as if from a granary, the grain for their bread. We must defend everything that is Polish (voices: “Yes!”). After all, every field cultivated by a Polish peasant is our field; after all, each Polish enclosure is our enclosure (bravos), our outpost, our fortress (applause). Poland never was nor will it ever be a predatory state (voices on the Left: “True!”). It wishes to live with all nations in harmony and friendship, and so it is with the Czechs, the more so as they enjoy such favour on the part of the allied states. If the Czecho-Slovak state, which is headed, after all, by a man of great repute, of great merit, and of great virtue, wishes to repair the great injustice done to us, an accord must take place, because such an accord will be necessary for the good of mankind, for the good of both nations and for the good of Europe.

[...]

*PDD 1919, doc. 143*

## 97

*21 February 1919, letter from an employee of the representative  
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow  
to the Director of the legation (to Warsaw) about protection of Poles*

21 February 1919

To His Excellency  
Envoy of the Republic of Poland in Russia

From the moment our Representation ceased to serve the masses of Polish citizens forced to remain in Russia, it has become a matter of utmost importance to place those Poles under the care of one of the neutral countries. In one of the notes sent to the Russian government, the Polish government indicated that it had approached the Danish government in this matter. On this basis, and keeping in mind the instructions received from Warsaw, in December of last year, the Senior Counsel of the Representation, Mr. Jan Żarnowski, began negotiations on this question with the Danish envoy, Mr. Scavenius. The latter promised a favourable decision in the matter and even issued a note to the Russian government to demand the return of property looted by the Bolsheviks from our Representation. It seemed, therefore, that all was on the right track and that the Poles, along with English and French citizens would be under Danish protection. Unfortunately, following Mr. Scavenius' departure, the matter took a less fortunate turn. Both the Danish legation in Petrograd and the consulate in Moscow began to decline to provide care to Poles, pointing chiefly to technical difficulties. Prior to my departure from Moscow (on 5 February), I had a long conference on this subject with Mr. Möller, who is presently conducting Danish affairs in Russia. Mr. Möller told me that difficulties of a technical nature could ultimately be overcome but that the real obstacle to placing Polish citizens under Danish care is the lack of instructions from the Danish government. Furthermore, Mr. Möller indicated that, in his opinion, it would be desirable for the Polish government to communicate with his government.

Given the utmost importance of obtaining the protection of a neutral state for the Poles in Russia, who are entirely defenceless, and keeping in mind Mr. Więckowski's approaching departure for Moscow, I have the honour to communicate the above to Your Excellency, so that the steps Your Excellency may feel are appropriate can be taken.

*Adam Chełmoński*

*PDD 1919, doc. 146*



## 98

*21 February 1919, report by the government representative in Kiev (from Odessa) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the troops of General Żeligowski and the political situation in Ukraine*

Odessa 21 February 1919

Confidentially  
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
(Political Department)  
in Warsaw

The courier, Mr. Czudowski, is leaving today at 10:00 AM. The following, therefore, is a brief summary of the latest news.

1. The meeting General Żeligowski convened for 12:00 PM yesterday for the purpose of settling the matters of supplies of clothing, footwear, etc., for the division, didn't take place. General Ostapowicz didn't come, because the divisional commander not only failed to take into account the demand of the head of the military mission about the removal of some officers, but appointed one of them to a meeting in the capacity of rapporteur. The consul, Mr. Brzozowski, didn't come, having informed General Żeligowski that he couldn't attend due to important and pressing matters. Messrs Zieliński and Oplustil from the Supreme Military Committee also failed to attend. These facts point to General Żeligowski's total isolation in this area. Even such matters as divisional supplies and recruitment (to say nothing of the entirely proper attitude of General Ostapowicz in the circumstances), cannot concentrate any serious Polish agents around the commander of Polish forces in the East. Should this continue, the division will fall apart, to be replaced by partisan units, whose spontaneous and uncoordinated activities could cause great harm to the Polish cause in Ruthenia.

Today is an unusually happy moment. The great majority of the people in Ukraine will greet a regular Polish army acting in a planned and legal manner with enthusiasm and great friendliness. Farmers, Ruthenian peasants, have had enough of upheavals and unfulfilled promises, which they have ceased to believe. Subversive agitators can be punished without mercy and the population will applaud but, out of concern for Poland's good name, this can be done successfully only by a regular and disciplined armed force that does not commit any abuses or violence and are not driven by the desire for revenge.

For all those reasons, once again I wish to stress the necessity for the Polish government to decree that energetic steps be taken to clean up the state of

affairs that arose here in Odessa, before the coming of spring and, hence, the start of war operations.

2. The English diplomatic agent, Reilly, visited me for a couple of hours yesterday. Prior to this, he had met with the delegation of the so-called Khleboroki from Ukraine (the same ones who, in their time, toppled the Central Council and bestowed the dignity of Hetman of All-Ukraine on General Skoropadsky), who told him, as they had earlier told General Berthelot, that Ukraine should constitute an integral part of Russia. Mr. Reilly holds the same view so far, but in connection with right-bank Ukraine he hesitated. He and I analysed maps, statistical tables and other materials attesting to Poland's right to exert the predominant influence on this country. We looked over the so-called Line of Equilibrium (Czekanowski's work<sup>14</sup>) and Sphere of Influence by Professor Romer,<sup>15</sup> after which Mr. Reilly observed that Poland's boundaries should be moved further east than he had thought. He promised to report on the matter to the English Consul General, Mr. Cooke, who is to arrive tomorrow or today and who is to be in possession of wider powers.

3. The most important event of the moment is the fall in Winnica of the two-faced Directorate with its Bolshevick sympathies, the removal from the political stage of Mr. Vynnychenko and the establishment of a new ministry headed by Professor Ostapenko.<sup>16</sup> The Federalists came to power at last and Mr. Matsiyevych became Minister of Foreign Affairs. His first act was to arrive in Odessa, and this must be followed by acceptance of the Entente's conditions and war with the Bolsheviks. These conditions are resumed in the following points: 1) a clear war with Bolshevik Russia and raising an army for this purpose; 2) acting against the Bolsheviks jointly with Poland, whose army will take up positions on the left wing of the Ukrainian army; 3) placing the railways at the disposal of the Supreme Command of the Coalition; 4) making the composition of the supreme authority and the government subject to Coalition authorisation; 5) the presence in that government of a representative of Poland.

<sup>14</sup> This is a reference to the book by Jan Czekanowski, *Stosunki narodowościowo-wyznaniowe na Litwie i Rusi: w świetle źródeł oficjalnych z czterema mapami* (Książnica Polska Tow. Nauczycieli Szkół Wyższych, Lwów 1918), in which the author drew a "line of balance" between the Polish, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian nations based on data concerning landed property and confession.

<sup>15</sup> The geopolitical concepts of Eugeniusz Romer are included in a work he edited: *Geograficzno-statystyczny atlas Polski*, Gebethner i Wolff, Warszawa-Kraków 1916.

<sup>16</sup> This refers to the government formed on 13 February 1919 by Serhyi Ostapenko. It included social-federalists, among others. This government favoured cooperation with the Entente powers and with Poland against the Bolsheviks.

Perhaps, Mr. Matsiyevych is still counting on some softening of the above conditions, but it is doubtful his demands for changes will be taken into account. I was unable to see him yesterday, but will do so today and depending on the result of our discussion I will remain here or return to Winnica. Unfortunately, the courier is departing earlier than this discussion is to take place, but I will not fail to inform the ministry of its tenor by the earliest available courier.

*PDD 1919, doc. 148*

## 99

*22 February 1919, instruction from the Deputy Minister  
of Foreign Affairs to the government representative in Sofia  
in the matter of politics in the Balkans*

Warsaw, 22 February 1919

To Mr. Tadeusz Grabowski  
Chargé d'Affaires in Sofia

I received your reports of 7 January 1919 No. 70 and from 16 January 1919 No. 71 and I have noted their substance with satisfaction.<sup>17</sup>

In the matter of your intervention in the Bulgarian-Serbian dispute and the departure for Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana, please follow the guiding thought of our foreign policy for the southeast, namely that we must in the first instance maintain the friendliest of relations with Romania, with which we share enormous and vital interests. We should, therefore, avoid even the appearance that we might be supporting the Bulgarians against any state in the Balkans, or that we may wish to use one of them against any other.<sup>18</sup>

While closely following this guideline, you can take the steps you see as indicated.

<sup>17</sup> Tadeusz Grabowski was in Sofia from 1915 as a delegate of the Supreme National Committee. On 22 November 1918, he was appointed representative of the Polish government in Bulgaria, and on 2 January 1919, he submitted his letters of accreditation as chargé d'affaires at the mission in Sofia.

<sup>18</sup> The Peace Conference decided to take away from Bulgaria the part of Macedonia and Southern Dobruja that had been under Bulgarian occupation in 1915–1918, and this was reflected in the peace treaty signed on 27 November 1919 in Neuilly-sur-Seine. Bulgaria signed an armistice with the Allies on 29 September 1918.

The Polish government will await the arrival of the Bulgarian legation to Warsaw.

It would be most desirable, however, if this legation did not arrive in Warsaw before those of Romania and Yugoslavia. Please act to delay matters accordingly.

The Polish government views favourably the question of providing premises and an automobile for the future Bulgarian legation. It will be possible to finalise this matter in due time.

Vice-Minister  
/-/ Wróblewski

*PDD 1919, doc. 149*

## 100

*22 February 1919, report by the head of the Polish Military Mission  
in Bucharest: Discussions about military cooperation against the  
Bolsheviks*

BUDAPEST 22 FEBRUARY 1919

### REPORT OF GENERAL LAMEZAN

As I have already mentioned in my report of 18 February, the plan for armed intervention against the Bolsheviks has not yet taken concrete shape. General Berthelot supposedly arrived in Bucharest with a fully drawn up plan against the Bolsheviks. The execution of this plan was suspended in Paris due to the political pressure exerted on the undecided government. It would seem, however, that despite this, the idea of intervention was not entirely abandoned. It is certain, however, that the French corps presently found in the east cannot for the most part be used for this purpose. General Berthelot told me that he can't demand new sacrifices from his troops, which have been fighting for four years. I heard the same from sources that the present situation of the French army in the east does not make it possible to use it as a fighting army. On the other hand, a volunteer French formation and colonial troops are to be used for this action. All political agents here, as well as the French general staff, are conscious of the unavoidable necessity of armed intervention. There is no one who would not appreciate the horror of this situation and would not think that

one should act quickly. Despite this, so far, nothing positive has been done in this direction. I have the impression that there will be much talk instead of action, until it is too late. I began to act with this in mind at the French General Staff because, whether Paris agrees to it or not, all preparations for action against the Bolsheviks need to be started in a serious manner and a precise plan has to be drawn up with the participation of the representatives of those armies that have to take part in this type of action in any case, or which are already fighting, i.e., representatives of the French, Polish, [and] Romanian armies and, so it would seem, also the Greek one. It is impossible at this stage to know if my proposal will be accepted.

Only after this plan is drawn up will it be possible to indicate in a definite manner how many additional troops will have to be supplied by the allies, besides the above-mentioned countries. At the same time, however, it is imperative to impress firmly upon the decision-making agents that urgent armed intervention is necessary. Once there is finally a plan for this action based on the real state of affairs, it will at least be possible to avoid those detrimental consequences of a military sort that a belated decision by political agents could entail. As far as the participation of our army is concerned, I did not fail to point out that if it is to be ready to fight against the Bolsheviks, it will first be necessary to supply it with materials, arms, and ammunition from the allies as quickly as possible and, second, that our conflict in East Galicia interferes in our struggle against the Bolsheviks and that it would be in the interest of the allies to settle this conflict in a manner satisfactory to us. The news that General Berthelot had established contact with Petlura was ill-received. When asked, he said that he had done it to win time as the allies do not have enough forces. I asked the general, therefore, to inform the missions sent to Poland to deal with the East Galicia conflict of the real basis for these negotiations. This step by the French General Staff is universally viewed here as a mistake because it brings renewed strength to Petlura's position, as well as to that of the Ukrainians who are fighting alongside him and whose unfavourable political situation in recent times made them more susceptible to come to an arrangement with us. I communicated these sentiments to the French General Staff. In addition, several days ago, the Romanians stated in a demonstrative manner in their communiqués that in recent battles on the Bessarabian front, Petlura's regular troops were fighting alongside the Bolsheviks against the Romanian army. To end, I would like to note that among all influential persons I observe a great friendliness toward Poland and this has been manifested in a most friendly reception. The chief of the Romanian General Staff, General Prezan, has received us particularly cordially. The community of our interest with Romanian's has once again found confirmation, and there is no lack of grounds to further shape and tighten those relations. We encounter complete

understanding for our military situation and for our aims from all quarters. What's more, they are ready to support us.

*PDD 1919, doc. 151*

## 101

*24 February 1919, note from the PNC representative in London to the Director of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office about financial aid for Poland*

24 February 1919

Dear Mr. Gregory,

In order to consolidate the new regime in the Eastern Europe and to establish a strong barrier against Bolshevism, it is imperative to provide solid economic basis for such States as Poland, which have to constitute a rampart against the spirit and conditions likely to breed anarchy, an imminent danger threatening not only Poland, but also all the Allied countries. Should the Allies fail her with regard to her economic reconstruction, Poland would not be in a position to resist the economic power of Germany, who would easily regain the predominant place, formerly occupied by her on the Polish and Russian markets.

During the war Polish industry has been systematically destroyed by the Germans by the same means and methods, and with the same object as applied by them in France and in Belgium, viz:—to cripple all commercial and consequently also political competition for a possible long period of time, in order to assure for Germany ample economic advantages and gains, as a compensation for her military and political losses.

Guided by the idea of weakening her neighbours, Germany pursued her plan of industrial destruction, which consisted in either compelling the Polish workmen to a mass migration to Germany, or in rendering them an easy prey of Bolshevism by simply exposing them to starvation. Fortunately, those fond German dreams of Bolshevik expansion in Poland have been mercilessly shattered by the national spirit of the Polish working masses, and the sense of organisation and untiring energy of the industrial and governing circles, who timely realised the necessity of great sacrifices to be made in order to check anarchy.

These proofs of vitality of the nation and of political and social wisdom, however, will be of no use whatever, if the Allies do not consider it their duty and do not realise the urgent necessity of hastening to Poland's aid in her immediate economic reconstruction. The foodstuffs sent to Poland are very welcome there, but this is only a palliative, Poland does not ask for alms, she wishes to earn her daily bread...

In the meantime, as a result of German requisitions which have practically destroyed Polish industry and agriculture, also in view of the shortage of food and of first necessities, the cost of living in Poland has become enormously dear (a pair of ordinary workmen's boots costs 200 frs., a suit from 500 to 800 frs). Consequently the standard of salaries and wages rose to abnormal heights, and the cost of production has become almost insolvable.

In order to extricate Poland from this suicidal tangle a large quantity of articles and commodities of primary importance should be purchased in the Allied countries and sold in Poland at reasonable prices. The present demobilisation in this country affords an unique opportunity, to effect those purchases. It is absolutely necessary to obtain loans from the Allies, in as much as Poland is unable to pay in cash, as foreign currency, now valid in Poland, is greatly depreciated and cannot be favourably exchanged against the currencies of the Allies. In order to secure an accurate repayment of loans it is necessary to re-establish without delay a normal economical life of the country, which alone is able to regulate the exportation, thus introducing the necessary tender.

The payment can be effected by means of Polish Treasury Bills, and as security may be regarded the entire wealth of Poland, as well as the property belonging to the Polish Government which is represented by:

1. 12,065 miles of railways.
2. 6,711,236 acres of forests value 80.0.0. per acre, total 536.989.880.
3. 270 sq. miles of Cracow coal fields, with the approximate output of 6000–8000 million tons, the estimated value of which is 2,000,000,000.

The pre-war State Revenue in the territories which will form the new Polish State of Poland amounted to 100,000,000.

Further, the indemnities claimed by Poland at the Peace Conference for the German requisitions may also contribute to the means towards settlement of the loans.

This economical question is closely connected with the military one. In order to safeguard the frontiers against the Bolshevik army, it is necessary to raise and to maintain a well equipped army, with sufficient quantity of munitions. Some could be supplied by the Allies, owing to their demobilisation. The necessity of obtaining credits for the armaments does not only concern

the Poles, but also the Allies, and the importance of this question is so obvious that any further comment on the matter is totally superfluous.

The amount of credit to be granted by the British Treasury will be fixed upon information received from the War Office and the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement as to the quantity of available articles of demobilisation. Pending this, I have the honour to ask His Majesty's Government whether it is their intention to give an effective help with regard to the economical reconstruction of Poland. In case of an answer in affirmative, further negotiations with the Treasury would be, I believe, the logical consequence of the adopted principle.

Yours sincerely,  
*/signed/ L. Sobański*  
 Representative of the Polish National Committee

*PDD 1919, doc. 153 (ENG)*

## 102

*24 February 1919, note by the counsel of the Warsaw delegation  
 about the Jewish question*

Paris, 24 February 1919

### The Jewish Question and Foreign Public Opinion

Unfortunately, foreign opinion is only being informed about the Jewish question in Poland by hostile elements. I have in mind primarily the Zionists. Their international organisation, which reaches all European and American cities, allows them to affect foreign opinion and, at times, to exert at times considerable influence, one out of proportion to their factual strength.

But the attitude of Jewish circles abroad toward Zionism is largely hostile and this is known by all who are acquainted with this milieu.

The exception is, or rather was, as this fact belongs to the past in my opinion, England.

During the war, English Jews became Zionist through British patriotism. Palestine has for five years been the object of England's desires. This fact is evident, as are also its causes. But could England openly voice its claims to that country? This did not conform with the "disinterestedness" of its war aims and



would have exposed the Foreign Office to an unpleasant exchange of diplomatic notes with France, whose influence there is too important for it to allow neighbouring Palestine to be seized by a foreign power, even an allied one.

England needed a new cloak, and it found one in Zionism. The plan was a simple one. The victorious Entente will return Palestine to the Jews, and as the Jews in Palestine are a negligible minority (100,000 Jews for 600,000 Arabs, out of which a quarter only is productive while the rest live off world charity) they agree to an English protectorate, which will last until the Jews are able to take over the country, i.e., an entirely indefinite period. This explains the sudden turnaround of the English government in the Zionist direction and, above all, Balfour's letter to Lord Rothschild, in which he assures him, in the name of the entire cabinet, of England's partiality for the Zionist movement.<sup>19</sup> A certain *mot d'ordre* originating from government circles was immediately seized upon by Jewish milieus. People such as the Great Rabbi Auerbach suddenly found Zionist sentiments in themselves. A campaign was begun on a large scale: associations were established, Jewish legions were founded to go and conquer Palestine under English command. On many occasions, English communiqués referred to the bravery of those legions, giving to understand that the sole reward for blood so amply shed could only be the creation of a Jewish state, naturally an English protectorate.

The Zionism of English Jews was one of the forms of their English patriotism. This explains the influence of Zionist leaders in London's governing circles.

Presently, the situation has already changed. Through the accord with the Arabs, whose evident result is the "Hejaz Kingdom," the English found far more serious allies.<sup>20</sup> Zionism lost in value (this doesn't stop the Zionists, who are grateful for this momentary grace, to engage in propaganda on behalf of the English protectorate over Palestine. I know from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Paul Hymans that Zionist leader Sokolov has called on him and urged him to support this idea at the conference. The legal advisor of the Belgian mission, Professor Bourquin, has also been visited for this purpose by the known Zionist Tolkovsky).

<sup>19</sup> On 2 November 1917, British Foreign Secretary wrote a letter to Walter Rothschild, a representative of the Jewish community, in which he declared his government's readiness to create in Palestine a national homeland for the Jews—a postulate of the Zionist movement. The Balfour Declaration formed part of the Sèvres Peace Treaty of 1920 and led to the establishment of the British Mandate in Palestine.

<sup>20</sup> In 1916, Great Britain and the Emir of Mecca concluded an agreement pursuant to which the Arabs launched an uprising against the Ottoman Empire. This revolt led to the establishment of the Kingdom of Hejaz, which existed until 1925 and was incorporated into Saudi Arabia in 1932.

In other European countries, Zionism never had access to higher Jewish spheres. In France, in Italy, in Belgium, and even in Germany, Zionism has always been fought. Both religious communities and powerful organisations, like the Alliance Izraélite Universelle<sup>21</sup> and the JCA (Jewish Colonisation Association<sup>22</sup>) fought fiercely against Zionist influences.

Alliance Izraélite, active only on the territory of former Turkey and in the French colonies in North Africa is of no importance for our country.

The JCA, however, could play a great role in the settlement of the Jewish question in Poland.

This association was established by Baron Maurice de Hirsch, as a stock company under English law and over which the London parliament has jurisdiction. Baron de Hirsch gave the JCA 200,000,000 francs. After the death of the founder, the company's stocks were distributed among the Jewish communities of Paris, London, Brussels, Frankfurt-am-Main, and Berlin, with the French and English Jews being assured an absolute majority. During the war, the influence of German Jews, which had never been very great, decreased to zero. Presently there is talk of excluding them altogether.

The aim of the JCA is, as the association's name indicates, is above all to turn Jews into farmers. The first area of its activities was Argentina. Hirsch dreamed of settling pauperised Jews from the ghettos on the wide and fertile Argentine steppes. As a financier used to colossal operations, he wanted to resolve the Jewish question in one sweep.

Despite undeniable successes (30,000 Jews are presently earning their livelihood by working the land in Argentina), this action did not reach the magnitude that Baron Hirsch dreamt of. Therefore, to make use of its enormous capital, the JCA shifted its activities to other spheres of social life. Presently, as in the past, the aim of the association is the spiritual and material raising of the Jews, making them into citizens.

The JCA establishes and supports agricultural and trade schools, initial schools, courses for adults, workshops, agricultural stations, etc. Agricultural colonies in the south of Russia are administered by its intermediary (the gubernias of Kherson and Yekaterinoslav), it owns agricultural schools in Czestoniewo (in Grójec County), crafts schools in Warsaw, and many other institutions of this type. The JCA regulates and supports the emigration of Jews

<sup>21</sup> An association established in Paris in 1860. It was influential in France, fought for equal rights for Europe's Jews, and engaged in charitable and educational activities.

<sup>22</sup> An institution founded in 1891 by Baron Maurice de Hirsch to support the emigration of Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe and their settlement in both Americas. It was particularly active in Brazil and Argentina. The JCA also engaged in charitable and educational activities.

from countries with excess Jewish population and, for this purpose, maintains emigration offices that provide all necessary information to emigrants. Before the war, the activities of the JCA in the Congress Kingdom didn't reach the scale that could have been expected given the number of Jews living in the country. The cause of this was excessive centralisation, especially the fact that a Central Committee with its seat in Petrograd managed all the institutions to be found on the territory of the former Russian state. This committee did not have a proper understanding of Polish needs and it is probably its fault that the JCA's representative for the Congress Kingdom, Mr. Stanislaw Natanson, did not expand the association's activities.

From the beginning of its existence, the JCA adopted a downright hostile attitude toward Zionism. The JCA's aim is, as I mentioned above, the material and spiritual lifting of the Jewish masses; it wishes to transform those Jews still living in ghetto-like conditions into useful citizens of the state to which they belong. The idea of Jewish nationality is entirely foreign to it. It sees the settlement of the Jewish question in the east in turning Jews into citizens through assimilation. On many occasions, the Zionists have tried to win over the JCA and its powerful capital, but always met with energetic opposition.

Two different world views that no one can reconcile are in conflict here.

While the Zionists have a hostile attitude towards Poland, it is the opposite for the JCA, which harbours a very clear partiality for our country and understands our problems perfectly. It stands for full and sincere equality for the Jews, but holds a very unfavourable view of any thoughts of cultural or national autonomy as demanded by all Jewish nationalist groups. To illustrate this positive attitude of the JCA for Poland, let me relate two facts.

In December of last year, I talked with the present chairman of the JCA, Mr. Franz Philippson, a very distinguished individual holding an influential position in Belgium. The topic of our conversation was the very energetic action I had taken up against the anti-Polish campaign initiated by the Zionists following the Lwow incidents. I asked Mr. Philippson, who had just arrived from Paris, if he had heard anything of what had taken place in Lwow.

"I do not bring any precise information from Paris," Mr. Philippson said to me. "I don't know what exactly happened in Lwow. One thing I know is that the anti-Polish campaign of the Zionists is a folly that should be opposed. I have complete understanding for your actions and I approve of them completely."

I spoke with Mr. Philippson for a second time in January of this year following my return from Paris, where I had the opportunity to inform myself comprehensively about the present state of the Jewish question in Poland.

"Polish-Jewish relations are highly inflamed at this time" I told Mr. Philippson. "Various factors contributed to this, and it is needless to name them all here.

The present state is a temporary one. What's important is the future, and it depends in large measure on the position that the body of Jews will adopt with respect to the cultural and national autonomy programme put forward by the nationalists. Either the slogan of that body will be civic equality—equal rights and obligations in an independent and indivisible Poland, or national autonomy, i.e., a state within a state. In the first case, the Jews will have the support of what is, after all, a considerable majority of Polish society, and political anti-Semitism will become the programme of only one group, like in other countries. In the second case, the entire Polish nation will stand up against the Jews as one man. The result will be war in which the socialists will be no less unrelenting than the conservatives. Each Pole will then be an anti-Semite.”

“In my opinion” responded Mr. Philippson, “Poles are absolutely right. No nation can tolerate a state within a state. The Jews should demand equality, not privileges.”

The words of the JCA chairman characterise the attitude of that association to the Polish question in Poland perfectly. These convictions of the chairman are also shared by other members of the Conseil d'Administration. The collaboration of the JCA could have a very beneficial impact on the development of the Jewish question in Poland.

The advantages that the state could derive from this, given an appropriate policy, are not only of an internal nature. The external situation also could only benefit from it. The news disseminated by the Zionists about the present state of the Jewish question in Poland has clearly been harmful to our cause. Only a Jewish institution can effectively counter the propaganda of the Zionists. Informed by honest people and good Poles, the JCA can play this role with the greater success as its council is made up of distinguished individuals who occupy outstanding positions in all walks of social life.

For example, let me mention a few members of the JCA “council:” Mr. Salomon Reinach, member of the institute; Mr. Paul Errera from Brussels, mayor and former university rector; Mr. Franz Philippson, one of Belgium's greatest bankers; [and] Messrs Lonzada and Montefiore from England, both of whom are very influential in their home country.

It is in the Polish state's interests that the spheres represented by these gentlemen be appropriately informed about the Jewish question in Poland.

Anatol Mühlstein

*PDD 1919, doc. 154*

## 103

*24 February 1919, instruction from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the extraordinary delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow and Petrograd*

24 February 1919 r.

Mr Aleksander Więckowski

Confidential

I appoint you to the position of Extraordinary Delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland and I request that you leave for Moscow and Petrograd immediately for the purpose of coming to an agreement with the government of the Russian Soviet Republic about the release of members of our legation in Russia who have been arrested by the Soviet government, and about the return of the legation's archive and treasury.

Please assure the Soviet government that, on our side, we shall undertake all steps to find the real perpetrators of the murder of the four members of the Red Cross delegation, to punish them most severely, and we expect that the Soviet government will not fail to free immediately all members of our legation, both in Moscow and in Petrograd, and to ensure their safe and free travel to Poland.

At the same time, I empower you to come to an agreement with the Soviet government in all matters arising from the presence on the territory of the Soviet Republic and directly related with the fact that the Soviet government has still not returned to us our property left behind as well as art and culture artefacts taken away to Russia.

In matters concerning our citizens who are still in Russia, please demand that: 1) the authorities of the Soviet government strictly respect their rights as citizens of another country, notably as concerns recruitment to the Red Army; 2) our citizens have the right to freely leave Russia and travel to Poland.

If, during the negotiations with you, the Soviet government frees the arrested officials of our representation and grants them the authorisation to leave Russia, please insist that the return of our representatives to Poland take place through Finland. This is desirable for the safety of the returnees. We have already sent instructions for the appropriate steps to be taken with the Finnish government to the secretary of our representation in Helsinki. As the mission with which we entrust you and the practical organisation of the return to Poland of our representatives from Russia may entail considerable

expenditures, I authorise you to make use of the finds belonging to the representation which are in Moscow and Petrograd.

Should, contrary to our expectations, matters not subject to the present instructions rise to the order of the day during the negotiations, please take them seriously under consideration and communicate with me to obtain appropriate further instructions. As the negotiations progress, please inform me on a continual basis about their course.

Minister of Foreign Affairs  
/–/ J. Paderewski

*PDD 1919, doc. 156*

## 104

*25 February 1919, note from the delegate to the Peace Conference  
to the Chairman of the Commission for Polish Affairs  
about the boundaries of the Polish State*

Paris, 25 Février 1919

Monsieur Jules Cambon  
Président de la Commission  
Pour les Affaires de Pologne<sup>23</sup>

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Me conformant à votre demande, je m'empresse d'envoyer à Votre Excellence un mémoire sur le territoire du futur Etat polonais – j'y joins une carte de la Pologne qui servira à l'illustrer. Ce mémoire que j'ai rédigé et remis au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères des grandes puissances il y a quelques

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<sup>23</sup> The Commission for Polish Affairs headed by Jules Cambon, on 1 March 1919 appointed a sub-commission chaired by General Henri Le Rond, which prepared a position in the matter of Teschen Silesia, the Polish-German border (with the exclusion of the Silesian question) and East Prussia during meetings held on 3, 4 and 6 March 1919. The full commission met on 6 March 1919. The problem of the Polish eastern boundaries, especially its Polish-Ukrainian segment, was dealt with by the Inter-Allied Commission in Poland, which was headed by Joseph Noulens, who had left Paris on 9 February 1919 and regularly sent reports to the Commission for Polish Affairs.

mois, n'a qu'un caractère préparatoire. Des propositions territoriales définitives seront faites par le Comité National Polonais dans le plus bref délai, après qu'il se sera entendu à ce sujet avec le Gouvernement Polonais qui vient d'être collectivement reconnu par l'Entente. J'ai des raisons très sérieuses pour affirmer que dans ses grandes lignes, ce programme territorial définitif ne différera pas de celui que j'ai l'honneur de remettre à Votre Excellence pour l'usage de la Commission des Affaires Polonaises.

A ce mémoire je me permets d'ajouter quelques observations.

Nous acceptons comme point de départ de nos revendications l'année 1772, c'est-à-dire la date du premier partage et considérons comme notre droit primordial, la restitution de ce qui nous avait été arraché de vive force par les empires qui gisent aujourd'hui en décombres.

Mais il n'est nullement dans notre intention de profiter de ce droit de restitution dans sa totalité. Nous sommes parfaitement conscients du fait que pendant les 150 ans qui se sont écoulés depuis le partage de la Pologne, il s'est produit à nos confins de l'Est des changements, avec lesquels nous sommes obligés de compter.

Grâce aux répressions constantes et inflexibles du Gouvernement russe, la civilisation polonaise sur les confins extrêmes de nos marches orientales s'est affaiblie et le pourcentage de la population polonaise y a sensiblement baissé. Nous ne voulons pas faire rentrer toutes les anciennes provinces polonaises dans notre futur Etat: non seulement eu égard aux principes des libertés au nom desquelles la guerre a été menée par l'Entente, mais aussi parce que ce serait contraire à l'intérêt de la future Pologne elle-même. Nous ne voulons pas posséder au sein de cet Etat des éléments qui ne se laisseraient pas assimiler, ou dont l'assimilation se ferait au détriment de l'état renaissant.

Nous nous contentons de faire rentrer dans l'Etat polonais, en dehors des territoires ethnographiquement homogènes uniquement ceux dont le pourcentage polonais est suffisamment élevé et qui, grâce à leur communauté historique avec la Pologne, rentrent indubitablement dans l'orbite des influences polonaises.

C'est ainsi que nous renonçons au gouvernement de Kiew en entier, au gouvernement de Podolie presque en entier, au gouvernement de Volhynie dans sa plus grande partie, à un tiers du gouvernement de Minsk, à deux districts du gouvernement de Vilnius, au gouvernement de Mohylew en entier, au gouvernement de Witebsk presque en entier. En ce qui concerne la Lituanie, nous considérons qu'elle a le droit à son territoire ethnographique en entier (gouvernement de Kaunas, une partie du gouvernement de Vilnius, la partie nord du gouvernement du Suwalki, la partie lithuanienne de la Prusse orientale). Nous sommes d'avis qu'il serait à désirer que les deux parties intéressées que la

Lituanie soient rattachés à la Pologne par une union réelle ou que ces rapports avec celle-ci soient réglés sur les bases d'une très large autonomie.

D'autre part dans le même laps de temps, à la frontière Ouest de la Pologne, sur des territoires qui ne lui ont pas appartenus en 1772, mais qui lui ont été enlevés beaucoup plus tôt, il s'est produit en dépit des persécutions allemandes une renaissance de sentiment national polonais tellement forte, que leur caractère polonais ne peut pas être mis en doute.

A l'Ouest nous demandons l'incorporation dans le futur Etat polonais du territoire polonais de la Silésie de Cieszyn (Teschen), des districts de Spiz et d'Orava, de la Haute Silésie (prussienne), de toute la Prusse occidentale et d'une bande de terrain suffisante pour garantir la possession de Dantzig, ainsi que de la Régence d'Allenstein (Prusse orientale).

Le bilan de ces changements territoriaux dans la formation du futur état polonais comparé aux frontières de 1772 se présente comme suit:

#### LA POLOGNE DANS LES LIMITES DE L'ANNEE 1772

Partie	Superficie	Population
de la Russie	623.049	38.187.000
de l'Autriche-Hongrie	78.497	8.026.000
de la Prusse	56.598	3.920.000
	758.144	50.133.000
TERRITOIRES NON REVENDIQUES		
de la Russie	308.857	16.541.00
de l'Autriche-Hongrie		
de la Prusse	2.150	64.00
	311.007	16.605.000
Il reste dans la Pologne nouvelle	447.137	33.528.000
Il faut ajouter les territoires qui sont polonais au point de vue de l'ethnographie et de la civilisation et qui se trouvaient en dehors des frontières de la Pologne de 1772.		
	34.249	3.317.000
Total	481.386	36.845.000

Bref en chiffres ronds, des territoires de la Pologne de 1772 qui seraient susceptibles à être restitués, nous renonçons à 311.007 kilomètres carrés avec 16,5 millions d'habitants, et nous revendiquons, en dehors de frontières de 1772, 34.249 kilomètres carrés avec 3,3 millions d'habitants.

Les détails concernant les changements territoriaux par rapport aux frontières de 1772 et en général, notre programme territorial, sont exposés dans le mémoire ci-joint.



Veillez agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

(signé) Roman Dmowski

*PDD 1919, doc. 157*

## 105

*26 February 1919, note from the delegate to the Peace Conference  
to the Chairman of the Commission for Polish Affairs  
about the state of Polish-German relations*

Paris, le 26 Février 1919

Monsieur Jules Cambon  
Président de la Commission  
pour les Affaires de Pologne

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

L'armistice du 17 Février<sup>24</sup> courant constitue pour les Polonais de Posnanie un progrès sensible par rapport aux conditions où ils se trouvaient antérieurement. Il laisse toutefois subsister pour le reste de la Pologne allemande un état de choses qui n'est pas sans présenter des difficultés sérieuses. Comme les territoires qui restent en dehors de la ligne de démarcation fixée par l'armistice, soit une partie de la Posnanie, toute la Prusse occidentale, la régence d'Oppeln en Haute Silésie et celle d'Allenstein en Prusse orientale, représentent les trois quarts environ de la population polonaise en Pologne prussienne, il est d'une grande importance que leur sort ne soit pas livré pour un temps indéterminé à la grâce d'autorités qui leur sont nettement hostiles. Les dangers qui en résultent et que je voudrais signaler à Votre Excellence me paraissent avoir un double caractère: premièrement, d'ordre matériel, secondement d'ordre politique et moral.

La ligne de démarcation tracée par l'armistice s'accorde avec la situation de fait, telle que les événements des dernières semaines l'avaient créée. Or, cette situation était due en grande partie au hasard, et n'était pas le résultat d'un plan prémédité. L'entaille faite ainsi dans l'organisme vivant du pays met les

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<sup>24</sup> This is a reference to the prolongation of the Allied-German armistice signed in Trier on 16 February 1919.

contrées qu'elle délimite provisoirement dans une situation économique des plus difficiles. La Posnanie privée du charbon qui lui venait de Haute Silésie, cette dernière privée des denrées alimentaires qu'elle puisait principalement en Posnanie, souffrent l'une comme l'autre d'un tel état de choses. L'incertitude par rapport à l'avenir, dans laquelle se trouve le pays, se complique encore du fait qu'il est difficile d'établir un régime économique provisoire, le réseau des voies ferrées se trouvant coupé en plusieurs tronçons. Cette situation peut provoquer des troubles profonds dans la vie normale du pays et se compliquer de problèmes sociaux particulièrement graves.

Je voudrais également attirer l'attention de Votre Excellence sur les dangers que présenterait pour l'état matériel du pays l'abandon prolongé des provinces polonaises à l'administration allemande. L'état y avait en effet concentré depuis un siècle une somme considérable de richesses immobilières. Mines, entreprises industrielles, immeubles, domaines et forêts constituent un fonds énorme qui risque d'être fortement entamé si des mesures préventives ne sont pas prises à temps. Nous apprenons en effet de source sûre que, des la conclusion du premier armistice, les autorités gouvernementales se sont déjà efforcées de prélever sur leurs propriétés situées en Pologne des acomptes, sous forme soit d'emprunt, soit de ventes ou de contrats à long terme. Les forêts de l'Etat pourraient être tout particulièrement dévastées ce qui signifierait une perte d'autant plus sensible pour la Pologne, que les forêts du territoire ci-devant russe ont été systématiquement ravagées pendant toute la durée de l'occupation. En rapport avec cette question, on nous signale également que de grandes quantités de bois en grume, provenant des coupes imposées à la Pologne, se trouvent actuellement en dépôt au bord de la Vistule sur le territoire de la Prusse occidentale. Si on réussissait à les mettre dès maintenant sous contrôle, les revendications légitimes de la Pologne à une restitution en nature s'en trouveraient singulièrement avancées.

Les motifs d'ordre politique qui parlent en faveur d'une libération rapide du territoire polonais, ne sont pas d'une moindre importance.

On commettrait une grosse erreur en supposant que la politique allemande à l'égard de la Pologne ait pu subir une modification quelconque à la suite de la révolution. Les sentiments et les aspirations de l'Allemagne révolutionnaire sont les mêmes que ceux de l'Allemagne du temps du Kaiser. Tous les partis politiques, aussi bien les pangermanistes que les socialistes les plus avancés, sont persuadés que les provinces polonaises de la Prusse ne doivent jamais cessé de faire partie de l'Allemagne, que la Pologne doit entièrement dépendre de celle-ci au point de vue économique, qu'elle doit continuer à offrir comme par le passé un vaste champ à la colonisation allemande. Tous les partis sont d'avis qu'enlever la Posnanie à l'Allemagne ce serait porter un coup fatal à sa puissance politique et militaire en Europe orientale. Ils s'accordent également

à reconnaître que la cession de Dantzig à la Pologne et la création d'un littoral polonais auraient des conséquences néfastes pour la puissance maritime de l'Allemagne, de même que la perte du bassin houiller de la Haute Silésie porterait gravement atteinte à son industrie. Aussi n'est-il pas étonnant que les Allemands aient juré de ne pas laisser enlever à la Prusse ses provinces polonaises et qu'ils se préparent à les défendre sur le terrain politique et militaire. Cette volonté obstinée se manifeste par des passe-droits et des actes de violence de plus en plus fréquents. Sur toute l'étendue du territoire la haine invétérée du Polonais est attisée systématiquement par les autorités, la propagande et la presse. Nous ne voulons citer que quelques cas flagrants qui nous sont parvenus dans le courant des dernières semaines.

Dans la crainte que l'élément polonais ne manifeste ses vrais sentiments politiques dans des réunions publiques les autorités allemandes dispersent les assemblées polonaises, elles s'efforcent de terroriser les chefs du mouvement national et si elles n'arrivent pas au résultat voulu elles procèdent à des arrestations. C'est le sort que subissent l'avocat Czaplà de Beuthen membre du Conseil National Suprême, le rédacteur d'une feuille populaire M. Kulerski de Graudenz, le député travailliste Sosinski, l'abbé Kunka curé de Wysoka etc. Ce dernier est frappé en outre par les gendarmes. Dans les cas où la population polonaise ne réussit pas à les libérer à temps les détenus sont transportés de force dans les provinces allemandes. Un grand nombre s'en trouve, paraît-il, à Glogau.

Les soldats du grenzschutz alléchés par des soldes élevées et l'appât du pillage s'adonnent aux pires excès. Ils dévalisent des banques comme ce fut le cas à Dantzig, à Oppeln et dans d'autres localités de moindre importance. A Dantzig en particulier ils s'en prirent encore aux magasins polonais ainsi qu'à la rédaction du journal polonais "Gazeta Gdanska".

Mais ce n'est pas seulement dans leurs biens et leur liberté personnelle, c'est dans leur vie que les Polonais sont menacés. C'est ainsi que l'abbé Stepinski de Rudy fut tué par la soldatesque de même que les paysans Drajewski et Sowa de Rusko. Une femme de Koznia (Exin) eut les seins coupés et mourut à la suite à l'hôpital de Posen. Les dernières nouvelles que nous transmet le Conseil Populaire Suprême annoncent le fait qu'en gare de Krenz les soldats allemands crevèrent les yeux à des civils polonais.

Si l'on considère le fait que l'élément allemand se laissa aller après le premier armistice à une prostration complète et se comporta alors presque avec soumission vis-à-vis des Polonais et si on le met en présence des actes de brutalité que nous constatons actuellement, il est à craindre que le moment ne soit proche où les Allemands des provinces polonaises organisent avec l'appui de la force armée de vraies vèpres siciliennes. Cette appréhension est basée sur les nouvelles de plus alarmantes qui nous parviennent de la Pologne allemande.

Des délégués qui se suivent à bref délai représentent les dangers que court la population polonaise sous des couleurs tragiques. Des dépêches du Conseil Populaire Suprême réclament à tout prix une intervention du Comité National Polonais auprès des Puissances de l'Entente.

Il ne faut pas se dissimuler que la résistance de l'Allemagne et la conviction qu'elle pourra, grâce à cette résistance, atténuer, sinon écarter complètement le danger qui la menace, ne font que devenir de plus en plus forte au fur et à mesure que l'armistice est prolongé. Depuis le mois de novembre, où l'Allemagne s'est vue en face de sanctions inéluctables, elle n'a fait que relever la tête et chaque mois qui s'écoule fortifie en elle l'espoir de la résistance. Aussi nous paraît-il nécessaire d'agir le plus rapidement possible si l'on ne veut pas se heurter à une opposition de plus en plus forte. Ce n'est pas uniquement du point de vue polonais mais bien du point de vue français que cette question vient d'être nettement posée sur les colonnes du „Temps”. Dans l'article de fond du 19 ct., nous y lisons ce qui suit:

“En signant le nouvel armistice, l'Allemagne abandonne-t-elle «tout les territoires habités par des populations indiscutablement polonaises», comme il est dit au treizième point du Président Wilson? Non. Elle s'engage uniquement à ne pas essayer de reconquérir la portion de la Posnanie où les habitants se sont révoltés contre elle et où, de l'aveu même des journaux berlinois, les troupes prussiennes recrutées dans les arrondissements de nationalité polonaise ont marché contre l'Allemagne, encore vêtues de l'uniforme allemand. Le nouvel armistice a donc tracé une ligne de démarcation entre Polonais et Allemands. Mais que l'on compare cette ligne avec celle qui était fixée, avant la guerre, sous le régime de l'absolutisme prussien et des lois anti-polonaises, par le suffrage universel à chaque renouvellement du Reichstag. En Prusse occidentale et en Silésie, il y a des circonscriptions qui nommaient régulièrement des députés polonais. Pourquoi ne sont-elles pas comprises dans la zone que les Allemands doivent s'engager à respecter? L'autorité allemande ne va-t-elle pas en profiter pour germaniser fiévreusement ces régions, afin qu'on les laisse à l'Etat prussien quand on rédigera le traité de paix? Les populations polonaises ainsi menacées de germanisation, ne seront-elles pas tentées de se révolter à leur tour, comme les habitants de la Posnanie? Sanctionner d'une part l'émancipation, maintenir d'autre part l'oppression, est-ce calmer les esprits?”

Cet article se passe de tout commentaire. Bien que le fait d'avoir obligé les Allemands suspendre leurs opérations militaires, non seulement en Posnanie, mais également sur l'étendue des autres territoires polonais, constitue déjà un énorme pas en avant vers la solution de la question polonaise à l'Est de l'Allemagne, ce n'est pas encore néanmoins une mesure suffisante. Seul le retrait le plus rapide possible des armées allemandes des autres parties de la Pologne prussienne, soit de la Prusse occidentale, de Dantzig, de la Haute

Silésie et de la régence d'Allenstein (partie méridionale de la Prusse orientale) peut écarter le danger dont ces pays sont menacés.

Je comprends parfaitement que les Alliés ont le droit d'exiger que les Polonais s'engagent à administrer d'une manière équitable les territoires qui auront été évacués par les armées ennemies, sans anticiper nullement sur les décisions définitives de la Conférence de la Paix. Mais il sera d'autant plus facile aux Polonais de prendre cet engagement que le Conseil Populaire Suprême en Posnanie a déclaré publiquement à plusieurs reprises qu'il avait l'intention d'observer une pareille ligne de conduite et que pas une seule fois il n'a agi contrairement à ces déclarations.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

(signé) Roman Dmowski

*PDD 1919, doc. 160*

## 106

*28 February 1919, report by the government representative  
in Kiev (from Odessa) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
about discussions with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine  
and with the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Odessa*

Odessa, 28 February 1919

Confidential

Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
(Political Department)

On the eve of the departure of Mr. Czudowski (the courier through whom I sent my report No. 127), arrived a delegation of the Ukrainian government headed by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Matsiyevych. I visited him the day after (22 February) at the Bristol Hotel. He makes a good impression, that of a decent, worldly, and highly amiable individual. After the exchange of courtesies, I summarised for him the course of relations between the legation and the Ukrainian ministry, after which I asked him outright whether he was going to do something to improve those relations, and what.

He answered almost literally as follows: "I took over the ministry in extraordinary conditions, upon the resignation of Mr. Vynnychenko, the reorganisation of the Directorate and the assumption of the office of prime minister by Mr. Ostapenko, who appointed me. However unprepared I may be, I accepted the portfolio of minister of foreign affairs out of a sense of obligation and to resolve without delay two pressing matters: 1) an accord with the French command in Odessa in the matter of fighting the Bolsheviks; 2) an accord, only temporary, with Poland. The first of these matters was downright urgent, as we were keeping our troops near Kiev. I had, above all, to go to Odessa. I did not neglect the second matter, however, the more so as I knew that the Polish legation had left for Odessa. I had only a couple of hours between assuming my portfolio and my departure. I took advantage of them to confer with Mr. Karpinsky. If my stay here was to prolong itself, I will summon Mr. Karpinsky to Odessa, to send him on to Warsaw following an agreement with you."

I observed in response that the two matters were related and that Ukraine could not fight against the Bolsheviks without withdrawing from Galicia, i.e., without ceasing to fight against the Poles. I added that the necessary condition for an agreement, irrespective of other issues, is putting a stop to the bashing of Polishness and the Polish element in Ukraine, which I myself witnessed. It would furthermore be necessary to free from jail all Poles arrested without charge and without legal basis, to reopening the Polish schools in Podolia and, generally, to change internal policy with respect to the Polish element.

He answered that he had attended to the matters I had raised before leaving Winnica, and that he would without delay send a request from here that the demands of the legation be fulfilled. He is convinced that this will be done in the following days, and that there will be no cause for acrimony.

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On the following day (23 February), I called on the Supreme Commander of Coalition Forces here, General d'Anselme. He received me with utmost solemnity. I told him that I arrived as the temporary assistant of the Polish envoy to Ukraine, given that the matter of the accord between the Allied command and Ukraine is of great interest to Poland and that in this matter, the Polish government is entitled to demand that its most vital interests be taken into account.

"Je ne suis pas politicien" said the general, "il s'agit d'une convention, purement militaire pour faire face aux bolchéviks".

"Vous avouerez pourtant, mon général", I observed to this, "que cette convention, où si Vous le préférez, cet arrangement touche de près des

questions très graves liées aux intérêts de la Pologne, en première ligne la cessation des hostilités en Galicie”.

Here, the general interrupted me and, having risen, said that from the first moment of our conversation he had thought to read out to me above all the radio dispatch stating that the peace conference in Paris had ultimately recognised the statehood and the government of Poland and had proceeded to more detailed discussions about the Polish question. He then asked that I continue my comments.<sup>25</sup>

I resumed them, raising the necessity of including in the text of the accord with the Ukrainian government the cessation of fighting and the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Galicia, the cessation of persecutions of the Polish element in Ukraine and, above all, the release from jail of all Poles (with the exception of ordinary criminals).

General d'Anselme replied to me that he would categorically demand one and the other that very evening, as that evening he was to have a conference with the Ukrainians.

Attention!—here I should correct the news, given in my previous report, about the terms of the accord between the Coalition Command and the Ukrainians. I obtained it from our military mission. It was inaccurate from beginning, just as, unfortunately, some other information from the mission, which does not have sufficient intelligence in Odessa.

The further discussion with General d'Anselme took on the nature of a friendly chat. He found a booklet (*un petit bouquin bleu*), in which he found the prophecy of Blessed Andrzej Bobola about the resurrection of Poland,<sup>26</sup> he gave it to me to read, told me about his problems in Odessa, and recalled that our military units here, tired and discouraged, should be brought home. In the end, he himself raised the issue of the 4<sup>th</sup> Division, praising the bravery of the Polish soldier, but observing:

“Ce n'est pas une division, par même une brigade. Il n'y a que deux bataillons d'infanterie et quelques autres détachements. Et on veut que j'aie affaire avec un tas de monde. Je ne veux connaître que le brigadier (thus, he refers to General Żeligowski) et cela me suffirait. Enfin, si M. le général de division (that is, General Ostapowicz) a quelques observations à faire, il n'a

<sup>25</sup> On 21 February 1919, the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers (the Council of Ten) officially recognised Paderewski's government and the sovereignty of Poland. Between 24 and 27 February 1919, this decision was confirmed in separate notes by France (24 February), Great Britain (25 February) and Italy (27 February).

<sup>26</sup> This refers to the apparition supposedly witnessed in 1819 by the Dominican Alojzy Korzeniewski, during which the Jesuit Andrzej Bobola predicted the resurrection of the Polish state following a great war.

qu'à s'adresser à moi. Mais je ne puis avoir affaire avec un tas de monde qui vient me parler des questions militaires et de la brigade ..."

With this, we parted. I only observed that just as the general does not wish to be a politician, so I am not military.

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On 24 February, I received information from our military mission that four officers of former Polish formations in Ukraine had been imprisoned in Winnica. On that day, I sent a letter to Mr. Matsiyevych demanding their liberation. The following day, I received an extremely kind response that a dispatch demanding the liberation of the imprisoned had immediately been sent to Winnica (Enclosure 1). The minister's secretary, Mr. Guergeuin (a Frenchman, obviously hired with Odessa affairs in mind), incidentally declared the readiness of Mr. Matsiyevych's chancery to send to Winnica all requests addressed to our acting temporary consular agent in that city, Mr. Ostromecki, and of all correspondence.

I do not dare for the moment to send correspondence or to send couriers to Warsaw through Ukraine. In addition to what is happening or yet may happen in Koziatyń or in Równe, rail stations between Odessa and Winnica keep falling into the hands of Bolshevik or other bands, and there can be no question of safety on the way.

*PDD 1919, doc. 163*



## 107

*2 March 1919, minutes of the discussion about Poland's eastern boundaries held during a meeting of the PNC in Paris*REPORT FROM THE DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT OF POLAND'S  
EASTERN BOUNDARIES THAT TOOK PLACE  
DURING THE MEETING OF THE POLISH NATIONAL COMMITTEE  
ON 2 MARCH 1919.

PILTZ: During the meeting of the Commission for Lithuanian affairs of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference, on the subject of defining Poland's eastern boundary, the delegates of Byelorussia and Ukraine considered how the issue of the boundary should be approached in principle.<sup>1</sup> Given that there were two concepts, the first consisting of not attaching to the Polish state that part of Old Poland lying farthest to the east but only its western portion, and the second, consisting of a federal system, i.e., the creation of a state that would be federated with Poland. The point was to decide how this issue should be presented, considering the necessity of showing a united front vis-à-vis the allies. The Committee almost unanimously expressed the view that today any duality is harmful. For this reason, those who thought that a federative approach would better correspond to our aims agreed that the concept of the Committee had to be adopted. I was asked to make this declaration here.

BARTOSZEWICZ: In addition to what Mr. Piltz has said, I would like to note that this was formally voted on and only one vote was against. The rest were of the opinion that the position of the Committee, i.e., not a federative position but one of incorporation of certain Lithuanian and Byelorussian lands to Poland, should be the binding position. On the other hand, I must add to this that some members of the delegation thought that certain changes could be made in this project, in this concept of the Committee, especially representatives of Lithuania claimed that this territory could be extended eastward as far as the boundary of 1772, yet without the federative programme. Such were the pronouncements of some, but not all.

Count ŁUBIŃSKI: Representatives of the Northern Borderlands drew attention to a number of changes that, in our opinion, should be made to this boundary line. Their words indicate that among the local population, the thought of incorporation to Poland and complete detachment from Russia is

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<sup>1</sup> This refers to the Eastern Commission of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference, which met alongside the PNC on 2 March 1919. An Editing Commission was then selected to formulate the postulates concerning the eastern boundary.

generally widespread and one of everyone's cardinal demands. It would thus be advisable, as much as possible, to revert to the historical boundary, not only because such are our aspirations and old rights but also for other reasons, namely, if there was talk of a country's strategic boundaries in the west, the same concern exists in the east. There is a line here, which is in Germany referred to as the Moltke Front and which is also treated accordingly by the French. This line runs along the River Dvina, and at a certain distance from it, beyond Witebsk, it turns to the south and flows to the River Soża and links up with the River Pripet. This line contains the gates to Poland that open up between those two rivers and this area was always the scene of fighting. It is the line that everyone decided was extremely important. Beyond this line are the most important and only rail junctions, namely: Witebsk, Orsza, Żłobin, Homel, i.e., the entire rail communication line constitutes protection for Poland.

Then, in addition to this railroad line, are all the waterways, like the canal between the Berezina and Dvina rivers, which in today's state could not be used in those conditions. Then there are the Pripet lines and its affluents. A great canal between the Dvina and the Dnieper is planned in this location and will come to be sooner or later. Those are things we are most concerned about at this point. Furthermore, the expanses around Bobrujsk, Pińsk, etc., are very sparsely populated by the Byelorussian population. But this is an area of highly valuable forests. I do not have precise figures as to their value but, according to pre-war prices and currency, it is a value of more or less 2.5 billion roubles. It is exceedingly difficult to assess it in terms of today's prices. It is, therefore, an immensely serious issue for our treasury. I wish to stress that if we do not obtain it, there will no way to obtain timber for mines, which need it. It should also be kept in mind that ethnic Poland, stripped of forests, will not be able to develop local mines without access to large quantities of timber. One mine needs an average of one trainload of timber daily, so if they do not have this material, they won't be able to grow.

The issues that concern us here are of a strategic, economic and communications nature. In terms of population, I must say that the line that has been described above has been drawn in keeping with ethnographic balance. But this balance rests upon figures, about which we ourselves feel rather sceptical. We have figures from some parts, like the areas of Homel near the Dnieper River, which indicate that there are very large and considerable groups of Polish petty gentry. Therefore, in the areas closer to Brest-Litovsk, there is almost no Polish population. In other words, this territory doesn't encompass the Polish population, but only offers a median of sorts. Thus, even in case of unrest there, nothing can be done. However, my familiarity with the population there indicated that this population is not a threat to our Polish cause. It is a very passive population that leans far more toward Poland than

toward Russia. As Poles. we will have less problems with it than with the Lithuanians.

For the reasons I am honoured to recall, this boundary should be moved to the east. And the country's economic system, without mentioning that this would give us large sparsely populated areas, makes wide expansion of economic colonisation possible. This entire valley, which is today quite slightly exploited, nevertheless provides exceptional material as a colony. The entire valley of the Berezina and the Pripet, once drained, created an opportunity for rearing cattle and improving the state of agriculture which, given the decline of cattle-raising during the war, will encounter great development difficulties.

DMOWSKI: How far to the east would the gentlemen holding this position wish to extend the boundary?

Count ŁUBIŃSKI: Along the line of the Dvina, i.e., a strip of 40 km beyond the Dvina to the northeast. It's an entire line of lakes and swamps that here lay in a strip of about 40 km.

SUJKOWSKI: I am glad that the previous speaker is arguing for the necessity to move the boundary to the east. I could perhaps suggest some improvements but not by much. But there are even more important aspects to this question. While for Poland, this would be a matter of utmost importance, the realisation of it will entail some difficulties. Polishness in that country is hidden to a certain degree. As we know, in the past, the conditions were unfavourable for declaring allegiance to the Polish nation. It is widely known that the lands that lay to the north have a greater percentage of Polish population than those in the south. This is explained by the humidity of the soil, which makes cultivation difficult and discourages human settlement. When it becomes possible to introduce intensive agriculture here, after drainage, the influx of Polish population to these lands will have to rise. But all this cannot be a cause for advancing demands during the Peace Conference for these lands to be joined to Poland today. We have to remember that we cannot present at the Peace Conference the evidence that we are discussing here. This is an area necessary for our expansion, but we cannot speak of it at the Peace Conference.

I draw your attention to Lithuania. If we shift the boundary, we leave Lithuania to itself. That Lithuania, as we know has been artificially set against Poland for a couple of decades, will not possess Vilnius. Although the Lithuanians have the same rights to Vilnius as the Poles have to Wrocław, for example, Vilnius for them has turned into a slogan. Without having Vilnius, there will be extremely fertile ground for all manner of anti-Polish agitation.

In terms of strategic considerations, we anticipate a war between Poland and Russia. In that event, please imagine what easy ground for agitation

Lithuania would become. From the Neman River, Russian influence can penetrate unusually deep from the north into the area of the Polish-Lithuanian state. On the other hand, wherever we set the boundary to the east, this area of Polish-Lithuanian Byelorussia, so to speak, will remain a sort of large protrusion under extreme danger of being surrounded. We have enemies from the side of the Neman River and from the southeast and in this manner an entire hostile environment. Whenever I spoke of this, no one responded to those objections, but it is a fact that strategically this area cannot be held on to. It is true that, in keeping with the initial plan of shifting the boundary eastward, with what Count Łubieński is saying, this would be a consolidation of this area and would make it possible to conduct the fighting away from Vilnius. By the way, leading Russian troops all the way to Suwałki would mean that this would be impossible for Poland to hold on to. I draw your attention to two things, one, what can be negotiated at the Peace Conference, and two, what can be defended in case of war. We should seek an outcome that would resolve one and the other in our favour. In this case, I draw your attention to ethnographic Lithuania. I know that if it had the possibility of locating its institutions of education and central administration in Vilnius, ethnographic Lithuania would be entirely satisfied, and this is precisely what corresponds to the concept of federation. For the debates at the Peace Conference, I stress that Polish politicians cannot make use of the term "union", but only that of "federation". Irrespective of whether we support it or not, this needs to be stressed. Central administration institutions in Vilnius would not deprive that city of its Polishness, but would only be a factor that would extend the influence of Polishness deeper into Lithuania. Only if Lithuania was to enter into a combination with Poland would it be possible to avert that strategic threat. Today, granting them some form of autonomy would be a difficult and unsatisfactory matter. Such autonomy would have to entail the presence of their institutions in Vilnius. Now, to go on, if we wanted to incorporate into Poland such a small area of Lithuania, we would expose ourselves to the suspicion that we are striving toward imperialism and that we are leaving the rest of White Russia to Moscow.

A great portion of the population here is so clearly Byelorussian that even if at times it is Catholic (like in the eastern Vilnius gubernia or in western Minsk gubernia), the Poles' demand to incorporate the Byelorussians into Poland, in light of England's clear desire to diminish Poland, can lead to the allegation that this constitutes imperialism, because we demand non-Polish lands. Such an allegation may be especially raised by the Americans, for whom the ethnographic state of affairs remains the decisive argument. Let us remember that the Lord has excellent knowledge of this question and, in my view, he knows more than would be needed by us. The notion of federation imposes itself as the only way to avoid being thought of as imperialists during the Peace

Conference. Lithuania, already federated internally, would have in Vilnius its central political, economic, and cultural institutions, but we could only agree to this on the condition that Lithuania be federated with Poland.

The federation would above all consist of common military affairs, i.e., at the staff level [and] a common ministry of foreign affairs and, finally, it would constitute a single customs and economic area. It is understood that, here and there, the currency would have to be the franc. So this would not give rise to fighting.

It is my impression that only in the name of a Lithuania that is independent, if only seemingly, and by neutralising the allegations of Polish imperialism, can we attain a position allowing us to reach for the Dnieper and for the Dvina rivers and to create a great strategic Poland able to defend Europe, as it is said today, from the Bolsheviks. Stating our case differently could not be taken into consideration by Europe, or by the Entente at any rate. Strategic lines are of concern to us, but they aren't important for the Entente. At the same time, if we present the question as that of a state of federation with Poland, then we have the right to demand, because the allegation of our imperialism disappears and we state openly that, being federated militarily with the Lithuanian state, we want a boundary moved to the east—but having first dispelled or prevented the allegations of imperialism.

So, it is about coming to an agreement with Lithuania and leadership at the Peace Conference. What does it matter to present our demands if at the Peace Conference they won't even want to talk to us about them?

I spoke about this a couple of times with Commander Piłsudski who, as one born in the area of Święciany, maintains relations with Poles from Lithuania, from the most various areas, and is very well informed about those affairs. He is a decided supporter of the federation programme, and I spoke of this with Minister of Foreign Affairs Paderewski, who told me I can refer to him that he is a proponent of the widest possible federation with Lithuania. To the clear question of an ultimatum, he responded that he supports the idea of creating a United States of sorts, in which Lithuania would be fragmented into a couple of units and federated with Poland, and that this idea is perfectly compatible with the idea of a federated Lithuania. As I had to analyse this matter carefully in Warsaw, I reached Commissioner Kolankowski, who is the director of the Lithuanian and Byelorussian Department. He showed me documents they obtained from different groups in Lithuania declaring that they wish to belong to Poland, and it is only in very broad discussions that the future status of Vilnius recurs.

All Byelorussian parties, those with most support, want precisely unification with Poland but, at the same time, they would wish for certain guarantees for Byelorussian culture or, we should rather say, the possibility of developing that

culture and they are also not displeased by the prospect of a federation in direct dependence on Poland.

The most important and conclusive factor has been communicated to me in over a dozen locations, namely: Whether we carry out the programme of a Lithuania tailored to suit Poland, or one of a Lithuania federated with Poland, we have to carry this programme into Lithuania at the tips of Polish bayonets. In such a case, ethnographic Lithuania, the Peace Conference, and the whole of Europe, will easily acquiesce and will not hinder our work. But they will allow us go ahead with it only if we can demonstrate to the world our selflessness. Such selflessness can only be conveyed through the slogan of a federated Lithuania. Of course, we must say that the civil and military commissioner will be the representative not only of the state but also of the social order, because it will be difficult to even dream of immediately introducing some form of constituent assembly for as long as the government doesn't order matters there. Then again, it will be necessary to be unusually careful in organising elections, because elections in Lithuania could produce a downright ridiculous result, if through violence they wanted to carry through a democratic organisation, given the unawareness of the local population, and it is difficult in today's times to produce a non-democratic organisation.

