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<dc:title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The Importance of the Zapad 2017 Exercises]]></dc:title>
<dc:title xml:lang="pl"><![CDATA[The Importance of the Zapad 2017 Exercises]]></dc:title>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dyner, Anna Maria.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:subject xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Russian Federation]]></dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Belarus]]></dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Military manoeuvres]]></dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Military cooperation]]></dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Power projection]]></dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="pl"><![CDATA[Federacja Rosyjska]]></dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="pl"><![CDATA[Białoruś]]></dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="pl"><![CDATA[manewry wojskowe]]></dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="pl"><![CDATA[współpraca wojskowa]]></dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="pl"><![CDATA[pokaz siły]]></dc:subject>
<dc:description xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Warsaw]]></dc:description>
<dc:description xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The Zapad 2017 Russian military exercises were just one element of an extensive plan to checking its armed forces’ combat readiness. At the same time, the exercises were used to test the experience gained by the Russian army in combat operations in Ukraine and Syria, and to practise full-scale conventional conflict. The manoeuvres proved that, according to the strategic documents of Russia and Belarus (including the Treaty on the Union State of Russia and Belarus), the Belarusian army would, in the event of war, become a de facto part of the Russian military.]]></dc:description>
<dc:description xml:lang="pl"><![CDATA[Warsaw]]></dc:description>
<dc:description xml:lang="pl"><![CDATA[The Zapad 2017 Russian military exercises were just one element of an extensive plan to checking its armed forces’ combat readiness. At the same time, the exercises were used to test the experience gained by the Russian army in combat operations in Ukraine and Syria, and to practise full-scale conventional conflict. The manoeuvres proved that, according to the strategic documents of Russia and Belarus (including the Treaty on the Union State of Russia and Belarus), the Belarusian army would, in the event of war, become a de facto part of the Russian military.]]></dc:description>
<dc:publisher><![CDATA[The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)]]></dc:publisher>
<dc:date><![CDATA[2017.09.21]]></dc:date>
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<dc:format xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[427 KB]]></dc:format>
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<dc:identifier><![CDATA[http://digit.pism.pl/Content/6084/Bulletin%20PISM%20no%2086%20(1026)%2021%20September%202017.pdf]]></dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier><![CDATA[https://digit.pism.pl/dlibra/publication/6268/edition/6084/content]]></dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier><![CDATA[oai:digit.pism.pl:6084]]></dc:identifier>
<dc:source xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Library of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)]]></dc:source>
<dc:source xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[PISM Bulletin no. 86 (1026), 2017]]></dc:source>
<dc:source xml:lang="pl"><![CDATA[Library of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)]]></dc:source>
<dc:source xml:lang="pl"><![CDATA[PISM Bulletin no. 86 (1026), 2017]]></dc:source>
<dc:language><![CDATA[eng]]></dc:language>
<dc:relation><![CDATA[Biuletyn PISM nr 86 (1528), 2017]]></dc:relation>
<dc:relation><![CDATA[oai:digit.pism.pl:publication:6268]]></dc:relation>
<dc:rights xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)]]></dc:rights>
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