Carrying through the project of uniting Lithuania with Poland would only be possible with the Entente if we pursue it not out of a desire for a conquest of Lithuania, but in the name of federation with Lithuania. For this reason, I think that it is not the idea of uniting Lithuania with Poland, but propagating the idea of federation, i.e. that of historic Lithuania with Poland, that will make it easier to resolve this problem.

DMOWSKI: I represent here an entirely different position, which has been previously adopted by the Committee. During today's meeting I will seek its approval, so to speak. The time has come to present to the Coalition our demands about the eastern boundary.

I must say about the situation at the Peace Conference that Mr. Sujkowski does not appreciate it fully, because what professors and the experts of allied states say is an entirely different matter than what is said by people who make the decisions and who hold outcomes in their hands. Among those people who decide, there has been an incredibly far-reaching evolution, consisting of a situation in which all the representatives of France, England, America, and Italy say that the main aim today is to create a Poland that is strong. This evolution has been influenced by the following factors:

- 1) The realisation that Germany will not cease to be very dangerous and that one can't reorder Europe on the basis of some disjointed general premises, but only on practical principles, so as to prevent the restoration of Germany as a power like the one that led to the war in 1914.

2) The second issue is the territories east of Poland. As for the Muscovites, their stock today is rated lower than ever. It has been admitted that the Muscovites are unable to create a government in the European style that it is a state threatened by anarchy for a long time. In addition, it was ascertained that no political camp existing in Russia today would give a guarantee to the allies that Russia, this or a different one, would not seek to ally itself with Germany.

3) A closer look at the Ukrainians and the Lithuanians, and reports about the relations between them, which led allied agents to the conviction the neither the Ukrainians nor the Lithuanians are able to create their own state.

As a result of this, if we wish to present our case in a proper fashion today, we must above all demonstrate that we are able to establish a strong state and that our plan is to create a strong state. Given that [the allies] realise that we will have to shoulder an enormous responsibility in a future Europe that they are beginning to look upon Poland as the most solid element in Eastern Europe, we cannot come forward with a project of a state that is sloppily put together, but a strong one, which will be internally cohesive and which will project significant power externally. I will draw your attention to the fact that even President Wilson, during a discussion about the League of Nations project, when the French stressed their precarious future situation, told them: But gentlemen, you will not be alone on the continent. Germany will have new neighbours. We are forming new countries today—we are forming Poland, which will be your ally. They are speaking in an entirely different language today, under the influence of fear caused by German power on the one hand, and by Bolshevism on the other.

If one speaks of the need to create a strong state—and we, working abroad and aware of our dangerous situation, had from the outset been aiming at establishing a strong state—if one speaks of the need for a strong state, one should avoid the term “federation”. Federation means weakness, not strength, the more so when there is no one to federate with. Because in whatever state you include that Lithuania in its historical boundaries, who is going to govern that Lithuania? With whom are we going to federate? It is impossible to imagine a country in Europe in which a greater hodgepodge prevails: On the one hand, there is the Lithuanian element, on the other, the Byelorussian one, than again the semi-anti-Polish and semi-Bolshevik Jewish anarchy and fourth, the Polish population, which is based mostly on extensive land-ownership and which must disappear from there quickly. I believe that the idea of a federation cannot be convincing to us who wish to have a strong state, nor can it seem convincing to those who direct allied policy and who have understood the need to create a strong state.

Summing up :

1) I must add that a strong state lying on the border between eastern and western civilisation, on the border between the civilised and the autocratic world, between the organised world and one unfit for self-government, cannot rest upon an uncivilised principle. Otherwise, on the western boundary of our state we will have a population at an absolutely European level, and on the eastern one a population at the highest levels of anarchy. We are close to the border to such an extent that it will run right through the centre of the country. After all, those are incredible distances, for example from Poznań to Minsk..

What is the possibility of federation? Federation requires above all the ability to compromise. I wish to state boldly that there is no people in Europe farther removed from this ability than the Lithuanians and other nations of the east, i.e., seeking federation with them is to create disorder, decay, anarchy, and the sources of weak statehood. We claim that the Polish state can be strong only if it is a state with strong central political power, maximally independent, with the widest possible decentralisation in matters of culture, the economy, etc., because decentralisation is the principal matter—but with a single source of state power, one Sejm and one government. That's the first point.

2) If the state is to have one Sejm and one government, its area has to be the largest possible, but it can't exceed boundaries beyond which this Sejm would cease to be a national Polish Sejm, otherwise this state will cease to be a Polish state and will cease to express Polish thought and policy. In other words, we can't expose ourselves to the possibility that the Sejm might have as little as 75% Polish deputies. Experience teaches us that even if there are only 25% non-Polish deputies in a Sejm, there will always be 25% of Poles who, in the name of ambition, will join them when their support is sought. We are not an ideal nation, and we have examples of similar actions in other countries, as in England with the Irish, etc. In any case, we already have experience with our own politics in this respect, from our own elections. So, our boundaries should not be pushed outwards, even if this entails economic or strategic costs, so as not to create a state that would be non-homogenous in national terms. This is the second basis for the territorial programme that will be presented to you.

3) And finally, Poland is located in the most dangerous place in Europe, because there is no place for a small country between the most powerful German nation and the most savage and most anarchical Russian nation. We must thus strive to become a greater nation than we presently are. We have very favourable conditions for this, above all because ethnic Poland is very densely populated, while in the east we have areas that are sparsely populated. We are living in a country where great landed properties will be disappearing quickly. In other words, whether this country lying to the east becomes more Polish or less so will depend on the pace of this process. If that country finds itself in the hands of some regional government, let's say the Sejm in Vilnius,



where Poles will be a minority, and that government will strive to minimise large landed estates, everything indicates that Poles will be forced to leave. If, on the other hand, the Poles have their government in Warsaw, it will depend on how this process will be managed, so that people from heavily populated areas take part in the colonisation of sparsely populated regions. Thus the Polish element there will be reinforced.

For all these reasons, until now the National Committee has absolutely supported the principle of national unity. We have been rejecting any federation in principle and opted for establishing ethnographic Lithuania, i.e. a factor which is very highly mobile, organised and which has made a lot of political noise in the world during the war and gained many supporters. We nevertheless hope that, given the evolution that has been taking place in the last few years, we will be able to limit this ethnographic Lithuania solely to cultural autonomy language, local administration, etc., while politically it will be subordinated to the government of Poland. And so I hope strong Polish influences there will not decrease but increase as soon as peace is signed.

Based on the above, I wish to emphasise that any expansion of boundaries that would alter the internal balance of forces within the state would deprive the Polish population of the great advantage within the state that was a key point of our programme. As we have already noted, the land we are losing in the east of the former territories the 1771 Commonwealth,<sup>2</sup> will go to Russia. It is sad, naturally that we are reducing our former area in this manner, but we prefer this in exchange for the expansion of the south-eastern boundary, especially as in the latter case we can see an even greater danger in the form of the loss of the entirety of eastern Galicia. Nevertheless, the manner in which the allies' views on Russia are taking shape does not entail that in which what we do not incorporate into the Polish state will necessarily be Russian. There is much to indicate that in the peace treaty that will soon be signed the allies will seek to reduce Russia to the boundaries of the Muscovite Empire.

The idea is not, however, to create a set of small states on the territories of the former Russian Ukraine, but to take all those lands under protection. As you know, the peace treaty that is soon to be signed is intended to create a new quality in the life of nations, a League of Nations. The act, or rather contract or pact of the League of Nations, provides for territories to be administered on behalf of the League of Nations. This administration would be in the hands of states duly empowered and qualified on account of their experience, material resources, and geographical location. The initial plan provided for managing in this fashion only of Germany's former colonies and the provinces of the Turkish state, like Armenia, Afghanistan, Syria, Palestine, Arabia, etc. Later

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<sup>2</sup> This is a reference to the boundary before the First Partition of Poland in 1772.

on, this scope was widened and a general article was drawn up without singling out Germany and Turkey. Additionally, in the comment it was agreed that this provision may be applied to the provinces of the disintegrated Russian state. It is, therefore, entirely possible, as the matter is still being discussed that the Russian state will be limited to Great Russia, while a whole range of other countries will be under the control of various great powers. It is also possible that one power will take the Caucasus, another one Crimea, a third one the Baltic provinces, and in such a situation we could come forward with the proposal of taking under our control those provinces that once belonged to the former Commonwealth. This would be very important, because it would extend our influence and power over the entire area belonging to the old Commonwealth and would not hinder our internal construction by introducing to it representatives of areas where our influence is very weak.

For all those reasons, gentlemen, I ask:

- 1) That we firmly reject the programme of a federation.
- 2) That we accept as a principle that only areas that will ensure our absolute national predominance will be incorporated into a unified Poland, not divided into any political entities, only this will enable us to govern a unified Polish national state.
- 3) That you kindly approve the boundary proposed by the Committee, with some corrections possible, which we ourselves see as needed. These corrections cannot be significant enough, however, to alter the basic percentage of the non-Polish population in the Polish state.

I must say that economic arguments, even those of a serious nature, should give precedence to fundamental national considerations. One cannot create a state with excellent economic prospects if that state is not Polish enough, because that is a pre-condition for development. We discussed forests here. Even without those rich forests which have been seized, Poland will have a sufficient quantity of forests for its needs. We spoke of the canal between the Dnieper and Dvina rivers. Neither the Dnieper nor the Dvina is in our hands. Why then should we demand the canal? According to our programme, both the Dnieper and the Dvina flow through non-Polish territories. We can't, therefore, aspire to the possession of a link between the Dnieper and the Dvina.

Of course, it would be nice to have everything, but one can't. Let's not commit the mistake which destroyed the Russian states. The trait of the Russian state was that its appetite was greater than its stomach. It hungered for more than it could digest. I know that we have our own appetites, but we are a western nation and our appetites should be limited. These appetites have to be kept in check otherwise we will create for future generations a fatherland

they won't be able to maintain, just as the Russians couldn't maintain Russia, because its appetite was greater than its digestive capabilities.

PILTZ: The extent of the evolution that has taken place in the minds of the allies in terms of the creation of state organisms can be seen in the fact that, just yesterday, the issue of whether or not to include 2.5 million Germans in the Czech State was resolved unanimously in the sense that the Czech state has to be strong and, therefore, it must be given geographical boundaries. That's one thing.

The second point is that, according to statistical calculations, with the boundary which is laid out here, in this future Polish state we will have about 54%, at most 60% of Poles. If that boundary is laid out in keeping with the project presented by Count Łubieński, this percentage will probably decrease. What would such a state with such a small portion of a national population look like?

General HALLER: I would like to ask the Chairman if there is any understanding in Lithuanian affairs between the Taryba representatives who are sitting here and the Committee and Polish delegation to the Peace Conference?

DMOWSKI: There isn't.

General HALLER: It has been brought to my attention that an agreement is indispensable that this will facilitate the solution toward which not only France but also America and, most probably, England are leaning, to fully attach Lithuania to Poland, of course on the condition that there will be an agreement between Lithuania and Poland concerning the self-government of the former. They are also extremely interested that this be resolved by 8 March.

DMOWSKI: Gentlemen, please allow me to answer the General. Mr. Pichon already talked to me several weeks ago about the need for an understanding between us and the Lithuanians. I have already had the opportunity to tell him that such an understanding is impossible today. We could come to an understanding with the Lithuanians only if we assumed a Lithuanian territory, to which we can in no measure agree, and if we granted them a far-reaching autonomy that would simply be equivalent to an alliance between Poland and Lithuania. I, however, hope that we will be able to resolve this issue without agreement with the Lithuanians, because they are increasingly discrediting themselves: For example, Mr. Gabrys arrived, following which Mr. Voldemaras arrived and said that Mr. Gabrys is not a representative but a paid German agent. They are presently claiming the same about Mr. Voldemaras. Everyone, the English and the Americans, says that it is "a strange thing, when we talk with the Poles, we see that they are people from the same world as ours—speaking the same language, producing the same figures as we, etc. When

we speak with the Lithuanians, they speak a language that we are unable to understand, for example when they produce figures, we ask where they obtained them, they say nowhere but that the figures are real and they get offended when we demand to see the sources. They claim that the population around Vilnius is Lithuanian. When we point out that they speak Polish, they acknowledge that they speak Polish, but they are Lithuanians. The allies say of the Lithuanians that they are semi-wild that talking to them is like talking with Bushmen. I thus hope that those gentlemen, having first talked a bit with the Lithuanians, will understand that they are not people with which one can negotiate, sign agreements, etc.

General HALLER: The allies have known for a long time that such a small Lithuanian state cannot survive and think that uniting it with Poland is necessary. But there is one snag—that Poles and Lithuanians come to an agreement.

Going further east, I second what has been said by Mr. Piltz about strategic boundaries. In order to shape them, to secure for those gates to Poland, of course maybe it would be better if they were pushed further east. But this is impossible given the population. On the other hand, I must agree with Mr. Sujkowski that if Lithuania was separate, we would be terribly exposed, and the existence of this promontory would be dangerous.

The matter of forests, floating timber using canals, etc., it seems to me that this is a double-edged sword that we are presently in an uncomfortable situation, because thinking along these lines we may lose part of Teschen Silesia. We are basing our principle on Polish ethnography. The entire value of our thinking consists of its application where there is a Polish population. Here, we wish to incorporate a non-Polish population using economic arguments—that there is more wood here. The Czechs are also saying “we need more coal”. Only by keeping to the principles that were previously defined will we be able to defend Silesia. I may be wrong, but I have no fear that we may run out of wood. The increment of wood in Poland is enormous and that wood will be sufficient for the mines. After all, we have the Białowieża Forest; we also have wood from the Carpathian Mountains that mainly goes to the mines. So, I would definitely favour this, supposing a deal with the Lithuanians is made so they will know what relationship theirs is to be toward Poland. The allies are inclined no to make Lithuania a separate state and that it must be united with Poland, so let’s not make our task more difficult.

DMOWSKI: I forgot to mention yet one more thing that the weakest point of the Polish territory is the one mentioned by Count Łubieński—east of Brest-Litovsk. This territory and the Grodno gubernia are areas where there is a dense non-Polish population but, unfortunately, from a geographic point of view, these areas simply can’t be cut out from Poland. If we wish to possess

Vilnius, on the one hand, and Eastern Galicia, on the other, we can't allow for a foreign territory stretching all the way to the Bug River. This shatters all our statistics in the northeast because there we could go all the way to the Homel area, but geographically this is unacceptable, because this will cut into Polish territory a mere 200 km from Warsaw.

SUJKOWSKI: Let me begin with Lithuania. As to the agreement with the Lithuanians, this is indeed how the matter looks: same Mr. Voldemaras arrives and begins to negotiate. Later, another gentleman arrives and claims that no one knows where this Mr. Voldemaras comes from, and then someone else arrives and demonstrates without any difficulty that the previous gentleman has been paid by the Germans, so that the Warsaw government is indeed in a stew as far as those agreements are concerned. But there is a second issue. The Chairman himself admitted that the Lithuanians are an organised people averse to Poland, with their peasant masses additionally averse to great landed property. This makes them susceptible, as an independent state or as an autonomous province, to Russian or even German influence. And for this reason, I stress the need to find such a form of statehood that would block them and their policy and protect us.

DMOWSKI: It's good that you said, "their policy".

SUJKOWSKI: As to the Byelorussian programme, if everything unfolds as the Chairman says it will, I will support it wholeheartedly. But please note how many things we assume in our thinking that are difficult to bring about in real life. The first such premise is that the states of Western Europe are so eager for a strong Poland that they will agree to all its demands. I would say that, unfortunately, if it were so we would be little concerned about the German population if those boundaries were extended westward, and in economic terms this would enrich us enormously.

DMOWSKI: What boundary do you mean?

SUJKOWSKI: All of Upper Silesia.

DMOWSKI: We fear this.

SUJKOWSKI: But half a million inhabitants would be a great source of strength in economic terms.

If it is true that the League of Nations will take over all of this area under its administration, in practice the majority of those implementing it would have to be Poles. In other words, our interests would then be secure. This includes what Count Łubieński and I were referring to—for Russia not to grow roots in Byelorussia. If, however, we are disappointed and nothing comes out of it, we will find ourselves in a very difficult situation. In short, all things considered, it seems that the federation programme doesn't lose any of its value if we

bring it up at the Peace Conference. I will take the liberty of protesting against one statement—that in Lithuania there are no Polish elements besides great landowners. If there is a 630,000 Polish petty gentry there, one can easily say that there is 2.5 times more.

DMOWSKI: On what grounds do you say 2.5 times more?

SUJKOWSKI: Because, speaking modestly, I'm not saying 3 times more. We know, after all that Russian statistical authorities were artificially reducing the figures of Poles in Lithuania.

DMOWSKI: We know that they reduced figures for Poles, but have no proof that they did the same for the Lithuanians.

SUJKOWSKI: Mr. Piltz and Mr. Downarowicz can state that the great landed properties in Lithuania and Byelorussia amount to a total of about 12,000 estates.

COUNT ŁUBIEŃSKI: There are 8,000 estates over 100 hectares in Lithuania and Byelorussia.

SUJKOWSKI: So, if we take several families and their servants, about 40 Poles for each large estate, this will give us only 320,000 Polish inhabitants.

DMOWSKI: Great landed properties include the estate owner, the clerks and tenants, the solicitor, the doctor who treats the owner, the merchant, the craftsman, etc.

SUJKOWSKI: As I said: including personal servants. Forty people that's quite a lot. These figures indicate that, even in case of expropriations, the proportions would not change. Probably only the great landed estates would disappear, in any case they would become of secondary importance. But the area would lose nothing of its Polishness. I see there is a concern that the Sejm would be overloaded with foreign elements—a rightly so—and therefore it seems that exactly the federation would be the solution we want. This federation would help to focus on the Polish and Byelorussian people and neutralise all others. But at the same time, it makes it possible to incorporate much more territory. The state today needs to be strong. This is the very term I emphasise. A strong state means militarily powerful. In a federation between Lithuania and Poland, I see much greater strength for Poland than in the incorporation of only some parts of Lithuania. If there is a need for decentralisation—although I feel there could be some form of cultural autonomy for Lithuania—if we even adopt decentralisation, with a non-uniform Lithuanian government, we will need to find rapprochement, we will find many more links in between the federation and incorporation programmes.

I didn't mention forests because I would have to note that their natural growth would not be enough. Moreover, the forest in the Carpathian Mountains,

already has a market there. As to the canal, I am sure the Committee already knows that the Latvians wish for a military convention with Poland, and a military convention will facilitate all trade contacts and, in such case, the Dvina will be for us a very important international transport route.

DMOWSKI: But the Latvians might be administered by the League of Nations.

SUJKOWSKI: I am ready to accept the idea of a Lithuania attached to Poland but we will be responsible for governing ethnographic Lithuania and Byelorussia. But can you two gentlemen, as Polish delegates at the Peace Conference, simply impose iunctim that we propose a project with such and such conditions? Will this pass? If you can impose this, then I renounce the federation programme, but otherwise I must stand by it.

DOWNAROWICZ: While I share Mr. Sujkowski's views, I must say that, personally, I do not see any difference in principle between them and what the Chairman said, especially as far as fundamental problems and their solutions are concerned. The solution of the Chairman, namely the concept of a strong Poland, is, it would seem, understood by all. The rest concerns methods of arriving at this end and we should reflect upon this. Mr. Sujkowski pointed out that he is entirely for the concept advanced by the Chairman and would have nothing against it if this concept could truly be implemented. Just what should be implemented in this respect is difficult for me to assess, thus I can't comment, but I would like to voice some reservations about certain issues. Namely, I would like Poland to be Polish. In truth, I would dismiss one argument, i.e., the observation about a national minority that could introduce this or that national direction into the state's administration. Admittedly, it has already happened in the Sejm that a few votes tipped the scale and determined the outcome of the vote. But I would nevertheless like to disregard this argument because in the concept advanced by the Chairman, we won't be able to be rid of those few votes because we are not going to create an entirely homogenous country and there will always be a struggle between various groups, each of which will vote differently in the Sejm. My point is that in order to be strong, the state should organise without producing difficulties, above all without creating irredentism. In the concept that was spoken of here, I don't see one thing that I find extremely striking in this territorial programme. Namely, the National Committee's project seems to entail a very distant boundary in Ruthenia. It seems to me that if this entails shifting the boundary to the east, this is very dangerous because national consciousness there is quite strongly developed. It seems that we can clearly state that we are talking about national expansion that if we speak of boundaries in the east, we understand that territories that are as yet not inhabited by Poles will shortly be inhabited by them, and this seems to me the most difficult matter. If there are

doubts, in my view this is the greatest. It seems to me that you are reaching even beyond Kamieniec Podolski.

DMOWSKI: We are taking over two districts—those of Płoskirów, Kamieniec Podolski, and that of Uszyce in part.

SEYDA: There is no hope that we will get them.

DOWNAROWICZ: As far as Ruthenia is concerned, there is the fear that they may be tempted by the idea of federation with Russia. As far as the Byelorussians are concerned, it is difficult to speak of them as a nation as such. It is insufficiently crystallised. During the war, this territory was terribly depopulated, especially Volhynia. Here we could, if possible, shift the boundary eastward and I think that our expansion, our emigration, could very quickly move eastward and these territories would quite easily become Polish. I would like to voice one reservation—in terms of the danger of foreign elements, Ruthenia is particularly concerning.

DMOWSKI: But you yourself are talking of moving to Volhynia.

DOWNAROWICZ: I am speaking of eastern Ruthenia.

DMOWSKI: You are not questioning Eastern Galicia? Besides it, we are taking only two districts in Podolia, of which one is very Polish, the rest is Volhynian-like.

DOWNAROWICZ: As far as shifting the boundary in the northeast is concerned, it seems to me one could, like Mr. Sujkowski says, go a long way to the east. But I wish to stress the danger of Latvia here. I don't know what can be attained there, but I can imagine that if it were to be the federative concept, I would be surprised if Latvia did not seek to unite with Lithuania and to form a state there. Uniting Lithuania with Poland seems quite difficult to me. I would be wary of this danger. In this respect, I fully agree with the Chairman that we are a western nation which can make use of the methods of the Russian state. In this regard, a question arises—would a federative link not be safer. I understand the Chairman's reservation and I share it, but it is precisely in this manner that one introduces into the state a large non-Polish element, one at times discontented and potentially dangerous. In the federative concept, those parts which will constitute the Polish state will form a homogenous unit. If other parts of historic Lithuania are also included, I realise that it will contain various nationalities, of which none will be dominant. I believe that this cultural factor will be Polish and will play a very important role. That, which was mere mysticism at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is now taking on physical shape and is perhaps becoming more real than the physical force propagated by Germany.



For this reason, I believe that with the appropriate principles of decentralisation, where the central authorities would hold the main rudder of government, the Poles would play the leading role in Lithuania. With the beginning of the struggle for cultural colonial expansion, who knows if this path would not be safer. Despite the doubts within me, which lead me to wonder if it would not be more prudent to take this route, I nevertheless agree with the Chairman's concept, but on the condition that part of Lithuania will be incorporated while in the second part we will exert our influence. If, however, this cannot be achieved, what then? I would then ask if it would be possible for the Committee to instruct our representative at the Conference to clarify the above concept on the condition that no solution would include the partition of Lithuania, because it would be highly dangerous if the Lithuania thus created would lean towards either Germany or Russia. Even if this option were to prevail, we should not surrender our programme. That condition I would make.

And now I would make yet another suggestion, which I consider difficult to achieve now given the lack of time, i.e. to communicate with Warsaw on the matter of eastern boundaries. From what the Chairman has said, I know that this project should be presented in the coming days. It is my understanding, however, that this matter will require time, but if in the meantime we receive a response from Warsaw, it will be crucial. I wish to stress the importance of consulting Warsaw. I don't mean the relationship between the National Committee, the government and the Chief of State, but policy coordination. I feel that allowing for any differences between the representation to the Peace Conference and public opinion at home would be extremely dangerous. Such differences could be detrimental. In Poland, Paderewski and Piłsudski are negotiating with allied missions and were this lack of unity be noted in the Entente states, that could have very sad consequences. In addition, I would like to emphasise that in Poland and in Lithuania, a certain policy is being pursued taking inspiration from this or that programme.

DMOWSKI: We have not been informed about it.

DOWNAROWICZ: As far as the concept for Lithuania is concerned, it is the concept of both the Chief of State and of Paderewski. I would only like to make a slight correction in the declaration of the Chief of State's, who, in light of what he said, would probably not necessarily insist on federation and would accept a position that we can call imperialism. But he probably would voice the same reservation we are voicing: "Yes, but in this form, not the other". We know that between Chief of State Piłsudski and Paderewski there is full agreement, and we should inform the French about this. I think it would be desirable to send a detailed report about this project.

DMOWSKI: Already sent.

DOWNAROWICZ: As I said, a certain policy is being pursued there. Polish troops are moving forward, and the Polish administration follows.

DMOWSKI: I would say that they are only organising this administration.

DOWNAROWICZ: They are conducting a certain policy, certain propaganda and this must absolutely be acknowledged. Thus I would make two suggestions. We can provisionally agree with this concept, but on the condition that it might later be subject to serious amendments once we receive instructions from the home authorities and we compromise the incorporation concept with the federation programme, although I am certain that the Chief of State Piłsudski and Paderewski would agree to the Chairman's concept.

DMOWSKI: I must make another point here that one should not condition a political programme on whether or not it can be implemented. If I was to accept the project presented by Mr. Sujkowski and a proponent of the Committee asked me how I imagined the conditions under which the federation might be founded, I would say that two countries would be organised—a Polish one and a Lithuanian one. Then the constituent assembly should convene in Vilnius and decide if it for joining Poland or not. Later, following the method of Mr. Downarowicz, my interlocutor could say that he may agree to federation but only on the condition that it would undoubtedly take place. But a federation is the voluntary move that brings two countries together so we never know in advance what the ultimate decision would be. One cannot exclude that either country would declare that it wishes to federate with Russia, and not with the other. I don't know if you gentlemen know about this, but there is a covert understanding between Lithuanian nationalists and the Jews of Lithuania, and I have indications that these two elements could control the constituent assembly in Vilnius.

KOZICKI: I would also agree to federation if I had the certainty that we would achieve the aims set out by Mr. Sujkowski and that the federative programme would secure Lithuania and Ruthenia for Poland; that all those countries which we wish to keep would remain with us. I think that those states that achieve independence without being able to govern themselves, would become the object of foreign influence, probably German and, in all probability, would turn against Poland. I doubt if the Lithuanian and Byelorussian movement can be placated. On the whole, this movement doesn't rest on contradictory interests with Poland, but on seeking to create a nationality through a struggle against Polishness. I am convinced that we won't win them over through concessions. If we adopt the federative approach with respect to Lithuania, logically we will have to apply it also to Byelorussia, and the latter will take away Eastern Galicia from us.

BARTOSZEWICZ: I would like to respond to the point that we should not extend our boundaries too far into Ruthenia. Of course, I understand this

may intend to mean only a prudent and minimal advance to the east, but I can't understand how the Polish state can be reborn in such a way that it would push ahead far to the east in the north without a corresponding advance in the south.

DMOWSKI: It would be unforgivable if the nation are to repeat the same mistake.

BARTOSZEWICZ: If one talks of the danger of the Ruthenian people, one has to differentiate between the Ruthenians in the Lwow area and those beyond the Dnieper River. The difference is enormous. There is another issue. If we talk of expansion, we must remember that the expansion of Polish peasants into Ruthenia from the west is greater than from the north. We can see this in the pattern of settlement in Ruthenia. A Pole from the west will chose better and more fertile land. Let's take north-western Volhynia as an example—it is much more sparsely populated by Poles than southern Volhynia. Polishness is expanding into Volhynia and Podolia in a rather compact wedge on the Lwow-Berdyczów axis. This line of expansion of the Polish peasants is explained by the fact that in those areas the land is more fertile. Now, the inconvenience of not including Ruthenia to the Polish state is that it is impossible to move too far east in the north while pulling back in the south to the San River.

Now about the question of federation: Here, Mr. Kozicki just said, and very rightly so that one can't federate in the north and not do so in the south. And if we were to do it in the south, it means we will lose Eastern Galicia. So, if we are talking of such a programme, let's just say, we will create a Poland with ethnographic boundaries and what happens beyond them...

SEYDA: Paderewski's old programme was in this vein: Ethnographic Poland as a Polish Republic linked in federation with a Lithuanian Republic, a kind of Podlasian republic, etc.

BARTOSZEWICZ: In this case, it is easier to federate with kings than with republics. And since there are no kings anymore, and we will be dealing with popular democracies, the matter of the union presents itself as a more difficult process—a considerably longer one in any case. Anyway, today, we must choose a unified Polish state, as it was already in 1791, as a point of departure. If we were to pursue the matter of union as something plausible, we would have to go back not to the times of the partitions, not even to the 16<sup>th</sup> century, but rather to the 14<sup>th</sup>. But we can't go back that far, because we have to recognise that the Polish state's historical boundaries are those before the partitions. Despite linguistic and ethnographic differences, Poland at the time was already a politically unified organism, not a federation of Poland, Lithuania, and Ruthenia. If today, we claim certain territories beyond Poland's ethnographic boundaries, it is because these territories have preserved their Polish character. If we were to adopt the federation programme, we would

have to lock Poland into its ethnographic boundaries. But in the states of Lithuania and Ruthenia, even federated with Poland, the governments could pursue policies against the interests of the Polish nation. It would be naïve to presume that Lithuanian or Ruthenian governments, which will no doubt be under Jewish-German influence, will allow us to maintain our present position and develop as a nation. After all, we can see what the policy of Ukraine toward the Poles has been since 1917. For these reasons, as the Committee has decided, we must strive for a Poland with wider boundaries if possible and if circumstances give us a chance, with or even without ethnographic Lithuania. On Lithuania, even if it were not united with us from the outset, sooner or later it will be forced to seek unification. Therefore, if favourable conditions for this exist, we should take advantage of them as much as possible. We must remember that these nations will gravitate toward us if only Poland is strong and great. A weak Poland won't be attractive to anyone. So, if we succeed in bringing about the Committee's project, which guarantees the state's internal national solidarity while granting us considerable territory, we will end up with a situation that will allow us, a few decades later, to reach further to our old historical boundaries.

Count ŻÓŁTOWSKI: I would like to draw your attention to the fact that this question can be considered only from two angles: One, what is desirable, and two, what is possible.

One, those who spoke previously agreed that if this programme that has been sketched here were to prove viable, it would fulfil Polish interests to a degree that would be greater than the federative programme, since it successfully resolves the Russian question, which the federative programme does not even address. I think that there are not many Poles who would wish to create a Russian state with which they would be in a federal union. Here, we come against our historical tradition and, above all, our political interests. If this can be exploited, this could bring us extraordinary benefits. The Eastern Borderlands are our colony. It has always been our colony to some degree and should remain so. This is desirable.

Two, what is possible? Will federation be the result of this programme?

Does the federation question stand a chance and is it very pleasing to the Allied states, which are deciding about world and territorial questions today? We have no evidence here. The slogans of small nations have gone silent—even in the press one doesn't encounter them. These nations are neither cohesive nor are they represented by authorities that could speak in their name. This means that they are not ready for self-government and binding accords. But time is of the essence or, as a diplomat told me yesterday, one is working under the whip. If we were to come forward today with a new plan that would require crystallisation, understanding with the home country, and the internal

organisation of individual provinces, this would set us back a month or more. When the critical moment of submitting the plan arrives, we could be late. So, the plan of federation is, besides the other problems it entails, difficult to prepare at such an urgent moment as now. As to the protectorate under the aegis of the League of Nations, it seems to me that there are chances for this point to be considered. It is up to us to concentrate all our strength and energy to strive to this end and coordinate our efforts to present this to the Entente in an accessible manner. Insofar as we have a chance to achieve this programme, we should take the path that allows for various options. In any case, we should seek to have economic influence in those Borderland states.

DŁUSKI: I am always afraid of these Eastern Borderlands because I always fear that a national consciousness has awoken among the local population. It is not so dense.

Now the Lithuanian programme. First, it seems to me that we can't depend too much on what the allies are saying at a given moment. Much has been said about little nations, about which little is now being written. The Chairman said that they would be immediately at war were it not for the fact that they are exhausted for about 20 years. I would like to find a way out of this situation. I presume that we would all like to create a Poland as large as possible, but one that would not be exposed to such dangers. This question is so important for me because Russia is now weak, but give it another two or three years and the patriotic spirit in Russia will awaken, and it will once again be the old colossus. I would like it if we could arrive at some *modus vivendi*, because I would agree to what the Chairman is proposing if I were not afraid of this irredentism. It seems to me that if we proposed a federation in a form that would satisfy only the ambitions of Lithuania, if only in a semi-fictional manner, then with this balance of forces I would not be afraid of this federation at all. We have to take Bolshevik currents into account. As our army is moving near Brest-Litovsk and will introduce civilian administration there, we will be able to create the type of federation that we will ourselves dictate. For this reason, it seems to me that the concept of federation should not be abandoned, because we could find ourselves facing a situation in which we will be lying: Here at the Peace Conference we will say one thing while facts will force us to do something different.

SUJKOWSKI: I would like to draw your attention to the fact that, irrespective of convictions and camps, everyone in Poland favours the incorporation of a considerable portion of Volhynia, which is not at all Polish. This is due primarily to strategic considerations because Lithuania, whether incorporated, divided, or federated, requires the incorporation of Ruthenia. Of course, from the Eastern Borderlands, Volhynia is indispensable to us, and this introduces an undesirable element—Ruthenians. I cannot agree with

Mr. Bartoszewicz that one can push the Polish element into Ruthenia. In its southern part, land is very expensive and there cannot be any new Polish colonisation there. Meanwhile, we have to include this Ruthenian element in our Sejm. There is no way around this. And we must fight for this Volhynia to belong to Poland. If we don't go with the federation, can we govern them without introducing them to the Sejm in these democratic times? We cannot, today, after Stolypin's fashion, give them five times fewer seats than is their due and we need to introduce foreign elements. I speak of federation so that we would not have to introduce this element to Warsaw. Let them sort it out between themselves in Lithuania, but not in Warsaw. We will have as much Lithuania as we take of it. We are demanding Byelorussia in order to keep it from Muscovising itself—so we can ensure Byelorussia's free development. In the meantime, if we are to ensure order, we will then be setting this up as a military and economic union, and the Sejm will be in Lithuania, where those elements will be in friction while we will indirectly only think of maintaining Polish influence there, and we will be much more successful in this under federation. As poor as the allies' help looks in relation to Teschen, it will look far worse in Lithuania. We need to do this ourselves. Federation takes away Lithuanian and Byelorussian deputies from the Warsaw Sejm.

SEYDA: Mr. Dłuski drew attention to the fact that we shouldn't be too attached to the first concept adopted by the Committee, to take into account that factors may emerge that will lead to the adoption of a federation-based solution. Now, even though I hope that proponents of the federation programme are making a weaker case for it than earlier, I take into account that there are many supporters of this solution. And this is what I'm afraid of and I think that we should work to oppose this. This would be the negation of what we have been striving for, because we always had a concept of a cohesive and strong Poland that would be able to survive, tittering between two worlds. I think that we should oppose this as forcefully as possible, so that if this concept were to be accepted, it would be only out of compulsion, as evil.

Count ŁUBIENSKI: I will not speak of federation, because I have come to the conclusion that in today's conditions and today's times it is out of the question. Primarily, because we do not know with whom we could federate. All I said of boundaries was that what mattered to us was that the country be strong, and that in order to be strong it has to have the economic conditions [for it]. Although the General spoke dismissively about the forests, please do not forget that in these times they are one of the most valuable objects. But I would also like to call attention, strongly, to the strategic boundary. This supposedly strategic boundary is not one at all because it is not possible to defend a boundary that goes through mud, without any highways, and furthermore we have wonderful railway junctions and that whole system of

roads. Thus, I would like to have them for our country and not against our country.

DOWNAROWICZ: I would like to emphasise that there is no point in talking for long, because I do not see any fundamental difference in opinions. What are we talking about? Above all that we want the boundary in the plans to be moved to the east as far as possible. In this respect, we would only be afraid of creating a wedge by moving the boundary in Lithuania. The question of federation or non-federation is another matter—a question of the methods of settling the matter. I would like to stress moreover the necessity of sending off all these things to Poland.

Here, I would like to inform you of various tendencies in Poland. I can see that here a conviction prevails with which I am in entire agreement—striving for a strong and centralised Poland. In agreeing with this, I would yet like to warn against one thing that is happening in the country, namely, the emergence of a plan for other federations. In the Sejm, several constitutional drafts are being considered. I even read in one of these drafts that the division of all Poland into several dozen lands is proposed. Each of these lands would have its own autonomy, parliament, etc., and this would be a federation of Polish lands. I would like to point out that this plan comes from milieus that are close to the Chairman, from Poznań circles.

DMOWSKI: Some madmen may even be very close to me. There is no borders to political ignorance and the greater the ignorance the greater the initiative. I know a Pole who came to me with a plan to make Poland into an English colony.

Briefly then, as it is my task to refer this plan, I would like to say that there is a certain conflict among those who are against the Committee's boundaries—and namely, some are demanding that the eastern boundary be pushed even further to the east, asserting that it would not burden us unduly—while others are afraid that Poland with such boundaries would cease to be a nation. There is thus a danger.

What should be relinquished in order not to burden the state with a foreign element? I would find it hardest to relinquish what lies close to the Baltic. The question of Danzig and Königsberg is most important to us—the entire future of the country depends on it. After that, it would be hard to give up Lithuania. Within its present territory, the country will definitely have too short a coastline. Thus, we want to extend the boundary to Libau.

SUJKOWSKI: This will be difficult.

DMOWSKI: Lithuania's natural port ... We are going to try to obtain it for Lithuania on account of Palanga having been taken from it at one time. That's the first thing. Once again, I would like to say, let us not be dreamers. Let us

take things as they really are. Let us remember that the world is actually moving toward democracy. There is no doubt here and we cannot be a barrier against democracy. We have to go with the flow of the times. Only let us not hide from ourselves that those elements situated to the east of Poland, in which the upper stratum of the intelligentsia has been replaced by indolent Lithuanians and Russians, are elements of incredibly low moral culture, and above all, they are the dregs of society, which easily rise to the surface there. Those are people with whom there can be no thought of coming to an agreement, of inclining them to maintain relationships with us on the basis of mutual confidence. It is quite possible that their political position will very often depend on whose coffers they are taking money from. And then it will be possible to say that they will very often take it from us. That is the second thing.

Then, I must point out that every policy is an organic whole. It is not possible to remove one brick and put another in its place. A policy that was not begun today, but was organised during the war, or even before the war, in anticipation of it, is based on a larger construction. When the allies wanted to remake Poland on the Austrian model and create a federated state out of us, we fought against it, asserting that there are no conditions for such a country to exist. When it was thought to federate us with Russia—and they still think it—again we fought against it, saying that it was impossible, that Russia's level is too low for federation. On this same principle, I am against federation in Poland. We are logical and we agree with each other. If we fight federation with Austria—because there are still tendencies to that affect, namely the Czechs want to achieve hegemony in it—if we fight federation on the banks of the Danube, if we fought Russian federation and then we step forward with our own federation, it means we are putting the lie to ourselves. Today, I wouldn't dare to utter the word "federation" after all that I have said on the subject. But never mind that, because if one person cannot say the word, another can be put forward, if it is thought proper.

If the Lithuanians dislike the Poles—not those who live by the Vistula but those who live by the Neman—and if those Poles in Lithuania are left alone with them, they will do everything possible to ruin them, and the federation principle would leave them all alone. Next, we have to join to Poland those non-Polish lands that we don't want to have. I would prefer to see Ruthenians in the Homel area than those Poles who are there. I would prefer to see those Ruthenians in Volhynia living somewhere else, and I would prefer here a population from Pomerania. But unfortunately, in Livonia, in the Homel area, we have a population that is quite all right. We could cut this out for Poland and later colonise it. But we have to cut out some sort of reasonable shape for Poland. We consider that our boundary is the best possible and that a perfect one can't be created. Our colonisation in the east did not follow any plan: it produced distant islands with Polish populations, and nearby are areas that



are ethnographically not ours. It is hard to find another country in the world that has such an abnormal ethnographic area as ours. Therefore, let us shrink Poland a little but make of it a whole that can exist. I will say just one thing: that I can more easily believe in the peaceful coexistence of Lithuanians and Poles, and Ruthenians and Poles, if they know they depend on the central government in Warsaw. Till this time, it has been difficult, because between us and the Lithuanians, as between us and the Ruthenians, there has been Russia. Today, once they know that it is a Polish government, that much will depend on this government, they will act better with us. A Lithuanian from the Kaunas gubernia will sooner come to an agreement with a Pole from Warsaw than with a Pole from Lithuania. They will trust them more. Thus, I consider that we should: One, reject the federation principle; two, accept the Committee's boundaries, with the possibility of rectification in the west or east.

As to the point raised by Mr. Downarowicz in regard to our position on the Chief of State, etc., Mr. Paderewski has announced that he will be coming to Paris within the next two weeks. So, I hope we will be able to discuss this matter with him, as the representatives of the Warsaw government. I must just point out that the Committee has the first voice in this whole affair, because the National Committee has from the outset managed, organised, and directed this issue, and if we introduced a fundamental change today, the whole system, i.e., our whole policy, would be overturned. I consider that we have met with great success with this policy. What appeared to be a dream—Danzig—is today on the way to be implemented. What appeared to be unrealizable—that Königsberg belongs to Poland—is today close to realisation. I also believe that there are good chances with regard to the eastern border.

DOWNAROWICZ: The policy in Poland contributed to those successes.

DMOWSKI: Of course, the fact that the country behaved decently greatly strengthened our policy, but on the other hand, what we have done here should not be denied. I do not hold with the principle of false modesty and I consider that our policy has been organised here as successfully as possible for such an inexperienced and politically unsophisticated nation as we are. Our opinion counts here, not only at the conference but behind the scenes. Our opinion is frequently listened to, and not only in regard to Polish questions. Therefore, if one has a certain system and a point of departure that can be applied to other countries, it should be applied to oneself as well. I am convinced that we have an increasing influence through our relations with the allied governments, in the position we hold, even on the Russian question.

SUJKOWSKI: One can't say that the federation principle could be abandoned just because in other cases it wasn't applied—there could be differences.

KOZICKI: I would like to propose the following: The Committee resolves that the memorandum on the eastern boundary, which is to be presented at once, be based on the premises and defined boundaries of the Committee's existing territorial programme.

DLUSKI: This is more or less what the Chairman said. In reference to what I said before, there could be facts in the country that could influence policy and therefore I consider that the first point should be rejected, but as to the second, I agree. Only I am very much afraid that we could make a final decision on something here while in Poland they would do something else.

KOZICKI: I made my proposal in order to facilitate a consensus vote. When I say it is based on the programme, this means modifications are not ruled out.

PATEK: I have talked with my colleagues and I propose that today we select a committee to take into account all these corrections and that we adjourn the meeting until tomorrow. It might be easier to vote on what we all agree to, rather than with the possible corrections, because these could be of a kind that not everyone would agree to.

DMOWSKI (to Mr. Piltz): When are we to present this memorandum?

PILTZ: Tomorrow evening. I would like to make a clarification in response to Mr. Dłuski's question—at this time, it is only a matter of presenting a memorandum that would defend our cause, but there is no doubt the Polish representatives will still be called to some meeting at which they will be able to express their views.

DMOWSKI: I think that our cause does not allow for yet another meeting, because we cannot work night after night. Thus, I propose we now vote on two points: One, the federation principle. I suggest that we definitely reject this principle. I consider it impossible. Thus, if you will allow, we will vote on it. Who is for application of the federation principle? Three votes. Who is for rejection of the federation principle? Eleven votes, one abstention.

DLUSKI: Please add my *votum separatum* to the protocol. I will be forced to protest at the meeting of the Conference.

DMOWSKI: There is a principle binding on all the delegates to the Conference—the principle of solidarity.

DLUSKI: In that case, I could refrain from being at that meeting when you will be speaking.

DMOWSKI (to Dłuski): Yes, you could refrain from being there.

SUJKOWSKI: I am also joining the *votum separatum*.

DMOWSKI: Please add it to the protocol. Now, as to the eastern boundary, I propose we accept the eastern boundary as planned by the Committee, with the possibility of a rectification that would not fundamentally change the plan.

DŁUSKI: What does that mean—the eastern boundary?

DMOWSKI: The entire boundary from the boundary of Romania to the Baltic sea coast. From points on the Galician boundary—because that boundary has already been established on the western boundary—and that province we are demanding whole, to the mouth of the Neman—that was the presented western boundary. Now the eastern boundary begins from the point where the Galician boundary meets Romania.

COUNT ŁUBIENSKI: Could there be a small correction? With changes of a strategic nature.

DMOWSKI: They can be strategic and economic. I am speaking of small changes dictated by geographical considerations. Geographic considerations are also strategic.

WIELOWIEYSKI: In Piłsudski's cable there was a clear desire that in those cases where the boundary is planned along a river it should be moved 10 kilometres beyond the river, in order for the river to be fully in Poland's possession.

DMOWSKI: This won't pass. A river is the hardest to obtain, particularly if it flows toward the Dvina and if it is necessary for navigation. With today's military technology, a river is not a strategic barrier. Thus, I am putting to a vote first of all the addition—no, this will be difficult. It seems to me that it would be better to vote on the whole. Thus, the proposal is to accept the boundary as planned on the map by the Committee, with the possibility of small rectifications dictated by geographic considerations. Whoever is for, please raise your hand. Ten votes. Who is against this border? Four.

DŁUSKI: I am making a reservation as to the eastern boundary—the same as before, i.e., if it is necessary to appear together, I will abstain, but I will refer to the Warsaw authorities.

SUJKOWSKI: I would like to ask that my motivation for not voting in favour be included in the protocol, namely that I do not want to leave Byelorussia at the mercy of Russia, because this form does not secure Byelorussia from the influences of Russia.

DMOWSKI: But that is already in your speech. In any event, then, I would dictate to the protocol that I do not want to leave all Lithuania at Russia's mercy. Given that the entire discussion is recorded by the stenographer, only a *votum separatum* is recorded with regard to voting.

KOZICKI: I hope that the speakers will receive the speeches for correction and will be able to edit them.

*PDD 1919, doc. 166*

## 108

*3 March 1919, letter from the Chairman of the Polish National Department to the President of the USA about aid for Poland*

March 3rd, 1919.

Hon. Woodrow Wilson,  
President of the United States,  
Washington, D.C.

Sir,

In appreciation of the many urgent calls being made upon your time and energy, which of necessity bar a personal interview, I am taking the liberty, through this communication, to present for your consideration certain problems confronting the recently recognised Republic of Poland which require American co-operation for their successful solution.

In directly presenting these matters, we are particularly desirous of making plain that as American citizens of Polish ancestry, we appreciate that the right to define the relations between the United States and the Republic of Poland rests absolutely in your hands and in the hands of the constituted American public authorities. Therefore, in addressing you, we have no desire to originate or affect in any way, the official policy of the United States in this matter. We believe however, that we have an obligation at this critical time in helping to cement the relationship between America and Poland.

To that end, we are approaching you, not only for advice as to what course we may adopt which will forward the building of the Polish nation, but in order that we may avoid any manifestations which may conflict with your plans or those of other American authorities.

Through advices received from Paris and Warsaw, it has been made known to us that the new Republic of Poland is in great need at this time of financial and material aid, far beyond the resources of its own citizens and of the Polish immigration in the United States. While billions of property have been

destroyed or requisitioned by the Germans, the acknowledgments, which the Polish people hold, cannot for the present be realised upon except as pledges.

The food problem is particularly acute, and a rationing system must be provided to carry the people through an eight months period until the new crops are harvested. The business of tilling and seeding the soil for this new crop is also seriously complicated by reason of the lack of seed, of animals and agricultural implements with which to prosecute these farming labors. In Łódź and other textile centers, the looms have been destroyed or dismantled, and in the mining sections, disorders still prevail.

The general situation is seriously complicated by the presence in the country of bands of discharged German and Austrian soldiers and prisoners of war, who, relieved from all discipline, have become marauding forces. In addition, from all portions of Russia, bands of refugees have been making their way into Warsaw and other centers which at the present time are the only havens of refuge in the near eastern portion of Europe.

Poland needs not only food for its citizens and for those unfortunates who have been cast within Polish territory by the general condition of disorder in Russia and other territories contiguous to Poland, but it also needs money in order that it may establish proper order and maintain a proper force within its borders for this purpose.

To that end, we pray that you will consider the early arrangement of a loan to the Polish government which shall be available for all general governmental purposes, such a loan to be safeguarded in the usual manner.

We also ask that the possibility be considered of selling to the Polish government on a system of credits, food and material supplies from the great stores gathered by the American government for the prosecution of the war, which are now being held in America and in store houses abroad. We have in mind, not only the fats and grains, but also the shoes and clothing and medicines. We have thought that as against these deliveries, we could place as a pledge, the German indebtedness to Poland for property requisitioned which has never been paid for, and which we assume will later be taken up for adjudication by the Peace Conference.

We are desirous of purchasing on the credit system part of the stores of munitions and equipment for the Polish militia now being organised for the preservation of order. Indeed, we fear that unless we secure equipment sufficient to properly outfit these men, we are in great danger of losing supplies which America and the Allies may contribute, because of our inability to hold them against the raids of the guerrilla forces now in operation at points of entry into Poland.

We would appreciate your permission to inaugurate in this country the sale of Polish national securities through American bounding houses, and along the line by which sales of French and English securities were allowed during the war. We are satisfied that such Polish securities would find an acceptable market.

May we express the hope that this memorandum will receive your favorable attention. We anticipate that representatives of the Polish National Committee will wait upon you in connection with matters hereabove referred to upon your arrival in Paris.

With assurance of my most sincere appreciation of your kindness and sympathy, I beg leave to remain,

Yours most obedient servant,

President,  
National Polish Department<sup>3</sup>

*PDD 1919, doc. 170 (ENG)*

## 109

*4 March 1919, note from the representative of the PNC in Paris  
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France  
about the exchange of prisoners of war*

Paris, le 4 Mars 1919.

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Stéphane Pichon  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence les nouvelles récemment reçues de Finlande au sujet de 75.000 Polonais prisonniers et otages des Bolchevistes. Le sort de ces malheureux exige une intervention urgente en leur faveur, car ils se trouvent placés par leurs détenteurs entre deux alternatives également tragiques: d'un côté la mort par la faim, de l'autre

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<sup>3</sup> This concerns the National Department of the Polish Central National Committee, established in 1916 as the representation of the Polish community in the USA.

l'enrôlement dans les rangs de l'armée bolcheviste. Cette situation n'est pas uniquement terrible du point de vue humanitaire, elle peut présenter aussi un réel danger militaire. Sur 75.000 hommes jetés dans la plus pénible extrémité, ne faut-il pas craindre des défaillances et n'y en a-t-il pas qui grossiront de leur nombre l'armée révolutionnaire apportant dans ses rangs un élément d'autant plus redoutable qu'il luttera désespérément jusqu'à la mort, exaspéré par la souffrance et par la faim.

Il paraît cependant qu'on pourrait remédier à cette situation tragique par des échanges de prisonniers. Nous apprenons en effet de Finlande également que bien des familles bolchevistes mènent une campagne contre Lénine et Trotzki, les accusant d'abandonner leurs fils en proie à la barbarie de la bourgeoisie occidentale. Vu ces revendications les autorités russes seront peut-être assez abordables pour des propositions d'échanges de prisonniers faites par les Gouvernements de l'Entente. Je soumets cette idée à Votre Excellence, espérant que d'une façon ou d'une autre elle voudra prendre en mains activement cette question qui exige une très grande urgence et dont dépendent des milliers de vies humaines.

Je me permets de communiquer simultanément à Votre Excellence, comme annexe à ma lettre, un appel de familles éplorées qui s'adressent au Président du Comité National Polonais en faveur de leurs maris, fils et frères retenus en Russie. Ce n'est qu'une manifestation très réduite et qui n'est qu'une faible image de la grande angoisse qui étreint toute la Pologne pour ses enfants exilés et cruellement torturés.

Espérant, Monsieur Ministre, que vous voudrez considérer favorablement ma demande, je vous prie d'agréer l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

(signé) Erasme Piltz

*PDD 1919, doc. 171*

## 110

*5 March 1919, unsigned note about the discussions of the delegate to the Peace Conference with the counsel of the President of the USA, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, and the British Foreign Secretary*

5 March 1919

For K. Skirmunt

On 27, February Dmowski met with House, Foch, and Balfour about the matter of sending the army to Poland.

House's position is the same as Balfour's, i.e., that the army can be sent based on Art. 16 of the Ceasefire Agreement, which gives the allies access to Poland through Danzig.<sup>4</sup> It is enough to assure the Germans that the army is landing and will pass through territory that is in German hands. In response to Dmowski's remark that this can't be done other than by organising railway guards along the line, either by the allies or the Poles, H. agreed that such a guard, operated by the Polish army, could be imposed on the Germans. If this manner of transporting the army turns out not to be feasible, Germany will be responsible and then other methods can be imposed on them.

Foch is offended that for the moment the allies have not accepted his proposal to force the Germans to evacuate the entire territory of the Prussian partition, or at least the zone through which the railway runs, at once.

D. responded to this by saying that at present we have no other options than to act on the basis of Balfour's plan, but if this plan proves to be unworkable then it will be necessary to look for a more energetic solution.

General Dupont in Berlin was instructed to inform the Germans that the Polish army will shortly be sent through Danzig. All the preparations for sending the army are being made quickly according to the following plan proposed by D. At the moment, the transfer of two divisions and a training division is being organised, with the rest to be sent later—110,000 people in all. After the first division has been sent, if the tonnage is insufficient, priority will be given to war materials and clothing over the rest of the army.

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<sup>4</sup> Art. 16 of the Armistice Agreement of 11 November 1918, stated that the "Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier, either through Danzig or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of these territories or for the purpose of maintaining order."



Foch agrees to act energetically in accordance with this plan, although he does not believe that it is feasible: he (correctly) sees difficulties in landing for as long as Danzig is not in the hands of the allies, and furthermore he foresees that it could turn out that there are no locomotives and railway wagons, and finally he sees the possibility of provocation and conflicts on the part of the Germans, who have troops on the spot.

D: There is no other way out, until it turns out that the plan is not feasible.

Balfour spoke quite vigorously against Foch. He claimed that he is adamantly insisting on sending the troops, but that Foch is making such conditions that he now gives the impression that he doesn't want to send them. He claims that Foch is demanding that peace be concluded with the Germans and the army be sent only afterwards, which will take a lot of time. F. agreed finally with D. B. stressed that it is not a question of asking the Germans to be kind enough to allow the army through—they have to do it. They need only be informed that the army is going through. In response to D.'s remark that the creation of a railway guard by the Polish army on the Danzig line would be unavoidable, he replied that he will agree to it, insofar as the Germans themselves do not officially assume responsibility for the security of the transport of the troops.

He gives the impression of sincerely wishing the army to be sent as quickly as possible and considers this to be the only way.

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As to the transport, Foch declared that it had been requested from the inter-allied maritime agency in London.

D. is taking advantage of talks with Foch and Balfour to initiate discussions about the territorial question.

On the premise that the present situation clearly indicates how weak Poland is without Danzig, he pointed out to House the necessity of resolving the territorial question in the west as soon as possible.

House gave him to understand in great confidence that all the American members are of the opinion that Danzig should belong to Poland, and he is himself strongly convinced that this will happen.

While speaking with Balfour, Dmowski said that it is very sad for us that the most serious opposition to the achievement of such an important matter as, for instance, the settling of the boundaries with Germany (Danzig), comes from the side of the English.

Balfour replied that there is no opposition and that he is himself well-disposed toward the Polish cause, that it is only that some of the English have doubts as to whether giving Poland Danzig, a city that was always German and

was only for a moment under ...<sup>5</sup> would not leave the Germans with a festering wound that would continually envenom relations. They would sooner agree to the loss of a major part of ... and Silesia, as lands that are undoubtedly Polish, than of a strong German centre such as Danzig. Let Poland not forget that it is very dangerous since Poznań lies only two hours from Berlin.

Dmowski has the impression that Danzig ...

From the Polish Committee, Dr. Bowman, who is very tough on Danzig and ... to the west of P. (not north), also accepts the plan of creating a Republic of Königsberg, which would be independent of the Germans, without the right to maintain an army, and bound by a customs union. He considers that it would be useful to have delegations, or maybe a representation (credentium), come to Paris from our western borderlands, which are requested with the Masuria and West Prussia, to declare the will of the people to belong to Poland.

An American minister in Warsaw is proposed by House ... General of the army in Egypt, who is his personal friend and comes from Texas.

*PDD 1919, doc. 177*

## 111

*6 March 1919, letter from the Chief of State to the Prime Minister of France in connection with the recognition of the Polish State*

To His Excellency, M. Georges Clemenceau  
Prime Minister  
Paris

Dear Prime Minister,

Through the courteous intermediary of Ambassador Noulens, I had the honour to receive a cable from Your Excellency dated 27 February, in which you were gracious enough to express, in the name of France, wishes of happiness and success for Poland on the occasion of my having been entrusted by the Sejm with the dignity of Chief of the Polish State.<sup>6</sup>

Being deeply moved by the kind words that Your Excellency, as translator of the sentiments of Poland's most powerful ally, had the goodness to direct to

<sup>5</sup> Illegible fragments.

<sup>6</sup> The Legislative Sejm, through a resolution of 20 February 1919 extended Piłsudski's tenure as Chief of State.

me, I am hastening to beg Your Excellency to accept my most sincere gratitude, in which the entire Polish nation joins from the bottom of its heart.

Among the numerous difficulties with which a reconstituted Poland must currently struggle, this new proof of France's cordial feelings towards us is doubly valuable. For its part, Poland will not spare any effort to contribute to the development of bonds so happily forged.

I am earnestly counting on the support of Your Excellency's government—of which the most valuable proof at this moment, for the entire Polish nation, would be to send the Polish armies currently in France to Poland.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, the expression of my deep respect.

Piłsudski

*PDD 1919, doc. 178*

## 112

### *8 March 1919, speech by the General Secretary of the Economic Delegation about the situation in Poland*

*Exposé of the General Secretary of the Economic Delegation, Z. Chamiec,  
for the Allied Commission on its way to Poland, delivered during  
the meeting between the Commission and the Delegation on 8 March 1919.*

Nous aurons l'honneur, Messieurs, de vous faire parvenir des copies de ce Mémoire, avec plusieurs annexes contenant tous les chiffres nécessaires pour vous renseigner exactement, et pour appuyer les thèses que nous présentons. Tous ces documents vous parviendront sans doute cet après-midi.

Notre délégation comprend uniquement des hommes qui appartiennent à des très vieilles organisations polonaises et qui représentent l'ensemble du monde financier, agricole, industriel de Pologne. Ils ont exercé les uns ou les autres, une grande influence sur toute la vie économique de notre pays. Nous sommes donc particulièrement qualifiés pour parler au nom de la Pologne et pour dire qu'il faut reconstituer le plus vite possible la vie économique dans ce pays, ne serait-ce que pour éloigner le danger social du bolchévisme qui nous menace.

La première condition, dans cet ordre d'idées, est d'avoir des frontières sûres. Nous habitons une maison dont le garde-manger a été mis au pillage. Pour pouvoir reprendre dans cette maison une vie normale, il faut en consolider les

murs, j'entends le mur de l'Ouest et le mur de l'Est. D'un côté nous sommes assaillis par l'impérialisme allemand déguisé et de l'autre par le bolchévisme. Vous n'avez, Messieurs, qu'un mot à dire aux Allemands pour qu'ils s'arrêtent aussitôt, et nous n'aurons plus à craindre qu'ils entrent chez nous. A l'Est, au contraire, les mots ne serviront de rien: Là, c'est le bolchévisme, l'anarchie, et il faut nous défendre. La muraille qu'il faut opposer au bolchévisme est une muraille vivante, et pour élever cette muraille, il nous faut des hommes, les soldats mêmes qui se trouvent en France. Il faut encore des munitions, car nous n'en avons plus. Il faut aussi des armes. Nous n'avons comme canons que les quelques vieilles pièces que nous avons conquises sur les Allemands en Pologne. Les membres militaires de la Commission pourront vous dire que ces ressources sont très insuffisantes, parce que, dans un pays occupé, le vainqueur ne laisse en général que du matériel de peu de valeur. Or, vous avez, grâce à la démobilisation, beaucoup de munitions de reste. Nous vous demandons instamment de nous en envoyer.

Vous avez pu voir, par la lecture que je viens de vous faire, que nous avons heureusement échappé jusqu'à présent à la contagion du bolchévisme, et qu'il nous reste encore assez de force pour devenir le pilier de l'ordre social dans l'Est de l'Europe. Les résultats des élections l'ont démontré, puisqu'ils sont nettement anti-bolchévistes. Mais si l'état désastreux de notre vie nationale persiste, nos forces iront s'amointrissant, et nous pourrions être condamnés à un effondrement qui serait l'effondrement de l'idée d'ordre social dans l'Europe orientale.

Notre pays a été pillé et dévasté, son industrie est complètement arrêtée. Cela a eu pour conséquence une hausse considérable du prix de toutes les marchandises: denrées alimentaires, vêtements et généralement tous les objets de première nécessité. La cherté de la vie a provoqué à son tour l'augmentation des salaires des ouvriers, des employés de chemins de fer, et par conséquent celle des prix de transport et des objets fabriqués sur place. C'est donc un cercle vicieux. Il n'y a qu'un moyen d'en sortir: C'est de faire venir le plus vite possible en Pologne des produits alimentaires qui feront baisser le prix de la vie et, par voie de conséquence, tous les autres prix, mais pour faire venir ces marchandises en Pologne, il faut un chemin. Ce chemin commence au port de DANTZIG. Cette revendication, qui a été également faite par le Comité National au point de vue politique, se justifie de notre part par des considérations économiques: C'est à ce point de vue seulement que nous nous plaçons, car nous ne faisons pas de politique. DANTZIG est d'une importance vitale pour notre pays; c'est la porte de la Pologne.

Malgré l'armistice de Novembre 1918, nous sommes encore aujourd'hui en Pologne comme dans une forteresse qui serait cernée de tous côtés et qui n'aurait aucune communication avec le dehors. Songez, Messieurs, à toutes

les souffrances que la Pologne a endurées pendant la guerre. Et aujourd'hui, alors que l'armistice date de trois mois déjà, la Pologne n'a pas encore senti les bienfaits de votre victoire. Nous avons eu, pendant toute la durée de la guerre, assez de force morale pour tenir tête à l'oppression allemande. Nous avons dit à notre peuple – qui le comprit parfaitement – que notre place était à vos côtés. Soutenu par cette idée, le peuple polonais a vaillamment enduré toutes les souffrances. Mais aujourd'hui, enfin, il est grandement temps que ces souffrances cessent, sans quoi nous pourrions, à juste titre, nous demander pourquoi nous sommes les seuls à être obligés de souffrir, pourquoi nos enfants meurent en foule, sans une seule boîte de lait pour les réconforter. Pendant toute la guerre nous avons lutté au prix de notre sang pour l'idée de justice que proclamait l'Entente: 300.000 Polonais sont tombés dans les rangs russes sur les champs de bataille. Dans les crèches, pendant l'évacuation on a constaté le chiffre invraisemblable de 106% pour la mortalité infantile [sic!], les enfants mouraient avant de pouvoir entrer dans les crèches. On a brûlé les maisons par centaines de mille, ravagé nos terres. Les Polonais qui servaient dans les armées autrichiennes aimaient mieux franchir les lignes et aller se rendre. Messieurs les Délégués Italiens pourront en témoigner. Le seul espoir qui nous ait soutenu était donc de voir arriver la fin de tous ces maux quand sonnerait l'heure de la justice et de la réparation des injures commises. Or, je le répète, Messieurs, avec toute la force que me donne une conviction intime. Voilà trois mois que nous promettons l'aide des Puissances de l'Entente à nos compatriotes, et cette aide ne vient toujours pas. Nous vous disons donc, Messieurs, puisque vous nous y avez invités, à nous expliquer: Mettez fin à cette attente du peuple Polonais; c'est seulement grâce à un appui efficace des Puissances associées que la vie économique normale, condition "sine qua non" d'une paix sociale durable, pourra se développer chez nous.

M. Le Président: Nous vous remercions, Monsieur CHAMIEC, de vos explications, qui se résumeraient ainsi: d'une part un certain nombre de desiderata qui pourraient être satisfaits à plus ou moins longue échéance, et d'autre part les vœux que vous avez formulés en terminant lorsque vous avez demandé formellement l'ouverture à la Pologne du port de DANTZIG pour l'alimentation des habitants et en particulier des enfants. Cette revendication du port de DANTZIG, qui peut se justifier par des considérations générales, s'appuie aussi sur des raisons économiques.

Mr. CHAMIEC: Il y a encore une question très grave que je voudrais soumettre à la Commission. J'ai indiqué tout à l'heure que les machines avaient été enlevées de la plupart de nos usines et fabriques. Elles ont été volées par les Allemands qui les ont emportées chez eux. Or, une des clauses du dernier acte d'armistice stipule la récupération des machines qui ont été prises par les Allemands en France et en Belgique. Pourquoi cette clause ne s'étend-elle pas à la Pologne? Nos usines manquent de machines, nous savons où retrouver

celles qui nous ont été volées, mais cette récupération nous est interdite parce qu'il n'y a pas de clause dans l'armistice en ce qui concerne la Pologne. Pendant ce temps, les ouvriers allemands travaillent avec nos machines. Ils sont pourtant les vaincus et nous, qui sommes les alliés des vainqueurs, nous avons chez nous 700.000 ouvriers victimes du chômage. Nous nous permettons donc de présenter la requête suivante.

“Le 16 Janvier<sup>7</sup> 1919 a été signée une prolongation de l'armistice jusqu'au 17 Février. Dans cet accord se trouve le § suivant: «Les machines, pièces de machines, objets d'outillage, industriel ou agricole, accessoires divers de toute nature, et, d'une manière générale, tous objets industriels ou agricoles enlevés des territoires occupés par les armées allemandes sur le front occidental, sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, par l'autorité militaire ou civile allemande, seront tenus à la disposition des Alliés pour être expédiée à leur lieu d'origine».”

Il est indispensable, Messieurs, que dans le prochain acte de prolongation de l'armistice figure un article de tous points analogue en faveur des intérêts polonais. Après les mots “sur le front occidental” il est nécessaire d'inscrire „et en Pologne” et, à la fin de l'article, il faudrait stipuler: “Le matériel enlevé devra être envoyé au gouvernement Polonais aux endroits indiqués par ce dernier.”

M. le Président: Nous prenons acte de vos déclarations et de votre demande que nous communiquerons aux gouvernements chargés de donner des instructions pour le renouvellement de l'armistice.

M. CHAMIEC: Ne la transmettez-vous pas, Monsieur le Président, avec l'appui de la Commission?

M. le Président: Nous en délibérerons ensemble tout à l'heure. Vous pouvez en tout cas être sûr que nous la transmettrons.

M. CHAMIEC: Au point de vue du matériel roulant, voici un document significatif: “La Pologne ne possède que 11.000 wagons au lieu de 34.000, et la Galicie 6000 seulement au lieu de 20.000. Pour pouvoir ravitailler le pays et permettre la mise en route au moins partielle de son industrie [sic!].”

*PDD 1919, doc. 184*

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<sup>7</sup> In the original, the date is erroneously given as “7 Janvier”.

## 113

[before 9 March] 1919, report by the Prime Minister's envoy  
to London about the attitudes of British circles with regard  
to the Polish question

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Having arrived on 13 February of this year with the economic mission to London,<sup>8</sup> I soon met a number of old friends—people who are entirely reliable, possess considerable influence in the English Parliament and in the Foreign Office, and gave me very important information in strict confidentiality. A good part of it I managed to verify personally in several English political halls and I became convinced that the situation is as follows:

English foreign policy largely depends today on a certain exceptionally influential group, which controls the better part of the English press and has enormous capital. This group is comprised of the following persons:

Lord Northcliffe—owner of several of the most powerful English papers (*The Times*, the *Daily Mail*, and others). He created Lloyd George, who owes his position to him.

Wickham Steed—Northcliffe's right hand, foreign editor of *The Times*, head of the propaganda office, of whom it was said, even before the war, "qu'il tenait les fils de politique internationale." He is an unusually talented person, a great intriguer, having enormous influence, by profession a journalist, of unclear origin, leading an expansive lifestyle, and needing considerable funds. There is information that before the war he was generously paid by the Russian government and it is known that he was first to bruit the idea of joining Constantinople to Russia. Steed's hatred for Poland is known in London. Steed's axiom is that Poland could be a small nation, closely connected with Russia or Germany.

Namier—a Galician Jew (real name Bernstein), naturalised in England, educated at London University, a friend of Burrows, the rector of that university, who is known as a "pacifist". He is a collaborator with *New Europe* and a critic in *The Times*. As an employee of the Foreign Office, he composed memorandums for Lloyd George. He does not disguise his hatred of all things Polish and serves as the strongest tool in Steed's hands to hinder the Polish cause. In close connection with Namier are: Lipcher, a German Jew, and von Zimmern, an official in the Foreign Office (the editor of the November note on the pogroms in Poland).

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<sup>8</sup> The author of this note was probably Tytus Filipowicz.

Seton-Watson—an expert of the English government on the Yugoslav question at the Peace Conference, a Mason, closely connected with the Mason A. F Whyte, editor of *New Europe*, known for his demagogic-Bolshevik sympathies.

Sir Alfred Mond—a German Jew, enormously rich, in possession of compromising documents ...<sup>9</sup> with the help of which he holds him in check.

Madame Rose—a friend of Steed's, officially Italian but in actuality a Levantine Jewess. She has been with Steed for over a dozen years and they live together. A great intriguer. She hates Poles. She conducts anti-Polish propaganda.

\* \* \*

Steed's group is working permanently for the benefit of Russia and Germany—a secret alliance from pre-war times. Its members, paid in their time by the Russian government and with personal interest in the concessions and enormous capital that they possess in Russia, have predominantly been raised in Germany and have absorbed German philosophy and science. They do not at all hide their liking for today's democratic Germany and they believe that Russia, after a few years of combating Bolshevism, will arise again as a powerful state and bring the group colossal material gains. A large and independent Poland thus threatens their political ideas. Consequently, they are working exceptionally hard behind the scenes and—in order to harm the development of Poland at any cost—they are entangling in their meshes the circles that are currently deciding the fates of nations. They have drawn up the following secret scheme by which they propose to resolve our affairs: Poland will receive part of the Poznań Province, Western Galicia with the San as the border, and in the best case, part of Silesia. Teschen Silesia will go to the Czechs in exchange for the Chełm and Suwałki areas, which will go to Russia, Poland will receive the Białystok district. At the same time, it is proposed to connect Poland with the Baltic Sea through a river system by making the Vistula an international river. Such a Poland would not divide Russia from Germany, but would serve as grounds for the mutual rapprochement between these two friends.

The creation of a strong Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in close alliance with Russia is one of the main axioms of the Steed group and its aim—by means of that famous Czech-Slavic corridor—is to give Russia access to the Adriatic Sea, as recompense for losing Constantinople. Correspondingly, the Adriatic ports of Trieste and Fiume are to be given to Yugoslavia.

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<sup>9</sup> Illegible fragment.



Simultaneously, the Steed group, fearing a close Polish-French-Italian-Romanian alliance, is expending every effort to prevent such an agreement and does not disdain any methods in this satanic intrigue.

The wider English public knows nothing about Poland. Better informed circles are continually misled by press actions and the publications of the Northcliffe-Steed group. Indifference toward Poland is wrapped in the similarity of our question to the Irish question and in Catholicism. We enjoy some sympathy within the royal family and in certain official circles, but it is unfortunately of the platonic sort.

*PDD 1919, doc. 188*

## 114

*10 March 1919, note from the Speaker of the Sejm  
to the Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies of France*

Varsovie, 10 Mars 1919

Monsieur le Président de la Chambre des Députés  
à Paris

Monsieur le Président,

La Diète constituante de la République Polonaise m'a confié l'honneur de transmettre à la Chambre des Députés l'expression des sentiments fraternels.

Ce devoir que je remplis avec joie n'est que l'expression de l'amitié traditionnelle qui unit depuis plus de cent ans la Pologne à la France.

Nos aïeux déjà luttaient et mouraient sous Vos étendards avec la foi, que Votre triomphe sera celui de la civilisation sur la violence, de la grande âme d'un peuple héroïque sur la force brutale et sur l'oppression.

C'est avec une émotion profonde que la première Diète de la Pologne ressuscitée salue chaleureusement le Parlement Français.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de ma haute considération.

(signé) Trąpczyński

*PDD 1919, doc. 191*

## 115

*11 March 1919, letter from the representative of the PNC  
in London to the assistant to the British Foreign Secretary about aid for  
the Polish Navy*

11 March 1919

Sir George Clerk, K.C.M.G., C.B.  
Foreign Office,  
S.W.1.

Dear Sir George,

With reference to our conversation of yesterday, I would like to attract your attention to the advisability of some action on the part of the English Government with regard to the organisation of the Polish Navy, which is so very important for the development of future relations between England and Poland. Should the British Government also attach equally great importance to the matter and agree to help with the above mentioned organisation, I would suggest that a prompt action be taken for the following reasons:

1. There are 14 Polish naval officers and 79 sailors, now serving with the Polish Army in France, who are desirous of serving in the Navy and would form the nucleus of the Polish Navy.

2. The time is not far off when Danzig will become an important port and a base for naval intercourse with Allied countries. Hence the necessity of good organisation.

It is superfluous for me to add that the professional training and the tradition of the English Navy would become both, from the technical, as well as from the political point of view, an important factor in bringing about of a speedy and lasting order in Poland.

In view of this would it not be desirable to send out to Poland a naval mission, similar to the military mission sent out there by the French Government, which could make use of the now available material in naval men and officers and draw a plan of organisation of a Polish Navy.

Yours sincerely,

*PDD 1919, doc. 196 (ENG)*

## 116

*11 March 1919, memo from the prisoner of war repatriation agency  
about persons returning from Russia*

11 mars 1919 r.

## Memorandum

concernant le transport des prisonniers de guerre revenant de Russie

Les prisonniers de guerre et les émigrés, désirant revenir de Russie dans leur patrie, arrivent aux frontières du royaume de Pologne, dans un état de misère extrême, affamés, épuisés physiquement, portant en eux le germe de différentes maladies infectieuses, qui sévissent en Russie, vêtus de haillons et démoralisés par le bolchévisme qui est propagé dans leurs rangs. Ces prisonniers de guerre et ces émigrés appartiennent à des différentes nations. A part les Polonais et les Allemands, il y a parmi eux des représentants de nationalités, qui constituaient l'ex-empire d'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire des Allemands autrichiens, des Italiens, des Slovaques méridionaux, des Hongrois, des Roumains, des Serbes et des Turcs. Il se trouve aussi parmi eux des Ukrainiens et des Russes s'enfuyant de leur patrie. Bien qu'en ce moment il ne puisse être question d'un transport régulier de prisonniers de guerre venant de Russie, surtout à cause de l'état de guerre existant entre la Pologne et les bolchevicks, chaque jour, quelques centaines de ces malheureux passent la frontière à la dérobée, de sorte que les armées polonaises dans leur avance vers l'est rencontrent constamment de grands rassemblements d'ex-prisonniers de guerre voulant revenir dans leur patrie. Il ne faut pas oublier, que selon toute probabilité, avec le printemps, l'affluence de prisonniers de guerre augmentera encore, et atteindra des proportions qu'il est impossible de prévoir aujourd'hui. Il est à craindre qu'ils amèneront avec eux différentes épidémies et des germes de démoralisation qui menaceront de se répandre jusqu'aux frontières de l'Adriatique. Lors de leur rapatriement, il sera nécessaire de prévoir des mesures appropriées afin d'éviter ces deux dangers. L'Agence gouvernementale pour le Retour des prisonniers de guerre, émigrés et ouvriers déportés, fait tout son possible sous ce rapport, mais elle ne dispose pas de moyens suffisants pour que son action puisse complètement obvier au danger. Les territoires situés sur la frontière est de la Pologne sont, dès que les bolchevicks les abandonnent, occupés par les armées polonaises, ces territoires sont complètement dévastés et n'ont aucune organisation sanitaire. Il faut tout créer, ce que, vu le manque de moyens, d'appareils, de désinfecteurs, etc. exige beaucoup de temps, d'autant plus, que ces organisations doivent être établies sur toutes les lignes de chemins de fer dans la direction de l'est. Il manque,

outre les produits alimentaires, du linge, des vêtements les plus indispensables, dont il faut recouvrir ces malheureux après leur avoir enlevé les haillons sales et pouilleux dont ils sont vêtus et que l'on ne peut même pas désinfecter, car après désinfection ils tombent en lambeaux.

En présence de cet état de choses déplorable qui exige sur-le-champ une action énergique, l'Agence gouvernementale pour le Retour des prisonniers de guerre, émigrés et ouvriers déportés a l'honneur de formuler les demandes suivantes:

Le secours immédiat de la part des Alliés est de toute nécessité. Cet aide pourrait se manifester par l'envoi, pour le transport des prisonniers de:

- a) 20 trains sanitaires et 5 trains de désinfection;
- b) une quantité correspondante d'appareils de désinfection;
- c) du linge;
- d) des habits;
- e) des produits alimentaires.

Le prisonnier de guerre, qui après avoir quitté la Russie, qui aurait la possibilité de rentrer dans des conditions d'existence normale en tant qu'il serait lavé, nourri et proprement vêtu, oublierait, il est à croire par là même, les principes bolchéviques qu'on lui aurait inculqués.

Les appareils de désinfection, envoyés en quantité suffisante, permettraient d'organiser à tous les points frontières des stations sanitaire-préventives, où chaque rapatrié passerait par le bain, la désinfection, le contrôle médical. En même temps il y serait pourvu de vêtements.

Les trains sanitaires, employés au transport des prisonniers de guerre, empêcheraient d'une manière certaine, la propagation des maladies contagieuses. Les rapatriés seraient groupés par nationalités et par lieux de destination, les trains sanitaires les transporterait non seulement jusqu'aux frontières de la Pologne, mais encore jusqu'aux stations extrêmes sur le territoire de l'ancienne Autriche, de la Hongrie et de la Turquie. Le rapatrié serait, pendant toute la durée de son trajet sous la surveillance médicale, et dans tous les cas de maladies contagieuses, qui pourraient surgir en route, il serait isolé. Il y aurait des compartiments spéciaux pour les malades, atteints non gravement, mais dont l'état exigé un traitement spécial, comme par exemple les maladies vénériennes. Cette ségrégation permettrait de noter sur les passeports certaines remarques qui pourraient fournir d'utiles indices aux communes et à leurs organisations sanitaires. Il serait de la plus grande importance que ces trains accomplissent leur trajet sans obstacle jusqu'aux stations terminus: Trieste, Fiume, Bucarest et Odessa. On amènerait dans cette dernière ville les prisonniers russes revenant d'Allemagne qui passent journallement la frontière

par centaines et dont le transport occasionne tant de difficultés. Il faut encore attirer l'attention sur ce fait, que, outre les prisonniers de guerre, il y a parmi ceux qui passent la frontière, des émigrés et des exilés avec leurs femmes et leurs enfants. Les trains affectés au transport des rapatriés, pourraient en revenant, prendre les personnes qui désirent rentrer dans leur pays. Il est à croire que, étant donné la bonne organisation des transports, il ne sera pas nécessaire de recourir à l'emploi des escortes militaires, dont le manque se fait tellement sentir en ce moment.

L'Agence gouvernementale pour le Retour des prisonniers de guerre, émigrés et ouvriers, sa basant sur son expérience de quelques mois est d'avis, que la nécessité de prendre les dispositions esquissées est évidente.

Ces mesures doivent être prises, non seulement dans l'intérêt de la Pologne, mais aussi dans celui de tous les Etats qui sont menacés par l'infection des maladies contagieuses et du bolchevisme. C'est seulement par l'application de moyens ci-dessus mentionnés que l'on pourra empêcher la propagation de ces deux fléaux dont est menacée l'humanité par les multitudes de prisonniers de guerre et d'émigrés revenant dans leur patrie.

*PDD 1919, doc. 198*

## 117

*14 March 1919, letter from the Chairman of the PNC  
to the Chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee  
about Józef Piłsudski's political aspirations  
and the situation at the Peace Conference*

Paris, 14 March 1919

Highly confidential

Dear Stach,

Your letter of the 5<sup>th</sup> of this month partly confirmed my view of the situation in the country and partly aroused new concerns.

I had already become convinced, some time ago that Piłsudski is dreaming of a military dictatorship, of Napoleon's role, riding on the waves of revolution.

This person has many very dangerous sides:

1. He does not understand Poland. He does not understand what it needs and what is possible;

2. He is not a man of today. His mental construction dates from the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century;

3. He is not consistent. He is a combination of old Polish romantic with Muscovite Bolshevik, which can be genetically explained;

4. He is not himself but rather a mimic of great historical models, which always leads to stillborn actions;

5. Being given the attributes of a god by the blockheads who surround him, he is trying to be greater than the Good Lord created him. He poses as having great powers, which conceals his weakness and so forth. Sometimes, he gives me the impression of an ox who thinks he's a bull and mounts a cow...

Such a person, urged on by his co-conspirators, who are greedy for power, could easily be tempted to mount a coup against the parliament.

In my opinion, such an attack is certain to be a fiasco in the sense that no one is in a position to govern Poland without the support of the nation.

But our concern must be to ensure not that such an attack is unsuccessful but that it does not occur.

The very attempt at such a coup could put an end to Poland.

It would have two consequences:

- 1) Our standing, which today is good among the allies, would fall drastically;
- 2) Our ability to defend ourselves militarily on the fronts would be paralysed.

Thus, we must not allow such an attempt to be made, no matter the cost.

I see the following avenues in this direction:

1. Not to hurry with fundamental solutions and not to provoke the dictator-candidate, but on the contrary, to repair relations with him and maintain them as close as possible;

2. To prepare for rapid elections in the Prussian partition;

3. To introduce a new factor in the military organisation in the country—a French military mission;

4. To organise the army in Poznań Province quickly, without allowing any conspirators (PMO) into it;

5. To cleanse the Polish military in France of conspiratorial agents; it will now undoubtedly be returning to Poland before long.

Our affairs appear to stand as follows:

1) The Allied commission, led by Cambon, has already determined the Polish-German boundary, giving us Upper Silesia with the exception of Racibórz and Głubczyce; two districts of Middle Silesia; Poznań Province, with a small excision; and West Prussia, with a larger excision. Danzig and the entire Vistula delta, with the Nogat River, are ours. The Piła [Schneidemühl]-Chojnice-Tczew railway line is on our territory, as is the Danzig-Marienburg-Mława line.

As to Masuria and East Prussia, they are proposing a plebiscite after the evacuation of the Germans from those areas.

The question of establishing an independent Republic of Königsberg under the protection of the League of Nations is on the agenda.

That Polish-German boundary is expected to be decided any day in the Council of the great powers (at the beginning of the coming week).

This decision will create a new situation. From the moment the decision is taken, Poland's existence within a new mental framework—our own, great conception—will begin. It will no longer be the little folwark, on which the ideas of our radical and not-so-radical "activists" (devil may take calling them by such a name, we have to stop—it's too great an honour) have revolved, but a great European state with broad interests and the broader ideas that are born of them.

The haste in establishing the Polish-German boundary can be explained by the fact that it needs to take place in conditions of temporary peace with the Germans. What this means is that before long they will require the Germans to evacuate the entirety of this territory in order for Poles to occupy it. This means that before long, everyone in Poland will learn that in a short time not only all of Poznań Province but also Upper Silesia and Western Prussia will participate in the life of the Polish state and their deputies will sit in the Sejm. I consider that this will cool those great dreams of a military dictatorship because I can't imagine anyone would be stupid enough to believe that dictatorial rule could be imposed on those lands ...

I also consider that this will give great encouragement and boldness to all sensible people. This fact will make a power in Poland of the Poznanians, because it is primarily they who will be called on to organise Silesia and West Prussia politically. No one else will know how to do it and no one else can expect obedience in those lands.

2) General Henrys (who makes a very good impression on me) has been named head of the French military mission in Poland. He will remain here for two weeks or more in order to select and complete his staff and to prepare

for the mission by becoming acquainted with Polish affairs. I will familiarise him with the situation as well as I can, so that he will be properly oriented. I will not hide from him the danger of the situation and the tasks that will consequently arise for him. The mission will be very large. Its presence in Poland and its penetration of the Polish Army's organisation will give us a good guarantee that it will be an army and not a conspiracy. In time, everything will be different. Until then, we have to endure patiently and not bring about any internal conflicts which would undercut the Polish cause.

The decision of the allies will also hasten the departure of our army from France. With this decision, opening up of Danzig for ongoing transport will become possible.

I have undertaken, in as far as time allows, to bring order to the matters of that army. At present, it is an army subordinate to the Committee. Before leaving France, it will take an oath of loyalty to the Sejm and all legal authorities established by the Sejm. I have been deliberating on the text of this oath since yesterday.

I must finish now as I have to attend a sitting of the Military Commission.

My dear, I am running on the last of my strength. A week's rest would put me back on my feet, but I don't have a week to spare because the most important things are on the table.

The seemingly definite acquisition of Danzig and Silesia is giving me strength. It is tremendously uplifting when a person finds that his efforts have not been in vain, and this is what I wish for you and all our friends. Amen.

Warm regards.

Yours,

Roman

P.S. For the love of God, remember our old motto: "We can wait..."  
(on the margin of these two sentences there is a notation: don't spread this about now) [sic!]

*PDD 1919, doc. 207*



## 118

*17 March 1919, letter from the Secretary General  
of the Economic Delegation to the Chairman of the Delegation  
(to Warsaw) about peace terms with Germany*

Paris, 17 March 1919

The Honourable Andrzej Wierzbicki, Chairman,  
in Warsaw

Dear Sir,

Tomorrow is Tuesday, and thus the courier will leave—I wanted to send you at least a few pieces of information.

I am attaching the minutes of the sitting of the Internal Finance Commission, from which you will be able to see what the External Finance Commission is. As you can see, it is one of the most important commissions of the entire Peace Conference because the Fourth Sub-Commission, in particular, will determine the long-term economic conditions of all the nations entering the composition of the League.

I can add today that the First Sub-Commission, which among other things is engaged in dividing debts between the territories that will be taken from Germany (because at this moment it is only a question of Germany, and not yet of Austria, Bulgaria, or Turkey), will begin its deliberations in the coming days.

This Sub-Commission will also look into a matter of tremendous importance for us, and namely the “conditions on which the provinces that will be transferred to other countries will be removed from the German state.”

There is an English plan that has just been distributed to us and according to which Germany is to give over the provinces that will be relinquished to other states without a penny of debt. The new states, however, will have to make a strict inventory of all the state and public goods and assets and to declare the sum of this inventory as part of the assets of the German state that is to cover the reparations. In other words, everything that we find in Poznań would be considered as partial payment of our reparations. This is an extremely undesirable stance because, as we know, Prussia made huge investments in our provinces—many of them for the purpose of Germanification, and thus the resulting tally would be enormous. After long consideration, we decided to proceed in the matter as follows.

We will defend the theory of the English scholars who say that a new state takes on ipso facto the entire assets of the former state without acquiring any of its existing obligations. However, if we are unable to defend this latter point, then we must in any case introduce a certain correction to the English proposal, namely, to say that joining provinces of the German state to Poland is restitution and not annexation, and thus there should be a reckoning of what the German state in its time through partition received in the way of crown goods, royal property, etc., and what it will today give back to us, and to say that only the difference in appreciation can be considered as the sum that could be used to reduce our reparations. Furthermore, further corrections should be added to the sum of that appreciation, as part of this appreciation was covered by taxes collected from the inhabitants of these territories, who will today become Polish citizens.

We could also defend another theory, of the following kind: the surplus investment of the entire German state above its normal revenues is naturally expressed as the sum of the investment debt of the pre-war German state. If it is thus a matter of factoring this surplus to the account of our reparations, then we should take on part of the pre-war debt. We are trying at the moment to calculate which of the numbers is smaller and only after this calculation will we be able to choose this or the other method of defence.

Mr. Olszowski, Professors Buzek and Rybarski, and I are participating in this work. Count Ostroróg is working on the legal aspects.

The Fourth Commission will consider and regulate all the inter-allied financial matters, including thus the Polish ones. As you will see from the attached list of questions, it will also consider the subject of advances on account of German reparations. Unfortunately, we have not to this time had any information about how this issue was presented by our Ministry of the Treasury in Noulens' commission. We are thus completely unable to defend it before this financial commission, where it will be settled. Noulens' reports do not arrive. Arctowski, who arrived a few days ago, told me that he is in despair because he is unable to find an entire series of these reports here. We therefore need to have, as soon as possible, a memorandum from the Ministry of the Treasury with regard to Poland's financial needs in order to be able to defend the principles in that memorandum before the financial commission.

Yesterday, on the recommendation of Chairman Dmowski, I called upon Mr. Foster, an American who was returning from Warsaw. He is extremely well-disposed toward us and ready to help us acquire the American demobilisation materials. He has already conferred in this regard with Parker and Hollis'

commission,<sup>10</sup> i.e., the same one with which Mr. Markowski and I conferred. The matter is thus quite ripe. We have to have from the country an exact list of what it desires because, otherwise, in a very short time all the demobilisation materials will be sold and we will have to buy them from private hands at significantly higher prices and on significantly less convenient conditions. I am thus allowing myself to draw your attention to this matter very earnestly because we could lose a chance in the good interest of the country.

*With sincere expressions of respect and warm regards,*

*Chamiec*

*P.S. The day after you left, Mr. Benis came and went to work at once in the Economic Commission. Mr. Palex also joined it. The members of this Commission are complaining about the lack of jurists.*

*Z. Sokółowska*

*PDD 1919, doc. 210*

## 119

*20 March 1919, instructions from the Secretariat General  
of the PNC to PNC representatives in Rome*

Paris, 20 March 1919

Confidential

Secretariat General of the PNC  
To the PNC Mission in Rome

### POLITICAL INSTRUCTIONS

The view presented in the report on the general political situation and on the aims of Polish policy on Italy is in accord with the main policy line of the PNC.

<sup>10</sup> This refers to the United States Liquidation Commission of the War Department in Paris, an institution that dealt with the liquidation of U.S. Army surplus supplies in Europe.

The support of Italy could be very useful to us in the present situation, which can be considered difficult. The greatest difficulties are coming from the side of England, as well as the United States. Poland's western boundary, with Danzig, as proposed by the Cambon Commission, is to be revised and the coalition is beginning to treat the Ukrainians as equals to the Poles, promising to listen to the territorial demands of both sides, as if Ukraine were an ally of the Entente equal to Poland. However, Italy undoubtedly has an interest in Poland's having a common boundary with Romania and thereby removing the danger of Russia's direct or indirect expansion toward the Adriatic Sea. The English once gave some thought to such expansion—and maybe they're still thinking about it today—seeing in it compensation for Russia's being cut off from the Bosphorus and Aegean Sea. The creation of an independent Ukraine would in reality prevent the union of Poland with Romania and would create a good outpost for German intrigue.

The Italians should know that Ukraine is a German show; that the Ukrainians are working for the Germans to the detriment not only of Poland but of all the European states which are interested in bringing law and order to Eastern Europe.

Poland could deal with Ukrainian and with Russian Bolshevism on its own, but for that it needs war supplies and provisioning for its armies.

We are not demanding anything of the Coalition anymore except that they provide us with arms, ammunition, supplies, and funds for war operations. We are also requesting the return of General Haller's division, which is being wasted in France.

Unfortunately, there continue to be obstacles in the way of this and the Coalition cannot manage to overcome them, i.e., to ensure the transport of our armies from Danzig to Thorn and Mława. England did not want this assurance to be given until the question of the incorporation of Danzig and West Prussia into Poland was settled. When the Cambon Commission presented a favourable proposal to the Council of Ten for a decision, yesterday, the 19<sup>th</sup> of the present month, it was decided to review the question of Poland's western boundary. In this manner, the departure of Haller's army is held back again.

Guidelines for our representation's actions in Italy emerge clearly from this short report.

We request to be kept informed, regularly and in detail, about the political situation in Italy. Strictly political and confidential reports should be sent to the PNC separately, that is, not in the general report on the activities of our representation in Rome. In general, we would like to receive this type of report every two weeks, unless an earlier need for such arises.

*PDD 1919, doc. 215*

## 120

*21 March 1919, note by the Economic Delegation expert [?]  
about the purchase of military equipment  
from the American Army in France*

The matter of the purchase of surplus army supplies from the Americans

The main American financial delegates at the peace conference are: Albert Strauss, Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and former partner of the banking firm J. W. Seligman and Son in New York; T. W. Lamont, a Morgan's partner; and Norman Davis, representative of the American Treasury Department.

Vance McCormick of Pennsylvania and John Dulles, legal advisor to the delegation, both of whom are in fact delegated for economic affairs, are also participating in the financial discussions.

All these delegates appear externally and take part in all the conference committees, but in addition there is a whole range of financial and economic experts and so-called "advisors". These latter have a semi-official position and are predominantly very wealthy people from the world of finance who for patriotic reasons selflessly offered their services to the government for the duration of the war. Such advisors sometimes play an unusually important and influential role behind the scenes, as they are in continual contact with the most important dignitaries of their delegations and are in on the secret of all the details of the course of the conference. In financial matters, we know Oscar Crosby, an expert of the Treasury Department, and the advisor Henry Sanderson, a trusted friend of Henry C. Frick, one of the largest steel and railway magnates in America.

At the head of all the other delegates and enjoying at present the greatest influence over President Wilson, equal to or even greater than Colonel House, is a certain Bernard Baruch, who appears not only as the first delegate in financial and economic committees but also sits in the "Conseil des dix" and in the ceasefire talks in Spa, etc.

Given the exceptional influence that Baruch currently has in Paris, it will not be inappropriate to provide a few more details about him here.

By profession, Baruch is a banker in New York and admitted to me with complete frankness that his father was a Polish Jew from Poznań Province who emigrated as a young man to America. I have always tried to make use of every occasion to present and clarify the Polish question to him and by my frequent contacts with him I have managed to interest him very seriously in our lot. Naturally, Baruch is desirous to maintain his reputation of complete

impartiality and thus the present communication about his goodwill toward us should be treated as strictly confidential.

The behaviour of the delegates is carefully followed and commented upon and the least suspicion that Baruch is making any exceptions for us could only do us harm. Baruch's entire behaviour reveals that he is a typical businessman, who grasps a situation and makes decisions quickly. He is an unusually energetic and bold person, who is very aware of his authority. As an example, one could mention his independent decision in the matter of the relinquishment without payment to Belgium of surplus army supplies worth half a billion francs. For a couple of months, the Belgians had been running after those supplies feverishly and were being continually sent from one instance to another until finally King Albert invited Baruch to the Belgian front and showed him the devastated territory. That same day, Baruch signed a contract on the spot ceding Belgium this enormous quantity of mules, clothing, boots, harnesses, etc.

In telling me about this, Baruch laughed at the trouble he had caused by this to various bureaucratic institutions of the Treasury and War departments, etc. "I know President Wilson's way of thinking; thus I decided and took the responsibility on myself; I signed, and let those committees and the Treasury Department do what they can!..." At the same time, Baruch emphasised that the matter with Belgium should not be considered an official precedent and argument because generally in cases "where you're asking" it doesn't do to pressure and dictate too much. You have to be clever and make use of the situation. We have here visible proof of how high a role is played by personal relations and influence between the delegates, and that to a certain degree, the "red tape" of the conference bureaucracy can be circumvented.

Of course, the most urgent task for us, after the Belgian example, would be to obtain the largest possible amount of surplus supplies from the allied armies, and thus we are putting special pressure on the American delegates in this connection.

The American delegate Norman Davis communicated to me that the Americans are setting up a special commission to liquidate surplus army supplies on the French front. This commission is called the "United States Liquidation Commission, War Department in Paris". The chairman is to be Judge Edwin B. Parker, and the commission members are to be Senator Henry F. Hollis, Homer H. Johnson, Brigadier General Krauthoff, and Stettinius, Morgan's partner.

The headquarters of the commission will be in the Elysée Palace Hotel.

Judge Parker and Stettinius were to come to Europe with President Wilson last Friday, i.e., on the day of our departure from Paris to Warsaw. On seeing Baruch, I told him about the commission and it turns out that

he knows Judge Parker very well. He thus took it upon himself to give him appropriate instructions, but he also advised calling at once on the members of the commission who have already arrived in Paris. Supplied with a letter of recommendation from Davis, I went to see Senator Hollis, Johnson, and General Krauthoff. I met with them twice. As matters stand, we are to provide them with lists of the materials that we most need, and they will look them over and talk to the representatives of their general headquarters and supplies administration, to determine what goods on the French front they can dispose of. Given my supposed departure from Paris, I brought Mr. Chamiec to the Americans and introduced him, and he has already undertaken to supply them with those lists and to conduct the further negotiations.

We placed particular emphasis on the fact that we would like to receive from the Americans locomotives, wagons, uniforms, greatcoats, boots, harnesses, wire, certain machines, electrical gear, etc., etc.

It turned out that the Americans even have a quantity of tractors and ploughs, not to mention a great quantity of shovels, which would be very useful to us for farmers.

It would not be worth it to transport mules, because they wouldn't withstand the journey.

In conference circles in Paris a persistent rumour circulated to the effect that France bought the Americans' entire surplus of locomotives and railway wagons located on the front in Europe. Baruch claims, though, that it's not true. The French wanted to receive it, but the Americans have not yet disposed of it. We thus have a good chance in the matter. The liquidation of surplus army supplies is within the competence of the above-mentioned commission, but only those located at the front in France. There were a lot of these supplies, but a large portion has been given to Belgium and part has been promised to the Romanians and Serbs. Nevertheless, there are enormous supplies of everything in army depots in America itself, where, as is known, the Americans were preparing for five years of war, and we should receive a huge amount of material from there.

We would pay as Belgium did, by bills of exchange redeemable after 18 months with the right of renewal for another three months after that term. But from my talks with the American delegates I have concluded that we would not have difficulty in obtaining a general prolongation even for up to three years.

Thus, everything depends on the skilful conduct of our affairs, but with Baruch's promised support and the friendly behaviour towards us of those members of the American delegation whom we know and with whom we are in contact, we should quite soon receive not only those supplies that are

available on the French front—and possibly even in the form of complete trains composed of locomotives and wagons loaded with military equipment and sent through Germany to Poland—but also the supplies sent to us directly from America.

The necessary tonnage exists, because those same supplies would have come by ship to Europe had the war lasted longer, and thus it is only necessary to change the ships' routes and send them to Danzig instead of Bordeaux. And in this, we would also obtain the additional benefit that we would increase allied shipping traffic in Danzig and thereby we would consolidate our possession of the city even further.

In all likelihood, unless something unexpected happened during our absence, upon Mr. Wierzbicki's and my return to Paris we should find the matter of the purchase of surplus army supplies from the Americans well on its way, and in so far as the gentlemen who left last Sunday for Paris have the proper powers, this matter should be already contracted and settled.

Paris, 21 March 1919

*PDD 1919, doc. 220*

## 121

*27 March 1919, telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' extraordinary delegate to Moscow and Petrograd to the ministry about the release of Polish legation officials*

Warsaw stop

Ministry of Foreign Affairs stop

Russian Department stop

Moscow 27 March stop

N 3 stop

I received an official announcement today from Mr. Chicherin, which I quote: "The government of the RSFSR has decided to free both the members of the Regency Council delegation and persons being members of provincial commissions for the protection of exiles, unless such persons are under suspicion of any sort of crime, and to make their return to Poland possible. Stop. The relevant instructions have been issued and will be carried out in the coming days." Stop.



Please radio whether the matter of the trip from Helsinki through Danzig to Poland has been fully discussed with the relevant authorities. Stop. The Danish Red Cross is engaged in the protection of Polish citizens in Russia, and in addition, Polish delegates assigned for individual provinces will be operating in Moscow and Petrograd. Stop. I wish to emphasise that all other states have acted in the same manner. Stop. As I consider that the ultimate freeing of the hostages has already become only a technical matter, I am proceeding in accord with my instructions to further negotiations. Stop.

Wienckowski

*PDD 1919, doc. 228*

## 122

### *28 March 1919, note by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about policy toward Romania*

#### Memo concerning Poland's attitude to Romania

Recently, no factors have appeared in Polish-Romanian relations that would point to a tightening of the bonds of friendship between Romania and Poland. The response of the Romanian government on being notified about the arrival in power of Prime Minister Paderewski should be considered a display of ordinary courtesy in diplomatic relations.

It would seem that the Ukrainians' position as to Bessarabia and Bukovina's being joined to the Kingdom of Romania—and namely the Ukrainians' unsuccessful coup against the Romanian authorities in Czerniowce at the beginning of February of this year, the upheaval in the northern part of Bessarabia, and the supposed appointment of a directorate of the Republic of Bessarabia in Chocim, which was touted worldwide by the Ukrainian press—should lead to a real Polish-Romanian rapprochement in the matter of fighting a common enemy. Unfortunately, whether we did not know how to make use of the situation or the Ukrainians proved themselves to be more crafty and resourceful than we, Polish-Romanian sentiments have remained platonic and in the realm of theory.

On the contrary, we have proof of a certain Romanian-Ukrainian rapprochement. In *L'Indépendance roumaine* (a semi-official publication) on 19 January 1919—No. 13152—the introductory article, “La question de l'Ukraine”, claims that, “Par conséquent nous n'avons aucune raison de voir

d'un mauvais œil une éventuelle Ukraine officielle et définitive à nos côtés: si elle se maintient dans les limites de son droit, la Roumanie vivra en bonne amitié avec elle et les deux pays peuvent se faire beaucoup de bien réciproquement. Nous sommes sûrs que c'est ce qui arrivera."

This article appeared on the second day after the arrival in Bucharest of the delegation of the government of the Ukrainian directorate, headed by Mr. Hasenko, who was supposed to convince the Romanian government that the Bolshevik movement in Bessarabia and Bukovina has nothing to do with Ukraine.

At the same time, there are rumours that in Stanisławów an agreement has been concluded between the Ukrainian and Romanian leaderships to guarantee mutual désintéressement as to the Dniester-Galicia line. By this agreement, the Romanian army is not to cross the line of Czeremosz and Seret, i.e., the boundary of Bukovina. A sign of this supposed agreement is an official Romanian communiqué from general headquarters on 18 January 1919 which says that "the Romanian army operating in Bukovina and Transylvania has reached its goal entirely."

The weapon the Ukrainians undoubtedly used with regard to the Romanians, and which they also used with regard to the Coalition, was the promise to fight Bolshevism, i.e., that it will be possible to create in Ukraine "une base d'opération contre le bolchevisme russe." It did not bother the Ukrainians in the least that they were simultaneously conducting, with complete Byzantine duplicity, talks with Romania's eternal enemy Hungary, with which Romania is moreover in a state of war. Two intercepted cables, attached under Nos. 1 and 2, testify to such machinations by the Ukrainians in Hungary.

Further, as a manifestation of this Ukrainian-Romanian rapprochement is the fact that Dr. Isopescu-Grecul will become the representative of the government in Czerniowce, [and] at the same time, of the Ukrainian government in Prague.

One can only wonder at the gullibility of the Romanian politicians who fall for the Ukrainians' smooth and cunning words and forget the inherently diametrically opposite interests of the two states and nations. At present, the Ukrainians want to lull Romania and ensure themselves freedom of movement on one wing, in order later, at a more suitable moment, to settle their disputes with that country. Today, they have to deal with Poland and the Soviet army.

Events in the last days have changed the situation. The Soviet army is drawing closer to Romania's boundary. Winnica is in the hands of the Bolsheviks.

Petlura can't cope with them. A Bolshevik coup has taken place in Hungary.<sup>11</sup> The new government has broken off with the coalition and extended its hand to Moscow. Romania is currently in the crossfire and has become the double enemy of Hungary: First, as a state standing in the way of the Bolshevik idea, and second, as encompassing provinces that formerly belonged to Hungary.

There is also news of strong Bolshevik agitation within Romania itself.

Today, the situation is such that Romania actually needs our help more than we need hers. In our mutual interest, the situation should absolutely be taken advantage of. The moment for real, frank rapprochement is very appropriate, particularly since in the coming months Poland will have at its disposal an army of several hundred thousand men.

Various signs indicate that the Romanians seek rapprochement with us.

Thus, a Polish-Romanian military convention should be concluded with regard to defence against the Soviet armies and with regard to action against the Ukrainians relative to Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, and Bessarabia. The question of Eastern Galicia, despite a possible ceasefire, will return.

This important mission should be entrusted to a seasoned diplomat (Count Agenor Gołuchowski). Naturally, the negotiations on this subject could only be conducted in Paris, because the head of the Romanian cabinet and minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Jonel Bratianu, is there at present.

Also in the interest of our mutual Polish-Romanian relations, our representation in Bucharest should be staffed permanently as soon as possible.

Counsellor for Romanian affairs:

Zbyszewski

Warsaw, 28 March 1919

*PDD 1919, doc. 229*

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<sup>11</sup> On 21 March 1919 the establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic were proclaimed in Budapest. It lasted until 1 August 1919.

## 123

*28 March 1919, note from the government representative in Vienna to  
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about Denmark's protection  
being extended to Poles in Russia*

Vienna, 28 March 1919

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw

In accordance with the ministry's written recommendation to me of 11 March of this year (L.D. 2684/19), I went today to see the Danish envoy, Mr. Fleming de Lerche, and asked him to be so kind as to ask his government if it would place the Polish citizens in Russia under its protection. Mr. de Lerche declared the following to me: According to his information, the Danish government, having broken diplomatic relations with the Soviet government in the middle of December 1918, has not restored those relations and probably will not restore them soon. Mr. de Lerche does not know who is this Mr. Möllen supposedly performing consular functions in Petrograd for the Danish government. He presumes that it is an ordinary Danish citizen who, after the departure of Mr. Scavenius from Petrograd, of his own initiative has taken care of his, incidentally very few, countrymen, but without empowerment from his government and at the most after some kind of understanding with Mr. Scavenius. These words of Mr. de Lerche are consistent with what the secretary of the Danish legation here, Dr. Proch, who was secretary of the Danish envoy in Petrograd and left the city on 19 December with Mr. Scavenius, said about that Mr. Möllen. In Dr. Proch's opinion, the person who is meant is probably a certain Mr. Möller (not Möllen), a Dane who after the departure of the Danish legation in Russia remained in fact in Petrograd and remains there to this day, but this Mr. Möller, as Dr. Proch confirms, neither before nor probably presently plays any official function there.

Despite all this, I requested Mr. de Lerche fulfil the wishes of the Polish government and to ask in Copenhagen whether—provided the Danish government has an agent in Petrograd—that agent could possibly be entrusted with the protection of our countrymen. Mr. de Lerche will send an appropriate note to his government on this matter today.

*Dr. M. Szarota*

*PDD 1919, doc. 230*

## 124

*28 March 1919, report by the Secretary General  
of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference  
for the Chief of State about current affairs*

28 March

Dear Commandant,

1. The last report of 23 March was sent by Lieutenant Michałowski. The other day Captain Zwiśłocki arrived here with General Romer and communicated verbally your instructions to us. At the same time, I received a letter from Captain Wieniawa in which I was asked to tell you my opinion of Mrs. Lalande. I imagine that you have yourselves enough material to judge in the matter, but for my part I can add two remarks: first that Mrs. L. is a person having important and very serious influence at the Ministry of War and in French military circles; second, that Mrs. L. not only saved Captain Wieniawa's life<sup>12</sup> but very actively and energetically engaged herself in Polish matters, fiercely combating the National Democrats and raising your proponents in French opinion.

2. I will suspend the action in England until my visit to Warsaw and clarification of your intentions regarding the staffing of the legation in London. In the current state of affairs, I can do nothing there and nothing can be remedied due directly to Lloyd George's stance. In the long term, I consider London, and the regulation of Polish relations there, to be the most important matter abroad.

3. After the arrival of the remaining members of our Delegation, we were able to work on renewing our relations with various French parties. Of all the foreign matters, the Polish question is now playing the primary role and differences of political opinion also most often touch upon the Polish issue. From the moment of the preliminary decision about Danzig, general interest has emerged in industrial and trading spheres, particularly that of maritime shipping and trade. In the coming days, the result of all this will doubtless be the establishment here of a French-Polish Committee headed by one of the better-known statesmen: to this time, the President of the Chamber Deschanel and Crozier, the former ambassador, have been proposed. The president of the Foreign Affairs Committee, M. Franklin-Bouillon, who will probably be minister of foreign affairs in Briand's future cabinet, is dealing with this matter. This

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<sup>12</sup> This probably refers to the aid given by Bronisława Berenson—Długoszowski's future wife, who also used the name Jeanne-Liliane Lalande—for the purpose of freeing him from jail in Moscow in 1918.

society will be divided into three sections: political, economic, and scientific. It would be desirable to create an analogous association in Warsaw. The first act of the Committee here will doubtless be to send a couple deputies to Poland for the purpose of establishing closer relations.

4. Leon<sup>13</sup> will write about Baltic, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian affairs. I will thus limit myself to mentioning the following: we have established permanent relations and are engaged in a series of conferences with the Latvians and Estonians; there is talk of a future politico-economic alliance and a military convention, and in the meantime, of an exchange of legations. After Gabrys' departure and the takeover of the representation by Voldemaras and Yčas, the Lithuanians have taken a clearly Russian path; there have not yet been talks with them; the National Committee is going to delegate Wasilewski to conduct these affairs. *The Ukrainian delegation is directed by Mr. Sidorenko, who gave us to understand through a couple of channels that he is seeking to establish contact. There have been no talks till this time.*

PDD 1919, doc. 232

## 125

*29 March 1919, unsigned note for the secretary of the Prime Minister  
about policy toward countries of Central Europe*

29 March 1919

For Mr. Ciechanowski

Pro memoria

1) In consideration of the Hungarian events and the resultant danger to us, it would be good to weigh and investigate the possibility of entering into contact with counter-revolutionary Hungarian elements in Budapest and abroad. The great hope that some Hungarian milieus place in Poland and the frequent calls for help and support from the Entente gives us an unusually strong position in Hungary and the possibility of counteracting the influences of Berlin and Moscow there. Nevertheless, an indispensable condition for intervention would be to bring about better relations between Hungary and

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<sup>13</sup> This refers to Leon Wasilewski.

Romania. At this moment, it seems that Romania, which is being attacked from two sides, would be more inclined to concessions, and on the other hand, that Hungary, being threatened by Bolshevism, would not insist on territorial integrity.

The following can be considered guidelines for our activity in Hungary:

a) Polish mediation in a settlement between Romania and Hungary following the principle of nationality, or possibly of a dynastic union;

b) Obtaining a guarantee with regard to a common Polish-Hungarian boundary and mutual security against the political, military, and economic expansion of Czechoslovakia;

c) Support the idea of a plebiscite to determine the Polish-Czech-Hungarian boundary and in particular to resolve the issues of Slovakia, Spiš and Orava. A federation between Slovakia and Hungary could thus count on support;

d) Special trade agreements will be concluded, particularly tariff agreements concerning the transfer of goods through Hungary to the Adriatic ports and from Hungary to Danzig through Poland;

e) Poland will defend Hungarian affairs at the conference and in the League of Nations and will facilitate the Hungarians' entry to the League, with the reservation that the Hungarians will give the Polish delegate a voice in the selection of future delegates to the Executive Council of the League of Nations.

2) On account of the allies' activities against the Hungarian Bolsheviks, it is necessary to appoint a Polish agent for the allied military command in the Czechoslovak-Hungarian boundary areas. The best form would be to have a consular post in Bratislava. Mr. Stanisław Srokowski, a well-known activist from Eastern Galicia, would be particularly suitable for the position.

3) Bulgaria is asking for Poland's mediation with the Entente, in particular for help and support in the matter of joining the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It should be investigated to what extent such an initiative on Poland's part could expect to be successful, and should be pointed out that a kind of moral protectorate over the weak Balkan states is not only a question of prestige for the Polish state and would not only cede to us some of the Russian legacy in Slavdom but, at the same time, would immeasurably strengthen our position and voice at the League of Nations.

4) There is a risk that as a consequence of allied military intervention against the Hungarian Bolsheviks, the Czechs could significantly improve their position with the Entente and in exchange for an army contingent could demand political concessions at the cost of our south-eastern [sic!] border.

This action could simultaneously strengthen the bonds between Czechoslovakia and Romania. A military and political understanding and rapprochement with Romania is thus all the more important in order to isolate Hungary from the east and to stifle the Bolshevik movement.

5) Given the Entente's notorious lack of any programme for the east, Poland's viewpoint should be laid before it. This could involve the strict implementation of the principle of nationality—in contrast to social movements—in such a manner that based on it all the nations are organised according to self-determination. Each nation—Hungary, Ukraine, Lithuania (possibly with Byelorussia), Georgia, etc., etc.—by its own power, with the moral and material support of the Entente, must combat its own Bolshevism and constitute itself as a state. All these nations, which are separately threatened by the imperialistic tendencies of Bolshevism, will have to seek support in the West, that is, in its strongest outpost—Poland.

*PDD 1919, doc. 233*

## 126

*31 March 1919, letter from the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to the PNC about the situation in Hungary (with enclosure)*

Warsaw, 31 March 1919

To the National Committee in Paris

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is sending as an attachment for your information copies of the reports of 21 and 25 March by the military attaché in Budapest, Captain Jerzy Potocki, with the mention that the ministry considers the present situation created by events in Hungary to be appropriate for entry into a real relationship with Romania for the purpose of protection against common threats from the east and southwest.

I trust the National Committee will inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the outcome of the steps taken in this direction.

On behalf of the Minister

*Wróblewski*



[Enclosure]

[...] <sup>14</sup>

The emergence of a Soviet Republic in Hungary places Poland in a dangerous situation. Poland, being surrounded on all sides by the Bolshevik wave, will have an even more active and dangerous enemy to the south. Agitation and the example in Hungary could easily spill over to the neighbouring countries. The present Directorate is placing its hopes in external aid, which it considers to be close to realisation. The army of the Ukrainian Soviets is truly moving partly toward Galicia and partly to Bessarabia. Romania will certainly not be able to withstand the stronger pressure of the Bolshevik armies. The Romanian army, which is ill-disciplined and suffers from dreadful provisional and sanitary conditions, is already very susceptible to influence from the east and in the crossfire by agitators it will quickly become a victim of fate.

Count Jerzy Potocki  
Captain

*PDD 1919, doc. 244*

## 127

*31 March 1919, the Secretary General of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference for the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the proceedings*

31 March 1919

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs  
in Warsaw

1. The Peace Conference is facing intensified internal and external conflicts: The success of the Bolsheviks in Russia, the Hungarian revolution, the threat of revolution in the Czech lands, the renewed outside German pressure within the Conference against the background of these other factors, and the intensified dispute between the Anglo-Saxon and French way of seeing things. The Anglo-Saxon view requires a peace that would be swiftly concluded and would suppress Germany economically but that would yet not leave behind

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<sup>14</sup> The fragment about relations between Hungary and the Entente in the context of the Bolshevik threat was omitted.

contentious issues, not harm Germany or the German nation territorially, and not sow the seeds of revenge. America's view is additionally sparing of Germany and rests the entirety of the peace on the immediate construction of the League of Nations, in which all states and peoples would be connected by a common contract and new international law. At the same time, the views of England and the United States contain a tendency to reduce the significance of Europe as a whole by means of a new-found form of balance of power on the continent. The French view, which is exclusively continental, exclusively anti-German, in every single matter exhibited a view that is egoistic, self-interested, grasping, and desiring to subjugate Germany financially, territorially, and as a nation. The extreme and one-sided nature of the French view always enabled rapprochement between the Anglo-Saxons and led every conference question to be decided against the French.

2. 21 and 23 March Lloyd George questioned the report of the Commission on Polish Affairs and brought about the postponement of the matter of Poland's western boundary to the moment at which all of Germany's boundaries are to be determined. With respect to the attacks of the French press (Herbette's article in *Le Temps* of 23 March), at a meeting on 24 March, Lloyd George moved that the Council of Ten be transferred to a neutral city, and was supported in this by Wilson, who was irritated by previous and present attacks by the French press. Given the dangerous international situation in Eastern Europe, a compromise was reached in which it was decided to conclude peace quickly by means of reducing the Peace Conference to a COUNCIL OF FOUR (Wilson, Lloyd George, Orlando, and Clemenceau). The Council of Four began with a meeting on 25 March and devoted it to the immediate drafting of a treaty with Germany. As a compromise, they all agreed on haste in every respect: thus, there will be no renewal of the armistice, no preliminary treaty, but a definite peace with Germany is to be concluded within the course of a couple of weeks. On Saturday 5 April, there is to be a plenary sitting of the Peace Conference to confirm the text of the treaty, and preparations are simultaneously being made to transfer all the appropriate peace representatives to Versailles, where the Germans will be summoned to sign the peace treaty in the Hall of Mirrors. It has not yet been decided when or whether other enemy states will participate in this treaty.

3. The peace treaty with Germany is to cover three areas: 1) war indemnities; 2) the Rhine; 3) the western boundary of the Polish state.

The question of indemnity was considered on the basis of fantastical French-English calculations: the contribution imposed on Germany was to amount to 30 billion pounds sterling, i.e., the sum of about 800 billion francs. At present, under American pressure, these proposals have been withdrawn, and the indemnity is to conform more or less to the amount of war damages.

English policy on the subject has been the most ruthless in regard to Germany, while currently France leads in the matter.

The French are now presenting the matter of the French-German boundary as the question of the Rhine. According to the French concept, Germany is to have a threefold boundary: political, economic, and military. The political boundary will be drawn back only beyond Alsace and Lorraine, and part of the Saar basin. The economic boundary is to give France the exploitation of the entirety of the Saar basin, and possibly other enterprises on the left bank. Germany's military boundary is to be withdrawn to the right bank of the Rhine, and in such a manner that the main right-bank bridgeheads—and thus the entire left bank of the Rhine—remain in the hands of the occupying French army either until the reparations are paid or simply for an unspecified time.

As with the indemnity plans, France's demands have been meeting with America's consistent resistance and are the subject of Lloyd George's above-described tactic.

At the same time, along with the Council of Four, another Council, composed of five ministers of foreign affairs, is sitting. Japan, which is curiously not represented in the Council of Four, participates in it. The council of ministers is engaged in secondary issues and, at the same time, appears to be serving as the executive organ for certain important matters, for instance, for the newly forming eastern front. The commander of this front, above Henrys, Pellé, Berthelot, and even above Franchet d'Espèrey, is to be Commander-in-Chief General Mangin, who is currently residing in Vienna, but later perhaps will be closer to the Romanian or Polish front. This general, who is known for his excellent battles in the last year, is to coordinate the entirety of the activities of the Polish, Romanian, and allied armies in order to secure the peace of Eastern Europe against Bolshevism.

4. Given this general state of affairs, the Polish matter at the conference is also undergoing its own crisis. This crisis is advantageous rather for immediate needs, which are to be met at last, partially under the pressure of the Commission from Warsaw. At one of its first meetings, the Council of Four made the final decision to transport Haller's army and everything indicates that this transport will be pushed through Danzig. A transport flotilla has already been readied. The transport itself, however, is to take two months.

On the other hand, the question of the state of Poland's western boundary remains in a state of fluctuation dependent on general policy changes. Everything indicates that the matter of Danzig has been brought into question again at the Council of Four, and that Lloyd George, in striving for a "just, sound, and likely" peace, introduced a correction ("suggestion") leading to the creation of a separate, neutral statelet with Danzig as its capital. At the same

time, this plan would resolve the question of Marienwerder and Marienburg in Germany's favour. It is not known what would happen with Puck.

The question of the boundary in Teschen Silesia was the cause of a small coup d'état conducted by the Czechs. With the aid of France, the question was resolved in the Czechs' favour in Cambon's Czech committee and submitted for consideration by the Council of Ten just prior to its suspension. The matter was removed from the agenda and postponed only due to Polish intervention at the last minute.

The question of Galicia's eastern boundary is currently on the agenda of Cambon's Polish committee. Besides France, we are also supported on this question by America, which is of the opinion that all of Eastern Galicia should belong to Poland. And also in this matter, England is making difficulties based in this case on ethnographic concepts while perhaps reserving for itself special economic interests. Events occurring in Galicia itself could have a deciding influence in this matter.

Although the final decisions will not be made at present, the question of Poland's eastern boundaries has been put on the agenda of Cambon's Polish committee and is the focus of work by a special subcommittee led by General Le Rond and including Mssrs Degrand (France), Kisch (England), Lord (America) and Brambilla (Italy). The Lithuanian question is of first importance for this subcommittee and its future resolutions.

In nearly all questions other than the Silesian one, the Polish position is supported absolutely by France. This support naturally gives us a great deal, but at times it could contribute—in the case of conflicts between the great states—to unnecessary tensions and to our easy defeat. At moments of important decisions, France's fate at this Conference is to remain in the minority.

*PDD 1919, doc. 246*

## 128

*1 April 1919, letter from the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
to the PNC in connection with the arrival of power  
by the Bolshevik government in Hungary*

WARSAW, 1 April 1919

To the National Committee  
in Paris

The armed and political action against the Bolsheviks in Hungary has to reinforce the position in Paris of the Czechs. They are expected to be the first to provide an appropriate military contingent and to take up the struggle against the communist government in Budapest. There is the threat that the Czechs will base their aid and intervention beyond the boundaries of the Czechoslovak republic on political and territorial guarantees at the cost of our boundaries and in the dispute over Teschen, Spiš, Orava, and Čadca, and will enormously strengthen their position.

Entrusting this matter to the special care and attention of the National Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to point out that in counteracting the potential threats, the following viewpoints should be borne in mind:

1) The threat of Bolshevism makes generous material aid for Poland's financial and military needs especially urgent.

2) It is in our interest to bring about an understanding and military coordination with Romania as fast as possible for the purpose of isolating Hungary from Bolshevism in Ukraine and Russia.

3) The most beneficial, in terms of Poland's interests, would be to activate all anti-Bolshevik forces in Hungary and to assist them generously so as to reduce the Czechs' role in the suppression of the communist government in Budapest to a minimum without exceedingly saddling our forces or those of the Entente.

For the minister:  
*Wróblewski*

## 129

*1 April 1919, letter from the Chief of State to the Supreme Commander of the Polish Army in France about merging them with the Polish Army*

Beloved General (*to General Haller*),

I received your letter and I hasten to thank you for your attempts to settle the matter, one of the most sensitive that remained to be settled at that time. From its partitions, Poland emerged with so many provincial, group, party, and other backwaters that I fear that for a long time yet, it will not be able to come to terms with them. It is natural that in the army those very habits and distinctions are more harmful than elsewhere.

As to the armies under your command, I have on many occasions turned to the governments of the Entente, especially to France, requesting that they be sent to Poland as quickly as possible. I would not wish to deepen all the differences that are already great by nature. I wished to avoid the allegation that these armies are quietly standing around in France while thousands upon thousands of Polish soldiers are shedding their blood in daily battles and skirmishes. I do not wish to hide, however, that I foresee several practical difficulties I will undoubtedly come against the moment the armies formed in France arrive in the Fatherland. The first of these will be the question of pay and officers' wages. In France, they are enormously high in comparison with the ones here. To increase them to the level that prevails in France would bring the country to bankruptcy, and is absolutely impossible. After all, in the ranks, I already have about 200,000 soldiers and about 10,000 officers. The slightest increase in pay and officers' wages creates a serious gap in the budget of the state, which is poor and has lots of non-military needs. I also see no possibility of reducing the pay of the armies formed in France to our level, especially with regard to contracts concluded with volunteers and, as you understand well that the existence of units that are privileged in terms of pay and officers paid disproportionately higher than their colleagues, can't fail to lead to strong friction and discontent.

The second question that worries me is that of prisoners of war used to form the army in France. It has been my sad experience with prisoners of war of all types that they constitute very uncertain soldier material. They are above all in a hurry to return home and they complicate two special questions. One is that, according to customary law in force in Austria, and about which every soldier knows, he is entitled to six weeks of leave upon his return from captivity. I am convinced that a great mass of those soldiers will demand this right upon arrival in Poland, and insofar as it isn't applied, it will lead to desertions and, at the very least, will provide grounds for great disaffection. The second, even more serious circumstance is that in Galicia only certain classes were called to

serve and only for a certain period. It is thus difficult to imagine that a soldier not subject to this law, tired of war and longing for home, would wish to be subjected to another law, which, as applied to him, would seem an exceptional law. In general as far as former prisoners of war are concerned, I am almost certain that it won't be possible to keep them within the ranks and that they will bring more problems than benefits.

About the first question, which is unusually difficult to resolve, I would very much wish to know your views. As to the second one, I would think that the best way out would be not to form units of a higher order using this material because such units would be broken up upon arrival and, having a relatively high share of foreign—I am thinking French—cadres, they would become an anomaly in our general military organisation. To the contrary, it would perhaps be best to use them for marching battalions, gear and equipment and would not harm the general organisation should the need arise to disband them.

I am submitting this proposal for your consideration. If it doesn't meet with opposition from the French, perhaps you could implement it. Such a decision would make the situation very much easier for me.

In addition, I would like to ask you to use all your influence to ensure that General Romer's mission<sup>1</sup> brings the best and, especially, the quickest results. This is the most urgent matter of all that exist now in Poland. We have a lot of soldiers, and even more unused human material, but all efforts come to a standstill given the impossibility of clothing, arming, and equipping soldiers. In terms of technical equipment, we are considerably poorer than all our adversaries, and in terms of war material, we have used all what we have gained from the occupiers in Galicia and the Congress Kingdom to the maximum. I consider this the most pressing issue, our most urgent request, and that the propitious and rapid resolution of this question is the only way out of the difficult situation in which Poland finds itself.

In entrusting all these matters to your attention, General, please accept the assurances of high regard and respect with which I remain.

J. Piłsudski  
Marshal of Poland

Warsaw-Belvedere, 1 April 1919

*PDD 1919, doc. 251*

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<sup>1</sup> Through the Decree of 1 April 1919, the Chief of State appointed the members of the Polish Military Purchases Mission (representatives of various ministries), and accorded them the status of government spokesmen. Jan Romer was chosen to head the mission.

## 130

*[before 3 April] 1919, report by the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee  
about the discussion of Poland's eastern boundaries  
and correspondence with Soviet authorities*

REPORT OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE<sup>2</sup>

In the matter of:

1. The Polish Borderlands
2. The Republic's correspondence with Russia's Soviet authorities.

Poland's representatives to the inter-allied discussion at the Peace Conference supported the idea of establishing a league of nations, so Poland has, by doing so, passed on all its disputes with its neighbouring states and nations over boundaries to the final settlement of the Peace Conference.

Nowhere was the aim of the Polish military action to forestall the decisions of the Peace Conference by force of arms, or to incorporate through force into Poland any lands against the wishes of its inhabitants, but only to safeguard against foreign invasions. In full confidence that the Peace Conference, in bringing historical justice in Poland, will undo the crime of the partitions and will restore to Poland its ancient provinces of Upper and Teschen Silesia and East Prussia, which have maintained their natively Polish character despite several centuries of separation from the home country. The Foreign Affairs Commission finds that the government should do everything it can to bring about the unification into one state organisation of all the lands that have been imbued with the character of Polishness through the numeric strength of their Polish population or through many centuries of civilisational efforts.

At the same time, the government should take great care to ensure that not only the local Polish population but also the Byelorussian and Ruthenian ones can pronounce themselves freely about their union with Poland. Remembering the voluntary ties of the union that has for centuries linked the Polish nation with the Lithuanian nation and recognising the right of the Lithuanians to organise their own state, the government of the Polish Republic should make all efforts to re-establish the voluntary union between both nations. The Polish

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<sup>2</sup> The report was prepared in relation to Daszyński's question in parliament about relations with Bolshevik Russia and fears that Więckowski's mission to Moscow could entail recognition of the new Russian authorities. Also examined was the government's position with respect to the Lithuanian-Byelorussian Socialist Republic, which in a dispatch dated 17 February 1919 claimed sovereignty over the territories of historical Lithuania and Belarus.



Republic cannot recognise, however, as representing the will of the population of those lands the Soviets imposed on it by the Bolshevik armies, which are no less predatory than the armies of the former tsarists. And so, the Foreign Affairs Commission decided that the dispatch of the Lithuanian and Byelorussian Soviets of 17 February did not merit a reply and that the government did well to leave it without response.

The Foreign Affairs Commission, having examined the correspondence that took place since the emergence of the independent Polish Republic between the government of the Polish Republic and Russia's Soviet authorities, concludes that this correspondence concerned exclusively matters of the return to Poland of personnel of the Polish representation in Russia instituted in its time by the Regency Council and the return from Russia of Polish war exiles. Using this correspondence as the background, the Soviet authorities attempted from the outset to draw the Polish government into negotiations concerning mutual relations between Poland and Russia and Poland's eastern boundaries, and above all to gain, if only indirectly, recognition from the Polish government of the Soviet authorities as the legal government of the former Russian Empire, including Lithuania and Byelorussia. Such was also the character of Chicherin's dispatch from 11 February 1919.<sup>3</sup> The Commission finds that in the entirety of this correspondence, the Soviet authorities have not expressed any serious peaceful intentions and that the Polish government assessed properly the danger to Polish interests had it embarked on any arrangement with Russia's Soviet authorities without prior understanding with the Allied states and knew how to avert this danger.

The Foreign Affairs Commission finds that announcing individual dispatches excerpted from this correspondence would serve no purpose. On the other hand, it has nothing against announcing the entirety, without exception, of the correspondence between the Polish government and Russia's Soviet authorities from the moment the first Polish ministerial cabinet is formed.

Chairman and Rapporteur:  
-/ St. Grabski

*PDD 1919, doc. 253*

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<sup>3</sup> This refers to a note dated 10 February 1919, which acquiesced to Więckowski's arrival in Moscow.

## 131

*3 April 1919, report by a member of the Warsaw delegation for the Chief of State about the opinions of representatives of the nationalities of the former Russian Empire*

Paris, 3 April 1919

REPORT No. I

Having the opportunity to draw a few conclusions from the matters I have attended to here thus far, I would like to recapitulate them here.

I. – The position of the Russians. Representatives of various anti-Bolshevik Russian governments are present here. Their position is such that, while understanding Russia's present weakness, they demand from "their" former Borderland peoples that they not determine definitely either their boundaries with Russia or their future legal relations with it as a state just yet. They accept the loss of Poland (in its ethnographic boundaries); they would perhaps accept the loss of Finland with gnashing of teeth, but they would consider it a heavy setback; with respect to Estonia and Latvia, they agree to ultimately grant them autonomy; they would be willing to grant Lithuania certain far-reaching concessions, they care for it and most evidently wish to have in the Lithuanians an anti-Polish tool; they do not recognise Byelorussia; and they resist the notion of Ukraine as something distinct as strongly as possible. During the discussions with us, they recognise the need for good neighbourly relations between Poland and Russia and would even be ready (Bakhmetev, Russia's ambassador in Washington) to certain deviations from the purely ethnographic principles in setting the boundary with Poland and consider certain "corrections" of a geographical, strategic, and economic nature. Of us as well they demand that we refrain, today and prior to the de-Bolshevisation of Russia, from determining our boundaries with Russia. They think it practically desirable today to bring about the coordination of our military forces with Russian ones in the combat against Bolshevism.

All in all, they are aware of their present weakness and they wish to defer the settlement of all questions to such a time when they will be strong again. The clear conclusion for me from this is that we, as well as other former Borderland peoples, have to hurry to settle our boundary and other matters.

II. The position of the Estonians. The Estonian delegation, on account of the presence in it of a couple of outstanding and energetic individuals, is playing here a certain liaison role between the Borderland peoples. The Estonians' position is that of complete separation as a state from Russia, and they are

influencing their neighbours in this spirit. Aware of their numerical weakness and danger from two sides, they are fervently propagating the idea of creating an Estonian-Latvian-Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian-Romanian union. They consider that the initiative in this direction should be taken by Poland, which could in this manner lead this league. From this position, the Estonians are influencing other Borderland peoples in a Polonophile spirit, but on the other hand, they facilitate our relations with them by creating neutral ground for contacts.<sup>4</sup> Their practical task right now is to get Poland to recognise Estonia's independence, accredit its representative in Warsaw, and possibly get Poland to send its own to Reval.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, they consider it necessary to set up a unified Estonian-Latvian-Polish front in the north. They are presently on their way to Pskov, where they have daily radiotelegraphic contact with home. They receive entirely sufficient material and armament aid from the English.

Granting their practical demands and their relations with us in general I see as a very important matter for us.

III. The Latvians. Their attitude toward us is analogous to that of the Estonians, if slightly less enterprising. Their position is that of complete independence from Russia and they made to the Peace Conference a declaration in this spirit, analogous to that of the Estonians. Militarily they are much weaker and their units are actually part of the German army. They are also supplied by the English. They consider an alliance with Poland to be very profitable for themselves and they offer Poles access to the Baltic. They demand from Poland recognition for their independence and mutual exchange of representatives, if only semi-official ones for the time being.

IV. The Lithuanians. Their delegates keep changing and are mostly individuals of the dodgiest sort. They lie in all directions, insult everyone, they collude with everyone, they are seething with hatred against Poland and should not be trusted in the slightest. Officially, they don't want to talk with Poles unless Poland recognises Lithuania's independent statehood. They make it a condition that a representative of the Coalition be present during official discussions. I had a private talk with Yčas, the second delegate of the Taryba to the Peace Conference, a supposedly unique jewel among Lithuanian delegates (he is a Lithuanian of long standing, he wasn't a spy, it isn't known if he is in anyone's pay, he hasn't yet stolen anything). I stated to him that I had been delegated by the Committee in Paris to talk with Lithuanians. He declared that this is a good thing because one can't talk with Dmowski, and that if they did, they would lose their mandates. They demand from Poland that it

<sup>4</sup> Poland recognised de facto Estonia's independence on 6 October 1919, and a Polish diplomatic mission, under Bronisław Bouffal, was operating there from September on. In 1920, Leon Wasilewski was appointed the first Polish envoy to Estonia.

<sup>5</sup> Tallinn.

recognise Lithuania's independent statehood and that be as soon as possible, because—as they say—it would be a bad thing if Russia were to recognise this independence earlier than Poland. In pursuit of this aim, they are ready to entirely bypass the question of Lithuania's boundaries in the preliminary discussions with the Poles and will be satisfied with the recognition of Lithuania's independence by the Paris Committee. As a practical issue, they propose a common anti-Bolshevik front while lying to the public about the supposedly Lithuanian troops operating in Samogita and about their supposed numbers of up to 22,000. The Taryba delegates here—Voldemaras and Yčas—are right-wing nationalists while clericals now have the upper hand within the Taryba. Besides, Gabrys (a former agent of Izvolsky, later a French and German spy at the same time, the most gifted and cunning of Lithuanian diplomats) is presently potting against them in Kaunas, and he just might topple them. In such conditions, it is extremely difficult to get anything done with them.

Incidentally, I feel that recognising the independence of the Lithuanian state in its ethnographic boundaries, without predetermining these boundaries, in some official Polish act could facilitate this matter, insofar as the Lithuanians haven't already concluded some pact with the Russians or the Germans (they received 100 million roubles in Kaunas from the Germans, although they claim it is a confiscation of the German till, but the Germans have not reacted to this confiscation), or with both at the same time. In any case, it would probably do them no harm to conclude some pact with us.

In general, I find that those relations are hopeless and that we will only be able to hold serious discussions with the Lithuanians when we have a solid grip on Vilnius.

V. The Ukrainians. The delegation of the Directorate here is headed by seasoned dodger Sidorenko, a member of all the Ukrainian cabinets in turn. His position is that Ukraine needs a strong Poland, just as Poland needs a Ukrainian state because if Ukraine was to be absorbed by Russia, Poland would not be able to withstand Russia's drive to achieve a common Russian-German boundary. I told him that the Polish Left had always supported Ukraine's aspirations for independence and that it continues to defend Ukraine's independent statehood, but it is difficult to convince the rest of Poland's politicians that the Ukrainian nation will create and sustain its own independent state and that the latter will not be a worse threat to Poland than Russia. Therefore, Ukrainian politicians, recognising the importance of good Polish-Ukrainian relations, should provide the Polish Left with arguments in support of its political line regarding an independent Ukraine. In this context, the idiotic war in Galicia must be ended above all else. To this end, Sidorenko declared that he had sent a telegram demanding the immediate cessation of war operations in Galicia and received news that Polish-Ukrainian ceasefire negotiations had been started in

Sambor. As to the independence of Ukraine, he has quite concrete data that it will be recognised by the Allies. Petlura has now ended his retreat before the Bolsheviks and is presently poised to take Kiev and Kharkiv from them, considering that if this succeeds, the Bolsheviks in the south will be paralysed for a long time because they will lose an army of 80,000 men.

I am not drawing any conclusions because I have only begun discussions with the Ukrainians. I will note that the Paris Committee's position with respect to Ukrainian statehood is most utterly hostile. This greatly complicates the situation because, by the nature of things, to the outside we must officially show solidarity and defend, for example, those idiotic southeastern boundaries that are plotted on the maps that are changed time and time again by the Committee.

I will write about internal and other matters in a subsequent report.

*L. Wasilewski*

*PDD 1919, doc. 255*

## 132

### *4 April 1919, report by the Warsaw delegation to the Chief of State about proceedings at the Peace Conference*

Paris, 4 April 1919

Received 8 April 1919

Commandant Pilsudski

#### II. Political notes.

1. Reducing the Peace Conference's deliberations to meetings of the Four<sup>6</sup> was due to the need to bring existing frictions and differences down to a close and restricted discussion. Such a reduction also confirms the Clemenceau conflict with England and America, in which Italy is able to tip the scales. Today, the dominant role of which the French majority once dreamt no longer exists and Clemenceau's influence and importance is increasingly diminishing—or has already diminished, it could be said. There can also be no doubt that the

<sup>6</sup> This refers to the Supreme Council, which took the most important decisions. In the absence of Japan's representative, it was called "the Big Four" and was composed of Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Wilson, and Orlando.

peace will be based on principles defined by Wilson and Lloyd George, with certain necessary corrections to rest the "Société des Nations" on a foundation of world balance.

All of diplomacy is involved in imbroglis, however. Powerlessness in the face of the Russian problem continues, but today even France gives signs of giving up on Russia, or at any rate on the intervention of Allied forces against the Bolsheviks. In the Chamber of Deputies, Pichon was forced to declare that France is not thinking of a military expedition to Russia. Hence, the rising tendency is to come to an agreement with Ukraine and to recognise its independence.

The situation in Germany and Bolshevism in Hungary are producing major fears in the diplomatic world and draining the energy needed for strong-hand action, as was so clearly shown in relation to Danzig and the passage of Haller's army. There is also a marked tendency toward a certain rapprochement with Austria, which wants to save itself from Bolshevism and from gravitating toward Germany.

Nevertheless, the tempo of Allied diplomacy between intention and implementation is very slow. Foch was consequently forced to speak very energetically at a meeting of the Council of Four.<sup>7</sup>

There is a great mess in the very organisation of the Peace Conference, making it difficult for decisions to be reached within set time periods. Moreover, when resolutions have been passed, they return at times for unknown reasons and are again considered or are subject to revisions in connection with the political situation.

In these organisational deficits, the mentioned lack of definite guidelines is obvious, as is unity among the Allies, even in the most basic questions.

Therefore, there should be no illusion that any decisions will be taken quickly on individual Polish issues.

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<sup>7</sup> In the middle of March 1919, Marshal Foch submitted to the Supreme Council a plan for the formation of an anti-Bolshevik front, an element of which called for supporting Polish troops in Eastern Galicia to enable the pushback of Ukrainian forces, which Foch associated with the Bolsheviks, from Lviv. This support was supposed to consist of the transfer from Odessa to Galicia of the Polish 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and in sending there one regiment from Haller's Army through Danzig. Lloyd George criticised this proposal during the meeting of the Council of the Ten held on 19 March 1919. A compromise solution was reached: Foch was to draw up a plan for the transfer of Polish troops from France through Danzig and to Odessa through Romania, but the idea of engaging the Ukrainian forces in Galicia was abandoned. On the same day, the Supreme Council also ordered a ceasefire in Galicia, while an Allied expeditionary force was to support the Ukrainians in their fight against the Bolsheviks in the vicinity of Odessa.

II. THE QUESTION OF TESCHEN SILESIA (according to the account of Dr. Dłuski, a delegate to the Peace Conference, the rapporteur of this matter): Teschen Silesia's prospects still appear weak. Mr. Dmowski, who always senses an auspicious diplomatic climate, eagerly charged Dr. Dłuski with the defence of this, according to him, very doubtful matter. The Czechs, strongly supported in this matter by France, considered it won in diplomatic terms almost up to these last days, and in official French circles last week, the Teschen matter was also considered a foregone conclusion to the benefit of the Czechs. In this regard, President Clemenceau himself supports it.

Chairman Dłuski took up the defence of the Teschen area with unusual energy. He held a series of conferences with allied diplomats and at the critical moment, when a decision was about to be taken on the matter, he went with a deputation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was received by the under-secretary of state, Mr. Laroche, and in the presence of Degrand, a Polish affairs specialist, presented the Polish position in detail. These gentlemen did not conceal the unfavourable situation in this question. Dr. Dłuski also conferred with Mr. Tardieu, a member of the Peace Conference and one of the most influential French politicians. It was decided that the Polish delegates to the Conference would also have the opportunity to defend their position before officials—something that had not been planned, as a unilateral presentation of the matter by the Czechs had been thought sufficient. From Dr. Dłuski's account, it appears that the Americans and the Italians are most favourably disposed toward Poland in the matter, while the French are the most opposed, being interested—it would seem financially—in the Bogumin-Koszyce railway.

Chairman Dłuski presented the Spiš and Orava delegates in official circles, where they received a warm welcome everywhere, but they did not receive any specific promises.<sup>8</sup>

4 April 1919

(At the last minute, the Czechs are manifesting indirectly a desire to discuss the matter of Silesia once more with the Poles. They are presumably doing so under some pressure from official circles.)

III. UKRAINE. In regard to the uncertain chance of bringing order to Russia, there is an increasingly strong tendency in allied circles to come to an agreement with Ukraine. The Ukrainian delegates are counting on having Ukraine recognised as a state by the Entente in the near future. These Ukrainian aims are supported by America and England; France is resisting.

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<sup>8</sup> A note by Dr. Dłuski on the original document reads: "I also took part in Wasilewski's conference with the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians; I agree with his report from A to Z."

IV. THE POLISH QUESTION, in the opinion of the French press, enjoys far-reaching support, with the exception of extreme-left organs, which criticise Poland's imperialistic aims and attack the French government's plans to make Poland the policeman of the east under the influence of the reactionary Dmowski. There is a general conviction that Poland is the only mainstay against Bolshevism and that assistance—insufficient till now—should be rendered to it as quickly as possible.

V. THE SOCIAL LEFT in the Entente countries is demanding reform with increasing boldness and radicalism. The crisis in England is still not over. Lloyd George's government had to retreat on all fronts on labour issues before the demands of the so-called triple alliance, i.e., the miners, railway workers, and transport workers. Within the French socialist party, an increasingly strong consolidation is taking place around a common radical programme. The resolutions of the socialist party Commission are telling. We are including them in the final point.

The socialist party does not associate revolution with violence. It fervently desires to achieve victory peacefully and by methodical organisation. The proletariat, however, cannot renounce any instruments of combat in its struggle to obtain political power, and how it evolves will ultimately depend on circumstances, namely on the kind of resistance that meets its strivings for liberation.

The socialist party is convinced that social revolution will succeed if it is carried out at the right hour. But just as the party has no control of the form the revolution will take, it has no control of the moment when it will break out.

The socialist party will not desist, at any moment, from a revolution that bourgeois errors have forced upon it.

In whatever form the revolution occurs, after the proletariat takes power, a period of dictatorship will occur, without a doubt.

The radicalism of our social organs pales in comparison with social movements in the West, and is treated condescendingly by western socialists as being very rightist.

VI. From general manifestations of the diplomatic situation and ideological currents that surface in Western political opinion, it is almost certain that the peace, in its conclusions, will correspond to Wilson's guidelines. From this angle, the map of future Poland as drawn by the clumsy hand of Mr. Dmowski seems ridiculous. It is indispensable that Poland's expansion to the east be accompanied by a more ideal programme: the programme of federalism, without which all our default aims will be impossible to attain and will place us in an unflattering light.



The resolution of the Sejm in the matter of Lithuania appears to be the first auspicious sign in this regard.<sup>9</sup>

W. Baranowski m.p.

*PDD 1919, doc. 257*

## 133

*5 April 1919, telegram from the temporary representative of the PNC in the USA to the PNC about American financial aid*

TELEGRAMS FROM MR. SMULSKI  
TO POLISH NATIONAL COMMITTEE  
Washington, 5 April 1919

April Fifth United States War Finance Corporation official body created by Government to facilitate credit in United States for European countries advises its willingness to discuss establishment for credits for sale of goods to Polish situation favorable immediate preliminary action. stop Important that financial agent representing Polish Government be sent or someone here furnished with credentials as fiscal representative for purpose of conducting negotiation. stop Cable authority Davie State Department and mail duplicate.

(Signed) Smulski

*PDD 1919, doc. 259 (ENG)*

<sup>9</sup> This refers to the Sejm resolution adopted on 4 April 1919 during the 25<sup>th</sup> meeting, calling upon the Supreme Command "to liberate as hastily as possible the north-eastern provinces of Poland with their capital, Vilnius, from the Bolshevik onslaught and to unite them permanently with the Republic of Poland."

## 134

*[after 6 April] 1919, report by the representative of the PNC in Kiev (from Odessa) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about discussions with the Ukrainians and the proposed military alliance with the UPR*

Odessa 3 April 1919

Confidential  
To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
(Political Section)  
in Warsaw

An order for the Coalition forces to leave Odessa arrived during the night from the French Supreme Command in the East. The reasons, as I was assured by General d'Anselme's general staff, are of a purely strategic nature. After the departure of the Russian "volunteer army" from Ochakov (which took place a week ago), the units of this "army" stationed to the east on both wings of the Odessa front, have withdrawn in panic after the first bolder attack by the Bolsheviks (the other day). This inclined the Greek centre<sup>10</sup> to retreat in the most unfavourable circumstances and made the continued defence of the Odessa place d'armes pointless. To the report about what took place sent by General d'Anselme by telegraph, General Franchet d'Espèrey responded with the above-mentioned order. Once again, the Legation thus has to move elsewhere suddenly and in the most arduous conditions. In addition, a telegram from Bucharest brought news that General Ostapowicz's military mission had been cancelled, and that Bucharest's communications with Budapest and Vienna are presently severed. In any case, I am leaving with the entire Legation to Bucharest, where I will be awaiting further instructions and orders from the ministry.

Panic gives rise to the most improbable rumours. The rumour factory spreads information that the departure from Odessa has to do with the cabinet shuffle in France, that Mr. Clemenceau has resigned (one version even claims he was murdered), that France is abandoning the idea of any active intervention in Russia and in the European east. Israelite banking circles claim that all this was accomplished in Paris by the former French consul, Mr. Hennaut, and that no one knows what will happen now. The Russians are complaining about the

<sup>10</sup> This is a reference to the Greek expeditionary corps, which, along with French forces, the Polish 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and Russian volunteers, took part in the Entente's anti-Bolshevik intervention and in fighting in Crimea, and around Kherson and Odessa.

clumsiness of the French command, even though this is due to the clumsiness of the “voluntary army” (which is demoralised in many respects and is a small group of little combat value). In the last two weeks, they were somewhat quiet, even though they continued confidentially to reach out to Berlin on matters unknown to me and were supposed to send a new delegation there, headed by Mr. Yershovy and several others as yet unnamed individuals, in the next few days. At the same time, another all-Russian mission is setting off for England and America. It is headed by Archbishop Platon, better known to bishops of the Anglican Church from the days of their pre-war stay in Petrograd, where the union of Eastern orthodoxy and Anglicanism were discussed.

For several days prior to my departure from Odessa, a new conference with the Ukrainians took place. Mr. Boris Kurdinovsky—a former officer of the Lifeguard Preobrazhensky Regiment, land owner in the Gubernia of Mogilev, married to the former Miss Rodzhanko, a relative of the former Speaker of the Russian Duma and a landowner in the area of Poltava—arrived in Odessa from the Caucasus. They are both fanatical adherents to the Ukrainian idea. Mr. K. brought documents showing that the government of Admiral Kolchak in Omsk recognises the independence of Ukraine and that English representations with that government and in the Caucasus also agree to that independence. All this made a great impression in Odessa’s Ukrainian circles, Mr. Kurdinovsky declared to them that Ukraine cannot exist otherwise than in accord, in alliance, and even in union with Poland. Fate had it that, while looking for the Polish representation in Ukraine, Mr. K. was tipped off by someone that it was General Ostapowicz’s mission. He then called on the general, who loyally informed me of everything, asking to be allowed to be present during the planned conference. I agreed to this, as the mission had not yet been called off, and the presence of General Ostapowicz, as a representative of the General Staff of the Polish Army and it did not seem to me that his presence would hinder the deliberations. In any case, the general did not take any active part in the debate, only occasionally speaking an off-topic sentence, when the subject seemed irritating to him.

The conference took place in the apartment of Mr. Bachynsky. In addition to him, participants included the above-mentioned Mr. Kurdinovsky, Mr. Korostovetz, Mr. Szemet and a couple of other deputy ministers present in Odessa. There was no talk anymore of Lwow or of any other far-reaching demands concerning Eastern Galicia. Mr. Bachynsky asked if the Polish government would agree to conclude a long-term military and customs agreement. I answered that I did not know, but that the first condition for any negotiations between our government and Ukraine would be the cessation of armed combat in Galicia and turning the army against the Bolsheviki in the east. To this, Mr. Korostovetz noted that this is an acceptable condition, and that of course without this an alliance would be impossible, because in general

the point would be to oppose Russia and to turn the alliance against it. At this point, I voiced a firm reservation, pointing out that this is the case as far as the struggle against Bolshevik Russia is concerned, but that I reject the idea of concluding an alliance directed against Russia proper, as we wish to live with it in the best of good-neighbourly relations.

Mr. Bachynsky then noted that some form of accord with Poland has to come about and that Ukraine is ready to bear the greatest sacrifices so that its representatives could stand alongside the Polish ones before the Paris Areopagus and declare: We have concluded an accord and we only demand its sanction. I answered that I would also desire this, but that it is difficult today to foretell if something like this could be brought about.

To this, Mr. Bachynsky said: "We are on the edge of a precipice, into which we could fall. When a person sinks, and someone extends a helping hand to him, no matter what later happens, the person who sinks and his children will never forget the kindly rescue. Extend your hand to us today ..."

It is difficult—I responded—to rescue someone who, without regard to the danger which surround him, raises an armed hand against the one who would perhaps wish to rescue him, but has to defend himself against the assaults of the one who perishes. Let me repeat once more: Move back from Lwow, and then we can talk.

Mr. Kurdinovsky supported me fervently, after which we parted.

The discussion continued a few days later, in the evening of 6 April, at the Akkerman, where I met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsiyevych, and with Mr. Kurdinovsky, Mr. Bachynsky, and one more deputy-minister, whose name escapes me now. Here, the Ukrainians spoke clearly for a union with Poland. Mr. Matsiyevych and Mr. Bachynsky indicated that they would be on their way through Jassy and Czerniowce to Stanisławów to convince the Halychians that further fighting over Lwow are a disaster for Ukraine. They both told me that they firmly disavowed all thoughts of fighting with Poland, that they request that I take with me to Warsaw Mr. Kurdinovsky and his companion (the latter, as it later turned out, didn't manage to leave Odessa), to whom they give powers to sign preliminary documents, and that they would send to Stanisławów another appropriate Halychian. They told me later how it used to be in the times of Mr. Chekhivsky with sending to Warsaw as envoy first Mr. Karpinsky and then a peace mission with Mssrs. Stebnicky, Karpinsky and Prokopovych.

Four attempts were scuttled by the Halychians, Vityk, Starukh, and the leaders of the "Sich Riflemen,"<sup>11</sup> going so far as to make threats and armed

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<sup>11</sup> These are the Ukrainian voluntary formations that existed in 1917–1919.

pronunciamentos. It was proper to give in. Today, times have changed and the mood among the Halychians has become dominated by disappointment and gloom.

I expect to take with me Mr. Kurdinovsky, with the reservation that the further course of his mission will depend on the Polish government, which I will keep informed about my discussions.

Mssrs. Matsiyevych and Bachynsky also told me that they also intended to conclude an accord with Romania. From Mr. Kurdinovsky, I found out on the way that the heretofore Ukrainian representative in Bucharest, Mr. Hasenko (an allegedly quarrelsome individual of no moral qualities) had been called back and would be replaced by Mr. Korostovetz.

I also found out that the French Supreme Command in the East (perhaps on the order of the Paris government, with its knowledge at the very least) appointed to the Ukrainian Directorate its chargé d'affaires in the person of the famed Mr. Cerkal Darras (about whom I wrote in my reports from Kiev) and a military mission headed by Colonel Freydenberg (General d'Anselme's former Chief of Staff). At any rate, these facts are indicative of some form of completed accords, about which I know only that they determine France's economic influence in Ukraine, they place the armies of the Directorate under French command and promise a number of concessions to French capital on the take-over of a serious part of Russia's debt by Ukraine.

None of this is known by the secretary of the Polish Legation here, Mr. Gwiazdoski, or by the representative of the Paris Committee, Mr. Koźmiński, whose powers date from 16 January of this year.

The latter was astonished when I told him about Cerkal's appointment.

I was further astounded at the news given to me by Mr. Koźmiński about the impudent denunciation that was done against me with the Romanian government and the French command. The denunciation claims that I had met with Mr. Hasenko and contains substance of a conversation I supposedly held with him of an anti-Semitic nature. I declared to Mr. Koźmiński that I don't even know what this Hasenko looks like, as I had never in my life laid eyes on him. I asked Mr. K.—considering that his relations with the French are intimate enough for him to be shown such documents by the Bureau des renseignements—if he would be so kind as to rectify this invented claim without delay. He promised he would be willing and eager to do so.

*PDD 1919, doc. 261*

## 135

*8 April 1919, letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
to the Prime Minister (to Paris) in the matter of Haller's Army  
and the possible outbreak of an uprising in Upper Silesia*

The Polish public was unpleasantly surprised by news from the Wolff Bureau that at Spa conference that Marshal Foch gave in to the German delegation's insistence and took note of its proposal to transfer General Haller's army via Stettin, Königsberg or through some land route; this no doubt undermined the prestige of the Entente.<sup>12</sup> The results of the negotiations are generally considered a defeat for the Entente. Forces unfavourable to the Entente are taking advantage of this to recall Noulens' previous setback in Poznań and point to Germany's strength, which is supposedly underestimated by the present government. The impatience caused by the delays in sending General Haller's army is increasing, not only on account of the military situation but also on account of the general mood, so efforts should be made for this transfer to take place as soon as possible.

At the same time, the supposed paragraph of the accord in Spa, speaking of the exclusive use of General Haller's army to "keep internal order" raises the greatest of concerns. This clause, which would hinder the Supreme Command in its actions at the front, would reduce the future activeness of those troops to a policing role and already today constitutes a moment that considerably reduces the hopes placed in them.

In light of the results of the Spa negotiations, the matter of Upper Silesia is becoming especially difficult and complicated. According to the accounts received from there, the situation is getting increasingly tense day by day, especially in the industrial district. Both Bolshevik agitation of the Spartacists and abuses by the government authorities are increasing constantly. The possibility of a quick peace doesn't influence the situation because the troops stationed in Silesia will not depart from this province without fighting in any case or, even worse, will first abandon it as prey to the Spartacists. Polish leaders thus see the only way out in armed self-defence; they see the outbreak of the uprising as unavoidable and its ultimate date they place at mid-April.

<sup>12</sup> The German government feared that the presence of Haller's Army in Danzig could forestall the decision of the Peace Conference about that city's future and demanded that this question be discussed solely by the Permanent Ceasefire Commission in Spa. On 4 April 1919, an understanding was signed between Foch and Erzberger, calling for the transfer of Haller's Army not through Danzig, but by a land route leading through Coblenz, Leipzig, and Kalisz. Germany guaranteed safe passage for the transports.

All the preparations made in this respect were based on the assumption that the transfer of General Haller's army would take place through Danzig, i.e., that their crossing of the territory of the German state would take place using the shortest route, one crossing areas that are predominantly Polish, i.e., not propitious to military counter-action on the Germans' part. The transfer by a land route or even that through Stettin, as proposed by the Germans, would condemn the Polish troops to a long crossing through hostile country and, by the same, expose them to the possibility of complete isolation in case of military operations on the Polish-German front.

Taking this state of affairs into account, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in agreement with the General Staff of the Polish Army, decided to play for time and to delay as much as possible the outbreak of the uprising in Silesia. It can't be denied, however, that a delay will have a terrible impact on both the economic situation in Silesia, from where the Germans are hastily evacuating all resources, and on the morale of the population, exposed as it is to ongoing Bolshevik agitation at a time when Polish official circles are systematically suppressing their patriotic fervour. In this respect, it can't be ruled out that all calls for patience and calm will prove unable to restrain the spontaneous impulses of the Silesian masses.

So, unless the transfer of General Haller's army takes place in the near future, one should keep in mind the possibility that the Silesian uprising will precede its departure or will coincide with it in time. In such a case—supposing the route through Danzig becomes entirely impracticable—the sea route through Stettin or Königsberg would be the more advantageous, as the crossing of German territory would take less time.

The transport of Polish troops via Danzig would have the additional advantage that it would also constitute a form of guarantee of the continuity of future food shipments for Poland. With the de facto incorporation of Silesia into Poland, the matter of food supplies will become more pressing than ever—the Silesian worker is hungry and expects that Poland will assuage this hunger. Disillusionment in this respect could be dangerous. It is difficult to imagine that the Germans, having the exclusive and undisputed possession of the Danzig-Thorn and Danzig-Mława rail lines, would not take advantage of fighting in Silesia to, using the violation of the ceasefire as a pretext, suspend the shipments to Poland.

The dangers sketched out above can only be averted through energetic pressure from the Entente with the understanding that the Silesian Uprising—a natural and spontaneous reaction of the local population against Bolshevism on the one hand, and national oppression on the other—doesn't involve the Polish state in any direct manner, doesn't violate the ceasefire, and doesn't release Germany from having to abide by the obligations taken on in Spa. The Foreign

Ministry's efforts are aimed at making sure that military injunctions of the Polish Army General Staff and of the Supreme Command in Poznań region do not undermine such a view of the Silesian Uprising on the international stage.

Warsaw, 8 April 1919

*PDD 1919, doc. 263*

## 136

*12 April 1919, note by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
about the situation in Germany (excerpt)*

Warsaw, 12 April 1919

[...] <sup>13</sup>

The German General Staff, Hindenburg, and Hoffmann are opponents of the Bolsheviks. Large spheres of the capital are also in great fear of them. They would be willing to unite the Polish and German fronts in the struggle with the east. In liberal and petty-Bourgeois circles, Bolshevism no longer seems so terrible after what happened in Hungary.

The Paris Conference, which initially and just a few weeks ago played the decisive role in Berlin, has now lost in importance there. Much greater attention is paid in Berlin to developments in Hungary and in Russia. Recently, the negotiations which the Entente intends to conduct with Lenin are drawing great interest. As to Romania, one can say that most of it is on the side of the Bolsheviks. Rakovsky, who is a Bolshevik, has gone there with a large force. It seems that all of Romania will be in his hands any day now.

As far as a more detailed characterisation of the Spartacists is concerned, it should be noted that there is still no real type of Spartacist in Germany. The theoretical Spartacist type is an absolutely perfect one. This movement has largely been joined by the German artistic and literary milieus, especially their expressionist and activist currents. On the other hand, the masses that they make use of are composed generally of soldiers running wild and people without work. Organised workers are not on their side but on that of the independent socialists.

About the attitude of the Germans toward Poland, one can say that various Germans treat these matters differently. Regarding Poznań Province, they have

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<sup>13</sup> Fragments concerning the internal situation have been omitted.



already reconciled themselves to the idea that they will hand it back, just as with a certain small portion of West Prussia. As to Silesia, however, they can't come to terms with it. In this respect, that is a sort of diversion. The very radical circles, the independent socialists, and even part of the majority socialists agree that Silesia should be given back to Poland on ethnographic grounds. In contrast, conservative, especially industrial circles, are protesting in earnest.

Everyone is protesting forcefully and in unison about Danzig, even the independent socialists who, in other matters go very far in pointing out the dirty tricks played by the Germans. And so, Mr. Gerlach, a great friend of Poles, as we now, has made a loud protest. It seems that incorporating Danzig will be no easy matter, and the Germans may even offer armed resistance. This possibility will most probably tip the scales and one can get the impression that Danzig will not formally be incorporated. It will perhaps be a free seaport and, in this form, may end up being under greater Polish than German influence. But it probably won't belong to Poland.

In Germany, the mood with respect to the Poles was very hostile for a time before the Danzig rally, before the rupture of talks with Poznań Province. It wasn't even known if the Polish consulate in Berlin would survive. Later, however, this mood became somewhat milder, especially when the matter of Danzig began to take a slightly different turn. The Germans grew less stringent and cause no internal problems. Gerlach has left the government on account of differences with it about Poland. He opposed breaking off negotiations in Poznań Province,<sup>14</sup> considering that Germany's conditions were impossible to meet. Having resigned, he gave a great talk in Berlin about the Polish question. Many people came to this talk. Gerlach took a very favourable stance with respect to Poland. He stated that the question of establishing friendly relations with Poland is a task for Germany in the future. But even in his opinion, Danzig should not be given to Poland, but only neutralised.<sup>15</sup>

*PDD 1919, doc. 269*

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<sup>14</sup> On 19 March 1919, the German delegation broke negotiations with the Inter-Allied Commission and left Poznań. On 12 April 1919, German political parties and organisations in Danzig sent a letter to President Wilson to protest the incorporation of Danzig into Poland.

<sup>15</sup> On 9 April 1919, the Council of the Four informed Paderewski about the decision to create the Free City of Danzig.

## 137

*12 April 1919, note by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [?]  
about a Polish-Romanian military alliance*

Paris, 12 April 1919

## ON THE POLISH-ROMANIAN ALLIANCE

The threat of organised Germano-Russian Bolshevism is approaching—particularly after the events in Budapest—to the western boundaries of Europe. As the Peace Conference is meeting in Paris, a union is forming that is hostile to the principles of European peace; it includes Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, and the states of the German Reich. In the very near future, Bolshevik power—which intends to resist the powers of the Coalition from the Rhine to Asia—can be expected to press on Poland and Romania. Recent events clearly show that Russian Bolshevism is gaining ever-stronger bases for development due to the Peace Conference's undecided stance toward it. The capitulation of Odessa<sup>16</sup> and the victory of Bolshevism in Bavaria and Hungary are serious threats that could destroy the fruits of the Coalition's victories. Poland in the north and Romania in the south constitute a dam against Bolshevik pressure. These two states form a barrier holding back the wave of Bolshevism.

Under stronger pressure from outside, Romania's territorially complicated internal situation or internal upheavals could produce catastrophe. It should be noted that Romania, in occupying territory that is larger than the state itself, is having difficulty maintaining law and order domestically, not to mention in the occupied areas of Bessarabia, Transylvania, Bukovina, and Banat. Poland should thus take advantage of Romania's difficulties so that Czechoslovakia will not profit from them, and should enter into an alliance with it at the price of intervention in Hungary.

The above circumstances, given the inactivity of the Allies, are forcing Romania to seek direct assistance in Poland. The Romanian government (as is confirmed in the reports by S. Koźmiński, A. Poklewski-Kozięł, General Lamezan and Captain Count Potocki) is firmly maintaining a policy of rapprochement with Poland, the creation of the longest possible common border, and action to prevent a Ukrainian-Russian and Hungarian wedge from being driven between Romania and Poland.

It is a natural, and a historical necessity, for Romania and Poland, not having incompatible interests and threatened by a common danger, should

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<sup>16</sup> Odessa was evacuated on 4 April 1919.

form a military alliance<sup>17</sup> that would serve in the future as the basis of a lasting covenant between these two countries. While increasing Poland's role in the east, this union would simultaneously reduce the significance of Czechoslovakia in relation to Romania and its allies.

The forms of our alliance with Romania could be varied. Nevertheless, for the time being, on account of the uncertain situation in the Balkans and the southeast, and of our future relations with Hungary, we should not be cramped by an alliance that in the future could draw us into Romanian-Hungarian or Romanian-Bulgarian disputes and antagonisms. Therefore, our alliance with Romania should be primarily oriented eastwards and for the time being, this alliance should have the nature of a temporary military convention.

The benefits of such an alliance would appear first of all in a change in the situation in Eastern Galicia. Ukrainian forces, attacked from the south and southeast by the Polish-Romanian army, would then have to withdraw from the Lwow area and leave all of Eastern Galicia. Then, the Warsaw-Bucharest railway line, of primary strategic importance, would serve further operational activities in the east and prevent the connection of Russia with Germany or Hungary.

In practice, carrying through the military alliance with Romania and preparing the appropriate grounds should begin in Paris by entering into negotiations with the representatives of the Romanian government present here. It would be desirable for the military alliance with Romania—or at least its general outlines—to be formulated and signed directly by Polish and Romanian delegates empowered for the purpose, without participation from other states. An example of such *fait accompli* is the Balkan union<sup>18</sup> against Turkey and its later successes and benefits. Such a covenant would be the first independent step in our foreign policy and would allow us to keep the initiative in the eastern question in our hands. The current international situation and political relations in the east favour such a move on our part, especially if the Bolsheviks gained a base of operations against Romania in Odessa, they could extend a hand to the Hungarian Red Guard from the northeast. Romania's situation, and consequently our own as well, is dangerous and requires quick action.

For this purpose, after an initial military agreement is concluded, and in addition to the accreditation of a Polish Envoy to Romania, a special Polish military-political mission should be sent to Bucharest to establish good relations and a similar Romanian mission should come to Warsaw. At present,

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<sup>17</sup> The Polish-Romanian treaty of alliance was concluded only in 1921.

<sup>18</sup> This is a reference to the Bulgarian and Serbian secret anti-Turkish alliance signed on 13 March 1912, and subsequently joined by Greece and Montenegro.

a series of articles calling for the alliance should appear in our press, the foreign press, and in the Romanian press in particular. The creation in Paris of a Polish-Romanian economic society is also desirable, particularly as there are very good bases for the future development of trade relations, and Poland could provide Romania with the necessary factories in exchange for agricultural products, such as maize, wheat, etc. The Romanian ports on the Black Sea, which would make it possible to export Polish goods to Asia Minor, are of primary trading importance for us.

Taking into consideration recent information indicating that England desires to see a large Romania in the east and is favourably disposed to the creation of a common Polish-Romanian border, the subject should be discussed in influential English spheres in Paris.

The arrival in France of the Polish Prime Minister will significantly facilitate direct discussions of the alliance's basic postulates with Romanian statesmen.

Legation Counsellor  
Czesław Pruszyński

*PDD 1919, doc. 271*

## 138

*13 April 1919, note by the special envoy of the Minister  
of Foreign Affairs to London about British opinions in the matter  
of Poland's eastern boundaries*

I. In London, at the Foreign Office, the attitude to the plan of creating a great Poland (Dmowski's map) is unfavourable. The Polish state, as it is understood there, is limited to ethnographic Poland. Such a Poland—as they told me—could subsequently enter into a federal relation with Lithuania, even with Latvia. Lithuania should receive Vilnius as its capital. As to White Russia—it is Russia, even if White—Russia has first rights here, as to its ethnographic terrain. Volhynia and East Galicia should rather fall to Ukraine, not Poland. These are the prevailing views at the Foreign Office.

II. A number of influential members of parliament and Unionists hold views along the same line. Moreover, from certain of these gentlemen I also heard that Danzig and the left bank of the Vistula cannot be placed under Poland's sovereignty, as that would violate Germany's territorial unity with

East Prussia. "Poland can at most expect some form of internationalisation of Danzig and the lower bank of the Vistula."

III. The unfavourable position held by influential and government personages is the more striking given the support of the entire English press (with small exceptions) and the major part of public opinion for Poland's demands, particularly in regard to Danzig. The conciliation of all political camps in Poland has had no small impact on creating this state of affairs. It has made a large impression that remains to this day.

IV. A couple of times—though not in official spheres—I heard that it can be deduced from Poland's foreign activity to this time that the Poles are failing to notice that England with America are the deciding factor in the present international situation.

V. There is a certain surprise in circles close to the Japanese delegation that Poland has not made any attempts to draw closer to the Japanese representation, either in London or elsewhere.

#### OBSERVATIONS

Ad I. The view on Poland's relationship to Lithuania is so deeply rooted that there can be no question of changing it by way of persuasion. On the other hand, I consider that at the cost of making a declaration recognising the Lithuanian statehood we could receive a promise from England to support Lithuania's federation with Poland. I also have the impression that an analogous declaration about Byelorussia would contribute considerably to removing the difficulties that Polish aims in the east place before English policy, which respects Russia's irritability with regard to Byelorussia. In general, in raising any question pertaining to east of the Bug, one should expect that official England still considers Russia to be its ally, and Bolshevism to be a brief transitional episode.

Ad II, III. The support that the "Danzig for Poland" idea enjoys in English opinion means that we can persist in the full extent with our demands with some chance of success.

Ad IV. A) A necessary condition for keeping the press and opinion favourable to Poland is to preserve the unity of the Polish political front, expressed in the names: Paderewski, Piłsudski, and Dmowski. The emergence of any sort of break on this front would undermine the favourable stance among English public opinion at once.

B) Given the role that England plays and will play, the strengthening and expansion of the Polish representation there is essential. Among other things, a special information office, on the model—for instance—of the office the Italians have, should at once be organised in connection with that representation.

Everything that is currently being done with regard to propaganda in England, while exhausting the energy of the personnel, is entirely insufficient given the tasks at hand.

Ad V. For reasons that I will communicate by other means, the establishment of relations with Japan is a burning need. For the moment, Paris presents the best grounds for this.

Paris 13 April 1919

Signed: Tytus Filipowicz

*PDD 1919, doc. 274*

## 139

*14 April 1919, information from the Deputy Minister  
of Foreign Affairs for the Council of Ministers  
about the conclusion of an alliance with the Entente states*

14 April 1919

To the Prime Minister's Office

In answer to your letter of the 3<sup>rd</sup> of this month, No. 3523/19, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would like to inform you that the matter of concluding political agreements with Coalition countries—in the spirit of the Legislative Sejm's resolution of March 27<sup>th</sup> of this year—constitutes one of the objects of the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs' journey to Paris.

The Prime Minister intended to hold preliminary talks on the subject and the Ministry will inform the Prime Minister's Office of the results without delay.

With regard to military agreements, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must leave the initiative in this area to the competent military authorities and limit its participation to diplomatic mediation, as the military authorities will make a substantive request for the conclusion of such an agreement.

Economic agreements have not yet been concluded, though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in continual contact with the interested ministries, and above all the Ministry of Industry and Trade, in regard to the contents.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs intends to take advantage of his stay in Paris to conduct talks with financial spheres there in regard to obtaining a foreign loan.

The Polish National Committee has established relations with the French government in regard to postal and telegraphic communications between France and Poland.

In addition to these two matters (finance and communications), no agreements are expected to be concluded in the immediate future, aside from ad hoc agreements about the provision of essential raw materials, for the purchase of which a special mission travelled to Paris.

For the Minister  
*Wróblewski*

*PDD 1919, doc. 275*

## 140

*14 April 1919, letter from the Supreme Commander  
of the Polish Army in France to the Chief of State  
about the state of the army and its transfer to Poland*

Paris, 14 April 1919

Chief of State!

In thanking you for your gracious letter of 1 April of this year,<sup>19</sup> I am eager to inform you that beginning on the 15<sup>th</sup> of the present month, transports with Polish troops will travel across all Germany, from France to Poland.

I am leaving on a separate train, with my staff, on the evening of the 16<sup>th</sup> of this month, thus barring unforeseen circumstances, I should be in Łódź on the 18<sup>th</sup> of this month, i.e., on Good Friday.

As I have already informed General Staff in Warsaw, the first to go will be the 1<sup>st</sup> Rifle Division, the Army Staff, the staff of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division and part of the training division; after which, subsequent divisions with their corps staffs will follow. The entire transport is to last around two months, as only six trains leave daily, and for one division with staff around 40 trains are needed, that is, seven days not counting any potential interruptions.

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<sup>19</sup> See document No. 129.

In truth, I was deeply pained that I was unable to come with the troops under my command to the aid of Poland as I had wished and as I had been requesting from September of last year, but the 1<sup>st</sup> division fought here on the front against the Germans until the armistice, and thus fulfilled an important duty and also weighed in the political balance for Poland in the Entente camp. In addition, the division troops increased in number and battle-worthiness, and I obtained for them war materials, which was not as easy as it might appear. On the other hand, the troops that were subordinate to me and to this time are still in Russia and Siberia have done and are doing very well in spreading the fame of Polish arms as obedient and valiant ranks under the standard of the White Eagle.

Unfortunately, in the last battle in the north, at least eight soldiers were killed and 20 wounded. The 4<sup>th</sup> division, part of which had recently taken Tiraspol, had to retreat with the Entente armies from Odessa on orders from above. The 5<sup>th</sup> Division in Novonikolayevsk, of which one regiment, recently fulfilling its glorious task on the front, was withdrawn, is being reorganised.

In any case, over 80,000 soldiers, with the not-quite 20,000 in Russia and Siberia, form an army of 100,000, which I want to put at the disposal of Poland; thus perhaps certain differences would weigh less on the scale, particularly as this army desires to be at the front as quickly as possible at the side of their courageously and heroically fighting brothers, who have been militarily organised in Poland, to fulfil their most holy duty of defending the Fatherland as one unified army with a national spirit, even if momentarily differing externally.

I want to repeat that the difficulties that could ensue will not weigh so heavily given the real advantages that they will bring, and secondly, given the high sense of patriotism of the soldiers, who if needed will voluntarily relinquish part of their pay to the benefit of other soldiers. Officers' pay does not vary much, and the difference is chiefly in the currency. Bonuses for soldiers are replacing the benefits paid to families in the home country. As regards the second question, about prisoners of war, they are indeed presently 5/6<sup>ths</sup> of the entire army, but they are selected material, multiple times re-shuffled, nationally conscious, and young, as I put almost all those above 35 years of age into the camp companies that will remain in France until all the prisoners of war are collected and also for the purpose of transporting war materials. These latter will only deliver arms and ammunition and other materials and could be demobilised at once after their arrival in Poland, as they in fact deserve.

In the younger age groups making up the divisions, proper use of leave will help avoid any larger problems of desertion, although the usual rate of desertion has to be taken into account.



Aside from the six divisions that were created here (two corps), others will not be formed, except for battalions, supplementing as marching battalions, which will be sent to Poland as they are ready. I believe it would be better if the entire human material of the prisoners of war returns to the country as uniformed, equipped, armed soldiers under a certain discipline rather than as a disorganised herd of unemployed prisoners of war.

I am helping Romer as far as I can, which is the more difficult as I do not have enough officers myself, and even though he has many personnel, he is continually in need of the aid of other officers.

Romer is having problems on account of the high prices and because of the lack of transport, but all this could be avoided if there were by now any sort of treaty or military convention.

To expressions of the deep respect in which I hold the Chief of State, I add a soldier's Salute!

Dedicated as always to the service of the Fatherland,

HALLER

*PDD 1919, doc. 278*

## 141

*16 April 1919, protocol from the Polish-French negotiations  
about a military convention*

SECRET

### PROTOCOL

of the meeting of April 16, 1919

at 6:00 PM at the Palace of the Ministry of Military Affairs

about the military convention between the governments of Poland and France and the cooperation of the French General Staff in training, organising, and command of the Polish Army.

Present: Colonel Billotte;

Lieutenant Colonel Delalain

Lieutenant General Majewski (1<sup>st</sup> Vice Minister)

Lieutenant General Sosnkowski (2<sup>nd</sup> Vice Minister)

Colonel Haller, Chief of General Staff

Major Starzewski

Lieutenant Count Zaleski, writing the protocol

Colonel Billotte: General Henrys went from Warsaw to Poznań and has empowered me to replace him. The matter is important and requires haste. He is asking whether the Polish Military Mission would go to Paris and points to the need for this. Efforts should always be made to be in contact with the French military authorities.

Colonel Haller: The Polish Military Mission is already being organised. I imagine that in a few days it will leave Warsaw.

Colonel Billotte points out the difficulties that could arise. During the war, France had 100 divisions. The larger part is now demobilised. If Germany does not accept the peace conditions, everything is ready to mobilise 80 divisions at once. Without counting General Haller's army, France could provide Poland with equipment and material for 11 divisions, whereas an army of 500,000 is composed of 17 divisions.

Colonel Haller: The mobilisation of six classes of recruits, which was recently passed by the Polish Sejm, gives 450,000, not counting 50,000 volunteers.

Colonel Billotte: Poland can count on the aid of all the Allies; other countries will undoubtedly provide material and equipment. I am asking whether a resolution of the Sejm is necessary for the conclusion of the convention.

Colonel Haller holds the view that the Sejm would certainly accept all the terms of the convention. The Sejm has engaged itself by resolving on the need to conclude a military convention with the Entente; the matter could in any case be submitted to the Sejm Military Committee. The next sitting of the Sejm will be on 29 April.

General Sosnkowski: This chiefly concerns those paragraphs of the draft of the agreement that are of a political character; those paragraphs should be presented to the Sejm. The practical work on questions that are purely military can begin at once, as the matter requires haste and no time should be wasted.

Colonel Haller: One of the most important questions to resolve here will be the question of transporting the material destined for Poland. Poland does not have a fleet and the state of its railways is lamentable.

Colonel Billotte shares this view; doubtless the allies will provide Poland with tonnage. He then discusses one after the other the paragraphs of the draft of the agreement, with which the Chief of State agrees, as is claimed by General Henrys, who had such an impression after long talks with him. And thus it will not be possible to change anything important in the draft of the agreement.

Discussion: It has been established that, aside from a few points without much significance, the agreement suits both parties. Next there is a discussion as to the four higher staff officers who will be allocated to the Polish General Staff.

Colonel Billotte: The entire responsibility will remain in the hands of the Poles. French officers will not sign a single document. They will only help you.

General Sosnkowski: The entire difficulty of the situation with us can be reduced to the fact that we have officers from the Russian, German, and Austrian armies. The differences are enormous and it is not easy to eliminate them as quickly one would wish. Thus efforts must be made above all to remove the differences between Haller's army and the Polish army in the country. The differences are fairly large; in particular, a decision has to be made in the question of pay. Pay in Haller's army is much higher than in ours.

Colonel Billotte: It should not be forgotten that the presence of French officers will be temporary. He shares General Sosnkowski's opinion that Haller's units will arouse the envy of all the other Polish divisions. A gradual reduction of pay must thus take place.

General Sosnkowski: It might be better to settle the question in a radical manner, by giving Haller's units the same pay as in the Polish army from the time of their arrival in Poland.

Colonel Haller: I propose that the French pay be maintained for another month, in order not to alienate the soldiers.

Colonel Delalain discusses the draft of the agreement about French officers assigned to the Polish army and indicates the number of them that is needed.

General Sosnkowski: We would like to have French officers for the following units:

- 1) artillery inspectorate
- 2) aviation inspectorate
- 3) communications service inspectorate
- 4) army engineers inspectorate
- 5) railway inspectorate

Successively, for the departments of:

organisation

economics

medical

artillery

military training  
communications.

Similarly, for the geography institute and the army provisions department, which is presently at the formation stage.

Colonel Billotte points to the differences between the French and Polish systems.

Colonel Haller asks how the French and Polish officers will liaise and how they will communicate with each other.

Colonel Billotte is of the opinion that both sides should be given complete independence and the system of subordination should be entirely put aside. They will try to work together as good colleagues, jointly with the Polish authorities. A system of mutual confidence and friendship should be the basis. The French officers will be dependent on General Henrys and will be at the disposition of the Polish authorities. The sides must be left capable of retaining their own individuality.

General Majewski and Colonel Haller share this opinion.

Colonel Haller cites and lists the General Staff units that would like to have French officers.

Next a discussion ensues on the matter of schools and military training.

Colonel Delalain: General Haller's army has training units. We are ready to provide you with officers who would help you in the organisation of military training of staff officers, officers, and non-commissioned officers. This issue is important and will not bear delays on account of the large differences between German, Austrian, and Russian training.

Colonel Haller is of the opinion that above all, the schooling of officers and non-commissioned officers should come first; he thinks that the plan for a military school will have to be postponed until later. He lists the army schools that presently exist in Poland. The number of officers is too small for an army of 500,000. It will often be necessary to appoint officers who do not possess all the qualifications required of an officer.

Colonel Billotte: A French general has already been assigned for the training of the Polish army. The French general staff has four units: 1. organisational; 2. intelligence; 3. operational; and 4. supply. This system was also present in corps, divisions, brigades, etc. It is very practical. According to this system, French officers assigned for Poland will be divided into four groups and sent to the proper Polish units. This system should be adopted in the organisation of the Polish army. Basically, this system is the same; there is only one

difference—the aims are uniform. For organisation, he proposes one colonel (himself) and four officers who will be assigned to the chancellery of General Sosnkowski.

General Sosnkowski is of the opinion that the French personnel must be fairly limited in number at the beginning.

Colonel Billotte raises the need for permanent communication between the front and the army schools. The schools should all the time be adapted to current needs on all the fronts.

General Sosnkowski explains the organisation of army railways. He proposes to initially assign to each department a single officer who could become oriented and acquainted with the entire organisation and could decide how many officers would be needed for each unit. It should not be forgotten that everything with us is still at the organisational stage. The Ministry of Military Affairs is an entirely new creation. Initially, the General Staff was to deal with all military affairs of the country.

Colonel Delalain explains the French General Staff organisation system, which everywhere had four units: 1) intelligence; 2) organisational; 3) operational, and 4) transport. We did not have inspectors. They were appointed when the need arose. At the end, we had an artillery inspectorate on account of the huge importance of this branch. This system of four units exists everywhere and we will send officers to Poland in keeping with this system.

General Sosnkowski: At any rate we would want to have the largest number of French officers for all the technical, training, aviation, engineering, and communications units and departments.

Colonel Haller discusses the number of French officers for the Polish General Staff.

Colonel Delalain proposes one officer for the 3<sup>rd</sup> unit, three for the operational unit, nine for the 6<sup>th</sup> unit, and three for aviation.

Colonel Billotte: We are ready to send all these officers. I am head of the organisational department and I need 43 officers of all kinds (staff, cavalry, artillery, infantry, aviation, commissary, medical, geographical, and automotive). Seven officers are assigned to training, 18 (of which 10 are staff officers) for communications and supplies. Thirteen officers for the operations department. If you want, it would be possible to assign one officer to the leadership of each General District.

Colonel Haller is of the opinion that no time should be lost waiting for the decision of the Sejm; delay is not desirable.

General Sosnkowski is of the same view and asks if those officers could be brought in at once.

Colonel Billotte: They have to be brought from Paris. We cannot yet put ourselves at your disposition as General Henrys still needs us. We are very busy. Colonel Delalain could begin his work in the commissary at once; he will deal with the matter of communications and supplies.

Colonel Haller: I am certain that the Sejm will not make any difficulties. Would it be possible to send department directors at once and at least one officer for each department?

General Sosnkowski's view is that the arrival of those officers from Paris should be hastened.

Colonel Haller: As it is a matter of a convention between governments, the draft of the agreement should be presented at the next sitting of the Council of Ministers, which will look it over and be able to present it for authorisation to the Sejm Military Committee.

Colonel Billotte: With us, the draft of the agreement has not yet been presented to the Chamber, but the government, being very strong, does not doubt that the Chamber will endorse the draft. The choice of officers is not easy and has not yet been made. As soon as the convention is signed, General Henrys will go to France to choose officers. First, it will be necessary to regulate the material side of the question in order to present the case to the French officers in its entirety. I will thus send you a draft of the financial agreement.

Colonel Haller and General Sosnkowski consider whether there is a way of settling the question without the Sejm, which will only meet after the holidays.

Colonel Haller: In any case, we will present the matter for a decision by the Prime Minister, as it involves an agreement between governments.

General Majewski proposes that the next meeting be scheduled for Friday the 18<sup>th</sup> of this month at 9:00 AM, as he wanted to present the draft of the agreement to the Council of Ministers, which will meet on Friday afternoon.

General Sosnkowski asks if it would not be possible to send a few officers before signing the draft of the entire agreement, without awaiting a decision as to the paragraphs of an exclusively political nature.

Colonel Billotte responds and declares that it would be difficult, as the convention has to be signed before that. Before, it is only possible to make preparations.

Colonel Haller supposes that the Sejm Military Committee could influence the Sejm, authorising the government to sign the Convention.

Colonel Billotte explains that General Henrys cannot begin to take steps until the Convention has been signed; though it would be possible to telegraph for three or four officers to come for a fixed period and unofficially.

End of the meeting 8:30 PM

Next meeting: Friday the 18<sup>th</sup> of this month at 9:00 AM.

*PDD 1919, doc. 286*

## 142

*23 April 1919, letter from the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
to the PNC about the obligation to notify  
the arrival of allied missions*

Warsaw, April 23, 1919

To the National Committee  
in Paris

In reference to the attached copy of the letter of February 5 of this year, No. 1425/19, the Ministry requests that the National Committee once again bring to the attention of Allied governments the need to notify us about all political, economic, military, and other missions sent to Poland by Allied governments.

In particular, the National Committee will point out, very firmly that sending supposed missions in the manner practiced till now, that is, without informing the government, gives rise to numerous misunderstandings and places in particular the Polish authorities in the regrettable situation of having to occasionally question the official character of a given mission.

At the same time, the National Committee will appeal to the governments of England, America, and Italy to provide the composition, nature, and plenipotentiary powers of those civilian and military missions that are currently in Poland.

For the Minister  
(signed) Wróblewski

*PDD 1919, doc. 303*

## 143

*23 April 1919, telegram from the Minister of Internal Affairs  
to the Prime Minister (to Paris) about the offensive on Vilnius  
and the situation in the country*

Varsovie, le 23 Avril 1919

PRESIDENT PADEREWSKI,  
11 bis Avenue Kléber  
Paris  
RADIO

Opérations front nord-est dirigées personnellement chef d'Etat développent favorablement. Lida, Nowogródek, Vilnius nos mains esprit troupes excellent<sup>20</sup>. Population chrétienne accueille partout nos troupes cordialement prêtant volontiers toute assistance souvent refusant argent offert. stop Régime bolcheviste objet haine générale fut exercé, jeunes juifs souvent occupés louches affaires. stop Population juive en général soutient bolcheviks participant même activement combat Lida. stop Faits cruauté contre prisonniers polonais établis. stop Prière obtenir évacuation immédiate territoires Suwałki, Grodno, par Allemands. stop Leur présence prolongée sous prétexte défense contre invasion bolcheviste manqué tout fondement. Au contraire leurs mesures aident bolcheviks. Rozwadowski partira ces jours avec nos décisions toutes affaires courantes. stop Suite vœu unanime commission Diète je prépare projet déclaration concernant constitution lequel soumettrai Conseil Ministres et Diète. stop Haller arriva Varsovie 21 grande ovation. stop Reçois ce soir dépêche Dowbor-Musnicki train franco-américain Croix Rouge de Paris médicaments, vivres pour Varsovie retenu par Allemands Krzyż, personnel convoyant arrêté. Prière intervenir. stop Attends nouvelles quand dois espérer retour Président.

(Signé) Wojciechowski

*PDD 1919, doc. 305*

<sup>20</sup> This refers to the Polish offensive in the northeast and east that began on 16 April 1919. Its targets were Lida, Nowogródek, Baranowicze, and, above all, Vilnius. The latter city was captured on 19 April.



## 144

*25 April 1919, letter from the Secretary General  
of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference  
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the proceedings*

25 April 1919

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs  
in Warsaw

1. The crisis, which had long been expected at the Conference, was the consequence of the Italian question. The Italians, on the basis of a 1915 London treaty concluded with France and England, demanded Trieste and the Dalmatian coast, with part of the island and town of Zara. In addition, they also demanded the town and port of Fiume.<sup>21</sup> The Yugoslavs for their part demanded Pula and even Gorizia, in addition to Dalmatia, Fiume, and Trieste. Recently, the conflict had taken the form of war operations for which both sides had been preparing. It thus had to go at once before the Four for deliberation. Adding to the differences of opinion was a conflict with Wilson on Dalmatia and Fiume, and with Lloyd George on some aspects of those questions.<sup>22</sup> Italy was supported by France. The planned compromise (Dalmatia to Yugoslavia, Fiume a free city, with the port Italian) pleased no one and the dispute broke out into the open on the day before the Germans' arrival in Versailles. The Italians left the Conference and it would appear that they are to request a parliamentary resolution and, having their position strengthened by that resolution, to return after 7–10 days to Paris. Much is said loudly about maintaining treaties, friendship, etc., while in reality the greatest resentment prevails and war in the south of Europe is expected.

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<sup>21</sup> This is a reference to the London Treaty, a secret understanding between Great Britain, France, and Italy, signed on 26 April 1915. It called on Italy to break off its alliance with Germany and Austro-Hungary (the so-called Triple Entente) and to enter the war on the side of the Entente within a month. In exchange, France and Great Britain undertook to give Italy considerable territorial gains, including South Tyrol, Trieste, Istria, Gorizia, North Dalmatia, and protectorate rights over Albania. The treaty didn't give Italy any rights over the city of Rijeka (Fiume).

<sup>22</sup> On 23 April 1919, Wilson announced that in the future peace treaty, the provisions of the London Treaty of 1915 should be ignored in connection to Italy's boundaries, and Italy should be satisfied with the award of territories from the Trentino, through South Tyrol, and all the way to Trieste, supposedly inhabited by a mostly Italian population. It could not, however, lay claim to Dalmatia, as it is not an ethnically Italian territory. Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando protested and on 24 April, the Italian delegation left the Peace Conference, but returned on 5 May.

2. Negotiations with the Germans will begin at Versailles between May 1 and 3. Poland was represented at the meeting of "19 countries" that had declared war on Germany, where Clemenceau made an announcement about the upcoming negotiations; thus, Poland will participate in them. The preparation of a treaty text containing around a thousand paragraphs took a month of time. It supposedly entailed understandings with the Germans conducted in the most secret fashion, so that the treaty in its main outlines will be already accepted by them when they come to Versailles. In this manner, a compromising rupture of the accord or untimely bargaining will be avoided. In spite of all this, the heavy atmosphere of the Paris Conference will undoubtedly give rise to a great number of various surprises. There is still the danger that at the last minute, concessions could be made to the treaty at our cost, in exchange for a more concordant treatment of France's demands. The situation at the Conference could be described as still uncertain for Poland.

3. In general, Poland's western boundary was established in accord with the resolutions of the Polish Commission. The first exception concerns Danzig: Danzig will be a free city with its own government, whose foreign, military, and customs affairs will be under Polish jurisdiction; the Polish government will also own the port of Danzig. The right bank of the Vistula will be divided so that Thorn will fall to Poland, but the railway from Mława to Thorn—this is the second exception to the Commission's resolution—will run through Prussian territory. Poland will have the right of transit from Danzig to Mława, while Prussia will have the same right in communications with East Prussia. The third exception might concern the border near Racibórz, which has not yet been finalised. Upper Silesia is to fall to Poland in its entirety. The final text of the treaty is not yet established and will only be communicated to the Polish Delegation a couple of days before it is submitted to the Germans.

4. On the question of war indemnities, under the influence of the English parliament, a compromise was reached between the positions of Lloyd George and Wilson and the postulates of France. The Germans will be charged with the entire sum of damages, amounting to 100–125 billion francs. The distribution of these sums has not yet been decided; France set its final demand at 150 billion. Poland set its at 72. The real value is in the sum of 25 billion that is to be paid at once. However, of this sum, three countries—England, the United States, and France—will take around 12 billion for themselves to cover the costs of occupying Germany. From the remaining sum, Poland will not receive more than 1–1.5 billion.

5. The work of the Committees. In the finance committee *ex rel.* the printing of crowns by Austro-Hungary, Poland requested that an inter-allied commission take on all the settlement questions of the former Austrian state and order the repayment of Galicia's assets. In the roads committee, Czech

efforts to get the question of the Vistula being internationalised on the agenda was unsuccessful. On the question of the Kiel canal, Poland supported the French motion to establish an international commission with a representative of Poland. To the General Secretariat of the Conference was brought a memorandum containing, among other things, the question of the Germans' guaranteeing not to destroy ceded territories; the question of the revindication of museum collections, libraries, etc.; and questions of Polish citizenship. In regard to the latter—analogously to the demands of France, which wishes to retain a free hand in regard to citizens born after 1870—Poland set the year for 1886, the date of the establishment of a colonisation commission. The inter-Allied council deciding on the text of the treaty was inclined to set the preclusion date as 1901.

*PDD 1919, doc. 309*

## 145

### *26 April 1919, instructions from the Supreme Command for the Head of the Polish Military Mission in Paris*

Warsaw, 26 April 1919

#### INSTRUCTIONS FOR GENERAL T. ROZWADOWSKI to Paris

Your tasks during your stay in Paris include:

1. Act as a military expert and provide clarifications about our military situation, with particular consideration for the situation on the Volhynia-Galicia front.
2. Definition of our current political position about the Ukrainians—according to the information contained in Enclosure No. 1.
3. In military terms, any ceasefire or potential truce with the Ukrainians should be firmly counteracted, unless on the condition of a complete surrender, demobilisation, and our obtaining permission to occupy all of Galicia and Volhynia up to Rovno.
4. This should be justified from a military viewpoint by the fact that Petlura's people and Galician Ukraine's are no longer free of Bolshevism; that their divisions are becoming increasingly indistinguishable—they pass from one to the other; that a considerable number of Ukrainians are Bolsheviks; and that

the Ukrainians themselves can no longer tell their troops apart, a good example of which is the continual outbreaks of Bolshevik unrest in the Ukrainian army.

Therefore, an agreement with such an army could expose our troops to contagion and according to our convictions and experience, talks with the Ukrainians would not stand on certain and durable foundations, given their great disorganisation. As a result, we would have to maintain a large army for a long time in Galicia, and this is not possible for us because we need the army divisions on the south-eastern [sic!] and German front. Thus, we have to end the war here.

Given that Germany and German Austria will always try to cut our links to the Coalition, we have to try to obtain a certain link with Romania, and through Romania with the Coalition. For Poland, this is a matter of survival.

Only a common Polish-Romanian front can stop Bolshevism. A Romanian-Ukrainian-Polish front would not be secure due to the undependability of the Ukrainians.

Evidence for the above is to be found in Enclosure No. 2.

5. The topicality of the matter of the military convention with the Coalition should be discussed with our Representation in Paris, in keeping with Enclosure No. 3.

The Supreme Command, however, is of the opinion that in this respect it would be good to wait to see whether the peace conditions are accepted by Germany and what the political situation between the Coalition and Germany will be after the peace is signed and whether a common Coalition Headquarters will still exist.

Such a military convention with the Coalition is above all a matter that must be resolved by political agents. The attached plan has to be revised in keeping with the situation before being submitted to the Peace Conference.

6. The question of a military convention with Romania should also be discussed with our representation in Paris and a possible separate convention against the Bolsheviks with that country should potentially be sought. The Romanians' help against the Ukrainians also comes into account here, although for the moment there is hope that we will be able to rout them without help from the Romanians.

7. Enclosure No. 4 explains our general military situation.

8. Lieutenant Colonel Ferdynand de Respaldiza, newly appointed military attaché of the Polish Legation in Bucharest, is travelling through Paris. Lieutenant Colonel Respaldiza should be made acquainted with the Romanian representation and informed of the situation, after which he should depart as quickly as possible to Bucharest.

9. On questions requiring joint action, General Romer has been placed under your command and should be informed of the fact.

Haller, Colonel

*PDD 1919, doc. 313*

## 146

*26 April 1919, note from the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
to the Minister (to Paris) about discussions  
with the Lithuanian delegation*

26 April 1919

Confidential  
Ignacy Paderewski  
Prime Minister  
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris

A few days ago, an official Lithuanian mission arrived in Warsaw. The mission was comprised of Dr. Jurgis Šaulys, member of the State Council, plenipotentiary Minister, and Mission Head; Vladas Daumantas, representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and, Colonel M. Velykis, military attaché.

At the request of the Mission, I received it on the 24<sup>th</sup> of the present month in the presence of the chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee, Professor Władysław Grabski, and Mr. Okęcki.

After reading the plenipotentiary papers presented to me (copy attached) by M. Sleževičius, present Chairman of the Council of Ministers and director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kaunas, I greeted the Lithuanian delegates warmly, while mentioning how many interests Poland and Lithuania share, and expressing the conviction that our mutual relations will be amicably arranged.

To this, Mr. Šaulys responded by agreeing with me that we have common interests, and to Mr. Grabski's remark about the common danger not only from Bolshevism but also from Germany, he indicated that it is true that we are jointly threatened by Germany and Russia.

He further mentioned that the misunderstandings of recent times can surely be overcome but, at the same time, he emphasised the surprise that the

actions of the Polish army in Lithuanian territory have produced (an allusion to the seizure of Vilnius).

In response, I said that I was not aware of any actions by our army on ethnographically Lithuanian territory. To this, Mr. Šaulys formally declared that the Lithuanian delegation has been instructed to entreat with the Polish government only if Poland recognises the Lithuanian state with Vilnius as its capital.

Against the background of this reservation, a short debate ensued in which our side said to the Lithuanian representatives that Vilnius is not ethnographically a Lithuanian city, that it was not the Lithuanians but we who were capable of liberating the city from the Bolsheviks, that the resolution of the Polish Sejm did not allow us to embark at present on a debate as to the future of Vilnius, and that, furthermore, this issue was part of the boundary issue, about which the Lithuanian delegation was not empowered to entreat—as would appear from its powers and own declaration—and we, on our side, did not have the appropriate powers, either. We thus proposed to exclude the matter of Vilnius from the discussions for the moment, and to begin talks as to the three points mentioned in the powers.

As an objection to our arguments, Mr. Šaulys stated that while the population of Vilnius and its vicinity do speak Polish, they are ethnographically of Lithuanian origin. Stating that Vilnius “is, was, and will be Lithuanian,” he refused to conduct further talks. However, after some hesitation, he proposed that he request an opinion and instructions from his government as to our proposal and asked that he be given for this purpose a written answer to the note on the subject that he promised to send this same day to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

With this, the talks ended.

I have not yet received the promised letter from Mr. Šaulys.

I consider the self-confidence the Lithuanians tried to show to be mostly a pose and not sincere.

Not knowing how the Polish-Lithuanian question stands at present in Paris, I would like to prolong the talks only until receiving instructions from you. I do not think, though that it will be possible to do so for long.

For the Minister:  
*Wróblewski*

N.B. I am appending a copy of the note I have just received from Mr. Šaulys.

*PDD 1919, doc. 314*

## 147

*28 April 1919, letter from the PNC to the Minister  
of Foreign Affairs of France with a request for intervention  
to speed up the withdrawal of former Ober-Ost troops*

Paris, le 28 Avril 1919

A Son Excellence  
Monsieur Stephen Pichon  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères  
Monsieur le Ministre,

Conformément à l'article XII (alinéa 2) de la convention d'armistice, conclue avec l'Allemagne le 11 Novembre 1918<sup>23</sup>, toutes les troupes allemandes qui se trouvaient lors de la conclusion de cet armistice dans les territoires qui faisaient partie avant la guerre de la Russie, devront rentrer dans les frontières de l'Allemagne, telles qu'elles étaient au 1er Août 1914 „dès que les Alliés jugeront le moment venu, compte tenu de la situation intérieure de ces territoires”.

Si ces troupes allemandes ont été laissées sur le territoire de l'ancien Empire russe, et notamment dans les gouvernements de Suwałki et de Grodno, c'est évidemment pour maintenir l'ordre dans ces régions et pour retenir la poussée des forces bolchevistes russes.

Aujourd'hui quand les troupes polonaises ont occupé Vilno et avancent vers Minsk, le maintien des troupes allemandes en arrière du front polonais n'a plus aucune raison d'être au point de vue de la défense-contre les bolcheviks. De plus leur présence dans ces contrées est au point de vue du maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité publique, nettement nuisible.

D'après les informations envoyées par le Gouvernement polonais, les troupes allemandes s'appliquent à dévaster méthodiquement ces contrées et à piller les habitants, vivres, bois, installations d'usine, machines agricoles, rails, matériel roulant sont expédiés impunément et en toute hâte vers l'Allemagne; plusieurs églises ont été pillées. On est en possession à Varsovie de nombreux

<sup>23</sup> Art. 12 of the ceasefire of 11 November 1918 stated: "All German troops at present in any territory which before the war formed part of Austria-Hungary, Rumania, or Turkey, shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914, and all German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined, as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories."

documents témoignant d'attentats et de meurtres commis quotidiennement sur la population inoffensive, urbaine et rurale par les militaires allemandes. Si ce régime allemand n'est pas changé immédiatement tous les efforts de l'Entente pour ravitailler la population menacée de famine resteraient stériles. La population, en majorité polonaise, horriblement persécutée par les Allemands invoque le secours de la Pologne. Ce n'est qu'une intrigue allemande qui a provoqué la déclaration de la „Bieloruskaja Uprawa” – organisation purement russe – demandant la prolongation de séjour des troupes allemandes à Grodno.

Vu les raisons ci-dessus indiquées, le Comité National Polonais a l'honneur de vous prier, Monsieur le Ministre, de vouloir bien intervenir auprès du Maréchal Foch pour qu'il donne l'ordre aux troupes allemandes d'évacuer les territoires de Grodno et de Suwałki, et de se retirer dans les frontières de l'Allemagne.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma haute considération.

*PDD 1919, doc. 318*

## 148

*29 April 1919, letter from the Secretary General of the PNC to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the situation of Polish prisoners of war of Jewish origin in Italy*

Paris, April 29, 1919

To the MINISTRY of FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
in WARSAW

In answer to the letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 23 April 1919, No. ND/3990/19, the Secretary General of the Polish National Committee in Paris wishes to inform the Ministry that:

1) the Cassino Camp, Province of Caserta [sic!] was a mixed camp in which various nationalities were to be found. The Poles in this camp were set free regardless of their religion, and thus that included Jews born on Polish territory, speaking Polish, and considering themselves to be Poles.

2) No declaration to the effect that the Mission did not request the release of the Jews from the camps and their transportation to Poland was made either



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by the Mission of the Polish National Committee in Rome or by the Polish Military Mission there.

3) Only the two above-mentioned institutions were engaged in caring for the Polish prisoners in Italy; they did not make any distinction between Jews and Poles. This question simply did not exist as it was considered that Jews considering themselves Poles, speaking Polish, and born in Poland, are *eo ipso* Poles and as such should be treated equally with Polish prisoners.

4) The striking absence of any facts or details in the Jewish National Council's claim makes it impossible for the National Commission to determine whether in individual cases some deviation took place from the generally adopted principles of treating Polish prisoners without differentiation of religion.

Secretary General  
Polish National Committee

*PDD 1919, doc. 322*

## 149

*2 May 1919, letter from the Secretary General  
of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference  
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the proceedings*

2 May 1919

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs  
in Warsaw

1. The question of Poland's western boundaries has been ultimately settled in the way that was communicated in the last report (25 April). Danzig is a free city with its own government, and its foreign, customs and passport affairs are merged with those of Poland; the city has its own police force. Poland is entitled to defend the port by its canons and deploy a Polish garrison in the city. The course of the eastern part of the Polish-German boundary is such that the district of Stuhm and Marienwerder belong to Germany, so that Germany reaches the Vistula. For this reason and based on the principles already adopted by the roads commission, the Vistula will be recognised as an international waterway and subjected to strict international regulations. The similarly incomplete settlement of an issue that holds for us great danger, has given rise to discontent among the great powers themselves and in their press. *The Times* article written by Simonds, an American, is telling.<sup>1</sup>

2. The question of Eastern Galicia was entrusted to a subcommittee composed of the following people: Botha and Lieutenant Kisch (England), General Le Rond and Mr. Degrand (France), Colonel Embick and Bowman (America).<sup>2</sup> This sub-commission held two meetings, one with Poles and the other with Ruthenians. During the first of these, Paderewski and Dmowski were present; they deferred to the Polish military authorities in the matter of the ceasefire and raised a number of fundamental political conditions: the linking-up of Polish and Romanian troops, verifying the involvement of Germans in the Ruthenian army, Polish control over mines. General Rozwadowski only arrived after this meeting. The Polish representatives did not agree to decide on the ceasefire conditions without our participation. From the American side, especial pressure could be felt to force us to accept conditions determined in advance. This pressure manifested itself through the suspension of American shipments to Poland.

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<sup>1</sup> The article in question is "The Sacrifice of Poland" by Frank H. Simonds, *The Times*, 26 April 1919.

<sup>2</sup> This refers to the Inter-Allied Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission.

3. In the matter of Teschen Silesia, the decision taken on 7 April and which was unfavourable to us, has been postponed for a month, and thus the matter will return to the order of the day before too long.<sup>3</sup> In the meantime, we have signs of certain tractability on the part of the Czechs, who are seeking an area of compromise. This trend is represented by Mr. Beneš. He argues that Poland and Czechoslovakia should presently be bound by a military convention in the face of external threats; calls for a boundary along the course of the Vistula while mentioning the possibility of compensation for Poland, particularly in Upper Silesia.

4. Talks with the Germans are to begin on 6 May in Versailles. On that day, there will be a secret meeting, during which the text of the treaty will be communicated to representatives of the smaller countries.<sup>4</sup> Because of this, the Polish delegation issued a letter to the Presidium of the Conference, asking that Poland be informed early enough about decisions concerning it so that it could submit its requests and observations. The method used thus far to settle the most important matters concerning Poland, without our involvement and often without even hearing us, has, among other things, recently led to the adoption of a provision in the treaty requiring Poland to compensate the German state for all revenue-generating state property on territories taken away from Germany.

*PDD 1919, doc. 330*

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<sup>3</sup> On 7 April 1919, a discussion took place between the prime minister of Poland and the prime minister and foreign minister of France. Pressured by possible French support for the Czech plans to incorporate all of Teschen Silesia, Paderewski proposed to Clemenceau a compromise solution to this question in the form of a plebiscite. At the turn of April to May, the view took shape among the Entente powers that this issue should be resolved through bilateral discussions.

<sup>4</sup> On 7 May 1919, the draft Peace Treaty was submitted to the German delegation. During the course of further negotiations, its conditions were considerably mitigated.

## 150

*2 May 1919, note from the expert of the Polish Delegation  
to the Peace Conference for the Chairman of the Economic Delegation  
on his discussion with a member  
of the American Liquidation Commission*

Paris, 2 May 1919

To the Chairman of the Economic Delegation  
in Paris

## Note

Mr. Wieniawski and I have gone today to see Senator Hollis. A colonel with the American Army, Hoover's representative for matters of transport to Eastern Europe (and who has just arrived from Serbia), was also present.

The most important points of our conversation are the following:

1) Hollis stated that the American Liquidation Commission agrees to the establishment of a Polish corporation that would take over all purchases for the Polish government dealt with until now by General Romer's mission and, therefore, there wouldn't be the slightest interruption in these purchases.

2) The founding capital of this corporation can be reduced from 25,000,000 to only 10,000,000 dollars. The amount of the capital does not play a significant role here, as the main thing is the amount of the guarantee, in this case the bills of exchange we can give them in exchange for the goods purchased.

3) While discussing the composition of this corporation, Hollis insisted that people known to him be included. My name was mentioned here.

The composition of the founders may be very limited, with the reservation that if it matters to you, it could be enlarged in time.

Hollis claims that setting up such a corporation is not even necessary, that a company composed of a couple of people known to him would be sufficient for him (once again, he insists that I also take part in this).

Mr. Wieniawski presented this matter in the following manner: creating this corporation from the present members of the military mission is impossible. This matter cannot be appropriately explained back home and public opinion would accuse the members of acting out of personal interest, and that the corporation should be composed of third persons who would

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receive instructions from the relevant ministries and would be under the control of the government.

4) The bills of exchange will be signed by people who are presently part of General Romer's mission and whose plenipotentiary powers were recognised as being sufficient to issue such obligations. The bills of exchange will be issued in the amount of 10,000,000 dollars and, if the need arises, later they will be supplemented.

5) Hollis promised to obtain a 5-year loan for us at 5%, i.e., much more comfortable than the previous one, which was for 3 years and at 6%. Here, Mr. Wieniawski pointed out the extraordinary advantage for us, namely our agreement with the French is also at 5%, with the condition, however, that if we were to enter into an agreement with anyone else on worse conditions, then we would have to raise the interest rate with them as well. We are thus safe today from such an eventuality.

6) Hoover's representative pointed out the significance of this corporation (the Czechoslovaks already have one). It will serve not only as a temporary emergency measure, but should be organised in such a manner as to be able to include our exports in the future, thus becoming Poland's clearing house. It will also be much easier to maintain Poland's currency abroad on a better footing through its intermediary than by the mediation of private and smaller institutions.

As it develops, this corporation could be united with bank syndicates, representatives of industry, and still be strictly related to the Polish treasury, and this would give it greater prestige.

S.M.<sup>5</sup>

*PDD 1919, doc. 332*

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<sup>5</sup> Stefan Markowski.

## 151

*3 May 1919, telegram from the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
to the Prime Minister (to Paris) about relations with Lithuania*

3 May 1919

To the Prime Minister  
and Minister of Foreign Affairs  
J. Paderewski  
in Paris

With reference to the report from 26 April No. 4202/19, I wish to communicate the following developments in Lithuanian matters:

The plenipotentiaries of Lithuania's military authorities arrived to meet General Szeptycki and tendered him a protest against the occupation of Vilnius by Polish troops. General Szeptycki responded by tendering them a protest stating that the issue their protest raises is of a strictly political nature and that, therefore, it should be tendered by the plenipotentiaries of the Lithuanian government to the Polish government in Warsaw.

The Lithuanians presented an identical protest against the occupation of Grodno by Polish troops to the representative of the Polish General Staff in Grodno, Colonel Nieniewski, who refused to accept it.

In the matter of Vilnius, in addition to the protests, the Lithuanian military authorities demanded that Lithuanian troops be allowed to enter Vilnius and that a base of operations against the Bolsheviks be created there. The commander in chief did not acquiesce to the above demand and proposed in exchange that the Kaunas-Vilkomir rail line, which runs some 100 km to the north of Vilnius, be placed at the disposal of the Lithuanian military authorities, with the simultaneous delimitation of a demarcation line that would correspond more or less to the limits of ethnographic Lithuania, while leaving Szyrwinty in our possession, and Koszedary in that of the Lithuanians. As of yet, the Lithuanians have not responded to the Supreme Commander's proposal.

At present, Lithuanian troops number about 4,000 men, of which only 2,000 are facing the Bolsheviks, the remaining 2,000 being dislocated on our rear, to the north of Grodno.

The state of relations in Byelorussia is still unclear. Some Byelorussians, organised into the Byelorussian Agency in Kaunas, are taking sides with the present Lithuanian government. A significant faction wishes for the unification of Byelorussia all the way to Smolensk and would wish to achieve this with

Polish assistance and in strictest harmony with it. This Byelorussian faction considers Vilnius its own as well. As for the Poles living in Lithuania and Byelorussia, in a memorandum submitted by the councils of those lands, they are asking for protection and support.

The matter of negotiations with the Lithuanian delegation of Minister Šaulys is suspended. To the note, whose copy I received on 25 April and which contains the demand for the recognition of the Lithuanian state with its capital in Vilnius, I responded as in enclosure No. 1. I did so only to gain time. In another five or six days, I intend to send a further, more substantive answer, as in enclosure No. 1. I have obtained the authorisation of the Chief of State and of the Chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee for the tenor of this answer.

For the Minister:  
(-) Wróblewski

*PDD 1919, doc. 336*

## 152

*5 May 1919, letter from the Chairman of the PNC to the Chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee about current matters*

Paris, 5 May 1919

Dear Stach,

We have been summoned once more for tomorrow morning by the commission for the ceasefire with the Ukrainians (chaired by General Botha). I am going with General Rozwadowski and I will uphold my heretofore stance: 1) occupation of Eastern Galicia to enable contact with Romanian troops; 2) placing Ukrainian troops under Allied control and cleansing it of Bolshevik, German, and Austrian elements; 3) Polish control of all petroleum wells.

During the closure of the peace conference meeting tomorrow afternoon, we will be shown the contents of the treaty with Germany. There are things in it that are hard for us on the Danzig question and on financial matters, but the western boundary is the same as was adopted by the Territorial Commission.

In general, in the last couple of weeks the Polish question stood lower than it had previously. Two factors led to this:

1. The strengthening of England's position—England does not want to allow Poland to become a great power. Should this happen, to the present concern of five a sixth member would be added, and this would make governing the world more difficult for the Anglo-American syndicate. England also has great plans for the exploitation of Eastern Europe, to which Poland's existence would be a hindrance. It wishes to affect matters in Danzig and, as we are beginning to see, to obtain a mandate from the League of Nations to exert its influence in Lithuania (Poland was not included in the executive section of the League of Nations).

2. Enormous increase in Jewish influence.

Nonetheless, if that which is being planned for the treaty remains unchanged, we will be able to thank God that we did not come out worse. We owe this to the strong push given our cause at the beginning of the conference, when our enemies hadn't yet caught their bearings.

The situation was already bad when Paderewski arrived—there were no conditions for the triumphs he had prepared for.

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The Allies are certain that the Germans will sign the treaty without fundamental changes. They rest this certainty on the fact that they held discussions behind the scenes with the Germans while drawing up the conditions.

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If it turns out so, the Germans will have 15 days following the signing of the treaty to evacuate Upper Silesia, the rest of Poznań Province and West Prussia within the boundaries we were awarded, as well as Danzig and the Regency of Olsztyn [Allenstein] (Masuria). An Allied Commission is leaving for Mazuria to prepare the plebiscite.

The incredibly important issue of how to administer those lands stands before us. Given that it is an area that stands culturally higher than the rest of Poland and that it used to be under an administration of a very high level, introducing there an ineffective administration like that of the Congress Kingdom would lead to a scandal (and would have an indirect impact on the result of the plebiscite in the Masurian counties, and assuredly lead to fiasco). With this in mind, it is necessary to begin work today on settling this matter. We need an "Act on the Temporary Administration of Poznań Province," ready to be carried through the Sejm immediately after the treaty is signed (this may take 2–3 weeks) and which would establish a "Governing Commission" with



a seat in Poznań. This commission should be composed of people from Poznań Province, and be organised like a ministerial cabinet—internal affairs, treasury, military affairs (also), communications, education, justice, agriculture, trade and industry, postal service, and telegraphs...

The people for the administration should be recruited locally, in the Prussian partition, because only they will be able more or less to organise such an administration, with Germans remaining at their posts for a certain time.

The present laws must remain in force.

Only in this manner, at the cost of this unpleasant and temporary autonomy, can we avert a catastrophe.

Agitation in view of the plebiscite in Masuria<sup>6</sup> should also be left to people from Poznań Province helped by Teschen Protestants. I entrust this urgent matter to your attention.

The passing by the Sejm of many urgent ad hoc requests about the incorporation of Lithuanian lands caused a scare among activists and leftists here, and frightened Paderewski.<sup>7</sup>

I have reasons to believe that Piłsudski proclaimed his Vilnius manifesto<sup>8</sup> in consultation with Paderewski. They did not expect such a reaction in the Sejm.

Paderewski is leaving for Poland on Thursday (or so he intends) to take up this matter with the Sejm committee.<sup>9</sup>

Today, during our delegation meeting, he stated: "Between Mr. Dmowski and myself there exists a fundamental conflict about programmes (federation or incorporation)—this can only be resolved by the Sejm committee."

My stance is such that if the programme of creating a Lithuanian State encompassing Vilnius, Grodno, and Minsk, and federated with Poland were

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<sup>6</sup> The plebiscite in Warmia, Masuria and Powiśle (the East Prussia plebiscite) took place on 11 July 1920.

<sup>7</sup> This refers to three urgent motions submitted during the Sejm's 31<sup>st</sup> sitting (29 April 1919), concerning the unification with Poland of the north-eastern territories (including Vilnius) that had just been liberated from the Bolsheviks.

<sup>8</sup> This is a reference to the Chief of State's proclamation of 22 April 1919, directed to the inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

<sup>9</sup> On 6 May 1919, the prime minister instructed that Speaker of the Sejm Trąpczyński be informed that "[...] passing the motion concerning the northeastern boundaries could be of incalculable consequences. The situation is so serious that the Prime Minister would wish to present his clarifications to the Sejm in person and, for this reason, he asks Speaker Trąpczyński to remove the motion from the order of the day pending the arrival of the Prime Minister, which can take place in 10 days," AAN, MSZ, 1480.

to prevail in Poland, I would consider it a national failure and I would resign from the conference so as not to burden my conscience with this blow to the national interest.

I am counting on you to put an end once and for all to this federation comedy.

On the other hand, I beg you not to pass an act on incorporation, because this would place us in conflict with the entire peace conference. Until the passing of the treaty, which will award us those lands, we should just indicate that its position is one that favours incorporation. In Lithuania, agitation among the population should be organised to get them to declare themselves at public gatherings and in collective petitions for incorporation to Poland.

Paderewski is to raise two more issues before the commission:

1. The question of the attitude of the organs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Allied countries toward the Polish delegation at the Peace Conference. Such organs from other countries are properly managed by the delegations to the Peace Conference (in which in any case each country has its prime minister and its minister of foreign affairs). I am not a minister, nor do I wish to be one, but as the first plenipotentiary at the Peace Conference, I have no intention of disowning the Polish cause and I demand that the organs of the foreign ministry here be subordinated to my leadership. Otherwise, great confusion will ensue and Austrian diplomats such as Skrzyński (incidentally, a very stupid fellow) will disorganise our policy entirely. I told Paderewski that only in such conditions, if granted to me, can I represent Poland at the Peace Conference. Please support this stance unless you wish for the results of our hard work until now to be wasted and the Polish question be sunk by the Poles themselves through a return to politics of the time of the late Regency.

2. The nomination of Polish diplomatic representatives. Paderewski is entirely unable to deal with this question. He wishes to appoint people no one would shout at, but there is someone who shouts at every candidate, so he cannot decide on anyone. He mainly reckons with the left, and if one would let him, he would appoint only leftists and activists.

I set the principle that I have to agree to each representative because I cannot conduct policy with people who will counter me.

I see that Paderewski has no qualifications for governing:

1. He cannot decide on anything and fears everything.
2. In relations with representatives of other countries, he is too soft.
3. At present, his actions are guided mainly by Madame and by that intriguer Horodyski.

4. He is subordinated to the Chief of State in a way that leaves him no independence.

5. Through some rivalry with the "National Democracy" he excessively supports the left.

6. Various sombre figures have access to him, like Jechalski, Barski, and especially a certain Judge Mayer from New York, who is his cordial friend and about whom I have confidential information that one of his and his gang's mains goals is to discredit me. N.B., he is a German-American Jew (and this would also seem to be related to the Lithuania-federation programme). He brought to Paris Mr. August Zaleski, Lednicki's former agent in London, who intrigued against us there during the entire war and who also has ties of some sort with that Judge Mayer. The president makes use of Mr. Zaleski in talks with the English, among whom he is highly valued by those who are hostile to the Polish cause.

I ask you, however, do not press for Paderewski's overthrow. This would harm us greatly at the conference and could produce havoc in the Sejm. On the other hand, some firmness with regard to him will not hurt, along with the threat of refusing our support in the Sejm if he does not give in to our indications.

Do not allow yourselves to be frightened that rejection of the federation programme will torpedo the Polish cause at the conference. Attempts to scare me with this in Paris have been going on for several months. Terrorising is a method often used in diplomacy, and has been especially effective against the Poles recently. It is high time we stopped being taken in like that. Our position has to be that we are willing to recognise a union or a federation only with ethnographic Lithuania. As for the rest, it is incorporation or occupation (beyond our boundary line).

I would very much like to drop in on you if only for a couple of days. I do not know if I will succeed in doing so anytime soon, because it is dangerous to be absent here.

I am so afraid of stupidities taking place in the matter of the administration of the Prussian partition after incorporation.

Let Haller fight, not chatter, because he says harmful stupidities.

Read this with a couple of close friends and destroy it. It's too unceremoniously written.

Warm hugs  
Roman

## 153

*7 May 1919, letter from Deputy Minister Wróblewski  
to Deputy Minister Skrzyński (to Paris)  
about German preparations for an attack on Poland*

Warsaw, 7 May 1919

Strictly secret  
To the Vice Minister  
Władysław Skrzyński<sup>10</sup>

I am sending to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a copy of the decree of the Prussian War Ministry dated 22 April (enclosed) on the matter of German instructors for the Bolshevik army. This document complements the orders of the German High Command sent on the 4<sup>th</sup> of this month, N.D.III 1074/19. It shows that the German government has once again come to agreement with the Russian Republic of Soviets and is preparing joint German-Russian military action against the Entente states and Poland.<sup>11</sup>

Based on information concerning the concentration and movements of the German army, as well as with its provisioning and supply of ammunition, the General Staff of the Polish Army is reckoning with possible hostile steps being taken by the Germans as early as the second half of this month (about the 15–25 May). The General Staff also notes that, given the great length of the possible Polish-German frontline (the front in Poznań region alone is nearly 600 km long), the German army's numerical superiority, and the engagement of Polish troops on other fronts, the consequences of the German action could

<sup>10</sup> Władysław Skrzyński was appointed undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 11 April 1919.

<sup>11</sup> On 3 May 1919, the General Adjutancy of the Commander in Chief prepared a document containing the operational assumptions for a possible war with Germany, "[...] if the peace terms are too stringent for the Germans, they will not accept them, and they initiate a new war with the Coalition. In this case, we would also be forced to conduct war against Germany, above all to defend our borders, but also as allies of the Coalition. The conditions for war against Germany are very difficult for Poland at present. At the present moment, breaking off the agreement to transport Polish troops and war material from France would sever entirely all possibilities of supply. For this reason, it is necessary to: 1) conclude a lasting peace with the Czechs in order to collaborate with them in Prussian Silesia and to cover some of our needs from Czech factories; 2) to carry out and complete as quickly as possible the offensive on the south-eastern front so as to open up the possibility of transports through Romania [...]" IJPA, Adiutantura Generalna Naczelnego Wodza, 2/4/2.

prove extremely detrimental, especially at the initial stage. We should also reckon with the breaking of our defensive lines in Poznań region, and with threats to our entire front in Lithuania, where German units being constituted in East Prussia, and in the regions of Kaunas and Suwałki, occupy the rear and the flank of the Polish army.

Based on this opinion by the General Staff and in strict coordination with it, the Ministry is asked to turn to the governments of Allied countries as quickly as possible to obtain guarantees from them that they will respond immediately to any German offensive steps against Poland by means of military counteraction on the western front. Given that such counteraction can only indirectly affect the course of German-Polish fighting, it would be greatly desirable to reach an understanding at the same time with the Czech government in this matter—one that would set aside the entire Teschen question and leave it open—and by taking advantage of the conciliatory stance that is emerging there, to secure for ourselves in this manner at least its benevolent neutrality in case of hostilities with Germany.

For the Minister  
(signed) Wróblewski

*PDD 1919, doc. 348*

## 154

*15 May 1919, note from the PNC to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
about Polish-Chinese relations*

Paris, 15 May 1919

### NOTE

Of the General Secretariat of the PNC  
To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw  
In the matter of Polish interests in China

In response to the letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 4176, with the enclosed memo by Mr. Karol Pindor,<sup>12</sup> the General Secretariat communicates the following observations:

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<sup>12</sup> Karol Pindor (a former employee of the Austro-Hungarian consulate in Shanghai) wrote in his report of 23 April 1919, that “for this purpose, it would be desirable

1) The notification of the Polish state with the Chinese government is necessary.

2) After this action has been carried out, to establish diplomatic relations it is above all necessary to conclude a political and economic treaty encompassing, among other things, the question of reciprocal representation. China is a state in which international customs do not have the same weight as elsewhere and all relations between foreign states and China are based on such treaties.

3) The Austro-Hungarian settlement in Tianjin was accorded by China along with Italian and Belgian concessions in 1900, i.e., after the Boxer Rebellion, following pressure exerted then upon China by European states. At the time, the Austro-Hungarians were more interested in sustaining the importance and dignity of their state rather than securing their trade interests, of which they almost had none in China. The settlement itself should be seen solely as an income-generating undertaking consisting of the sale of plots of land at a high price and not as a political or trade post. This settlement is located on the Pei-ho River, at a point to which seagoing ships have no access. Instead, they stop at the English settlement, which lies nearer to the sea.

Should the settlement be occupied on Poland's behalf, it would not be a focus point of Poland's trade interests in China, of which there are almost none, but such an occupation would give rise to very strong protests against Polish imperialism on the part of the Chinese, who took over the settlement *de jure* (the war ruptured the Austro-Hungarian-Chinese treaty) and *de facto*, and will not let it be torn away easily.

In closing, it should be added for your information that Mr. Ługowski, who is mentioned in the memo, is no longer alive. As to the candidature of Mr. Pindor, the General Secretariat cannot issue an opinion about his Polishness or abilities, as it has no knowledge of him.

4) Wishing to occupy the settlement, it would be advisable to also turn to the commission liquidating common Austro-Hungarian assets, insofar as such a commission exists.

5) Besides the question of occupying the settlement and establishing a representation, it would be advisable to resolve the issue of appointing a consul in China as quickly as possible. In Manchuria, there are numerous Poles who arrived there during the war or who have long had business there. They number nearly 5,000. It is thus indispensable to establish a Polish consulate in Harbin.

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for the Polish government to send a representative to Peking now, with the aim of taking possession, in agreement with the Chinese government, of former Austro-Hungarian properties pending the regulation of this matter by means of a formal agreement by the Polish and Chinese states;" PDD 1919, doc. No. 302.

6) In other Chinese cities there are Poles, former Austrian prisoners of war who fled Siberia. Until the consulate is established, and this will take some time, those Poles could be placed under the care of one of the consuls from the Allied states—from France, for example. A line of credit could also be opened for expenditures connected with this function and a functionary appointed for the purpose of determining the interested persons' Polish nationality, such as Mr. Tadeusz Krzywoszewski, who is present in Shanghai as the deputy director of a bank.

7) In sending, enclosed with these presents, a copy of the letter to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which the above-mentioned question is raised, we ask for the sending of the act of notification of Poland's independence to China, after the submission of which the Political Department will be able to establish relations with the Chinese legation in Paris.

*PDD 1919, doc. 365*

## 155

*16 May 1919, letter from the Secretary General of the Polish  
Delegation to the Peace Conference to the Chief of State about the  
rejection of terms of the Polish-Ukrainian ceasefire*

Paris, 16 May 1919

Dear Commandant,

As I reported on 13 May, Mr. Dmowski and General Rozwadowski did not accept the proposal of the Allies and declared that they can only accept a ceasefire based on a set strategic boundary line south of Lwow. General Botha saw such an answer as a final refusal and submitted his report to the Council of the Four.

On 14 May, Mr. Esme Howard called on the Delegation and declared to Mr. Dmowski as follows: If the Poles do not accept the ceasefire conditions presented by the Commission and do not agree immediately to everything, it will be impossible to vouch that Poland's western boundaries in their present shape will be upheld. Howard's declaration, made in the name of England's leading politicians, was very polite, yet energetic and firm nonetheless. Mr. Dmowski responded that this matter exceeded his competence and he sent a telegram to Mr. Paderewski.

Mr. Dmowski's tactic was above all to protract matters. On the one hand, in Galicia, military successes are expected that would change our situation and, on the other, it is going to be verified whether Howard's intervention was made only by England or also in the name of others. My impression, however, is that this method makes our position much more precarious and that it will not be possible to hold to it much longer, and that the entire question of our boundaries in the south and east has taken a turn for the worse in recent weeks.

Such are, among others, the consequences of making our policy dependent on Quai d'Orsay, of disregarding England, and of neglecting diplomatic work in London. The stay of Mr. Paderewski has improved our situation somewhat, but the Poles still do not have any relations with the leaders of England's policy, i.e., with Lloyd George and with Balfour.

All other matters are at a complete standstill. It is not my impression that the treaty with Germany will come either soon or easily. I especially fear a surprise in the matter of Upper Silesia. The matters of our policy and representation are, naturally, in suspension. The National Committee is holding out and all political decisions still belong to it. We are awaiting, therefore, the arrival of Mr. Paderewski.

*PDD 1919, doc. 368*

## 156

*17 May 1919, note by an employee of the Polish Delegation  
to the Peace Conference about discussions  
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland*

Paris, 17 May 1919

### PRO MEMORIA

from talks with the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Enckell

Beginning: 3:00 PM

Ending: 3:30 PM

I called upon the representation of Finland (22, rue de la Paix) for the purpose of obtaining information about sending a diplomatic mail to Finland.

The door was opened by Mr. Enckell, who, upon hearing my question about the diplomatic mail, invited me to enter the salon of the Delegation.



The question of the shipments was settled favourably, after which Mr. Enckell asked me about the cabinet crisis in Poland, and especially about a possible socialist background to the crisis.<sup>13</sup>

I replied that my information is limited to news brought by the morning papers and that:

1) The crisis seems to have been overcome with the Sejm's refusal to accept Paderewski's resignation (*The New York Herald* as of 17 May);

2) That there can be no question of a Bolshevik background;

3) That the cause of the crisis is the differing views on foreign policy between the Sejm and the government—differences which will no doubt be overcome given the goodwill on both sides.

I asked Mr. Enckell what he "advises me to think" about the news given by the press about the supposed Finnish offensive on Petrograd.

I got the following reply:

The news, as presented by the press, is inconsistent with reality.

What is true, however, is in the Gubernia of Olonets, an anti-Bolshevik movement broke out and the population has asked the Finnish government for assistance. The Finnish government is not in a position to provide armed assistance to come to the aid of anti-Bolshevik elements for the following reasons:

1. It cannot take the initiative in action directed against Petrograd without the certainty such action will be seen well by the government of Admiral Kolchak.

2. It cannot embark on official war operations without having obtained appropriate guarantees from the Entente (Mr. Enckell did not define the type of said guarantees and was reluctant to speak on this subject for understandable reasons).

3. It has to be reckoned with that the Finnish government has limited war means, as a result of which it cannot commit itself *dans le vide*.

Mr. Enckell further stated that:

1. While discussions were held and are being held with representatives of non-Bolshevik Russia (Mssrs. Sazonov, Maklakov, and Prince Lvov), there

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<sup>13</sup> At the time, European press wrote about Paderewski's possible resignation in connection with his conflict with Piłsudski about the stance to take regarding the Council of the Four's demands for an immediate ceasefire in the Polish-Ukrainian war.

is still no “serious pourparler” with Entente powers about Finnish action in Russia and guarantees for Finland.

2. The Finnish government nevertheless unofficially provides war materials to anti-Bolshevik elements in northern Russia.

On the question of the Baltic Federation, Mr. Enckell noted that Kolchak’s Russia will seek to rule (with assurances of autonomy) over all territories of former Russia, with the exception of Finland and Poland and, in particular, will never renounce the Baltic coast.

The situation of Estonia and Latvia is difficult as a result, since those countries are pursuing a fundamentally anti-Russian policy.

Summing up, we can see that:

1. The Finnish minister of foreign affairs attaches great importance to the shaping of relations between the Entente and Admiral Kolchak.

2. That Finland has no intention to take up any action without ensuring very serious benefits for itself.

3. That viewpoint of Mr. Enckell (whose brother supposedly was a Russian military agent in Rome) on Finland’s future relations with Russia is not entirely clear.

During the discussion, I stressed it was private, non-binding, and purely informative in nature.

*Adam Benis*

*PDD 1919, doc. 369*

## 157

*19 May 1919, ciphred telegram from the Deputy Minister  
of Foreign Affairs (from Paris) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
about the proposed mutual recognition  
of Poland and Czechoslovakia*

Paris, 19 May 1919, 11:35 AM  
Received 20 May 1919, 9:45 AM

Strictly Confidential  
Polish National Committee  
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
in Warsaw

Encrypted telegram

No. 65.

This is to notify that Beneš declared himself before the Territorial Commission to be against giving East Galicia to Russia or Ukraine. Beneš, whom I had previously sounded out, turned to me today with a specific proposal that Poland and Czechoslovakia reciprocally recognise each other's independence. If the government agrees, please send to me in Paris the necessary powers to exchange the relevant documents with the Czech government. Given this evolution of Beneš—who is going farther than either the Czech president or the Czech prime minister—Lord reminded me today of the president's intention to visit Prague on the way to Paris, saying that this visit could now prove fruitful.<sup>14</sup> Lord claims that should we only give the appearance that the Galician Ruthenians wish to live within the boundaries of the Polish state, the position of America would change. Nothing would further this today as much as statements pronounced in the Sejm about East Galician autonomy.<sup>15</sup>

Skrzyński

*PDD 1919, doc. 372*

<sup>14</sup> Paderewski visited Prague on his way to Paris and held talks with Prime Minister Masaryk on 25 May 1919.

<sup>15</sup> On 21 May 1919, the PNC received a ciphred telegram from the prime minister stating: "I agree to an exchange of mutual recognition of independence by Poland and Czechoslovakia. As to the matter of autonomy for Eastern Galicia, the Sejm will shortly pronounce itself." AAN, KNP, 256.

## 158

*19 May 1919, report by the government delegate in Danzig to the  
Prime Minister about the political situation*

19 May 1919

Confidential

To the PRIME MINISTER

The political situation that has emerged in Danzig in recent months, the cardinal change in the Germans' attitude toward the Entente mission, and the feverish arming of East and West Prussia, and Danzig require rapid and immediate preventive measures from the Entente states and the Polish government.

Guided by this thought, I consider it my sacred duty to present the state of affairs in Danzig to Your Excellency.

For over a month we have been the witnesses to feverish war preparations: the entire city and its surroundings are full of soldiers, in the fields outside the city and in fields by the Vistula daily military exercises are taking place, artillery batteries and cavalry regiments are filing past, and dozens of airplanes are gliding above the city, while the coastal batteries of Weichselmünde and Westerplatte, silent until yesterday, resounded loudly.

In connection with those actions, the attitude of the German authorities, above all the Generalkommando, has changed to unrecognisable. Difficulties appeared, as did a multitude of barriers to expediting English and American shipping to Poland. Lastly, the Generalkommando withheld the entire shipment from the English Red Cross and clothing sent from America, on the grounds that these items are not part of the programme of supplies for Poland.

Despite the strong protests of the American and English missions in Danzig, the arrival in the port of the English cruiser *Dracon* and destroyer *Walrus*, the American destroyer *Lea* and a French gunboat, the situation has not changed. There wasn't from the German side even the most elementary exchange of courtesies and it is only yesterday, after almost three weeks, that the German authorities allowed 258 railcars held in the Port of Danzig to depart for Poland.

According to my highly accurate information, Germany's present armed forces, the so-called *Grenzschutz*, between Danzig and the Polish boundary comprise 30,000 highly trained and excellently armed soldiers, mostly officers and volunteers from the intelligentsia spheres, almost as many reservists,

20 batteries of field artillery, heavy coastal artillery at the mouth of the Vistula, and significant technical forces.

The weapon in which the military authorities place the highest store during any future fighting are poisonous gasses and, in this regard, many preparations are being made in Danzig, including instruction courses on the use of poisonous gas, to which officers flock from all of Germany. No less attention is paid to technical defence measures—there are entire flamethrower units.

The intelligence section is organised with the usual German scrupulousness. It is with sadness that I must point out that the central spying organisation is located in Warsaw and in Olsztyn (Allenstein) on the Polish border and that, unfortunately, German military spheres are all too precisely informed about the goings on at the General Staff of the Warsaw Command.

Krzyż in Prussia, on the boundary of the Duchy, is a place where stamps and passports are forged.

The movement and the active defence of the German nation are led by the Danzig Generalkommando, headed by General von Below and Major Count Schwerin. Schwerin has an iron will, great ambition, and an unfathomed hatred of Poland, a man who has all the qualities and defects to become Germany's national hero and saviour. A third, and no less agitated individual is von Jagow, the Regierungspräsident. This group is backed by an enormous host of higher German officials, a significant portion of the Prussian Junkers and fanaticised soldiers. A couple of weeks ago, the decision was taken to break with the Reich government and the Berlin cabinet if the latter were to sign the peace terms, and to unite Pomerania, West and East Prussia with Danzig into one state and defend it and its rights in a life-and-death struggle.

So as to raise spirits among the German population, for a certain time efforts have been made and all possible means have been used to bring about unrest among the Poles and Kashubians inhabiting the Baltic coastline between Danzig and Marienburg.

Local activists told me that they can restrain the seething among the Poles, and especially among the Kashubians, only with great difficulty.

Such is the threat of war in the old leases of the Commonwealth from Danzig toward Thorn and Mława.

The Prussian eagle is still alive, its beak is curved and its claws are sharp, and although wounded, it can surge and inflict a deadly wound to those who come close to it unawares.

These conditions should not be underestimated. To say that all this is fantasy, that unforeseen circumstances would repeal it would be light-hearted. The threat is coming nearer, from the west the same dark cloud, the gauntlet

has been thrown down, and we have to take up the challenge. Let us think about this while there is time and prepare a defence so we do not draw blame for the defeat of our nation.

The further fate of Danzig and of West Prussia and the relation between those lands and the rest of the Polish state depend above all on the general line of state policy. Conditions in Danzig and in the Kashubian lands are so complex, so different, that they require deep reflection, great caution, and a precise grasp of the local conditions. It should be in the interest of the Polish Republic to draw the population of this country, not only the Polish but also the German one, closer to Poland to turn this population into loyal citizens of the Republic and, finally, not to provide fodder for any anti-Polish nationalist propaganda.

Danzig and West Prussia can be lost not only through war, but also an unskilled and, I would say, a too narrow state policy that doesn't take the people's nature and mentality into account. The future also depends on the first steps taken.

The population, including the German one, should from the first day be aware of the possibilities for peaceful work, personal security and assured further development under the Republic's protection.

I would consider it a terrible mistake to remove immediately all the German lower officials: railway people, telegraph operators, etc., etc. This excellent element, trained in the hard-Prussian school, should be used for the good of the state. Assuring work for these will calm down the greater part of the German population and take the wind out of the sails of those who spare no effort to stir it up and incite it to armed assault against Poland. No less important is the need to provide food for the local population.

The next important task is to win over for Poland the Danzig patricians. The Danzig merchants, more swiftly than others, accepted the concept of tying their further destiny to that of Poland. The causes of this lie in their business interests, and perhaps also somewhere deeper...

It should not be forgotten that the Polish eagle stands firm at the gates of Danzig and the Polish flag is flown on a warship in old Artus Court.<sup>16</sup>

Almost two thirds of the Danzig population has an attitude toward Poland that is, if not positive, then more or less indifferent, so it depends on Polish policy to turn this indifference into either liking or friendship.

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<sup>16</sup> Artus Court was decorated by, among other items, models of ships, and also by the "Church Ship," carrying the coat of arms and flags of Poland, Royal Prussia, and Danzig, thus symbolising the unification of those lands following the Thirteen Years' War (1454–1466).

I would consider that, above all else, one should turn to those Polish elements who know the substance and the soul of the country, who survived many long years of servitude and misfortune in the borderlands of the Republic, and for whom old Danzig is as dear as are Cracow and Vilnius.

It is into the hands of those seasoned, calm champions of the idea of the Great Republic, those people of far-reaching views on the state, like Dr. Łaszewski, Stanisław Count Sierakowski from Waplewo, Dr. Wybicki, and Dr. Kręcki, I repeat, into the hands of those people that Poland should place the destiny of Danzig and West Prussia.

By sending bureaucratised Galician officials of fanatical party agents into those very sore relations, one could scuttle the entire question and provoke threatening and unpredictable consequences for the Polish state.

To end, I must point to the danger of resorting to a plebiscite in parts of West Prussia given the present conditions.

*Mieczysław Jałowiecki*  
Delegate of the Polish Government in Danzig

*PDD 1919, doc. 376*

## 159

*20 May 1919, note by the PNC about Polish-Ukrainian relations*

Paris, 20 May 1919

*Confidential*

### REPORT ON POLISH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS

From 1 to 17 May 1919

In order to hold back steps to war being taken between the Ukrainians and the Poles, an inter-Allied commission composed of Colonel Kisch, General Le Rond, Baron Degrand, Colonel Embick and Prof. Bowman, and chaired by General Botha, convened at the end of April in Paris. Poland has delegated Mssrs. Paderewski, Dmowski and General Rozwadowski, and the Ukrainians, Mssrs. Paneiko and Sidorenko. After a failed attempt to impose on us conditions that we would have had to accept en bloc and after the Polish delegates indicated that for the Poles the three following demands are sine

qua non conditions of any ceasefire, namely establishing the anti-Bolshevik front line through a link-up of the Polish and Romanian armies, Allied control of Ruthenian armies and the elimination from them of Austro-German and Bolshevik elements, and total control of oil fields by Poland, on 13 May 1919, the delegation of Poles received for approval ceasefire conditions whose contents can be brought down to the following postulates:

1) The demarcation line runs from Litowiza on the Bug River to the south through Uhrynów, Lubów, Zabcze and Wanów, spot height no. 207 to Borów, along the stream Zeldec, to the east from Drybułki through Żółtańce, the Lwow district boundary, Gliniany, through Mikołajów, Kocurów, Hryniów, to the west of Bóbki, further through Suchodół and Huta Szczawiecka, Głuchowiec and the district boundary, going around Demnia to the Uście, Dniester and Bystrzyca to Mokrzan, the boundary of the districts through Spryńskie and mountain tops Huta, Wydylek, Roztoczna, Króliki, Małowienka, through Siwidniki, Góra Bukowska through Hołowska, Góry Bochna and Szymoniec, further along the Stryj River to Małkowo and through Krywka to the spot height no. 831 (Jaszenowo) on the Hungarian border.

2) The ceasefire does not in any way settle the East Galicia question, leaving it to the peace treaty.

3) The military forces of either side should not exceed 20,000. They can also be reduced if the inter-Allied commission demands it. This commission is also to supervise the prohibition of shipping ammunition to the territories subject to military operations.

4) As compensation for the oil fields located on land occupied by the Ukrainians, Poland will receive half of the yearly production, at production and shipping costs.

5) Articles 4, 7 and 8 indirectly imply that the ceasefire is to be permanent.

Without derogating from the ceasefire as a principle, the Polish delegates replied that given the rising Bolshevik influence in the Ruthenian army and the dangers that arise from the German-Bolshevik understanding, Poland must create a unified front with Romania. The ceasefire conditions should thus contain the right for the Polish and Romanian troops to occupy the Lwow-Halicz-Stanisławów-Czerniowce and Stanisławów-Korozmeso rail lines. In addition, the Polish and Romanian troops should have the right, for the purpose of defending the above-mentioned rail lines, to enter East Galicia to create a front running from Dniester-Złota Lipa-Styr. Moreover, the delegates noted that no ceasefire can be signed if it does not contain those conditions.

During those discussions, news and information arrived from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the serious political changes taking place in eastern Ukraine, namely that on 22 March a committee for the "Protection of the



Republic" is to be established in Kamieniec Podolski, composed of extreme-left elements and inspired by Hrushevsky and Holubovych. The Protection of the Republic resolves to break off negotiations with the French command, to begin negotiations with the Bolshevik Rakovsky government, and to form a new cabinet.<sup>17</sup> Shaken by the news, the Ostapenko cabinet was replaced on 25 April by a new one,<sup>18</sup> composed of, among other people, Martos and Izaak Mazepa, and Temnycky (minister of foreign affairs, a Ruthenian from Galicia). The new cabinet conducts a very extreme, even Bolshevik, policy, and announced in its proclamation the control of state institutions by Worker Councils and the division of land without indemnity. With respect to Poland, this cabinet adopted a stance of absolute opposition and claims the Chełm area, Volhynia and Galicia with Lwow. A telegram sent on 13 April by Petlura in the name of the Directorate to Deputy Prime Minister Feshchenko-Chopivsky, shows that Petlura agreed to the formation of this cabinet. The rise of Bolshevik influence in Ukraine is reflected in ataman Oskilko's coup attempt against Petlura, who is Bolshevizing increasingly.<sup>19</sup>

This information made the Polish government stand fast by its demands for a strategic ceasefire line protecting the link-up between Poland and Romania. In recent days, it turned out that the pressure on us on the matter of the ceasefire originates in England and is due to the aims of English policy. This pressure at times takes the form of threats (Mr. Howard) to the effect that should we reject the ceasefire conditions, Poland will find itself without assistance in the face of German resistance to the handing over of the Prussian Partitions.

A report about the above negotiations was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the prime minister, from whom on 17 May a dispatch arrived for Mr. Dmowski, demanding that negotiations be suspended pending further

<sup>17</sup> On 22 March 1919 in Kamieniec Podolski, a Committee for the Protection of the Republic was formed under the leadership of former Prime Minister Volodymyr Chekhivsky, who called for an immediate cessation of negotiations with the Entente and the initiation of peace talks with the Ukrainian Bolshevik government in Kharkiv, headed by Christian Rakovsky.

<sup>18</sup> The Ostapenko cabinet disintegrated and lost the capacity to govern at the turn of April to May 1919. As a result, on 9 April, the members of the Directorate, Petlura and Makarenko, confirmed the composition of the new government, with Borys Martos as prime minister. The right-wing parties of the Ukrainian People's Republic saw the formation of the Martos government as illegal

<sup>19</sup> On 29 April 1919 in Rovno, which served then as the temporary capital of the Ukrainian People's Republic, a putsch broke out, led by Ataman Volodymyr Oskilko, commander of the northern group of armies of the UPR, who proclaimed himself commander in chief of the Ukrainian army. The putsch collapsed on 30 April when the army did not accept Oskilko's plans to arrest Petlura.

instructions. The dispatch states that acceptance of the ceasefire conditions as presented by the Commission, and depriving Poland of the oil fields, would cause a revolution in the country and would never be ratified by the Sejm. Serious changes took place in the composition of the Directorate itself, its power was greatly reduced recently, as a result of which the mandates of the Ukrainian representatives in Paris became worthless.

/-/ Tadeusz Domański

*PDD 1919, doc. 379*

## 160

*21 May 1919, telegram from the temporary representative  
of the PNC in the USA to the PNC about the Jewish campaigns*

Washington, May 21<sup>st</sup> 1919

### TELEGRAM FROM MR. SMULSKI TO POLISH NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Jewish anti-Polish demonstrations based on alleged pogroms started anew in United States mass meetings held New York Chicago and other cities anti-Polish campaign has been outlined Wednesday in New York Hughes former presidential candidate principal speaker condemned Poles outright impossible to make proper answer here without information silence of Polish Government embarrassing American officials want definite statement from Polish Government for America preferably they say from Paderewski State Department has cabled Gibson Warsaw important formal be sent me for presentation to State Department an answer to be used as basis for replies to charges.

/-/ John F. Smulski

*PDD 1919, doc. 380 (ENG)*

## 161

*22 May 1919, ciphered telegram from the Deputy Minister  
of Foreign Affairs (from Paris) to the Prime Minister  
about British pressure in the matter  
of the Polish-Ukrainian ceasefire*

Paris, 22 May 1919

Polish National Committee to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

To President Paderewski

No. 73

The Council of the Four is threatening by telegraph to suspend provision assistance. Lloyd George demanded the suspension of military, food, and resources supplies for Poland but Wilson was against. We are only facing the threat of a possible suspension of troop and ammunition transports. The Ukrainians would have agreed to hold back the Polish offensive, but Botha insists that the Poles withdraw to the line from 12 May. The entire commission is impressed by Lloyd George's obstinacy against Poland. Friendly circles advise us to play for time and to respond in the tone of the unjustly wronged. The English claim that a small unit from Haller's army entered East Galicia.

Skrzyński

*PDD 1919, doc. 385*

## 162

*23 May 1919, letter from the Supreme Command  
to the Prime Minister with a recommendation  
for a defensive pact with Czechoslovakia*

Warsaw, 23 May 1919

To Prime Minister PADEREWSKI  
in Warsaw

Agreement with the Czechs  
about the defence of Poland's western boundary

The German documents that have recently fallen into our hands are unanimous that should the peace treaty not be signed, Germany is to attack Poland. Such an attack is also planned from Prussian Silesia, doubtless in the direction of the Dąbrowa Coal Basin. In an intercepted telephone conversation, there was talk of an attack on 27 May.

Given that we still have considerable forces tied down on the eastern front and are too weak to effectively defend our western boundaries, we are in serious need of Czech assistance. A German offensive in the direction of the Dąbrowa Coal Basin could best be held back by means of a Czech attack along the left bank of the Oder River.

If political conditions allow it, an agreement in this spirit should be concluded immediately.

Should you decide it is possible, Captain Pieczonka's orders are to begin discussions with the Czech general staff about such an initiative immediately. Should the need arise, a higher-ranking officer, summoned by telegraph, could also leave for Prague. The best, however, would be if a Czech general staff officer came to Warsaw to discuss the agreement in depth.

*Haller  
Colonel*

*PDD 1919, doc. 387*

## 163

*23 May 1919, note by an expert of the Polish Delegation  
to the Peace Conference in the matter  
of the proposed Baltic Federation*

Paris, 23 May 1919

## PRO MEMORIA

The Baltic Federation, supported by England (see *The Times* of 21 May 1919<sup>20</sup>) is encountering two fundamental difficulties:

1) The states that are supposed to comprise it are not yet at a developmental level that would allow them to create an entirely independent state organism (they owe this circumstance in some measure to the support of England, which by definition is trying to subordinate to itself the Baltic Federation).

2) The attitude of the young Baltic States toward Russia presents itself as follows: Finland, as Mr. Enckell, the Finnish minister of foreign affairs claims, wishes to maintain good relations with Russia while knowing that as the largest of the said states, it will survive even if it is isolated because it can always count on England's support. Estonia's policy toward Russia is less clear, but is one of the states that are to be a part of the Baltic Federation, the least likely formation. Latvia's stance toward Russia is downright negative. It wishes for a close understanding with Lithuania and with Poland.

To sum up the previous, one can state that while it is difficult to talk of a fundamental rapprochement between Poland and the Baltic Federation at the present moment, we should keep in close contact with their leading politicians and de facto recognise temporarily their independence pending the decision of the Peace Conference on this matter (in the pattern of the Entente states) and strive to earn their sympathy for the future.

Legation Counsellor  
C. Pruszyński

*PDD 1919, doc. 388*

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<sup>20</sup> The article "The Bolsheviks Decline," carried by *The Times* on 21 May 1919, mentioned the soon-to-be-established Baltic League.

## 164

*23 May 1919, letter from the Secretary General  
of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference to the Chief of State  
about relations with Great Britain*

Paris, 23 May 1919

Dear Commandant,

It is my impression that relations with England, which continue to be neglected and are continually being ruined, have reached a critical stage. England is showing at every turn, in every commission, in all economic matters, an aversion toward us, distrust of our government and state organisation, and exhibits a conscious tendency to prevent us from becoming the fourth great European state. I fear it may be too late and I wonder if we will not be forced to reckon with England's opposition toward us for the foreseeable future, with England's supporting of all our enemies. On England's initiative, paragraph 93 was introduced into the treaty, binding Poland to accept "provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of Poland who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion."<sup>21</sup> As a result of this paragraph, and on England's initiative, a "national minorities" commission was established with the special task of overseeing Poland. At its head stands Berthelot, a French Russophile hostile to Poland, and one of its members is one of the most intelligent Englishmen here, Headlam-Morley. This commission works in complete secrecy and Poland has no access to it.

Similarly, on England's initiative the Baltic Commission was established. It is composed of four Englishmen headed by Esme Howard and the Frenchman Kammerer, who is unfriendly to Poland. While you may have gotten the impression during your past discussions with Howard that cooperation was possible in its formation of *Balticum*, presently the situation has changed fundamentally: One gets the impression that England is forming the Baltic League in order to keep Poland in check, to take over the mandate from the League of Nations over Lithuania and even—who knows—is not for cooperation in this manner in reconstructing Russia. Recently, the London press, in an entirely similar way as the French press, has been preparing public opinion for the recognition of Kolchak's government and demands the reconstitution of a Russia great and whole.

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<sup>21</sup> This refers to the later Article 93 of the draft Peace Treaty with Germany, which bound Poland to protect minorities. The so-called Little Versailles Treaty that arose from it and was signed along with the treaty proper, made Poland responsible for the just treatment of its national and religious minorities. The League of Nations became the guarantor of minority rights.

It is only against this background that one may understand the latest developments here, of which you have most certainly been informed by telegraphs: with the absence of Orlando at a meeting of the Four on 21 May, Lloyd George spoke in a fury against Poland and demanded sanctions for the Galicia offensive; these sanctions are to be two-fold—the suspension of all supplies, not only of a military nature but also of food to Poland, possible concessions to Germany concerning the western borders, above all in Upper Silesia. As a consequence of Lloyd George's intervention, a compromise motion was passed to send a telegram drawn up by Wilson to Paderewski. As far as we know, it was supposed to be sent yesterday with the signatures of the Four and was supposed to contain a firm demand that a ceasefire be concluded with the Ruthenians.

Lloyd George's initiative is being ascribed, among others, to agreements that England has supposedly concluded with the Ukrainians and which place the Borysław under England's control (Stakhovsky, a Ukrainian deputy posted in Copenhagen until recently, has now been sent to London). All this is connected to English ideas of obtaining again a League of Nations mandate over the Borysław district, and even over the entirety of East Galicia and, possibly, Upper Silesia.

I will admit that, being here, I no longer see a remedy to all these things and I do not augur well for any talks with the English for the time being. For example, Wasilewski's discussion with Howard that you were recommending recently will probably not take place in the next few days. It is all very harmful and downright dangerous. I wouldn't want my past reports containing criticism and disregard of the Peace Conference to contribute in the slightest to the neglect, if even for a moment, of our relations with England, on whom the future of Poland depends to a great extent.

Only you, Commandant, hold in your hands the remedy, which lies in your attitude toward the nations that are our neighbours, above all Lithuania and Ukraine. I described to you already how much your Lithuanian proclamation has changed the nature of the international policies pursued in the matter of Poland in Paris. A similar gesture with regard to Ukraine, i.e., an agreement concluded by you on the spot in East Galicia with the beaten adversary would have a much greater impact and would change the situation entirely. This would have to take place soon, it would have to be done on your clear initiative, and be done with such persons as Metropolitan Szeptycki, for example, a person with whom Europe would have to reckon with and whom neither the locals nor the Ukrainians in London could disavow. Only such a policy of a wide scope, one that takes into account the future and development of all nations that surround us, can provide us with position in the world and could alter this terrible error that was our entire English policy.

The second aspect of such a policy would be for you to establish direct contact with Latvians and Estonians there. I do not know to what extent this is strategically possible at this moment and whether it is part of your intentions. I know from discussions here, however, that if it was possible, it would have an enormous impact on those nations and how much this would fundamentally alter the campaign being conducted against us in the Baltic area.

*PDD 1919, doc. 393*

## 165

*26 May 1919, ciphered telegram from the Chairman of the PNC to the Council of Ministers about subordinating the Polish Army to the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces*

Paris, 26 May

Polish National Committee  
To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
To the Council of Ministers

No. 77

To ensure the cooperation of the Allies in case of attack from Germany and to warn Germany, it is necessary to place the Polish army under the supreme command of Marshal Foch, equal to all other Allied armies.

This matter should be settled during the next few days. The decision on this matter belongs to the French government and Foch. Formally, this must be initiated by means of an appeal from the Polish government to the French government. Please coordinate matters with the Chief of State and immediately empower Paderewski or myself, should he be absent, to submit the appeal, demanding that:

- 1) The Polish army be placed under the supreme command of Marshal Foch on an equal footing to other Allied armies;
- 2) An appropriate agreement be signed with the French government;
- 3) This fact be made public.

Dmowski

*PDD 1919, doc. 399*



## 166

*26 May 1919, note by the PNC representative in London about the attitude of the Foreign Office about White Russia and Ukraine*

26 May 1919

CONFIDENTIAL

This very moment, I found out that the position of the Foreign Office with regard to anti-Bolshevik Russia and Ukraine is as follows:

The Foreign Office is of the opinion that Kolchak's government should be recognised immediately, but on certain conditions, including with respect to the future boundaries between Russia and Poland. They are convinced that Ukraine can only exist as an integral part of Russia. Delays in recognising Kolchak are seen as dangerous because he is still weak, but once he occupies Moscow he will not be so slow.

From this position, one should conclude that the matter of Poland's eastern boundaries can be settled only when Bolshevism will be crushed and concrete negotiations with a future united Russia become possible. To my question whether this is also Lloyd George's view, I was told that there is hope of convincing him of this. I wish to stress, however, that even though this is the position of the Foreign Office, this does not forestall at this time the decisions of the government. I doubt if the change in England's policy with regard to anti-Bolshevik Russia were to alter England's position with respect to Poland. But one should take such a possibility into account, because Russia represents more attractive terrain for economic expansion than Poland, which remains unknown.

*Sobański*

*PDD 1919, doc. 401*

## 167

*26 May 1919, ciphred telegram from the Deputy Minister  
of Foreign Affairs (from Paris) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
about the views of White Russian representatives  
in the matter of relations with Poland*

Paris, 26 May 1919

PNC to MFA

Top secret.

No. 75

Maklakov claims that for the sake of good future Polish-Russian relations, it would be beneficial to first determine the boundaries of territories that are to belong indisputably to Poland or to Russia. The territories lying between them should be treated as a zone in question, whose further destiny would depend on arrangements with Russia, on plebiscites or on objective statistics. An advance by Polish troops in such a situation, instead of irritating Russia, would be considered assistance given to Kolchak and Denikin. The parts of this zone in question that are occupied by Polish troops could remain under Polish or local administration pending the final decision. In the matter of Eastern Galicia, we can count on silent Russian désintéressement, but not on clear renunciation. With Finland, the Russians are conducting negotiations on very wide autonomy, and with Estonia on a much narrower one. Despite the difficulties made by Lloyd George and America, the matter of recognition for the Kolchak government and the appointment of Russian representatives with the Entente is progressing. Maklakov and conciliatory Russians think most important is that Poland does not give the Russian people grounds to think it is taking advantage of Russia's current situation. In their view, such a solution would awaken hostile sentiments and would not last. On the Russian question, we could find ourselves facing inconvenient faits accomplis if we do not choose some specific policy.

Skrzyński

*PDD 1919, doc. 403*

## 168

*28 May 1919, ciphered telegram from the Prime Minister  
to the delegate of the Peace Conference  
about placing the Polish Army under the command  
of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces*

28 May 1919

Prime Minister Paderewski

Comité National Polonais

11bis avenue Kléber, Paris

[In response to] dispatch No. 77 from Mr. Dmowski, we answered in code:

Having discussed the matter with the Chief of State, it is my honour to report that the question of the military convention with the French government, about which Mr. Dmowski wrote in his telegram, is presently at such a stage that the text of the convention drawn up in Warsaw between our High Command and General Henrys is awaiting the confirmation of the French government. The Chief of State expects that General Henrys, who is to return to Warsaw on Friday, will bring this confirmation with him, after which the Sejm will have to ratify it. This matter thus is not yet ready to be made public. On the other hand, placing the Polish army, as was the case of the armies of alliés et associés states, under the supreme command of Marshal Foch the Chief of State considers to be a simple consequence of the Sejm's enactment of an alliance with those states. As Commander in Chief of the Polish Army, he has also drawn the logical consequence from this fact, namely when he gave out extensive orders for the western front in case of a conflict with Germany, [in which] he stated to the generals that those orders could be subject to change if the Supreme Command of Allied Forces demands it. I would also like to mention that the French General Massenot (from Haller's Army) was also present during talks on this matter.

*PDD 1919, doc. 408*

## 169

*28 May 1919, note from the representative of the PNC  
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France  
about German sabotage in Upper Silesia*

le 28 Mai 1919

Son Excellence Monsieur Stephen Pichon  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

Il y a plus d'un mois, les Représentants de la Haute Silésie ont saisi la Délégation Polonaise Economique au Congrès de la Paix, d'une motion concernant l'empêchement des sabotages qui pourraient être organisés par les Allemands dans l'ancienne Pologne prussienne au moment de quitter ce pays; il s'agirait en premier lieu de les rendre responsables de toute détérioration qu'ils auraient pu commettre. Vu l'importance de cette question, la Délégation Economique polonaise, l'a suggère à la Commission présidée par M. Cambon, comme une des clauses du Traité de la Paix, mais le texte des préliminaires l'a passé sous silence.

Le danger du sabotage des biens fiscaux, des usines d'état et autres, surtout en Haute Silésie, devenant de plus en plus à redouter, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence certains faits qui prouvent suffisamment les intentions des Allemands à ce sujet et la gravité de la situation. Le Sieur Otto Hörsing, commissaire gouvernemental pur la Haute Silésie nommé uniquement pour combattre dans cette province toutes les tendances polonaises, n'a pas hésité à affirmer que les Allemands ne céderont jamais de bon gré la Haute Silésie et qu'ils la défendront avec l'aide du gouvernement de Berlin ou sans lui. Cette défense aurait certainement une répercussion néfaste sur toute la vie économique du pays en le minant et en mettant sur pied des centaines de Milles d'ouvriers. Prévenir et se garantir contre ces sabotages est non seulement de l'intérêt de la Pologne, mais aussi de l'intérêt des Alliés; car le traité de la paix prévoit des paiements que l'Etat polonais aura à effectuer en rapport avec les biens fiscaux qui lui reviendront; or, si ces biens sont détériorés et inaptes à être exploités, les paiements en question rencontreront de très grandes difficultés. Nous croyons qu'il est de notre intérêt commun de faire le possible pour prévenir cet état de chose. Pour ne citer qu'un exemple de l'importance de cette question les quatre mines de charbon, appartenant en Haute Silésie à l'état représentent la valeur de 100 millions de marks.

En me permettant de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence les renseignements ci-dessus, je prends la liberté de vous prier, Monsieur le Ministre, si vous le trouvez opportun, de vouloir bien intervenir afin de

contrecarrer les projets allemands de sabotages dans l'ancienne Pologne prussienne et particulièrement en Haute Silésie, et de garantir les dommages intérêts qu'ils auraient à payer si les sabotages en question étaient commis.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

/-/ E. Piltz

*PDD 1919, doc. 409*

## 170

*28 May 1919, note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs  
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia  
about the mutual recognition of statehood*

Paris, le 28 Mai 1919

A Son Excellence Monsieur Benes  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la République Tchéco-Slovaque

### ECHANGE DES NOTES ENTRE LES GOUVERNEMENTS POLONAIS ET TCHECO-SLOVAQUE AU SUJET DE LA RECONNAISSANCE RECIPROQUE DE CES DEUX ETATS

Monsieur le Ministre,

La Pologne, reconstituée comme Etat indépendant et souverain, prend son rang parmi les Etats Alliés et s'apprête à collaborer à la grande tâche de l'organisation de l'Europe nouvelle, où les développements politiques et sociaux seront les garanties et en même temps les conditions préalables du triomphe définitif des principes du droit et de la justice.

En portant ceci à la connaissance de Votre Excellence, je tiens à exprimer au nom de la Pologne les sentiments que nous inspirent non seulement les glorieuses traditions historiques de nos deux pays, mais aussi les souffrances endurées en commun. Avant-gardes de la culture occidentale, la Pologne et la Tchéco-Slovaquie, de concert avec les grandes démocraties civilisées, sont appelées à collaborer au bonheur de l'humanité.

Je me plais d'espérer que des relations cordiales de bon voisinage s'établiront entre nos deux États et qu'elles prendront un caractère de plus en plus intime.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

/-/ I. J. Paderewski

*PDD 1919, doc. 411*

## 171

*29 May 1919, ciphered telegram from the Supreme People's Council to the PNC about the situation in Poznań region*

Radios du Conseil Populaire Suprême de la Posnanie  
au Comité National Polonais Reçus le 29 et 30 Mai 1919

- 1) Situation très sérieuse allemands préparent grande offensive.
- 2) Toutes les villes et tous les villages sur ligne de démarcation remplis de troupes régulières allemandes.
- 3) Notre situation extrêmement sérieuse tâchez par tous les moyens de renforcer notre résistance militaire.
- 4) Situation excessivement grave mais le moral des troupes excellent.

*PDD 1919, doc. 415*

## 172

*31 May 1919, note from the Polish Delegation  
to the Peace Conference to the Chairman of the Conference  
about German activities in Upper Silesia*

Paris, le 31 Mai 1919

Son Excellence Monsieur  
Georges Clemenceau  
Président de la Conférence  
de la Paix

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence les agissements des autorités allemandes dans les pays se trouvant encore sous la domination allemande et reconnus à la Pologne par les conditions du traité de paix avec l'Allemagne. L'état d'exaspération créé par le Gouvernement allemand est extrême et certains documents nous prouvent que tous les préparatifs sont faits en vue d'un conflit armé germano-polonais.

Par les moyens les plus perfides et par des vexations continuelles les Allemands cherchent à provoquer une révolution polonaise qui leur délierait les mains devant les Puissances Alliées et Associées, et leur permettrait en se déclarant attaqués de noyer la soi-disant révolution dans le sang.

Grâce aux efforts du Conseil Populaire Suprême de Posnanie la population confiante dans les décisions des Puissances Alliées conserve son calme, ayant la certitude de voir ces territoires rattachés définitivement à la mère-Patrie. Néanmoins la situation reste extrêmement grave.

Le Département politique du dit Conseil dans son communiqué du 23 Mai nous fait savoir que dans toute la Prusse Occidentale de grandes quantités de troupes sont massées, et surtout de l'artillerie. De fortes réserves se trouvent à Stettin et en Prusse Orientale; en dehors des formations du „Grenzschutz”, des forces armées régulières „Reichswehr” composées surtout de Bavarois arrivent jour et nuit en Haute Silésie. La fabrique d'explosifs Kruppenmuhle près de Kielcz (Kieltsch) district de Gross-Strelitz travaille fiévreusement depuis trois semaines; dans toutes les gares de la Haute Silésie des caisses de dynamite sont déposées, le matériel roulant est évacué. En prévision de combats prochains les autorités allemandes distribuent des fusils à la population civile allemande et arment le personnel des chemins de fer (20.000 hommes). Des trains chargés de munitions et d'armes ne cessent d'être envoyés vers la frontière orientale.

Ci-joint nous nous permettons de communiquer à Votre Excellence les copies de sept documents allemands authentiques qui nous sont parvenus à titre confidentiel.

Il ressort aussi d'une circulaire très confidentielle destinée aux agents allemands se trouvant à l'étranger que l'Allemagne fera tout son possible pour empêcher la création d'une Pologne forte, réellement indépendante.

Le Gouvernement Polonais a pleine confiance que les Puissances Alliées et Associées voudront donner tout leur appui à la Pologne dans la situation périlleuse où elle se trouve.

Veuillez agréer, je vous prie Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

*PDD 1919, doc. 427*

## 173

### *31 May 1919, final report on the activities of the PNC representation in London*

#### *Report of the London Mission of the Polish National Committee from 31 May 1919*

The general line of our political activity in England falls within the sphere of the general activities of the Polish National Committee. The report by the Polish National Committee's Mission in London will thus be restricted to a description of the English viewpoint with regard to Polish affairs.

The most striking phenomenon, which persists to a considerable degree, has been the almost complete ignorance of English public opinion—even educated opinion—about Poland, its past, and its importance. This unawareness can be explained by the lack of close ties between England and Poland in the past century, and the lack of Polish émigrés in England who might maintain interest and sympathy for Poland as the French and Italian émigrés have done for their countries. Furthermore, the mind of the average English person, being in any case so little acquainted with geography, is unwilling to engage in questions that do not have real meaning for his practical conception of life. And as to the Polish question, until the outbreak of the war, was unfortunately seen by the English as entirely theoretical, they ceased to be interested and considered our cause to be an internal Russian, German, or Austrian one, just as the world considered the analogous Irish question to be an internal English matter.



This average view of the Polish question is not limited to the pre-war period; even in the first years of the war, not only public opinion but also the English government was reluctant to raise the Polish question as an international one or to offend its ally, Russia, which for its part—and not only in England—would not allow any discussion on the subject up until the time of the revolution. Only on the eve of the revolution, when an English mission led by Lord Milner arrived in Russia, was it possible to notice a certain more realistic interest in the Polish problem. The arrival of Mr. Dmowski to England contributed to this in large measure, although later when Count Z. Wielopolski and Mr. Raczkowski visited as a delegation from the Russian Duma, everyone understood that at this moment it was still too early to raise the Polish question in sharp antagonism to Russia in England. Only the Russian revolution and recognition of Polish independence by the government of Prince Lvov allowed Polish politicians to present the Polish question in its entirety within the appropriate international framework.

This is how the question was presented by Mr. Roman Dmowski in his book entitled *PROBLEMS OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE*,<sup>22</sup> which makes Poland's independence dependent on the Entente's victory over Germany and the division of Austria.

With the matter presented thus, it had to be demonstrated that Poland's independence and unification are a necessary condition for peace and to move from theory to the realisation of this postulate and its programme. Given Germany's military superiority at the time, the accusation that our postulates in regard to unification—and thus complete independence—were considered to be pious and unrealistic dreams, was serious. This scepticism carried another danger for us: that England would agree to an Austrian resolution of the Polish question, as presenting fewer difficulties in implementation. It goes without saying that such views cannot be voiced officially, but in talks with influential people it is easy to see that although an ultimate victory over the Central Powers is believed, it is not believed to the degree of forcing Germany to relinquish Danzig, Poznań Province, Silesia, etc. While there was a camp of people, such as Wickham Steed, Seton-Watson, and so forth, grouped around the influential weekly *New Europe*, which above all sought the breakup of the Austrian monarchy and the creation of independent states from its ruins, they were not very sympathetic to Poland, as it did not correspond in their opinion to certain social and religious ideals. These people would have agreed on a formation of Slavic states in which a primary role was played by the Czechs, who have long sympathised with Russia, until Russia returned to its never fulfilled role as the great protector of Slavdom. In this concept, there was no room for a strong and truly independent Poland.

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<sup>22</sup> This is a reference to a broad memorial published in book form in 1917.

Such a policy of taking the line of least resistance coincided with the policy of the activists in Poland who had the external forms of state power in their hands, while the impossibility for real opinion in Poland to express itself could have given the appearance that Poland itself had given up its long-standing demands.

Our task was thus to convince people that just any sort of Poland would be an easier prey for Germany and would not weaken but rather strengthen it; that the activists were a negligible minority; that Poland's desires were in accord with ours; and that despite the desperate situation in which the country found itself, the Central Powers' attempts to draw Poland into their orbit had met with passive resistance. Less frequent but reliable information from Poland confirmed our views and allowed us to proceed along this path, explaining that not only is Poland not going to be sucked into the "Mittel Europa" project but should become an ally of the Entente, and in the future, a wall against Pan-Germanism. One consequence of this was the creation of a Polish army allied with the West, as visible proof of our nation's true sentiments and wishes.

In attempting to persuade England of its real interest in creating a strong Poland, we have been continually hampered by the English pacifist camp and also the Zionists—internationalists, who saw, correctly, that the achievement of our programme would mean the war would have to end with victory. For as long as the war continued, Lloyd George and his government sacrificed everything to an ultimate victory and thus they saw us as a means to an end. However, at the moment when that victory was assured, Lloyd George began to be concerned above all with pleasing voters and the working masses by returning as quickly as possible to the pre-war state, and as foreign policy questions are in general unfamiliar to him, he imagined that victory in the West, with the destruction of Germany's colonial and military might, would sufficiently guarantee that Germany had been weakened. Furthermore, it is possible that he is not eager to see the end of German expansion toward the east, which he seems to consider an essential safety valve. Our enemies made use of this short-sighted foreign policy of the English prime minister to our disadvantage during the peace conference, recruiting to their side those who do not want Poland to be independent because it would hinder the previous direction of their financial influence in the east through Berlin and Vienna.

Turning now to the chronological order of things, our activities in England could only acquire the proper character from the moment—15 October 1917 (enclosure A)—when the English government recognised the Polish National Committee as the official Polish representation, and only then was it possible to begin work on the English theatre in a normal fashion. Until that time, not only was the Polish question little known and understood in England, but to cap it all, the efforts of various Poles were met with the English accusation

that there is not a Pole who would not pretend to the title of Poland's true representative. Thus, it was easy for the unaware English to conclude that Poles would never agree among themselves and easy for people who do not wish us well to argue that the proposed independence of the Polish state is not viable. The main difficulties of presenting the Polish question in the proper theatre, that is, that the creation of a strong independent Poland is a necessary condition of the victorious peace for England itself, rested on this lack of awareness in public opinion, which was used by our enemies. The recognition of the Polish National Committee as the official Polish organisation has facilitated our activities in relation to official spheres, the press, politicians, and public opinion, which in England is especially concerned with placing foreign people and affairs in set categories. Moreover, and most importantly, the English government's recognition of the Polish political organisation as official at once turned the Polish question into an international one and not an internal Russian one, as it was previously considered. Of course, Russia's revolution and disintegration have been a great help to us in this; nevertheless, that first breakthrough of a formal nature made it possible to obtain certain commitments toward Poland from the English government. Aside from the words of English statesmen, the first such official commitment by England was a letter of 18 February 1918 from the undersecretary of state, Sir Ronald Graham, to the representative of the Polish National Committee in London (enclosure B) in the matter of the peace of Brest-Litovsk between the Central Powers and Ukraine. In this letter, there is a clear undertaking that England will not recognise any peace involving Poland without a previous agreement with Poland. This fact should be considered the more striking because England's foreign policy tradition, more than that of any other state, is characterised by excessive caution in making any kind of commitment. A further consequence of this act was to award the Polish National Committee the right to represent Poland at the peace conference (enclosure C).

As the further development of events forced the Entente to centralise both political and military activities, further official declarations about Poland were common to England, France, Italy, and the United States. Thus, as their description enters into the general sphere of the activity of the entire Polish National Committee, I am omitting them from the present report, which is limited solely to the strictly English theatre.

The next step toward recognising the principle of Poland's independence was to grant, on 22 February 1918, Poles living in England who had previously been Austrian or German subjects (as well as those who had been former Russian subjects) not only the status of being purely Polish but also the status of "alien friend," that is, friendly foreigners, the same as the French, the Italians, and other allies (enclosure D).

This agreement simultaneously gave de facto—if not yet de jure—consular rights to the Polish National Committee. The negotiations on this matter were difficult and burdensome on account of general wartime restrictions and obstacles connected with Poland's as yet undefined legal status and the necessity of obtaining the agreement not only of the Foreign Office but also of the ministries of war and internal affairs. This subject in reality belongs to the competence of the Office of Civilian Affairs; I must mention it here, though, because it arose out of the need of the Polish National Committee's mission in London to adopt a position in regard to the Jewish question. The Jews in England began, naturally, to take an interest in Poland's position in regard to its future Jewish subjects, and they quickly oriented themselves as to the advantages to be had from the privileges acquired by the Polish National Committee for the former Polish subjects of enemy nations, freeing them from certain restrictions. Thus, all the Jews who were not English subjects (at whom, it should be added the English authorities had begun to look at with increased suspicion, as an organ of pacifist, and also Bolshevik, propaganda) desired to obtain a certificate of Polishness on the strength of a nearer or more distant affiliation with their Polish co-religionists. This question could not be settled at once due to the difficulties in defining the Polishness of individuals who do not even speak Polish and to the firm opposition of the Ministry of Internal Affairs here; the result was violent attacks by English Jews to the effect that the Polish National Committee, and the future Poland, are hostile to Jews. The local Jews, who are for the most part wealthy and assimilated into English society despite retaining their religion, did not understand the foreign and immigrant nature of the majority of their co-religionists in Poland; thus, the Polish National Committee and Poles have been continually suspected of anti-Semitism, despite our assurances that in the future Poland, all Polish citizens, without regard to faith, will be considered equal before the law.

There is no room or time here for a fundamental review of whether and to what degree the position of Polish politicians on the Jewish question was a cause or only a pretext for the difficulties the Polish question has encountered on the international stage—at any rate, it should be stated that in England as well, with the increase of incidents and the gradual implementation of Poland's independence and unification, Poland's supposed anti-Semitism has sometimes been an effective weapon in the hands of our enemies.

From the moment the Polish army, under the leadership of General Haller, was formed in France, the French and English governments recognised it as autonomous and allied (enclosure E). Polish armies fighting as part of the allied armies became visible proof of our sympathy and joint action with the Entente, despite Poland's inability to take part in the struggle on its own, and this was a powerful advantage for us in defending our cause.

In England, the period from recognition of the Polish National Committee to the victory of the Allies and the armistice of 11 November 1918 was a time of slow but continual progress in the work of enlightening official circles, as well as public opinion, on the significance for England of a proper resolution of the Polish question. One important advantage for us was the creation of an economic mission in London, in connection with the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement, since with the aid of this mission we managed to arouse interest in Poland in English industrial, trade, and financial circles, that is, to give a real basis for the local public's interest, which had previously been rather platonic. In truth, progress in this area as well is still slow, but it is obvious that despite the conservatism and caution here, every English merchant or industrialist, once drawn into business with Poland, will be our natural ally, and a more constant one than a politician, whose amity and interest is dependent on the variable currents of public opinion and on motives that are often purely domestic.

It goes without saying, however, that this first period of the Polish National Committee's activities in England was only a preparatory period.

The matter of Danzig, Poznań Province, Silesia, etc. became real issues from the moment of Germany's defeat and from the moment the peace negotiations began. From that moment, however, the focus naturally shifted to Paris. Not only did the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs move there but also the majority of Foreign Office officials, and consequently, our influence on official spheres in England has been reduced to a minimum. This state of affairs could have its advantages, as contacts between the leading Polish politicians in Paris and the English political leaders could become easier; at the same time, it has its negative aspects, because since Lloyd George became the sole decision-maker on our question on the English side, the Foreign Office, as the body directing foreign policy, with its centuries-old traditions, routine, and knowledge of the subject, has become of third-rank importance, and the direction of England's foreign policy was taken over by one omnipotent person, who doubtless has uncommon abilities but who is entirely unfamiliar with foreign policy and continental affairs, and in particular with Poland, and who is subject to the influence of irresponsible persons who look at foreign policy questions exclusively from the standpoint of parliamentary elections. The opinion of experts has not the least importance for Lloyd George. Striking proof of this was the outcome of the visit of a mission sent to Poland, that is, the rejection of the opinion of Cambon's committee on the Danzig issue. The only possible brake on Lloyd George's autocracy is parliament. Unfortunately, the majority of today's parliament is composed of new people who are themselves little acquainted with foreign policy and do not have sufficient authority to oppose the prime minister.

*PDD 1919, doc. 428*

## 174

*31 May 1919, reply of the Chief of State for the French envoy  
to the note from the Supreme Council*

In answer to a new note of the Four,<sup>23</sup> the Chief of State today tendered the following reply to M. Pralon:

In response to the dispatch sent to me by the French minister, M. Pralon, I have the honour to communicate the following:

The offensive of my armies on the Ukrainian front was caused by an attack by Ukrainian troops on various parts of the front occupied by the Polish army. This attack was conducted with force; it was started by the Ukrainians immediately after proposals for a ceasefire were made. Despite the impending moment of a possible armed conflict with Germany, I could not even think of concentrating forces in the west, since the majority of the army was engaged in the east in repulsing the Ukrainian attacks, which threatened Polish Lwow with occupation, with all the consequences of that city's fall. I thus ordered a counter-attack along the entire front, giving the military as goals: a. to crush the enemy, so as to allow me easily to withdraw the great majority of forces toward the west; b. to obtain a link-up with Romania, so that in the case of war with Germany, Poland would not be cut off from the entire world, and left on its own in an armed conflict with Germany and the Bolshevik army, acting together and in solidarity. I must draw attention here to the fact that, given the number of troops I possess and especially the technical equipment that the army has had to this point, Poland would be helpless if in addition to the struggle with these two forces it were pinned down by attacks by the

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<sup>23</sup> The note from the Council of Four to Piłsudski from 27 May 1919 stated: "The boundary between Poland and the Ukraine is under consideration and is as yet undetermined, and the Council has more than once informed the Polish Government that they would regard any attempt either by Poland or by the Ukrainian authorities to determine it, or to prejudice its determination by the use of force, as a violation of the whole spirit and an arbitrary interference with the whole purpose of the present Conference of Peace [...] The Council has, therefore, more than once insisted that there should be an armistice on the Ukrainian front, arranged in Paris and under the advice of the Council itself. [...] The Council feel it their duty, therefore, [...] to say to the Polish authorities that, if they are not willing to accept the guidance and decisions of the Conference of Peace in such matters, the Governments represented in the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Governments will not be justified in furnishing Poland any longer with supplies or assistance. If it is her deliberate purpose to set at naught the counsel proffered by the Conference, its authority can no longer, it is feared, be made serviceable to her. [...];" AAN, Archiwum Ignacego Jana Paderewskiego, 967.

Ukrainians. I thus considered it my duty to the Fatherland to secure it to the best of my ability against the dangerous threat of being crushed in an unequal fight not on two but three fronts, to the complete ruin of its wellbeing and internal peace.

Upon obtaining the above-mentioned goals of the offensive, I stopped at once, without putting any obstacles on the way to a ceasefire or even to a lasting peace. Even before I received the cable from the Chairman of the Peace Conference, the majority of my army units had been directed toward the western front.

I must add that the cruelty committed by the Ukrainians against the unarmed Polish population under their control would infuriate even the quietest people and cause them to undertake the extremely proper demands of securing their lives, not to mention property, through open force.

On the political matter constituting the text of the dispatch, I ordered a meeting of the proper Polish officials, with the demand that they send an immediate answer directly to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Paderewski, who is presently in Paris.

In so far as the cable addressed to the Chief of State, General PIŁSUDSKI, from the Chairman of the Peace Conference concerned political questions, he transmitted them to the government of the Republic of Poland.

The government of the Republic of Poland considers it its duty to state what follows:

As was confirmed by a unanimous resolution of the Sejm on 24 May,<sup>24</sup> the Republic of Poland desires to be an element of the international peace based on the right of every nation to independence and self-determination, and declares itself for a union of free and equal nations for the purpose of avoiding wars and bringing about a lasting peace between nations.

In this spirit of peace and desiring to satisfy the wishes of the Allied countries, the Polish government accepted on 28 February the ceasefire with the Ukrainian armies dictated by the inter-Allied commission in Lwow. The Ukrainian army, however, did not accept it. Therefore, when on 23 March, on the initiative of the Allied states, the Polish government again began negotiations for a ceasefire with the Ukrainian armies, it had to at the outset demand a commitment from the representatives of the Ukrainian armies that after the ceasefire negotiations would commence, there would be a truce on the basis indicated by the inter-allied commission on 28 February. The rejection of this condition by the Ukrainian army convinced the government of the Republic of Poland that the Ukrainian armies did not have a real desire

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<sup>24</sup> The Sejm adopted a resolution to this effect during its 41<sup>st</sup> sitting, on 23 May 1919.

for peace. On the other hand, the withdrawal of the Ukrainian armies from the territory of the Ukrainian state created by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the occupation of this territory almost in its entirety by the Russian Bolsheviks, and the advance of the latter toward Galicia with the open aim of linking up with the Hungarian Bolsheviks, the increasingly frequent passage of Ukrainian divisions to the Bolshevik side, along with the provocative gathering of German troops on the Polish border, threatened Poland with the very grave danger of being completely cut off from the Allied states in the event of a simultaneous attack by the Germans and the Russian, Ukrainian, and Hungarian Bolsheviks. Therefore, the Polish government had to secure as quickly as it could against a possible German initiative a common front with Romania against the Bolsheviks and to occupy militarily the transport routes leading from Kiev through Galicia to Budapest. For this reason, the Republic of Poland was unable to accept the ceasefire proposed on 12 May by the inter-Allied commission in Paris, which was much worse for Poland than the previously proposed ceasefire, not because the Polish government [...] <sup>25</sup> [was in] direct danger. It was the more necessary because, despite the negotiations for a ceasefire, the Ukrainian army not only failed, even for a moment, to cease its attacks on Polish positions, but even in bombing open cities. This indicated the clear divergence between the Ukrainian declarations in Paris and the actions of the Ukrainian military authorities in Galicia.

The actions of the Polish army against the Ukrainians were not intended to settle the boundary between Poland and Ukraine by force of arms, but on the contrary, to defend Poland against the Ukrainians' attempt to take away the eastern part of Galicia by force, despite the fact that the latter has been Polish territory uninterruptedly since the 14<sup>th</sup> century to the partitions of Poland. After the partitions, all of it was an indivisible territory of the Austrian monarchy. It never belonged to the Ukrainian state, and even the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, by which Germany and Austria established the Ukrainian state, recognised the indivisibility of Galicia as a Polish territory. In occupying Galicia, Petlura's army thus occupied territory to which it had no right, with the aim of moving the boundary of Ukraine by force of arms to the detriment of Poland. As to the so-called "Republic of Western Ukraine," the Polish government considers itself obliged to draw the peace conference's attention to the fact that that republic's leaders never even attempted to appeal to the people of the territory for a mandate. They have always ruled solely by armed force, entirely in the same manner as the Bolshevik authorities, and they are thus only an army conspiracy, not organs of a newly-formed state. Furthermore, as we know well and have incontrovertible evidence, not only do the real Ukrainians living on the territory of the former Russian empire

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<sup>25</sup> Illegible fragments.



not believe that their nation has rights to parts of Eastern Galicia, but on the contrary, there are important Ukrainian milieus that stress the impossibility of negotiating a common political platform between formerly Russian Ukraine and the Ruthenian elements that in the past, as in the present, have been subject only to German influence—and this is precisely what Ukrainian politicians in Petlura's circle are saying. Thus, the aim of the Polish army's actions in Galicia is solely to defend territory that was never, by any legal act, severed from Poland, and above all to protect the Polish population, which is being mercilessly and barbarously persecuted, and to whose desperate cries for help the Polish nation cannot remain indifferent. This population itself had at first driven the Ukrainian army out of a series of cities, such as Brody and Stanisławów, before the Republic of Poland's army came to its aid.

In keeping with President Wilson's principle of the self-determination of nations, the Republic of Poland announced ... for the Ukrainian population of the eastern part of Galicia. The Republic of Poland will determine the extent and nature of this autonomy in mutual agreement with the legally elected representatives of the population of that country.

The Republic does not intend to determine its eastern boundary by unilateral decision and recognises in this regard the full authority of the peace conference and of the League of Nations. The government of the Republic of Poland believes, however, that a final settlement of the south-eastern boundary of the Republic of Poland is not possible, nor will the future of the lands and peoples that Poland is to border in the east be clarified until the legal order on the territory of the former Russian empire is decided.

Despite all this, in keeping with the wishes of the peace conference, on 29 May the Polish government gave the order to halt the Polish army's victorious counter-offensive.

At the same time, however, the government of the Republic of Poland cannot fail to point out that the Polish nation will see the halting of this counter-offensive as an abandonment of the Polish population, and the districts that are under the control of the Ukrainian army, to the most horrible persecutions and mass murder. Every day we receive new information about such cruelties in the areas of Galicia not occupied by the Polish army.

*PDD 1919, doc. 429*

**175***31 May 1919, the Prime Minister's declaration  
about minority rights*

Au nom du Gouvernement polonais, je déclare que la Pologne accordera à toutes les minorités de race, de langue et de culte les mêmes droits qu'ont tous les autres nationaux. Elle leur assurera les mêmes libertés qui leur ont déjà été accordées ou seront accordées par les grandes nations et Etats occidentaux.

Elle sera prête à élargir ces droits dans le même sens que la Ligue des Nations le jugera utile pour tous les Etats qui la constitueront.

J'exprime la conviction que ces garanties, une fois inscrites dans les lois fondamentales de la Pologne par sa Diète constituante, seront en conformité absolue avec l'esprit si noble et élevé qui guide les labours de la Conférence de la Paix.

*E&M, doc. 5*

## 176

*1 June 1919, telegram from the PNC in Paris to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the speech of the Prime Minister at the Peace Conference in the matter of national minorities*

Telegram

Polish National Committee  
To Deputy Minister Wróblewski in Warsaw

Paris, 1 June 1919, 6:00 PM  
Received 3 June 1919

Authorised by the Prime Minister for publication:

On 31 May, during the plenary session, the Peace Conference considered the question of international guarantees for racial and religious minorities in newly emerging states and in the states emerging on the territories of the former Habsburg Empire. The representatives of Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the South Slav nations spoke in the name of those states. President Paderewski spoke in the name of Poland. He noted the concordance of intent between the League of Nations, currently represented by the Council of Four, on the one hand and Poland's statehood traditions as well as the present aspirations to democracy of the Polish nation and parliament. He expressed his conviction that the Polish constituent assembly would resolve to include in the basic laws of the Republic the same rights for national and religious minorities as they have or are to have in Western democracies. The Polish nation is inspired by the same spirit of tolerance as the nations of the Paris Peace Conference and there is no need to fear that any ethnic or religious minority would feel less secure under Polish rule than under the guarantees of the international League of Nations. After the speeches of the Slavs and Romanian representatives, President Wilson responded to the Romanian, Czech, and Southern Slav delegates.<sup>1</sup> President Paderewski's declaration was accepted without discussion, after which the international guarantee draft was sent back to the Council of Four for reformulation.

(=in cipher=): [sic!] Note to editors for inspiration: Paderewski's speech was a great success for Poland: With political adeptness, without causing

<sup>1</sup> Wilson made reference to the Powers' obligation to guarantee the peace, from which arises their right to impose regulations guaranteeing the rights of national minorities on lesser states.

offense, he emphasised Poland's sovereign right and the right of its constituent assembly and brought about a change in the formulation.

*AAN, MSZ, 1480*

## 177

### *3 June 1919, note by the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference about comments by the German Delegation on the peace terms*

#### Observations of the Polish Delegation on the German Delegations' reply to the peace conditions<sup>2</sup>

In its "remarks on the peace conditions," the German Delegation claims that the conditions formulated by the Allies are in general the conditions of a "peace of violence," that they are contrary to various declarations of the Allied countries' statesmen, that they are not in accord with President Wilson's principles, on the basis of which Germany asked for an armistice, and in particular that, "depending on the case, the Allies base themselves either on unalienable historical rights, or on ethnographic facts, or again, they take an economic standpoint", yet the decision is always to the detriment of Germany.

In actuality, the decisions of the Allies concerning the territory that is to be returned by Germany to Poland are absolutely in accord with the principles of the Allied countries' governments, and in particular with Point 13 of Wilson's programme. The territory concerned is inhabited by a population that is in considerable majority Polish. Even according to the Prussian general census of 1910, which was tendentiously conducted for anti-Polish purposes, the territory has 3,076,000 Poles and only 1,821,000 [Germans], counting the colonists, functionaries, and German soldiers settled in the country by the government. The Prussian statistics on the nationality of children attending elementary schools in 1911 lists 710,000 Polish children in the territory and a mere 251,000 German children.

Historical rights and economic interests only reinforce the ethnographic argument in favour of this territory.

If the question were to rest exclusively on the grounds of historical rights, then it might in truth be possible to allege that the basis of Poland's claim

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<sup>2</sup> This refers to the German response issued on 29 May 1919, to the draft Peace Treaty submitted by the Allies on 7 May 1919. See doc. No. 183.

to Upper Silesia is one of long standing; but then all of Poznań and all of West Prussia would have to be taken into account, without excluding any part. Thus, the latter would include Danzig and the districts on the right bank of the Vistula branches, among other places, not to mention all of Warmia from East Prussia. What the Allies are awarding Poland of the Polish territories of 1772 is far from the “former boundaries of Poland,” and that is precisely because the Allied governments, in drawing the Polish-German boundary, took ethnographic data as the basis and excluded, to Germany’s benefit, the border districts that had become Germanised over time.

In certain minor details, the Allies’ plan slightly departs from the ethnographic boundary, at times to Poland’s detriment, namely in the Człuchów, Wielen, (on the left bank of the Noteć River), Międzyrzecz, Babimost, Wschowa, Syców, Namysłów, and Wejherowo districts, whose border areas include dozens of Polish villages that make up a dense and continuous complex—and yet they were awarded to Germany. However, these are matters of little importance in comparison to the great boundary line established by the Allies in accord with the ethnographic nature of the country.

The passage of the German response, in which the Germans’ territorial proposals are presented, begins with the following words: “No territory that can irrefutably be proven to have constituted the Germans’ national heritage for centuries and where no dispute ever arose between it and the German state, which it joined, will be taken from the Germans.”

Above all, the Polish provinces that are in question here did not “join Germany,” but were taken by force. Then, for decades the Prussian government and parliament justified all anti-Polish administrative measures, all extraordinary laws whose purpose was to destroy the Polish element, through the participation of Poles from Prussia in national uprisings, in the conspiracy of 1846, in the insurrection of 1848, and later through the continually rising Polish revolutionary sentiments, all the way to the bloody demonstrations of 1912 and 1913 on the eve of the war. Furthermore, all court verdicts punishing the political transgressions committed by Polish organisations, dailies, and activists were always motivated by the fact that the Polish national movement was unalterably seeking to dispossess Prussia of the Polish territories, running “from Puck to Myslowice,” from the Baltic to the boundary of Galicia and Teschen Silesia.

Indeed, the tendency to throw off the Prussian yoke, to regain independence, was always the traditional guiding idea not only of the educated classes but also of the masses of the Polish people under Prussian rule.

### A. Poznań Province

As to what concerns Poznań Province, the German Delegation declares that Germany is ready to relinquish to Poland “areas with an irrefutably Polish character,” but considers that the boundary drawn by the Allies stands in opposition to the principle of nationality. Even according to the general Prussian census of 1910, we can see that in the territory of Poznań Province the Germans are to return to Poland, there were 1,264,000 Poles and merely 691,000 Germans. The school statistics of 1911 show 279,000 Polish children and not more than 103,000 German children on the said territory. The Bydgoszcz enclave, which is filled with German functionaries and colonists who were settled there for anti-Polish purposes, is surrounded by Polish districts. On the other hand, as we have already pointed out, the exclusion of numerous villages in the border areas, which were awarded to Germany with the western districts, is a very painful loss for Poland.

### B. Upper Silesia

The statements that “Upper Silesia has had no political contact with the Kingdom of Poland since 1163” and that “over 750 years’ close political union have linked Upper Silesia with Germany,” do not correspond with the historical facts. In 1163, Silesia was not at all united with Germany; it was divided between the sons of a Polish prince (Władysław). The Silesian princes never ceased to be called “Polish princes” and a number of them (Henry the Bearded, Henry the Pious and Henry IV of Wrocław) ruled in Cracow. Only between 1289 and 1327 did the princes of Silesia pledge fealty to the Czech kings, something the Polish king recognised in 1335. But the princes of the Polish house of the Piasts ruled in certain Silesian duchies until the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Silesia passed on to the Habsburgs in 1526 along with the Crown of Bohemia. Present Prussian Silesia was taken from Austria by Frederick the Great in 1742. Germany thus does not have any special historical rights with which to support its claims to Upper Silesia.

Despite the great national losses that resulted from Frederick’s dreadful policy of Germanisation in Upper Silesia, despite the ruthless control system over the state, the communes, the mine administrations, and—as should be specially emphasised—in spite of the unheard of moral pressure on the population by German priests, pressure that went so far as abusing the secrets of the confessional for political purposes—in spite of all that, the great majority of the masses have remained Polish, faithfully attached to their nationality.

The general Prussian census of 1910 found 1,240,000 Poles and 625,000 Germans on the territory of Upper Silesia that the Allies awarded to Poland. According to Prussian statistics concerning the nationalities of children attending elementary school in 1911, there were 308,000 Polish children and merely 74,000 German children on this territory. Thus, dis-annexation here

also is in accord with the nationality principle. Part of the Głubczyce district awarded to Poland constitutes in truth an exception, but it forms an enclave surrounded by Poles and Czecho-Moravians. On the other hand, in the districts of Nowe Miasto and Niemodlin, the boundary was shifted to the disadvantage of Poles.

It should be added that in regard to Central Silesia, the German Delegation is correct in claiming that the zone awarded to Poland in the districts of Milicz and Góra is ethnographically German; but in exchange, the Germans were given the Polish part of the Syców and Namysłów districts.

Against Poland's restitution claims in regard to Upper Silesia, the German Delegation is advancing the results of elections to the German parliament. But the figures it is presenting are inaccurate because they count all the socialist votes as being German, when in reality the majority are Polish. Furthermore, the German Delegation does not subtract from the total of German votes the votes in German districts left to the Germans by the Allies and in which Poles did not field candidates. It should moreover be pointed out that in some districts, the Upper Silesian population, which is devoutly Catholic, has long been accustomed to vote for Polish candidates from the German Catholic Zentrum [party], recommended by the clergy. As a result, in the vicinity of Nowe Miasto, for instance, the Polish election committee did not field any national candidate against the Zentrum candidate—a Polish farmer. Nevertheless, during the dissolutions of the former Reich parliament, Poles had five Silesian deputies in it belonging to the Polish Caucus and defending the Polish cause in solidarity with other members of that group. Those Silesian deputies represented 13 districts, including all the industrial districts.

The German Delegation mentions to its advantage that during the election to the German Constituent Assembly in 1919, 60% of the voters of Upper Silesia took part in the voting, although the Polish election committees attempted to restrain them from voting. Above all, those numbers concern voters in districts not incorporated into Poland.

Furthermore, despite the fact that some of the Poles of Upper Silesia took part in the vote it in no way ensues that those voters wanted thereby to express their desire to belong to Germany. This fact is explained by the chaos that reigned in those lands. The clergy, obeying the instructions of the Wrocław bishop, using the pulpit and the confessional, inclined the population to vote against anti-Catholic, socialist candidates. For their part, the state authorities exerted strong pressure on the populace in accord with the directions of the socialist government in Berlin: among other methods, threatening in proclamations all those who abstained from voting with loss of their German citizenship and all public rights. It should be pointed out that a short time later, these same authorities, by means of a special decree, forbade district

elections in Upper Silesia, as well as in the Polish provinces—elections that were supposed to be held for the first time in Prussia based on a democratic election ordinance. And this prohibition was issued to prevent the Poles from taking control of the district councils—as was confessed by Mr. Hörsing, the government commissioner, in the newspaper *Volks-Wille*.

The argument that only some of the parents of schoolchildren stated they were against education in German “even after the fall of German power,” is not at all convincing when it is considered that the decree on registering for Polish-language lessons was advertised only three days before the list was closed and exclusively in the German newspapers.

To claim that the speech used by the Upper Silesian population is a mixture of the Polish [and] German languages is equal, for example, to claiming that “Plattdeutsch” is only half German. The Upper Silesian speech is, on the contrary, a Polish dialect, as are a large number of local dialects, and furthermore, is a very beautiful old folk speech. In their press and their books, the Upper Silesians use Polish literary language.

The German Delegation states that Upper Silesia owes all of its development to the work of Germans. In fact, the manual labour on which industry and agriculture rests is provided in the overwhelming majority by Polish labourers and peasants. It is impossible, particularly in our democratic times, not to appreciate their productive force and to consider only capital or officials as having such force. We should point out that of the 130,000 miners in Upper Silesia, 85,000 belong to the Polish National Trade Union and that around 15,000 Poles belong to socialist trade unions.

The German Delegation claims that without Upper Silesia, Germany will be economically ruined, as all the industry of eastern Germany cannot be without Upper Silesian coal. This argument does not stand up to criticism: above all, the eastern provinces of Germany are for the most part to be taken from it.

Furthermore, out of Upper Silesia’s general production of 43 million tonnes of coal, only one quarter, that is, 10.6 million tonnes, was transported to the German lands of the Reich; the rest was absorbed by Upper Silesia and other Polish territories of Germany, the Congress Kingdom of Poland, Galicia, and exports abroad.

Moreover, even after the loss of the Upper Silesian Coal Basin and the Saar, Germany will be able to export 20 million tonnes of coal annually. For Poland, on the other hand, the Upper Silesian coal is absolutely necessary; without it, we would have to import yearly 18 million tonnes from abroad and in this respect, we would find ourselves in complete dependence on Germany, which is the closest provider of this fuel.



In any case, the principal ready market for Upper Silesian products before the war was Poland, with which Upper Silesia forms a geographic whole.

If, on the other hand, Germany is lacking in iron ore, Poland possesses it in abundance. The same applies to timber for mines: Upper Silesia imported three times more timber from Polish lands than from Germany. Poland moreover provides nearly all the food needed by the industrial population of Upper Silesia; the latter imports from Poland three times more wheat, oats, and potatoes, and six times more pigs, than Germany does. Incorporating Upper Silesia into Poland would not at all bring about the ruin of German industry, but would, on the contrary, correspond to the natural needs of this Polish land, as well as the whole of Poland.

According to the German reply, in no case can Germany agree to the renunciation of Upper Silesia because “even in the best of situations, Germany would be able to fulfil its obligations resulting from the war only if it retains Upper Silesia.” The German generals Hindenburg, Groener, Lepper, etc. expressed the necessity of retaining Upper Silesia for Germany in an entirely different manner in their speeches in Opole, Katowice, and Leszno. They claimed that only by retaining that province would Germany be able to conduct a war of retaliation in 20 or 25 years.

### C. West Prussia

It is true that the Teutonic Order (beginning in 1318) “gave West Prussia a German character,” but it did so by fire and sword. West Prussia were again returned to Poland (1454) and belonged to it for three centuries until the partitions.

The German Delegation declares that Germany is inclined to relinquish to Poland parts of West Prussia, “insofar as they are irrefutably inhabited by Poles.” The Allied governments have already defined which parts these are, excluding numerous Germanised districts in the west and east. According to the Prussian census of 1900, the remaining territory of West Prussia, which has been awarded to Poland, contains not 580,000 Poles and 744,000 Germans—as is claimed in the German reply—but 533,000 Poles and 422,000 Germans, with the latter including a significant number of colonists, functionaries, and soldiers. According to the Prussian school statistics of 1911, there were 122,000 Polish children in the said territory and not more than 60,000 German children.

Cutting a corridor through West Prussia, so as to link East Prussia with Germany, would be contrary to the ethnographic principle, as the Polish element extends in an unbroken bloc through this country all the way to the sea. Yet, the peace treaty contains stipulations that ensure for Germany railway communication with East Prussia.

#### D. Danzig

The German Delegation protests against separating Danzig and its vicinity from Germany, but it behaves as if the question were one of relinquishing Danzig to Poland. Yet, the Peace Conference did not restitute to Poland its only sea port but decided to make a free city. Only the stipulations of the treaty for economic union between Danzig and the Polish state can ensure Poland the necessary conditions for its economic independence.

The German Delegation rejects even this minimum: it demands a territorial corridor for 1.5 million Germans in East Prussia, even though the corridor is ethnographically Polish. But for the twenty-some million Poles living in the Vistula river basin, it opposes even the creation of the economic union provided by the treaty.

In exchange, the German Delegation proposes "extensive rights in the free ports of Memel, Königsberg and Danzig," which of course are to belong to Germany. While enriching those cities through trade with Poland, it would, at the same time, make Poland entirely dependent economically on Germany. This is not what President Wilson proposed achieving in declaring that Poland was to be ensured free access to the sea.

#### E. East Prussia

The German Delegation expresses the fear that as a result of East Prussia's separation from Germany, the province might "decline and end up in Polish hands."

No one denies the Germanity of the northern part of East Prussia. However, Poland claims the right to the southern part, where it is true that according to the general Prussian census of 1910, there were only 281,000 Poles as opposed to 299,100 Germans, but in actuality the number of Poles there is significantly larger. The Prussian school statistics of 1911 acknowledge 77,000 Polish children and scarcely 32,000 German children.

Here, as on the right bank of the Lower Vistula, in the Marienburg, Stuhm, Marienwerder, and Sucha districts, a plebiscite is to determine the area's national affiliation. The plebiscite, like the administration of the area until the vote, cannot be entrusted to the control of a neutral authority composed of Danish, Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish, Swiss, and Spanish citizens, but must remain in the hands of the victorious Allied powers.

The Delegation requires that the treaty formally guarantee Germans' right of "protection over their German-speaking former citizens in the territories that will be ceded to Poland." At the same time, the Delegation claims that it must insist on this the more so as "the Poles have not to this time shown themselves to be trustworthy defenders of the rights of national and religious

minorities” and name the Ruthenians of Galicia and the Jews in this regard. This bold assertion should be answered by stating that the Ruthenians in East Galicia had entire equality of civil and political rights at a time when the Poles in Prussia were placed under extraordinary legislation.

As to what concerns the Jews, it is a historical fact that at one time, in order to escape the persecution to which they had fallen victim in Germany, they took refuge in Poland. If today, in time of war, lamentable incidents occasionally take place, their cause is speculation or the provocative behaviour of elements hostile to the Polish army, or German propaganda, which is pushing the Jewish masses against the Poles. The Polish government authorities are fulfilling their obligations with the greatest possible impartiality, and both the government and the parliament have shown the greatest possible tolerance.

The “accusation” against the Poles that they do “not respect the rights of minorities,” is particularly strange coming from the German side, as for decades the Prussian government and the entire German nation has instituted a whole system of administrative persecutions and severe extraordinary laws in order to uproot the Polish element. In regard to the claim that the members of the present German government always combated the anti-Polish policy of the former regime, it should be remembered that democratic and progressive parties also voted in 1908 for the so-called “language” paragraph directed against the Poles, and for pension bonuses awarded to officials in the eastern provinces for their anti-Polish zeal, and that they took active part in Germanisation actions in the spheres of public education and social life.

The German Delegation raises a principled protest against the provisions of Art. 90, section 2, “in accordance with which German citizens who moved their place of residence to the ceded territories after 1 January 1908, can receive Polish citizenship only by special permission of the Polish state.” It would actually be entirely proper to extend the provision to the year 1886, when the Colonisation Commission began to expropriate Poles and to settle German colonists on Polish territories, not to mention the system consisting of sending multitudes of officials and German army personnel. Poland will not pursue a policy of repression with regard to the Germans; but it has to be able to protect itself against foreign elements.

Appendix to the observations of the Polish Delegation  
on the German Delegation’s reply to the peace conditions

German opinions about Upper Silesia.

The purely Polish character of Upper Silesia was recognised by J. Partsch, professor of the University of Breslau in his work entitled “Schlesien. Eine Landeskunde, II Teil“ (Breslau 1903), where on page 13, the following can be read:

“The vicinity of Poland has had almost as strong an influence on the country as that of Germany. Part of the country united with Poland in the 15<sup>th</sup> century, while in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the duchies of Opole and Racibórz were left to Poland for 22 years, while the deaneries of Bytom and Pszczyna were part of the bishopric of Cracow until 1821.”

Mr. Partsch does not stop there and does not hesitate to say, a short while later, that the essential core of the Upper Silesian population has remained Polish.

In any case, a map attached to the first volume of the above-mentioned book overcomes all doubts as to the ethnographic boundaries of this country and simultaneously provides the best proof of the correctness of the decision taken by the Allies.

The Polish language in Upper Silesia.

This is what Pastor Pohle wrote about it in a work published in Tarnowice in 1791, entitled “Der Oberschlesier verteidigt gegen seine Widersacher.”

“It is certain that the inhabitants of Upper Silesia speak Polish better than the inhabitants of Lower Silesia speak German.”

Another author, Pastor Richter, includes the following sentence in a book that was published in Opole in 1882, and whose somewhat oblong title can be found in the appendix.

“Those who do not know the Polish language and think it is hard, monotonous, and un-learnable, are like blind people speaking about colours.”

Dr. J. Roger, doctor to the Prince de Racibórz, expresses himself as follows in the introduction to “A Collection of Folk Songs of Upper Silesia” (1863):

“The careful reader will easily be convinced of the falsehood of the widespread belief that the language of the Poles of Upper Silesia is a debased Polish dialect.”

As to the economic aspects of the question, the German Delegation claims Germany cannot do without Upper Silesia. The loss of this province, the Delegation claims, would be a true catastrophe for the country and would prevent it from fulfilling its obligations toward the Allies. Yet, numerous German publications complain that Upper Silesia, on account of its unfortunate geographic situation, is rather a burden for Germany, and in any case that industry in that province can be maintained only through the efforts and permanent support of the government, and finally, that the province does not have the value for Germany that it should, given its mining resources.

F. Frech, a professor at the University of Breslau, in a work entitled "Deutschlands Steinkohlenfelder und Steinkohlenvorräte" (1912) writes on page 138 that:

"Upper Silesia's unfavourable geographic location, in spite of the neighbouring countries' need for coal, has not allowed it to reach the level of development that is found in Westphalia."

In the matter of the export of products from Upper Silesia, on page 139 we can read the following:

"Despite all the efforts, the coal of Upper Silesia has not been able successfully to hold back the flood of English coal in the regions lying by the Baltic Sea."

And further:

"The situation of coal from Upper Silesia on the Berlin market is even worse. The attitude of the market to this coal is so unfavourable that it is not possible to expect an increase in production to the degree that has occurred in Westphalia."

On page 86 of the "Handbuch des Oberschlesischen Industriebezirks," we can read, literally:

"Another burning concern of our iron industry is the question of the sale of products. Upper Silesia's location near the boundary plays a more important role in this instance than in that of coal and tin."

On page 139, addressing the question of labour, the author writes:

"In contrast to all other German coal basins, the location of Upper Silesia is so much less propitious in that it is a political peninsula, surrounded on three sides by foreign lands, and in addition it occupies the furthest extremity of this peninsula."

In the matter of transports, on page 277 we find the following:

"As to what concerns sales in the north of the products of Upper Silesia's coal industry within the borders of the German state, the geographical location of this industry is unfavourable because these products have to travel at least 100 kilometres to exit the alley in which they are concentrated due to Upper Silesia's being squeezed between Russia and Austro-Hungary.

Today, Upper Silesia is no longer surrounded by Russia and Austro-Hungary, but is surrounded by Poland to the north, east, and south, and it borders on the Czechoslovak state in the southeast.

At the time of German successes, the industrialists of Upper Silesia firmly demanded that the former Congress Kingdom of Poland be closely connected with the German state, because the development of Upper Silesia's industry is

dependent on the ties between that province and neighbouring areas of Poland. On 24 September 1916, the chamber of commerce in Opole presented a memorandum to the Chancellor of the Reich stating this view.

The memorandum contained the following conclusion:

“The future of Upper Silesia depends on how relations with the Poland of the Russian partition are settled.”

The opinion of Germans on Danzig.

It is irrefutably true that from the time the Slavic population of Danzig was exterminated by the Teutonic Knights, the population of this city has been composed predominately of Germans, although the Danzig inhabitants are Germans only in a certain sense of the word, that is, by origin but not by conviction. From the moment when West Prussia and Danzig returned to Poland, relations connecting it to Poland began to grow ever stronger. The reasons for this should be sought not only in the benefits of an economic nature that Danzig derived from its connections with Poland but also in the Polish state's broadest application of the principles of national and religious tolerance in its relations with the Danzig inhabitants. Thus, they considered themselves loyal citizens of Poland and gave proof of their attachment to the country even during the period of the partitions. The Prussian king, in listing the motives that inclined him to incorporate Danzig, mentioned the hostile attitude with which the city retained for long years with regard to Prussia.

According to him, the close relations that the inhabitants maintained with France and Poland forced him to limit the freedoms of Danzig and to guard the security and peace of the adjacent Prussian provinces.

During the present war, similar tendencies could be observed among the inhabitants of Danzig, as confirmed in a telegram of 21 October 1918, sent by the minister of the German plenipotentiary in Bern to the minister of foreign affairs.

On the other hand, Bismarck admitted that the possession of Danzig was a necessary condition for the existence of an independent Poland; on 23 September 1894, during a speech to the German delegates of East Prussia, he declared the following, among other things:

“For the Polish state with Warsaw as its capital, the possession of Danzig is a far more urgent need than gaining control of Poznań... The Polish state will have to gain control of Danzig above all because the city is situated on the sea. The Poles will not rest until they have control of it.”

*E&M, doc. 6*

## 178

*4 June 1919, letter from the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
to the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference  
about anti-Jewish excesses*

Warsaw, 4 June 1919

To the Polish Conference Delegation  
in Paris

In response to the letter of the Polish Conference Delegation of 30 May,<sup>3</sup> the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would like to communicate that on 18 May its Representation in Paris was sent a detailed report, No. D. 4707/19, on the state of the Jewish question, and particularly on the pogroms in Lida and Vilnius.

To these, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is enclosing a communiqué from the High Command and a declaration by the members of the Danish delegation from Petrograd, who were present when the Jewish civilian population in Vilnius was shooting at Polish army troops.

In the matter of the anti-Jewish disturbances in Central Galicia, the report by general delegate Galecki was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' representation in Paris on 21 May under N.D. 4938/19. The work of the Sejm committee created ad hoc with the participation of Jewish deputies has not yet been finished.

On 27 May, disturbances against the Jewish population in Częstochowa occurred once more (report by the government commissioner enclosed). At the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the allied states' legations went at once to Częstochowa and ascertained on the spot that:

1. The disturbances were instigated by German provocateurs.
2. The civilian and military authorities behaved impeccably. Thanks to their energetic intervention, the disturbances were quashed in a relatively brief time.

In addition, the legations received the enclosed copy of a French excerpt of the government commissioner's report.

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<sup>3</sup> On 30 May 1919, the PNC turned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a request for information about anti-Jewish incidents in Poland in response to proposal to publish an official rectification in the London press.

It is typical that information about all the above-mentioned disturbances appeared in the German press almost before they appeared in the Warsaw Jewish press. This fact, with the action of the German provocateurs in Cześćochowa, proves the close cooperation and connection between Zionist and German propaganda.

On the Polish side, it is impossible to refute the existence of strong anti-Semitic tendencies in the military, particularly in General Haller's army. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has thus turned to the Supreme Command of the Polish Army and the Ministry of Military Affairs with a request for the publication of daily orders rebutting the slanderous charges against the Polish armies in the foreign press and at the same time declaring that any soldier participating in anti-Jewish excesses will be liable to severe punishment. Similarly, all authorities subject to the Ministry of Internal Affairs have received instructions to act against any clashes between the Christian and Jewish populations energetically.

In the Polish press, a series of articles discussing Polish society's attitude to the Jewish question is to appear shortly. These articles will be sent at once, in translation, to foreign telegraph agencies.

On the 8<sup>th</sup> of this month, a delegation of assimilationists, in the persons of the deputy-mayor of Cracow, Sare Józef, Consul Eiger, Prof. Dickstein, and Prof. Askenazy of Warsaw, are travelling to Paris to counteract the Zionist action there.

The American legation in Warsaw, which has a very neutral and matter-of-fact approach to Jewish affairs, has proposed that the prime minister should officially invite to Poland some outstanding Jewish American, perhaps former ambassador Morgenthau or someone else. In the legation's opinion, such an invitation would make the best impression on public opinion in America, and the visit of an eminent and properly informed Jewish personage in Poland would in itself incline Zionist agencies, which are spreading sensational reports about pogroms, toward greater prudence.

For the Minister:  
(signed) Wróblewski

*AAN, KNP, 1869*



## 179

*6 June 1919, letter from the Prime Minister to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs about placing the Polish armed forces under the command of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces*

Paris, le 6 Juin 1919.

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Stephen Pichon  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères  
Paris.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Dans sa résolution unanime du 29 mars 1919 la Diète souveraine de Pologne a reconnu que "l'armée polonaise est une armée alliée et cobelligérante avec les Armées Alliées". Elle a demandé que "des conventions politiques, militaires et économiques soient conclues au nom de la République souveraine de Pologne, par lesquelles l'alliance réelle de la Pologne avec les Puissances précitées serait effectivement mise en vigueur".

Le Gouvernement Polonais, désireux d'exécuter la volonté unanime de la Diète Polonaise d'une part, et de définir nettement la situation militaire d'autre part, s'adresse au Gouvernement Français en lui demandant que l'armée polonaise soit mise directement sous le Haut Commandement de Mr. le Maréchal Foch, et qu'une convention spéciale soit passée à ce sujet entre le Gouvernement de la République Française et le Gouvernement de la République de Pologne. Etant donné les circonstances actuelles le Gouvernement Polonais désirerait que la convention précitée fut passée le plus rapidement possible afin d'amener plus de cohésion et d'unité dans l'action qui se prépare sur le front Est, ainsi que d'affirmer le caractère notamment allié de nos troupes aux yeux de l'ennemi.

Dans l'espoir qu'il vous plaira, Monsieur le Ministre, de donner à ma requête les suites qu'elle comporte, je vous prie de bien vouloir agréer les assurances de ma plus haute considération.

(Signé) I.J. Paderewski

Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

*AAN, KNP, 190*

## 180

*7 June 1919, note from the government representative in Vienna  
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
about the views of Slovak politicians*

Vienna, 7 June 1919

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
in Warsaw

On the question of Slovakia:

I had the opportunity to talk with two eminent politicians from Slovakia, that is, with Dr. Dvorcak, who was elected president of the Republic of Slovakia on 11 December, and with Prešov's Greek Catholic Bishop Novák. Both these gentlemen adamantly pointed to the hatred of the entire nation for the Czechs. Dr. Dvorcak presents the current successes of the Hungarian army as a national movement of Hungarians, as well as Slovaks, against foreign invaders. He claims that if the Czechs are thrown out of Slovakia, there will be no place or material for Bolshevism in the nation. The Slovaks, they agree, are deeply religious; there are few workers, and no peasant will ever be a Bolshevik or even a socialist. The present aid to the Red Army is a clearly anti-Czech action.

After the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, enthusiasm for the Czechs became widespread in Slovakia. Five months of Czech occupation was sufficient to make them hate that nation and the movement against it became elemental. "For one thousand years, the Hungarians could not manage to take away our ethnicity; it might be easier for the Czechs, on account of their similarity of speech and commonality of race." Even for such people as Father Hlinka and Father Jehlička, who greeted the Czechs with enthusiasm, when it was a question of naming one of them bishop of Spiš, the Czechs announced in the Nunciature that these two candidates were naturally out of the question. The Slovaks expected that after the entry of the Czechs they would receive the autonomy they had expected for so long. Instead, the Czechs sent them officials, teachers, and gendarmes. The results were not long in coming; trial plebiscites were organised in a few localities and the highest vote in favour of the Czechs was scarcely 15%.

Dr. Dvorcak claims that their political ideal is independence, that is, internal independence. Their own government; own administration; own court system, etc., in a word, the ability fully to maintain their national culture. They must have an economic union, foreign policy, and common border defence

with Hungary. The Slovak minister would be a kind of envoy in Budapest. He imagines the relationship with Poland will be as friendly as can be. Slovakia would be a link between Poland and the South. He would thus like to send a deputation to Warsaw (Mudroń, Liptak, Siwerzeń, Hlinka, and Kobulski) and asks if the Government of Poland could arrange their visit to Paris, where they want to make known the essence of the antagonism of their nation toward the Czechs and present their postulates. Moreover, they are planning to create a Slovak Legion and would like the centre of this activity to be Nowy Sącz and Cracow. The Ruthenian counties should be awarded to Slovakia, with an assurance of internal autonomy for those lands.

Bishop Novák is more supportive of the Hungarian position. He doesn't speak of independence but rather of autonomy, but his concept of the appropriate system is similar to Dr. Dvorcak's. He desires autonomy for the Ruthenian counties, but does not want any connection with the Galician Ruthenians and fears Ukrainism. He strongly supports preserving the integrality of the former Hungarian state. He says that until it is restored, there will be no peace in Hungary. If they do not obtain it, they will fight to get it. "Ungheria fará da se" he said to one of the Italians, with whom he was speaking about the issue.

Czech agitation in the "Ruthenian country" is led by Beskid, a former member of the Hungarian parliament, a very unattractive individual—as he was described to me—corrupt and without fixed convictions and principles. He was in the Czech legion at the Peace Conference. On 24 May, a deputation of 110 Ruthenians (80 from Užhorod and 30 from Prešov) under his leadership came to President Masaryk. On 1 June, they were already in Bratislava to see Vavro Šrobár. This deputation asked for autonomy for the Ruthenian counties and expressed their subservient sentiments. In answer, they received many polite words and assurances of sympathy but also the information that a decision as to the political affiliation of their lands had not yet been taken.

If true, this information would be unusually important. Bishop Novák claims that if people could openly express their views, 90% would declare themselves with enthusiasm for the pre-war state of affairs.

Count Bethlen asked Dr. Dvorcak if the Poles have claims to Spiš and Orava. He answered yes, so he told me, and that they would gladly give us back those areas.

Both gentlemen are concordant in supposing that it must come to general Jewish pogroms throughout the whole of Hungary.

It seems to me that in this question our role is clear. The union of Slovakia and the Ruthenian counties with Hungary is more advantageous to us than the permanent connection of these lands with the Czech Republic. Every means should thus be used to explain to the French that the Czechs and Slovaks are

not one and the same. The present operations in Upper Hungary are giving sufficient arguments to support such a claim. If possible, it would be good to send a mission to Paris and find a way for it to present their cause there. We should support their separatist aims and struggle to achieve independence. The Slovaks know well that they cannot exist alone. They must thus be supported by a neighbour. This would be the only way to prevent the Czechs from closing our road to the south, and at the same time to cut the dangerous corridor for us that leads from Prague through Koszyce, Mukacevo, and Stanisławów, to Kiev.

/-/ Szembek

AAN, KNP, 98

## 181

*13 June 1919, report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs delegate to Teschen Silesia to the ministry about the situation in the province in connection with the Czech-Hungarian conflict*

In Teschen, 13 June 1919

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
in Warsaw

On the situation in Teschen Silesia  
in connection with the Hungarian offensive<sup>4</sup>

The situation in Teschen Silesia, which for several weeks has been at a standstill, is today giving rise to several important questions and the need for a quick resolution due to the Czech defeat in Slovakia and the Hungarian army's approach to the Polish boundary.

Three questions that vary in political nature but are of great importance for Poland's cause, and above all, for Silesia, have been made pressing by the events in Slovakia.

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<sup>4</sup> On 28 March 1919, the Hungarian People's Republic declared war on Czechoslovakia. In a few weeks, Béla Kun's units occupied the territory of Slovakia.

These are: the transport of Czech troops and convoys withdrawing from Slovakia through Silesia; the matter of obtaining Orava, Spiš, and Čadca; and the question of the retaking of Polish territories of Teschen Silesia.

As far as granting free passage to Czech trains on the Čadca-Bogumin rail line, which remains in Polish hands on the stretch from Teschen to Mosty, it should be pointed out that four days ago the Czech authorities turned to the Command in Teschen for permission to transport 500 wagons and 80 locomotives by the above-mentioned rail line. The Command, in an understanding with the Ministry of War, agreed to this transport on the condition, however, that they were to be opened.<sup>x</sup> Two days later, the Czechs asked again for permission for a similar party to pass. Then the Command, and I, in the name of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requested from the proper persons that for this great service given to the Czechs, the Polish government should receive from them serious recompense, not of trade or economic but a political nature, for instance, the veritable performance of the conditions of the agreement of 3 February of this year.<sup>5</sup> If it is necessary to allow further convoys of Czech trains to pass, then it should even be demanded of them that they pull back the military line to the boundary of 5 November 1918. However, the order that came from the Ministry of War, supposedly in agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recommended that the Czech army continue to be allowed to pass through Silesia, without receiving any political advantage in exchange!

I would like to call your attention to the fact that this manner of framing this affair means losing it—without benefiting from any of the cards that fall into our hands. Demanding certain conditions from the Czechs would only be a political ploy that could bring us enormous advantages without any risk. In case of a Czech refusal, we could for our part refuse to allow the trains to pass and the Czechs would have to seek another route for the transport of their convoys, while our position in Teschen Silesia would remain unchanged.

In addition, allowing the Czech convoys through Silesia has outraged the local population, both the farming and the mining people. If the population knew that this was being done without the situation being put to skilful use, this would doubtless make their active outrage a danger to the Czechs, particularly as the trains that have been searched so far have held less war material and more war plunder, furniture, household equipment, flour, etc., which is being transported in bulk by the Czech army from the lost Slovakian lands to the enrichment of the Czechs.

As a result of these sentiments, the National Council, under public pressure and guided by their own judgement, decided to block Czech transports until

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<sup>x</sup> the Czech army loaded ammunition and arms for receipt, and wagons... [sic!].

<sup>5</sup> This refers to the agreement of 1 February 1919. See doc. No. 86.

the Czechs make important concessions on their part. I am forewarning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of this fact, adding that on my side, in appraising the situation on the spot, and taking into account the weakening of the Czechs, and the moment being excellently suited for taking advantage of it, I would consider a different decision in the matter to be a great political setback and tactical incompetence.

With the advance of the Hungarians toward the Polish boundary, the question of Orava, Spiš, and Čadca becomes daily more urgent. It is very possible that within a week the Czechs will have to relinquish these territories, leaving them to the pillage and mercy of the Hungarian Bolsheviks. Passive observation of these events would be a sin for the Polish government, because in losing one occupier it would gain another, from whom these territories could not be taken even by arms without earning a new enemy in Hungary.

The Polish government and the proper military authorities thus need to be ready so that at the precise moment of the Czechs' withdrawal from these territories—because they will be lost to the Czechs anyway—the Polish military authorities could at once enter them, so that Hungary would find them already occupied by us. This type of occupation would not be a war with the Czechs but only a defence of the Polish population against Hungarian Bolshevism, and it would not be a war with Hungary, because it would not be the occupation of territories that they had conquered but only a return to the former state of affairs.

I feel obliged to point out that the local population, as the delegations of three districts occupied by General Haller have declared loudly and publicly, and as is confirmed by the information coming from those parts, has decided to take the initiative into its own hands before long, it is so eagerly awaiting liberation and the Czechs are so far from being a danger.

The current weakness of the Czechs, their mass desertion from the front, the clear expression by Czech soldiers that they are serving in the army only for pay and not for the purpose of fighting with anyone at all, and moreover the diminishing number of army divisions in the Karvina coal basin, are making the question of that coal basin serious and urgent. The local population is actively preparing to remove the Czechs by force. This is a fact that I am communicating to the minister with full cognizance of the weight of this information and with complete responsibility. Whether the miners' move is to meet with definite and absolute success and how wide of circles it will reach is difficult to foresee. At any rate, it is the same and not as turmoil, but as an increasing ferment that must someday explode. There is no way to either stifle or restrain it.

It is actually being increased, as if deliberately or irrationally, by Czech provocations, because the Czechs are still inspecting miners' trains for an hour and a half, making the workers late to work, so they lose half a workday.

They are trying to drive the Polish inspectors away from the shafts, even though their presence there is guaranteed by the coal accord. On the night of 11-12 June 1919, Czech soldiers murdered the miner Kądzilek, who had returned to his sick wife only after 23 January 1919, and they disfigured the body so badly they do not even want to hand it to his mother. In addition, the Czech authorities are accusing us of not providing coal to Slovakia, while an investigation conducted by an Entente commission showed that the Czechs themselves are closing certain railway lines in Slovakia to the movement of goods; they are themselves holding back the transport of coal on their own terrain. It goes without saying, that these are attempts to prove how much they need the Čadca-Teschen-Bogumin rail line, which in their opinion the Entente should take from us.

The people know these Czech machinations and see the provocations of the Czech nation. They also see the demoralisation of the army and its dwindling ranks. It is more than probable that in the near future they will throw themselves on the Czechs and begin to fight. The government and Polish army should be prepared for that moment so as to prevent there being too many victims among the miners and to take this land, freed by its population, and occupied by the army.

These three issues concerning the situation in Silesia are dependent on the further course of events in Slovakia. They could play out in a few days. First—the haggle over allowing the Czech army through Teschen Silesia is a political matter, which the government should actively take up on its own accord, without risking anything in exchange. The second, the occupation of Spiš, Orava, and Čadca, is a military matter, and the military should have a free hand to choose the proper moment to act. In the third matter, the Government should adopt a wait-and-see stance and appear to the end to be passive, without hindering the population in creating *fait accompli* and the seizure of control by the newly arrived army.

I am asking you to consider these three aspects of the situation in Silesia and to make the most rapid decision possible in their regard.

Dr. Władysław Günther  
Delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
in Teschen

*AAN, KNP, 141*

## 182

*14 June 1919, note by the Prime Minister's envoy to London  
about British policy toward Poland*

The behaviour of England in the matter of Danzig, and recently of Upper Silesia, has made it possible to suppose that if in the near future there were to be a conflict between Poland and Germany—for instance, in connection with the organisation of a plebiscite in Silesia—then in England, the same elements would stand against us as have just recently taken a position that was not very favourable to us.<sup>6</sup> As the Germans themselves have twice already (in the matter of Danzig and Silesia) gained by appealing to a certain part of English public opinion, it is not out of the question that, being aware of such a state of affairs, they might deliberately try to conduct the territorial cession in such a way as to provoke a conflict with Poland to next win it entirely or in part by appealing to English opinion.

Foreseeing such a possibility means that everything possible must be done on the Polish side to obtain the maximum English sympathy for us.

In England, there are two spheres whose opinion about Polish affairs has lately had a negative effect on us. These are: 1) industrial and financial groups; 2) the liberal left and the Labour Party. Thus, particular attention should be paid to winning over these two spheres, or at least to weakening within them the influences that are unfavourable to us.

The means that could be used for this purpose are the following:

A) Industrial and financial spheres. These spheres, by the nature of their position, understand only a policy based on the principle of *do ut des* and would stand on Poland's side only if they saw an economic interest in doing so. The sense of such an interest could be awakened in them not by presenting distant prospects based on the development of Polish trade and industry, as has been done till now, but by offering them outright, today, real economic concessions, for instance, to build railways, regulate rivers, expand the Danzig port. Such an approach would be entirely in accord with the interests of Poland, which neither has sufficient capital to undertake a wide range of necessary public works, nor will have in the near future.

B) Spheres of the democratic left, a very frequent cause of disadvantageous initiatives for us is—as with almost all the other English milieus—their ignorance of Polish affairs. In these conditions, Poland's task is to provide the

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<sup>6</sup> The plebiscite in Silesia took place on 20 March 1921, and was preceded by two anti-German Silesian uprisings.



English public with proper factual material. For this purpose, an Office of Polish Propaganda should be opened in England in the near future. This office should work with the present Polish press office, which should be correspondingly enlarged. The Propaganda Office should initially be limited to the following departments: 1) readings and lectures; 2) books and brochures; 3) exhibitions, cinematographers. During the war, powerful England had a propaganda office in Holland that employed dozens of people. And since one of the great powers of the Entente possesses a special propaganda institution in England today, in addition to its special representation, then all the more is Poland's organisation of its own propaganda office in London a burning necessity.

/-/ *Filipowicz*

Paris, 14 June 1919

AAN, *Archiwum Ignacego Paderewskiego*, 978

## 183

### *15 June 1919, memo of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference about the minorities treaty draft*

The Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference appreciates the great importance of the Polish state's sovereignty and independence having been confirmed in the treaty concluded between the Main Powers and Poland. But it is precisely from the standpoint of Poland's sovereign right that the Delegation feels obliged to present its reservations in regard to the introduction of Article 93 into the treaty with Germany. According to this article, Poland must recognise the intervention of the Main Powers in its internal affairs. Poland has experienced the disastrous consequences that can arise from foreign powers' protection of ethnic and religious minorities. The Polish nation has not forgotten that Poland was partitioned as a consequence of the intervention of foreign powers in matters concerning its religious minorities and this painful memory has caused Poland to fear external intervention in the internal affairs of the state more than anything else.

Recently, this fear has once again been confirmed in a unanimous resolution of the Polish parliament.<sup>7</sup> While requiring that the government immediately

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<sup>7</sup> This probably refers to the unanimous passing during the 47<sup>th</sup> sitting of the Sejm, on 6 June 1919, of the urgent nature and the substance of the motion concerning the

draft a law respecting the rights of minorities, parliament simultaneously expressed its ultimate opposition to any foreign intervention.

Poland will ensure full civil rights to all its citizens but will demand that all its citizens be conscious of their obligations to the state. This cannot be achieved if the rights of minorities are to be imposed on the Polish state and if those minorities, feeling that they remain under foreign protection, decide that in connection with this they may address their complaints against the state to which they belong to a foreign court of appeal. This would inevitably produce outrage against the minorities and would become a cause of continued unrest.

#### Polish-Jewish relations

It is with regret that we must state that lately relations between the Jewish and Christian populations have become tense. For people who understand the development of the Jewish question in Poland, this is a surprising phenomenon. The Polish nation, among which Jews expelled from Germany had for centuries found shelter and every facility for the organisation of their religious life, desired at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century to emancipate those Jews who had been pushed into ghettos and even after the loss of independence tried to ensure them full civil rights. During the entire 19<sup>th</sup> century, Polish-Jewish relations were characterised by good mutual understanding. The present discord is caused by the attitude of the Jews, who consider the Polish cause to be lost and, in many cases, have taken the side of Poland's foes.

This policy of the Jews has caused public opinion to turn against them. Nevertheless, the restoration of the Polish state, which must be recognised by the Jews as an accomplished fact, allows the Polish nation, whose existence will no longer be threatened by their hostility, to return to the former principles in regard to the Jewish question. Relations between Jews and Poles will automatically be regulated in a short time, in a normal manner, to the satisfaction of both sides. Ensuring the protection of the Jewish population in Poland by transferring the matter to the international sphere is likely, however, to create nothing but difficulties.

Imposing on Poland duties that infringe on the essence and form of its constitution

The representatives of Poland grant equal rights, based on the principles of liberty, to all citizens regardless of origin, faith, or language, and also acknowledge the necessity of guaranteeing these principles in the Polish constitution. However, Poland's representatives must firmly resist all clauses

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Peace Conference's imposition on Poland of international protection of the rights of national and religious minorities.

of the treaty that would violate the sovereignty of the Polish state by way of imposing unilateral responsibilities concerning the essence and form of the Polish constitution and that would force it to submit possible changes to this constitution for the approval of the Council of the League of Nations.

#### The Powers' continued control over Poland

Placing one particular part of the Polish constitution under the protection of the League of Nations and requiring the approval of its Council (§13 and 14 of the treaty draft) is equivalent to considering the Polish nation to be a nation at a lower civilisational level, incapable of ensuring the rights and civil liberties of its citizens and not recognising the concept of a modern state's obligations. The Polish state, while being sovereign in principle, would thereby be placed under the continued control of the Powers; every change of the constitution, which is an expression of the nation's sovereignty, would be subject, in so far as it concerned the obligations indicated in the treaty draft, to the examination and approval of the Council of the League of Nations.

In reality, the will of one member of the Council could limit the development of the Polish constitution—a development that could be dictated by the country's vital interests.

#### Guarantees concerning the inviolability of the constitution

The constitutional principles emphasising the rights of minorities, as well as the constitution as a whole, will contain in Poland, as in other countries, guarantees of inviolability. Laws, decrees, and administrative acts that are contrary to the constitution will not have force of law. The organisation of the political powers and the appropriate political and judicial guarantees will constitute sufficient guarantees of the inviolability of the basic laws.

Art. 14 of the treaty draft concerning approval of constitutional changes by the Council of the League of Nations, as well as the cause in Art. 1 according to which the provisions of the treaty, which are to form part of the constitution, are placed under the jurisdiction of the League, must therefore be removed as they violate Poland's sovereignty.

#### The equal rights of all citizens

Even though the entire draft of the constitution submitted to parliament, all the declarations passed, and all the details of the legislation that has been passed are based on the principle of the equal rights of all citizens, and even though the draft of the legislation concerning national minorities that constitute the core of a given territory's population guarantee those minorities extensive autonomy, the treaty draft throws into question the value of the supreme principle that to this time has guided the Polish state. This draft seems to deprive the principles of equality—which are set forth in detail in the constitution—of their

character of being the free expression of national will, and deliberately presents these principles as the consequence of demands imposed by foreign powers, which retain for themselves the right of control. Art. I refer to “the desire of (Poland) to adapt its institutions to the principles of liberty and justice, and also to give certain guarantees to all the inhabitants of the territories which it has encompassed by its sovereign power,” as if Poland were a state without a past or a constitutional tradition and for the first time found itself in the face of the principle of liberty and justice. It is precisely the living traditions of the former Polish state—which was far ahead of other states in ensuring political rights to all its citizens without regard to origin, faith, or religion and opened its doors to faith communities persecuted in neighbouring countries, as well as providing shelter to the Jews who were expelled from the West—that helped to maintain the national consciousness among Poles. Poland expresses its earnest desire that the principles of freedom should be applied everywhere in regard to minorities. Poland promises to pass the legislation concerning their rights that the League of Nations considers obligatory for all countries belonging to the League, in the same manner as in relation to labour protections.

The treaty’s regulation of details concerning Jewish schools and the rights of using the Yiddish language in the courts seems particularly inappropriate considering that the present Jewish question in Poland is a question of the violent differences within the Jewish population itself. One part of the Jewish population only wants complete equality of rights for citizens of Jewish origin. This has been guaranteed to them. Others demand a separate religious organisation, which the state is to provide with political, national, social, economic, cultural, and linguistic rights that would shape the Jews into an autonomous nation. Certain Jews consider the Yiddish dialect used by the majority of Jews in Poland to be a deformation of the German language in the form in which it was spoken in the Middle Ages as inappropriate for contemporary needs and suitable solely for the Germanisation of the Jews, if it is to be used in schools. Others in turn desire to use this dialect as their national language, while a part of the Jewish population would like to renew the old Hebrew language. In the present transitional period, it is not really possible for the national and linguistic rights of Jews in Poland to be established. There is no doubt that the clause proposed in regard to the rights of the Jewish population is producing deep unhappiness among the Jewish population, which—although attached to their religion—consider themselves to be citizens of Polish nationality and earnestly desire to avoid conflict with Poles as to their national and linguistic rights.

The Jewish opposition in Poland  
The independence of Jewish schools

The fact that the proposed clauses could in the future have a disastrous impact on Poland’s internal affairs cannot be emphasised strongly enough.

School authorities for the entire population are controlled by the Polish government. And meanwhile, Art. 10 of the treaty creates one or a series of school committees for the Jewish population as strictly religious institutions that are to be established by Jewish districts, independent of the government, and their right to organise and run Jewish schools is recognised. This type of privilege must of necessity produce an analogous demand from other denominational organisations and could lead to the establishment of schools that are especially reserved for students of a given faith, and to produce a tendency to create a strictly religious educational system, which would contribute to deepening religious cleavages in Poland. This article is not acceptable because it would cause the breakdown of the political organisation into religious organisations with public rights that are privileged from the administrative standpoint, as occurred in the Middle Ages. This is also contrary to the contemporary trend in all countries to use schools as a means to produce citizens raised in a certain spirit of unity and social solidarity. This tendency must be adopted by the Polish state in particular, which is to emerge from the combination of areas that for over 100 years have been under foreign and decidedly hostile influences.

#### Minority privileges

Art. 9 will also and almost certainly produce general dissatisfaction because it creates privileges for ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities, ensuring them of a “just share” in revenues and the division of sums that could come from public, ministerial, or departmental funds, or local government budgets, or other funds with educational, religious, or philanthropic aims. Taking into account that the above minorities will, at the same time, have the right to make use of educational or charitable institutions intended for the entire population and maintained by national, local, or other funds, the privileged minorities could in this fashion obtain more benefit from public funds than the inhabitants in general.

In the same manner, Art. 12, which justifiably assures the Jews of the right to celebrate their Sabbath, could become a source of conflict between them and the Polish population, because the clause in which “Jews will not be obliged to perform any activity in violation of their Sabbath”, could entitle them to refuse to work in the public service as state employees (the civil service, railway service, or local governments) or in the army.

#### The creation of a new problem

In refusing, in regard to the Jewish question, to give the Polish state time to try the method of civil equality—whose effectiveness has been recognised by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy—and by distinguishing

the Jewish population from their co-citizens by special privileges, the Great Powers are creating a new Jewish problem and thus taking on a serious responsibility in regard to humanity. Instead of contributing to resolve the problem in a peaceful manner, they are complicating it—with unpredictable consequences. It should be feared that the Great Powers are preparing an unwanted surprise for themselves. Considering the migration ability of the Jewish population, which so willingly moves from one country to another, it is certain that given the emergence of precedents in this manner the Jews will require elsewhere the same national principles they enjoyed in Poland.

#### Citizenship rights

The reasons why the clauses concerning Polish citizenship (articles 2-5) should be added to a special treaty between the Great Powers and Poland are not clear. The treaty with Germany (articles 90-91) resolves the question insofar as it is a matter of the population of the Polish territories acquired by Prussia. This question is to be resolved in the same manner as in the treaties with Austro-Hungary and Russia. All questions concerning Polish citizenship are thus avoided, and the provisions of the present treaty are unnecessary.

#### Constitutional law and administrative details

The treaty between the Main Powers and Poland contains, as we understand, general guiding principles in regard to national minorities, that is, that the tendency of the draft is to create fundamental rights by those principles—rights that would become an unalterable part of the constitution—and to create a declaration of rights (§13). On the other hand, the treaty adds administrative and governmental details to those basic principles, for instance, the organisation of the school system, or the management of educational and philanthropic funds (§9-10), which cannot be included in the basic rights of the constitution.

#### The rights of Germans in Poland

In the end, we trust that the provisions of the treaty draft will not include the German inhabitants of Poland. After conclusion of the peace treaty, a percentage of the Polish population will remain within the borders of the German empire. Formerly, the Polish population in Germany was not only deprived of rights but subject to a severe system of extraordinary laws and administrative decrees aimed at eliminating the Polish element. The peace treaty does not impose on Germany any responsibility to guarantee the equal rights of Poles in the empire. The language rights of Poles in courts, and the possibility of maintaining Polish schools with national and local government funds, were not guaranteed in this treaty. Thus, it cannot be considered that the treatment of the Polish minority in Germany and the German minority in Poland is based on reciprocity. Since the peace treaty with Germany does

not contain any clauses guaranteeing the rights of the Polish minority, it would be unjustified if the treaty of the Main Powers with Poland were to ensure the Germans in Poland, in addition to equal rights, the privilege of using the German language in Polish courts, as well as the maintenance with public funds of schools with German as the language of instruction.

In sending the present response on the draft treaty, the Polish Delegation would like to point out that on the question concerning Poland's internal legislation, the Polish parliament and government are the first to be called to express their opinion.

The treaty draft has been forwarded to them.

*E&M, doc. 9*

## 184

*16 June 1919, letter from the Secretary General  
of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference to the representative  
of the PNC in London about Upper Silesia  
and the threat of a plebiscite in Eastern Galicia*

16 June 1919

Dear Count,

In accordance with your wishes, I am sending you some news from the last week.

We have lost the issue of Upper Silesia. In the response delivered to the Germans today, it is said that there will be a plebiscite in Upper Silesia. The fact has been communicated to Mssrs. Paderewski and Dmowski, who were called to a meeting of the Council of Four on Saturday, the 14<sup>th</sup> of this month, at 3:30 p.m. The Polish delegation resisted the plebiscite to the end. Mr. Paderewski explained the question in an hour-and-a-half-long speech to the Council of Four; then on Monday, the 9<sup>th</sup> of this month, he sent a letter of protest to Clemenceau. The delegation submitted a memorandum to the Council of Four, of which I am attaching a copy.

Under pressure from Lloyd George, however, with the fairly passive stance of Wilson, Clemenceau in the end gave way and agreed to a plebiscite. There is nothing to do but to increase our efforts to ensure the plebiscite is held in the best conditions for us.

I feel it my duty to mention that the subject of Eastern Galicia came unexpectedly onto the agenda of the Council of Five (Ministers of Foreign Affairs). There are serious fears that the use of a plebiscite will be the resolution. Polish public opinion in the country should be informed of this so that the undesirable decisions in Paris do not take us by surprise. Permit me to express the opinion that the most urgent step in defence of Eastern Galicia should be to introduce good administration on this territory—something that would reconcile the population with Polish rule.

I have been personally engaged in organising the League of Nations and I am taking the liberty of sending you a copy of a letter sent by the Secretariat of the Delegation to the Council of Ministers.

Respectfully yours,

*Stanisław Kozicki*

*AAN, MSZ, 1480*

## 185

*[after 16 June 1919], report from the Polish Delegation  
to the Peace Conference in the matter of the treaty with Germany*

Report of the Secretariat of the Polish Delegation  
on the Delegation's Activities  
from 7 May to 16 June on the treaty with Germany

The peace treaty drawn up at the Conference by the countries fighting Germany was delivered to the German Delegation on 7 May at a ceremonial meeting in the Hotel Trianon Palace in Versailles. Present at this meeting were the Polish delegates I.J. Paderewski and Roman Dmowski; S. Kozicki, the secretary general of the Delegation; and M. Seyda, as journalist-director of the Press Department of the Polish National Committee. At the meeting, the delegates received a copy of the treaty.

The Polish delegates and the experts familiarised themselves with the contents of the treaty; there was no official pronouncement on the part of the Delegation, even though from the Polish viewpoint serious steps have been taken in both the territorial sphere and in other parts of the treaty. It is sufficient to mention the manner of resolving the Danzig question, the announcement of a plebiscite in part of East Prussia, and Germany's retention of several areas inhabited by Polish populations (Wieleń, Babimost, Syców, Namysłów, etc.).



The Polish Delegation did not consider it proper to ask for changes in the treaty because the Delegation was of the opinion that as a whole the treaty satisfied the most important Polish postulates, that changes to it could be dangerous, and that the Polish side should not, by demanding changes, give the Germans grounds to demand changes.

The action of the Polish Delegation began only at the moment when the German Delegation delivered its response to the treaty draft to the Allies, that is, on 29 May.

29 May

On 29 May, the German Delegation sent the president of the Conference a letter which bore the French-language title of "Remarques de la Délégation allemande sur les Conditions de Paix." A fair amount of space in this letter was devoted to questions concerning Poland.

1 June

At the meeting of the Council of the Polish Delegation on 1 June, Mr. Grabski spoke extensively on the German letter from the viewpoint of Polish interests, after which the Council resolved as follows:

To draft a note clarifying the Polish viewpoint on the German reply. The task of composing the note was entrusted to Mr. Seyda and Prof. Romer. For the final work on the note, a commission composed of M. Seyda, Prof. Romer, Dmowski, Grabski, Wierzbicki, Pułaski, Kutrzeba, Rymer, B. Marchlewski, and M. Marchlewski was appointed.

Mr. Seyda composed the draft of the note, and Prof. Romer the draft of the enclosures.

2 June

On 2 June at 5:00 p.m., the commission held a sitting in which the draft of the note was read; comments were made and Mr. Seyda was given the task of final editing.

3 June

Delivery of the note to the Conference Secretariat took place on 3 June. The title in French was "Observations de la Délégation Polonaise au sujet des Remarques de la Délégation Allemande sur les conditions de Paix" (Enclosure 1).

4 June

At the Meeting of 4 June, the German response was considered further and it was resolved:

“To prepare and to submit (unofficially) at once a note about rectifying the boundary, the western borderlands in particular. The task of writing it was entrusted to Mr. Seyda.”

This same day, Mr. Dmowski went to the chairman of the Conference, M. Clemenceau, and not finding him, sent a written request that the Polish Delegation be heard before a response is given to the Germans (Enclosure 2).

5 June

The next day, an unofficial note was sent to Mr. Seyda (Enclosure 3). On that day, it was learned that the Council of Four had decided to make changes to Poland's western boundary at the request of Lloyd George. Information on the nature of these changes and the commission selected to make them is given in an extract from the protocol of the Council of Four (Enclosure 4).

On the same day, as a result of Mr. Dmowski's letter, Mr. Paderewski was called at 11:30 a.m. to a meeting of the Council of Four, where, in a speech lasting an hour and a half (Enclosure 5), he showed that the western boundary of Poland as established in the treaty draft is the minimum of what is demanded by justice and the political interest of the countries of the coalition.

Before the meeting, Mr. Paderewski was handed a memorandum written in English by R. Dmowski (Enclosure 6).

The articles of the treaty with Germany not concerning territorial affairs were meanwhile considered by the experts, chiefly economic ones, and the result of these meetings was a memorandum that was handed to the Conference Secretariat on 8 June. It bears the title of “Observations de la délégation Polonaise sur le traité de Paix avec l'Allemagne” (Enclosure 7).

On that day, the Council considered the danger of changes to the peace treaty being to the disadvantage of Poland. It was resolved as follows:

“It would be desirable to send to the Council of Four a note explaining the position of the Polish Delegation in regard to the proposal of a plebiscite in Upper Silesia.”

Mr. Seyda at once wrote a draft of a note in reply. This draft was presented to Mr. Paderewski, who discussed it with the delegates at 7:00 p.m. (in Hotel Wagram, Mssrs. Paderewski, Dmowski, and Grabski were present). The delegates decided that the note, with changes, should be sent in the form of a letter from Mr. Paderewski to the chairman of the Conference.

9 June

The prime minister sent the letter the following day, 9 June, in the morning (Enclosure 8).

12 June

When it was learned that it had been decided to hold a plebiscite in Upper Silesia, Mr. Grabski called the experts on this matter to a meeting, where they considered what principles should prevail in conducting the plebiscite (Enclosure 9).

A memorandum on this subject was privately delivered to the appropriate persons.

14 June

On 14 June, Mssrs. Paderewski and Dmowski were called at 3:30 p.m. to see President Wilson, where the changes to the original draft of the treaty with Germany were communicated to them on behalf of the Council of Four (Enclosure 10).

16 June

On 16 June, after the meeting of the secretary general, a new text of the treaty was delivered to the German Delegation, together with Clemenceau's letter and the remarks of the Allies to the German response.

AAN, KNP, 1354

## 186

*19 June 1919, letter from the Chairman of the PNC  
to the Chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee  
about the situation at the Peace Conference*

Paris, 19 June 1919

Dear Stach,

It's been a fairly long time since I had news of you. In the meanwhile, the situation in the country is worrying me terribly.

Perhaps at the moment when you receive this letter it will already be known whether the Germans will sign the peace treaty or not.

As you know well, it is hanging by a hair whether we go to war with them. In comparison to them, we are rather unprepared in terms of the amount of

arms and ammunition. The cooperation of the Allies, if it is limited to activities from the west, will help us about as much as incense helps the dead.

Today, I am going to Foch's headquarters to emphasise the need for an immediate descente in Danzig. Here I am afraid the English will make difficulties.

I am terrified about our situation in Eastern Galicia. For God's sake, do everything you can to push for an immediate strengthening of our armed forces there. All of Eastern Galicia, from the Carpathians to the Zbrucz River, must be held strongly in our hands. We have to move into Volhynia to occupy the right strategic line. We have to be so placed as not to allow the Hungarian Bolsheviks to connect with the Moscow ones, either from Hungary or from Russia. What we have lost there in recent times must be taken back at any cost. Is it true that Stanisławów is again in the hands of the Ruthenians?

Neglecting Eastern Galicia will have two consequences:

1. We will be surrounded by the enemy on all sides, which will result in Poland's being overrun, and therefore, the introduction of Bolshevism in it.

2. Our enemies here will make use of our withdrawal from Eastern Galicia in order to steal it from us. Do you not have the forces necessary to paralyse the game of our socialists who are aiming to give back Eastern Galicia?

\* \* \*

Changes in the treaty concerning our boundary with Germany are not disastrous.

A plebiscite in Upper Silesia is a serious setback for us. I hope that the plebiscite, if it comes to that, will not turn out too badly. That is what the Silesians themselves are saying, anyway.

After a plebiscite had been decided upon and it was no longer possible to quash it, I emphasised the conditions in which it is to occur during a meeting of the Council of Four last Saturday. I demanded that the inter-allied commission make use of Poles and Germans in equal measure in administering the area before the plebiscite. Wilson answered me that the commission would remove any inconvenient German officials.

As to the rectification of the remaining boundary line, the ethnographic principle was used. We have had taken from us:

- 1) A piece of Pomerania that had been awarded to Poland;
- 2) Piła [Schneidemühl], with a narrow belt along the boundary (railway);
- 3) The district of Góra and part of Milicz, that were awarded to us from Central Silesia.

On the other hand, we have been awarded:

Part of the Polish district of Człuchów (West Prussia);

Part of the district of Wieleń (Duchy of Poznań) to the south of the Noteć River;

The eastern part of the Syców and Namysłów districts (Central Silesia).

At a meeting of the Council of Four on Saturday, I tried to fight for part of the districts of Babimost and Międzyrzecz. Wilson and Lloyd George said to me that they do not in principle oppose those corrections and will see what can be done. I do not know yet how the point has been ultimately decided.

Do not forget about Eastern Galicia!!!

Cordially,  
Roman

*Biblioteka Naukowa PAU i PAN w Krakowie, Dział Rękopisów, 7808*

## 187

*19 June 1919, instructions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs  
to the envoy in London in connection  
with his departure for Great Britain*

### Instructions for the Polish Envoy in England<sup>8</sup>

England's stance at the Peace Conference is decidedly unfriendly toward Poland, at least to our minds; England clearly does not want to award us the position and role that Poland is firmly claiming.

Given England's enormous influence and the impossibility of openly opposing it, and given that it is particularly incumbent on the Polish Legation in London to stress the friendship and alliance between the two nations, the Polish Representation should more energetically emphasise in its public speeches and talks that Poland is a country that is above all unknown to the English. Its role can be described as trying—on the one hand—to become perfectly familiar with English ways and the spirit of the English nation, and on the other hand, not hiding that it hopes to overcome many misunderstandings and false conceptions about Poland.

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<sup>8</sup> The first Polish envoy in London was Eustachy Sapieha.

Without prejudice to more precise information the Polish Legation may obtain on the spot, the hostile influences in England have two sources and centres:

The first appears to be the policy of a relatively small group of great financiers and statesmen, whose intentions do not accord with the existence of a strong and viable Poland. This circle would appear to have plans of great magnitude for gaining, in heritage from the Germans, control of European Russia and for stretching its influence and economic enterprises from the Baltic ports to the depths of the continent, from the Black Sea to the Caucasus, where there are already English outposts and where the way is open to Mesopotamia, Persia, and Afghanistan. In a word, Eastern Europe and Western Asia are to be drawn into the British Empire's orbit. Probably, in these people's view, in such a system it would be easier to harness a series of smaller countries, loosely bound into some kind of federation, than the mass of a homogenous, compact Poland.

This type of thinking cannot be combated solely by strict reasoning—these gentlemen need to have it explained to them that Poland has no cause to hinder them in doing the best of business, that it has enough work of its own and that it will not appear as a competitor on world markets before the passage of a very long time, and that above all there is a fundamental error in their calculations. In desiring to draw lasting advantages from relations with Eastern Europe, England must create for itself some real support in Eastern Europe.

The English tell themselves that they will find such support in Germany and the Germans, who according to their calculations will emigrate in great numbers to Russia. They imagine that around 10 million Germans will go there and will be the forerunners for English influence and interests. This explains the very clear tendency to spare the Germans and to preserve their friendship. We must strenuously combat these intentions, showing to what degree the economic expansion of Germany goes in hand with political intrigue, and warning the English not to set themselves up for defeat in the future by relying on such a dangerous rival. This error they committed once at the Congress of Berlin and they reaped the harvest in 1914.

Let the English not imagine that they will find such support in so-called "small nations" such as the Latvians, Lithuanians, Byelorussians, or the Ukrainians. These are nations that are exceptionally underdeveloped, and yet too developed so that the methods used in Uganda or Baluchistan could be applied. In the meantime, there is not the least reason why Poles could not be of support to the English and in a certain measure a tool of English interests. In Poland, there are enormous tasks to be undertaken in which English capital and the entrepreneurship of English citizens could find an exceptionally profitable outlet.

Nearly all our rivers need to be regulated; we have quantities of waterways to be created, and thousands of rail lines to be built, not to mention the need for machines, raw materials for the textile industry, and so forth.

Poles are very strongly rooted in the countries lying on Poland's outskirts, of which they have perfect knowledge and in which they are the only civilised element. They could play there the role of the Mahometans in India, and while serving their fatherland, could provide benefits to England, which as a trading power is interested above all in the opening up of the broadest expanses of territory.

Probably the authors of these gigantic expansionist plans imagine that the Jews will be their natural allies and that is why they are so concerned for them. On this point they should be told outright that they do not know our Jews, who are not at all an element of progress, organisation, or creativity. In this respect, one might turn to all the envoys of the western countries who have ever come in contact with Polish Jews. One might lament their situation and strive for their betterment, but no sober politician or economist would build on that quagmire.

The above-mentioned political and financial groups, which are operating consciously or deliberately, are helped by public opinion at large, which is moved by a thousand different invisible springs and often operates in bad faith, to our detriment. This is the second sphere of activities directed against us. The struggle here could be partially condemned to failure from the outset, even though it must be undertaken by the first official Polish Representation in England, by means of interviews given to journalists, talks with influential persons, the banquet speeches that the English love so much, and so forth. The above-mentioned arguments could be used in large measure here; others could also be used that would be out of place in more technical political discussions.

Here as elsewhere, a Polish envoy in a friendly country must naturally behave with all moderation and, even with hostile elements, should not engage in acrid discussions that could produce distaste. On the other hand, he is always free to emphasise analogies that work to Poland's benefit, that is, Poland's readiness to treat national minorities as the great powers do and to relinquish imperialism in the same measure as the great powers' relinquish it, etc.

The English do not like abstract theories and can be particularly sensitive to this type of comparison and arguments. One could emphasise the barbarity and cruelty of the Ukrainians, the savagery of Russia, the ignorance of Byelorussia; it should be explained that Poland, having been deprived for 120 years of the possibility of exerting those civilisational and educational influences that every state exerts on its citizens, is not grasping and being aggressive in wanting to maintain its influence on the lands that have for centuries been subject to it and where it is the sole defender of its compatriots against murder, conflagration,

and complete annihilation. Here, one might very profitably cite the eternal English principle of the absolute defence of every one of His Majesty's subjects.

In England, humanitarian concerns will produce a separate category of discussions, particularly in the press. Here, there is a need to disperse the multitude of false ideas. It must be explained to English philanthropists that there is only one cure for the poverty of the Jews or the backwardness of the Ruthenian peasants, and that is to make us a civilised country in the grand style. Salvation through various experiments in Byelorussia or Ukraine would suit German intrigues but not the true interests of those people, who must be lifted urgently to a higher level of civilisation. The same concerns the Jews. Pandering to their whims of belonging to some irrational political formation that could easily be controlled would only perpetuate their lamentable state, with which a decisive rupture is in order.

It would be extremely desirable for the Polish Delegation to establish relations as quickly as possible with English labour spheres, which at the moment are extremely influential in England. Here again, various prejudices will have to be overcome, which at the present moment should not be too difficult considering the very democratic system in Poland.

Obviously, in all its undertakings the Polish envoy and his personnel should remember that they are accredited to the king and government, and thus it would not be suitable for them to fraternise with circles standing in clear opposition to the government, even if they were to exhibit greater friendliness toward us. For instance, Northcliffe's press is generally less unfavourably inclined toward us than Lloyd George's radical organs. Nevertheless, it would be unacceptable for the Polish envoy to over-accentuate his preference for it. Any sort of behind-the-scenes plotting is even more out of the question; the framework of loyalty and tact must absolutely be maintained.

Caution should be taken even in relations with "friendly" press. In both important and minor circles, all supposedly covert activities come to light unusually quickly and the Polish envoy cannot expose himself to having it said that he is intriguing in press spheres against the government.

This also has to apply to the Irish, for whom we are free to express sympathy and goodwill, but never in a form that could annoy the English government.

As to relations with its own government, the main task of the Legation will be to keep it informed and to obtain information for it. The above arguments contain indications of the kind of information that is wanted above all at present. We must absolutely find out who in England our enemy is—this will be easy—and what will be more difficult, what interests and desires are standing counter to ours, and how we could satisfy them to such a degree that



our most essential needs would not be opposed. Only by this route can we find the means to counteract them.

The establishment of trade and economic relations cannot be the envoy's main task, but he should give it his most sincere support and provide all possible facilitations. Poland's political interests absolutely require that the greatest number of common interests with England be found and forged.

We should gradually strive to move the institutions supporting England's expansion into Russia from London to Warsaw, as such and as a gateway to Russia, and to draw English capital to Poland. The attention of English financiers should be drawn to the fact that due to their lack of knowledge of the Russian market and our market, they are exploited unbelievably by various intermediaries. By joining Polish enterprises, created in Poland, having easy access to Russia, and knowing Russia, they could save themselves enormous sums. The people serving them today as intermediaries are often working for German industry.

In general, the members of the legation should remember that they are representatives of the Polish government and thus they may not make any declarations or undertake any commitments for which they have not been expressly empowered. They should in all cases guard against any sort of policymaking on their own initiative.

Besides, as a result of the exceeding expansion of its social life, England presents a very good field for acting on public opinion outside the framework of politics as such. In all kinds of philanthropic, scientific, educational, artistic, etc. clubs and associations, there are an enormous number of possibilities for working on public opinion didactically without offending any party or interfering in national disputes. London is still the only centre where salons have a large influence on politics. Thus, access to them should be sought very earnestly and they should not be underestimated as a means of propaganda.

In regard to current issues, let the Legation try to find out what lines public opinion and opinion-making milieus have taken recently in regard to the issue of Eastern Galicia. Have the recent findings of the inter-allied mission that travelled around Galicia effected any change in views? What concessions could be expected to shape the City's opinion in a more favourable manner for us?

Equally careful attention should be paid to the present state of intentions and views concerning Lithuania. Are they still thinking, in England, of laying hands on the Baltic provinces and Lithuania directly, or are they intending to begin from the Baltic coast to rebuild Russia? What, according to the needs of the day, is referred to as Lithuania?

Does England sincerely desire to end Bolshevism, or does great capital still consider the depreciation of various natural resources or market values by the Bolshevik movement to be advantageous for it?

As the Legation will be operating in unfriendly terrain—despite appearances of great courtesy—it must impose on itself the obligation of extreme caution. Even in private relations, whether with the English or representatives of other countries, any unconsidered outpourings should be avoided as they could give rise to rumours that would spoil the Legation's relations with official personages.

The Polish Legation in London should send all reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For as long as the Peace Conference continues, the Legation should send a copy of its reports simultaneously to the National Committee in Paris.

The Polish community in England is incredibly driven by party quarrels. It will be the envoy's part to indicate that as the representative of the Polish state in a foreign country, he recognises Polish citizens without difference by party, and he should not let himself be drawn into party disputes in any regard.

It is not the part of the legation to engage in intelligence activities. Nevertheless, it should take an interest in whether the Polish Consulate is not neglecting that activity. After the arrival in London of the Polish military attaché, the responsibility for organising and supervising the intelligence service will fall on him. Given the continual influx to Poland of people with official or semi-official missions, there should definitely be attempts made to deliver sufficient information to the intelligence office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in conjunction with their arrival.

The envelopes of reports and dispatches of all sorts should be clearly marked if they concern "confidential" (for the minister), political or administrative questions, as this will expedite the sorting of diplomatic mail at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

For the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

Warsaw, 19 June 1919

*AAN, MSZ, 5091D*

## 188

*20 June 1919, letter from the envoy in Bucharest  
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs about his discussion  
with the Prime Minister of Romania in the matter of Pokuttia  
and anti-Bolshevik policy*

Bucharest, 20 June 1919

Dear Minister,

At once after arriving in Bucharest, I sent a letter to the president and minister of foreign affairs, Michal Pherekyde, asking when he could receive me and give me the opportunity to ask him to arrange an audience with the king for the purpose of submitting my letters of accreditation. I received an audience the following day. The president began the meeting with very kind words, warmly emphasising the spiritual closeness of Romania with Poland, the community of state interests, and the need for the greatest harmony in action, based on mutual faith. He expressed his regret that these intentions are not always sufficiently appreciated in Poland, and sometimes steps that are motivated by other serious concerns are considered by us as symptoms of Romania's insincere feelings toward us. As one such instance, he mentioned finding it necessary to allow the transfer through Romania of 10,000 Ukrainian troops in transit from Bender to Zaleszczyki (of which there was talk in April), but having first to disarm them out of fear that they would join, with their weapons and equipment, the Bolsheviks, who were pressing on them from behind, particularly as they had advanced that possibility.

I told Minister Pherekyde that these minor misunderstandings must give way before the one main idea guiding all our undertakings: the common boundary that we must achieve, and the joint political line against the enemies surrounding us, the only means of giving our demands their proper weight and importance.

In connection with this, I stated that not only the government's intentions and my instructions tended in this direction but also the feelings of the entire nation, which warmly sympathised with Romania. I could not hide, however, that certain rather too rough speeches by various Romanian military commanders in Pokuttia might give the Polish population justifiable cause for offense, and in reaching public opinion could throw a false light on our friendly mutual relations. The only solution I see for avoiding such occurrences is to appoint a Polish civilian commissioner to Zadik, general commander in Czerniowce, to defend the interests of the Polish population. The agreement of the Romanian government would be obvious proof of its feelings toward

Poland, and by giving it certain publicity in our press—which I hereby dare to recommend—would stifle any eventual complaints, and for public opinion would be a confirmation of the existence of our impeccable mutual relations. President Pherekyde agreed to my proposal.

I further informed the president of General Henrys' plan for moving the anti-Bolshevik line of defence to the Zbrucz River. I called his attention to the fact that the arguments for the proposal are solely of a strategic nature. Therefore, unfortunately, my government—though it recognised the great importance of such a shift in the front—could not, without harm to the cause, offer support or the initiative on such a plan, as at once intentions of a political nature would be ascribed to it in Paris. Nevertheless, it is counting on the Romanian government—in appraising the purely strategic arguments for shortening our front and basing it on Romania, and thereby strengthening our common anti-Bolshevik line—to want to support this plan as fervently and energetically as possible and to consider it its own.

The president recognised the correctness of these arguments and promised to support the plan with all his efforts. In this connection, he revealed his distaste for the world's arbitrators.

According to him, England laid hands on what it needed and is not concerned with the rest. France is powerless, and Wilson, with his impracticable ideals, is endangering the existence of small states whose opinions he does not take into account. He seemed to me mainly distressed by the reduction of the boundary that had already been awarded in 1916 in Transylvania: "The Entente is afraid that we will go to Pest," he said. And on the emerging question of the defence of national minorities, that is, a dangerous new form of the Jewish question: "They want to give," he said, "the national minorities an advantage over the majority, thus providing the former with a source of support in the Allies."

When he recalled that the voices of us small nations go unheard by those who are deciding the fate of the world, I very slightly touched on the idea that if, however, it were to happen that several small nations of several tens of millions were to get together and act together, the weight of their voice would be quite different.

The president answered that we would have to work on this, particularly as means of coercion will be lacking in the West, and the implementation of the details would remain, in spite of everything, in our hands.

The president promised me an audience with the king in the coming days.

Respectfully yours,  
(signed): Al. Skrzyński

## 189

*21 June 1919, letter from the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
to the PNC in Paris about the situation in Upper Silesia*

Strictly confidential!

21 June 1919

To the Polish National Committee  
in Paris

On 21 June of this year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the National Committee a cable in cipher with the following text:

“Public opinion in Upper Silesia has been touched to the quick by the ongoing violence and lawlessness of the German authorities. Stop. A large part of the Polish intelligentsia has been arrested. Stop. Young people are hiding in the forests or fleeing from the compulsory draft. Stop. The Polish government is using all its influence to hold back an explosion of despair. Stop. Its efforts will have no effect unless the lawlessness of the German authorities and the provocations of the Grenzschutz stop at once.”

As a supplement to the above cable, I have the honour to communicate the following:

On the 18<sup>th</sup> of this month, a meeting of the PMO district commanders of Upper Silesia was held in Piotrowice (Teschen Silesia). Several officers took part in these meetings of their own accord.

The PMO commanders announced unanimously that given the increasing outrage of the Upper Silesian people it would not be possible to restrain an uprising much longer.<sup>9</sup> All succeeding delay would expose them to a loss of confidence in the labour circles, which have been brought to despair by the ongoing lawlessness of the German authorities. After a short exchange of opinions, the night of 22 to 23 June was designated as the date of the uprising. A general railway strike, to immobilise the German army, was to begin at the same time as the military action.

Immediately after receiving the information about the Piotrowice resolutions, and particularly about the date of the uprising having been set for the eve of the final deadline given the Germans for signing the peace treaty, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with the High Command and the Poznań Commissariat,

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<sup>9</sup> The First Silesian Uprising began in the night of 16-17 August and lasted until 24 August 1919.

took energetic steps to calm the situation. Intelligence officers were ordered to communicate with the Silesian PMO headquarters and to get them to withdraw the preparations. Deputy Korfanty is going today by airplane from Poznań to Sosnowiec to talk on the spot with representatives of the Upper Silesian organisation and to use his influence to support the actions of the staff. Unfortunately, in spite of all the efforts being made, there is no certainty that the order holding back the outbreak will reach all the PMO district organisations and it is possible that in one or another locality there will be disturbances on the 22<sup>nd</sup>-23<sup>rd</sup>.

It is in any case certain that the influence of the Polish government may be sufficient to hold back the uprising for a certain time, but that it is not sufficient to hold it back entirely. Thus, if the German army does not withdraw from Silesia in the immediate future, it should be expected that there will be an uprising in Silesia regardless of the result of the negotiations in Versailles. The fact that the German delegates signed a peace treaty will not in itself calm the Silesian population.

The position of the Polish authorities in the Silesian question in regard to the Allied countries is, and has been from the first, entirely loyal. Everything possible has been done on the Polish side not to forestall the decisions of the Conference. If nevertheless it comes to an armed uprising on the part of the local population, the responsibility for it will fall exclusively on the German policy of violence and provocation.

Undersecretary of state:

*Wł. Skrzyński*

AAN, KNP, 127

## 190

*22 June 1919, letter from the Supreme Command to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the position of the Powers in the matter of Eastern Galicia (with enclosure)*

Warsaw, 22 June 1919

To the MINISTRY of FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
in WARSAW

This is to communicate that the head of the Ukrainian-Galician army informed the Command of the Galician-Volhynian front on 19 June of this

year that it does not consider the ceasefire agreement concluded between the military delegation of the High Command and the military delegates of Ataman Petlura to be binding upon itself.

Therefore, the Ukrainian side has officially broken the ceasefire. Certain information has also arrived of a formal agreement between Petlura and the Bolsheviks.

War operations between the Polish and Ukrainian armies are continuing.

It is requested that appropriate steps be taken in regard to the governments of the coalition states in order to obtain an entirely free hand in regard to the action in Eastern Galicia, as well as in regard to the use of the divisions of General Haller's army in that area.

Since our action in Eastern Galicia was stopped at the moment when it was proceeding most propitiously, at the categorical demand of the Coalition—as expressed especially in Ambassador Pralon's note, which was delivered on 19 May in the name of the chairman of the Peace Conference to the Chief of State—the High Command of the Polish Army requests that it be informed at once as to what steps the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intends to take in regard to the present political and military situation in Eastern Galicia.

The High Command of the Polish Army particularly requests a definite and immediate response about the diplomatic steps taken with regard to the last sentence of the above-mentioned note, namely, "*le conseil insistera pour une cessation immédiate des hostilités de la part des forces militaires ukrainiennes.*"

A translation of the letter of the Commander of the Ukrainian-Galician army in the matter discussed above is attached.

Haller  
Colonel

[Enclosure]

The Chief of State, General PIŁSUDSKI, forwarded the dispatch of the chairman of the Peace Conference, in so far as it addressed political issues, to the government of the Republic of Poland.

The government of the Republic of Poland considers itself obliged to state the following:

As the Sejm unanimously resolved on 24 May,<sup>10</sup> the Republic of Poland desires to be an agent of international peace based on the right of every nation to independence and to define its existence as a state and declares itself for

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<sup>10</sup> This refers to the 40<sup>th</sup> sitting of the Sejm, on 22 May 1919, at which the said resolution, prepared by the united parliamentary committees, was voted on in

the union of free and equal nations for the purpose of avoiding wars and achieving permanent peace between nations.

Moved by this spirit of peace and desiring to satisfy the wishes of the Allied states, on 28 February, the government of Poland accepted a truce with the Ukrainian armies, as dictated by the inter-allied commission in Lwow. The Ukrainian army did not accept it, however.

Therefore, when on 23 March, at the initiative of the Allied states, the Polish government began negotiations for an armistice with the Ukrainian armies, it first had to demand an undertaking from the representatives of the Ukrainian armies that after the ceasefire a truce would be negotiated on the basis indicated by the inter-allied truce commission of 28 February. The Ukrainian army's rejection of this condition convinced the government of the Republic of Poland that the Ukrainian armies had no real intentions of peace. On the other hand, the withdrawal of the Ukrainian armies from the territory of the Ukrainian state created by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the occupation of this territory almost in its entirety by the Russian Bolsheviks, the movement of the latter toward Galicia with the open aim of joining up with the Hungarian Bolsheviks, the increasingly frequent passing of Ukrainian divisions onto the side of the Bolsheviks, along with the Germans' provocative amassing of troops on the Polish border has threatened Poland with the grave danger of being entirely cut off from the Allied states in the event of a simultaneous attack by the Germans with the Russian, Ukrainian, and Hungarian Bolsheviks.

Therefore, given a potential onslaught by Germany, the Polish government felt the need to secure a front with Romania against the Bolsheviks as quickly as possible and to have its armies occupy the transport routes leading through Galicia from Kiev to Budapest. For this reason, the Republic of Poland could not accept the truce proposed on 12 May by the inter-allied commission in Paris, which was much worse for Poland than the previously proposed one—not because the government of Poland had insufficiently considered the desires of the Allied powers, but due to the necessity of defending both its fatherland and the peace of all Eastern Europe against the direct danger threatening it. This was the more necessary because, in spite of the negotiations for a truce, the Ukrainian military did not cease, even for a moment, from attacking the Polish positions, but openly bombarded cities, thus showing the clear divergence between the Ukrainian declarations in Paris and the actions of the Ukrainian military authorities in Galicia.

Furthermore, the aim of the Polish military actions against the Ukrainians were not intended to determine the boundary between Poland and Ukraine

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connection with the prime minister's report on his activities during the Peace Conference in Paris.



through armed force, but on the contrary, to defend itself from the Ukrainians' attempts to tear from Poland by force the eastern part of Galicia, even though it has been continuously a Polish land from the 14<sup>th</sup> century to the partitions of Poland. After the partitions, it was in its entirety an indivisible land of the Austrian monarchy and never belonged to the Ukrainian state, and even the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, by which Germany and Austria established the Ukrainian state, recognised the indivisibility of Galicia as a Polish land. In occupying Galicia, Petlura's army thus occupied a land to which it had no right in order to move the Ukrainian border by force to Poland's detriment. As to what concerns the so-called Western Ukrainian Republic, the Polish government considers itself obliged to draw the Peace Conference's attention to the fact that those authorities never even referred to the population of the land for a mandate, but always ruled by force in entirely the same manner as the Bolshevik authorities, and therefore they were only a military conspiracy, not the organs of a newly emerged state. Moreover, as we well know and of which we have irrefutable proof, not only do real Ukrainians living on the territory of the former Russian empire not have any convictions about the rights of that nation to part of Eastern Galicia, but on the contrary, there are serious Ukrainian elements that emphasise the impossibility of agreeing and finding a common political platform between formerly Russian Ukraine and the Ruthenian element, which has been subject in the past, as now, exclusively to German influence, as is also alleged by Ukrainian politicians in Petlura's circle. The actions of the Polish military in Galicia are thus exclusively in the nature of defending a land that has never been severed from Poland by any act having legal value, and above all to defend the mercilessly and barbarously persecuted Polish inhabitants, to whose despairing cries for help the Polish nation cannot remain indifferent. Those inhabitants themselves drove the Ukrainian army out of a series of cities, such as Brody and Stanisławów, before the army of the Republic of Poland came to their aid.

In accordance with President Wilson's principle of the self-determination of nations, the Republic of Poland announced broad national autonomy, by a resolution of parliament, for the Ukrainian population of the eastern part of Galicia. The nature and character of this autonomy the Republic of Poland will determine in conjunction with the legally chosen representatives of the population of this land.

The Republic is not intending to establish its eastern boundaries through unilateral decision and fully recognises in this regard the authority of the Peace Conference and the League of Nations. The government of the Republic of Poland considers that the final settlement of the south-eastern border of the Republic of Poland is not possible until legal order has been generally established within the territory of the former Russian empire and until the

future of the lands and peoples on which Poland is to neighbour in the east has been clarified.

In spite of all this, the government of the Republic of Poland gave the order on 29 May to halt the Polish army's victorious counter-offensive, in compliance with the wishes of the peace conference.

In this connection, however, the government of the Republic of Poland cannot fail to mention that in stopping this counteroffensive, the Polish nation feels that it is giving the Polish population remaining under the control of the Ukrainian military districts over to the most terrible persecution and mass murder. Every day news arrives of new cruelties in the Galician lands not occupied by the Polish army.

In answer to a new note of the Four, the Chief of State today delivered to M. Pralon the following response:

In answer to the dispatch communicated to me by the Minister of France, M. Pralon, I have the honour to communicate the following:

The offensive of my armies on the Ukrainian front was produced by attacks by the Ukrainian armies directed at various parts of the front occupied by the Polish army. This attack was begun by the Ukrainians at once after the proposals for a truce; considering the possible imminent armed conflict with Germany, I could not even think of the necessary concentration of forces in the west, having the majority of the army tied down by the Ukrainian attacks in the east, which threatened the occupation of Polish Lwow, with all the consequences of the fall of that city.

I thus ordered a counterattack along the entire front, giving to the army as goals:

a) To destroy the enemy to the degree allowing me to freely withdraw the great majority of forces toward the west.

b) To establish a link with Romania, so that in the event of war with Germany Poland is not cut off from the entire world and left alone in an armed conflict with Germany and the Bolshevik army, acting in unity and solidarity. I must draw attention in this regard to the fact that with the number of troops I possess and especially with the equipment that my armies have had till now, Poland would be powerless if, in addition to the battle with these two very powerful enemies, it also had to maintain a huge part of its forces on the Lwow front in connection with the attacks of the Ukrainians. I thus consider it my duty to the Fatherland to secure it to the best of my abilities against the danger of being crushed in an unequal fight not on two but on three fronts, to the final ruin of its wellbeing and internal peace.

As soon as the above-mentioned goals of the offensive were attained, I stopped at once, without in any way closing the path to a truce or even to a lasting peace.

Even before receiving the dispatch from the Chairman of the Peace Conference, the majority of my armies had been directed toward the western front.

I must add that the cruelty committed by the Ukrainians against the defenceless Polish population who are under their power would cause the mildest people to lose their temper and force them to undertake the extremely justified task of securing their lives—and not through words but by open force.

As to the political content of the dispatch, I have arranged a meeting of the competent Polish persons for consultations with a demand an immediate reply be sent to the prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Paderewski, who is presently in Paris.

*CAW, Oddział II Naczelnego Dowództwa Wojska Polskiego z lat 1919-1921, I.301.8.449*

## 191

*23 June 1919, note by the PNC in Paris  
about the activities of the Kolchak government*

Paris, 23 June 1919

### INTELLIGENCE ABOUT KOLCHAK'S GOVERNMENT

Admiral Kolchak's government is a de facto government created in Omsk shortly after the Bolshevik coup in October 1917. It bases itself on rightist parties, Octobrists, cadets, and part of the socialists. The Bolsheviks and the majority of the Menshevik party are fighting this government. The group of Avksentiev and Kerensky, which is currently in Paris, is keeping its distance from Kolchak's government, and sometimes behaves with hostility towards it. Kolchak's government has subordinated to itself General Denikin's government in the south and the Murmansk government in the north. The official outlet in Paris for all elements grouped around Kolchak's government is the so-called *Conférence Politique Russe à Paris*.

The genesis and process of creating the *Conférence Politique Russe* is the history of the gradual attraction of parties dispersed by the Russian revolution and their outstanding members. The first to come to Paris from Russia and

enter into relations with the other representatives here of official Russia was Maklakov, who came as the plenipotentiary of the government in Omsk. The next to come was Prince Lvov and members of the Archangelsk government and Denikin's government, the socialist Chaikovsky and Sazonov. These four created the Conférence Russe, gathering around themselves the majority of the political parties: from rightists, for instance, Krupensky, to leftists, for instance, Savinkov. The members of the Conférence Russe claim that Kerensky, who stands outside the Conférence, is not such a dangerous opponent of it, and that a ministerial portfolio would immeasurably cool his oppositional zeal. The Conférence also claims that there is absolute concordance between its programme and that of Kolchak's government: possibly the concordance is not so very ideal. The Conférence, with Sazonov at its head, active and having from former times influence in international spheres, has been recognised as the official representation and the porte-parole of Kolchak's government.

From the intelligence operations undertaken here, we have managed to learn that the programme of Kolchak's government includes immediately calling together a constituent assembly, on the most democratic principles (elections are already taking place in certain localities), and a liberal, federative-autonomous-based policy in relation to the former "otherbreds." In general, this is the revolutionary programme of 1917 from the pre-Bolshevik era. Russian politicians consider that economic factors are playing such an important role in the crumbling of Russia that the former provinces of the Russian Empire, without compulsion, will naturally strive for their clear benefit toward its centre. The Conference thus defends the entirety of the Russian cause (without ethnographic Poland and Finland) using all means, referring as need arises to Wilson's principles and on the necessity for plebiscites.

Kolchak's government, although it still is not recognised by the Entente, considers itself to be the legitimate heir of [Russia's] legal governments. In referring to Russia's services during the war, the Conférence Russe in Paris is making every effort for Russia to be represented at the Peace Conference, and today is reserving for itself all the advantages and prerogatives that will be granted the main countries allied through the peace treaty.

On the presumption that Kolchak's government, however revolutionary, is still the continuation of former legal governments of the Prince Lvov era and its *de lege* authority extends over the entire territory of 1914 Russia, the Conférence Russe de Paris demands the annulment of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty that Germany concluded with newly formed states such as Lithuania and Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia reserves to itself all rights that could in one way or another be violated by the peace treaty and demands the right of access to the League of Nations on an equal basis with the founding countries.

In relation to the newly formed states on Russian territory, Kolchak's government maintains the principle that all questions concerning the Russian

empire within its 1914 borders and questions concerning the legal system of nationalities living within the borders of this territory cannot be resolved without the participation of the Russian nation. The exception is Poland within its ethnographic borders. Only the will of the Russian nation, expressed by the constituent assembly, can be decisive and no other provisions as to the fate of those nations can be binding on Russia.

Therefore, the presently constituted governments of the newly emerged states are considered to be only *de facto* governments, corresponding to the needs of the moment. On the other hand, the “new” and “post-revolutionary” Russia is inclined to satisfy the “legal” desires and needs (*désirs légitimes*) of the non-Russian nationalities. Russia itself is to determine the legality of these desires, and there is thus no doubt that given the composition of the future Russian constituent assembly, which will have a uniquely rightist nature, this promise will be manifested in the form of a very limited autonomy or self-government.

In regard to the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia and Courland—the *Conférence Politique Russe* emphasises their special importance for Russia and in its arguments refers to the tradition of two-centuries-long struggle for a “window on Europe,” and to the economic, financial, and military interests (the possession of these provinces is necessary in the defence of both Russian capitals) that bind Russia and the Baltic states so closely that Russia could never allow them to fall off or become independent. In the Russian view, the national aspirations of these provinces should find an outlet within the framework of autonomy, which Russia is inclined to grant on the condition that the rights of national minorities, mainly Russians, will be particularly considered.

In relation to Poland, the 1917 programme is being applied: Russia recognises the Polish state within ethnographic borders, and thus the claims to the Chełm area and certain districts in the Siedlce and Suwałki areas should be expected. The appeal of the “Democratic League for the Rebuilding of Russia” (which is close to and almost identifies with the *Conférence Russe à Paris*) was striking in that it clearly stated that the fate of Eastern Galicia, inhabited by Ruthenians, cannot be decided without Russia’s participation in this decision, as Russia must inevitably protect nationalities that are Russian-related. The *Conférence Russe* takes no responsibility for that appeal and appears to relinquish Eastern Galicia.

Under pressure from England, influential circles of the *Conférence* have betrayed a willingness to conclude a Polish-Russian treaty for the purpose of establishing a boundary; they consider the conclusion of a strong military alliance between Poland and Russia to be a necessity. More than once they have expressed the desire for good neighbourly relations, claiming that both states have common interests in opposition to the Germans.

Bessarabia was never Romanian (so the *Conférence Russe* considers), but always Russian or Turkish; this is Russia’s legal title to Bessarabia. That

province's ethnographic situation is such that if it cannot be attached to Russia, a plebiscite will be necessary there.

Under pressure from France, Russia must with regret relinquish Finland. The Conférence will thus strive to protect its capital militarily from the Finnish side, as well as to guarantee itself the free movement of its fleet in the Bay of Finland.

Probably, these desires found their expression in attempts to settle on the northern coast of Finland.

As to Ukraine, according to Kolchak's programme, its relation to Russia is to be set forth by the future all-Russia constituent assembly. Certain representatives (Margolin) of the Ukrainians have protested against such an approach to the question, claiming that it would not be the will of the Ukrainian people—whose representatives would be a minority in the constituent assembly—but the majority of Greater Russians who would thus decide Ukraine's fate.

We are sending with these enclosures two memoranda of the Conférence Politique Russe to the Conférence de la Paix, as well as the conditions upon which Kolchak's government was unofficially but factually recognised, and this government's response to the Entente's conditions.

AAN, KNP, 75

## 192

*24 June 1919, report by the military representative  
to the Lithuanian government to the General Adjutancy  
of the Supreme Commander about discussions  
in the matter of the situation in Lithuania*

Warsaw, 24 June 1919

TO THE GENERAL ADJUTANCY OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
In Warsaw

STRICTLY SECRET

After arriving in Kaunas, I asked Lieutenant Jakutis, who is assigned to our Mission, who among the higher Lithuanian authorities might receive us.

Lieutenant Jakutis said that the Minister of War Colonel Merkys might receive us. I went to him that same day. The conversation was in Polish and Lithuanian. During the talk, Colonel Merkys remarked that the Poles do not want to come to an agreement with Lithuania, because Dr. Šaulys returned from Warsaw with nothing. I replied that the very fact of our arrival in Kaunas proves that the Polish government desires to come to an agreement with Lithuania, and I declared that the following day, after my visit with Staniszewski to the prime minister of the government of Lithuania, I would like to start discussing military questions. However, after our visit to the prime minister of the government of Lithuania, Mr. Sleževičius, when he told us that there could not be any negotiations until the Poles recognise the independence of Lithuania, transferring civilian control into Lithuanian hands in the territories of the former Ober-Ost, I was forced to relinquish these plans.

A few days later, I requested Lieutenant Jakutis to ask General Zukowski, the Commander in Chief of the Lithuanian armies, if he did not think it was possible, in spite of the suspension of political negotiations, to discuss questions of a purely official-military or private nature. After receiving agreement, I went to see General Zukowski. The conversation was in Russian. During the talk, General Zukowski expressed the wish that regardless of the results of the diplomatic negotiations a connection should be established between the right flank of the Lithuanian army and the right wing of the Polish army for common action against the Bolsheviks. I also raised the question of the demarcation line and the Vilnius-Daugavpils railway line, to which General Zukowski gave an evasive answer, as if he did not want to touch that question, but he said that from the demarcation line of Olita and so forth it would be possible to push the German army to the Wierzbołowo-Kaunas line if the Poles also withdrew from that line. He was chiefly concerned with establishing contact near Daugavpils. The question of the Poles' disarmament of the Byelorussian battalion in Grodno was also raised. Zukowski protested slightly, but he let it be understood that the Lithuanian authorities are even pleased about it as the maintenance of that battalion was very expensive: keeping one soldier for a month cost 1,000 marks. From the talk with General Zukowski, I had the impression that he is a Pole and for that reason he did not want to touch that question. From people close to General Zukowski I heard that for as long as he is Commander in Chief, there will not be any hostile actions from the Lithuanian side against Poles. When Polish-Lithuanian relations were discussed during a cabinet meeting, Zukowski said that he will resign if it comes to conflict with the Poles. The Lithuanian government would not attach too much weight to General Zukowski, but it is convinced that if General Zukowski resigned, many officers, particularly higher-ranking officers, would also resign.

Generally, I had the impression that the Lithuanian army does not present any danger for Poland; the German army is supposed to behave defensively;

in the event of conflict on the side of the Germans, the General Staff will be informed three days beforehand, because there is a German officer who belongs to the Polish intelligence service.

During my stay, I observed that the Polish intelligence service in Kaunas is very well organised and is operating flawlessly. Before my departure I paid a farewell visit to the Minister of War Colonel Merkys, and I also talked with the Chief of Staff Colonel Velykis, who both complained of the abuses committed by our armies, particularly the military police on the demarcation line, as in Orany, Szyrwinty and Jewie, where it very often happens that travellers to Lithuania are robbed, their last money taken, their boots taken off, and those who resist are beaten. I consider that such instances will have a very negative impact on current relations and on a future plebiscite, particularly as the Lithuanian press makes use of all such incidents to arouse the Lithuanian population against the Poles.

During my return to Vilnius I noticed that on our side they allowed travellers into Lithuania too easily, while the crossing of Lithuanians to our side is made very difficult. Lithuanian officers have complete freedom to travel to Vilnius. For example, the colonel of the former Byelorussian battalion in Grodno—a Jesuit, who is the head of counter-intelligence at the Lithuanian General Staff—was staying for some time in Vilnius.

In Vilnius and Kaunas, I was told that in Vilnius there are terrible abuses against the civilian population. The mounted reconnaissance unit of the divisional staff and the military police stand out in particular. There are very frequent instances of unjustified searches and thefts, and bribery especially is in full bloom. The military police, for example, are living very opulently—the soldiers of the military police pay several hundred marks for a dinner—and one wonders where such a soldier gets such money. The Lithuanian press blows every fact out of proportion; it twists facts and brings them to public knowledge, while pointing out that all this is aimed only at Lithuanians and Jews. This is having a very negative effect on Polish-Lithuanian relations. I also think that in Vilnius, the Lithuanian press enjoys too much freedom. It is openly acting against Poland and the Polish government; sometimes articles appear that directly insult the dignity of the Polish nation and they are not made responsible for that at all. One Lithuanian newspaper published in the Polish language, the *Głos Litwy*, stands out especially in this regard. It is edited by the former minister of education, Mr. Birżyszka. The stance of another Lithuanian newspaper, published in the Lithuanian language and appearing in Vilnius, *Nepriklausomoji Lietuva*, is hardly better. For comparison, I could point out that in Lithuania, the Polish press is almost entirely stifled—not a word of truth can be said of the terror that is meted out to Poles in Lithuania.



Enclosed, please find: 1) a detailed report on the Lithuanian and German armies and on their mutual relations.

MACKIEWICZ  
major

*IJPA, Archiwum Michała Mościckiego, 75/6*

## 193

*25 June 1919, note by an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
about the arrival in Warsaw of the Japanese military representative*

25 June 1919

To the Head of the Diplomatic Section

### Report

Having been ordered to receive in Warsaw on the 21<sup>st</sup> of this month the representative of the Japanese military mission, Captain Yamawaki, who is arriving from Paris, I went on the 22<sup>nd</sup> to meet the Paris train, where I greeted Captain Yamawaki as he descended from the car.

I made a short speech to him, expressing in a few words in Russian my pleasure at the honour of having been entrusted by the ministry with receiving in the name of the government the first representative of the mighty Japanese power, for which the Polish nation's goodwill is both real and sincere.

Captain Yamawaki thanked me, after which we got in the car and I took him to the Hotel Bristol, where I had previously reserved a room.

During my discussion with Captain Yamawaki, and thanks to his ease of manner, I arranged for the following:

1. We agreed that I could visit him at any hour of the day to discuss affairs of interest to him, and for any explanations on my side that could help the captain to a more exact familiarity with the relations of our country and the neighbouring countries: Lithuania, Latvia, farther Estonia, and Russia.

2. Captain Yamawaki asked me to find him an appropriate secretary speaking Russian and French who would be continually at his side.

3. And a teacher of the Polish and French languages.

I spent all Sunday and Monday with Captain Yamawaki and during this time I talked with him about a range of issues of an informative nature.

I took the opportunity to try to acquaint Captain Yamawaki with a number of appropriately chosen persons, and indicated what kind of visits he should make, and where and how. Captain Yamawaki has received only general instructions from his superiors and does not have any papers of accreditation other than the official information sent from Paris about his arrival and the nature of his mission.

The visits paid by Captain Y. on Monday were: 1. to the Ministry of War, 2. to the chief of the General Staff, 3. to the deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, 4. to the head of the political department. Today, Captain Y paid visits to: 5. General Henrys, 6. the head of the English military mission, 7. the French envoy, 8. the English envoy, 9. the American envoy, 10. the Italian attaché.

Captain Yamawaki received from the chief of the General Staff permission to send ciphered dispatches. He told me that he will send them only by telegraph, not radio, which he knows is overloaded and run by the French.

On reporting the above, I have the honour to add, for your information, the following requests in connection with the situation of the representative of the Japanese military mission in Warsaw:

I kindly request:

1. Given that Japan's interests and affairs in Europe, according to the information arriving from all quarters, are closely connected with the political affairs of Germany and Russia, Japan is becoming a very important political factor for us. There is thus a need to look after the Japanese in Warsaw very attentively, in the sense of appropriately influencing and orienting their representatives. It would therefore be desirable if the Japanese Section, which is so important for us, were directly subordinated to the head of the Diplomatic Section, and removed entirely from the overall Eastern Section.

2. Appoint the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' official Mr. Sokołowski to be the official guide for Captain Yamawaki.

The tasks of the official assigned to Yamawaki will depend on the official's personal abilities to become indispensable to his charge and thereby to have proper influence over him. It is impossible to give any sort of instructions in this regard. I will only take the liberty of suggesting a general direction based on an example, namely the assumption that Japan and Germany have common interests in regard to Russia, which is very dangerous for us, [so] all occasional talks should be conducted in the proper spirit, obviously with the most objective facts and specific data possible. Thus, in discussing the recent events

in Riga,<sup>11</sup> on reading the newspaper together (I translate the newspapers daily to Yamawaki), I moved on to the history of Latvia, to the role of the Courland nobility in Russia, and while pointing out that the German nation gave Russia bureaucratic organisers, I also showed that the Polish nation had given Russia the organisation of industry. On this occasion, I mentioned the role of Polish capital invested in Russia and the still greater role of the intelligentsia, which has vitalised and developed Russian industry and agriculture. In order to make the point clearer, I recalled the well-known fact of how involved we are in the railways in Persia, explaining that we arrived there not through England or Germany, but through our economic attainments across Russia, through the Caucasus and its Polish oil, to Persia. In order to have these matters presented to him in an even more concrete fashion, I introduced him to Mr. Podgórski, director of the railways in Persia, by inviting them to dinner. I proceed similarly in every question where we could acquire a benefit, while always remaining very specific and without any humbug, because the industrious Japanese know how to check facts, I believe. I am working to persuade the Japanese [captain] to the political idea that Poland could be a factor in the balance of influence in Russia, as Poland is better and safer than Germany, and at any rate it cannot be supplanted due to the undeniable foundations of its partial economic primacy in Russia and Siberia.

As to the technical tasks of the official assigned to Yamawaki, they are:

a. He should make reports on his meetings with him to the Ministry (the head).

b. he should arrange a programme of intellectual activities of various kinds several days in advance and should follow it skilfully. Some kind of theoretical or practical excursions should be added to the programme, such as visits to the ministry or trips out of town to show him various specificities of the country (for instance, the Jewish ghetto, which interests him), and so forth.

He should plan visits and the reception of guests, new acquaintances, social outings, plan entertainment even, and so forth.

Above all, he should direct the staff of people that I have slowly managed to assign to Captain Yamawaki, namely:

1. a permanent secretary (Mr. Rychlewicz);
2. an attaché officer, assigned from quarters;
3. a Polish-language teacher;

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<sup>11</sup> This probably refers to the collapse of Latvia's pro-German government and the return to power of Prime Minister Ulmanis.

4. a French-language teacher;
5. a servant boy, when the captain receives a permanent apartment.

Persons nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 must unofficially recognise the liaison official to be their chief, and fulfil his instructions in the sense of each of these people exerting the appropriate influence, either in writing correspondence (the secretary), or paying visits (the attaché), or in teaching a language.

3. The liaison official should have a set budget in connection with his representative function and its credit requirements.

*Ignacy Kozłowski*

*AAN, KNP, 66*

## 194

*25 June 1919, letter from the Secretary General of the PNC in Paris to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs about the treaty on the rights of national minorities*

Paris, 25 June 1919

The Honourable Count Władysław Skrzyński,  
Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
in Warsaw

Dear Sir,

I have nothing special to report at present. At the moment, Paragraph 93 of the treaty, that is, "securing the rights of national minorities", is under discussion here.

It seems that privileges for the Jews will be imposed on us. These will not only fail to ameliorate the situation but will aggravate it. I am not writing with the details to you yet because nothing has crystallised yet, but Commander Berthelot's first draft is known to you. Our delegates will try to introduce a correction to Para. 93, stating that the treaties are not to be imposed but accepted by Poland, and if this change is not made, then our delegates will cause problems over the signing of the treaty with Germany by raising objections to Para. 93 and the Sejm might not ratify it.

The burning issue at this moment is the question of the eastern boundary. Today, all the Allies are again hypnotised by Russia. Ukraine is no longer being

discussed. I even have the impression that the English are going to cast off the Latvians and Estonians. I recently spoke about this with an Englishman and asked how they make their present policy, the so-called Baltic policy, accord with their weakness for a great Russia, and he answered with a smile “Il y a beaucoup de choses de changées, la perfide Albion agira, nous les lâcherons.” Attention urgently needs to be paid to Russia. Heaven forbid getting carried away by our sentiments, but we have to look truth in the face. Today, there is still time to come to an advantageous alliance with Russia; in a couple of months it could be already too late. I am very earnestly recommending this subject for your consideration as I have the impression that in Poland the feeling of hatred is gaining the upper hand; and we could pay dearly for that. I do not need to explain this to you, as you are perfectly well aware of the issue and we have the same views on it.

Moving on to the question of nominations, I would kindly like to remind you of the following candidates in connection with the coming appointment of personnel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

1) Rozet, Marcelle—very good in the administrative-manipulative division; precise, industrious, knowing the Polish language quite well, in addition to French.

2) Sergej-Szumaska, Marta—has a certificat d'études universitaires (lettres) from the Sorbonne, and an Alliance française diploma in the French language; she can type fairly fast, and could be of use to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; she desires to return to Poland, where she has family, but she appears to be without funds.

In addition to the above-mentioned persons, I would like to take the liberty of asking you specially to consider the candidature of Mr. Stefan Natanson, office head of the Press Department of the Polish National Committee, as head of the similar office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Natanson has been working for a long time in the public arena and has been of considerable service in the Polish cause. He has great familiarity with foreign relations, as well as with domestic matters, and could organise the ministry's press division very well. This is an extremely important department, and so far as I know, the ministry has not organised it yet.

With warm greetings and expressions of respect,

*Just now I received a letter from Mr. Clemenceau, of which I am sending a copy with these presents. This changes the whole matter and that is why I crossed out the beginning of my letter.*

AAN, KNP, 195

## 195

*25 June 1919, note from the representative of the PNC  
with the French government to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France  
about Eastern Galicia*

Paris, le 25 Juin 1919

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Stephen PICHON  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

Monsieur le Ministre,

En portant à la connaissance de Votre Excellence le texte des trois télégrammes reçus par le Chef de la Mission polonaise à Paris du Haut Commandement polonais, j'ai l'honneur par ordre et au nom du Gouvernement de Pologne de vous prier, Monsieur le Ministre, de vouloir bien intervenir afin que la liberté d'action dans la défense contre les bandes bolchevistes et ukrainiennes soit reconnue au Commandement en Chef polonais.

Notre Gouvernement se rend très bien compte du désir des Alliés de ne pas régler les litiges territoriaux par les armes, de même que, de ce fait que la frontière de la Galicie Orientale a été fixée par une Commission compétente de la Conférence sur la ligne de Zbrucz, c'est à dire sur la ligne frontière de l'ancienne Monarchie Austro-Hongroise. Mais il tient à constater que la nation polonaise est douloureusement émue des faits indubitables des atrocités inouïes que commettent les bandes bolchevistes des Ukrainiens sur les prisonniers de guerre, ainsi que sur la population polonaise, privée de toute défense, surtout dans les districts qui ont eu le malheur de passer à nouveau sous la domination des bolchevistes-Ukrainiens.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma haute considération.

AAN, KNP, 18

## 196

*26 June 1919, letter from the Prime Minister to the Chairman of the Peace Conference about the national minorities treaty*

Mr. Chairman,

It is my honour to confirm reception of your note of the 24<sup>th</sup> of this month, to which you kindly appended the text of the Convention that the main Allied powers are to submit to us for signing following the introduction of changes concordant with our memo of the 13<sup>th</sup> of this month.

Poland is feeling sincerely grateful for the recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the Polish state, as expressed in the above-mentioned Convention, and in the note you kindly sent to me in the name of the Supreme Council of the main Allied and united powers.

Considering that the changes planned by us in the memorandum of the 13<sup>th</sup> of this month were in large measure taken into account in Chapter I; considering that in the convention draft and the appended note, the principle of the entire sovereignty of the Polish state is solemnly recognised and proclaimed; considering that the new order of international relations provides for the intervention of the League of Nations in the internal affairs of all sovereign states, as well as all its jurisdiction in all laws of an international character, it is my honour to declare in the name of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference, our readiness to sign the proposed Convention, as submitted on the basis of §93 of the peace treaty with Germany. At the same time, I ask, in the name of justice, that you guarantee politically, for the Polish population that is to remain under the rule of Germany, the right to make use of the same rights and privileges about language and facilitations as those being awarded to the German population which, pursuant to the treaty, are going to be Polish citizens. At the same time, we ask of you, Mr. Chairman, to kindly modify the text of Art. 9 in such a way that its Section II would have the following wording:

“In towns and districts inhabited by a considerable number of Polish citizens of Jewish faith, this minority will be guaranteed a just share in the division of the sums that were to be earmarked from public or municipal funds for educational, religious or charitable ends. These sums will be used to establish, under the supervision of the Polish state, elementary schools in which the requirements that the Jewish faith entails will be properly respected and where jargon would be considered as an auxiliary language.”

As to Chapter II, I take the liberty of drawing your attention to the following points:

I. In Chapter II, delegates have reservations only about three articles. Art. 2 is drawn up in such a way that it could be understood only if there were to be three different customs zones in Poland: one severed from Austria, one from Germany, one from Russia. The Polish Delegation proposes the following change to Art. 2: "Until the Polish government sets customs tariffs, goods originating from the Allied and united powers and imported to Poland will not be subject to higher tariffs than those that were in force in Russia as of 1 January 1914."

The Polish State has already used the Russian tariffs as the basis for its provisional tariffs, thinking that it had no need to apply to goods imported from Allied states a tariff that was lower than that which was in use before the war in Allied Russia.

II. Art. 6 of this chapter states that the Vistula's navigable network would be placed under international management. Yet, the treaty with Germany doesn't mention this, despite that fact that the internationalisation of the Vistula had been planned in the commissions and sub-commissions whose task it was to draw up the text of the treaty with Germany, and then this motion had been withdrawn in such a way that the Vistula became recognised as a Polish river. This is why the Polish delegates propose that Art. 6 be removed, they insist on this for particularly important reasons.

On the basis of the application of Art. 332-337 of the peace treaty with Germany to the Vistula navigable network (including the Bug and Narew rivers), this network has been placed under the international management intended for the Elbe, the Oder, and the Danube. Meanwhile, Art. 332 provides for the equality of all flags on the waters of those rivers. If this equality were to be extended to the Vistula, the Germans would have equal title to make use of it; basing itself on this law, it could revert to its pre-war preponderance over the Polish market, to penetrate all the way to Poland's eastern areas, using affluents of the Vistula like the Narew and the Bug. Imposing in this manner on Poland what is to be imposed on Germany, Art. 6 of Chapter II of the draft treaty between Poland [sic!] on the one hand and the main Allied and united powers on the other, opens the doors of the Polish state wide open to German economic expansion. Germany would develop this expansion all the more effectively because the movement of German merchandise on the Vistula had attained significant proportions in 1914, and further, the Polish market is well known to the Germans and in this manner, all they would have to do is to resume their activities interrupted by the war. Poland will only be able to put a barrier to the expansion of German navigation companies insofar as, being the master of its river networks, it can deny Germany the facilities extended to Allied states in special conventions. Prior to the war, Polish trade with foreign countries passed through the port of Danzig. This city was the centre from



which German trade spread to the entire Baltic coast. Danzig plays the role of intermediary between Hamburg and Poland. If Germany is treated on an equal footing with other nations, one can be certain of the emergence of German navigation companies which, having based themselves in Danzig, will strive to survive by taking on Hamburg's role. By excluding German companies, it will be possible to direct the traffic of merchandise from Poland to Le Havre and Liverpool and other ports in Allied States. Total mastery of the Vistula will be the only means by which Poland will be ensured in an effective manner the freedom to conduct its economic policy independently of Germany. In its new efforts toward economic liberation, Poland is ready to grant all facilities to those states that do not have access to the sea and to conclude a special agreement with them.

Polish policy in this respect is not an anti-national policy, but a policy aimed at the defence and the protection of the most vital national interests threatened by Germany.

From a formal point of view, the internationalisation of the Vistula signifies equal rights for all flags, but if one were to take into account, on the one hand, Germany's pre-war dominance and its penetration capabilities in the economic sphere and, on the other, the exhaustion of Poland, devastated by Germany, then this formula of equality becomes a tool of economic conquest by Germany.

3. In Art. 7, the Polish delegates propose to add the words "relevant states" in the fourth section, after the words "Polish conventions", to give the above-mentioned provision the character of reciprocity.

For the above reasons, whose weight is obvious, I take the liberty of trusting that the main Allied and united powers will be willing to accept the changes laid out above.

To end, I hasten to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for expressing such cordial sentiments for the reborn Polish state. I need not assure you that Poland, which once again occupies its rightful place among independent nations, will make all efforts to fulfil the tasks history has set out for it. Standing guard eternally over the great ideals of liberty and justice, the moment it achieves the possibility of developing all its means of action, Poland will strive to contribute to the joint work of peace, civilisation, and progress.

Please accept, Mr. Chairman, assurances of my highest respect.

Paris, 26 June 1919

*E&M, doc. 10*

## 197

*26 June 1919, letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
to the PNC in Paris about American pressure in the matter  
of exporting petroleum to Germany*

WARSAW, 25 June 1919

To the National Committee in Paris

On the recommendation of Mr. Hoover, his representative in Warsaw, Colonel Grove, and the American chargé d'affaires requested of our government, given that we have conquered Borysław, to begin the export of oil to Germany in first order. Mr. Hoover's telegram, which was confidentially shared with us by the American legation, is written in an extremely urgent tone. The export of oil from Poland is, according to him, one of the necessary conditions for reviving the economic life of central Europe. Thus, the slowness of our government on this point will ensure an easier audience for the economic demands that we will make on our side. For the moment, we will respond to the chargé d'affaires' communication by saying that military movements and the necessity of rescuing the unfortunate refugees from Eastern Galicia has made it impossible for us to begin the transport of oil, but that the Polish government will eagerly fulfil Mr. Hoover's desires as soon as conditions allow it.

I thus consider that we have to expect that we will have to begin transporting oil to Germany in the near future, even if on a very modest scale, and that we will have to waive President Paderewski's prohibition, made to Mr. Wojciechowski, against rendering the Germans any sort of economic aid. Therefore, I am asking that the prime minister be informed as quickly as possible about the above issue.

For the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

AAN, KNP, 27

## 198

*26 June 1919, lecture by the legal counsel of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference about the League of Nations*

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS  
and its stance in the treaty with Germany

When the League of Nations Commission submitted its draft project of the League Covenant at the plenary meeting of the Peace Conference on 14 February, a temporary paper characterising the essence and the importance of the League and analysing the provisions of the Covenant set forth at the initial stage was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Presently, when the Covenant was adopted, with some changes, during the meeting of the Conference on 28 April and was made an integral part of the treaty with Germany, the first paper should be complemented with a presentation of the changes brought to the text on 14 February, the role that the League is playing in the treaty with Germany and in the treatment of rebuilt or newly emerged states. The present observations are devoted to this subject.

I. Work of the Commission after 14 February 1919

Proceedings with neutral [states].

The League Covenant, as per 14 February, was made public and was the subject of discussion in the press and in many social organisations. Congresses in support of the League of Nations held in Paris and London, the April congress of the Labour Party and trade unions—to mention the most important—subjected the draft covenant to criticism. This criticism was especially sharp in the press and even in the American Senate. It was also thought appropriate to seek out the opinion of the governments of neutral states; for this purpose, on 20 and 21 March, two important meetings were held with representatives of those countries. The League of Nations Commission was represented by Colonel House (United States), Lord R. Cecil (British Empire), Mr. L. Bourgeois (France), Mr. Hymans (Belgium), Mr. Venizelos (Greece) and Mr. Vesnić (Serbia). The following representatives of neutral states took part in the proceedings:

<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. M. T. d'Alvear,	envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in France;
<u>Chile:</u>	Mr. Ibanez,	" "
<u>Columbia:</u>	Mr. Carlos Arbelaez,	" "
<u>Denmark:</u>	Mr. H. A. Bernhoft,	" "

	Dr P. Munch,	minister of national defence,
	Mr. N. Neergaard,	member of the lower house;
<u>Spain:</u>	Mr. González-Hontoria,	deputy and former under-secretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
<u>Norway:</u>	Mr. Baron de Wedel Jarlsberg,	envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in France;
<u>Paraguay:</u>	Mr. A. Schoch,	chargé d'affaires in France;
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. de Stuers,	envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in France,
	Mr. Loudon,	former minister of foreign affairs,
	Assistants: Mr. Loder,	member of the Supreme Court,
	Jonkheer van Eysinga,	professor at the University of Leiden;
<u>Persia:</u>	Mr. Mostowfi ol-Mamalek,	minister of foreign affairs;
<u>Salvador:</u>	Mr. Matheu,	chargé d'affaires in France;
<u>Sweden:</u>	Count Ehrensvärd,	envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in France,
	Count Wrangel,	" " in England;
<u>Switzerland:</u>	Mr. Calonder,	trade union counsellor, chief of the political department,
	Mr. A. Frey,	deputy to the Swiss National Council,
	Mr. Max Huber,	professor at the University of Geneva,
	Mr. Rappard,	" "
<u>Venezuela:</u>	Mr. Fortoul,	envoy extraordinary.

#### Tendencies of the neutral states.

2. Some of the neutral states had previously prepared their own drafts for the statute of the League of Nations (the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland), but these were not discussed. The procedure adopted during the meetings with the neutral states was that to each articles of the Covenant the neutral states voiced their observations, [proposed] amendments, and even submitted independent motions. From these voices, one can discern some general tendencies which are common to all the neutral states.

Their greatest concern was, of course, the matter of neutrality with respect to the compulsory measures instituted by the League. Motions tended to make the participation of the states in collective war operations dependent on their

agreement; reservations were raised with regard to the obligation to allow the forces of the League to march through neutral territory, and even against the obligation to sever relations with states infringing on the League Covenant. Switzerland sought to maintain its lasting neutrality, not so much by means of amendments raised with this aim, as by means of diplomatic efforts. It would even appear that the choice of Geneva as the seat of the League was a success, which is to justify in the future the necessity for permanent Swiss neutrality.

Then the neutral states demanded to increase the number of representatives of secondary states in the League Council; to limit the competence of this Council—where the Allied powers are mainly preponderant—by the creation of a permanent Conciliation Commission whose tasks would be to pronounce itself in international disputes that are unsuited for the Court of Arbitration; to define in the Covenant the composition of the International Tribunal and to rest it on the principle of equality between great and lesser powers; etc. Generally, the delegations of the neutral countries showed a tendency toward disarmament, increasing the competence of the League and submitting international relations to real control, and, at the same time, opposition to the excessive preponderance of the great powers.

The last meetings of the Commission.

3. The League of Nations Commission also held meetings on the 22<sup>nd</sup>, 24<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> of March and on the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> of April. Prior to the 10 April meeting, the Commission received the delegation of the international associations for the equality of women—something that did not find reflection in the text of the Covenant, unless we were to connect with this event the new provision of Art. 7, Section 3, which states clearly that League positions and functions are accessible to both men and women equally.

The new version of the Covenant was submitted at the plenary meeting of the Conference on 28 February.

## CHANGES TO THE LEAGUE COVENANT

### Changes in the layout.

1. Changes affected above all the outer layout of the Covenant. Articles were grouped in a different order, a whole range of provisions was added, and they were grouped in such a way that the number of articles (26) remained unchanged. In addition, the names of countries that have been members of the League since its inception (*membres originaires*) were given, and this was followed by a list of countries to be called upon to join (neutral states) and, lastly, the name of the League's first General Secretary was given.

Finally, a change in nomenclature should be noted: The term "High Contracting Parties", used with respect to Germany, which is not a member

of the League, the term “States belonging to the League” (members of the League) was adopted.

#### Members of the League.

2. Among the changes adopted in the text, one should point out the introduction of the distinction between initial member states and states called upon to join. The manner and conditions of admission to the League remain the same, but Article 1 was given a Section 3, stipulating that each member of the League can leave it with two years’ advance notice and after fulfilling all obligations. This provision has its history and I will cover it under No. 13 (“Review of the Covenant”). Art. 16, Section 4 covered under No. 9 (“Sanctions”) should be reconciled with it; we will then have all the regulations, entirely new regulations, concerning loss of membership in the League.

There was a request (from England) to make it impossible to leave the League before 10 years had passed. When it was noted that the exodus that could ensue 10 years after the founding of the League could deprive the [organisation] of its authority, the request was withdrawn.

#### Organs of the League.

3. Almost nothing changed in the articles concerning the composition and functioning of the League’s organs. Article 4, Section 2 provides for the possibility of increasing the number of members of the Executive Council by means of a resolution passed in the Assembly by a majority of votes. Similarly, a majority in the Assembly has to confirm the nomination of the Secretary General (Article 6, Section 2).

#### Procedure.

4. In keeping with Article 5, Section 1, decisions of the Assembly and the Council are taken unanimously unless the Covenant or the treaty itself expressly states otherwise (resolution passed by majority vote are thus the exception). Another change is unfavourable: the version of 14 February stated that the representative of the country whose interests are in question has to be summoned to the Council session and only on this condition will the Council’s resolutions be binding upon that state. The final version of Article 4, Section 5 has maintained this provision, but rejected its sanction.

#### Arms limitation.

5. In Article 8, concerning arms limitation, a stipulation was added that the disarmament programme as set by the commission will be subject to review in 10 years.

### International guarantees.

6. In Article 10, a seemingly insignificant word was added: The League guarantees the inviolability of territories and the present independence of states. This seems to be the expression of a tendency to make any given change to the inter-state order subject to the will of the League.

### Arbitration.

7. Article 13 expresses a tendency that existed within the Commission from the beginning and which lay behind the version of 14 February. It held that only the peaceful settlement of international disputes, not recourse to arbitration tribunals, was compulsory. The latter was reduced, following the pattern of The Hague conventions, to legal matters, and only the parties to the dispute can decide whether the contention qualifies to be heard by the arbitration tribunal or not.

### Internal jurisdiction.

8. A very important provision was introduced in Article 15 as Section 8: "If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement."

### Sanctions.

9. Amongst the compulsory measures provided for countries that violate the Covenant, the last version provides for expulsion from the League (Article 16, Section 4). Such expulsion takes place upon a unanimous vote of all members represented in the Council, with the vote of the country concerned by the measure not being taken into account.

### Obligations not contrary to the Covenant.

10. Articles concerning the registration and proclamation of treaties, their review, and obligations contrary to the League Covenant have remained unchanged. The following Article 21 was added, however:

"Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

This provision has a highly characteristic history. President Wilson's initial views inclined him towards prohibiting all separate alliances, covenants, and unions. This would have meant that the states of America, and the United States in particular, would be treated on an equal footing with all other states. In case of a dispute between the republics of Central America or South

America, in case of a dispute between one of those republics and the United States, the League—i.e., European and Asian states—would have a say. Such an intervention is precluded by the Monroe Doctrine; it is opposed by the policy which the United States has been pursuing systematically for decades on the American continent. Thus, the Covenant of the League of Nations has caused a storm in the United States. The fate of the Covenant thus became highly uncertain. It is then that, in order to blunt the ire of the opposition, the interpretation was adopted that alliances and unions whose aim is to reinforce peace are allowable. The Monroe Doctrine was clearly named as one such partial territorial agreements, whose existence is consistent with the existence of the League of Nations and the wording of its Covenant.

#### Mandates.

11. The article concerning the administration of territories under a mandate from the League of Nations has not seen any significant changes, but is now the 22<sup>nd</sup> instead of the 19<sup>th</sup> as before.

#### International organisations.

12. Article 23 groups regulations concerning international organisations (international labour law; protection of native inhabitants; combating human trafficking and traffic in opium, war material; freedom of communications; and control of disease). Article 25 refers by name to the Red Cross as an institution placed under the special care of the League.

#### Review of the Covenant.

13. In the end, a serious change was introduced in the provision concerning the review of the Covenant. The new version states that to alter the Covenant, [there must be a] unanimous vote of all countries represented in the Council and a majority of countries represented in the Assembly. The former version required the acquiescence of three-fourths of those countries. The review of the Covenant was thus made easier. It must be noted that by making reviews easier, the authority of the changes thus introduced would be weaker. For this reason, a Section 2 was added to Article 26:

“No such amendments shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.”

#### General assessment of the changes.

14. A general assessment of the League and of its Covenant from the standpoint of Poland's interests was given in the first preliminary report, under the title “General Observations.” Nothing can be added to the observations made then, despite the passage of several months and of serious occurrences taking place, nothing needs to be changed in them. The same possibilities of



benefits remain, whether the government is able to take advantage of the League of Nations to further Polish aims; the same danger of abuse of smaller state organisms by stronger ones through the use of the League remain.

The general significance of the changes introduced to the Covenant of the League of Nations comes down in large measure to giving the League a more flexible character, to an even greater departure from the concept of a supra-state, and an evolution toward the concept of an international organisation solely of an international law character. The traditional, classic concept of international law is triumphant, based on the idea of unhindered independence externally and unrestricted state sovereignty internally. Relations between states and diplomatic methods will be subject to even lesser changes than it could have seemed on the basis of the Covenant version of 14 February.

### III. The further fate of the Covenant.

#### The meeting of 28 April.

1. In its final version, the League Covenant was debated at the plenary meeting of the Conference on 28 April. The first to speak was the president of the United States, who presented the changes introduced. Then Baron Makino (Japan) asked to be allowed to speak about Japan's famous motion concerning racial equality.

#### The Japanese motion.

2. Prior to this, at the meetings on 13 and 14 April, the Japanese delegate requested the inclusion in the Covenant of a passage ceremoniously stating that people of all origins and races will be treated the same under like circumstances, and that skin colour and so forth will not be a cause for different treatment. When these motions fell through as a result of the opposition of the United States of America, the Japanese delegate proposed, during a meeting on 11 April, that at least in the introduction to the Covenant there should be a formulation enshrining the principle of the equality of nations and the equal treatment of citizens of various countries. When this proposal was also rejected, Baron Makino spoke at the general assembly in order once again—without hope of victory—to present the Japanese viewpoint and to demand equal treatment of foreigners without regard to nationality or skin colour. The Japanese motion was not voted upon or even debated, nor were other observations voiced at the plenum of the Conference.

This behaviour by the United States' delegation and President Wilson should be seen in the light of existing or future limitation of immigration to the United States, American state legislation against Asians, and finally, the treatment of the blacks in all of North America. On 7 May, the delegate of the National Equal Rights League of the U.S., Mr. William Monroe Trotter, presented to the Conference, in the name of 14 million black citizens of the

United States, a protest against their treatment until now, against “undemocratic colour discrimination, [and] autocratic race restrictions.”

England did not take any clear stand against Japan’s request, but was undoubtedly pleased with its rejection, and may even have quietly contributed to that rejection. In light of these facts, the articles of the treaty with Germany that impose the protection of racial, denominational, and linguistic minorities on the Poles and Czechs, and the communication of a special Convention on this subject to the Polish, Romanian, Serb, and Czech delegations is telling.

#### French amendments.

3. In the name of France, Mr. L. Bourgeois once again brought forward the thrice-rejected amendments to Art. 8 and Art. 9, requesting 1) real control over the armed forces of all countries (and armaments), and 2) the creation of a special permanent military organ of the League, which would, just in case, prepare and direct the military activities of the League. This motion was not recognised and was withdrawn in the end.

#### Honduras against the United States.

4. Mr. Bonilla spoke in the name of Honduras, and in a long speech, full of courtesy to the United States and its president, declared that the Monroe Doctrine had never been formally established and thus every statesman and every president of the United States interpreted it differently. If the League Agreement were to sanctify the Monroe Doctrine, the Republic of Honduras proposes it to be stated that all American republics have the right to independence, and no one can appropriate for themselves parts of those republics’ territory, interfere in their internal affairs, or finally, detract from their national dignity by exerting pressure on them. In addition, Mr. Bonilla declared that in joining the League of Nations, Honduras reserved the right to conclude treaties and create alliances with other republics of Latin America, and even to establish a Republic of Central America.

In this manner, the Conference did not pass without a protest—courteous in form but firm—against the predominance of the United States and its strivings for hegemony on the American continent.

#### Other voices.

5. The French minister of the treasury, Mr. Klotz, submitted an elaborated plan for the financial section of the League of Nations, asking for it to be submitted to the League Council. The French minister of foreign affairs, Pichon, proposed placing the Principality of Monaco on the list of League members. This request, which was not expected by the chairman, Mr. Clemenceau, led to a brief but fairly sharp exchange between the two statesmen. The incident passed unnoticed; the motion was sent to the League Council. If it were to pass,

it would essentially give France one more vote, against which the least entitled to protest would be England, which has six votes in the League Assembly.

Finally, the protest by Mr. Costa (Portugal) against allowing the representatives of a country that is not yet a member of the League (Spain) into the League Council went unrecognised.

#### First Measures.

6. The draft Covenant was unanimously adopted. At the same time, a supplement was adopted listing the original members of the League (the Allied and associated countries) and the countries invited to join (neutral), and naming the first Secretary General of the League: an Englishman, the Hon. Sir James Eric Drummond, K.C.M.B., C.B.

In accordance with a Commission resolution, the League is to be based in Geneva.

Finally, at the request of the Commission, an Organisational Committee was chosen under the chairmanship of Mr. Pichon. Its tasks are to:

- prepare detailed plans for the League's organisation;
- prepare proposals about locating the League headquarters in Geneva;
- prepare a programme for the agenda of the first Assembly of the League.

These directives and the best position for the government to take with regard to the organisation of the Secretariat and the upcoming work of the League were the object of two memoranda submitted by the undersigned Secretariat of the Delegation in Paris, and of a proposal by the general secretary of the Delegation, Mr. Kozicki.

### IV. THE POSITION OF GERMANY

#### General features.

1. As the League Covenant was inseparably attached to the treaty, Germany had to take a position with regard to it. In the text of the German counter-proposal ("Bemerkungen der deutschen Delegation zu den Friedensbedingungen," Part II, Vol. 1), we find important remarks concerning the League Covenant.

Recently, two drafts of the League of Nations Covenant were made in Germany: one by Mr. M. Erzberger, the other by the German society the Rights of Nations. In May of this year, the German delegation sent a third draft to the Conference, but until now it has not been communicated to the various delegations.

As to the League Covenant contained in the treaty, the German delegation announced its readiness to come to an arrangement, with the reservation that immediately after signing Germany would join the League on equal terms with all

other countries. As their main condition, the Germans demand that a provision be added to the Covenant to guarantee equal rights to all members of the League and treatment in economic matters based on reciprocity. The article proposed by the German Delegation places the principle of treating the citizens of countries that belong to the League as its own subjects (*régime national*) with regard to trade, industry, and agriculture in the first paragraph. Paragraph 2 demands that the governments of those countries undertake not to support, even indirectly, a boycott of goods or an economic battle with the industry of another country. Germany further demands freedom of transit and a world trade agreement.

The aim of these proposals is clear. When the Allies have reserved for themselves complete freedom in their treatment of foreigners, when countries destroyed by the war have received—at least to some degree—more advantageous economic conditions, and when various perfectly justified burdens have been imposed on Germany to equalise, at least in part, economic differences created by German war policy—at this moment, Germany wants to eliminate all settlements and demands equality and freedom, which would essentially be an incredible privileging of Germany.

The delegation agrees to eliminate obligatory military service on the condition that other countries proceed similarly, and to decrease the army to 100,000 men on the condition that Germany be granted a “transition period,” and that no particular arms-control measures will be adopted toward Germany.

In the conclusion, there is the now famous phrase about how only acceptance of the German conditions will make the present war really the last one, while rejecting them will naturally lead to a new war.

If one takes into consideration that the entirety of the German counterproposals, while referring constantly to President Wilson’s doctrine, are in very clear contradiction with the principles of the League of Nations—if only in the matter of Poland—then it seems there is no need to change the general characterisation of Germany’s attitude to the League outlined in the first report.

At the same time, Germany’s position gives a measure of what the League of Nations could become, what dangers are concealed within it, and how various political agents will want to make use of it for their own ends.

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## V. THE ROLE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN APPLYING THE TREATY

Part I of the peace treaty, containing the League of Nations Covenant, formulates the organisation principles of the League, naturally in a very general

manner and merely as a skeleton of what the League is supposed to be and could be in the future. In this regard, it is extremely interesting and important for a precise understanding of the League to investigate to what degree the draft of the treaty with Germany takes into consideration the existence of the League, what role it designates to the League, and whether it expresses any confidence in the League.

The remarks below attempt to answer these questions.

The Main Allied Powers and the League of Nations.

1. It might appear that the coalition could proceed in an organised fashion only as either the total of Allied and associated countries or as the League of Nations. However, there is a group of states that play a much larger role than all the other countries of the Coalition together, and a larger one than the League of Nations. This is the group of five main powers of the Allied and associated countries. Even in the introduction to the treaty they occupy a separate, leading place, in alphabetical order; only after them, in a different paragraph, come all the other countries of the Coalition, also in alphabetical order: “constituant,” as the introduction says, “avec [les] Principales Puissances ci-dessus, les Puissances alliées et associées.” A close reading of the draft of the treaty with Germany shows that the role designated for the League of Nations is much more modest than that allotted to the group of five main powers of the Coalition.

The role of the five main powers.

2. Leaving aside for the moment an explanation of the internal significance of this phenomenon, let us try to group, in a purely external order, in accordance with the treaty’s chapters and articles, those cases in which the group of five main Allied powers is to be involved:

Territorial and political matters.

The international commission that will designate on location the new boundary line between Belgium and Germany will be composed of five representatives of the main powers, one Belgian, and one German (Art. 35).

Luxembourg’s participation in the economic and communications benefits guaranteed to the Coalition countries by the peace treaty depends on the five main powers (Art. 41). The director of the Strasbourg-Kehl port will be appointed by the five main powers (Art. 65). Those powers will determine the boundaries of Austria, the Czechoslovak state, and Poland (Art. 81)—only with regard to the latter two is participation reserved to other interested countries; a convention is to be concluded with these main powers guaranteeing the rights of national and denominational minorities in Poland and the Czechoslovak state (Arts. 86 and 93); the commission designating on location the Polish-German

boundary is to be composed of five representatives of the main powers, one Pole, and one German (Art. 88). The International Commission for East Prussia (Art. 95) and four districts (*powiat*) on the right bank of the Vistula (Art. 97) are to be composed exclusively of representatives of the main powers, which after the plebiscite will also determine the Polish-German boundary in those lands. Germany is relinquishing the territory beyond the Neman on behalf of the five main powers (Art. 99). The boundary of the perimeter of the Free City of Danzig will be determined on location by a commission composed of three members appointed by the main powers, one Pole, and one German (Art. 101).

A Chief Commissioner for Danzig will be appointed by the main powers (Art. 101), thus his importance should be evaluated from this angle, even though he is being given the title of League of Nations Commissioner. The main powers will determine the text of the Polish-Danzig convention (Art. 101) and will manage the public assets of Germany within the circumference of the Free City of Danzig (Art. 107). The International Commission on Schleswig will be composed in the majority, or even exclusively, of members named by the main powers (Art. 109). Similarly, the Commission that will determine on location, after the plebiscite, the German-Danish border will be composed of five representatives of the main powers, one Dane, and one German (Art. 110). Before the demarcation is accomplished, the border will be generally set by the main powers and Germany will relinquish the territories situated to the north of the new border, on behalf of the main powers, who will turn them over to Denmark (Art. 111). The destruction of the fortifications of Heligoland will be done under the control of the main powers (Art. 115). Finally, Germany relinquishes on behalf of the main powers all its overseas possessions, titles, and rights, and agrees to the manner in which the main powers will dispose of them (Art. 118 and Art. 119).

#### 6. Military affairs.

The main powers will determine the number of minesweepers left to the Germans (Art. 182); they will take away part of Germany's military ships, including those located in neutral ports, and they will supervise the destruction of the remainder (Arts. 184, 185, and 186); they will take away German submarines (Art. 188); they will set forth type of armaments on German ships (Art. 192), and will indicate the places the Germans are to clear of mines (Art. 193). They will receive from Germany all their hydrographic information concerning the Baltic (Art. 195) and will assume control of Germany's three main radiographic stations (Art. 197). All German airplane material is to be turned over to the main powers (Art. 202). In general, supervision over the implementation of all the military, maritime, and airplane provisions is in the

hands of the main powers, which are creating for this purpose various special coalition commissions (interalliée; Art. 203, 204, 208, 209, and 210).

c) Various.

The tribunal that is to try Wilhelm will be composed of representatives of the five main powers (Art. 227).

The method of paying damages is defined by the main powers (Art. 235). The Commission on Damages will be composed of five representatives of the main powers, one Belgian, and one Serb; however, as no more than five members will be allowed to sit on it, the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy will always have seats, and the representatives of Belgium and Serbia will only take part in the commission's decisions if Japan's representative is not taking part (Supplement II, page 103, §2 et seq.).

Germany is to give up a number of cables and all rights and titles to them on behalf of the main powers (Supplement VII, p. 116).

Germany will give its reserves of gold to the main powers (Art. 259). Finally, the main powers will designate the time during which the Germany military will be withdrawn from Lithuania and the Baltic countries (Art. 433).

The Role of the League of Nations

3. In this same manner, following the order of the treaty, the cases in which the League of Nations has a role to play can be set forth.

a) Territorial and political affairs.

After the opinion of the inhabitants of the districts of Eupen and Malmédy has been sought, the League of Nations, having been informed by the Belgian government of the result, will decide whether these districts are to belong to Belgium or to Germany (Art. 34). The commission on location that is to set the border of the Saar region will be composed of one Frenchman, one German, and three other members appointed by the League Council (Art. 48). Germany relinquishes the right to govern this region on behalf of the League (Art. 49), which will manage it through a Managing Commission composed of five members; the members of this commission are to be appointed by the League Council for a year (supplement §16). The Council will set forth the manner in which, after 15 years have passed, the population of the region are to express their desires as to their future (§34), and will decide the fate of the region on the basis of the population's desires; moreover, should the people wish it, Germany is to relinquish its rights of authority over the Saar region to the League. If the Saar region returns to Germany, the League Council will regulate the coal question (§37). Austria can renounce its independence only with the agreement of the League Council (Art. 80). The text of the Polish-German convention will be established in case of need by the League

Council (Art. 98). The Free City of Danzig and its constitution are under the protection and guarantee of the League (Arts. 102 and 103). Finally, Art. 22 contains a general provision about the colonies and territories that have ceased to be under the authority that formerly ruled over them; however, there is not a word on this question in the relevant articles of the treaty itself; article 257 (Germany's debts) only touches on it indirectly.

b) Military affairs.

Art. 213 contains only a general provision that Germany will submit to all investigations ordered by the League of Nations.

c) Various.

Art. 280: The Council League can extend the period in which Germany is charged with certain customs obligations and the obligation to treat the ships of Coalition countries and their citizens in a specific manner.

Should no agreement be attained, the League of Nations will consider whether the pre-war treaty, whose renewal is requested by one of the Allied countries, does not contradict the peace treaty (art. 289).

In a specific situation, the League Council can appoint the chairman of the Court of Arbitration in the matter of debts, assets, contracts, and industrial property (Art. 304).

d) Communications.

Against a coastal state that does not want to perform the necessary work to allow ships to navigate on an international river, it is possible to appeal to an institution established for this purpose by the League (Art. 336). The case is similar if the work undertaken by the coastal state hampers navigation (Art. 337). A general convention on international rivers is to be drawn up and confirmed by the League (Art. 338). On the request of one of the coastal states, the Neman could be subject to an international commission composed of one representative of each of the coastal states and three others appointed by the League (Art. 342).

The costs of building the Rhine-Danube water route will be divided between the interested countries by a tribunal appointed by the League Council (Art. 353). The League of Nations has a certain voice in the question of railways, whose construction is being demanded of Germany by one of the Allied and associated countries (Art. 373). The League of Nations defines the manner of settling quarrels ensuing from the regulations on communications; it can arrange a review of these provisions and lengthen the period in which Germany is not entitled to reciprocity (Art. 376-8). Germany binds itself to join the convention on communications affairs after five years have passed from the entry into force of the treaty, with the agreement of the League



(Art. 379). In case of violation of the provisions concerning the Kiel Canal, the interested country can appeal to the League (Art. 386).

e) International labour legislation.

Every country belonging to the League belongs thereby to the international labour organisation (Art. 387). Its conferences will take place in the League headquarters (Art. 391); the international Labour Office is one of the organs of the League (Art. 392) and in general the entire thing has been envisaged as an institution most tightly connected with the League.

The role of the remaining countries of the coalition.

4. To obtain a complete picture of the situation, the role of the remaining countries of the coalition should be examined as well. This question is best illustrated by a sharp exchange at the second sitting of the conference on 25 January 1919. The chairman announced to the conference that the decision had been made that each commission would be composed of two representatives of each of the five main powers and five representatives of the remaining 17 countries of the coalition. Numerous delegates protested against this "decision." The Brazilian delegate spoke the most firmly. "It is with astonishment that I am continually hearing that this or that has been decided. Who made this decision? We are a sovereign assembly; the organ entitled to express our decisions is the conference itself." The chairman, M. Clemenceau spoke then and declared with an equally sharp manner: "Yes, we decided in the matter of the commissions; as we decided to call the present Conference; and as we decided to invite the representatives of interested nations. I make no secret of it. A Conference of the Great Powers is being held in an adjoining room. The Five Great Powers whose action it is desired should be justified before you today, are in a position to furnish that justification. A few moments ago, the prime minister of Great Britain reminded me that the day the war came to a close, the principal Allies had 12 million soldiers fighting on the fields of battle. That is a title. We have lost, killed and wounded, millions, and if we had not had present to our minds the great question of the League of Nations, we might have been selfishly led to consult ourselves alone. Who can say that we should not have been justified? Such was not our wish. We called together the entire assembly of the interested nations."

Thus, the doctrine of the peace conference is that the five great powers of the Coalition have an interest in everything connected with world politics and feel responsible for the new arrangement of relations, doubtless because they will bear the chief burden of maintaining this arrangement and keeping the peace, once established, against all transgressions. The name of this group is thus "the powers with general interests" (*puissances à intérêts généraux*).

The remaining countries have a voice in so far as their interests come directly into play: these are the powers with limited interests (*puissances à intérêts limités, particuliers*).

This same view found expression in the organisation of the League of Nations, where in the Executive Council and the Secretariat the Main Coalition Powers are numerically dominant. Art. 3 of the first draft of the League of Nations Covenant contained the following provision:

“Representatives of countries that have joined the League and are directly interested in affairs within the sphere of the League’s activities will gather as an Executive Committee as often as it is considered necessary.”

The United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan will be considered directly interested in all matters within the sphere of the League’s activities. Those powers whose interests are directly concerned will also be invited.”

This article was not retained in later editing. But the decisive influence of the main powers in the League of Nations remained.

An attempt at explanation.

5. It seems that the very concept of the League of Nations has undergone a certain breakdown in the course of work on its statute and on the treaty. The change has gone in the direction desired by America, according to which the League is to be a voluntary, as non-binding as possible, universal union for the peaceful settlement of disputes, not much differing in essence from a universal postal union, for example. Political questions have been almost entirely eliminated, and as one is led to expect from the open letter by the statesman Elihu Root—a former secretary of state under President Roosevelt and one of the most outstanding experts in international law—America will stress this stance even more strongly upon the treaty’s ratification.

As the matter is presented in the treaty, the League is to have a voice: 1) in matters of an outstandingly legal nature; 2) in matters calculated to last a long time and which are also susceptible to legal formulation; and finally, 3) where the party directly interested is one of the main powers. It is not the League but the group of main powers which has a voice in all matters of a political nature: the setting of boundaries, the regulation of relations between countries and nations, questions of armaments and the army, navy, and air forces, and so forth. All these matters are of an urgent nature; they have to be settled in the nearest future.

The League aside, there is the continued alliance of five main powers, which are bound by their joint obligation to guarantee the world order that has been created.

Finally, the countries with limited interests are present their interests are directly at stake and are not of an outstandingly political nature and involve, economic matters, damages, and so forth.

Polish affairs in connection with the League of Nations and the group of Main Coalition Powers will be the subject of a separate presentation.

B. Winiarski

Paris, 25 June 1919

AAN, MSZ, 1480

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*26 June 1919, letter from the Head of the Polish Military Mission in Paris to the Chief of State about the policy of the Entente toward Poland and the prospects of cooperation with the Czechs*

Paris, 26 June 1919

Dear Commandant,

In addition to today's report, I feel obliged to mention, confidentially, that the English are actually trying to increase the difficulties of a common allied action through Danzig, but at the same time, they are very interested in the local conditions there and the state of German defence works. It should be suspected that they might want to discourage the Allies from that joint action, but that they would themselves quite willingly settle in Danzig at little cost. They do not at all hide that they want to keep all the Baltic ports to the north of Danzig in their possession and thus to have a direct monopoly on trade relations with Russia. They would like to liquidate Murmansk and the rather too distant route through the Black Sea at once, and that is why they are very desirous of freeing themselves from further subvention and support for Denikin's group.

The Polish cause is of less concern to them at the moment than preparing for future trade with, and exploitation of, Russia.

France, on the other hand, officially desires to support us effectively and cannot permit any significant weakening of Poland by Germany. Given the complications of transport through Danzig and the local difficulties of landing larger units, and with the rather excessive dependence on the English fleet, in my opinion, gathering large forces in Czechoslovakia by the eastern land route

is the only means, in the not too distant future, of bringing about a decisive military action by friendly allied spheres, and in close and direct contact with our own army. The potential action of these forces through Wroclaw or below that city, would take a large part of the German army in Upper Silesia between two fires, would seriously threaten them with being cut off and complete destruction, and would ensure us the easiest swift occupation of those areas that are so important to Poland.

I have already had the opportunity to convince myself here that it is not realistic to count seriously on any great help or cooperation from the Czech side. Here people were deceived by the appearances of the Czech forces, but the rapid breakdown of those units in Slovakia opened everyone's eyes to the real combat value of this army. Without serious allied aid, for which I am continually clamouring, it would not thus be possible to think of an action in the direction I just indicated.

I am taking the liberty of sending this information straight to your hands, as I am certain of your complete entire understanding of the importance of such an enterprise. I cannot fail to mention that army circles here, which are very favourably inclined toward us, would already like to see the most intense use of French expertise for supplementing the schooling of our staff, officers, and all cadres, as the awareness that a serious conflict between the Poles and the Germans might be unavoidable is becoming increasingly widespread.

I do not know if you would consider it proper for me to come briefly to Warsaw at the right moment and speak personally on these delicate matters and on important organisational questions. I do not doubt that it would still be possible now greatly to strengthen our own forces by certain organisational changes and to prepare surprises for the enemy—of a kind they are not presently expecting from us, and by which we could attack them quite advantageously.

It might also be possible to take advantage of the present strong inclination of many Americans and Canadians, who would like to fight in our ranks against the Germans, by creating a volunteer legion out of them, as they will certainly fight well. With the influence and example of the younger officers, particularly the American ones, in regard to the attitude of an officer to a soldier and vice versa, it could be exceptionally beneficial to us in the future as well.

Being always ready to serve, for the sake of the affair itself, without any personal interest, I have tried to fulfil my duties here as well as I could, and for as long as the country's interest requires it I will be ready to incur all the burdens attached to the present post. Please thus make use of me in accord with your needs and as you see fit, but if serious complications were to arise and more difficult conditions were temporarily to make my presence necessary

at the front, I would like to be able to fulfil my military duty within Poland itself for the time and not to remain a spectator abroad at the moment of a battle deciding our fate.

Most respectfully and obediently yours,  
T. ROZWADOWSKI

*IJPA, Archiwum Michała Mościckiego, 75/6*

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### *28 June 1919, report of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference in the matter of the minorities treaty*

#### REPORT OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE POLISH DELEGATION ABOUT STEPS TAKEN IN THE MATTER OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE FIVE GREAT POWERS AND POLAND From 22 May to the 28 June

22 May—On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of May, the General Secretariat of the Peace Conference transmitted to the General Secretariat of the Polish Delegation, along with a letter (Enclosure 1), five copies of the draft Convention between Poland and the five great powers on the matter of the protection of national minority rights in Poland (Enclosure 2).

The draft of the Convention has been drawn up by the special commission “des Nouveaux Etats”, which was made up of Mssrs. Berthelot (France), Miller (United States), Headlam-Morley (England) and De Martino (Italy).

Presenting the draft of the Convention was entrusted to Mr. B. Wasiutyński, a Political Section official at the Polish National Committee.

24 May—Mr. Wasiutyński prepared the presentation for the Council meeting

The minutes of the meeting of 24 May read as follows:

“Mr. Wasiutyński read out the draft of the response of the Polish Delegates to the draft text of the treaty between the five great powers and Poland on the matter of national minorities in Poland, sent by the Secretariat of the Conference. A discussion was held about this draft, and it was decided that Mr. Wasiutyński would amend the draft in keeping with the indications made during the meeting.”

28 May—This matter was addressed again during the following Council meeting. The minutes of the meeting about this read as follows:

“Mr. Wasiutyński read out the draft of a note containing comments about the draft of the treaty between Poland and the great powers on the matter of the protection of minority rights in Poland. The draft presented by Mr. Wasiutyński was adopted in principle, with the recommendation that the comments made during the meeting be taken into account during the final drafting”.

31 May—On the 31<sup>st</sup> of May, a plenary meeting of the Conference took place at Quai d’Orsay, during which the contents of the treaty with Austria was communicated to the Delegates. During this meeting, a discussion broke out about the protection of national minorities in “new states”.

On this occasion, President Paderewski made a declaration in the name of the Polish Delegates (Enclosure 3).

15 June—The draft of the response drawn up by Mr. Wasiutyński lay at the Secretariat of the Delegation until 15 June, when the delegates decided to transmit their reply to the draft Convention.

On this day, a meeting of the Delegates took place, during which it was decided to bring changes to this draft.

16 June—The following day, on 16 June, the reply of the Polish Delegation was submitted to the Secretariat of the Conference (Enclosure 4).

22 June—The Polish Delegation received an amended draft of the Convention by a letter dated 22 June (Enclosure 5).

Work began on the response to the new, second version of the draft.

24 June—Before this response was sent, President Paderewski received a letter from Clemenceau and the third, final draft of the Convention (Enclosures 6, 7).

26 June—The Secretariat of the Delegation provided the president with a draft of the response at noon on 26 June.

The response, in the form of a letter, was sent to Clemenceau from the presidential chancellery at noon of 26 June (Enclosure 8).

28 June—The Polish Delegates signed the Convention in Versailles on 28 June along with the treaty with Germany (Enclosure 9).

*AAN, KNP, 1354*

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAN	– Archiwum Akt Nowych [Central Archives of Modern Records]
CAW	– Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe [Central Military Archives]
CB	– Companion of The Most Honourable Order of the Bath
CC	– Central Committee
CNP	– Comité national polonais
CSS	– Confederate States Ship
DC	– District of Columbia
E&M	– Ekspertyzy i materiały delegacji polskiej na konferencję wersalską [Expertise and materials of the Polish delegation to the Versailles conference]
FO	– Foreign Office
HMS	– His Majesty's Ship
IJPA	– Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego w Ameryce [Józef Piłsudski Institute of America]
JCA	– Jewish Colonisation Association
KCMB	– Knight Commander of the Order of Saint Michael and Saint George
KNP	– Komitet Narodowy Polski [Polish National Committee]
MFA	– Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSZ	– Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
PAN	– Polska Akademia Nauk [Polish Academy of Sciences]
PAU	– Polska Akademia Umiejętności [Polish Academy of Learning]
PDD	– Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne [Polish Diplomatic Documents]
PLC	– Polish Liquidation Commission
PMO	– Polish Military Organisation
PNC	– Polish National Committee
POW	– Polska Organizacja Wojskowa [Polish Military Organisation]
pp	– per procura
PPS	– Polska Partia Socjalistyczna [Polish Socialist Party]
ROSTA	– Rossiyskoye telegrafnoye agentstvo
RSFSR	– Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SDKPiL	– Socjaldemokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy [Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania]
UPR	– Ukrainian People's Republic
VcheKa	– Vserossiyskaya chrezvychaynaya komissiya po bor'be s kontrrevolyutsiyei i sabotazhem





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ISBN 978-83-64895-89-0



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